Judicial Review

Jabotinsky v. Weizmann

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 65/51
Date Decided: 
Saturday, July 21, 1951
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The High Court will not issue an order of mandamus against the President of the State directing him as to the method of carrying out his duties under section 9 of the Law of Transition, 1949. Such a matter is not justiciable.

               

By section 11(d) of the above-mentioned Law "The Government which receives a vote of no-confidence from the Knesset, or which has decided to resign, shall immediately tender its resignation to the President of the State, but it shall continue to exercise its functions pending the constitution of a new Government in accordance with the provisions of this Law." Section 9 provides that "after consultation with representatives of the party groups in the Knesset, the President of the State shall entrust a member of the Knesset with the task of forming a Government." The Government having resigned on February 14, 1951, following upon a vote of no confidence, the President held consultations with the representatives of the parties and entrusted the Prime Minister with the task of forming a new government. When the latter declined to do so, the President notified the Speaker of the Knesset that as a result thereof and of the consultations he had held, he had reached the conclusion that pursuant to section 11(d) of the Law of Transition the Government which had resigned must remain in office until the formation of a new Government after general elections.

 

The petitioners, members of the Knesset, contended that under section 9 it was the duty of the President, once one member had declined to accept the task of forming a new government, to entrust it to any other of the remaining 119 members of the Knesset, before concluding that it was necessary to hold general elections. They applied for an order of mandamus.

               

Held: The President although in a sense the highest public officer in the State, is not semble a "public officer" for the purposes of that part of section 7 of the Courts Ordinance, 19401), which empowers the Supreme Court. sitting as a High Court of Justice to give orders to public officers in connection with the execution of their duties. Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 43 of the Palestine Order in Council, 19222), "to hear... matters necessary to be decided for the administration of justice", is wider than that conferred by section 7, it does not extend to the subject of the petition, which raises a matter that is not amenable to judicial determination and decision, but is one affecting the executive and political, and not the ministerial, powers of the President.

 

Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. Attorney-General of the United States (71 S. Ct. 673) referred to.

               

The Attorney-General appeared at the hearing of the petition to object to the issue of the order nisi by virtue of his powers under section 6 of the Law of Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1934, which gives him the right to intervene in any matter pending before "any civil or criminal court" if it appears to him that the rights of the Government of Israel are involved or that it is necessary to do so in the public interest.

               

Held, overruling an objection to his appearance, that the High Court is a "civil court" within the meaning of section 6, and that rule 4 of the High Court Rules, 1947, which provides that an application for an order nisi will be heard ex parte, does not bind the court to hear the application in the presence of the petitioners alone. The very nature of the petition justified the intervention of the Attorney-General at the present stage in the proceedings.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

H.C.J  65/51

 

 

JABOTINSKY AND KOOK

v.

WEIZMANN

 

 

 

In the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

[July 20, 1951]

Before: Smoira P., Dunkelblum J., Cheshin J., Agranat J., and Silberg J.

 

 

 

            Administration of Justice - Limits of judicial power - Failure by President of State to perform statutory duty as to formation of new Government - Not justiciable - Mandamus - Application for order nisi - Intervension by Attorney-General.

           

                The High Court will not issue an order of mandamus against the President of the State directing him as to the method of carrying out his duties under section 9 of the Law of Transition, 1949. Such a matter is not justiciable.

               

                By section 11(d) of the above-mentioned Law "The Government which receives a vote of no-confidence from the Knesset, or which has decided to resign, shall immediately tender its resignation to the President of the State, but it shall continue to exercise its functions pending the constitution of a new Government in accordance with the provisions of this Law." Section 9 provides that "after consultation with representatives of the party groups in the Knesset, the President of the State shall entrust a member of the Knesset with the task of forming a Government." The Government having resigned on February 14, 1951, following upon a vote of no confidence, the President held consultations with the representatives of the parties and entrusted the Prime Minister with the task of forming a new government. When the latter declined to do so, the President notified the Speaker of the Knesset that as a result thereof and of the consultations he had held, he had reached the conclusion that pursuant to section 11(d) of the Law of Transition the Government which had resigned must remain in office until the formation of a new Government after general elections.

 

                The petitioners, members of the Knesset, contended that under section 9 it was the duty of the President, once one member had declined to accept the task of forming a new government, to entrust it to any other of the remaining 119 members of the Knesset, before concluding that it was necessary to hold general elections. They applied for an order of mandamus.

               

                Held: The President although in a sense the highest public officer in the State, is not semble a "public officer" for the purposes of that part of section 7 of the Courts Ordinance, 19401), which empowers the Supreme Court. sitting as a High Court of Justice to give orders to public officers in connection with the execution of their duties. Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 43 of the Palestine Order in Council, 19222), "to hear... matters necessary to be decided for the administration of justice", is wider than that conferred by section 7, it does not extend to the subject of the petition, which raises a matter that is not amenable to judicial determination and decision, but is one affecting the executive and political, and not the ministerial, powers of the President.

 

                Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. Attorney-General of the United States (71 S. Ct. 673) referred to.

               

                The Attorney-General appeared at the hearing of the petition to object to the issue of the order nisi by virtue of his powers under section 6 of the Law of Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1934, which gives him the right to intervene in any matter pending before "any civil or criminal court" if it appears to him that the rights of the Government of Israel are involved or that it is necessary to do so in the public interest.

               

                Held, overruling an objection to his appearance, that the High Court is a "civil court" within the meaning of section 6, and that rule 4 of the High Court Rules, 1947, which provides that an application for an order nisi will be heard ex parte, does not bind the court to hear the application in the presence of the petitioners alone. The very nature of the petition justified the intervention of the Attorney-General at the present stage in the proceedings.

 

English case referred to:

(1)        The Parlement Belge; (1879-80), 5 P.D. 197.

 

American cases referred to:

(2)        U.S. v. Aaron Burr; (1807), Robertson's Rep., I, 121.

(3)        Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court; 52 S. Ct. 103.

(4)        Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 ect. v. Wisconsin E. R. Board; 62 S. Ct. 820.

(5)        Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American National Bank; 57 S.Ct. 85.

(6)   Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Attorney-General of the United States; 71 S. Ct. 673.

(7)        Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth; 57 S. Ct. 461.

(8)        David Muskrat v. United States; 1911, 31 S. Ct. 250.

(9)        Mississippi v. Johnson; (1867), 4 Wall. 475, L. ed. 437.

(10)      McCulloch v. Maryland; (1819), 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.

 

S. Fishelev for the first petitioner.

R. Nohimovsky for the second petitioner.

H. H. Cohn, Attorney-General (with Naomi Salomon) intervening.

 

SMOIRA P., giving the judgment of the court.

 

            This is an application for an order nisi against the President of the State, requiring him to appear and show cause why he should not call upon a member of the First Knesset1) to form a new government and, if he fail, why one member after another should not be called upon until one of them finally succeeds in constituting a government which will enjoy the confidence of the Knesset. The petition is based upon an expression of no-confidence by the Knesset on February 14, 1951, in the government headed by Mr. Ben-Gurion, and upon the submission to the President of the government's resignation on the same day.

            The following facts are set out in the petition.

           

            The Prime Minister submitted the resignation of the government to the President on February 14, 1951, and on February 18 and 19, 1951, the President held consultations with the representatives of the various parties in the Knesset. On February 21, 1951, the Prime Minister visited the President and on February 25, 1951, the President sent a letter to the Prime Minister which concluded as follows:

           

            "...I have decided, before invoking the final remedy - the remedy of elections - to request you to make a further effort to reach a stable and satisfactory solution, within the framework of the present Knesset, and to form a new government which will enjoy the support of the majority of its members.

           

            I know that this will not be easy to achieve in the present situation, but I am convinced that it is my duty to request it of you.

           

            I would ask you to inform the other parties with whom you will consult of my request, and to convey to them my hope that they will cooperate with you so that a stable and satisfactory arrangement may be reached. I pray that you may succeed."

 

            The Prime Minister, in his reply to the President's letter of February 27, 1951, wrote:

           

            "If, Mr. President, you see any prospect of the formation of a government which will enjoy the confidence of a majority of the Knesset, it is for you to approach the representatives of any of the parties which voted against the present government. If any one of them succeed in forming a government, I shall gladly hand over my office to him with my sincere good wishes for success in his task.

           

            If this should not be possible and the majority of Mapam Herut. the United Religious Front, the Communists and the General Zionists1) who voted against the government, are unable to form a government, even for a period of transition, then section 11(d) of the Law of Transition, 1949, will come into operation. This obliges the present government, of which I have the honor to be the head, to remain in office until the formation of a new government, after elections."

 

            On March 5, 1951, the President sent a note to Mr. Yosef Sprinzak, the Speaker of the Knesset, in which he wrote, inter alia : -

           

            "After reading the reply of Mr. Ben-Gurion and as a result of the consultations with representatives of the parties in the Knesset, I have reached the conclusion that the government which resigned should remain in office in accordance with the Law of Transition until the formation of a new government after the elections."

 

            On March 21, 1951, the petitioners requested an interview with the President. They were informed that his state of health did not permit him to receive them and on March 28, 1951, the petitioner, Eri Jabotinsky, sent a letter to the President's private secretary in these terms: -

           

            "We wished to try and convince the President that it is his duty to impose upon one of the members of the Knesset the task of forming a government which would function until the convening of the Second Knesset but which would in the meantime enjoy the confidence of the present Knesset. I do not think there is any point in stating my grounds to the President here. The majority of them are known from the debates in the Knesset and from the press - in particular Ha’aretz. The Law of Transition lays down the President's duty in this matter in clear terms. The letters of the President to Mr. Ben-Gurion and to the Speaker of the Knesset also show clearly that the President has not yet imposed the task of forming a government upon any member of the Knesset and that after his failure with Mr. Ben-Gurion, he discontinued his efforts. These points are all well known. As far as the political arguments which we wished to raise in our conversation with the President are concerned, his state of health will no doubt prevent him from considering them in the period permitted by the present circumstances.

 

            In view of the impossibility of discussing the matter fully with the President I am now considering bringing the case at the beginning of next week before the Supreme Court - the only body which can determine the legality of the position. I would ask you to convey to Dr. Weizmann that, in so doing, I have no intention of offending him personally in any way whatsoever. I have long been of opinion that our Supreme Court should gradually become the final arbiter in constitutional questions affecting the State. The seriousness of the matter now in issue and the need for its legal clarification create the opportunity for the Supreme Court to enter upon this task."

 

            On April 16, 1951, the petitioners lodged this application. They submit that the President of the State had no authority to approach the Knesset directly on a political or legal-constitutional question. Their main contention is that the President has contravened the provisions of section 9 of the Law of Transition, 1949, in that for a lengthy period of more than two months he has failed to discharge his legal and constitutional duty of imposing upon one of the members of the Knesset the task of forming a new government.

 

            The petition also contains the following submissions:

           

            The President infringed the rights of the Knesset when, without first finding out whether the member whom he called upon would accept the task, he charged that member of the Knesset with the task of forming a new government and did not see fit to charge any of the other 119 members of the Knesset with the same task.

           

            In consequence of the failure of the President to fulfill his duty, a situation has been created which is inconsistent with the law of the State. In addition, the government which has resigned - which is in fact continuing to function without enjoying the confidence of the First Knesset - is an illegal government. It is the duty of the President, no matter what the consequences may be, to bring about the formation of a new government which will enjoy the confidence of the Knesset. The present situation destroys parliamentary and democratic rule and violates the principle of the collective responsibility of the government towards the Knesset. If the same government in which the Knesset has no confidence, continue functioning, then the Knesset will he given no opportunity of expressing again its lack of confidence. It has done so once and no new vote will add anything. As a result, the government which has resigned has in fact the full power of doing what it likes, untrammeled by law or the opinion of the Knesset.

           

            The petitioners do not see a remedy for the situation in the fact that July 30, 1951, has been fixed by law as the date for the elections to the Second Knesset. They submit that for a period of approximately five months - until the formation of a new government after the elections and the convening of the Second Knesset - an illegal situation will continue.

           

            The Knesset cannot force the President to discharge his legal and constitutional duty. It is only the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, which can order the President to charge a member of the Knesset with constituting a new government.

           

            This is a summary of the petition.

           

            The Attorney-General, having learned of the presentation of this petition, appeared on the day of the hearing and asked leave, in terms of section 6 of the Law of Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1934, to submit his arguments in the matter since it appeared to him that the rights of the Government of Israel were involved and it might be injurious to the public interest to hear the petition in his absence.

           

            He raised the preliminary point that no petition of any kind against the President of the State could be entertained by this court. Mr. Nohimovsky objected to the appearance of the Attorney-General at this stage - namely, before the issue of an order nisi. He submitted that although the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, is a "civil court" within the meaning of Article 38 of the Palestine Order in Council1), it is not a civil court within the meaning of section 6 above, where the expression is employed in contradistinction to a "criminal court." He further submitted that in terms of rule 4 of the High Court Rule, 1937, a petition for an order nisi is to be heard ex parte.

           

            The court rejects these arguments of Mr. Nohimovsky for two reasons.

           

            (a) Section 6 referred to above speaks of "any civil or criminal court," and there is no reason for excluding the High Court of Justice from the expression "civil court" in the comprehensive sense in which it is used in Article 38 of the Order in Council. In our opinion, the very nature of the petition brought before this court requires that the Attorney-General should be afforded the right of intervention, even at this stage.

           

            (b) It is true that the Rules of 1937 provide that an application for an order nisi should, as a general rule, be made ex parte. They do not, however, bind the court to hear such au application in the presence of the petitioner alone.

           

            The Attorney-General submitted two arguments: -

           

            (1) That this court will not entertain an application against the President of the State;

           

            (2) That this court has no jurisdiction to hear the petition.

           

            The first argument is that the President of the State enjoys general immunity and cannot be brought before the courts. The second argument is that in accordance with the existing law, this court has no jurisdiction to deal with the present petition.

 

(In the course of his argument counsel here referred to the Bible, the Talmud, and the works of Maimonides, but the court, holding that these sources were not relevant in the case, continued:)

 

            In passing to more mundane sources, the Attorney-General compared the position of the King of England and his immunity from all claims before the courts with that of our President. As authority for this proposition he relied upon Blackstone, as quoted in the case of the Parletment Belge (1). We there find statements such as these: "Our king", says Blackstone, "owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate on earth. Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him ...authority to try would be vain and idle without an authority to redress, and the sentence of a court would be contemptible unless the court had power to command the execution of it, but who shall command the king?" And in the same judgment Brett L.J., relying upon Blackstone, states that the real principle upon which the immunity is based is that the exercise of such jurisdiction would be incompatible with the king's regal dignity. The Attorney-General also wished to deduce from Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council that the principle, precluding the bringing of the king before the courts as incompatible with his dignity, also applies to the President of the State of Israel and that this court may not therefore enquire into the actions of the President.

           

            These arguments moved Mr. Fishelev, counsel for the petitioners, to contend that these principles apply to an absolute monarchy and have no place in the democratic regime of the State of Israel.

           

            We too are of the opinion that the writings of Blackstone on the position of the King of England have no relevance here. An apt answer to this approach was given in the year 1807 by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States in his judgment in the case of United States v. Aaron Burr (2). The question that arose in that case was whether it was possible to summon the President of the United States as a witness for the defence and to order that he appear. Marshall C.J. said, inter alia: -

           

            "Although he (the King) may, perhaps, give testimony, it is said to be incompatible with his dignity to appear under the process of the court. Of the many points of difference which exist between the First Magistrate in England and the First Magistrate in the United States, in respect to the personal dignity conferred upon them by the constitutions of their respective nations, the court will only mention two. (1) It is a principle of the English Constitution that the King can do no wrong, that no blame can be imputed to him, that he cannot be named in debate. By the Constitution of the United States the President, as well as every other officer of the government, may be impeached and may be removed from office on high crimes and misdemeanors. (2) By the Constitution of Great Britain the Crown is hereditary and the monarch can never be a subject. By that of the United States, the President is elected from the mass of the people, and, on the expiration of the time for which he is elected, returns to the mass of the people again. How essentially this difference of circumstances must vary the policy of the laws of the two countries in reference to the personal dignity of the executive chief, will be perceived by every one."

 

            I shall not add any comments of my own to these dicta of the distinguished Chief Justice of the United States. Every one will appreciate that in regard to the question of immunity before the courts, the position in this country is analogous to that in the United States and not to that in England.

           

            Whether the President is to enjoy immunity is not to be gathered by reference to the immunity of a monarch. In view, however, of the decision which we have reached on the question of jurisdiction, we need not decide in this case whether the President enjoys immunity or not.

           

            As I have said, the Attorney-General, in the course of his argument, placed the emphasis upon this court's lack of jurisdiction to deal with the petition and grant a mandamus against the President and it is, in our opinion, the answer to the question whether this court has jurisdiction which determines the fate of this petition.

           

            On this question too, lengthy arguments were addressed to us, and points raised which are irrelevant. It is our first task, therefore, to limit the scope of our consideration. The matter before us is a constitutional one. It is an accepted rule, as laid down also in the United States, that "Constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly", Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court; (3), at p. 108. "It is a familiar rule that the court will not anticipate the decision of a constitutional question upon a record which does not appropriately present it", Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American National Bank; (5), at p. 87.

           

            In the light of this principle we shall confine our discussion:

           

            (a) to the subject-matter of the case, namely, the alleged contravention of section 9 of the Law of Transition, as argued by the petitioners;

           

            (b) to the prayer, namely, the granting of a writ of mandamus against the President.

           

            The basic provision defining the jurisdiction of this court in the matter before us is section 17 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, which lays down that: -

           

            "So long as no new law concerning law courts has been enacted, the law courts existing in the territory of the State shall continue to function within the scope of the powers conferred upon them by law."

           

            It follows that, in the absence of a law extending its jurisdiction, the High Court of Justice in the State of Israel has no wider powers than those which were enjoyed by it in the time of the Mandate. Counsel for the petitioners emphasised, in fact, that they do not ask us to assume powers wider than these, but they request that we exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon us by law. Their submission, so they say, is de lege lata.

           

            The law relating to the jurisdiction of this court is to be found in Articles 38 and 43 of the Order in Council of 1922 and section 7 of the Courts Ordinance of 1940. Nothing relevant to the present case can be learned regarding jurisdiction from Article 38, which merely provides that the courts "hereinafter described shall exercise jurisdiction in all matters and over all persons" in the country. This jurisdiction is defined, however, in Article 43 of the Order in Council and in section 7 of the Ordinance.

           

            As I shall explain later there is no necessity for us to determine the extent of our jurisdiction under section 7(b) of the Courts Ordinance. 1940, which confers jurisdiction upon this court to issue orders of mandamus and injunctions against public officers and public bodies. We are in fact of the opinion that the President of the State is not a "public officer" within the meaning of the definition in the Interpretation Ordinance of 1945, though he is, in a wider sense, the highest public officer in the State.

           

            As I have said, however, there is no need for us to determine our jurisdiction under section 7(b) of the Courts Ordinance since this court has decided on numerous occasions that the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 43 of the Order in Council are wider than the limits laid down in section 7 of the Ordinance.

 

            I agree with the submission of counsel for the petitioners that we must decide the question of our jurisdiction de lege lata. With this, however, we put an end to all their submissions based upon the constitutions of other countries. The doctrine of impeachment, in the various forms which it assumes in different countries, has no relevance for us in this case. It is inconceivable that this court would assume to itself a power such as that of impeachment without a specific provision in the law to that effect. Counsel for the petitioners conceded, moreover, that the purpose of impeachment is to remove the head of the State from his office by reason of the commission of an offence such us treason or some other serious offence. This is stated expressly in the constitution of the United States, and this is the interpretation given to the expression "haute trahison" in the French constitution. And the petitioners have stated repeatedly that they do not seek the removal of the President but an order of mandamus.

           

            We return to the only question before us, namely, whether this court has jurisdiction to issue a mandamus against the President of the State in respect of his alleged failure to act in accordance with section 9 of the Law of Transition, 1949. We can decide this question de lege lata only on the basis of Article 43 of the Order in Council. We do not accept the contention that us the President is not mentioned in the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948, for that reason alone we have no jurisdiction to deal with the petition. The whole force of statute law - which provides for the norm and not for exceptions - lies in its power to create machinery for dealing with situations which do not yet exist when the law is promulgated. Section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, provides expressly, moreover, that the existing law shall remain in force subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment of the State and its authorities. The fact, therefore, that the high office of President of the State did not actually exist when the Law and Administration Ordinance was enacted does not stand in the way of our applying the law today to the President. Had the petition on its merits fallen within the provisions of Article 43 of the Order in Council of 1922 it would have been possible and necessary to entertain it.

           

            The field of enquiry is narrowed down to this: is the subject-matter of the petition and the prayer among the "matters necessary to be decided for the administration of justice?" Is the present petition a matter which calls for judicial decision? Some assistance in clarifying this problem may be derived from an examination of authorities in the Supreme Court of the United States .

 

            In terms of Title 3 Section 2 of the American Constitution, "cases and controversies" are made amenable to judicial decision, and these expressions - and the limits of judicial power in general - have been defined in a long list of cases. The most recent judgment is that of Justice Frankfurter of April 30, 1951, in the case of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Attorney-General of the United States (6). Let me cite some extracts from this judgment: -

           

            "...in a case raising delicate constitutional questions it is particularly incumbent first, to satisfy the threshold enquiry whether we have any business to decide the case at all. Is there, in short, a litigant before us who has a claim presented in a form and under conditions 'appropriate for judicial determination’?” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford , Conn. v. Haworth, (7).

 

            At first sight there is a distinction between the language of the American Constitution which makes "cases and controversies" amenable to judicial determination, and the language of Article 43 which employs the expression "matters." But it has been held in the United States that the expression "cases" is wider than the expression "controversies". See David Muskrat v. United States (8) at p. 954.

           

            "The judicial article of the Constitution mentions cases and controversies. The term "controversies", if distinguishable from "cases", is so in that it is less comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature."

 

            Mr. Nohimovsky, counsel for the petitioner, emphasised the wide term "matters", from which he sought to derive our jurisdiction. Even if we assume that the term "matters" is wider than "cases and controversies" we have still to enquire what are the matters which are submitted to our jurisdiction. They are only those "matters... necessary to be decided for the administration of justice." By the addition of these words the legislature has set limits to the area of "matters" in the ordinary meaning of that expression. In regard to this it was submitted by counsel for the petitioners that we must interpret the expression "justice" by reference to philosophical, religious and moral sources. We are not prepared to adopt this system of interpretation which is completely unlimited in scope and obscures the limits of judicial power.

           

            Justice Frankfurter said the following in connection with this problem in his judgment referred to above: -

           

            "Limitation on 'the Judicial Power of the United States' is expressed by the requirement that a litigant roust have 'standing to sue', or more comprehensively, that a Federal Court may entertain a controversy only if it is 'justiciable'. Both characterizations mean that a court Grill not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination is consonant with what was generally speaking the business of the Colonial Courts and the Courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed. The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts can be invoked only under circumstances which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute 'a case or controversy'. The scope and consequences of the review with which the judiciary is entrusted over executive and legislative action require us to observe these bounds fastidiously.''

 

            With all respect to the learned judge, I find in these remarks an excellent definition of the limits of judicial power. The reply to the question what are the matters which are necessary to be decided for the administration of justice cannot be drawn from the wide sea of philosophical, religious and moral relationships. To do w would be to widen those limits so as to include every matter necessary for human progress. On the other hand such limits cannot be defined by a purely geometrical formula. In leaving the matter to be decided by "the expert feel of lawyers" the learned judge readily concedes the intellectual impossibility of an accurate and absolute definition. We, as judges, must find the answer to the question whether the matter, in the language of the United States judgment, is "appropriate for judicial determination" or, in the language of our Article 43, is "necessary to be decided for the administration of justice", by bringing to bear our legal and judicial understanding.

           

            We also attach importance to the words of Justice Frankfurter relating to the "business of the Colonial Courts and the Courts of Westminster". We find in this remark the connecting link between the language of the American Constitution and that of Article 43 of the Order in Council.

           

            The question before us, therefore, is whether the petitioners have placed before the court a matter which is justiciable, a matter which is proper for judicial determination.

           

            The complaint of the petitioners is that the President of the State has failed to comply with section 9 of the Law of Transition or, at the least, that he has not exhausted the possibilities envisaged in that section by making repeated attempts to impose the task of forming a new government upon one of the remaining 119 members of the Knesset after the first member upon whom that task was imposed failed in his attempt. The petitioners ask us to order the President to continue imposing the task of forming a government upon members of the Knesset until one of them who undertakes this mission succeeds in forming a new government which enjoys the confidence of the Knesset.

 

            According to the reasoning which underlies the petition it will be the duty of this court to examine and determine whether, in his first or second or third attempt to do what is requested of him, the President of the State has discharged the duty imposed upon him by section 9 of the Law of Transition, or whether he must continue in his attempts. In order to decide the matter this court will have to consider the effectiveness of the imposition of the task in question upon one or other of the members of the Knesset. It is sufficient to point out the consequences of such a process in order to show that the present petition falls completely outside the limits of judicial determination.

           

            If the "expert feel of lawyers" is to be invoked, it may be said generally that the whole subject of the duty of forming a government in accordance with section 9 of the Law of Transition is non-justiciable and beyond the scope of judicial determination. The relationships involved are in their very nature outside the field of judicial enquiry; they are relationships between the President of the State, the government and the Knesset, that is to say, the executive and parliamentary authorities. If the question of a failure to comply with section 9 should arise, the remedy must be found through parliamentary means, that is to say, in the reaction of the Knesset to a government which, in its opinion, does not even possess the right to exist in transition in accordance with section 11(d) of the Law of Transition. That section provides that the government, after its resignation, shall continue in office until the formation of a new government in accordance with the provisions of that Law.

           

            It is highly significant that counsel for the petitioners did not cite a single authority from other countries in which a court directed the President of the State, in any form whatsoever, to follow a particular course in the discharge of his executive functions.

           

            We have reached the conclusion that the matter before us is not one which is amenable to judicial determination and decision. We point with satisfaction to the accord between our decision and those of the Supreme Court of the United States which, as is well known, has considerable experience in examining the boundaries between the respective functions of the three authorities of the State. Counsel for the petitioners invited us to follow in the footsteps of the Supreme Court of the United States, and strongly relied upon a saying that that court is in fact the Constitution. Just because of that, however, it is desirable to point to the care taken by the American Supreme Court not to overstep the boundary. Here are some examples.

 

            In the case of Mississippi v. Johnson (9), the court was asked to issue an injunction against the President of the United States restraining him from enforcing a law passed by Congress relating to the administration of the State of Mississippi. It was argued by the petitioners that the law in question was ultra vires the Constitution of the United States.

           

            Chief Justice Chase drew a distinction in his judgment between the ministerial and the executive and political duties of the President of the United States, and said:-

           

            "An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the Government to enforce the performance of such (executive and political) duties by the President might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, as 'an absurd and excessive extravagance' . . . It was admitted in the argument that the application now made to us is without a precedent and this is of much weight against it . . . The fact that no such application was ever before made in any case indicates the general judgment of the profession that no such application should be entertained."

 

            I may mention incidentally that there is in the last sentence quoted a hint of the conception mentioned by Justice Frankfurter in his recent judgment in which he speaks of the "expert feel of lawyers". In his judgment in the case of M'Culloch v. Maryland (10), Chief Justice Marshall deals with the boundaries between the functions of the legislative authority and the judicial authority, and we may say, following him, that were we to accede to the request of the petitioners in this case, we would exceed the limits of judicial authority and trespass upon the preserves of the political and executive authorities. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall, "this court disclaims all pretensions to such a power. ' '

           

            The question brought before us is one affecting the executive and political powers of the President, and is beyond the scope of judicial authority.

           

            We accordingly dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.

           

                                                                                            Petition for order nisi refused.

                                                                                            Judgment given on July 20, 1951.

 

1)              Courts Ordinance, 1940, s. 7:

The High Court of Justice shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the following matters:

                (a)           .......………

          (b)     Orders directed to public officers or public bodies in regard to the performance of their public duties and requiring them to do or refrain from doing certain acts;

2)              Palestine Order in Council, 1922, art. 43:

          .........The Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such matters as are not causes or trials, but petitions or applications not within the jurisdiction of any other Court and necessary to be decided for the administration of justice.

1) parliament or Congress.

1) Mapam and the Communists are left-Wing parties and the others Right-Wing parties.

1)       Palestine Order in Council, 1922 (as amended 1935), Article 38:

          Subject to the provisions of this part of this order or any Ordinance or rules, the civil courts hereinafter described, and any other courts or tribunals constituted by or under any of the provisions of any ordinance, shall exercise jurisdiction in all matters and over all persons in Palestine.

Shnitzer v. Chief Military Censor

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 680/88
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, January 10, 1989
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

This petition concerns the decision by the First Respondent to prohibit, under its authority according to Regulation 87(1) of the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) 1945, the publication of a newspaper article criticizing the functioning of the Director of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (the “Mossad”,) while noting the upcoming change in Mossad directors. After submitting to the First Respondent different versions of the article and after the Petitioners withdrew several portions of it, excerpts discussing two matters were prohibited for publication: the first topic was criticism of the Director of the Mossad and questioning his efficiency. In the First Respondent’s opinion, such criticism may compromise the functionality of the entire Mossad, on all levels of its ranks. The other topic concerns the timing of the change of directors while emphasizing the public importance of the Mossad Director’s role. The First Respondent’s position is that such publication may focus attention onto the Director of the Mossad, which creates real danger to his safety. The Petitioners maintain that the excerpts of criticism in regards to the Director of the Mossad and the timing of changing the director are worthy of publication and that their prohibition is unlawful. The Petitioners rely on the importance of freedom of expression and the public’s right to know in a democracy, and in their view the publication does not create a near certainty for harm to state security that justifies limits to free expression.

 

The High Court of Justice ruled:

 

A.         1.         The Interpretation that must be given to the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) in the State of Israel is not identical to the interpretation that must be given to them at the time of the British Mandate. The Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) are currently part of the laws of the democratic state, and they must be interpreted in light of the fundamental principles of the Israeli legal system.

            2.         The Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) concern state security. This fact impacts the way the system’s fundamental principles are implemented but it does not impact the mere application of these fundamental principles. The state security and the public order do not outweigh or negate the application of fundamental principles. They are weaved into them, influencing their shape and content, and are balanced against them.

            3.         The fundamental principles that shape the interpretation of the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) are, first and foremost, considerations of security, which cover the entire scope of the Regulations. Realizing the interests in state security, public safety and public order are at the basis of the purpose for which the Regulations were enacted and they must be interpreted according to this purpose.

            4.         Alongside the security considerations (in their broad sense) stand additional values that any piece of legislation in a democratic society must be interpreted in their light and which are implicated by the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency).

 

B.         1.         It may so happen that fundamental principles conflict with each other. The principles in terms of state security, public safety and public order may conflict with values such as the freedom of movement, free expression, and human dignity. In each of these cases the Court must balance between the conflicting values.

            2.         The “balancing formula” in the conflict between state security and free expression presupposes realizing the values of state security.

3.         Because of the centrality of the fundamental value of free speech the infringement of this fundamental value must be as limited as possible, and only when the infringement of free speech is essential in order to realize the value of state security is this infringement permitted.

4.         The likelihood that justifies limits on free expression is that of a “near certainty.” There must be extreme circumstances that create a real and almost certain danger to the safety of the general public.

5.         This likelihood does not exist where other means – aside from limiting personal liberty and aside from limiting free expression – may be employed in order to reduce the danger. Infringing free expression need not be the first resort; it must be the last resort.

 

C.         1.         Subjective discretion must be applied within the contours of the authorizing statute. Therefore those who were empowered under the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) may apply this authority in order to realize the purposes behind the Regulations rather than realizing irrelevant purposes.

            2.         Any governmental authority is based on conditions and requirements as to its implementation, and lawful implementation of the authority requires that such conditions be actually realized. Therefore, to the extent that the correct interpretation of Regulation 87 of the Defense Regulations (state of Emergency) is that a publication in a newspaper may be prohibited only if the Censor believes there is near certainty that the publication would cause real harm to security, then the Censor’s must give thought to the existence of such near certainty. Should the Censor prohibit a publication without being persuaded that the publication creates the required near certainty it did not exercise its discretion lawfully.

            3.         Discretion assumes freedom to select between lawful options.  Subjective discretion assumes that the competent authority makes the choice between the options according to an evaluation of each option’s benefits. This evaluation must be made according to the rules of administrative law: in good faith, without arbitrariness or discrimination, and following consideration of all relevant factors and only relevant factors.

            4.         The Censor’s decision must be reasonable, that is that any reasonable Censor would reach such decision under the circumstances. The question in each case is whether a reasonable military Censor may reach the conclusion that, on the basis of a given set of facts, there is near certainty that the publication would cause a severe or real harm to state security.

            5.         The determination that were the publication not prohibited there would be near certainty for real harm to state security must be based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.

 

D.         1.         There is no basis to the approach that the subjectivity of the administrative discretion restricts judicial review to only a limited number of grounds for review. The proper approach is that the theory of discretion establishes the conditions for the lawfulness of the use of discretion and the theory of adjudication establishes that the court is authorized to examine the existence of such conditions.

            2.         The principle of separation of powers requires the court to review the lawfulness of the administrative entities’ decisions. Security factors hold no unique status in this sense. Just as the courts are able and obligated to examine the reasonability of professional discretion in each and every area, so they are able and obligated to examine the reasonability of discretion in terms of security. There are no unique restrictions on the scope of judicial review over administrative discretion that concerns state security.

            3.         Under the circumstances here, once the First Respondent gave reasons for its decision, these reasons are subject to judicial review, just like any other administrative discretion.

 

E.         1.         The First Respondent’s distinction between criticism of the Director of the Mossad, which he believes compromises state security rendering prohibiting its publication and criticism of the Mossad itself, which must not be prohibited, is unacceptable. Publishing criticism of the functioning of the Director of the Mossad causes no near certainty of real harm to state security.

            2.         In a democratic society, criticism of people who hold public roles should be possible. Free expression includes the freedom to criticize and the freedom to pose difficult questions to those in government. Discomfort regarding criticism or the harm it may cause cannot justify the silencing of criticism in a democracy, which is founded on the exchange of idea and public discourse.

            3.         In deciding to prohibit the publication of criticism over the functioning of the Director of the Mossad, the First Respondent did not attribute sufficient weight to the principle of free expression. A free society cannot exist without a free press, therefore the press must be allowed to fulfill its function and only in special and extreme cases, where there is near certainty for real harm to state security, is there place for prohibiting news articles.

            4.         Under the circumstances here, the First Respondent did not meet the heavy burden of showing that advance restriction of free expression is lawful.

 

F.         1.         The First Respondent’s reasoning to prohibit the Petitioners to publish in an article details as to the timing of the change in the directors of the Mossad does not withstand the test of review. The possibility that publishing the timing of the impending change in the directors of the Mossad increase the risk to the outgoing Director’s safety is merely speculative.

            2.         There is public importance to the fact that the public is aware of the upcoming appointment. This reflects one of the aspects of the great importance of free expression and the public’s right to know.

            3.         Under the circumstances here, there position and the estimations of the First Respondent are unreasonable. In its approach, the Court does not appoint itself super-censor, but it finds that a reasonable censor, operating in a democracy and required to balance security against free expression, would not reach the conclusion reached by the First Respondent. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion

A v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
CrimA 6659/06
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

Appeals challenging the decisions of the District Court who upheld the legality of the appellants’ arrests under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law 5762-2002 (hereinafter: the Act.) We are concerned with the private case of the appellants, residents of the Gaza Strip, who in 2002-2003 were arrested in an administrative arrest under the security legislation that applies in the strip, when as a result of the end of the military rule there in September 2005, the Chief of the General Staff issued the appellants’ arrest warrants under the Act. The Appeals raise general issues as to the interpretation of the Act and its compliance with humanitarian international law and as to the legality of its arrangements.

 

The Supreme Court (in a decision by President Beinisch and joined by Justices Procaccia and Levi) rejected the appeals and held that:

 

The Act authorizes State authorities to arrest “Unlawful Combatants” – whoever take part in warfare or are part of a force executing warfare activity against the State of Israel, and who do not meet the conditions to be given the status of war prisoners. The objective of the Act is to prevent such persons’ return to combating Israel; it does not apply to innocent civilians and it must be interpreted, as much as possible, according to international law. The Act’s arrest provisions must be examined with the attempt to realize the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty as much as possible. The Act’s arrest authorities severely and extensively infringe an arrested person’s personal liberty, which is justified under the appropriate circumstances to protect the State’s security. However, in light of the extent of the infringement and the extremity of the arrest tool, the infringement upon liberty rights must be interpreted as narrowly as possible, so that it is proportional to achieving only the security purposes. The Act must be interpreted in a manner that complies as much as possible with the international law norms to which Israel is obligated, but according to the changing reality as result of terror.

 

The Act includes a mechanism of administrative arrest that is carried out under a warrant by the Chief of General Staff. Administrative arrest is contingent upon the existence of a cause for arrest that is a result of the arrested person’s individual dangerousness to the security of the State, and its purpose is preventative. The State must demonstrate through sufficient administrative evidence that that arrested person is an “unlawful combatant” insofar that he took significant part, directly or indirectly, in contributing to warfare, or that the arrested person was a member of an organization that carries out warfare activity and then to consider his link and contribution to the organization’s warfare activity, in a broad sense. Only after proving meeting the definition above may the State make use of the presumption in section 7 of the Act whereby releasing the arrested person would harm the security of the State, so long as it is not proven otherwise.

 

The right to personal liberty is a constitutional right. However, it is not absolute and infringing it may be required in order to protect other public essential interests. The Court must consider whether the infringement upon the right to personal liberty is consistent with the conditions of the Limitations Clause of section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, when it should be remembered that the Court does not easily strike down legal provisions. Under the circumstances, the extent of the infringement of the constitutional right to personal liberty is significant and severe. But the purpose of the Act, in light of a reality of daily terrorism is worthy, and therefore the legislature should be granted a relatively wide range of maneuvering in electing the appropriate means to realize the legislative intent. Considering this and additional factors, the Act meets the proportionality tests. Therefore the Act’s infringement upon the constitutional right to personal liberty is not to an extent beyond necessary, so that the Act meets the conditions of the Limitations Clause and there is no constitutional cause to intervene in it.

 

Israel should not have released the appellants, being residents of a liberated occupied territory, when the military rule in the Strip ended because the personal danger they pose continued in light of the ongoing warfare against the State of Israel. As for the individual incarceration warrants lawfully issued against the appellants, then the evidence reveals their tight connection with Hezbollah, their individual dangerousness was proven even without relying on the presumption in section 7 of the Act. There is no place to revoke the incarceration warrants. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

CrimA 6659/06

CrimA 1757/07

CrimA 8228/07

  CrimA 3261/08

 

1 . A

2.  B

v

State of Israel

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals

[5 March 2007]

Before President D. Beinisch and Justices E.E. Levy, A. Procaccia

 

 

Appeals of the decisions of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice Z. Caspi) on 16 July 2006, 19 July 2006, 13 February 2007 and 3 September 2007, and the decision of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice D. Rozen) on 20 March 2008.

 

Legislation cited:

Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002

Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, 5739-1979

 

Israel Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        CrimFH 7048/97 A v. Minister of Defence [2000] IsrSC 44(1) 721.

[2]        HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 793.

[3]        HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [2005] IsrSC 59(4) 241; [2004] IsrLR 505.

[4]        HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[5]         HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785.

[6]        HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264.

[7]        HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352; [2002-3] IsrLR 83.

[8]        HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349; [2002-3] IsrLR 173.

[9]        HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2006] IsrSC 60(2) 477; [2005] (2) IsrLR 106. 

[10]      HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior (2006) (not yet reported); [2006] (1) IsrLR 442.

[11]      HCJ 2599/00 Yated, Children with Down Syndrome Parents Society v. Ministry of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 834.

[12]      HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved Worker's Hotline v. Government of Israel [2006] (1) IsrLR 260.

[13]      HCJ 9132/07 Elbassiouni v. Prime Minister (2008) (unreported).

[14]      ADA 8607/04 Fahima v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(3) 258.

[15]      HCJ 554/81 Beransa v. Central Commander [1982] IsrSC 36(4) 247.

[16]      HCJ 11026/05 A v. IDF Commander (2005) (unreported).

[17]       CrimA 3660/03 Abeid v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported).

[18]      HCJ 1853/02 Navi v. Minister of Energy and National Infrastructures (2003) (unreported).

[19]      HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241; [1998-9] IsrLR 635.

[20]      HCJ 4827/05 Man, Nature and Law - Israel Environmental Protection Society v. Minister of the Interior (2005) (unreported).

[21]      CA 7175/98 National Insurance Institute v. Bar Finance Ltd (in liquidation) (2001) (unreported).

[22]      HCJ 5319/97 Kogen v. Chief Military Prosecutor [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 67; [1997] IsrLR 499.

[23]      CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported); [2005] (2) IsrLR 232.

[24]      CrimA 4424/98 Silgado v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 529.

[25]      HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 481.

[26]      HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 235.

[27]      HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Knesset Speaker [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 57.

[28]      HCJ 6893/05 Levy v. Government of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 876.

[29]      HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149.

[30]      HCJ 5627/02 Saif v. Government Press Office [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 70; [2004] IsrLR 191.

[31]      EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Tenth Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225;  IsrSJ 8 83.

[32]      CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221.

[33]      HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 433.

[34]      AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members' Club v. Haifa Municipality [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 782.

[35]      HCJ 2967/00 Arad v. Knesset [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 188.

[36]      CrimApp 8780/06 Sarur v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[37]      HCJ 403/81 Jabar v. Military Commander [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 397.

[38]      HCJ 102/82 Tzemel v. Minister of Defence [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 365.

[39]      ADA 4794/05 Ufan v. Minister of Defence (2005) (unreported).

[40]      ADA 7/94 Ben-Yosef v. State of Israel (1994) (unreported).

[41]      ADA 8788/03 Federman v. Minister of Defence [2004] IsrSC 58(1) 176.

[42]      HCJ 5445/93 Ramla Municipality v. Minister of the Interior [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 397.

[43]        HCJ 2159/97 Ashkelon Coast Regional Council v. Minister of the Interior [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 75.

[44]      HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Defence [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 801.

[45]      ADA 334/04 Darkua v. Minister of the Interior [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 254.

[46]      HCJ 4400/98 Braham v. Justice Colonel Shefi [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 337.

[47]      HCJ 11006/04 Kadri v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (2004) (unreported).

[48]      CrimApp 3514/97 A v. State of Israel (1997) (unreported).

[49]      HCJ 5994/03 Sadar v. IDF Commander in West Bank (2003) (unreported).

[50]      CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006]  (unreported), 2006 (1) IsrLR 320.

[51]      HCJ 3412/93 Sufian v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 843.

[52]      HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiah v. Israel Police [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 209.

[53]         HCJ 2901/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF  Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 19.

[54]    CrimA 1221/06 Iyyad v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

 

 

For the appellants - H. Abou-Shehadeh

For the respondent - Z. Goldner, O.J. Koehler, S. Nitzan, Y. Roitman.

 

JUDGMENT

 

President D. Beinisch:

Before us are appeals against the decisions of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice Z. Caspi), in which the internment of the appellants under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (hereinafter: "the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law" or "the Law") was upheld as lawful. Apart from the particular concerns of the appellants, the appeals raise fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and the extent to which the Law is consistent with international humanitarian law, as well as the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in the Law.

The main facts and sequence of events

1.  The first appellant is an inhabitant of the Gaza Strip, born in 1973, who was placed under administrative detention on 1 January 2002 by virtue of the Administrative Detentions (Temporary Provision) (Gaza Strip Region) Order (no. 941), 5748-1988. The detention of the first appellant was extended from time to time by the Military Commander and upheld on judicial review by the Gaza Military Court. The second appellant is also an inhabitant of Gaza, born in 1972, and he was placed under administrative detention on 24 January 2003 pursuant to the aforesaid Order. The detention of the second appellant was also extended from to time and reviewed by the Gaza Military Court.

On 12 September 2005 a statement was issued by the Southern District Commander with regard to the end of military rule in the region of the Gaza Strip. On the same day, in view of the change in circumstances and also the change in the relevant legal position, internment orders were issued against the appellants; these were signed by the Chief of Staff by virtue of his authority under s. 3 of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, on which the case before us focuses. On 15 September 2005 the internment orders were brought to the notice of the appellants. At a hearing that took place pursuant to the Law, the appellants indicated that they did not wish to say anything, and on 20 September 2005 the Chief of Staff decided that the internment orders under the aforesaid Law would remain in force.

2.  On 22 September 2005 a judicial review hearing began in the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice Z. Caspi) in the appellants' case. On 25 January 2006 the District Court held that there had been no defect in the procedure of issuing internment orders against the appellants, and that all the conditions laid down in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law were satisfied, including the fact that their release would harm state security. The appellants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, and on 14 March 2006 their appeal was denied (Justice E. Rubinstein). In the judgment it was held that the material presented to the court evinced the appellants' clear association with the Hezbollah organization, as well as their participation in acts of combat against the citizens of Israel prior to their detention. The court emphasized in this context the personal threat presented by the two appellants and the risk that they would resume their activities if they were released, as could be seen from the material presented to the court.

3.  On 9 March 2006 the periodic judicial review pursuant to s. 5(c) of the Law began in the District Court. In the course of this review, not only were the specific complaints of the appellants against their internment considered, but also fundamental arguments against the constitutionality of the Law, in the framework of an indirect attack on its provisions. On 16 July 2006 the District Court gave its decision with regard to the appellant's specific claims. In this decision it was noted that from the information that was presented to the court it could be seen that the appellants were major activists in the Hezbollah organization who would very likely return to terrorist activities if they were released now, and that their release was likely to harm state security. On 19 July 2006 the District Court gave its decision on the fundamental arguments raised by the appellants concerning the constitutionality of the Law. The District Court rejected the appellants' argument in this regard too, and held that the Law befitted the values of the State of Israel, its purpose was a proper one and its violation of the appellants' rights was proportionate. The court said further that in its opinion the Law was also consistent with the principles of international law. The appeal in CrimA 6659/06 is directed at these two decisions of 16 July 2006 and 19 July 2006.

On 13 February 2007 the District Court gave a decision in a second periodic review of the appellants' detention. In its decision the District Court approved the internment orders, discussed the appellants' importance to the activity of the Hezbollah organization as shown by the testimonies of experts who testified before it and said that their detention achieved a preventative goal of the first order. The appeal in CrimA 1757/07 is directed at this decision.

On 3 September 2007 the District Court gave its decision in the third periodic review of the appellants' internment. In its decision the District Court noted that the experts remained steadfast in their opinion that it was highly probable that the two appellants would resume their terrorist activity if they were released, and as a result the operational abilities of the Hezbollah infrastructure in the Gaza Strip would be enhanced and the risks to the State of Israel and its inhabitants would increase. It also said that the fact that the Hamas organization had taken control of the Gaza Strip increased the aforesaid risks and the difficulty of contending with them. The court emphasized that there was information with regard to each of the appellants concerning their desire to resume terrorist activity if they were released, and that they had maintained their contacts in this area even while they were imprisoned. In such circumstances, the District Court held that the passage of time had not reduced the threat presented by the appellants, who were the most senior persons in the Hezbollah terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, and that there was no basis for cancelling the internment orders made against them. The appeal in CrimA 8228/07 is directed at this decision.

On 20 March 2008 the District Court gave its decision in the fourth periodic review of the appellants' detention. During the hearing, the court (Justice D. Rozen) said that the evidence against each of the two appellants contained nothing new from recent years. Nevertheless, the court decided to approve their continued internment after it found that each of the two appellants was closely associated with the Hezbollah organization; both of them were intensively active in that organization; the existing evidence regarding them showed that their return to the area was likely to act as an impetus for terrorist attacks, and the long period during which they had been imprisoned had not reduced the danger that they represent. The appeal in CrimA 3261/08 was directed at this decision.

Our judgment therefore relates to all of the aforesaid appeals together.

The arguments of the parties

4.  The appellants' arguments before us, as in the trial court, focused on two issues: first, the appellants raised specific arguments concerning the illegality of the internment orders that were made in their cases, and they sought to challenge the factual findings reached by the District Court with regard to their membership in the Hezbollah organization and their activity in that organization against the security of the State of Israel. Secondly, once again the appellants indirectly raised arguments of principle with regard to the constitutionality of the Law. According to them, the Law in its present format violates the rights to liberty and dignity enshrined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in a manner that does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause in the Basic Law. The appellants also claimed that the Law is inconsistent with the rules of international humanitarian law that it purports to realize. Finally the appellants argued that the end of Israel's military rule in the Gaza Strip prevents it, under the laws of war, from detaining the appellants.

The state's position was that the petitions should be denied. With regard to the specific cases of the appellants, the state argued that the internment orders in their cases were made lawfully and they were in no way improper. With regard to the arguments in the constitutional sphere, the state argued that the law satisfies the tests of the limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, since it was intended for a proper purpose and its violation of personal liberty is proportionate. With regard to the rules of international law applicable to the case, the state argued that the Law is fully consistent with the norms set out in international law with regard to the detention of "unlawful combatants".

5.  In order to decide the questions raised by the parties before us, we shall first address the background that led to the enactment of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and its main purpose. With this in mind, we shall consider the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" and the conditions that are required to prove the existence of a ground for detention under the law. Thereafter we shall examine the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in the law and finally we shall address the specific detention orders made in the appellants' cases.

The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law - background to its enactment and its main purpose

6.  The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law gives the state authorities power to detain "unlawful combatants" as defined in s. 2 of the Law, i.e. persons who participate in hostile acts or who are members of forces that carry out hostile acts against the State of Israel, and who do not fulfil the conditions that confer prisoner of war status under international humanitarian law. As will be explained below, the Law allows the internment of foreign persons who belong to a terrorist organization or who participate in hostile acts against the security of the state, and it was intended to prevent these persons from returning to the cycle of hostilities against Israel.

The original initiative to enact the Law arose following the judgment in CrimFH 7048/97 A v. Minister of Defence [1], in which the Supreme Court held that the state did not have authority to hold Lebanese nationals in detention by virtue of administrative detention orders, if the sole reason for their detention was to hold them as "bargaining chips" in order to obtain the release of captives and missing servicemen. Although the original bill came into being against the background of a desire to permit the holding of prisoners as "bargaining chips", the proposal underwent substantial changes during the legislative process after many deliberations on this matter in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, chaired by MK Dan Meridor. On 4 March 2002, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was passed by the Knesset. Its constitutionality has not been considered by this court until now.

At the outset it should be emphasized that the examination of the historical background to the enactment of the Law and the changes that were made to the original bill, what was said during the Knesset debates, the wording of the Law as formulated at the end of the legislative process, and the effort that was made to ensure that it conformed to the provisions of international humanitarian law evident from the purpose clause of the statute, which we shall address below -  all show that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law as it crystallized in the course of the legislative process was not intended to allow hostages to be held as "bargaining chips" for the purpose of obtaining the release of Israeli captives and missing servicemen being held in enemy territory, as alleged by the appellants before us. The plain language of the Law and its legislative history indicate that the Law was intended to prevent a person who endangers the security of the state due to his activity or his membership of a terrorist organization from returning to the cycle of combat. Thus, for example, MK David Magen, who was chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee at the time of the debate in the plenum of the Knesset prior to the second and third readings, said as follows:

'The draft law is very complex and as is known, it gave rise to many disagreements during the Committee's deliberations. The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee held approximately ten sessions at which it discussed the difficult questions raised by this Bill and considered all the possible ramifications of its passing the second and third readings. The Bill before you is the result of considerable efforts to present an act of legislation whose provisions are consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law and which satisfies the constitutional criteria, while being constantly mindful of and insistent upon maintaining a balance between security and human rights...

I wish to emphasize that the Bill also seeks to determine that a person who is an unlawful combatant, as defined in the new Law, will be held by the state as long as he represents a threat to its security. The criterion for interning a person is that he is dangerous. No person should be interned under the proposal as a punishment or, as many tend to think erroneously, as a bargaining chip. No mistake should be made in this regard. Nonetheless, we should ask ourselves whether it is conceivable that the state should release a prisoner who will return to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel?' [emphasis added].

The Law was therefore not intended to allow prisoners to be held as "bargaining chips". The purpose of the Law is to remove from the cycle of hostilities a person who belongs to a terrorist organization or who participates in hostile acts against the State of Israel. The background to this is the harsh reality of murderous terrorism, which has for many years plagued the inhabitants of the state, harmed the innocent and indiscriminately taken the lives of civilians and servicemen, the young and old, men, women and children. In order to realize the aforesaid purpose, the Law applies only to persons who take part in the cycle of hostilities or who belong to a force that carries out hostile acts against the State of Israel, and not to innocent civilians. We shall return to address the security purpose of the Law below.

Interpreting the provisions of the Law

7. As we have said, in their arguments before us the parties addressed in detail the question of the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in the Law. In addition, the parties addressed at length the question of whether the arrangements prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law are consistent with international law. The parties addressed this question, inter alia, because in s. 1 of the Law, which is the purpose section, the Law states that it is intended to realize its purpose "in a manner that is consistent with the commitments of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian law." As we shall explain below, this declaration is a clear expression of the basic outlook prevailing in our legal system that the existing law should be interpreted in a manner that is as consistent as possible with international law.

In view of the two main focuses of the basic arguments of the parties before us - whether the arrangements prescribed in the Law are constitutional and whether they are consistent with international humanitarian law - we should clarify that both the constitutional scrutiny from the viewpoint of the limitation clause and the question of compliance with international humanitarian law may be affected by the interpretation of the arrangements prescribed in the Law. Before deciding on the aforesaid questions, therefore, we should first consider the interpretation of the principal arrangements prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. These arrangements will be interpreted in accordance with the language and purpose of the Law, and on the basis of two interpretive presumptions that exist in our legal system: one, the presumption of constitutionality, and the other, the presumption of interpretive compatibility with the norms of international law - both those that are part of Israeli law and those that Israel has taken upon itself amongst its undertakings in the international arena.

8.  Regarding the presumption of constitutionality: in our legal system the legislature is presumed to be aware of the contents of the Basic Laws and their ramifications for every statute that is enacted subsequently. According to this presumption, the examination of a provision of statute involves an attempt to interpret it so that it is consistent with the protection that the Basic Laws afford to human rights. This realizes the presumption of normative harmony, whereby "we do not assume that a conflict exists between legal norms, and every possible attempt is made to achieve 'uniformity in the law' and harmony between the various norms" (A. Barak, Legal Interpretation - the General Theory of Interpretation (1992), at p. 155). In keeping with the presumption of constitutionality, we must, therefore, examine the meaning and scope of the internment provisions in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law while aspiring to uphold, insofar as possible, the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. It should immediately be said that the internment powers prescribed in the Law significantly and seriously violate the personal liberty of the prisoner. This violation is justified in appropriate circumstances in order to protect state security. However, in view of the magnitude of the violation of personal liberty, and considering the exceptional nature of the means of detention that are prescribed in the Law, an interpretive effort should be made in order to minimize the violation of the right to liberty as much as possible so that it is proportionate to the need to achieve the security purpose and does not go beyond this. Such an interpretation will be compatible with the basic conception prevailing in our legal system, according to which a statute should be upheld by interpretive means and the court should refrain, insofar as possible, from setting it aside on constitutional grounds. In the words of President A. Barak:

'It is better to achieve a reduction in the scope of a statute by interpretive means rather than  having to achieve the same reduction by declaring a part of a statute void because it conflicts with the provisions of a Basic Law.... A reasonable interpretation of a statute is preferable to a decision on the question of its constitutionality' (HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [2], at p. 812; see also HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [3], at p. 276).

9. With respect to the presumption of conformity to international humanitarian law: as we have said, s. 1 of the Law declares explicitly that its purpose is to regulate the internment of unlawful combatants "… in a manner that is consistent with the commitments of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian law." The premise in this context is that an international armed conflict prevails between the State of Israel and the terrorist organizations that operate outside Israel (see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at paras. 18, 21; see also A. Cassese, International Law (second edition, 2005), at p. 420).

The international law that governs an international armed conflict is anchored mainly in the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) (hereinafter: "the Hague Convention") and the regulations appended to it, whose provisions have the status of customary international law (see HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [5], at p. 793; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [6], at p. 827; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at p. 364; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (hereinafter: "Fourth Geneva Convention"), whose customary provisions constitute a part of the law of the State of Israel and some of which have been considered in the past by this court (Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at page 364; HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8]; HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [9], at para. 14); and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977 (hereinafter: "First Protocol"), to which Israel is not a party, but whose customary provisions also constitute a part of the law of the State of Israel (see Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at para. 20). In addition, where there is a lacuna in the laws of armed conflict set out above, it is possible to fill it by resorting to international human rights law (see Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at para. 18; see also Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ Rep. 226, at page 240; Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 ILM 1009 (2004)).

It should be emphasized that no one in this case disputes that an explicit statutory provision enacted by the Knesset overrides the provisions of international law (see in this regard President A. Barak in HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [10], at para. 17). However, according to the presumption of interpretive consistency, an Israeli act of legislation should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent, insofar as possible, with the norms of international law to which the State of Israel is committed (see HCJ 2599/00 Yated, Children with Down Syndrome Parents Society v. Ministry of Education [11], at p. 847; HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved Worker's Hotline v. Government of Israel [12], at para. 37). According to this presumption, which as we have said is clearly expressed in the purpose clause of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the arrangements prescribed in the Law should be interpreted in a manner that is as consistent as possible with the international humanitarian law that governs the matter.

Further to the aforesaid it should be noted that when we approach the task of interpreting provisions of the statute in a manner consistent with the accepted norms of international law, we cannot ignore the fact that the provisions of international law that exist today have not been adapted to changing realities and to the phenomenon of terrorism that is changing the face and characteristics of armed conflicts and those who participate in them (see in this regard the remarks of President A. Barak in Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at pp. 381-382). In view of this, we should do our best to interpret the existing laws in a manner that is consistent with the new realities and the principles of international humanitarian law.

10.  Bearing all the above in mind, let us now turn to the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" and of the conditions required for proving the existence of cause for internment under the Law. The presumption of constitutionality and the provisions of international law to which the parties referred will be our interpretive tools and they will assist us in interpreting the provisions of the Law and in evaluating the nature and scope of the power of internment it prescribes.

The definition of "unlawful combatant" and the scope of its application

11. S. 2 of the Law defines "unlawful combatant" as follows:

'Definitions

2.  In this law -

"unlawful combatant" - a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel, where the conditions prescribed in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War with respect to granting prisoner of war status in international humanitarian law, do not apply to him;

This statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" relates to those who take part in hostile acts against the State of Israel or who are members of a force that perpetrates such acts, and who are not prisoners of war under international humanitarian law. In this regard two points should be made: first, from the language of the aforesaid s. 2 it is clear that it is not essential for someone to take part in hostile acts against the State of Israel; his membership in a "force perpetrating hostile acts" - i.e., a terrorist organization - may include that person within the definition of "unlawful combatant". We will discuss the significance of these two alternatives in the definition of "unlawful combatant" below (para. 21 .).

Secondly, as noted above, the purpose clause in the Law refers explicitly to the provisions of international humanitarian law. The definition of "unlawful combatant" in the aforesaid s. 2 also refers to international humanitarian law when it provides that the Law applies to a person who does not enjoy prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention. In general, the rules of international humanitarian law were not intended to apply to the relationship between the state and its citizens (see, for example, the provisions of art. 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, according to which a "protected civilian" is someone who is not a citizen of the state that is holding him in circumstances of an international armed conflict). The explicit reference by the legislature to international humanitarian law, together with the stipulation in the wording of the Law that prisoner of war status does not apply, show that the Law was intended to apply only to foreign parties who belong to a terrorist organization that acts against the security of the state. We are not unaware that the draft law of 14 June 2000 contained an express provision stating that the Law would not apply to Israeli inhabitants (and also to inhabitants of the territories), except in certain circumstances that were set out therein (see s. 11 of the Internment of Enemy Forces Personnel Who Are Not Entitled to a Prisoner of War Status Bill, 5760-2000, Bills 5760, no. 2883, at p. 415). This provision was omitted from the final wording of the Law. Nevertheless, in view of the explicit reference in the Law to international humanitarian law and the laws concerning prisoners of war as stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that according to its wording and purpose, the Law was not intended to apply to local parties (citizens and residents of Israel) who endanger state security. For these other legal measures exist that are intended for a security purpose, which we shall address below.

It is therefore possible to sum up and say that an "unlawful combatant" under s. 2 of the Law is a foreign party who belongs to a terrorist organization that acts against the security of the State of Israel. This definition may include residents of a foreign country that maintains a state of hostilities against the State of Israel, who belong to a terrorist organization that acts against the security of the State and who satisfy the other conditions of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant". This definition may also include inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, which today is no longer under belligerent occupation. In this regard it should be noted that since the end of Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip in September 2005, the State of Israel has no permanent physical presence in the Gaza Strip, and it also has no real possibility of carrying out the duties of an occupying power under international law, including the main duty of maintaining public order and security. Any attempt to impose the authority of the State of Israel on the Gaza Strip is likely to involve complex and prolonged military operations. In such circumstances, where the State of Israel has no real ability to control what happens in the Gaza Strip in an effective manner, the Gaza Strip should not be regarded as a territory that is subject to belligerent occupation from the viewpoint of international law, even though the unique situation that prevails there imposes certain obligations on the State of Israel vis-?-vis the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip (for the position that the Gaza Strip is not now subject to a belligerent occupation, see Yuval Shany, "Faraway So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza after Israel's Disengagement," 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2005 (2007) 359; see also the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, where the importance of a physical presence of military forces was emphasized for the existence of a state of occupation: Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (ICJ, 19 December 2005), at para.173; with regard to the existence of certain obligations that the State of Israel has in the prevailing circumstances vis-?-vis the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, see HCJ 9132/07 Elbassiouni v. Prime Minister [13]. In our case, in view of the fact that the Gaza Strip is no longer under the effective control of the State of Israel, we must conclude that the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip constitute foreign parties who may be subject to the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law in view of the nature and purpose of this Law.

With regard to the inhabitants of the territory (Judaea and Samaria) that is under the effective control of the State of Israel, for the reasons that will be stated later (in para. 36 below), I tend to the opinion that insofar as necessary for security reasons, the administrative detention of these inhabitants should be carried out pursuant to the security legislation that applies in the territories and not by virtue of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. However, the question of the application of the aforesaid Law to the inhabitants of the territories does not arise in the circumstances of the case before us and it may therefore be left undecided.

Conformity of the definition of "unlawful combatant" to a category recognized by international law

12. The appellants argued that the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law is contrary to the provisions of international humanitarian law, since international law does not recognize the existence of an independent and separate category of "unlawful combatants". According to their argument, there are only two categories in international law - "combatants" and "civilians", who are subject to the provisions and protections enshrined in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions respectively. In their view international law does not have an intermediate category that includes persons who are not protected by either of these conventions.

With regard to the appellants' aforesaid arguments we would point out that the question of the conformity of the term "unlawful combatant" to the categories recognized by international law has already been addressed in our case law in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], in which it was held that the term "unlawful combatants" does not constitute a separate category, but rather, a sub-category of "civilians" recognized by international law. This conclusion is based on the approach of customary international law, according to which the category of "civilians" includes everyone who is not a "combatant". We are therefore dealing with a negative definition. In the words of President A. Barak:

 'The approach of customary international law is that "civilians" are persons who are not "combatants" (see article 50(1) of the First Protocol, and Sabel, supra, at page 432). In the Blaskic case, the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Yugoslavia said that civilians are "persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces" (Prosecutor v. Blaskic (2000), Case IT-95-14-T, at paragraph 180). This definition is of a "negative" character. It derives the concept of "civilians" from it being the opposite of "combatants". Thus it regards unlawful combatants, who as we have seen are not "combatants", as civilians' (ibid., at para. 26 of the opinion of President A. Barak).

In this context, two additional points should be made: first, the determination that "unlawful combatants" belong to the category of "civilians" in international law is consistent with the official interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, according to which in an armed conflict or a state of occupation, every person who finds himself in the hands of the opposing party is entitled to a certain status under international humanitarian law - the status of prisoner of war, which is governed by the Third Geneva Convention, or the status of protected civilian, which is governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention:

'There is no "intermediate status"; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law' (O. Uhler and H. Coursier (eds.), Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: Commentary (ICRC, Geneva, 1950), commentary to art. 4, at page 51).

(See also S. Borelli, 'Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the "War on Terror",' 87(857) IRRC 39 (2005), at pp. 48-49).

Secondly, it should be emphasized that prima facie, the statutory definition of "unlawful combatants" under s. 2 of the Law applies to a broader group of people than the group of "unlawful combatants" discussed in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], in view of the difference in the measures under discussion: the judgment in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4] considered the legality of the measure of a military attack intended to cause the death of an "unlawful combatant". According to international law, it is permitted to attack an "unlawful combatant" only during the period of time when he is taking a direct part in the hostilities. By contrast, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law deals with the measure of internment. For the purposes of internment under the Law, it is not necessary for the "unlawful combatant" to participate directly in the hostilities, nor is it essential that the internment take place during the period of time that he is participating in hostile acts; all that is required is that the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law are proved. This statutory definition does not conflict with the provisions of international humanitarian law since, as we shall clarify clear below, the Fourth Geneva Convention also permits the detention of a protected "civilian"' who endangers the security of the detaining state. Thus we see that our reference to the judgment in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4] was not intended to indicate that an identical issue was considered in that case. Its purpose was to support the finding that the term "unlawful combatants" in the Law under discussion does not create a separate category of treatment from the viewpoint of international humanitarian law; rather, it constitutes a sub-group of the category of "civilians".

13.   Further to our finding that "unlawful combatants" belong to the category of "civilians" from the viewpoint of international law, it should be noted that this court has held in the past that international humanitarian law does not grant "unlawful combatants" the same degree of protection to which innocent civilians are entitled, and that in this respect there is a difference from the viewpoint of the rules of international law between "civilians" who are not "unlawful combatants" and "civilians" who are "unlawful combatants". (With regard to the difference in the scope of the protection from a military attack upon "civilians" who are not "unlawful combatants" as opposed to "civilians" who are "unlawful combatants", see Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at paras. 23-26). As we shall explain below, in the present context the significance of this is that someone who is an "unlawful combatant" is subject to the Fourth Geneva Convention, but according to the provisions of the aforesaid Convention it is possible to apply various restrictions to them and inter alia to detain them when they represent a threat to the security of the state.

In concluding these remarks it should be noted that although there are disagreements on principle between the parties before us as to the scope of the international laws that apply to "unlawful combatants", including the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the scope of the rights of which they may be deprived for security reasons under art. 5 of the Convention, we are not required to settle most of these disagreements. This is due to the state's declaration that in its opinion the Law complies with the most stringent requirements of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and because of the assumption that the appellants enjoy all the rights that are enshrined in this Convention (see paras. 334 and 382 of the state's response).

14.  In summary, in view of the purpose clause of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, according to which the Law was intended to regulate the status of "unlawful combatants" in a manner that is consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law, and bearing in mind the finding of this court in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4] that "unlawful combatants" constitute a subcategory of "civilians" under international law, we are able to determine that, contrary to the appellants' claim, the Law does not create a new reference group from the viewpoint of international law; it merely determines special provisions for the detention of "civilians" (according to the meaning of this term in international humanitarian law) who are "unlawful combatants".

The nature of internment of "Unlawful Combatants" under the Law - administrative detention

15. Now that we have determined that the definition of "unlawful combatant" in the Law is not incompatible with division into the categories  of "civilians" as opposed to "combatants"' in international law and in the case law of this court, let us proceed to examine the provisions of the Law that regulate the internment of unlawful combatants. S. 3(a) of the law provides the following:

 

'Internment of Unlawful Combatant

3. (a) Where the Chief of Staff has reasonable cause to believe that a person being held by state authorities is an unlawful combatant and that his release will harm state security, he may issue an order under his hand, directing that such person be interned at a place to be determined (hereinafter: "internment order"); an internment order shall include the grounds for internment, without prejudicing state security requirements.'

S. 7 of the Law adds a probative presumption in this context, which provides as follows:

'Presumption

 7.  For the purposes of this Law, a person who is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel or who has participated in hostile acts of such a force, either directly or indirectly, shall be deemed to be a person whose release would harm state security as long as the hostile acts of such force against the State of Israel have not yet ceased, unless proved otherwise.'

The appellants argued before us that the internment provisions in the Law create, de facto, a third category of detention, which is neither criminal arrest nor administrative detention, and which has no recognition in Israeli law or international law. We cannot accept this argument. The mechanism provided in the Law is a mechanism of administrative detention in every respect, which is carried out in accordance with an order of the Chief of Staff, who is an officer of the highest security authority. As we shall explain below, we are dealing with an administrative detention whose purpose is to protect state security by removing from the cycle of hostilities anyone who is a member of a terrorist organization or who is participating in the organization's operations against the State of Israel, in view of the threat that he represents to the security of the state and the lives of its inhabitants.

16.  It should be noted that the actual authority provided in the Law for the administrative detention of a "civilian" who is an "unlawful combatant" due to the threat that he represents to the security of the state is not contrary to the provisions of international humanitarian law. Thus art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which lists a variety of rights to which protected civilians are entitled, recognizes the possibility of a party to a dispute adopting "control and security measures" that are justified on security grounds. The wording of the aforesaid art. 27 is as follows:

'... the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.'

Regarding the types of control measures that are required for protecting state security, art. 41 of the Convention prohibits the adoption of control measures that are more severe than assigned residence or internment in accordance with the provisions of arts. 42-43 of the Convention. Art. 42 entrenches the rule that a "civilian" should not be interned unless this is "absolutely necessary" for the security of the detaining power. Art. 43 proceeds to obligate the detaining power to approve the detention by means of judicial or administrative review, and to hold periodic reviews of the continuing need for internment at least twice a year. Art. 78 of the Convention concerns the internment of protected civilians who are inhabitants of a territory that is held by an occupying power, and it states that it is possible to invoke various security measures against them for essential security reasons, including assigned residence and internment. Thus we see that the Fourth Geneva Convention allows the internment of protected "civilians" in administrative detention, when this is necessary for reasons concerning the essential security needs of the detaining power.

17.  In concluding these remarks we would point out that the appellants argued before us that the aforesaid provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are not applicable in their particular case. According to them, arts. 41-43 of the Convention concern the detention of protected civilians who are present in the territory of a party to a dispute, whereas the appellants were taken into detention when they were in the Gaza Strip in the period prior to the implementation of the disengagement plan, when the status of the Gaza Strip was that of territory under belligerent occupation.  They argue that art. 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention - relating to administrative detention in occupied territory - is not applicable to their case either, in view of the circumstances that arose after the implementation of the disengagement plan and the departure of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip. In view of this, the appellants argued that no provision of international humanitarian law exists that allows them to be placed in administrative detention, and therefore they argued that their detention under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is contrary to the provisions of international law.

Our reply to these arguments is that the detention provisions set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention were intended to apply and realize the basic principle contained in the last part of art. 27 of the Convention, which was cited above. As we have said, this article provides that the parties to a dispute may adopt security measures against protected civilians insofar as this is required due to the belligerence. The principle underlying all the detention provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention is that "civilians" may be detained for security reasons to the extent necessitated by the threat that they represent. According to the aforesaid Convention, the power of detention for security reasons exists, whether we are concerned with the inhabitants of an occupied territory or with foreigners who were apprehended in the territory of one of the states involved in the dispute. In the appellants' case, although Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip has ended, the hostilities between the Hezbollah organization and the State of Israel have not ceased; therefore, detention of the appellants within the territory of the State of Israel for security reasons is not inconsistent with the detention provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The cause of detention under the Law - the requirement of an individual threat to security and the effect of the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant"

18.  One of the first principles of our legal system is that administrative detention is conditional upon the existence of a cause of detention that derives from the individual threat posed by the detainee to the security of the state. This was discussed by President Barak when he said:

'[For cause of detention to exist] the circumstances of the detention must be such that they arouse, with respect to [the prisoner] - to him personally and not to someone else - concern that threatens security, whether because he was apprehended in the combat area when he was actually fighting or carrying out acts of terrorism, or because there is a concern that he is involved in fighting or terrorism' (Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at p. 367).

The requirement of an individual threat for the purpose of placing a person in administrative detention is an essential part of the protection of the constitutional right to dignity and personal liberty. This court has held in the past that administrative detention is basically a preventative measure; administrative detention was not intended to punish a person for acts that have already been committed or to deter others from committing them; its purpose is to prevent the tangible risk presented by the acts of the prisoner to the security of the state. It is this risk that justifies the use of the unusual measure of administrative detention that violates human liberty (see and cf. Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at pp. 370-372, and the references cited there).

19.  It will be noted that a personal threat to state security posed by the detainee is also a requirement under the principles of international humanitarian law. Thus, for example, in his interpretation of arts. 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Pictet emphasizes that the state should resort to the measure of detention only when it has serious and legitimate reasons to believe that the person concerned endangers its security. In his interpretation Pictet discusses membership in organizations whose goal is to harm the security of the state as a ground for deeming a person to be a threat, but he emphasizes the meta-principle that the threat is determined in accordance with the individual activity of that person. In Pictet's words:

'To justify recourse to such measures, the state must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real threat to its present or future security' (J.S. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958), at pp. 258-259).

20. No one here disputes that the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law should be interpreted in accordance with the aforesaid principles, whereby administrative detention is conditional upon proving the existence of cause that establishes an individual threat. Indeed, an examination of the provisions of the Law in accordance with the aforesaid principles reveals that the Law does not allow a person to be detained arbitrarily, and that the authority to detain by virtue of the Law is conditional upon the existence of a cause of detention that is based on the individual threat represented by the prisoner: first, the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law requires that it be proven that the prisoner himself took part in or belonged to a force that is carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel, the significance of which we shall address below. Secondly, s. 3(a) of the Law expressly provides that the cause of detention under the Law arises only with regard to someone for whom there is reasonable basis to believe that "his release will harm state security." S. 5(c) of the Law goes on to provide that the District Court will set aside a detention order that was issued pursuant to the Law only when the release of the prisoner "will not harm state security" (or when there are special reasons that justify the release). To this we should add that according to the purpose of the Law, administrative detention is intended to prevent the "unlawful combatant" from returning to the cycle of hostilities, indicating that he was originally a part of that cycle.

The dispute between the parties before us in this context concerns the level of the individual threat that the state must prove for the purpose of administrative detention under the Law. This dispute arises due to the combination of two main provisions of the Law: one is the provision in s. 2 of the Law, a simple reading of which states that an "unlawful combatant" is not only someone who takes a direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, but also a person who is a "member of a force perpetrating hostile acts." The other is the probative presumption in s. 7 of the Law, whereby a person who is a member of a force that perpetrates hostile acts against the State of Israel shall be regarded as someone whose release will harm the security of the state unless the contrary is proved. On the basis of a combination of these two provisions of the Law, the state argued that it is sufficient to prove that a person is a member of a terrorist organization in order to prove his individual danger to the security of the state in such a manner that provides cause for detention under the Law. By contrast, the appellants' approach was that relying upon abstract "membership" in an organization that perpetrates hostile acts against the State of Israel as a basis for administrative detention under the Law renders meaningless the requirement of proving an individual threat, contrary to constitutional principles and international humanitarian law.

21. Resolution of the aforesaid dispute is largely affected by the interpretation of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law. As we have said, the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" contains two alternatives: the first, "a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel", and the second, a person who is "a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel," when the person concerned does not satisfy the conditions granting prisoner of war status under international humanitarian law. These two alternatives should be interpreted with reference to the security purpose of the Law and in accordance with the constitutional principles and international humanitarian law that we discussed above, which require proof of an individual threat as grounds for administrative detention.

With respect to the interpretation of the first alternative concerning "a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel " - according to the legislative purpose and the principles that we have discussed, the obvious conclusion is that in order to intern a person it is not sufficient that he made a remote, negligible or marginal contribution to the hostilities against the State of Israel. In order to prove that a person is an "unlawful combatant", the state must prove that he contributed to the perpetration of hostile acts against the state, either directly or indirectly, in a manner that is likely to indicate his personal dangerousness. Naturally it is not possible to define such a contribution precisely and exhaustively, and the matter must be examined according to the circumstances of each case on its merits.

With respect to the second alternative  - a person who is "a member of a force carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel" - here too an interpretation that is consistent with the purpose of the Law and the constitutional principles and international humanitarian law discussed above is required: on the one hand it is insufficient to simply show some kind of tenuous connection with a terrorist organization in order to include the person within the cycle of hostilities in the broad meaning of this concept. On the other hand, in order to establish cause for the internment of a person who is a member of an active terrorist organization whose self-declared goal is to fight incessantly against the State of Israel, it is not necessary for that person to take a direct or indirect part in the hostilities themselves, and it is possible that his connection and contribution to the organization will be expressed in other ways that suffice to include him in the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense, such that his detention will be justified under the Law.

Thus we see that for the purpose of internment under the Law, the state must furnish administrative proof that the prisoner is an "unlawful combatant" with the meaning that we discussed, i.e. that the prisoner took a direct or indirect part that involved a contribution to the fighting  - a part that was neither negligible nor marginal in hostile acts against the State of Israel - or that the prisoner belonged to an organization that perpetrates hostile acts, in which case we should consider the prisoner's connection and the nature of his contribution to the cycle of hostilities of the organization in the broad sense of this concept.

It should be noted that proving the conditions of the definition of an "unlawful combatant" in the aforesaid sense naturally includes proof of an individual threat that derives from the type of involvement in the organization. It should also be noted that only after the state has proved that the prisoner fulfils the conditions of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" can it have recourse to the probative presumption set out in s. 7 of the Law, according to which the release of the prisoner will harm state security as long as the contrary has not been proved. It is therefore clear that s. 7 of the Law does not negate the obligation of the state to prove the threat represented by the prisoner, which derives from the type of involvement in the relevant organization, as required in order to prove him to be an "unlawful combatant" under s. 2 of the Law. In view of this, the inevitable conclusion is that the argument that the Law does not include a requirement of an individual threat goes too far and should be rejected.

Proving someone to be an "unlawful combatant" under the Law - the need for clear and convincing administrative evidence

22.  Above, we discussed the interpretation of the definition of "unlawful combatant". According to the aforesaid interpretation, the state is required to prove that the prisoner took a substantial, direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, or that he belonged to an organization that perpetrates hostile acts:  all this, taking into consideration his connection and the extent of his contribution to the organization's cycle of hostilities. In these circumstances internment of a person may be necessary in order to remove him from the cycle of hostilities that prejudices the security of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel. The question that arises here is this: what evidence is required in order to convince the court that the prisoner satisfies the conditions of the definition of an "unlawful combatant" with the aforesaid meaning?

This court has held in the past that since administrative detention is an unusual and extreme measure, and in view of its violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty, clear and convincing evidence is required in order to prove a security threat that establishes a cause for administrative detention (see Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at p. 372, where this was the ruling with regard to the measure of assigned residence; also cf. per Justice A. Procaccia in ADA 8607/04 Fahima v. State of Israel [14], at p. 264; HCJ 554/81 Beransa v. Central Commander [15]). It would appear that the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law should be interpreted similarly. Bearing in mind the importance of the right to personal liberty and in view of the security purpose of the said Law, the provisions of ss. 2 and 3 of the Law should be interpreted as obligating the state to prove, with clear and convincing administrative evidence, that even if the prisoner did not take a substantial, direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, he belonged to a terrorist organization and made a significant contribution to the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense, such that his administrative detention is justified in order to prevent his return to the aforesaid cycle of hostilities.

The significance of the requirement that there be clear and convincing evidence is that importance should be attached to the quantity and quality of the evidence against the prisoner and the degree to which the relevant intelligence information against him is current; this is necessary both to prove that the prisoner is an "unlawful combatant" under s. 2 of the Law and also for the purpose of the judicial review of the need to continue the detention, to which we shall return below. Indeed, the purpose of administrative detention is to prevent anticipated future threats to the security of the state; naturally we can learn of these threats from tangible evidence concerning the prisoner's acts in the past (see per President M. Shamgar in Beransa v. Central Commander [15], at pp. 249-250; HCJ 11026/05 A v. IDF Commander [16], at para. 5). Nevertheless, for the purposes of long-term internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, satisfactory administrative evidence is required, and a single piece of evidence about an isolated act carried out in the distant past is insufficient.

23. It follows that for the purposes of internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the state is required to provide clear and convincing evidence that even if the prisoner did not take a substantial direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, he belonged to a terrorist organization and contributed to the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense. It should be noted that this requirement is not always easy to prove, for to prove that someone is a member of a terrorist organization is not like proving that someone is a member of a regular army, due to the manner in which terrorist organizations work and how people join their ranks. In Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], the court held that unlike lawful combatants, unlawful combatants do not as a rule bear any clear and unambiguous signs that they belong to a terrorist organization (see ibid. [4], at para. 24). Therefore, the task of proving that a person belongs to an organization as aforesaid is not always an easy one. Nevertheless, the state is required to furnish sufficient administrative evidence to prove the nature of the prisoner's connection to the terrorist organization, and the degree or nature of his contribution to the broad cycle of combat or hostile acts carried out by the organization.

It should also be noted that in its pleadings before us, the state contended that the power of internment prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was intended to apply to members of terrorist organizations in a situation of ongoing belligerence in territory that is not subject to the full control of the State of Israel, where in the course of the hostilities a relatively large number of unlawful combatants may fall into the hands of the security forces and it is necessary to prevent them returning to the cycle of hostilities against Israel. The special circumstances that exist in situations of this kind require a different course of action from that which is possible within the territory of the state or in an area subject to belligerent occupation. In any case, it must be assumed that the said reality may pose additional difficulties in assembling evidence as to whether those persons detained by the state on the battle-field belong to a terrorist organization and how great a threat they represent.

The probative presumptions in ss. 7 and 8 of the Law

24. As we have said, s. 7 of the Law establishes a presumption whereby a person who satisfies the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" shall be regarded as someone whose release will harm the security of the state as long as the hostile acts against the State of Israel have not ceased. This is a rebuttable presumption, and the burden of rebutting it rests on the prisoner. We will emphasize what we said above, that the presumption in the said s. 7 is likely to be relevant only after the state has proved that the prisoner satisfies the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant". In such circumstances it is presumed that the release of the prisoner will harm state security as required by s. 3(a) of the Law.

As noted above, one of the appellants' main claims in this court was that the aforesaid presumption obviates the need to prove an individual threat from the prisoner, and that this is inconsistent with constitutional principles and international humanitarian law. The respondent countered this argument but went on to declare before us that as a rule, the state strives to present a broad and detailed evidentiary basis with regard to the threat presented by prisoners, and it has done so to date in relation to all prisoners under the Law, including in the appellants' case. The meaning of this assertion is that in practice, the state refrains from relying on the probative presumption in s. 7 of the Law and it proves the individual threat presented by prisoners on an individual basis, without resorting to the said presumption. It should be noted that this practice of the state is consistent with our finding that proving fulfillment of the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law involves proving the individual threat that arises from the type of involvement in an organization as explained above.

In any case, since the state has refrained until now from invoking the presumption in s. 7 of the Law, the questions of the extent to which the said presumption reduces the requirement of proving the individual threat for the purpose of internment under the Law, and whether this is an excessive violation of the constitutional right to liberty and of the principles of international humanitarian law, do not arise. We can therefore leave these questions undecided, for as long as the state produces prima facie evidence of the individual threat presented by the prisoner and does not rely on the presumption under discussion, the question of the effect of the presumption on proving an individual threat remains theoretical. It will be noted that should the state choose to invoke the presumption in s. 7 of the Law in the future rather than proving the threat to the required degree, it will be possible to bring the aforesaid questions before the court, since it will be necessary to resolve them concretely rather than theoretically (see CrimA 3660/03 Abeid v. State of Israel [17]; HCJ 1853/02 Navi v. Minister of Energy and National Infrastructures [18]; HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defence [19], at p. 250 {641}; HCJ 4827/05 Man, Nature and Law - Israel Environmental Protection Society v. Minister of the Interior [20], at para. 10; CA 7175/98 National Insurance Institute v. Bar Finance Ltd (in liquidation) [21]).

25. Regarding the probative presumption in s. 8 of the Law, this section states as follows:

'Determination regarding hostile acts

8. A determination of the Minister of Defence, by a certificate under his hand, that a particular force is perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel or that hostile acts of such force against the State of Israel have ceased or have not yet ceased, shall serve as proof in any legal proceedings, unless proved otherwise.

The appellants argued before us that the said probative presumption transfers the burden of proof to the prisoner in respect of a matter which he will never be able to refute, since it is subject to the discretion of the Minister of Defence. The state countered that in all the proceedings pursuant to the Law it has refrained from relying solely on the determination of the Minister of Defence, and it has presented the court and counsel for the prisoners with an updated and detailed opinion concerning the relevant organization to which the prisoner belongs. This was done in the case of the appellants too, who allegedly belong to the Hezbollah organization. In view of this, we are not required to decide on the fundamental questions raised by the appellants regarding the said s. 8.  In any case, it should be stated that in the situation prevailing in our region, in which the organizations that operate against the security of the State of Israel are well known to the military and security services, it should not be assumed that it is difficult to prove the existence and nature of the activity of hostile forces by means of a specific and updated opinion, in order to provide support for the determination of the Minister of Defence, as stated in s. 8 of the Law.

The Constitutional Examination

26.  Up to this point we have dealt with the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" and the conditions required for proving the existence of a cause for internment under the Law. This interpretation takes into account the language and purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, and it is compatible with the presumption of constitutionality and with the principles of international humanitarian law to which the purpose clause of the Law expressly refers.

Now that we have considered the scope of the Law's application and the nature of the power of internment by virtue thereof, we will proceed to the arguments of the parties concerning the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in its framework. These arguments were raised in the District Court and in this court in the course of the hearing on the appellants' internment, in the framework of an indirect attack on the said Law.

Violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty

27.  S. 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides as follows:

'Personal liberty

5.  There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.

There is no dispute between the parties before us that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law violates the constitutional right to personal liberty entrenched in the aforesaid s. 5. This is a significant and serious violation, in that the Law allows the use of the extreme measure of administrative detention, which involves depriving a person of his personal liberty. It should be clarified that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was admittedly intended to apply to a foreign entity belonging to a terrorist organization that operates against the state security (see para. 11 above). In Israel, however, the internment of unlawful combatants is carried out by the government authorities, who are bound in every case to respect the rights anchored in the Basic Law (see ss. 1 and 11 of the Basic Law). Accordingly, the violation inherent in the arrangements of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law should be examined in keeping with the criteria in the Basic Law.

Examining the violation of the constitutional right from the perspective of the limitation clause

28.  No one disputes that the right to personal liberty is a constitutional right with a central role in our legal system, lying at the heart of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (see Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at para. 20). It has been held in our case law that "personal liberty is a constitutional right of the first degree, and from a practical viewpoint it is also a condition for realizing other basic rights" (Tzemach v. Minister of Defence [16], at p. 251; see also HCJ 5319/97 Kogen v. Chief Military Prosecutor [22], at p. 81 {513}; CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. State of Israel [23], at para. 53; CrimA 4424/98 Silgado v. State of Israel [24], at pp. 539-540). Nevertheless, like all protected human rights the right to personal liberty is not absolute, and a violation of the right is sometimes necessary in order to protect essential public interests. The balancing formula in this context appears in the limitation clause in s. 8 of the Basic Law, which states:

'Violation of Rights

8. There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or according to a law as stated by virtue of explicit authorization therein. '

The question confronting us is whether the violation of the right to personal liberty engendered by the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law complies with the conditions of the limitation clause. The arguments of the parties before us focused on the requirements of proper purpose and proportionality, and these will be the focus of our deliberations as well.

29. At the outset, and before we examine the provisions of the Law from the perspective of the limitation clause, we should mention that the court will not hasten to intervene and set aside a statutory provision enacted by the legislature. The court is bound to uphold the law as a manifestation of the will of the people (HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset [25], at pp. 552-553; HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [26], at pp. 263-264; HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Knesset Speaker [27], at pp. 66-67). Thus the principle of the separation of powers finds expression: the legislative authority determines the measures that should be adopted in order to achieve public goals, whereas the judiciary examines whether these measures violate basic rights in contravention of the conditions set for this purpose in the Basic Law. It is the legislature that determines national policy and formulates it in statute, whereas the court scrutinizes the constitutionality of the legislation to reveal the extent to which it violates constitutional human rights (see per President A. Barak in Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [10], at para. 78). It has therefore been held in the case law of this court that when examining the legislation of the Knesset from the perspective of the limitation clause, the court will act "with judicial restraint, caution and moderation" (Menahem v. Minister of Transport [26], at p. 263). The court will not refrain from constitutional scrutiny of legislation, but it will act with caution and exercise its constitutional scrutiny in order to protect human rights within the constraints of the limitation clause, while refraining from reformulating the policy that the legislature saw fit to adopt. Thus the delicate balance between majority rule and the principle of the separation of powers on the one hand, and the protection of the basic values of the legal system and human rights on the other, will be preserved.

The requirement of a proper purpose

30. According to the limitation clause, a statute that violates a constitutional right must have a proper purpose. It has been held in our case law that a legislative purpose is proper if it is designed to protect human rights, including by determining a reasonable and fair balance between the rights of individuals with conflicting interests, or if it serves an essential public purpose, an urgent social need or an important social concern whose purpose is to provide an infrastructure for coexistence and a social framework that seeks to protect and promote human rights (see ibid. [26], at p. 264; HCJ 6893/05 Levy v. Government of Israel [28], at pp. 889-890; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [29], at pp. 52-53, {206}). It has also been held that not every purpose justifies a violation of constitutional basic rights, and that the essence of the violated right and the magnitude of the violation are likely to have ramifications for the purpose that is required to justify the violation.

In our remarks above we explained that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, according to its wording and its legislative history, was intended to prevent persons who threaten the security of the state due to their activity or their membership in terrorist organizations that carry out hostile acts against the State of Israel from returning to the cycle of hostilities (see para. 6 above). This legislative purpose is a proper one. Protecting state security is an urgent and even essential public need in the harsh reality of unremitting, murderous terrorism that harms innocent people indiscriminately. It is difficult to exaggerate the security importance of preventing members of terrorist organizations from returning to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel in a period of relentless terrorist activity that threatens the lives of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel. In view of this, the purpose of the Law under discussion may well justify a significant and even serious violation of human rights, including the right to personal liberty. Thus was discussed by President A. Barak when he said that -

'There is no alternative - in a freedom and security seeking democracy - to striking a balance between liberty and dignity on the one hand and security on the other. Human rights should not become a tool for depriving the public and the state of security. A balance - a delicate and difficult balance - is required between the liberty and dignity of the individual and state and public security' (A v. Minister of Defence [1], at p.741).

 (See also Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at p. 383; per Justice D. Dorner in HCJ 5627/02 Saif v. Government Press Office [30],  at pp. 76-77, {para.6 at pp. 197-198}; EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Tenth Knesset [31], at p. 310 {160}).

The purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is therefore a proper one. But this is not enough. Within the framework of constitutional scrutiny, we are required to proceed to examine whether the violation of the right to personal liberty does not exceed what is necessary for realizing the purpose of the Law. We shall now examine this question.

The requirement that the measure violating a human right is not excessive

31. The main issue that arises with respect to the constitutionality of the Law concerns the proportionality of the arrangements it prescribes. As a rule, it is customary to identify three subtests that constitute fundamental criteria for determining the proportionality of a statutory act that violates a constitutional human right: the first is the rational connection test, whereby the legislative measure violating the constitutional right and the purpose that the Law is intended to realize must be compatible; the second is the least harmful measure test, which requires that the legislation violate the constitutional right to the smallest degree possible in order to achieve the purpose of the Law; and the third is the test of proportionality in the narrow sense, according to which the violation of the constitutional right must be commensurate with the social benefit it bestows (see Menahem v. Minister of Transport [26], at p. 279; Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [10], at paras. 65-75; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [6], at pp. 839-840).

It has been held in the case law of this court that the test of proportionality, with its three subtests, is not a precise test since by its very nature it involves assessment and evaluation. The subtests sometimes overlap and each of them allows the legislature a margin of discretion. There may be circumstances in which the choice of an alternative measure that violates the constitutional right slightly less results in a significant reduction in the realization of the purpose or the benefit derived from it; it would not be right therefore to obligate the legislature to adopt the aforesaid measure. Consequently this court has accorded recognition to "constitutional room for maneuver" which is also called the "zone of proportionality". The bounds of the constitutional room for maneuver are determined by the court in each case on its merits and according to its circumstances, bearing in mind the nature of the right that is being violated and the extent of the violation as opposed to the nature and substance of the competing rights or interests. This court will not substitute its own discretion for the criteria chosen by the legislature and will refrain from intervention as long as the measure chosen by the legislature falls within the zone of proportionality. The court will only intervene when the chosen measure significantly departs from the bounds of the constitutional room for maneuver and is clearly disproportionate (see CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [32], at p. 438; HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [33]; AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members' Club v. Haifa Municipality [34], at p. 815; Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset [25], at pp. 550-551).

In the circumstances of the case before us, the violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty is significant and even severe in its extent. Nevertheless, as we said above, the legislative purpose of removing "unlawful combatants" from the cycle of hostilities in order to protect state security is essential in view of the reality of murderous terrorism that threatens the lives of the residents and citizens of the State of Israel. In these circumstances, I think that the existence of relatively wide room for legislative maneuver should be recognized, to allow the selection of the suitable measure for realizing the purpose of the Law.

The First Subtest: A Rational Connection Between the Measure and the Purpose

32.  The measure chosen by the legislature in order to realize the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is administrative detention. As we explained in para. 21 above, for the purpose of internment under the Law the state must provide clear and convincing proof that the prisoner is an "unlawful combatant" within the meaning that we discussed. The state is therefore required to prove the personal threat presented by the prisoner, deriving from his particular form of involvement in the organization. Administrative detention constitutes a suitable means of averting the security threat presented by the prisoner, in that it prevents the "unlawful combatant" from returning to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel and thereby serves the purpose of the Law. Therefore the first subtest of proportionality - the rational connection test - is satisfied.

The main question concerning the proportionality of the Law under discussion concerns the second subtest, i.e. the question of whether there exist alternative measures that involve a lesser violation of the constitutional right. In examining this question, we should first consider the appellants' argument that there are more proportionate measures for realizing the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Next we should consider the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law and examine whether they exceed the zone of proportionality. Finally we should examine the Law in its entirety and examine whether the combination of arrangements that were prescribed in the Law fulfils the test of proportionality in the narrow sense, i.e. whether the violation of the right to personal liberty is reasonably commensurate with the public benefit that arises from it in realizing the legislative purpose.

The argument that there are alternative measures to detention under the Law

33.  The appellants' main argument concerning proportionality was that alternative measures to administrative detention exist by virtue of the Law, involving a lesser violation of the right to liberty. In this context, the appellants raised two main arguments: first, it was argued that for the purpose of realizing the legislative purpose it is not necessary to employ the measure of administrative detention, and the appellants ought to be recognized as prisoners of war; alternatively, recourse should be had to the measure of trying the appellants on criminal charges. Secondly, it was argued that even if administrative detention is necessary in the appellants' case, this should be carried out under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, 5739-1979, for according to their argument, the violation that it involves is more proportionate than that of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

The first argument - that the appellants should be declared prisoners of war - must be rejected. In HCJ 2967/00 Arad v. Knesset [35], which considered the case of Lebanese prisoners, a similar argument to the one raised in the present appellants' case was rejected:

'We agree with the position of Mr Nitzan that the Lebanese prisoners should not be regarded as prisoners of war. It is sufficient that they do not satisfy the provisions of art. 4(2)(d) of the Third Geneva Convention, which provides that one of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to comply with the definition of "prisoners of war" is "that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." The organizations to which the Lebanese prisoners belonged are terrorist organizations, which operate contrary to the laws and customs of war. Thus, for example, these organizations deliberately attack civilians and shoot from the midst of the civilian population, which they use as a shield. All of these are operations that are contrary to international law. Indeed, Israel's consistent position over the years was not to regard the various organizations such as Hezbollah as organizations to which the Third Geneva Convention applies. We have found no reason to intervene in this position' (ibid. [35], at p. 191).

 (See also CrimApp 8780/06 Sarur v. State of Israel [36]; HCJ 403/81 Jabar v. Military Commander [37]; and also HCJ 102/82 Tzemel v. Minister of Defence [38], at pp. 370-371).

Similar to what was said in Arad v. Knesset [35], in the circumstances of the case before us, too, the appellants should not be accorded prisoner of war status, since they do not satisfy the conditions of art. 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, and primarily, the condition concerning the observance of the laws of war.

The appellants' argument that a more proportionate measure would be to try the prisoners on criminal charges should also be rejected, in view of the fact that trying a person on criminal charges is different in essence and purpose from the measure of administrative detention. Putting a person on trial is intended to punish him for acts committed in the past, and it is dependent upon the existence of evidence that can be brought before a court in order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Administrative detention, on the other hand, was not intended to punish but to prevent activity that is prohibited by law and endangers the security of the state. The quality of evidence that is required for administrative detention is different from that required for a criminal trial. Moreover, as a rule recourse to the extreme measure of administrative detention is justified in circumstances where other measures, including the conduct of a criminal trial, are impossible, due to the absence of sufficient admissible evidence or the impossibility of revealing privileged sources, or when a criminal trial does not provide a satisfactory solution to averting the threat posed to the security of the state in circumstances in which, after serving his sentence, the person is likely to revert to being a security risk (see, inter alia, ADA 4794/05 Ufan v. Minister of Defence [39]; ADA 7/94 Ben-Yosef v. State of Israel [40]; ADA 8788/03 Federman v. Minister of Defence [41], at pp. 185-189; Fahima v. State of Israel [14], at pp. 263-264). In view of all the above, it cannot be said that a criminal trial constitutes an alternative measure for realizing the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

34.  As we have said, the appellants' alternative claim before us was that even if it is necessary to place them in administrative detention, this should be done pursuant to the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law. According to this argument, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law violates the right to personal liberty to a lesser degree than the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Thus, for example, it is argued that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law requires an individual threat as a cause for detention, without introducing presumptions that transfer the burden of proof to the prisoner, as provided in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Moreover, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law requires a judicial review to be conducted within forty-eight hours of the time of detention, and a periodic review every three months, whereas the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law allows a prisoner to be brought before a judge as much as fourteen days after the time he is detained, and it requires a periodic review only once every half year; under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law,  the power of detention is conditional upon the existence of a state of emergency in the State of Israel, whereas internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law does not set such a condition and it is even unlimited in time, apart from the stipulation that the internment will end by the time that the hostilities against the State of Israel have ceased. To this it should be added that detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law is effected by an order of the Minister of Defence, whereas internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants is effected by an order of the Chief of Staff, who is authorised to delegate his authority to an officer with the rank of major-general. Taking into consideration all the above, the appellants' argument before us is that detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law constitutes a more proportionate alternative than administrative detention under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

35.  Prima facie the appellants are correct in their argument that in certain respects the arrangements prescribed in the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law violate the right to personal liberty to a lesser degree than the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. However, we accept the state's argument in this context that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is intended for a different purpose than that of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law. In view of the different purposes, the two laws contain different arrangements, such that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law does not constitute an alternative measure for achieving the purpose of the Law under discussion in this case. Let us clarify our position.

The Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law applies in a time of emergency and in general, its purpose is to prevent threats to state security arising from internal entities (i.e., citizens and residents of the state). Accordingly, the Law prescribes the power of administrative detention that is usually invoked with regard to isolated individuals who threaten state security and whose detention is intended to last for relatively short periods of time, apart from exceptional cases. On the other hand, as we clarified in para. 11 above, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is intended to apply to foreign entities who operate within the framework of terrorist organizations against the security of the state. The Law was intended to apply at a time of organized and persistent hostile acts against Israel on the part of terrorist organizations. The purpose of the Law is to prevent persons who belong to these organizations or who take part in hostile acts under their banner from returning to the cycle of hostilities, as long as the hostilities against the State of Israel continue. In order to achieve the aforesaid purpose, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law contains arrangements that are different from those in the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law (we will discuss the question of the proportionality of these arrangements below). Moreover, according to the state, the power of detention prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was intended to apply to members of terrorist organizations in a persistent state of war in a territory that is not a part of Israel, where a relatively large number of enemy combatants is likely to fall into the hands of the military forces during the fighting. The argument is that these special circumstances justify recourse to measures that are different from those usually employed.

Thus we see that even though the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law and the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law prescribe a power of administrative detention whose purpose is to prevent a threat to state security, the specific purposes of the aforesaid laws are different and therefore the one cannot constitute an alternative measure for achieving the purpose of the other. In the words of the trial court: "We are dealing with a horizontal plane on which there are two acts of legislation, one next to the other. Each of the two was intended for a different purpose and therefore, in circumstances such as our case, they are not alternatives to one another" (p. 53 of the decision of the District Court of 19 July 2006). It should be clarified that in appropriate circumstances, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law could well be used to detain foreigners who are not residents or citizens of the State of Israel. Despite this, the premise is that the specific purposes of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law and the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law are different, and therefore it cannot be determined in a sweeping manner that detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law constitutes a more appropriate and proportionate alternative to detention under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

36.  In concluding these remarks it will be mentioned that the appellants, who are inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, were first detained in the years 2002-2003, when the Gaza Strip was subject to belligerent occupation. At that time, the administrative detention of the appellants was carried out under the security legislation that was in force in the Gaza Strip. A change occurred in September 2005, when Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip ended and the territory ceased to be subject to belligerent occupation (see para. 11 above). One of the ancillary consequences of the end of the Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip was the repeal of the security legislation that was in force there. Consequently, the Chief of Staff issued detention orders for the appellants under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

In view of the nullification of the security legislation in the Gaza Strip, no question arises in relation to inhabitants of that region as to whether administrative detention by virtue of security legislation may constitute a suitable and more proportionate measure than internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Nonetheless, I think it noteworthy that the aforesaid question may arise with regard to inhabitants of the territories that are under the belligerent occupation of the State of Israel (Judaea and Samaria). As emerges from the abovesaid in para. 11, prima facie I tend to the opinion that both under the international humanitarian law that governs the matter (art. 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and according to the test of proportionality, administrative detention of inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria should be carried out by virtue of the current security legislation that is in force in the territories, and not by virtue of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law in Israel. This issue does not, however, arise in the circumstances of the case before us and therefore I think it right to leave it for future consideration.

Proportionality of the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law

37.  In view of all of the reasons elucidated above, we have reached the conclusion that the measures identified by the appellants in their pleadings cannot constitute alternative measures to administrative detention by virtue of the Law under discussion. The appellants further argued that the specific arrangements prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law violate the right to personal liberty excessively, and more proportionate arrangements that violate personal liberty to a lesser degree could have been set. Let us therefore proceed to examine this argument with regard to the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law.

(1)        Conferring the power of detention on military personnel

38.       S. 3(a) of the Law, cited in para. 15 above, provides that an internment order by virtue of the Law will be issued by the Chief of Staff "under his hand" and will include the grounds for the internment "without prejudicing state security requirement." S. 11 of the Law goes on to provide that "the Chief of Staff may delegate his powers under this Law to any officer of the rank of major-general that he may determine." According to the appellants, conferring the power of detention by virtue of the Law on the Chief of Staff, who may delegate it to an officer of the rank of major-general, is an excessive violation of the prisoners' right to personal liberty. In this context, the appellants emphasized that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law confers the power of administrative detention on the Minister of Defence only.

In the circumstances of the case, we have come to the conclusion that the state is correct in its argument that conferring the power of detention on the Chief of Staff or an officer of the rank of major-general falls within the zone of proportionality and we should not intervene. First, as we said above, the specific purposes of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law are different, and there is therefore a difference in the arrangements prescribed in the two Laws. Since the Law under consideration before us was intended to apply, inter alia, in a situation of combat and prolonged military activity against terrorist organizations in a territory that is not subject to the total control of the State of Israel, there is logic in establishing an arrangement that confers the power of internment on military personnel of the highest rank. Secondly, it should be made clear that the provisions of international law do not preclude the power of detention of the military authority responsible for the security of a territory in which there are protected civilians. This may support the conclusion that conferring the power of detention on the Chief of Staff or an officer of the rank of major-general does not, in itself, violate the right to personal liberty disproportionately.

(2)        The prisoner's right to a hearing after an internment order is issued

39.  Ss. 3(b) and 3(c) of the Law provide as follows:

Internment of unlawful combatant

3.   (a) ...

(b) An internment order may be granted in the absence of the person held by the state authorities.

 (c) An internment order shall be brought to the attention of the prisoner at the earliest possible date, and he shall be given an opportunity to put his submissions in respect of the order before an officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel to be appointed by the Chief of General Staff; the submissions of the prisoner shall be recorded by the officer and shall be brought before the Chief of General Staff; if the Chief of General Staff finds, after reviewing the submissions of the prisoner, that the conditions prescribed in subsection (a) have not been fulfilled, he shall quash the internment order.

According to s. 3(b) above, an internment order may be granted by the Chief of Staff (or a major-general appointed by him) without the prisoner being present. S. 3(c) of the Law goes on to provide that the order shall be brought to the attention of the prisoner "at the earliest possible date" and that he shall be given a hearing before an army officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel, in order to allow him to put his submissions; the prisoner's submissions shall be recorded by the officer and brought before the Chief of Staff (or the major-general acting for him). According to the Law, if after reviewing the prisoner's arguments the Chief of Staff (or the major-general) is persuaded that the conditions for detention under the Law are not fulfilled, the internment order shall be quashed.

The appellants' argument in this context was that this arrangement violates the right to personal liberty excessively in view of the fact that the prisoner may put his submissions only after the event, i.e., after the internment order has been issued, and only before an officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel, who will pass the submissions on to the Chief of Staff (or a major-general), in order that they reconsider their position. According to the appellants, it is the person who issues the order - the Chief of Staff or the major-general - who should hear the prisoner's arguments, even before the order is issued. These arguments should be rejected, for several reasons: first, it is established case law that the person who makes the decision does not need to conduct the hearing personally, and that it is also permissible to conduct the hearing before someone who has been appointed for this purpose by the person making the decision, provided that the person making the decision - in our case the Chief of Staff or the major-general acting on his behalf - will have before him all of the arguments and facts that were raised at the hearing (see HCJ 5445/93 Ramla Municipality v. Minister of the Interior [42], at p. 403; HCJ 2159/97 Ashkelon Coast Regional Council v. Minister of the Interior [43], at pp. 81-82). Secondly, from a practical viewpoint, establishing a duty to conduct hearings in advance, in the personal presence of the Chief of Staff or the major-general in times of combat and in circumstances in which there are liable to be many detentions in the combat zone as well, may present  significant logistical problems. Moreover, conducting a hearing in the manner proposed by the appellants is contrary to the purpose of the Law, which is to allow the immediate removal of the "unlawful combatants" from the cycle of hostilities in an effective manner. It should be emphasized that the hearing under s. 3(c) of the Law is a preliminary process whose main purpose is to prevent mistakes of identity. As will be explained below, in addition to the preliminary hearing, the Law requires that a judicial review take place before a District Court judge no later than fourteen days from the date of issue of the internment order, thereby lessening the violation claimed by the appellants. In view of all of the above, it cannot be said that the arrangement prescribed in the Law with respect to the hearing falls outside the zone of proportionality.

 (3)      Judicial review of internmentunder the Law

40.  S. 5 of the Law, entitled "Judicial Review", prescribes the following arrangement in subsecs. (a) - (d):

5.  (a) A prisoner shall be brought before a judge of the District Court no later than fourteen days after the date of granting the internment order; where the judge of the District Court finds that the conditions prescribed in s. 3(a) have not been fulfilled he shall quash the internment order.

(b) Where the prisoner is not brought before the District Court and where the hearing has not commenced before it within fourteen days of the date of granting the internment order, the prisoner shall be released unless there exists another ground for his detention under provisions of any law.

            (c)  Once every six months from the date of issue of an order under s. 3(a) the prisoner shall be brought before a judge of the District Court; where the Court finds that his release will not harm State security or that there are special grounds justifying his release, it shall quash the internment order.

(d) A decision of the District Court under this section is subject to appeal within thirty days to the Supreme Court, a single judge of which shall hear the appeal with; the Supreme Court shall have all the powers vested in the District Court under this Law.

The appellants argued before us that the judicial review process prescribed in s. 5 violates the right to personal liberty excessively, for two main reasons: first, under s. 5(a) of the Law, the prisoner should be brought before a District Court judge no later than fourteen days from the date of his detention. According to the appellants, this is a long period of time that constitutes an excessive violation of the right to personal liberty and of the prisoner's right of access to the courts. In this context the appellants argued that in view of the constitutional status of the right to personal liberty and in accordance with the norms applicable in international law, the legislature should have determined that the prisoner be brought to a judicial review "without delay." Secondly, it was argued that the period of time set in s. 5(c) of the Law for conducting periodic judicial review of the internment - every six months - is too long as well as disproportionate. By way of comparison, the appellants pointed out that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law prescribes in this regard a period of time that is shorter by half - only three months. In reply, the state argued that in view of the purpose of the Law, the periods of time set in s. 5 are proportionate and they are consistent with the provisions of international law.

41. S. 5 of the Law is based on the premise that judicial review constitutes an integral part of the administrative detention process. In this context it has been held in the past that -

'Judicial intervention in the matter of detention orders is essential. Judicial intervention is a safeguard against arbitrariness; it is required by the principle of the rule of law…. It ensures that the delicate balance between the liberty of the individual and the security of the public - a balance that lies at the heart of the laws of detention - will be maintained' (per President A. Barak in Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at page 368).

The main thrust of the dispute regarding the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Law concerns the proportionality of the periods of time specified therein.

With respect to the periods of time between the internment of the prisoner and the initial judicial review of the internment order, it has been held in the case law of this court that in view of the status of the right to personal liberty and in order to prevent mistakes of fact and of discretion whose price is likely to be a person's loss of liberty without just cause, the administrative prisoner should be brought before a judge "as soon as possible" in the circumstances (per President M. Shamgar in HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Defence [44], at pp. 819-820). It should be noted that this case law is consistent with the arrangements prevailing in international law. International law does not specify the number of days during which it is permitted to detain a person without judicial intervention; rather, it lays down a general principle that can be applied in accordance with the circumstances of each case on its merits. According to the aforesaid general principle, the decision on internment should be brought before a judge or another person with judicial authority "promptly" (see art. 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which is regarded as being of a customary nature; see also the references cited in Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at pp. 369-370). A similar principle was established in arts. 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention whereby the judicial (or administrative) review of a detention decision should be made "as soon as possible" (as stated in art. 43 of the Convention) or "with the least possible delay" (as stated in art. 78 of the Convention). Naturally the question as to what is the earliest possible date for bringing a prisoner before a judge depends upon the circumstances of the case.

In the present case, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law provides that the date for conducting the initial judicial review is "no later than fourteen days from the date of granting the internment order." The question that arises in this context is whether the said period of time violates the right to personal liberty excessively. The answer to this question lies in the purpose of the Law and in the special circumstances of the particular internment, as well as in the interpretation of the aforesaid provision of the Law. As we have said, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law applies to foreign entities who belong to terrorist organizations and who are engaged in ongoing hostilities against the State of Israel. As noted, the Law was intended to apply, inter alia, in circumstances in which a state of belligerence exists in territory that is not a part of Israel, in the course of which a relatively large number of enemy combatants may fall into the hands of the military forces. In view of these special circumstances, we do not agree that the maximum period of time of fourteen days for holding an initial judicial review of the detention order departs from the zone of proportionality in such a way as to justify our intervention by shortening the maximum period prescribed in the Law. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the period of time prescribed in the Law is a maximum period and it does not exempt the state from making an effort to conduct a preliminary judicial review of the prisoner's case as soon as possible in view of all the circumstances. In other words, although we find no cause to intervene in the proportionality of the maximum period prescribed in the Law, the power of detention in each specific case should be exercised proportionately, and fourteen whole days should not be allowed to elapse before conducting an initial judicial review where it is possible to conduct a judicial review earlier (cf. ADA 334/04 Darkua v. Minister of the Interior [45], at p. 371, in which it was held that even though under the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, a person taken into custody must be brought before the Custody Review Tribunal no later than fourteen days from the date on which he was taken into custody, the whole of the aforesaid fourteen days should not be used when there is no need to do so).

In concluding these remarks it should be noted that s. 3(c) of the Law, cited above, provides that "An internment order shall be brought to the attention of the prisoner at the earliest possible date, and he shall be given an opportunity to put his submissions in respect of the order before an officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel to be appointed by the Chief of General Staff" [emphasis added - D.B.]. Thus we see that although s. 5(a) of the Law prescribes a maximum period of fourteen days for an initial judicial review, s. 3(c) of the Law imposes an obligation to conduct a hearing for the prisoner before a military officer at the earliest possible time after the order is issued. The aforesaid hearing is certainly not a substitute for a review before a judge of the District Court, which is an independent and objective judicial instance, but the very fact of conducting an early hearing as soon as possible after the issuing of the order may somewhat reduce the concern over an erroneous or ostensibly unjustified detention, which will lead to an excessive violation of the right to liberty.

42.  As stated, the appellants' second argument concerned the frequency of the periodic judicial review of internment under the Law. According to s. 5(c) of the Law, the prisoner must be brought before a District Court judge once every six months from the date of issuing the order; if the court finds that the release of the prisoner will not harm state security or that there are special reasons that justify his release, the court will quash the internment order.

The appellants' argument before us was that a frequency of once every six months is insufficient and it disproportionately violates the right to personal liberty. Regarding this argument, we should point out that the periodic review of the necessity of continuing the administrative detention once every six months is consistent with the requirements of international humanitarian Law. Thus, art. 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides:

'Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.'

It emerges from art. 43 that periodic review of a detention order "at least twice yearly" is consistent with the requirements of international humanitarian law, in a manner that supports the proportionality of the arrangement prescribed in s. 5(c) of the Law. Moreover, whereas art. 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention considers an administrative review that is carried out by an administrative body to be sufficient, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law provides that it is a District Court judge who must conduct a judicial review of the internment orders under the Law, and his decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court which will hear the appeal with a single judge (s. 5(d) of the Law). In view of all this, it cannot be said that the arrangement prescribed in the Law with regard to the nature and frequency of the judicial review violates the constitutional right to personal liberty excessively.

 (4) Departure from the rules of evidence and reliance upon privileged evidence within the framework of proceedings under the Law

43.  S. 5(e) of the Law provides as follows:

'Judicial review 

  5. ...

(e) It shall be permissible to depart from the laws of evidence in proceedings under this Law, for reasons to be recorded; the court may admit evidence, even in the absence of the prisoner or his legal representative, or not disclose such evidence to the aforesaid if, after having reviewed the evidence or heard the submissions, even in the absence of the prisoner or his legal representative,  it is convinced that disclosure of the evidence to the prisoner or his legal representative is likely to harm state security or public security; this provision shall not derogate from any right not to give evidence under Chapter 3 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971.

The appellants' argument before us was that the arrangement prescribed in the aforesaid s. 5(e) disproportionately violates the right to personal liberty, since it allows the judicial review of an internment order by virtue of the Law to depart from the laws of evidence and it allows evidence to be heard ex parte in the absence of the prisoner and his legal representative and without it being disclosed to them.

With respect to this argument it should be noted that by their very nature, administrative detention proceedings are based on administrative evidence concerning security matters. The nature of administrative detention for security reasons requires recourse to evidence that does not satisfy the admissibility tests of the laws of evidence and that therefore may not be submitted in a regular criminal trial. Obviously the confidentiality of the sources of the information is important, and it is therefore often not possible to disclose all the intelligence material that is used to prove the grounds for detention. Reliance on inadmissible administrative evidence and on privileged material for reasons of state security lies at the heart of administrative detention, for if there were sufficient admissible evidence that could be shown to the prisoner and brought before the court, as a rule the measure of criminal indictment should be chosen (see Federman v. Minister of Defence [41], at p. 185-186). There is no doubt that a proceeding that is held ex parte in order to present privileged evidence to the court has many drawbacks. But the security position in which we find ourselves in view of the persistent hostilities against the security of the State of Israel requires recourse to tools of this kind when granting a detention order under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law or the security legislation in areas under military control.

It should be emphasized that in view of the problems inherent in relying upon administrative evidence for the purpose of detention, over the years the judiciary has developed a tool for control and scrutiny of intelligence material, to the extent possible in a proceeding of the kind that takes place in judicial review of administrative detention. In the framework of these proceedings the judge is required to question the validity and credibility of the administrative evidence that is brought before him and to assess its weight. In this regard the following was held in HCJ 4400/98 Braham v. Justice Colonel Shefi [46], at p. 346, per Justice T. Or:

'The basic right of every human being as such to liberty is not an empty slogan. The protection of this basic value requires that we imbue the process of judicial review of administrative detention with meaningful content. In this framework, I am of the opinion that the professional judge can and should consider not only the question of whether, prima facie, the competent authority was authorized to decide what it decided on the basis of the material that was before it; the judge should also consider the question of the credibility of the material that was submitted as a part of his assessment of the weight of the material. Indeed, that fact that certain "material" is valid administrative evidence does not exempt the judge from examining the degree of its credibility against the background of the other evidence and all the circumstances of the case. In this context, the "administrative evidence" label does not exempt the judge from having to demand and receive explanations from those authorities that are capable of providing them. To say otherwise would mean weakening considerably the process of judicial review, and allowing the deprivation of liberty for prolonged periods on the basis of flimsy and insufficient material. Such an outcome is unacceptable in a legal system that regards human liberty as a basic right.'

It has also been held in our case law that in view of the problems inherent in submitting privileged evidence ex parte, the court that conducts a judicial review of an administrative detention is required to act with caution and great precision when examining the material that is brought before it for its eyes only. In such circumstances, the court has a duty to act with extra caution and to examine the privileged material brought before it from the viewpoint of the prisoner, who has not seen the material and cannot argue against it. In the words of Justice A. Procaccia: "… the court has a special duty to act with great care when examining privileged material and to act as the 'mouth' of the prisoner where he has not seen the material against him and cannot defend himself" (HCJ 11006/04 Kadri v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [47], at para. 6; see also CrimApp 3514/97 A v. State of Israel [48]).

Thus we see that in view of the reliance on administrative evidence and the admission of privileged evidence ex parte, the court conducting a judicial review under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is required to act with caution and precision in examining the material brought before it. The scope of the judicial review cannot be defined ab initio and it is subject to the discretion of the judge, who will take into account the circumstances of each case on its merits, such as the quantity, level and quality of the privileged material brought before him for his inspection, as opposed to the activity attributed to the prisoner that gives rise to the allegation that he represents a threat to state security. In a similar context the following was held:

'Information relating to several incidents is not the same as information concerning an isolated incident; information from one source is not the same as information from several sources; and information that is entirely based on the statements of agents and informers only is not the same as information that is also supported or corroborated by documents submitted by the security or intelligence services that derive from employing special measures' (per Justice E. Mazza in HCJ 5994/03 Sadar v. IDF Commander in West Bank [49], at para.  6).

Considering all the aforesaid reasons, the requisite conclusion is that reliance on inadmissible evidence and privileged evidentiary material is an essential part of administrative detention. In view of the fact that the quality and quantity of the administrative evidence that supports the cause of detention is subject to judicial review, and in view of the caution with which the court is required to examine the privileged material brought before it ex parte, it cannot be said that the arrangement prescribed in s. 5(e) of the Law, per se, violates the rights of prisoners disproportionately.

(5)     Prisoner's meeting with his lawyer

44. S. 6 of the Law, which is entitled "Right of prisoner to meet with lawyer"' provides the following:

'6. (a) The internee may meet with a lawyer at the

earliest possible date on which such a meeting may be held without harming state security requirements, but no later than seven days prior to his being brought before a judge of the District Court, in accordance with the provisions of s. 5(a).

(b) The Minister of Justice may, by order, confine the right of representation in the proceedings under this Law to a person authorized to act as defence counsel in the military courts under an unrestricted authorization, pursuant to the provisions of s. 318(c) of the Military Justice Law, 5715-1955.'

The appellants raised two main arguments against the proportionality of the arrangements prescribed in the aforesaid s. 6: first, it was argued that under s. 6(a) of the Law, it is possible to prevent a meeting of a prisoner with his lawyer for a period of up to seven days, during which a hearing is supposed to be conducted for the prisoner under s. 3(c) of the Law. It is argued that conducting a hearing without allowing the prisoner to consult a lawyer first is likely to render the hearing meaningless in a manner that constitutes an excessive violation of the right to personal liberty. Secondly, it was argued that s. 6(b) of the Law, which makes representation dependent upon an unrestricted authorization for the lawyer to act as defence counsel, also violates the rights of the prisoner disproportionately.

Regarding the appellants' first argument: no one disputes that the right of the prisoner to be represented by a lawyer constitutes a major basic right that has been recognized in our legal system since its earliest days (see in this regard CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [50], at para. 14, and the references cited there). According to both the basic principles of Israeli law and the principles of international law, the rule is that a prisoner should be allowed to meet with his lawyer as a part of the right of every human being to personal liberty (see the remarks of President A. Barak in Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at pp. 380-381). Therefore, s. 6(a) of the Law provides that a prisoner should be allowed to meet with his lawyer "at the earliest possible date." It should, however, be recalled that like all human rights, the right to legal counsel, too, is not absolute, and it may be restricted if this is essential for protecting the security of the state (see HCJ 3412/93 Sufian v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [51], at p. 849; HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiah v. Israel Police [52], at pp. 212-213). As such, s. 6(a) of the Law provides that the meeting of the prisoner with his lawyer may be postponed for security reasons, but no more than seven days may elapse before he is brought before a District Court judge pursuant to s. 5(a) of the Law. Since pursuant to the aforementioned s. 5(a) a prisoner must be brought before a District Court judge no later than fourteen days from the date on which the internment order is granted, this means that a meeting between a prisoner and his lawyer may not be prevented for more than seven days from the time the detention order is granted against him.

Bearing in mind the security purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and in view of the fact that the aforesaid Law was intended to apply in prolonged states of hostilities and even in circumstances where the army is fighting in a territory that is not under Israeli control, it cannot be said that a maximum period of seven days during which a meeting of a prisoner with a lawyer may be prevented when security needs so require falls outside the zone of proportionality (see and cf. Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], where it was held that "[a]s long as the hostilities continue, there is no basis for allowing a prisoner to meet with a lawyer," (at p. 381); see also HCJ 2901/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [53]).

In addition to the above, two further points should be made: first, even though the prisoner may be asked to make his submissions in the course of the hearing under s. 3(c) of the Law without having first consulted a lawyer, s. 6(a) of the Law provides that the state should allow the prisoner to meet with his defence counsel "no later than seven days prior to his being brought before a judge of the District Court…." It follows that as a rule, the prisoner is represented in the process of judicial review of the granting of the detention by virtue of the Law. It seems that this could reduce the impact of the violation of the right to consult a lawyer as a part of the right to personal liberty. Secondly, it should be emphasized that the maximum period of seven days does not exempt the state from its obligation to allow the prisoner to meet with his lawyer at the earliest possible opportunity, in circumstances where security needs permit this. Therefore the question of the proportionality of the period during which a meeting between the prisoner and his defence counsel is prevented is a function of the circumstances of each case on its merits. It should be noted that a similar arrangement exists in international law, which determines the period of time during which a meeting with a lawyer may be prevented with regard to all the circumstances of the case, without stipulating maximum times for preventing the meeting (see in this regard, Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at p. 381).

45.  The appellants' second argument concerning s. 6(b) of the Law should also be rejected. Making representation dependent upon an unrestricted authorization for the lawyer to act as defence counsel under the provisions of s. 318(c) of the Military Justice Law, 5715-1955, is necessary for security reasons, in view of the security-sensitive nature of administrative detention proceedings. The appellants did not argue that the need for an unrestricted authorization as aforesaid affected the quality of the representation that they received, and in any case they did not point to any real violation of their rights in this regard. Consequently the appellants' arguments against the proportionality of the arrangement prescribed in s. 6 of the Law should be rejected.

 (6)      The length of internment under the Law

46.       From the provisions of ss. 3, 7 and 8 of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law it emerges that an internment order under the Law need not include a defined date for the end of the internment. The Law itself does not prescribe a maximum period of time for the internment imposed thereunder, apart from the determination that it should not continue after the hostile acts of the force to which the prisoner belongs against the State of Israel "have ceased" (see ss. 7 and 8 of the Law). According to the appellants, this is an improper internment without any time limit, which disproportionately violates the constitutional right to personal liberty. In reply, the state argues that the length of the internment is not "unlimited", but depends on the duration of the hostilities being carried out against the security of the State of Israel by the force to which the prisoner belongs.

It should be said at the outset that issuing an internment order that does not include a specific time limit for its termination does indeed raise a significant difficulty, especially in the circumstances that we are addressing, where the "hostile acts" of the various terrorist organizations, including the Hezbollah organization which is relevant to the appellants' cases, have continued for many years, and naturally it is impossible to know when they will cease. In this reality, prisoners under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law may remain in detention for prolonged periods of time. Nevertheless, as we shall explain immediately, the purpose of the Law and the special circumstances in which it was intended to apply, lead to the conclusion that the fundamental arrangement that allows detention orders to be issued without a defined date for their termination does not depart from the zone of proportionality, especially in view of the judicial review arrangements prescribed in the Law.

As we have said, the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is to prevent "unlawful combatants" as defined in s. 2 of the Law from returning to the cycle of hostilities, as long as the hostile acts are continuing and threatening the security of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel. On the basis of a similar rationale, the Third Geneva Convention allows prisoners of war to be interned until the hostilities have ceased, in order to prevent them from returning to the cycle of hostilities as long as the fighting continues. Even in the case of civilians who are detained during an armed conflict, the rule under international humanitarian law is that they should be released from detention immediately after the concrete cause for the detention no longer exists and no later than the date of cessation of the hostilities (see J. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (vol. 1, 2005), at page 451; also cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), at pages 518-519, where the United States Supreme Court held that the detention of members of forces hostile to the United States and operating against it in Afghanistan until the end of the specific dispute that led to their arrest is consistent with basic and fundamental principles of the laws of war).

The conclusion that emerges in view of the aforesaid is that the fundamental arrangement that allows a internment order to be granted under the Law without a defined termination date, except for the determination that the internment will not continue after the hostile acts against the State of Israel have ended, does not exceed the bounds of the room for constitutional maneuver. It should, however, be emphasized that the question of the proportionality of the duration of internment under the Law should be examined in each case on its merits and according to its specific circumstances. As we have said, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law prescribes a duty to conduct a periodic judicial review once every six months. The purpose of the judicial review is to examine whether the threat presented by the prisoner to state security justifies the continuation of the internment, or whether the internment order should be cancelled in circumstances where the release of the prisoner will not harm the security of the state or where there are special reasons justifying the release (see s. 5(c) of the Law). When examining the need to extend the internment, the court should take into account inter alia the period of time that has elapsed since the order was issued. The ruling in A v. Minister of Defence [1] concerning detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, per President A. Barak, holds true in our case as well:

'Administrative detention cannot continue indefinitely. The longer the period of detention has lasted, the more significant the reasons that are required to justify a further extension of detention. With the passage of time the measure of administrative detention becomes onerous to such an extent that it ceases to be proportionate' (ibid., at p. 744).

Similarly it was held in A v. IDF Commander [16] with regard to administrative detention by virtue of security legislation in the region of Judea and Samaria that -

'The duration of the detention is a function of the threat. This threat is examined in accordance with the circumstances. It depends upon the level of risk that the evidence attributes to the administrative prisoner. It depends upon the credibility of the evidence itself and how current it is. The longer the duration of the administrative detention, the greater the onus on the military commander to demonstrate the threat presented by the administrative prisoner' (ibid., at para. 7).

Indeed, as opposed to the arrangements prescribed in the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law and in the security legislation, a court acting pursuant to the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law does not conduct a judicial review of the extension of the internment order, but examines the question of whether there is a justification for cancelling an existing order, for the reasons listed in s. 5(c) of the Law. Nevertheless, even an internment order under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law cannot be sustained indefinitely. The period of time that has elapsed since the order was granted constitutes a relevant and important consideration in the periodic judicial review for determining whether the continuation of the internment is necessary. In the words of Justice A. Procaccia in a similar context:

'The longer the period of the administrative detention, the greater the weight of the prisoner's right to his personal liberty when balanced against considerations of public interest, and therefore the greater the onus placed upon the competent authority to show that it is necessary to continue holding the person concerned in detention. For this purpose, new evidence relating to the prisoner's case may be required, and it is possible that the original evidence that led to his internment in the first place will be insufficient' (Kadri v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria  [47], at para. 6).

In view of all the above, a court that conducts a judicial review of an internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is authorized to confine and shorten the period of internment in view of the nature and weight of the evidence brought before it regarding the security threat presented by the prisoner as an "unlawful combatant" and in view of the time that has passed since the internment order was issued. By means of judicial review it is possible to ensure that the absence of a concrete termination date for the internment order under the Law will not constitute an excessive violation of the right to personal liberty, and that prisoners under the Law will not be interned for a longer period greater than that required by material security considerations.

(7) The possibility of conducting criminal proceedings parallel to an internment proceeding by virtue of the Law

47. S. 9 of the Law, which is entitled "Criminal proceedings", provides the following:

'9. (a) Criminal proceedings may be initiated against an unlawful combatant under the provisions of any law.

(b) The Chief of Staff may make an order for the internment of an unlawful combatant under s. 3, even if criminal proceedings have been initiated against him under the provisions of any law.'

According to the appellants, the aforesaid s. 9 violates the right to personal liberty disproportionately since it makes it possible to detain a person under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law even though criminal proceedings have already been initiated against him, and vice versa. The argument is that by conducting both sets of proceedings it is possible to continue to intern a person even after he has finished serving the sentence imposed on him in the criminal proceeding, in a manner that allegedly amounts to cruel punishment. In reply the state argued that this is a fitting and proportionate arrangement in view of the fact that it is intended to apply in circumstances in which a person will shortly finish serving his criminal sentence and hostilities are still continuing between the organization of which he is a member and the State of Israel; consequently, his release may harm state security.

In relation to these arguments we should reiterate what we said earlier (at para. 33 above), i.e. that initiating a criminal trial against a person is different in its nature and purpose from the measure of administrative detention. In general it is desirable and even preferable to make use of criminal proceedings where this is possible. Recourse to the extreme measure of administrative detention is justified in circumstances where other measures, including the conduct of a criminal trial, are not possible, due to lack of sufficient admissible evidence or because it is impossible to disclose privileged sources. However, the reality of prolonged terrorist operations is complex. There may be cases in which a person is detained under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and only at a later stage evidence is discovered that makes it possible to initiate criminal proceedings. There may be other cases in which a person has been tried and convicted and has served his sentence, but this does not provide a satisfactory solution to preventing the threat that he presents to state security in circumstances in which, after having served the sentence, he may once again become a security threat. Since a criminal trial and administrative detention are proceedings that differ from each other in their character and purpose, they do not rule each other out, even though in my opinion substantial and particularly weighty security considerations are required to justify recourse to both types of proceeding against the same person. In any case, the normative arrangement that allows criminal proceedings to be conducted alongside detention proceedings under the Law does not, in itself, create a disproportionate violation of the right to liberty of the kind that requires our intervention.

Interim summary

48.  Our discussion thus far of the requirement of proportionality has led to the following conclusions: first, the measure chosen by the legislator, i.e. administrative detention that prevents the "unlawful combatant" from returning to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel, realizes the legislative purpose and therefore satisfies the requirement of a rational connection between the legislative measure and the purpose that the Law is intended to realize. Secondly, the measures mentioned by the appellants in their arguments before us, i.e. recognizing them as prisoners of war, bringing them to a criminal trial or detaining them under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, do not realize the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and therefore they cannot constitute a suitable alternative measure to internment in accordance with the Law. Thirdly, the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law do not, per se and irrespective of the manner in which they are implemented, violate the right to personal liberty excessively, and they fall within the bounds of the room for constitutional maneuver granted to the legislature. In view of all this, the question that remains to be examined is whether the combination of the arrangements prescribed in the Law satisfies the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. In other words, is the violation of the right to personal liberty reasonably commensurate with the public benefit that arises from it in achieving the legislative purpose? Let us now examine this question.

Proportionality in the narrow sense - A reasonable relationship between  violation of the constitutional right and the public benefit it engenders

49.       The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was enacted against the background of a harsh security situation. The citizens and residents of the State of Israel have lived under the constant threat of murderous terrorism of which they have been victim for years and which has harmed the innocent indiscriminately. In view of this, we held that the security purpose of the Law - the removal of "unlawful combatants" from the terrorist organizations' cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel - constitutes a proper purpose that is based on a public need of a kind that is capable of justifying a significant violation of the right to personal liberty. For all these reasons, we were of the opinion that the legislature should be accorded relatively wide room for maneuver to allow it to choose the proper measure for realizing the legislative purpose (see para. 31 above).

As we have said, the measure that the legislature chose in order to realize the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is administrative detention in accordance with the arrangements that are prescribed in the Law. There is no doubt that this is a damaging measure that should be employed as little as possible. However, a look at the combined totality of the above arrangements, in the light of the interpretation that we discussed above, leads to the conclusion that according to constitutional criteria, the violation of the constitutional right is reasonably commensurate with the social benefit that arises from the realization of the legislative purpose. This conclusion is based on the following considerations taken together:

 First, for the reasons that we discussed at the beginning of our deliberations, the scope of application of the Law is relatively limited: the Law does not apply to citizens and residents of the State of Israel but only to foreign parties who endanger the security of the state (see para. 11 above).

Secondly, the interpretation of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law is subject to constitutional principles and international humanitarian law that require proof of an individual threat as a basis for administrative detention. Consequently, for the purpose of internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the state must furnish administrative proof that the prisoner directly or indirectly played a material part - one which is neither negligible nor marginal - in hostile acts against the State of Israel; or that the prisoner belonged to an organization that is perpetrating hostile acts, taking into account his connection and the extent of his contribution to the organization's cycle of hostilities in the broad sense of this concept. In our remarks above we said that proving the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in the said sense includes proof of a personal threat that arises from the form in which the prisoner was involved in the terrorist organization. We also said that the state has declared before us that until now it has taken pains to prove the personal threat of all the prisoners under the Law specifically, and it has refrained from relying on the probative presumptions in ss. 7 and 8 of the Law. In view of this, we saw no reason to decide the question of the constitutionality of those presumptions (see paras. 24 and 25 above).

Thirdly, we held that in view of the fact that administrative detention is an unusual and extreme measure, and in view of its significant violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty, the state is required to prove, by means of clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" are fulfilled and that the continuation of the internment is essential. This must be done in both the initial and the periodic judicial reviews. In this context we held that importance should be attached both to the quantity and the quality of the evidence against the prisoner and to the extent that the relevant intelligence information against him is current (see paras. 22 and 23 above).

Fourthly, we attributed substantial weight to the fact that internment orders under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law are subject to preliminary and periodic judicial reviews before a District Court judge, whose decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court, which will hear the case with a single judge. Within the framework of these proceedings, the judge is required to consider the question of the validity and credibility of the administrative evidence that is brought before him and to assess its weight. In view of the reliance upon administrative evidence and the fact that privileged evidence is admitted ex parte, we held that the judge should act with caution and great precision when examining the material brought before him. We also held that a court that conducts a judicial review of internment under the Law may restrict and shorten the period of internment in view of the nature and weight of the evidence brought before it regarding the security threat presented by the prisoner as an "unlawful combatant", and in view of the time that has elapsed since the internment order was issued. For this reason we said that it is possible, through the process of judicial review, to ensure that the absence of a specific date for the termination of the detention order under the Law does not violate the right to personal liberty excessively, and that prisoners by virtue of the Law will not be interned for a longer period than what is required by substantial security considerations (para. 46 above).

Finally, although the arrangements prescribed in the Law for the purpose of exercising the power of internment are not the only possible ones, we reached the conclusion that the statutory arrangements that we considered do not exceed the bounds of the room for maneuver to an extent that required our intervention. In our remarks above we emphasized that the periods of time prescribed by the Law for conducting a preliminary judicial review after the internment order has been granted, and with respect to preventing a meeting between the prisoner and his lawyer, constitute maximum periods that do not exempt the state from the duty to make an effort to shorten these periods in each case on its merits, insofar as this is possible in view of the security constraints and all the circumstances of the case. We also held that internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law cannot continue indefinitely, and that the question of the proportionality of the duration of the detention must also be examined in each case on its merits according to the particular circumstances.

In view of all of the aforesaid considerations, and in view of the existence of relatively wide room for constitutional maneuver in view of the essential purpose of the Law as explained above, our conclusion is that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law satisfies the third subtest of the requirement of proportionality, i.e., that the violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty is reasonably commensurate with the benefit accruing to the public from the said legislation. Our conclusion is based on the fact that according to the interpretation discussed above, the Law does not allow the internment of innocent persons who have no real connection to the cycle of hostilities of the terror organizations, and it establishes mechanisms whose purpose is to ameliorate the violation of the prisoners' rights, including a cause of detention that is based on a threat to state security and the conducting of a hearing and preliminary and periodic judicial reviews of internment under the Law.

Therefore, for all the reasons that we have mentioned above, it is possible to determine that the violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty as a result of the Law, although significant and severe, is not excessive. Our conclusion is therefore that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause, and there is no constitutional ground for our intervention.

From the General to the Specific

50.  As we said at the outset, the appellants, who are inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, were originally detained in the years 2002-2003, when the Gaza Strip was subject to belligerent occupation. At that time, the administrative detention of the appellants was carried out pursuant to security legislation that was in force in the Gaza Strip. Following the end of military rule in the Gaza Strip in September 2005 and the nullification of the security legislation in force there, on 20 September 2005 the Chief of Staff issued internment orders for the appellants under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

On 22 September 2005 the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court began the initial judicial review of the appellants' case. From then until now the District Court has conducted four periodic judicial reviews of the appellants' continuing internment. The appeal against the decision of the District Court not to order the release of the appellants within the framework of the initial judicial review was denied by this court on 14 March 2006 (Justice E. Rubinstein in CrimA 1221/06 Iyyad v. State of Israel [54]). Before us are the appeals on three additional periodic decisions of the District Court not to rescind the appellants' internment orders.

51.  In their pleadings, the appellants raised two main arguments regarding their particular cases: first, it was argued that according to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel should have released the appellants when the military rule in the Gaza Strip ended, since they were inhabitants of an occupied territory that was liberated. Secondly, it was argued that even if the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is constitutional, no cause for internment thereunder has been proved with respect to the appellants. According to this argument, it was not proved that the appellants are members of the Hezbollah organization, nor has it been proved that their release would harm state security.

52.  We cannot accept the appellants' first argument. The end of military rule in the Gaza Strip did not obligate Israel to automatically release all the prisoners it held who are inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, as long as the personal threat posed by the prisoners persisted against the background of the continued hostilities against the State of Israel. This conclusion is clearly implied by the arrangements set out in arts. 132-133 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Art. 132 of the Convention establishes the general principle that the date for the release of prisoners is as soon as the reasons that necessitated their internment no longer exist. The first part of art. 133 of the Convention, which relates to a particular case that is included within the parameters of the aforesaid general principle, goes on to provide that the internment will end as soon as possible after the close of hostilities. Art. 134 of the Convention, which concerns the question of the location at which the prisoners should be released, also relates to the date on which hostilities end as the date on which prisoners should be released from internment. Unfortunately, the hostile acts of the terrorist organizations against the State of Israel have not yet ceased, and they result in physical injuries and mortalities on an almost daily basis. In such circumstances, the laws of armed conflict continue to apply. Consequently it cannot be said that international law requires Israel to release the prisoners that it held when military rule in the Gaza Strip came to an end, when it is possible to prove the continued individual danger posed by the prisoners against the background of the continued hostilities against the security of the state.

53. With regard to the specific internment orders against the appellants by virtue of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the District Court heard the testimonies of experts on behalf of the security establishment and studied the evidence brought before it. We too studied the material that was brought before us during the hearing of the appeal. The material clearly demonstrates the close links of the appellants to the Hezbollah organization and their role in the organization's ranks, including involvement in hostile acts against Israeli civilian targets.  We are therefore convinced that the individual threat of the appellants to state security has been proved, even without resorting to the probative presumption in s. 7 of the Law (see and cf. per Justice E. Rubinstein in Iyyad v. State of Israel [54], at para. 8(11) of his opinion). In view of the aforesaid, we cannot accept the appellants' contention that the change in the form of their detention - from detention by virtue of an order of the IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip to internment orders under the Law - was done arbitrarily and without any real basis in the evidence. As we have said, the change in the form of detention was necessitated by the end of the military rule in the Gaza Strip, and that is why it was done at that time. The choice of internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law as opposed to detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law was made, as we explained above, because of the purpose of the Law under discussion and because it is suited to the circumstances of the appellants' cases.

The appellants further argued that their release does not pose any threat to state security since their family members who were involved in terrorist activities have been arrested or killed by the security forces, so that the terrorist infrastructure that existed before they were detained no longer exists. They also argued that the passage of time since they were arrested reduces the risk that they present. Regarding these arguments it should be said that after inspecting the material submitted to us, we are convinced that the arrest or death of some of the appellants' family members does not per se remove the security threat that the appellants would present were they to be released from detention. We are also convinced that, in the circumstances of the case, the time that has passed since the appellants were first detained has not reduced the threat that they present. In its decision in the third periodic review, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:

'The total period of the detention is not short. But this is countered by the anticipated threat to state security if the prisoners are released. As we have said, a proper balance should be struck between the two. The experts are once again adamant in their opinion that there is a strong likelihood that the two prisoners will resume their terrorist activity if they are released. In such circumstances, the operational abilities of the Hezbollah infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and outside it will be enhanced and the threats to the security of the state and its citizens will increase. The current situation in the Gaza Strip is of great importance to our case. The fact that the Hamas organization has taken control of the Gaza Strip and other recent events increase the risks and, what is more, the difficulty of dealing with them.... It would therefore be a grave and irresponsible act to release these two persons, especially at this time, when their return to terrorism can be anticipated and is liable to increase the activity in this field. I cannot say, therefore, that the passage of time has reduced the threat presented by the two prisoners, who are senior figures in the terrorist infrastructure, despite the differences between them. Neither has the passage of time reduced the threat that they represent to an extent that would allow their release.'

In its decision in the fourth periodic review the trial court also emphasized the great threat presented by the two appellants:

'The privileged evidence brought before me reveals that the return of the two to the field is likely to act as a springboard for serious attacks and acts of terror. In other words, according to the evidence brought before me, the respondents are very dangerous. In my opinion it is not at all possible to order their release. This conclusion does not ignore the long years that the two of them have been held behind prison walls. The long period of time has not reduced the threat that they represent' (at page 6 of the court's decision of 20 March 2008).

In view of all of these reasons, and after having studied the material that was brought before us and having been convinced that there is sufficient evidence to prove the individual security threat represented by the appellants, we have reached the conclusion that the trial court was justified when it refused to cancel the internment orders in their cases. It should be pointed out that the significance of the passage of time naturally increases when we are dealing with administrative detention. At the present time, however, we find no reason to intervene in the decision of the trial court.

In view of the result that we have reached, we are not required to examine the appellants' argument against the additional reason that the trial court included in its decision, relating to the fact that the evidence was strengthened by the silence of the first appellant in the judicial review proceeding that took place in his case, a proceeding that was based, inter alia, on privileged evidence that was not shown to the prisoner and his legal representative. The question of the probative significance of a prisoner's silence in judicial review proceedings under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law does not require a decision in the circumstances of the case before us and we see no reason to express a position on this matter.

Therefore, for all of the reasons set out above, we have reached the conclusion that the appeals should be denied.

 

Justice E.E. Levy:

I agree with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague, the President.

It is in the nature of things that differences may arise between the rules of international humanitarian law - especially written rules - and the language of Israeli security legislation, if only because those conventions that regulate the conduct of players on the international stage were formulated in a very different reality, and their drafters did not know of entities such as the Hezbollah organization and the like.

Therefore, insofar as it is possible to do so by means of legal interpretation, the court will try to narrow these differences in a way that realizes both the principles of international law and the purpose of internal legislation. In this regard I will say that I would have preferred to refrain from arriving at any conclusions, even in passing, regarding the provisions of ss. 7 and 8 of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002. These provisions are a central part of this Law, as enacted by the Knesset. Insofar as there are differences between them and the provisions of international law, as argued by the appellants and implied by the state's declarations with regard to the manner in which it conducts itself de facto, the legislature ought to take the initiative and address the matter.

Justice A. Procaccia:

I agree with the profound opinion of my colleague, President Beinisch.

Appeals denied as per the judgment of President D. Beinisch.

8 Sivan 5768

11 June 2008

Amir v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 8638/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, April 6, 2006
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

This petition puts to the test the question of the Rabbinical Court's authority to adjudicate a property dispute between a couple after the divorce proceeding between them has been completed, and it focuses on an alleged breach of the divorce agreement by one member of the couple. Is the matter within the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court or is it within the power of the civil judicial instance; and if the Rabbinical Court does indeed have authority to adjudicate the matter, what is the source of the authority and from where does this authority derive? Is it from the law; is it from the parties' agreement in arbitration or otherwise? And what is the nature of this authority?

 

The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, granted the petition and held (per Her Honor Justice A. Procaccia, with the concurrence of His Honor Vice President (Ret.) M. Cheshin and His Honor S. Joubran) that –

 

The High Court of Justice's intervention in religious court decisions is limited to extreme cases of ultra vires, infringement of the principles of natural justice, departure from the provisions of law aimed at the religious court or when equitable relief is necessary where the matter is not within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal.  The subject matter of the petition justifies this Court's entertaining the matter on grounds of the Rabbinical Court's exceeding the jurisdiction vested in it.

 

The Rabbinical Court is a state judicial instance, which was established by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953 (hereinafter: "the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law"), and it derives its power and jurisdiction therefrom, and it has only those jurisdictional powers that the state law has given it.

 

The original powers of the Rabbinical Court were set in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they are built of exclusive powers by virtue of the law and powers that are parallel to the civil court and the Rabbinical Court that are vested by virtue of the parties' agreement. The case law has recognized the existence of the judicial instance's inherent ancillary power that derives from the original power of the Rabbinical Court by virtue of the law, and in special circumstances grants it jurisdiction to again hear a matter upon which it has ruled in the past.

 

Is the Rabbinical Court vested with jurisdiction to decide a dispute by virtue of the parties' agreement, where such jurisdiction is not in the scope of the statute that empowers the Rabbinical Court or within the ancillary powers that are vested in it? The parties' agreement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court might take on two guises: one, simple agreement, irrespective of the provisions the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law; the other, agreement intended to empower the Court to deliberate and decide on a dispute as an arbitrator. A court's jurisdiction is vested by law and it has no power to derive it from the parties' agreement except were the law itself has seen fit to recognize such agreement in certain circumstances as the source of jurisdiction. A similar approach is also taken with regard to the judicial instance's power to adjudicate by way of arbitration. Since the state judicial instance merely has the subject matter jurisdiction conferred to it by statute, it is not vested with power to deliberate and adjudicate a matter as an arbitrator by virtue of the parties' agreement, unless it has been expressly given that power by statute. The Rabbinical Court does not have power to hear and decide a matter that is not one of those that is within its exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the statute or within its parallel jurisdiction, even if the parties have given their agreement to its jurisdiction. According to the same way of thinking, the Rabbinical Court has no power to decide a dispute as an arbitrator by virtue of an arbitration agreement between the parties in a matter which by its nature is not within its legal jurisdiction.

 

Is the respondent's answer against the petitioner within the bounds of the Rabbinical Court's subject matter jurisdiction? The respondent's cause of action is the enforcement of a contractual indemnity provision concerning property in the divorce agreement that obtained the force of a judgement of the Rabbinical Court, further to which the parties' divorce was completed. The source of the Rabbinical Court's exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce in accordance with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law does not apply because the subject of the claim is a property matter after the dissolution of the parties' marriage and a matter of "marriage and divorce" is not involved. Nor is it a matter "connected with a divorce suit". The respondent's cause of action is a new one, the subject of which is the enforcement of a divorce agreement or an application for the enforcement of a divorce award, based on a divorce agreement. The Rabbinical Court does not have jurisdiction either by virtue of the parties' agreement pursuant to section 9 of the Law, which deals with the Rabbinical Court's parallel jurisdiction that is vested by virtue of the parties' agreement in matters of personal status according to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance. Subject matter jurisdiction under section 9 is limited solely to the matters mentioned in it – matters of "personal status" as defined in the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance. In a dispute that does not relate to those matters, even the parties' agreement cannot vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court. The Rabbinical Court therefore has no original jurisdiction to hear the respondent's claim.

 

The Rabbinical Court does not have "ancillary" inherent jurisdiction to try the respondent's claim. In the instant case, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to setting aside a divorce award by reason of a defect in making the divorce agreement, that might have given the Rabbinical Court ancillary jurisdiction to try its revocation, is of no relevance. Similarly, the Rabbinical Court has not acquired ancillary jurisdiction by virtue of a material change in circumstances after making the divorce award that justifies setting aside the divorce agreement and the divorce award since the respondent's claim is for the specific performance and enforcement of the divorce agreement. Again, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction in a matter pending before it until the proceedings conducted before it are concluded will not vest it with jurisdiction. The second respondent finally and unconditionally adjudicated herein and awarded the force of judgement to the divorce agreement. A property dispute that has arisen between the parties after the award of judgement gives rise to a new cause of action and necessitates the institution of new proceedings in accordance with the jurisdictional framework prescribed by law.

 

Nor does the Rabbinical Court have jurisdiction to hear the matter by virtue of the doctrine of "continuing jurisdiction". Continuing jurisdiction is vested where an instance has tried a particular matter in the past and in special circumstances need has arisen to set aside or modify an earlier decision due to a material change that has occurred in the circumstances upon which the original decision was based.  The claim seeks to enforce the agreement and has no place in the continuing jurisdiction vested in the Rabbinical Court.

 

The Rabbinical Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to try the new cause arising further to the divorce agreement in order to interpret the agreement. Having completed and exhausted its power to rule on the matter of divorce, it no longer has ancillary power to interpret the divorce agreement or the divorce award. Moreover, in the instant case no question of interpreting the divorce agreement has arisen and a claim for its enforcement has been brought instead.

 

A rabbinical court cannot be empowered to decide a dispute between litigants in arbitration, in a matter that is not within its subject matter jurisdiction according to the statute. In the instant case, it also appears from the divorce agreement that its contents cannot be construed as an arbitration clause, equal to "an arbitration agreement" between the parties. The power of an arbitrator to decide a dispute between parties derives from an arbitration agreement. The condition precedent for arbitration is the existence of an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration. If parties have agreed to refer disputes between them to the decision of some entity but it is not clear that a decision in arbitration is involved, then there is no arbitration agreement.

 

By deciding the respondent's lawsuit against the petitioner for the enforcement of a contractual indemnification provision in the divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Courts exceeded the power vested in them by law. Consequently, the decisions of the first and second respondents are void.

 

 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

In the Supreme Court

Sitting As the High Court of Justice                                             HCJ 8638/03

 

Before:

His Honor, Vice President (Ret.) M. Cheshin

Her Honor, Justice A. Procaccia

His Honor, Justice S. Joubran

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Petitioner:

Sima Amir

 

 

 

 

v.

 

 

 

The Respondents:

1. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem

 

2. The Regional Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem

 

 

3. Yoseph Amir

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Behalf of the Petitioner:

Adv. Michael Korinaldi

 

 

 

 

On Behalf of the Third Respondent:

Adv. Nechama Segal

 

 

 

 

On Behalf Of the Rabbinical Courts System:

Adv. S. Jacoby

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGEMENT

 

Justice A. Procaccia

 

1.         This petition puts to the test the question of the Rabbinical Court's authority to adjudicate a property dispute between a couple after the divorce proceeding between them has been completed, and it focuses on an alleged breach of the divorce agreement by one member of the couple. Is the matter within the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court or is it within the power of the civil judicial instance; and if the Rabbinical Court does indeed have authority to adjudicate the matter, what is the source of the authority and from where does this authority derive? Is it from the law; is it from the parties' agreement in arbitration or otherwise? And what is the nature of this authority?

 

2.         The petition concerns the petitioner's motion to vacate the decisions of the Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem – the first respondent – of May 4 and June 9, 2003, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the judgment of the Regional Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem – the second respondent – of May 27, 2002, and its decisions of March 5, 2001 and June 18, 2002.

 

Background and Proceedings

 

3.         The petitioner and the third respondent (hereinafter: “the respondent") were married in 1980 and have three children. Their relationship became unstable and they motioned the Regional Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem in 1992 in order to arrange for divorce proceedings. As part of that proceeding, the couple requested the Regional Rabbinical Court to approve a divorce agreement that they had made. In the agreement, the couple agreed on the act of divorce, the custody and support of the children, and various financial and property arrangements, as follows: the three children would be in the custody of the wife until reaching the age of 18 (clause 3); the husband would pay child support in the sum of NIS 1,000 per month for all three of the children until they reach the age of 18; the sum of the child support as set in the agreement would not be increased, and in exchange, the husband would transfer his share of the couple’s apartment to the wife, including his share of the apartment’s contents and the gold objects, ownership of which would all be transferred to the wife (clauses 4(a) and (b)); the husband also undertook to discharge the balance of the mortgage loan each month (clause 6(c)). The agreement also included a condition whereby the wife undertook not to sue the husband in any court for an increase in child support, either directly or indirectly, and if the husband were sued, the wife would compensate him in such a way that he would receive half of the apartment, half of its contents and half of the gold (clauses 4 and 5 the agreement). Taking out a stay of exit order inhibiting the husband's departure from the country would also be deemed a breach of the agreement and lead to the same result (clause 13). In order to secure the wife's obligation in accordance with the agreement, a cautionary note would be registered against the apartment, pursuant whereto one half of the apartment would be transferred into the husband's name if he were sued to increase child support. The relevant provisions of the agreement are as follows:

 

                        "4.       Child Support

 

                                    (e)       For the avoidance of doubt and without prejudice to the generality of the aforegoing, child support under the agreement shall unequivocally cover all the children's needs without exception… until the children reach the age of 18.

 

                                    The mother undertakes not to sue the father in any legal instance for an increase in child support or for the satisfaction of any of the children's needs without exception beyond what the father has undertaken in this agreement, either directly (herself) or indirectly (through any institution, entity, authority, person and/or in the name of the minor and/or anyone who now and/or in future has an interest), and if the husband is sued, the wife shall compensate him and he shall receive one half of the apartment, one half of its contents and one half of the gold. The obligation is in perpetuity.

 

                                    …

 

                        5.         Indemnification

 

                                    (a)       The mother undertakes and takes it upon herself not to sue the father in any legal instance whatsoever for an increase in child support or for the satisfaction of any of the children's needs without exception beyond what the father has undertaken in this agreement, either directly (herself) or indirectly (through any institution, entity, authority, person and/or in the name of the minor and/or anyone who now and/or in future has an interest).

 

                                    (b)       If, contrary to the abovementioned, the father is sued for an increase in child support and/or satisfaction of any of the children's needs, whether the lawsuit is brought by the mother and/or the mother in the name of the children or by an entity, authority, institution and/or anyone who now and/or in future has an interest, beyond what the father has undertaken in this agreement, then the mother undertakes to transfer one half of the apartment into the father's name and one half of its contents and one half of the gold. The obligation is in perpetuity.

 

                                    (c)       To secure the wife's obligations in this agreement, a cautionary note shall be registered, pursuant whereto one half of the apartment shall be transferred into the husband's name if the husband is sued to increase child support…"

 

            The agreement also includes a provision with regard to the exclusivity of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction in the event of a dispute between them after the divorce, in the following terms:

 

                        "9.       Cancellation of Mutual Claims And/or Complaints

 

                        …

 

                        10.       …

 

                        11.       If after the divorce, differences arise between the couple, they undertake to file the lawsuit solely in the Rabbinical Courts.

 

                        12.       …

 

                        13.       The wife undertakes not to take out a stay of exit order preventing the husband's departure from the country, and taking out such an order shall constitute a breach of this agreement, and the husband shall be entitled to obtain one half of the value of the apartment, of the contents and of the gold.

 

                        …"

 

            The divorce agreement was given the effect of judgement by the Rabbinical Court, and on May 26, 1992 the couple was divorced.

 

4.         About five years later, in June 1997, the couple's children (through the petitioner) filed a child support motion against the respondent in the Jerusalem Family Court (FC 10330/97). The motion was mainly intended to increase the child support upon which the couple had agreed in the Rabbinical Court to NIS 6,700. This was, inter alia, due to the petitioner's claim that the respondent was not paying the mortgage payments as undertaken by him in the divorce agreement. In the answer of defense, the respondent defended the claim on its merits. According to him, he was living off a general disability pension of NIS 1,200 per month, from which he was paying child support. The Family Court (per Judge N. Mimon) held in its judgement that the children's monthly support should be increased to a total of NIS 2,000 for both minor children together, and the sum of NIS 500 for the other child until his enlistment to the IDF; with respect to the minors, it was further held that from the time they reached the age of 18 until they completed their service in the IDF, the child support for them would be reduced by NIS 700, and upon completion of their military service the liability for their support will be terminated; if they do not enlist, the liability for them would be terminated when they reach the age of 18. With regard to the other child, upon his enlistment to the IDF and until his discharge, support of NIS 300 would be payable for him.

 

            On September 20, 1997, about three months after the motion to increase child support was filed in the civil court, the respondent filed a motion in the Regional Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem "for a declaratory judgement and specific performance" of the divorce agreement. In the motion, he pleaded that the petitioner had breached the divorce agreement several times and in several different aspects, as follows:

 

                        "8        (a)       The defendant (the petitioner – AP) filed a motion to increase child support in the name of the minors before this Honorable Court on February 28, 1993 – a motion that was dismissed by the Court

 

                                    (b)       The defendant filed another motion on November 6, 1994 and at the end of that motion the wife again applied for an increase in child support.

 

                                    (c)       The defendant motioned for a stay of exit order that was cancelled on July 21, 1997.

 

                        9.         (a)       The defendant went further, and when she saw that her motions were being dismissed by the Honorable Rabbinical Court, she  filed a motion to increase the child support in the name of the minors in FC 10330/97 in the Jerusalem Family Court.…

 

                                    (b)       As part of the motion in Family Court, the wife applied for a stay of exit order that the Court approved.

 

                                    (c)       Moreover, at about the time she filed the motion, the defendant filed a motion for a stay of exit order on July 22, 1997, after the previous order inhibiting departure from the country had been set aside, and the Chief Execution Officer approved it".

 

            He pleaded that the wife had therefore breached clauses 5 and 13 of the divorce agreement. On the basis thereof, the respondent sued the wife for one half of the apartment and its contents and one half of the gold.

 

5.         After filing his motion to the Regional Rabbinical Court, the respondent traveled abroad for more than two years and abandoned his motion. After returning to Israel, he renewed the motion in the Rabbinical Court. The petitioner pleaded in her defense, that the subject of the motion was " breach of a divorce agreement" and according to the law laid down in HCJ 6103/93 Sima Levy v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, PD 48(4) 591 (hereinafter: "Sima Levy Case") the Rabbinical Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion. As for the merits of the motion, the petitioner argued that the respondent had come to court with unclean hands because he had breached the divorce agreement by not paying the mortgage payments as he had undertaken in the divorce agreement. The Regional Rabbinical Court, in its decision of February 25, 2001, referred the issue of jurisdiction raised by the petitioner to the Rabbinical Courts' then legal counsel on rabbinical jurisdiction, Adv. E. Roth, for his opinion.

 

            During the same month (February 2001) the petitioner filed a lawsuit in the Jerusalem Family Court against the respondent for "declaratory judgement as to the revocation of the indemnity provision in the divorce agreement" (FC 10331/97). This was based, inter alia, on the argument that the respondent breached the divorce agreement by not paying the mortgage payments as he had undertaken in the divorce agreement. The petitioner further requested that the Court declare the revocation of clauses 11 and 13 of the divorce agreement, pleading that they were "contrary to public policy and the law". The respondent argued in his defense that the claim should be summarily dismissed due to the proceedings conducted on the same issues in the Rabbinical Court.

 

            On March 4, 2001, and before the Family Court had awarded its decision on the respondent's motion for the summary dismissal of the petitioner's claim, the opinion of the legal counsel on rabbinical jurisdiction, Adv. Roth, was filed in the Rabbinical Court. In his opinion, with reference to clause 5(b) of the divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's motion after the divorce. Nevertheless, he believed that clause 11 of the divorce agreement could be treated as an arbitration clause in accordance with the Arbitration Law, 5728-1968 (hereinafter: "the Arbitration Law"). By virtue of the rules of arbitration, the Rabbinical Court is empowered to adjudicate the suit as an arbitrator in accordance with the rules and restraints governing an arbitrator. He further added that, in his opinion, it was unnecessary for the couple to sign an arbitration deed, since clause 11 of the divorce agreement constituted an arbitration deed in all respects.

 

            Following the opinion of the legal counsel, Adv. Roth, the Regional Rabbinical Court decided on March 5, 2001 that it was vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's suit "since in the Court's opinion clause 11 constitutes an arbitration deed".

 

            On May 14, 2002, and before the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement had been awarded in the respondent's suit, the Family Court awarded its decision in the respondent's motion for the summary dismissal of the petitioner's suit. It reviewed the question of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to try the respondent's claim, whether as a court empowered by virtue of statute or as an arbitrator, but it decided to stay the award of its decision on jurisdiction on the ground that:

 

                        "Mutual respect of legal instances requires that after a decision has been awarded by the Rabbinical Court holding that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit that has been filed with it as an arbitrator, the award of a decision on jurisdiction should be stayed until the proceedings in respect of jurisdiction have been exhausted by the plaintiff, who will perhaps wish to act by applying on appeal to the Great Rabbinical Court or by applying to the High Court of Justice to clarify whether her position with regard to jurisdiction will be allowed, or even by motioning to vacate an arbitral judgment as provided in section 24 of the Arbitration Law…"

 

            On May 27, 2002, the Regional Rabbinical Court awarded its judgement in the respondent's motion. The court was divided in its opinion between the three judges, and the decision was made, in the words of the judgement, in accordance with –

 

                        "the third opinion, which was the decisive one of the three, since there are several doubts regarding the interpretation of the agreement, and there is a doubt as to whether it constitutes a breach according to Halachic authorities and the circumstances. Therefore, the case should be decided according to the law, and if the apartment has already been transferred into the wife's name, it is not possible to take away her ownership of the apartment because of a doubt, and of course the wife is liable to comply with all of the obligations in the divorce agreement.... If the apartment has not yet been transferred, it is not possible to order the plaintiff ... to transfer his share of the apartment into the wife's name ....

If the plaintiff has already signed a power of attorney and delivered it to the wife, it would appear that the wife cannot be precluded from exercising the power of attorney in order to transfer the plaintiff's share of the apartment into the wife's name…. On the other hand, if the husband still needs to sign transfer documents and the like, he should not be made to help transfer the dwelling into the wife's name in any way whatsoever….

With regards to the gold objects that the wife has received, it would also appear that she cannot be made to return them to the husband because they are in her possession and in this way her possession is valid…"

 

            As mentioned above, according to the Rabbinical Court's decision of March 5, 2001 it decided the respondent's suit as an arbitrator, but on June 18, 2002 it awarded another decision that was headed "Clarification", according to which:

 

                        "The Rabbinical Court makes it clear that it was the Rabbinical Court that approved the agreement and that there was an undertaking that all matters involved in the agreement would be tried solely by the Rabbinical Court. Therefore, since both parties undertook in the agreement, and the Rabbinical Court also approved the agreement, the Rabbinical Court consequently has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the matter, and the Rabbinical Court awarded the judgement by virtue of its jurisdiction, and there was no need for the Rabbinical Court to adjudicate the same as arbitrator, and although the Rabbinical Court could also adjudicate the matter as an arbitrator, the Rabbinical Court also had jurisdiction to try the matter as an adjudicating court in accordance with the aforegoing".

 

6.         The petitioner appealed to the Great Rabbinical Court against the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement of May 27, 2002. Her main plea in the appeal was that the Regional Rabbinical Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's suit, either as a competent court by virtue of the law or as an arbitrator, and its judgement is therefore void. As to the actual merits, she argued that the Regional Rabbinical Court had made an error "of judgement" and "disregarded facts" by not giving proper weight to the fact that it was the respondent who was in breach of the divorce agreement by not making the mortgage payments as he had undertaken in the divorce agreement. Consequently, on that ground too, on the merits of the case, the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement should be vacated. The respondent also appealed to the Great Rabbinical Court against the said judgement.

 

            The Great Rabbinical Court, in its decision of May 4, 2003, dismissed the petitioner's appeal with respect to jurisdiction and held that the interpretation of the divorce agreement indicated that it concerned the couple's agreement for "property in consideration for child support". That interpretation affects the substance of the complaint that the respondent filed to the Rabbinical Court, and it demonstrates that it is a suit to revoke the divorce agreement as opposed to a motion for the enforcement of an indemnity provision. That being the case, the Rabbinical Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's motion by virtue of its original (primary) authority because "indemnification was not involved, but property and child support and the connection between them, and those matters of property division and child support are certainly matters of personal status that are governed by section 9 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law". The Rabbinical Court was also vested with original (primary) jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit in view of clause 11 of the divorce agreement, which provides that if differences arise between the petitioner and the respondent after the divorce, the two undertake to file the motion solely to the Rabbinical Courts. The Rabbinical Court mentions that at the hearing, the respondent also pleaded avoidance of the Get and the divorce because according to him the Get had been given by mistake. Consequently, on that ground too, the Rabbinical Court had original (primary) jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. According to the Rabbinical Court, it also had jurisdiction by virtue of its "continuing" jurisdiction, because the respondent was "applying expressly for the revocation of the property arrangement as a result of a change in circumstances concerning child support". Finally, the Great Rabbinical Court held that the jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's suit was vested in the Regional Rabbinical Court, when "the jurisdiction is the essential jurisdiction vested in the Rabbinical Court, rather than jurisdiction by virtue of the Arbitration Law". The Great Rabbinical Court adjourned the deliberation on the appeal itself to a later date.

 

            On June 9, 2003 the Great Rabbinical Court awarded another decision, this time with regard to the respondent's appeal against the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement. In its decision, the Great Rabbinical Court ordered the matter to be remitted to the Regional Rabbinical Court for it to try the argument, which had not been tried in the Regional Rabbinical Court, that the petitioner had breached the divorce agreement by suing for increased child support in the Regional Rabbinical Court in 1993.

 

The Petition

 

7.         In her petition before us, the petitioner seeks to set aside the decisions of the Great Rabbinical Court and the Regional Rabbinical Court, according to which the Rabbinical Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's motion, both as original (primary) jurisdiction and by virtue of an arbitration clause.

 

            This Court issued an order nisi in the petition.

 

The Parties' Arguments

 

8.         The petitioner's essential argument in her petition herein is that the Rabbinical Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the property dispute that has arisen between her and the respondent in respect of the divorce agreement that was made between them. According to her, the Rabbinical Courts are not vested with original (primary) jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit. Moreover, they do not have continuing jurisdiction to hear the respondent's suit. The respondent's motion to obtain one half of the property, which was transferred to the wife, is based on the cause of enforcing an indemnity provision in the divorce agreement. This cause is based on a plea of breach, if one occurred, after the divorce agreement was made and the judgement of the Rabbinical Court giving it force and effect was awarded, and after the couple had been duly divorced. A subsequent breach of the divorce agreement in respect of property after the parties' divorce cannot be bound in retrospect with the divorce agreement and the judgment that materialized in the past. From the divorce and onwards, motions that relate to the breach of the divorce agreement are not a part of matters of personal status. The Rabbinical Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate them, and jurisdiction in respect of them is vested in the civil court. Moreover, it was argued that the respondent himself breached the divorce agreement by not paying the mortgage payments as he had undertaken to do in the divorce agreement. His breach of the agreement has civil-financial character, which also demonstrates that his suit after the divorce is subject to the jurisdiction of the civil, rather than religious, court. The petitioner further pleads that clause 11 of the divorce agreement does not amount to an arbitration clause and does not purport to establish an agreement for arbitration. Instead, its wording and contents merely demonstrate its determination, by agreement of the parties, to which court the couple's motions after the divorce should be filed. This agreement, per se, does not vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court. In view of all of this, and based on other grounds too, upon which we shall not focus, the Rabbinical Courts' decisions on jurisdiction are void.

 

9.         The respondent's position in his petition is that the Rabbinical Court is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit he filed to it. In this respect, he relies on the provision of the divorce agreement, according to which the parties expressly agreed to vest the Rabbinical Court with jurisdiction to try any future dispute between them concerning the agreement. He pleads that, according to case law, a matter that can be bound from the outset with the divorce suit, such as property matters, and it was agreed in the divorce arrangement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court in respect to them, is also within its jurisdiction after the divorce. He further asserted that the meaning of the cause of the action that he filed was the revocation of a conditional undertaking given under the agreement, as opposed to the enforcement of a contractual indemnification arrangement. That is to say that the respondent entered into a conditional undertaking to transfer property to the petitioner in consideration for the child support being set in a binding amount and not being increased, and for motions not to be brought in this matter. Since that condition had not been fulfilled, the property undertaking that he had given is void. A contractual indemnification provision is not to be treated in the same way as a conditional property undertaking, with regard to which the Rabbinical Court has continuing jurisdiction even after the divorce. Alternatively, it is argued, the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's suit according to the law of arbitration, by virtue of clause 11 of the divorce agreement, which constitutes an arbitration agreement, even if the word "arbitration" is not mentioned in it.

 

Judgment

 

10.       This Court's intervention in the decisions of religious courts is limited to extreme cases of ultra vires, infringement of the principles of natural justice, departure from the provisions of law aimed at the religious court or when equitable relief is necessary where the matter is not within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal (sections 15(c) and (d)(4) of the Basic Law: the Judiciary; HCJ 323/81 Vilozni v. The Great Rabbinical Court, PD 36(2) 733; HCJ 1689/90 E'asi v. The Sharia Court, PD 45(5) 148, 154-155; HCJ 1842/92 Blaugrund v. The Great Rabbinical Court PD 46(3) 423, 438; HCJ 5182/93 Levy v. The Rehovot Regional Court PD 48(3) 1, 6-8).

 

            The subject matter of the petition herein justifies this Court's entertaining the matter on grounds of the Rabbinical Court's exceeding the jurisdiction vested in it for the reasons explained below.

 

The Question

 

11.       The couple signed a divorce agreement containing property and child support arrangements. In the scope of the property arrangements, they agreed to limit and not increase child support. They added a condition according to which if motions to increase child support were filed by the wife, directly or indirectly, or if she took out stay of exit orders, these actions would have certain property consequences. The parties further agreed that if differences arose between the couple after the divorce, they undertook to conduct the claims solely in the Rabbinical Courts. Indeed, after the divorce, disputes did arise between the parties following motions to increase child support that were brought against the husband, and stay of exit orders were taken out. Further thereto, the husband filed a suit in the Rabbinical Court claiming a breach of the divorce agreement by the wife and requesting to receive one half of the property because of that breach. In those circumstances, after the couple's divorce, is the Rabbinical Court vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the husband's property suit, which is based on an alleged breach of the divorce agreement by the wife? Or is the exclusive jurisdiction to deliberate and adjudicate that claim vested in the civil court?

 

            The subsidiary questions that are to be decided can be divided into two:

 

            First is whether the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the law to adjudicate a property claim based on a breach of the divorce agreement after the divorce has been completed, by virtue of one of the following:

 

            (a)       Original-primary jurisdiction by virtue of statute to hear and adjudicate issues pertaining to the divorce;

 

            (b)       the Court's "ancillary" jurisdiction to adjudicate matters connected with the divorce after its completion, as interpreted and expanded by case law.

 

            The Second is whether the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction to decide a property claim based on the breach of a divorce agreement by virtue of the parties' agreement, and what legal significance is to be given to this agreement.

 

            We shall consider these questions.

 

The Starting Point

 

12.       The starting point underlying the analysis of the Rabbinical Court's scope of jurisdiction is based on several fundamental assumptions:

 

            First, the Rabbinical Court is a state judicial instance, which was established by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953 (hereinafter: "the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law"), and it derives its power and jurisdiction therefrom. As such a state judicial instance, the bounds of the Rabbinical Court's powers are defined and fashioned in accordance with the state law.

 

            Second, every state judicial instance, including the religious court, has merely those jurisdictions that the state law has granted it; it is the statute that established it, and it is the one that defined its powers and assigned them to it. In doing so, the statute assumed, as part of the basic concept of democratic government, that in the granting of judicial powers also lay judicial limitations. Anything that has not been granted to the judicial instance is outside and beyond its power, and it must not surpass its acknowledged boundaries and into areas that have not been entrusted to it and go beyond its responsibility. That is the principle of legality that characterises the structure of democratic government, upon which rests the perception of the status of the government authorities, including the courts. It is on the basis of this principle that the realm of jurisdiction that is vested in the state judicial instances, of which the Rabbinical Courts form part, extends.

 

            Third, the definition of the judicial powers of the various different courts, including the Rabbinical Courts, derives from statute, and statute is subject to interpretation by case law. The case law's interpretation of the extent of the powers vested in the judicial instance is intertwined with the provisions of the statute as the primary source of the power vested in the judicial instance, and it is intended to serve its purpose. In reviewing the boundaries of the religious court's power we shall therefore assume that the religious court is vested with the powers that have been granted to it by the statute, as they have been interpreted by case law, and it has only what the law has given it. As the Court stated (per Justice Landau) in HCJ 26/51 Menashe v. The Chairman and Members of the Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, PD 5 714, 719:

 

                        "The Rabbinical Courts of our country exist in accordance with the general law, which determines their place in the state courts system, and the questions relating to the spheres of their jurisdiction should generally be resolved in accordance with the same principles as govern other courts".

 

            This is what distinguishes Rabbinical Courts from arbitrators, internal tribunals and voluntary tribunals, which are not established by virtue of statute but mainly by virtue of contract or regulations, and the scope of their jurisdiction is determined pursuant thereto. These entities are essentially governed by the principles of the private law that creates them and they are not part of the country's state judicial system.

 

            As Justice Zamir stated in HCJ 3269/95 Yosef Katz v. The Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court, PD 50(4) 590, 602:

 

                        "The Rabbinical Court is established by virtue of statute and its jurisdiction derives from the statute. Its budget comes from the State Treasury and its judges receive salaries like state employees; it sits in judgement beneath the symbol of the State and it writes its judgements on State paper; the orders that it issues speak in the name of the State and are enforced by the State. The Rabbinical Court is not a private entity but a state institution. It is therefore subject to public law and review by the High Court of Justice. Amongst other things, the Rabbinical Court is obliged to respect and observe the fundamental principle that governs every government agency, namely the principle of legality. According to that principle, the Rabbinical Court has nothing other than the power granted to it in accordance with the statute" (emphasis added).

 

            In this respect Justice Cheshin stated in the Sima Levy Case (ibid, p. 616):

 

                        "The legal system takes a grave view of a judicial entity acting beyond the bounds set for it by the law; hence, the case law holds that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction plea stands out and the court will consider it at any stage of the litigation, even where a party first raises it on appeal".

 

            (See also HCJ 816/98 Eminoff v. Eltalaff, PD 52(2) 769, 796-7; HCJ 512/81 The Hebrew University Archaeology Institute v. The Minister of Education, PD 35(4) 533, 543-4; HCJ 30/76, MF 150/76 Siho v. The Karaite Jewish Community Religious Court, PD 31(1) 15, 17-18.)

 

            The state judicial system, and its various different courts, both civil and religious, is built on common norms that govern all its agencies. Thus, for example, it has been held in the past that the fundamental principles that govern civil judges also apply to rabbinical judges. The rabbinical judge, like the civil judge, is part of the judicial authority and in his position he is subject to the same basic rules as obligate any judicial officer:

 

                        "He is not an arbitrator between parties who voluntarily apply to him. He operates by virtue of state law and his authority extends over the whole public with all its diversity, opinions and views. Like a civil judge, a rabbinical judge enjoys independence in matters of judgement. The laws concerning conditions of service, immunity, appointment, discipline and the like that govern the rabbinical judge are very similar to those that govern a civil judge. Like the civil judge, so too the rabbinical judge must, by his action, ensure the public's trust in his judgement. The public is not only the religious public. The rabbinical judge deals with the whole people and he must by his conduct ensure the trust of the whole people, both secular and religious". (Per Justice Barak in HCJ 732/84 MK Tzaban v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, PD 40(4) 141, para. 16.)

 

            In this context, case law has also drawn a clear distinction between a person's fitness as a rabbinical judge of the Israeli Rabbinical Court and his fitness as a community rabbi. On enactment of the Dayanim (rabbinical judges) Law a clear separation was created between judicial and rabbinic functions, and a mix between the two in judicial work is no longer consistent with the concept of state law. In the words of the Minister of Religious Affairs Warhaftig, when he presented the Dayanim Law draft on first reading in the Knesset, as cited in the Tzaban Case:

 

                        "With the establishment of the State of Israel we adopted this course. We distinguished between those functions and separated between rabbis and rabbinical judges" (Knesset Proceedings Session 5457, 1954, p. 2182).

 

 

 

            As Justice Goldberg added on this subject in the Tzaban Case:

 

                        "The main power of the Rabbinate rests in its traditional authority over those who come 'to seek God', whilst the rabbinical judges' authority when sitting in judgement does not depend on the wishes of the litigants but is enforced in the context of the judicial system prescribed for it by the legislature. In this sphere, the rabbinical judges perform the function of 'judging the people', with its varied opinions and views".

 

 

            The religious function of the rabbinical judge as rabbi is not intertwined with the judicial function that he performs as a rabbinical judge and is separate from it. The Rabbinical Court cannot therefore rely on its religious power in order to assume jurisdiction in a matter that exceeds its powers and authorities in accordance with state law (Schiffman, Family Law in Israel, 5755, Vol. I, p. 42).

 

            Against this background there is difficulty with the argument that is sometimes made that the Rabbinical Court might perform a dual function: on the one hand, a state judicial function imposed upon it by virtue of state law, and on the other hand, a religious court in monetary matters by virtue of the parties' agreement. Like any public entity that performs a function in accordance with the law, so the Rabbinical Courts, which operate by virtue of statute must also discharge the responsibility owed by them by virtue of statute and decide the matters entrusted to them. As part of the state judicial system, they possess only the jurisdiction that the statute has placed in their hands. That is the essence of the principle of legality that underlies public administration and the judicial system (Katz Case, ibid, p. 607); hence, even if Jewish law and tradition permit a Rabbinical Court to adjudicate and decide disputes in a certain manner, that does not suffice to authorize it to do so because "the Rabbinical Court, as a state institution, must act within the authority vested in it by state law" (Katz Case, ibid, p. 607). To the same extent, a civil court, which is part of the judicial authority, may not assume an authority or function that does not derive from state law (Tzaban Case, ibid, p. 152).

 

            It is against this background that we shall examine the question of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to decide the respondent's property suit against the petitioner based on a breach of the divorce agreement, and the relief deriving therefrom. A comprehensive analysis of the issue of jurisdiction in a similar context can be found in the judgement of Justice Cheshin in the Sima Levy Case and it will guide and direct us.

 

The Rabbinical Court's Original – Primary Jurisdiction

 

13.       The original primary powers of the Rabbinical Court were set in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they are built on two tiers: exclusive powers by virtue of the statute; and parallel powers of the civil court and the Rabbinical Court that are vested by virtue of the parties' agreement. The exclusive powers comprise matters of marriage and divorce, as well as matters that are duly bound up in the motion for divorce, including wife and child support. Parallel jurisdiction that is vested by agreement relates to matters of personal status in accordance with article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council and the Succession Ordinance. The relevant provisions are as follows:

 

                        "1.       Jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce

 

                        Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, nationals or residents of the State, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts.

 

                        …

 

                        3.         Jurisdiction in matters incidental to divorce

 

                        Where a suit for divorce between Jews has been filed in a rabbinical court, whether by the wife or by the husband, a rabbinical court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in any matter connected with such suit, including support for the wife and for the children of the couple.

 

                        …

 

9.         Jurisdiction by consent

 

In matters of personal status of Jews, as specified in article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council, 1922 to 1947, or in the Succession Ordinance, in which a rabbinical court does not have exclusive jurisdiction under this Law, a rabbinical court shall have jurisdiction after all parties concerned have expressed their consent thereto."

 

The Rabbinical Court's powers – both the exclusive ones (marriage, divorce and matters bound with divorce) and the jurisdiction in accordance with the parties' agreement in matters of personal status – are original-primary powers by virtue of the statute to hear and rule on the matters that fall within the scope of those powers.

 

Power Ancillary to Original Jurisdiction

14.       The Case law has recognized the existence of a judicial instance's inherent ancillary power that derives from the original power of the Rabbinical Court by virtue of the statute and in special circumstances grants it jurisdiction to again hear a matter upon which it has ruled in the past. Such is, for example, the jurisdiction of the civil and religious courts to vacate a judgement awarded by them that is based on an agreement between the parties, in the making of which there has been a defect. Such a material defect might lead to the revocation of the agreement and therefore also to revocation of the judgment that rests upon it, and the instance empowered to decide its revocation is the one that rendered the judgment (HCJ 124/59 Glaubhardt v. The Haifa Regional Rabbinical Court, PD 13 1490; CA 151/87 Artzi Investment Co. v. Rachmani PD 43(3) 489, 498-500). Additional expression of such ancillary jurisdiction occurs when there is a material change in the circumstances of the matter, that has occurred after the award of judgement by consent, which makes its continued performance unjust (Sima Levy Case, ibid, pp. 605-6; CA 442/83 Kam v. Kam PD 38(1) 767, 771; CA 116/82 Livnat v. Tolidano PD 39(2) 729, 732; CA 219/87 Rachmani v. Shemesh Hadar, Building Company Ltd et al. PD 43(3) 489, 498-500). The recognition of this ancillary jurisdiction is intended to bring about a proper balance between the judgment’s finality on the one hand, and the interest not to leave in effect a judgment, the enforcement of which has become extremely unjust due to a change in circumstances. Inherent jurisdiction is also vested in the judicial instance, including the Rabbinical Court, to retain jurisdiction in respect of a matter that is pending before it until the proceedings have been completed. So long as final judgement has not been awarded, jurisdiction continues until the judicial court has completed its work. Once a final, unconditional judgment has been awarded, the work is completed (Sima Levy Case, p. 607; CA 420/54 Ariel v. Leibovitz PD 9 1337; ALA 2919/01 Daniel Oshrovitz v. Yael Lipa (Fried) PD 55(5) 592; J. Zussman, The Civil Procedure (seventh edition, 5755) 550).

One of the expressions of ancillary jurisdiction relates to the existence of the Rabbinical Court's "continuing jurisdiction", the essence of which is that, under certain conditions, where the Rabbinical Court has in the past heard a particular matter, its continuing jurisdiction to hear it again will be recognized. The continuing jurisdiction also derives from the inherent power of the judicial instance. Its basic purpose is to give expression to the duty of mutual respect and the need for harmony between judicial instances where there is parallel jurisdiction between them, and in order to avoid parties running from one judicial instance to another. It has nevertheless already been explained that continuing jurisdiction is not intended to undermine or derogate from the original powers vested in the judicial instances in accordance with statute. Its purpose is essentially "to vest power to vacate or modify an earlier decision due to a change that has occurred in the circumstances upon which the first decision was based" (per Justice Cheshin in the Sima Levy Case, ibid, p. 608, 610). Such are matters of child support and custody, which by their nature are subject to material changes of circumstance, and the original judicial instance therefore has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider them when the appropriate conditions arise.

It should be made clear that no inherent power has been recognized for a civil or religious court to exercise its original authority again in order to interpret a judgement awarded by it. Hence, a Rabbinical Court that has granted a divorce does not have inherent jurisdiction to interpret the divorce agreement and the judgement that awarded it force and effect (Sima Levy Case, ibid, pp. 612-13).

These are the characteristics of the original jurisdiction that is vested in the Rabbinical Court in accordance with the statute, alongside its ancillary powers that are sparingly exercised in special circumstances by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction, in order to complete the judicial act and make it a complete and just deed.

We shall now examine the question of whether the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute by virtue of the parties' agreement, where such jurisdiction is not set in the statute empowering the Rabbinical Courts, and is not within the scope of the ancillary jurisdiction vested in it.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of the Parties' Agreement

15.       The parties' agreement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court might take on two guises: one, simple agreement to grant the Court jurisdiction in a particular case, regardless of the provisions the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law; second, agreement intended to empower the Court to hear and rule on a dispute as an arbitrator. Can such agreement by the parties vest power in the Court that is not granted to it by the empowering statute or embodied in its ancillary powers?

The Israeli state judicial system and the various different judicial instances, derive their powers from statute. It is the statute that establishes them, it is what delineates the bounds of their activity and it is what defines the sphere of their subject matter and territorial jurisdiction. This is also the case in respect to the civil judicial instances; and so it is with respect to the special judicial systems, including the courts of Israel's different religious communities. These include the Rabbinical Courts in Israel.

By defining the powers of the various different judicial instances in Israel, the statute intended not only to delineate the function and responsibility of the system and its various different arms. It also sought, at the same time, to deny the power of a judicial instance to hear and adjudicate a matter which it was not charged with by the statute and which is not within its inherent jurisdiction. The definition of the judicial instances' powers has a dual dimension, both positive and negative: it constitutes a source of power and responsibility on the one hand, while denying the exercise of authority and power that have not been so conferred; the judicial instance has only what the statute that established it has vested in it, and insofar as it has been made responsible to adjudicate disputes within the scope of the power vested in it, it is under a duty that derives from the statute and the concept of democratic government not to try or adjudicate a matter that is beyond its statutory power.

A preliminary and mandatory condition for the satisfactory activity of any judicial system is a clear and exhaustive definition of the framework of powers and the apportionment of functions that rest with its various different instances. Without an exhaustive and specific definition of powers the systemic structure, built in accordance with the statute, is blurred and the stability of its functioning is not secured. The harmony necessary in the area of operation of the different judicial arms and the relationship between them is impaired; the allocation of professional, administrative and budgetary resources to the different instances is disrupted, and direct harm might occur to the efficacy of the judicial system and the level of judicial performance. The uniqueness of the responsibility owed by the judge, which requires the existence of a clear framework of authority, alongside which is the responsibility and duty to rule, becomes blurry. Thus, recognizing the power of a judicial instance to adjudicate matters, the power and responsibility for which have not been legally transferred to it, might materially disrupt the internal balance required in the structure of the judicial system and severely undermine its standing and performance.

A consequence of the aforegoing is that the power of a judicial instance, as such, be it civil or religious, is acquired by law and it has no power to be derived from the parties' agreement, except where the statute itself has seen fit to recognize such agreement in certain circumstances as a source of the power to adjudicate. Thus, for example, with regard to the effect of the parties' agreement, the law has distinguished between the apportionment of subject matter jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction between judicial instances. It is willing to acknowledge, in certain conditions, the parties' agreement as a valid source for changing the territorial jurisdiction that has been prescribed. Section 5 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984 provides that when an agreement between parties as to the place of jurisdiction exists, the lawsuit will be filed to the court in that area of jurisdiction. The relative flexibility regarding territorial jurisdiction, and the willingness to recognize the parties' agreement as the source of such jurisdiction, stems solely from the statute and derives its power from its provisions. That is not the case in respect of subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, the law does not recognize that the parties' agreement has power to depart from the rules of subject matter jurisdiction, as crafted by state legislation.

A similar approach is also taken with regard to the judicial instance's power to adjudicate by way of arbitration. Since the state judicial instance merely has the subject matter jurisdiction conferred to it by statute, it is not vested with power to hear and rule a matter as an arbitrator by virtue of the parties' agreement, unless it has been expressly given that power by statute. In general, a judicial instance is not supposed to adjudicate a matter that is referred to it as arbitrator. However, in certain circumstances, the law has expressly recognized the power of a civil instance to adjudicate a dispute in departure from the ordinary rules of procedure. Thus, for example, in the area of small claims, section 65 of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984 provides that if a lawsuit has been filed in the small claims court, the judge may, with the parties’ consent, try the claim as arbitrator, and the provisions of the Arbitration Law will govern the matter, with certain restrictions; in addition, a court hearing a civil matter has been empowered, with the parties’ consent, to decide a matter before it by way of settlement (section 79A of the Courts Law) or to refer a matter, with the parties' consent, to arbitration or conciliation (sections 79B and 79C of the Courts Law). The said authorities are all vested in the court by virtue of statute. They assume that the subject of the dispute is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court hearing the case and they give it special procedural means that are intended to facilitate and expedite the process of deciding the dispute and bringing about a just result. The various judicial instances have not been generally empowered by law to hear and decide matters that are not included in the scope of their subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' agreement, either as arbitrators or otherwise. Since such authority has not been conferred to them, it is, ipso facto, denied and does not exist.

The Rabbinical Courts are an integral part of the Israeli judicial system. They were established by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they derive their power and authorities from the state statute. They have nothing other than what is vested in them by the statute, and they are subject to the set of powers of the statute in their judicial work, as interpreted over the years by case law. Along those lines, this Court has held in the Katz Case that the Rabbinical Court is not empowered to issue a Letter of Refusal in monetary matters that is intended to compel a party to submit to the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction by ostracizing and disgracing the recalcitrant party; and in HCJ 2222/99 Gabai v The Great Rabbinical Court PD 54(5) 401, the opinion was expressed that the Rabbinical Court lacks legal authority to issue a forced settlement decision, without the parties' consent, thus forcing a judgment on the parties without determining facts on the basis of evidence, if it is unable to decide in accordance with the law.

It emerges from this that the parties' agreement as such cannot, per se, grant jurisdiction to the Rabbinical Court, unless, it has been recognized by the law as a primary source of authority. Thus, the parties' agreement has been recognized as a source of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 9 the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law, in matters of personal status of Jews pursuant to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council or according to the Succession Ordinance, which are within the parallel jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court and the civil instance. Nevertheless, the Rabbinical Court does not have power to hear and decide a matter that is not of the kind found within its exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the statute or within its parallel jurisdiction, even if the parties have given their consent to its jurisdiction. Such agreement does not derive from a legally recognized source of authority in the law and it cannot, per se, vest jurisdiction in a state judicial instance.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of an Arbitration Agreement

16.       According to the same line of reasoning, the Rabbinical Court has no power and authority to decide a dispute as an arbitrator by virtue of an arbitration agreement between the parties in a matter, which by its nature is not within its legal jurisdiction. The Court has not been vested with jurisdiction by law to decide disputes as an arbitrator and the parties' agreement cannot vest it with such power.

The issue of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to arbitrate financial and other matters that go beyond the powers granted to it in accordance with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law has caused consternation and confusion over the years. It appears that, in reality, the Rabbinical Court assumes the role of arbitrating matters that are beyond the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction (Katz Case, ibid, pp. 606-8; CA 376/62 Bachar v. Bachar, PD 17(2) 881, 882, 885; CA 688/70 Doar v. Hamami, PD 25(2) 396, 399; M. Alon, Jewish Law – History, Sources and Principles, third edition, vol. III, 5748, 1529). Justice Barak considered the inherent difficulty of a state judicial instance's need to adjudicate a dispute by arbitration where it was not empowered to do so by law, saying:

"The first possible argument is that the motion to the Rabbinical Court is like that to an arbitrator and embodied in the Arbitration Law, 5728-1968. That possibility – which has used in practice and can be encored as a year-long custom - raises serious problems in principle. Thus, for example, it can be asked whether it is proper for a judicial entity, whose powers are prescribed by law, to assume additional judicial powers, by being empowered as an arbitrator. Is it conceivable that parties would motion the magistrate’s court to try a pecuniary claim, that is outside its jurisdiction, as an arbitrator? From the state's point of view, is it justifiable to use judicial time and tools (whether of the civil or religious courts) for matters outside the jurisdiction that the law has granted the judicial authorities? Is there no fear that the public be confused as to which decisions the judicial instance has awarded as the government and those that it has awarded as arbitrator?"

(HCJ 3023/90 Jane Doe (a minor) v. The Rehovot Regional Rabbinical Court PD 45(3) 808, 813-14; see also S. Ottolenghi, Arbitration, Law and Procedure (fourth edition, 5765) 167-8; Schiffman, ibid, vol. I, 37.)

In HCJ 2174/24 Kahati v. The Great Rabbinical Court, PD 50(2) 214, this Court (per Justice Dorner) once again referred to the practice, adopted from time to time by the Rabbinical Courts, of deciding disputes as arbitrators in matters that are not within their jurisdiction. It expressed skepticism with respect to the validity of the practice. However, as in the previous case, it again left this question open without making any conclusive ruling, since such a ruling was not necessary in that case (cf. Aminoff, ibid, pp. 792-3).

17.       There is indeed an inherent difficulty in recognizing the Rabbinical Court's power to decide a dispute in a matter on which it has not been given jurisdiction by law (cf. Ottolenghi, Dispute Resolution by Alternative Means, Israeli Law Yearbook, 5752-5753, p. 535, 550-1). In the past, the Mandate government empowered the Rabbinical Courts to act as arbitrators by means of section 10(d) of the Israel Knesset Regulations of 1927, but upon the establishment of the State, the “Israel Knesset”, within its meaning under the Mandate, ceased to exist and it was held that those Regulations no longer had any force or effect (Crim. App. 427/64 Yair v. The State of Israel PD 19(3) 402; HCJ 3269/95, ibid, p. 622-3; Schiffman, ibid, p. 39). It cannot therefore be argued that the said section might serve as the source of the Rabbinical Courts' power as arbitrators. Moreover, upon enactment of the Arbitration Law, it was proposed that an arbitration decision made by a religious court when ruling as an arbitrator would in all respects, except with regard to the appeal, be treated as a judgement of the court sitting in accordance with its jurisdiction prescribed by statute, and that the award would not require confirmation under the Arbitration Law. That proposal was not accepted (Knesset Proceedings 5728, pp. 2966-7).

It is indeed difficult to settle the governing perception that views the judicial system as an arm of government, which derives its power and authority from statute, while acknowledging the possibility that the selfsame system can acquire other subject matter authorities deriving merely from the parties' agreement that do not originate from the empowering law. The Israeli Rabbinical Courts, that are part of the Israeli judicial system, integrate with the said perception and, like the other judicial instances, operate in accordance with the principle of legality of the arms of government (see the dissenting opinion of Justice Tal in the Katz Case, distinguishing between the power of religious courts as a state authority and the power they have, in his opinion, by virtue of Jewish law, which is not connected with state law).

18.       Apart from the essential difficulty inherent in the judicial decision of the Rabbinical Court as an arbitrator, which is not consistent with the principle of legality of the government authorities, other difficulties arise from the said procedural practice. The practice blurs the spheres of the Court's own activity in respect of the procedural basis upon which its decision rests: is it a decision within the scope of the Court's state power that is subject to review by the High Court of Justice in accordance with section 15 of the Basic Law: the Judiciary, or is it an extra-statutory power that is built on a different foundation originating from the parties' agreement and subject to review by a different judicial instance, like the District Court, in accordance with the Arbitration Law (cf. Jane Doe Case, ibid, para. 7)? In more than a few cases the parties might misunderstand the nature of their agreement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court as they do not always understand the meaning and implications of their consent. Moreover, usually, in the course of such adjudication, strict attention is not paid to enquiring into the existence of an arbitration agreement or the application of the Arbitration Law and the rules pursuant thereto, such, for example, the mechanism for the confirmation and revocation of an arbitral award and the role of the District Court as the competent instance in accordance with the Arbitration Law (Ottolenghi, ibid, p. 168; Dichovski, The Standing of a Rabbinical Court Dealing with Property Law As Arbitrator, The Jewish Law Yearbook 16-17 (5750-5751) 527; MF 268/88 Delrahim v. Delrahim, DCJ 49(3) 428; SC 2329/99 Kfir v. Kfir, PD 55(2) 518, para. 5). An arbitral judgment made by the Rabbinical Court frequently does not undergo confirmation or revocation proceedings in the District Court as required by the Arbitration Law for the purpose of its execution, and the Rabbinical Court has no power to confirm an arbitral judgment (Kahati, ibid, p. 220; HCJ 5289/00 Mograbi v. The Great Rabbinical Court, Takdin Elyon 2000(2) 581; Kfir Case, ibid, para. 5). Furthermore, a situation in which the District Court, by virtue of the Arbitration Law, might oversee the Rabbinical Court's decisions as an arbitrator might harm the proper balance between the instances and aggravate the tension between the civil and religious judicial arms (A. Porat, The Rabbinical Court As Arbitrator, Kiriat Mishpat II (5762) 503, 521-4; Dichovski Case, ibid, p. 529).

The Rabbinical Court, purporting to act as an arbitrator between the parties, still operates under cover, and with the characteristics, of its state role. To that end it makes use of the court's physical and organizational system, which is financed by the state; it adjudicates disputes as an arbitrator in the scope of the court calendar, as part of its ordinary work; the overall services, the organizational and professional arrangement and the government budget are also used by it in that function, which by its nature does not have a state character. The time that it should devote to matters of personal status in its official capacity is partly assigned by it to a different judicial function that is not for the state, despite appearing to carry the state seal in the eyes of the public at large, who finds it difficult to distinguish between the judicial function and the extra-statutory function performed by the Court. This intermingling of functions is inconsistent with the principle of legality and a correct definition of the functions and powers of a state judicial instance (Katz Case, ibid, p. 608; Schiffman, ibid, pp. 37-8).

19.       Mention ought to be made to the approach of Prof. Shochatman in his paper entitled The Rabbinical Courts' Jurisdiction in Matters Other Than Personal Status (Bar Ilan University Yearbook on Humanities and Judaism, vols. 28-29 (5761) p. 437, p. 449 et seq.). As he sees it, the Rabbinical Court might acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' agreement in matters outside its jurisdiction in accordance with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law by virtue of section 15(d)(4) of the Basic Law: the Judiciary, thereby acquiring jurisdiction as an arbitrator. According to that Law, which defines the High Court of Justice's power to review religious courts, the question of a religious court's jurisdiction can only be referred to this instance when it was raised at the first opportunity. The author infers from this that where there is prior agreement between the parties to vest subject matter jurisdiction in the religious court, a party who has so agreed may not later dispute jurisdiction. By virtue of that preclusion the religious court acquires subject matter jurisdiction, and the High Court of Justice is itself precluded from intervening therein. According to this approach, such an agreement vests subject matter jurisdiction and is not limited solely to matters of personal status. It might encompass numerous spheres that are beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the religious court, as defined in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law.

I cannot agree with this position. The interpretation expressed by Prof. Shochatman assumes that it is possible to recognize the existence of subject matter jurisdiction of an Israel state judicial instance by means of the parties' consent, combined with the doctrine of preclusion and estoppel that prevents someone who has agreed to jurisdiction from later disputing it. That approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the principle of legality that obligates judicial instances, including the religious courts. It is not consistent with the starting point whereby subject matter jurisdiction is vested in a judicial instance by a positive arrangement, and its existence is not to be inferred by an indirect interpretation of provisions of law concerning estoppel and preclusion. The Rabbinical Court's powers are granted to it by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they cannot be added to by an indirect interpretation of statutory provisions, the purpose of which is not the vesting of power. Moreover, it has already been held (in Sima Levy Case, ibid, p. 618-19) that the element of preclusion emerging from section 15(d)(4) of the Basic Law: the Judiciary was not intended to vest in the Rabbinical Court subject matter jurisdiction that is not vested in it by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law. The said preclusion is based on the assumption that the matter being adjudicated by the Rabbinical Court is of the type that are within the parallel jurisdiction of the civil court and Rabbinical Court, and regarding the latter, jurisdiction is conclusively consummated if both parties have agreed to it. In those circumstances, and only in them, a party's prior agreement or silence, or subsequent denial of jurisdiction, might lead to preclusion with respect to a lack of jurisdiction argument in the High Court of Justice - that and nothing more. An interpretation that takes the doctrine of preclusion out of context, and assumes the existence of a potentially unlimited Rabbinical Court subject matter jurisdiction, the final consummation of which is dependent only upon the parties' agreement, is directly opposed to the principle of legality, upon which the concept of democratic government is based. It is inconsistent with the subject matter jurisdictions vested by statute in the arms of government, including the judicial system.

Alternative Decision-Making Systems

20.       The need of various different circles in the religious world to entertain alternative systems for the resolution of disputes is proper and recognized. Indeed, alternative rabbinical judicial systems that are not associated with the state rabbinical judicial system, which decide disputes between litigants in the community, are recognized. They can be granted powers to act as arbitrators by agreement of the parties. The need of different communities for alternative dispute resolution systems specific to them can be met by reference to internal arbitration frameworks that are not part of the state judicial system, within which disputes can be settled by virtue of the parties' agreement. This alternative course to litigation in the state judicial instances can be developed and strengthened in accordance with the different needs and preferences of the communities. This was considered by Justice Zamir in the Katz Case (ibid, p. 606), who stated:

"As is known, there are still observant Jews who prefer to litigate in matters of property according to religious law before a religious court rather than the state court. The state's law does not preclude that, if both parties to the dispute so desire, and it is even willing to give the force of arbitration to such litigation, if the litigants fulfil the provisions of the Arbitration Law. Indeed, in practice, such courts exist in various communities around Israel, not by virtue of state law or as official institutions but as private entities. That is, for example, the case of the rabbinical court of the Edah Chareidis [the Haredi Community] in Jerusalem. However… in these cases we are not dealing with a private entity but a state court, and the law applies to it just as any other of the state's courts. Like any court, in fact, like any government agency, the Rabbinical Court is also subject to the principle of legality, meaning that it has nothing other than what was granted to it by the law… In this respect, the Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem is distinguished from the rabbinical court of the Edah Chareidis in Jerusalem. The Israeli Rabbinical Court, which has jurisdiction in accordance with the Basic Law: the Judiciary, is not like one of the rabbinical courts of the Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Unlike them, it has the power and authority of a government institution. So too, unlike them, it is also subject to the restrictions that apply to any government institution".

Consensual Resolution – Looking to the Future and to the Past

21.       The scope of the Rabbinical Courts' subject matter jurisdiction to decide a dispute by virtue of the parties' agreement outside the framework of the law looks to the past and the future. It calls into question the validity of the Court's rulings based on the parties' agreement outside the scope of the statute, not merely henceforth, looking to the future, but also with respect to the past. The outlook to the future seeks to find a binding definition of the limits of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction and to strictly observe those limits hereafter. However, the outlook to the past calls into question the binding legal validity of the Rabbinical Court's decisions that have been made over the years by virtue of the parties' agreement as aforesaid. That issue is far from simple; there is no need to decide it here, and it will wait until its time comes.

From the General to the Particular

22.       Let us return to the respondent's suit against the petitioner in the Rabbinical Court and examine whether it is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court; the test of jurisdiction depends on the nature of the cause of action, and whether the cause falls within the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court.

The Cause of Action – Enforcement of a Contractual Indemnity Clause

23.       The respondent's cause of action in the Rabbinical Court is the enforcement of a contractual clause concerning property, which is contained in the divorce agreement that was made between the couple for the purpose of the divorce proceedings. It provided that if the respondent were sued for an increase in child support and the satisfaction of any of the children's needs or if a stay of exit order was granted at the initiative of the wife, then the petitioner would compensate him, in the language of clause 4(e) of the agreement, with half the property. That provision is also mentioned in clause 5 of the agreement, which is headed "Indemnification", and according to the substance of the provision, and also its location and wording, it is an indemnity clause. The respondent sues for the enforcement of a property condition for his indemnification due to a breach of contract by the wife, and he gave expression thereto by heading his claim as one for "specific performance". That is to say, we have here a property claim for the enforcement of the contractual indemnity clause in a divorce agreement that received the effect of a judgement of the Rabbinical Court and further to which the parties' divorce was completed.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction to Adjudicate a Property Claim for the Breach of a Contractual Indemnity Clause in a Divorce Agreement after the Parties' Divorce

Does the respondent's suit, according to its cause, fall within the scope of one of the sources of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction? Because of the great similarity between the instant matter and the case of Sima Levy, we shall draw guidance and direction from that case.

 

 

Original – Primary Jurisdiction

24.       The source of the Rabbinical Court's exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce, as provided in section 1 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law, does not apply in the instant case because the subject of the suit is a property matter after the dissolution of the parties' marriage and a matter of "marriage and divorce" is, no longer involved. Nor is it a matter "connected with a divorce suit", including support for the wife and children, within the meaning of section 3 of the Law. After divorce, a property claim in respect of the breach of an indemnity clause is not connected with the divorce suit, which has ended and no longer exists. The respondent's cause of action is a new one, the subject of which is the enforcement of a divorce agreement or an application for the enforcement of a divorce judgment, based on a divorce agreement. The cause is based on the breach of a divorce agreement after the award of the divorce and completion of the couple's divorce, and such a new cause is naturally not to be bound up with the matters that were in the past connected with the divorce suit.

With regard to the property cause of action, which surrounds the breach of an indemnity clause of a divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Court does not have jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' agreement pursuant to section 9 of the Law, which deals with the Rabbinical Court's parallel jurisdiction that is vested by virtue of the parties' agreement in matters of personal status according to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council and the Succession Ordinance. Section 9 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law raises the question of whether jurisdiction can be vested in the Rabbinical Court by consent in a matter included in its parallel jurisdiction after completion of the divorce, or whether its jurisdiction pursuant to that provision is limited solely to matters within its parallel subject matter jurisdiction that arise in connection with, and until, the divorce and its completion, but not afterwards. Whatever the answer to this question, it is in any event clear that the subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 9 is limited solely to the matters mentioned therein, that is, matters of "personal status" as defined in the Palestine Orders in Council and the Succession Ordinance. In a dispute that is not within the bounds of those matters, even the parties' agreement cannot vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court (Schiffman, ibid, vol. I, p. 37; Jane Doe Case, ibid, p. 812). The power of the parties' stipulation is restricted solely to the matters defined by the statute (MF 358/89 Zalotti v. Zalotti PD 43(4) 41, 42; Porat, ibid, p. 510).

Clause 11 of the divorce agreement in this matter looks to the future, and provides that if differences arise between the couple after the divorce, then they undertake to bring their claims solely in the Rabbinical Courts. That agreement is effective only to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court pursuant to section 9 of the Law in respect of matters of personal status according to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance. A property claim for the enforcement of a contractual indemnity clause in a divorce agreement is not a matter of personal status within the meaning of the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance, and thus, the parties' contractual agreement in respect of such a dispute cannot vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court pursuant to section 9 of the Law.

The Rabbinical Court therefore does not have original jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's claim.

"Ancillary" Inherent Jurisdiction

25.       Does the Rabbinical Court have "ancillary" inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's claim? The answer is in the negative.

            In the instant case, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction is irrelevant insofar as it relates to the revocation of a divorce award because of a defect in the making of the divorce agreement. It is not a defect of fraud, mistake, deceit, duress or similar that occurred in the making of the agreement and that might have given the Rabbinical Court ancillary jurisdiction to consider its revocation.

            Similarly, the Rabbinical Court has not acquired ancillary jurisdiction by virtue of a material change in circumstances after granting the divorce judgment that allegedly justifies revoking the divorce agreement and the divorce judgment in order to achieve a just result. On the contrary, the respondent's suit is for the specific performance and enforcement of the divorce agreement, not its revocation. Although, in the Great Rabbinical Court, the respondent pleaded that his suit was to revoke the divorce agreement because, according to him, the Get had been given by mistake (the Great Rabbinical Court's decision of May 4, 2003). These arguments were made as an "embellishment" at a late stage of the trial and do not reflect the real cause of action; the motion to revoke the divorce agreement and the act of divorce is inconsistent with the respondent's claim in his suit to compensate him with half the property (the apartment, the contents and the gold), which is nothing other than a claim for the enforcement of the divorce agreement (cf. CA 105/83 Menashe v. Menashe PD 38(4) 635; Yadin, The Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law 5731-1970, Second Edition, 5739, p. 44).

            Again, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction in a matter pending before it until the proceedings conducted before it are concluded will not vest it with jurisdiction in this case. The Regional Rabbinical Court had granted a final and unconditional judgment and awarded the effect of judgement to the divorce agreement. Indeed, the divorce agreement does contain an indemnification provision, which by its nature looks to the future, but this fact cannot transform a judgement that gave effect to a divorce agreement into a judgment that is not final, leaving the Rabbinical Court with jurisdiction that has not yet been exhausted to continue adjudicating with respect to the divorce agreement's future performance in this property matter. A financial-property dispute that has arisen between the parties after the award of judgement gives rise to a new cause of action and necessitates the institution of new proceedings in accordance with the jurisdictional framework prescribed by law (see Sima Levy Case, pp. 607-608; CA 468/85 Dondushanski v. Don PD 40(2) 609; D. Bar Ofir, Execution - Proceedings and Law (Sixth Edition, 2005, pp. 164-5)).

            Nor has the Rabbinical Court acquired jurisdiction to hear this matter by virtue of the doctrine of "continuing jurisdiction". It should be kept in mind, that continuing jurisdiction is vested where an instance has tried a particular matter in the past and, in special circumstances, a need has arisen to vacate or modify an earlier decision due to a material change that has occurred in the circumstances upon which the original decision was based such, for example, in matters of child support and custody. The instant case is fundamentally different. The motion does not seek to modify or revoke the divorce agreement made between the parties. On the contrary, it seeks to enforce the agreement, and such a claim has no place within the continuing jurisdiction vested in the Rabbinical Court. A decision on property matters is a final one and not a matter for continuing jurisdiction, as the Court stated in Sima Levy (Justice Cheshin, ibid, p. 611):

                        "As distinct from decisions concerning the payment of support or child custody – which by their nature are not final and the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction applies to them – a decision on a property matter is in principle a final one" (emphasis added).

            The property aspect of the divorce agreement, including the indemnification clause, and the divorce judgment that gave it effect, are therefore not within the Rabbinical Court's continuing jurisdiction.

            And finally, the Rabbinical Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate the new cause that arose following the divorce agreement in order to interpret the agreement. Firstly, the Rabbinical Court, having completed and exhausted its power to rule on the matter of divorce, no longer has ancillary power to interpret the divorce agreement or the divorce judgment (cf. HCJ 897/78 Yigal v. The National Labour Court, PD 33(2) 6, 7; CA 5403/90 The State of Israel v. RAM Revhiat Ibrahim PD 46(3) 459). Moreover, in the instant case, the question of the agreement’s interpretation hasn’t risen as such, but a claim for its enforcement has been brought instead. Hence, the Rabbinical Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction in this respect either.

            In conclusion: the Rabbinical Court does not have primary original jurisdiction, or ancillary inherent jurisdiction, to adjudicate a property claim for enforcement of a contractual indemnification clause in a divorce agreement that has given the effect of judgement, once the couple's divorce has been completed.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of Consent

26.       As can be recalled, clause 11 of the divorce agreement provides that differences between the couple after the divorce are to be adjudicated solely in the Rabbinical Courts. The couple's agreement as such cannot vest the Rabbinical Court with jurisdiction where there is no legal source for it. The agreement in this case concerns something that is not a matter of personal status according to section 9 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law, and it was therefore given for this purpose outside the scope of the law, and is ineffective.

            Indeed,

                        "where the subject of the litigation is not within the jurisdiction of a particular judicial entity, no agreement in the world has power to grant the entity jurisdiction that the statute has not given it; it is the statute that gives and it is the statute that takes away" (Sima Levy, p. 617).

            The Regional Rabbinical Court's decision of June 18, 2002 and the Great Rabbinical Court's decision of May 4, 2003, according to which the Rabbinical Courts have jurisdiction in principle to try the claim by virtue of the law, are inconsistent with its provisions.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of an Arbitration Arrangement

27.       It was further argued that clause 11 of the divorce agreement is an arbitration provision that vests the Rabbinical Court with power as an arbitrator to adjudicate the respondent's claim of a breach of the agreement's indemnification provision. Although not strictly necessary, we have considered the question in principle of whether a Rabbinical Court can be empowered to decide a dispute between litigants in arbitration, in a matter that is not within its subject matter jurisdiction according to the statute. We have answered that question in the negative and the answer is applicable to the case herein.

            In the instant case, the conclusion that the Rabbinical Court lacks jurisdiction to try the matter as an arbitrator is also reinforced by another reason. Studying the contents of clause 11 of the divorce agreement shows that it cannot be construed as an arbitration clause, equal to an "arbitration agreement" between the parties. It is well known that the power of an arbitrator to decide a dispute between parties derives from an arbitration agreement. Without an arbitration agreement, no arbitration arises. An "arbitration agreement", according to the Arbitration Law, is "a written agreement (between parties) to refer to arbitration a dispute that arises between them in the future, whether an arbitrator is named in the agreement or not" (section 1 of the Arbitration Law). The condition precedent for arbitration is therefore the existence of an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration. If parties have agreed to refer disputes between them to the decision of some entity but it is not clear that a decision in arbitration is involved, then there is no arbitration agreement (ALA 4928/92 Aziz Ezra Haj v. Tel Mond Local Council PD 47(5) 94; Ottolenghi, ibid, pp 9-41).

            In this case, the parties undertook to refer any disputes arising between them after the divorce solely to the Rabbinical Courts. No intention can be inferred from that agreement to refer such disputes to the Rabbinical Court qua arbitrator. In Jane Doe (para. 6 of Justice Barak's opinion), as in the case herein, the couple mistakenly believed that their consent to the Rabbinical Court's adjudicating disputes connected with the divorce agreement could vest it with power to decide as a state judicial instance, rather than as an arbitrator. Indeed, the wording and contents of clause 11 of the divorce agreement do not demonstrate the parties' intention to treat it as an arbitration clause purporting to empower the Rabbinical Court to act as arbitrator. Consequently, even if we assumed that the Rabbinical Court could be empowered to act as an arbitrator in matters in which it has no original or ancillary jurisdiction by virtue of the law, there is still no effective arbitration agreement, as pleaded.

A Note before Closing

28.       The issue of the Rabbinical Court's power to adjudicate by virtue of the parties' agreement, outside the scope of the law, has arisen in earlier contexts in the past, and although different opinions have been expressed in such respect by the courts, no binding decision has been necessary in connection therewith. This absence of a ruling has permitted the continuation of a procedural practice that is inconsistent with the organizational structure of the courts and the division of powers between them in accordance with state law. This custom has enabled a judicial practice that is inconsistent with the principle of the administration's legality and the legality of the judicial system. The time has come to move from the stage of expressing an opinion to the stage of making a ruling, which is necessary to ensure the proper function of the judicial system within the scope of its powers, and thereby to protect the basic foundation that defines the boundaries of its activity based on the principle of legality and the rule of law. This will not harm, in a any way, the need and ability of various social groups to entertain alternative resolution systems outside the state judicial instances, based on the principles of arbitration regulated by law or on the basis of other agreed and recognized rules of procedure. However, at the same time, it is necessary to safeguard, and protect against blurring the boundaries between the state judicial systems and alternative resolution systems that are built on the parties' agreement, in order to protect the proper operation of the different arms of the judicial system and the public's confidence in the way in which its powers are exercised and its judgments.

Conclusion

29.       By deciding the respondent's lawsuit against the petitioner for the enforcement of a contractual indemnification clause in the divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Courts exceeded the power vested in them by law. Consequently, the decisions of the Regional Rabbinical Court and the Great Rabbinical Court in the respondent's claim are void. The result is that the order nisi that has been awarded should be made absolute. The respondent shall bear the petitioner's professional fees in the sum of NIS 12,000.

 

Vice President (Ret.) M. Cheshin

 

            I concur.

 

Justice S. Joubran

            I concur.

Therefore, held as stated in the opinion of Justice Procaccia.

Awarded today, this eighth day of Nissan, 5766 (April 6, 2006).

 

___________________

___________________

___________________

Vice President (Ret.)

Justice

Justice

 

Axelrod v. State

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 129/13
Date Decided: 
Sunday, January 26, 2014
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The petition urges the Court to compel the Knesset to legislate the matter of marriages between those who cannot (as in cases of intermarriage) or wish not to marry under religious law and are therefore excluded from marrying in Israel. Holding that the Court cannot order the Legislature to legislate outside of correcting a constitutional flaw in existing statutes, President Grunis and Deputy President Naor declined to intervene. In his concurrence, Justice Rubinstein finds that as current marriage laws exclude large portions of the population, the State cannot continue to ignore this reality and violate citizens' right to marry. He therefore believes a legislative solution is required.  

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

Supreme Court of Israel

HCJ 129/13

 

Before:            The Honorable President A. Grunis

                        The Honorable Vice President M. Naor

                        The Honorable Justice E. Rubinstein

 

Petitioners:      1. Eli Axelrod

2. Moshe Axelrod

v.

Respondents: 1. Government of Israel 

2. Israeli Knesset

3. Ministry of the Interior

 

Petition to grant an order nisi

 

Date of Hearing: 21 Shvat 5774 (January 22, 2014)

 

On behalf of Petitioners:           Adv. Eli Axelrod

On behalf of Respondents 1,3: Adv. Ran Rosenberg

On behalf of Respondent 2:     Adv. Dr. Gur Bleigh

 

Judgment

 

President A. Grunis and Vice President M. Naor:

1.         This petition seeks to bring before this Court again a difficult and painful problem. This problem pertains to citizens of Israel, many thousands of them, who cannot marry in this Country because they are not members of one of the recognized religious groups, or one of them is not a member of one of those groups. In addition the petition relates to those who can marry in Israel, but do not wish to do so in a religious ceremony.

2.         The stated problem has been presented to this Court in several petitions argued in the last few years: HCJ 7127/11 Center for Jewish Pluralism v. Government of Israel (Dec. 5, 2011); HCJ 1143/11 Jerusalem Institute for Justice v. The Knesset (Oct. 18, 2012). The first petition was deleted and the second was denied, in both cases after the petitioners accepted the recommendations of the different panels hearing the cases to retract the petitions. There is nothing novel in the current petition in comparison to the previous ones. Clearly, the solution to the difficult problem has to be by way of Knesset legislation. However, the Court cannot order the legislature to legislate. There is a dramatic distinction between striking down a law due to a constitutional defect, and ordering the legislature to regulate a certain issue in legislation. The additional claims raised by the petitioners, including the one pertaining to the Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Ordinance and its treatment of civil marriage, do not substantiate a cause of action.

3.         Regrettably, we do not see a basis for the Court’s involvement.

 

President, Vice President

 

Justice E. Rubinstein:

A.        I join my colleagues’ judgment. I would like to note that, sadly, the problem invoked by the petitioners is very old, and has worsened with the wave of immigration from the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union) from the late 1980’s, as it is undisputable that large numbers of those entitled to Shvut in a family’s two generations are not Jewish according to Halacha; even though they are of Israel seed, through father, grandfather, or grandmother.

            I would be the last to support intermarriage; however a solution to citizens seeking to marry must be given to them within their country. In my opinion in LFA 9607/03 Ploni v. Plonit (2006), paragraphs J-K, I said about them:

“Intermarriage, a painful issue since ancient days (see, during the first return to Zion – Ezra 9 1-2, 12 and chapter 10, and Nehemia 9 31), makes my heart cringe, due to its meaning in the historical respect and its impact on the state of the Jewish people and its size, to an existential degree … (But) I doubt that closing our eyes to the fact of these difficulties is the way to deal with intermarriage, given the factual and legal reality that has evolved over the years … It seems that the wave of intermarriage, which appears with great force within a big part of the Jewish diaspora and exists among our people as well since the waves of immigration of the previous decades – is not going to be stopped in this way, and attending to the larger matter is beyond the judicial scope … The place for decision is the legislature … the Legislature ought to consider an arrangement that would be suitable to those Israelis who cannot marry in Israel (emphasis in original – E.R.); I dare say, that if it were possible to persuade each and every Jewish man and woman, for many good reasons, to marry members of the Jewish people, there would be no-one happier than me, certainly so after a third of the People was decimated in the Holocaust. But since this is not the reality, the state should provide the suitable solutions, of course while accounting for its Jewish and democratic character – as well as for the slippery slope that can ensue.”

 

The son of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother – Petitioner 1 did nothing wrong. He is an Israeli citizen, as good as any of us, subject to duties and entitled to rights, including the right to marry. Since the 1970 amendment to the Law of Return, 1950, and the addition of Section 4A, the right to marry applies also to citizens entitled to Shvut and to their offspring. The Law on Matrimonial Partnership for People without Religion, 2010, does not apply to the Petitioner, since he seeks to marry a Jewish woman. He apparently chose not to convert into Judaism although he considers himself Jewish; to me this would have been a practical and commendable solution, but it is up to him and his personal decision. Therefore the state should devise a fair solution to those like him, one that would not make any of its citizens feel as if they are “second rate.” Indeed, the difficulty in this is clear and for that reason the Law on Matrimonial Partnership was dedicated to those without a religion, as its name suggests; however a solution to the complex question is required, while reserving marriage to the religious groups within themselves; the issue is clearly in the purview of the legislature.

 

Justice

 

The petition is denied. Given the circumstance no fees will be assessed.

 

Entered today, 25 Shvat 5774 (Jan. 26, 2014)

 

President                             Vice President                             Justice

Full opinion: 

Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Social Affairs

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 7245/10
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

We are concerned with petitions for the revocation of Section 61(2)(d) of the Arrangements Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009, as it is unconstitutional, which included Amendment no. 113 to the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5755-1995 (hereinafter: the “Amendment to the Law”) that ordered, inter alia, the reduction of the child allowances paid for children who have not received the vaccines required based on their age and health condition and according to the Vaccination Program ordered by the Director General of the Ministry of Health. The vaccination program includes a vaccination by the name of MMRV, which is a “quadrivalent” vaccine against four diseases: measles, mumps, rubella and chicken pox. The vaccination is given to infants at the age of one year, and the program will apply to infants born starting January 1, 2012, such that the first reduction of allowances will be made no earlier than July 1, 2013.

 

The HCJ (per the opinion of Justice Arbel, Justices Hayut and Barak Erez concurring) denied the petitions and held:

 

Justice Arbel held that there is no room for judicial intervention in the legislative process for the Amendment. Justice Arbel reviewed the nature of the child allowance arrangement and its purpose, the approach of the Ministry of Health and medical science towards vaccinations generally, and the quadrivalent vaccination specifically. Justice Arbel believed that the starting point should be that the legislator, in setting child allowances, had in mind the welfare and best interests of the children. Justice Arbel stated that in the framework of the constitutionality of the Amendment, the question of whether constitutional rights established in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter: the “Basic Law”) are violated will be examined, and if the answer is affirmative, it will be examined whether the conditions of the limitation clause of the Basic Law are satisfied. If one of the conditions is not satisfied, the remedy for the unlawful violation will be discussed.

 

Justice Arbel examined whether the Amendment violated rights enshrined in the Basic Law, i.e. the right to a dignified life or the right to social security, the right to autonomy and the right of equality, and held that the Amendment does not violate the right to a dignified life and does not violate the constitutional right to autonomy or to parental autonomy, but does violate the right of equality. It is noted that in this context, Justice Arbel believed that the group of equals included the parents insured through the National Insurance Law. However, Justice Arbel held that the violation satisfies all four conditions of the limitation clause of the Basic Law: the violation of the human right was made in or by a law or by virtue of explicit authorization therein; the violating law befits the values of the State of Israel; the violating law is intended for a proper purpose; the law violates the right to an extent no greater than  required. Justice Arbel held that this violation satisfies all of the conditions of the limitation clause in a manner that strikes a proper balance with other interests and rights, and hence the Amendment is proportionate and there is no room to intervene therein.

 

Justice Barak-Erez also found that the Amendment to the Law violates the right of equality, holding that the petitions should be denied because the violation satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. Justice Hayut believed that the starting point according to which the question of discrimination should be examined is that the right to the child allowances is a right of the parents, and that this is the relevant group of equals. Unlike Justices Arbel and Barak-Erez, Justice Hayut found that the distinction made by the Amendment to the Law between parents who have vaccinated their children and parents who have refrained from doing so, for the purpose of deducting a fixed amount from the child allowances, does not violate the constitutional right of equality of the parents who chose not to vaccinate their children, and therefore in her opinion too, the petitions should be denied. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

In the Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

                                                                                                                        HCJ 7245/10

                                                                                                                        HCJ 8357/10

                                                                                                                        HCJ 908/11

 

Before:                                                Her Honor Justice E. Arbel

                                                Her Honor Justice E. Hayut

                                                Her Honor Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

The Petitioner in                     

HCJ 7245/10:                          Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

                                   

                                                v.

 

The Respondents:                   1. The Ministry of Social Affairs

                                                2. The National Insurance Institute

                                                3. The Knesset

 

The Petitioner in                      The Israel National Council for the Child

HCJ 8357/10: 

                                                v.

 

The Respondents:                   1. The Israeli Government

                                                2. The Minister of Finance

                                                3. The Attorney General

4. The Minister of Health

5. The Israeli Knesset

6. The National Insurance Institute

 

The Petitioners in                    1. The Association for Information on Vaccines

HCJ 908/11:                            2. Binyamin Brotski

                                                3. Matan Koren

                                                4. Netta Dror

                                                5. Itay Hadar

                                                6. Lilach Rochel                                             

 

                                                v.

 

The Respondents:                   1. The National Insurance Institute

                                                2. Director General, Ministry of Health

                                                3. The Speaker of the Knesset

 

Petitions for an order nisi and an interim order

 

Date of session:                       Tammuz 12, 5772 (July 2, 2012)

 

On behalf of the Petitioner    

in HCJ 7245/10:                      Adv. Z. Zausan, Adv. H. Jabarin

 

On behalf of the Petitioners   

in HCJ 8357/10:                      Adv. V. Windman, Adv. C. Pollack-Cohen

 

On behalf of the Petitioners   

in HCJ 908/11:                        Adv. A. Naveh

 

On behalf of Respondents     

1-2 in HCJ 7245/10 and

Respondents 1-4 and 6

in HCJ 8357/10 and the

Respondents in HCJ 908/11:  Adv. A. Keidar, Adv. M. Freeman

 

On behalf of Respondent 3

in HCJ 7245/10 and

Respondent 5 in HCJ

8357/10:                                  Adv. Dr. G. Bligh

 

 

Judgment

 

Justice E. Arbel:

 

The petitions before us concern the reduction of child allowance for a parent whose children have not received the required vaccines announced by the Director General of the Ministry of Health. In the petitions, the petitioners demand the revocation of Section 61(2)(d) of the Arrangements Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009 (hereinafter, the “Arrangements Law” or the “Law”), on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.

 

The Arrangements Law

1.The Arrangements Law, which was enacted in 2009, included Amendment no. 113 (hereinafter, the “Amendment”) to the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5755-1995 (hereinafter, the “National Insurance Law”). The Amendment mainly concerns the gradual increase of the child allowances paid for the second, third and fourth child in a family unit. Concurrently, the Amendment orders the reduction of the child allowances paid for children who have not received the required vaccines based on their age and health condition and according to the Vaccination Program ordered by the Director General of the Ministry of Health. The main part of this arrangement is currently set out in Section 68(d) of the National Insurance Law:

(d)(1) If the child meets the provisions of Paragraph (2), the monthly child allowance paid for him will be reduced by the sum of NIS 100 (in this section – the “Sum of the Reduction”), provided that notice was given as stated in Subsection (e) and the 14-day period has passed as stated in the said subsection from the date of service of the notice according to the provisions of Subsection (h)(2); the reduction will begin on the 1st of the month following delivery of the notice to the Institute as stated in Paragraph (2);

(2) The Ministry of Health shall notify the Institute that six months have passed from the date on which the child was required to receive the vaccines based on his age and health condition and according to the Vaccination Program ordered by the Director General of the Ministry of Health; such notice shall be sent to the Institute no later than seven days after the date on which six months have passed as aforesaid;

(3) A program as stated in Paragraph (2) will be published in the Israel Official Gazette and shall include provisions regarding the type of vaccine, the vaccination schedule, additional dates on which a vaccine that was not administered on the required date may be supplemented, and the maximum age at which each vaccine may be administered (in this section, the “Vaccination Program”).

It should be noted that additional sections in this arrangement include: instructions regarding the notice that must be sent to parents whose children have not received vaccines as aforesaid, options to challenge and appeal decisions on the matter, sums of allowance reductions according to the number of children in the family, recalculation of the allowance after the child has been vaccinated as required or after the passage of the last date on which the vaccine, because of which the allowance was reduced, could be administered, etc.

2.Publication of the Vaccination Program by the Director General of the Ministry of Health was initially postponed because claims were raised regarding lack of access to Family Health Centers (“Tipat Chalav”) by the Bedouin population in the Negev, such that in practice the Amendment could not be implemented. After actions were taken to increase access and awareness among the Bedouin population in the Negev, the Director General of the Ministry of Health published a vaccination program by virtue of the Law, which included one vaccine named MMRV, a “quadrivalent” vaccine against four diseases: measles, mumps, rubella and varicella. The vaccine is given to infants at the age of one year and the program applies to infants born starting January 1, 2012, such that the first reduction of allowance will be made no earlier than July 1, 2013.

The petitions at bar were filed against this arrangement.

HCJ 7245/10 –Petitioners’ Claims

3.The petitioners are organizations and associations that act to promote Arab and Bedouin minority rights, as well as residents and chairpersons of local committees of three Bedouin villages in the Negev, in which, on the date this petition was filed, no Family Health Center operated.

4.First, the petitioners claim that the Amendment was passed following a coalition agreement, and that prior to its approval no discussion was held in respect thereof. They also argue the respondents did not base the approval of the Amendment on any analysis or research. Second, the petitioners claim that the Amendment violates the children’s constitutional rights. According to them, the child allowance belongs to the children themselves, even though it is remitted to their parents. The court has emphasized on various occasions the importance and objective of the child allowances is for the children’s welfare. The conclusion, therefore, according to the petitioners, is that reduction of the allowances harms the children and violates their rights, mainly children belonging to poor families that will be forced to waive monetary expenses necessary for the upbringing and development of the children. It is argued that the Amendment violates the supreme principle of the best interest of the child, which has been established in the case law of the Supreme Court and in international treaties. The petitioners further claim that the Amendment violates the principle of equality between children, as it creates an irrelevant distinction between children who have received vaccines and those who have not received vaccines, and between children whose parents have access to preventive medical services and children for whom the State has not ensured access to such services. They further claim that the Amendment violates the children’s constitutional right to the property, since the allowances belong to them. They claim that the very payment of the insurance contributions to the National Insurance Institute create a contractual agreement between the parent and the National Insurance Institute, which includes the expectation of payment of child allowances against payment of the insurance contributions by the parent. Violating this expectation, it is claimed, is also contrary to

5.According to the petitioners, the violation of the aforementioned constitutional rights does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause. The violation, it is argued, is not for a proper purpose. The violation was made without examination and without an appropriate foundation; it aggravates poverty and socioeconomic gaps; and it also harms the public interest that mandates protecting and avoiding harm to those children who are not being vaccinated.

6.It is further asserted that the violation does not satisfy the threefold proportionality test. The violation does not satisfy the rational connection test, since the means chosen do not achieve the objective of protecting the child’s health and public health. According to the petitioners, the Amendment in fact harms the child’s wellbeing, health, development, property and right to social security, and causes a deepening of poverty. It is asserted that punitive use of the allowances is prohibited, and that the allowances should not be used to combat various negative or wrongful phenomena. The Amendment punishes the children for non-receipt of vaccination services.

The petitioners further claim that the violation does not meet the second proportionality test, the less harmful means test. According to them, other appropriate means could have been adopted to achieve the goal, such as making preventive health services accessible in the unrecognized villages in the Negev. The petitioners assert that the main population that will be harmed by the Amendment is the children residing in the Bedouin villages, including the children of the unrecognized villages. According to them, the high rate of unvaccinated Bedouin children is the product of the State’s failure to provide preventive health services at Family Health Centers. The Bedouin children’s access to these services is limited. In approximately forty-five unrecognized villages there are, it is argued, only twelve Family Health Centers, and even those were only put in place after a petition to the HCJ, and some are under threat of closure. The petitioners add that the residents of these villages also have limited mobility due to the absence of driving licenses and suitable public transportation in the area, and that they have low socioeconomic status and a very high rate of poverty. The Amendment therefore punishes the Bedouin children through no fault of their own, and due to the Ministry of Health’s failure to fulfill its obligation to realize these children’s rights from the outset. This punishment will further aggravate the socioeconomic status of the Bedouin children, and deepen the social gaps between this population and the general population. The petitioners assert that despite the neutral language of the Amendment, the said data reveal that, de facto, it discriminates against the Bedouin children on the basis of nationality.

Finally, the petitioners claim that the violation also fails to fulfill the narrow proportionality test. According to them, democracy cannot justify punishing children because they have not been vaccinated by their parents. The Amendment leads to a result opposite to that sought by the legislature and, instead of protecting the children’s health, causes them additional harm.

7.In supplementary pleadings filed by the petitioners on August 16, 2012, the petitioners seek to emphasize the claim that the violation of rights should be examined in light of the fact that the matter concerns children, a group with special characteristics which mandate special constitutional protection. According to them, this fact distinguishes between a regular violation of the right of equality, which may be a permitted distinction, and a violation which falls under the definition of prohibited discrimination, i.e. violation of the constitutional right.

HCJ 8357/10 – The Petitioner’s Claims

8.The petitioner in HCJ 8357/10 is the Israel National Council for the Child. It too asserts that the Amendment constitutes a violation of the equality between children whose parents vaccinated them and children who have not been vaccinated for whatever reason. According to the petitioner, this is not a distinction that is relevant to the purpose of the legislation. The purpose of the child allowance arrangement, it is argued, is to allow a redistribution of income among the population, transferring income from citizens who have no children to those who have children and whose income needs to be divided between a greater number of persons. According to the petitioner, the allowance is not a prize for desired behavior, and conditioning the allowance on a condition unrelated to the size of the family is wrongful ab initio. The petitioner claims that the case does not concern denial of a benefit given to parents for vaccinating their children, as the State claims, since the allowance increment granted in the Amendment does not apply to the first child or the fifth and any subsequent children. The Amendment may also harm populations that are already weakened, who do not vaccinate their children due to lack of access to Family Health Centers or due to the absence of time and financial resources. The petitioner emphasizes that the rate of unvaccinated children is particularly high in the unrecognized settlements in the Negev as a result of a lack of physical, cultural and linguistic access to vaccination services. The petitioner further claims an additional violation of the right to social security which will bring more children into the cycle of poverty and deepen penury among families already below the poverty line, contrary to the objective of the child allowances, particularly with respect to the first child and the fifth child onwards in the family.

9.The petitioner argues that the violation of the constitutional rights of the children does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause. The objective of increasing the vaccination rate is foreign to the purpose of the allowances, and therefore is not a proper purpose. Introducing this consideration will create a dangerous precedent whereby allowances may be reduced for any health, educational or social reason. The proportionality test is also not satisfied according to the petitioner. When the reasons for non-vaccination are ideological or depend on access to health services, it is clear that the reduction of the allowances will not affect vaccination. Therefore, the means are inconsistent with the purpose. The lack of consistency, it is claimed, stands out against the background of the data regarding the high rate of vaccination in the State of Israel, mainly with respect to the vaccinations currently required by the Vaccination Program published in accordance with the Amendment. The petitioner makes a distinction between a benefit, the conditioning of which on vaccination may be proportionate, and the imposition of a sanction for failure to vaccinate which is not proportionate. The petitioner rejects the State’s claims regarding the measures taken in order to moderate the harm. It further claims that there are many and varied measures for achieving the goals reflected in the Amendment that do not violate the children’s rights and have a greater benefit potential. Thus, it is possible to act to increase awareness and improve access to child vaccination services.

HCJ 908/11 – The Petitioners’ Claims

10.The petitioners in HCJ 908/11 are the Association for Information on Vaccines and parents whose children they argue suffered various negative reactions following a vaccination. The petitioners claim that there are differences of opinion in the medical community and among the public regarding the effectiveness of vaccines and the severity of their side effects. Hence, they believe that parents should be allowed the right to choose whether or not to vaccinate their children. According to them, the fact that there is a law aimed at compensating those injured by vaccines proves that vaccines are not risk-free. The petitioners further assert that the Amendment violates the right to equality, the individual’s right to autonomy and the right to autonomy of parents in the upbringing of their children. The petitioners challenge the Amendment legislation procedure and its inclusion in the Arrangements Law, which does not allow the issue to be thoroughly discussed and examined. Similar to the other petitions, these petitioners claim that the violation does not satisfy the conditions of the Limitation Clause.

The Respondents’ Claims

11.Respondents 1-5 the legislative proceedings, which began at the initiative of the Director General of the Ministry of Health, and included preparation and examination of the data in Israel and worldwide. A separate legislative memorandum was subsequently circulated, unlike the regular procedure for enactment of the Arrangements Law, in order to allow specific examination of the matter. The memorandum was discussed both at the various government ministries and at the Finance Committee of the Knesset, and conflicting positions were heard. The respondents note that it was decided to stop collecting the Family Health Centers’ fees in order not to create an economic barrier to vaccination. The respondents further specified the actions that were performed by the ministries for the implementation of the Law, including increasing access to Family Health Centers and increasing awareness of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law.

12.The respondents emphasize the importance of the MMRV vaccine and the severity of the diseases against which it immunizes. According to them, the vaccine is intended to combat diseases that can cause severe harm to public health, and particularly to the health of children. In addition, these diseases are highly contagious. The respondents stress that according to professional opinion, in order to reach “herd immunity”, which protects even those who cannot be immunized or who have not developed resistance despite having received the vaccine, the immunization coverage required in the population is approximately 95%. The respondents further state the importance of immunization coverage to each individual child, relative to both the child population and the general population. They also note the expected economic and social repercussions for the State due to the absence of effective prevention of disease outbreak.

13.The respondents maintain that the default is that the Court will not be inclined to intervene in socioeconomic policy established in primary legislation of the Knesset. The respondents further claim that the legislative procedure was duly carried out and does not create cause for the Court’s intervention. The respondents also assert that the Amendment does not violate constitutional rights. With respect to violation of the children’s rights, the respondents contend that the allowance is not a direct right of the child, but rather the right of the parents, intended to help them support the family unit. It is argued that the fact that the amount of the child allowance depends on the birth order of the child in the family supports this conclusion. In addition, on the practical level, it is the parents who decide on the use of the allowance, and they are not obligated to use it for purposes pertaining directly to the children. According to the respondents, even if the allowance did belong to the children, there is no case law establishing a property right for recipients of the allowances. 

14.According to the respondents, the Amendment does not violate the constitutional right to minimal dignified existence. According to the respondents, there is no room for the assumption that any change in the allowance’s entitlement rate constitutes a violation of a constitutional right. They refer to case law that determines that the array of social rights does not necessarily reflect the bounds of the right to social security at the constitutional level. Moreover, the case at bar concerns the reduction of an allowance that for the most part corresponds to the allowance increment that was granted in the Amendment, and therefore there is no ground for the assertion that the Amendment will violate the right to minimal dignified existence. With respect to the violation of equality, the respondents claim that the Amendment establishes an egalitarian norm which seeks to incentivize individuals to take action that is highly desirable from a social and health perspective, and it cannot be said that it constitutes a discriminatory norm. Every parent is able to ensure that his child is vaccinated, and in such a case, the child allowance will not be reduced. In any event, it is argued that there is no violation of equality at the constitutional level—that is, a violation that is closely and pertinently related to aspects of human dignity as a constitutional right. As for the assertion of consequential discrimination on the basis of nationality, the respondents claim that the data indicate a similar rate of vaccination in the Jewish sector and in the Arab sector, while in the Arab sector there is a slightly lower rate of vaccination than in the Bedouin sector. The respondents admit that the percentage of vaccination in the unrecognized villages in the Negev is lower, but believe that the current level of access to Family Health Centers in these settlements, after various actions have and are being taken, is reasonable and appropriate. Finally, the respondents assert that the Amendment does not violate the constitutional rights to autonomy and to parenthood. They state that the professional position of the Ministry of Health, which is based on the prevailing approach in the medical world, is that vaccines are a desirable, efficient and safe method of preventing morbidity. They claim that the fact that there is a professional dispute on the matter does not provide grounds for the Court’s intervention in primary legislation. They further argue that the law does not force parents to vaccinate their children, but merely creates an economic incentive to vaccinate. In any event, it is argued that there is no violation whose severity rises to the level of a violation of a constitutional right. The respondents believe that the Amendment promotes other aspects of human dignity, leaving no basis to determine that the bottom line is injurious.

15.Alternatively, the respondents assert that even if it is determined that a constitutional right is being violated, the violation is lawful and satisfies the conditions of the Limitation Clause. They state that the purpose of the Amendment is protection of children while ensuring their health and welfare and caring for public health in general. This, they claim, is a proper purpose the values of the State of Israel. They further claim that the purpose is not foreign and extraneous to the National Insurance Law. They also assert that the Amendment satisfies the three proportionality tests. Experience in other countries establishes the effective connection between economic incentives and the conduct of parents with respect to their children, including increasing vaccination rates. Regarding the less harmful means test, the respondents admit that other alternatives exist to incentivize the vaccination of children. However, they claim that the means chosen by the legislator do not exceed the bounds of proportionate measures. They add that the State may intervene in arrangements and regulation of conduct where there is a public good that creates a “market failure” in the actions of citizens, each of whom is relying on the immunization of the other. Finally, they claim that the proportionality requirement in its narrow sense is fulfilled, in view of the clear public interest in vaccinating children and maintaining a high vaccination rate on the one hand, and considering that the harm is limited and proportionate, taking into account the conditions and limitations set forth in the legislation regarding reduction of the allowance, on the other hand.

16.The respondents refer in detail to the issue of the repercussions of the Amendment on children in the Bedouin diaspora. They argue that following actions taken on behalf of the respondents, there is currently reasonable and adequate access of the Bedouin population to Family Health Centers. In addition, they state that the MMRV vaccination rate in the Bedouin population registered at Family Health Centers is higher than the MMRV vaccination rate in the Jewish sector.

17.Respondent 6, the Knesset, rejects the petitioners’ claims and joins the position and reasoning of Respondents 1-5.

Deliberation and Decision

Claims Pertaining to the Legislative Process

18.The petitioners raise claims concerning the enactment of the Amendment in the framework of the Arrangements Law in expedited legislative proceedings, and argue that the Amendment was born out of a coalition agreement without comprehensive ground work. These claims should be dismissed. As detailed by the respondents in their response, the Amendment emerged following the request of the Director General of the Ministry of Health in 2008, Prof. Avi Israeli, to the Ministry of Finance, in which he requested to examine the possibility of conditioning child allowances on various acts, including vaccination of children. In 2009, the issue was also introduced into the coalition agreements, but there is nothing wrong with that in itself. Following the request of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance carried out a review of similar arrangements around the world, as well as examined the vaccination data in Israel. The resulting position paper stated that the use of allowance conditioning around the world to increase school attendance and the use of preventive medicine has been proven to be effective. It further indicated that there is a phenomenon in Israel of not vaccinating infants, contrary to the Ministry of Health’s recommendation. An outbreak of tuberculosis in Israel in 2008 was mentioned, and it was emphasized that the Ministry of Health has no effective means to handle the said problem. The position paper proposed a model whereby receipt of child allowance would be conditioned upon regular attendance at an educational institution and receipt of the vaccines required by the child’s age and health condition. As part of the discussions in preparation for the Arrangements Law, several discussions regarding this proposal were held at the relevant ministries as well as before the Attorney General. In the course of these discussions, several changes were made to the model proposed by the Ministry of Finance. Later, a Government Resolution was made generally adopting the proposed model with certain changes, primarily the reduction in child allowances, rather than their denial, and the establishment of caps for the reduction in each family.

19.Following the Government Resolution, and contrary to the regular procedure in the framework of the Arrangements Law, the Ministry of Finance circulated a separate legislative memorandum in order to allow continued examination and detailed discussion on the issue. The memorandum was examined by various entities at the ministries, and the Ministry of Justice also forwarded its comments regarding the memorandum. In addition, the Finance Committee of the Knesset held a discussion on the memorandum and examined the arrangement established therein. Prior to the discussion, the committee members received an analysis on the matter prepared by the Knesset Research and Information Center, which also included positions opposing the proposed arrangement. Many entities from the various ministries and from the National Insurance Institute were present at the Committee’s discussion on June 24, 2009, as well as representatives of the Israel National Council for the Child, one of the petitioners at bar. The vaccination data in the various sectors in the State of Israel were presented to the members. On July 7, 2009, another discussion was held at the Finance Committee, and its members were informed of the removal of the condition of regular attendance at an educational institution. Finally, the Finance Committee approved the bill for a second and third reading. The law in its final version was approved by the Knesset on July 14, 2009 after a discussion that included specific reference to the issue at bar (see the Knesset minutes of July 13, 2009, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/plenum/data/02626209.doc#_Toc258334465).

20.In order to examine the petitioners’ claims regarding the legislative proceedings described above, it is necessary to mention the case law that held that intervention of this Court in parliamentary proceedings will be limited to cases in which “the legislative process causes deep harm to material values of the constitutional regime[.]” (HCJ 6784/06 Shlitner v. The Pensions Commissioner, Paragraph 36 of the opinion of Justice Procaccia (January 12, 2011)). The test that was set out is “whether the defect in the legislative proceeding goes to the root of the proceeding, and whether it harms basic values of the constitutional regime.” (Id). It was further held that an expedited legislative proceeding, such as the Arrangements Law, does not, in itself, lead to the striking down of the law. Even in such a case, the Court will examine whether there was a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding to an extent that justifies judicial intervention, and the consequence of such a defect in accordance with the severability model. (HCJ 4885/03 The Poultry Breeders in Israel Organization Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd. v. The Israeli Government [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14, 42 (hereinafter, “The Poultry Breeders Organization Case”); HCJ 3106/04 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Knesset [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 567). It was further held that “even if it were proven that the legislative procedure prevented the holding of an in-depth and exhaustive discussion and impaired the ability of Knesset members to formulate a well-established position with respect to each one of the issues included in the bill, this is not enough to justify judicial intervention.” (The Poultry Breeders Organization Case, on p. 50).

21.In the case at bar, there is no room for judicial intervention in the legislative proceedings of the Amendment. Contrary to the practice with the Arrangements Law, a separate legislative memorandum was circulated on the issue in question to the various ministries for their comments. In addition, as can be seen from the chain of events reviewed above, the issue was discussed and examined by various entities; various positions were heard, a report of the Knesset Research and Information Center was prepared and data were presented regarding the success of similar arrangements around the world. In the course of the discussions, the bill was modified, narrowed, and arrangements were added in order to reduce the harm to the entitled population. The issue was also raised in the discussion at the Knesset, and objections by various Knesset Members were heard regarding conditioning the child allowances on the vaccination of children. Indeed, there may have been room for a more in-depth discussion with a broader foundation. However, this is not a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding, and therefore there is no room for the Court’s intervention based on a defect in the legislative proceeding. (See and compare HCJ 494/03 Physicians for Human Rights – Israel v. The Minister of Finance [2004[ IsrSC 59(3) 322, 330 (hereinafter, “PHR Case”)).

Regarding the Content of the Legislation

22.Before examining the constitutionality of the Amendment, we must first state the essence and purpose of the child allowance arrangement. I will then review the standpoint of the Ministry of Health and medical science on vaccines in general, and specifically on the MMRV vaccine. These reviews will lay the foundation for examining the constitutionality of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law. As part of this examination, I will examine the question, as customary, of whether constitutional rights established in Basic Law:

 

Child Allowance – the Arrangement and its Purpose

23.

24.Johnny Gal Taub Center  Social Policy Dan BenDavidEditor, 2010) (hereinafter, “Gal”); HCJFH 4601/95 Serossi v. The National Labor Court [1998) IsrLC 52(4), 817, 831; HCJ 6304/09 Lahav, The Umbrella Organization for Independent Businesspeople v. The Attorney General, Paragraphs 43-44 (September 2, 2010) (hereinafter, “Lahav Case”)). The social insurance system is supposed to ensure minimal dignified existence for all of its residents and to protect their standard of living. The system is based on the principle of social solidarity and mutual assistance. (LCA 7678/98 The Payment Officer v. Doctori [2005] IsrSC 60(1) 489, 525; Lahav Case, Paragraphs 44, 58). The purpose of the child allowances is to help families with children to bear the increasing costs of raising children. In fact, the child allowances to equalize the state of different-sized families whose level of income are equal. In addition, they help families not to fall below the poverty line due to the added expenses of having children, and protect the family against exposure to the social risk of a decline in the standard of living created as a result of expansion of the family. (Abraham Doron “The Erosion of the Israeli Welfare State in 2000-2003: The Case of Children Allowances”, Labor, Society and Law, 11 95, 106 (5766); Gal, on p. 254; Ruth Ben-Israel “Family and Social Security: From A Traditional Division of Labor to a New Division”, Menashe Shava’s book, 207, 215-216 (Aharon Barak & Daniel Friedmann eds., 2006)). Understandably, these allowances affect the welfare of the child in the family, and therefore one of the purposes of the allowance is to further the best interests of the child and caring for the children’s welfare. (NIA /04 Azulay v. The National Insurance Institute, the opinion of Deputy President E. Barak-Ussoskin (November 2, 2006) (hereinafter, “Azulay Case”); HCJ 1384/04 Betzedek – The American-Israeli Center for the Promotion of Justice in Israel v. The Minister of the Interior [2005] IsrSC 59(6) 397, 408 (hereinafter, “Betzedek Center Case”)).

25.The Competent Authority under the Invalids (Nazi Persecution) Law 5717-1957 [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 408 (hereinafter, “Sin Case”), Justice C. Cohen holds that the child allowances are not income of the insured parents, but rather escrow funds the mother is entrusted with to spend for the welfare of her children. Certainly, it was held, it is not income of the father, who does not receive the money, neither into his possession nor for his enjoyment. The Court added that “the legislator’s intention in allocating an allowance to children would be entirely thwarted and frustrated if the children’s allowance was deemed as income of their parents, and all types of authorities would be able to get a hold thereof and take it from the mouths of the children in order to collect payment from their parents.” (Sin Case, on p. 411; see also LCA 3101/00 Betiashvili v. The Competent Authority [2002] IsrLC 57(1) 183). Indeed, a ruling of the National Labor Court held that the person who is entitled to the child allowance is the insured parent and not the child directly, and that the parent does not hold the money in trust for his child in the legal sense. (Azulay Case, Paragraphs 4-5 of the opinion of Justice V. Wirth Livne). However, this Court has not ruled on the issue, and the petition filed on the opinion in the Azulay Case was dismissed in limine because it was theoretical, and did not state a position on the merits of the issue. (HCJ 967/07 Jane Doe v. The National Insurance Institute (April 29, 2007)). In addition, it should be noted that in the Azulay Case, a minority opinion was voiced by Deputy President E. Barak-Ussoskin. This position, which was based, inter alia, on the said judgments of this Court, asserted that the right to child allowance is granted to the child and not to the parent, and that the parent receives the allowance in trust in order to care for the welfare of the child.

In any event, I do not believe that we are required to decide this issue, but we should rather assume that the legislator, when determining the child allowances, had in mind the welfare and best interests of the children.

The Vaccination Program

26.The issue at bar mainly concerns the conditioning of part of the child allowance on vaccinating the child for whom the allowance is paid. Therefore, the purpose of the Vaccination Program in Israel should be briefly stated. As the respondents clarified, the professional position of the Ministry of Health is that vaccines are a means of utmost importance for protection of the health of children and of the general public. The vaccine system currently in place protects the population in general and children in particular from serious morbidity. The importance of the vaccines is not expressed merely in vaccinating children, but also in ensuring the vaccine is timely given, in accordance with the recommendations of the Ministry of Health. This was addressed in the past by Deputy President E. Rivlin:

“There is no doubt that compliance with the vaccination dates is of great importance, and it is the duty of the persons charged with it to ensure and verify that there is no unjustified delay in vaccinating infants. The schedule set for vaccinating infants was set for good reason, and it obviously must be adhered to with the utmost attention and the strictness required in such a matter.” (CA 9628/07 Shalom v. Clalit Health Services, Paragraph 6 (September 2, 2009)).

27.The Ministry of Health deems the vaccination of children to be of great importance on two levels: the first level concerns the protection of the health of the individual child receiving the vaccine. The respondents state that a vaccine is the only way to ensure protection of the individual from the diseases against which the children are vaccinated. They explain that in a world that has become a type of “global village,” there is a risk that any immigrant or tourist will bring with him diseases that are not currently found in Israel, and which may infect those who are not immunized against such diseases. The second level concerns what is termed “herd immunity.” Herd immunity protects individuals in the public who have not been vaccinated for justified reasons, such as newborn babies who have yet to reach the age in which the vaccine is administered, the elderly person whose immune system is not functioning properly, or other persons at risk with respect to their immune systems, such as people suffering from serious illnesses or undergoing chemotherapy. In addition, herd immunity protects the small percentages of individuals who were vaccinated but are not reacting to the vaccine. Herd immunity is only achieved when there is a high coverage rate of vaccinated individuals in society and so long it is maintained.

Herd immunity creates a unique characteristic with respect to the issue of children’s vaccination, since the individual decision of each parent as to whether or not to vaccinate his children has an effect on the entire public. In addition, a “free rider” problem may develop in this regard, whereby a parent will choose not to vaccinate his children on the assumption that herd immunity will protect them from the diseases against which the vaccines protect. A wide-scale phenomenon of free riders could harm the herd immunity and thus harm the general public.

28.It appears that the majority of the petitioners also recognize the importance of vaccines and their significant contribution to public health; the main dispute is about what measures should be taken in order to encourage the vaccination of children. However, the petitioners in HCJ 908/11 challenge this starting point, arguing that the effectiveness of vaccines and the severity of their side effects are in dispute. It appears to me that this position cannot change the said starting point. It seems that the position of the Ministry of Health regarding the importance of vaccines is a prevalent and very common position in Israel and around the world. (See e.g. Avraham Sahar “Opportunity Makes the Thief...” Beliefs, Science and the Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law, 5750-1989” Medicine and Law 36 on p. 105 (2007) (hereinafter, “Sahar”); Bilhah Kahana “The Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law – A Law that is Not Enforced” Medicine and Law 38 on p. 14 (2008)). Insofar as we are aware, to date no causal link has been scientifically proven between vaccines and neurological or other damages. However, medical science recognizes that vaccines, or to be precise, the fever caused in some children as a result of vaccination, can create a risk and cause damage to a very small percentage of children with a certain genetic predisposition who receive a vaccine. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether, even if the vaccine had not been given, damage could have been caused as a result of another fever-inducing disease. (See Tali Sagi “Comments on the Article “Opportunity Makes the Thief - Beliefs, Science and the Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law”” Medicine and Law 36 on p. 116 (2007)). In addition, there is broad consensus that even if there is a certain risk, it is very small, and that the benefit resulting from the vaccine is much greater:

“The risk entailed in receiving the vaccine, even though it does in principle exist, is very distant and rare, while the benefit and necessity of the vaccine to the health of the child are not doubted” (CA 470/87 Eltori v. The State of Israel – The Ministry of Health [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 146, 153).

Examples from Israel and around the world can illustrate this risk. When the public immunization level declines, usually due to fears raised by vaccine opponents, there are reports of outbreaks of epidemics which were ostensibly extinct, causing severe injuries. This was the case in Britain after the rate of persons immunized against pertussis dropped to approximately 30% in early 1980; a pertussis epidemic broke out leading to the hospitalization of approximately 5,000 children and the death of twenty-eight children (Sahar, on p. 106). In Israel, an outbreak of measles occurred in 2003 among a population that did not habitually vaccinate. Within two weeks, sixty children fell ill, out of whom one child passed away from the disease. Another outbreak occurred in 2007-2008 after a sick tourist arrived from England. The disease spread among a non-immunized population and within several months 1,452 cases of measles were reported.

29.It should further be noted that the case law holds that the administrative authority, and certainly the legislative authority, may rely on expert opinion, even if there is a contradicting opinion, and the court will honor the authority’s decision between the contradicting opinions. “When a law is based on a matter within professional expertise, the fact that there are contradicting opinions on such issue does not justify striking it down.” (HCJ 6976/04 The “Let the Animals Live” Association v. The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Paragraph 11 (September 1, 2005) (hereinafter, “LAL Case”); see also HCJ 1554/95 Gilat Supporters v. The Minister of Education and Culture [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 2, 19; HCJ 4769/95 Menachem v. The Minister of Transport [2002] 57(1) 235, 271 (hereinafter, “Menachem Case”)). Understandably, had there been a well-established and prevalent position among medical experts believing that the risks from the vaccines exceed the benefit, it would have affected the constitutional analysis of the Amendment being examined before us. However, this is not the factual situation. As I stated, the prevalent and recognized position worldwide is that the benefit derived from the vaccines immeasurably exceeds the risk inherent therein. (See e.g. . This position has opponents, but it appears that they are the relatively marginal minority. Therefore, this will be the starting point for the continuation of our discussion.

The MMRV Vaccine

30.As mentioned above, according to the Amendment to the National Insurance Law, the Director General of the Ministry of Health is required to publish a program of the vaccinations required. The child allowance will be reduced only for parents who have not vaccinated their children with the vaccines included in the program published. This program currently includes only one vaccine, the MMRV, also known as the quadrivalent vaccine, which is given to infants at the age of one year in a single dosage. Another dose is given to children in first grade, but this dose is not included in the Vaccination Program published. It is therefore appropriate to provide some details on this vaccine.

31.The quadrivalent vaccine, as its name suggests, protects against four diseases: measles, mumps, rubella and chicken pox. The vaccine is common in many countries worldwide. All European countries recommend a vaccine against measles, mumps and rubella. The vaccine against chicken pox is recommended in the United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Latvia, and Japan.

32.Measles is a serious childhood disease. The disease may cause serious complications in the respiratory airways and in the nervous system. Approximately one third of patients will develop complications such as otitis media, diarrhea and keratitis. Rarer complications are pneumonia and encephalitis (one in 1000 cases). A very rare complication of the disease, which may appear approximately ten years after its manifestation, is a complication that manifests as a degenerative disease of the brain called subacute sclerosing panencephalitis and which causes serious and irreversible damage to the central nervous system, including mental deterioration and seizures. The risk of complications is higher among children under the age of five, among adults over the age of twenty, and among patients with a suppressed immune system. 1-3 children of every 1,000 patients die from the disease. Worldwide, measles is responsible for approximately twenty-one percent of mortality resulting from diseases preventable by vaccines. Measles is highly contagious, and a person who is not immunized and is exposed to a patient has a general risk of 90% of being infected. The vaccine against measles is very effective. 95% of children who receive the vaccine at the age of one develop antibodies against the disease, which give them long-term immunity. A few lose the protection against the disease after several years, and to address that, a repeat vaccine was introduced in Israel to be administered at school age. It should further be noted that in outbreaks of measles in Israel, the highest morbidity rates were of infants below the age of one, as they were not vaccinated against the disease.

33.Measles manifests in swelling in the salivary glands and in the glands beneath the ear lobe, sore throat, high fever, headaches and weakness. In approximately ten percent of patients, meningitis may develop, which manifests in vomiting and headaches. A common complication among adults is orchitis; more rare complications are an infection in the joints, thyroid, kidney, cardiac muscle, pancreas and ovary, deafness and other complications in the nervous system. Manifestation of the disease in a pregnant woman in the first trimester causes an increased rate of spontaneous miscarriage. The disease is more severe among adults and the rare mortality from the disease is mainly among this group. The vaccine against the disease is very effective. 80% of persons vaccinated with a single dosage are protected, and 90% are protected after receiving 2 doses.

34.Rubella may, in certain cases, cause complications such as encephalitis, which is more common in adults, and hemorrhaging due to a decline in the number of platelets, a phenomenon common mainly in children. Among women in the first months of pregnancy, rubella may harm the developing fetus and cause the death of the fetus or severe birth defects, which include eye defects that cause blindness, heart defects, deafness, defects in the nervous system which cause behavior disorders, and mental disability.

35.Chicken pox manifests in a high fever accompanied by a rash with blisters. Complications of the disease are pneumonia and encephalitis, a severe bacterial infection of the skin, a decline in the number of platelets and in rare cases hemorrhaging, kidney dysfunction, and even death. The disease is more severe among adolescents and adults, and is especially serious among persons with suppressed immunity who cannot receive the vaccine. Cases of death from chicken pox have been described among children treated with corticosteroids, which are frequently given as a treatment for other diseases (such as asthma). Contracting chicken pox in the first twenty weeks of pregnancy may cause birth defects in the eyes, limbs, skin and nervous system. Contracting the disease shortly after birth is especially dangerous for a newborn. Patients who have recovered carry the “varicella-zoster” virus in a dormant state in their body. This virus may, years later, or when the immune system is weakened, cause an outbreak of a disease called “herpes zoster.” This disease causes severe local pain which may last for a long time. The vaccine results in the development of protection in 85% of the persons vaccinated at the age of one year. The vaccine protects against a serious disease with complications, and giving two doses leads to a very high protection of 97%, to a point where it is impossible to identify chicken pox.

36.With respect to the MMRV vaccine, the vaccination coverage in Israel among the general population was on average 90% between the years 2006 and 2009. It should be noted that according to what we have been told, the position of professionals is that to achieve “herd immunity” with the MMRV vaccine, the vaccination coverage required in the population is approximately 95%.

Now that the factual foundation has been laid, the legal aspect shall be built upon it.

Examination of the Constitutionality of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law

37.We should first reiterate what is known: that the Court will not be quick to intervene and repeal statutory provisions enacted by parliament. In this regard, the court must exercise judicial restraint, caution and reserve:

“Indeed, striking down a law or part of it is a serious matter, not to be taken lightly by a judge. Striking down secondary legislation for conflicting with a statute is not the same as striking down primary legislation for conflicting with a basic law. By striking down secondary legislation, the judge gives expression to the desire of the legislator. By striking down primary legislation, the judge frustrates the desire of the legislator. The justification is that the legislator is subject to supra-statutory constitutional provisions, which he himself set. (See A. Barak “Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of a Statute”, Law and Governance C 403 (5756)). Nevertheless, considerable judicial caution is required.” (LAL Case, Paragraph 9).

However, I do not accept the respondents’ position that the judicial restraint required in this case is similar to that required for constitutional review in areas of economy and finance. As is known, case law mandates that this Court exercise particular restraint in areas of economy and finance, which involve far-reaching social and economic aspects. It has been held that the authorities entrusted with the economic policy should be allowed broad leeway “as the entities in charge of determining the comprehensive policy, and bearing the public and national responsibility for the State’s economy and finance.” (Menachem Case, on p. 263; see also HCJ 8803/06 Ganei Chuga Ltd. v. The Minister of Finance, comments of Justice Procaccia (April 1, 2007); Lahav Case, Paragraph 63). In the case at bar, although the Amendment to the National Insurance Law is part of the Arrangements Law, it is not a law whose essence is budgetary or economic. Although this is a socio-public matter, this is not what was meant by the special judicial restraint mentioned. As the respondents emphasized, the purpose of the Amendment is not economic and is not monetary savings. On the contrary, the purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that no child loses his allowance, since the purpose is that all children be vaccinated. Hence, I do not believe that the said case law applies to this matter. It is, however, clear the judicial restraint and reserve required by the mere constitutional review of an act of the Knesset also apply to the case before us.

38.As is known, constitutional review is divided into three stages. At the first stage, it is necessary to examine whether the law in question violates constitutional rights enshrined in the basic laws, and in the case before us, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter, “Basic Law”). If the answer is negative, the constitutional review ends and it should be held that the law in question is constitutional. If the answer is affirmative, it is necessary to proceed to the second stage at which we examine whether the violation satisfied the conditions set in the Limitation Clause in Section 8 of the Basic Law. In order for the law to be declared constitutional, the violation must satisfy all of the conditions set forth in the Limitation Clause. If one of the conditions is not met, it is necessary to proceed to the third stage, which is the stage of the remedy for the unlawful violation. (HCJ 2605/05 Human Rights Unit v. The Minister of Finance, Paragraph 16 of the opinion of President Beinisch (November 19, 2009); HCJ 10662/04 Hassan v. The National Insurance Institute, Paragraph 24 of the opinion of President Beinisch (February 28, 2012) (hereinafter, “Hassan Case”); Lahav Case, Paragraph 75). As held in the Hassan Case, this method of constitutional analysis will be identical both when we are concerned with civil and political rights and when we are concerned with social and economic rights. (Hassan Case, Paragraph 31 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

We shall begin, therefore, at the first stage of constitutional review and examine whether, as the petitioners claim, the Amendment to the National Insurance Law indeed violates rights enshrined in Basic Law. In this framework, we will specify three principal rights that the petitioners mentioned in their pleadings: the right to a dignified life or the right to social security, the right to autonomy, and the right to equality.

The Violated Rights: The Right to a Dignified Life

39.Nowadays, no one disputes that the human dignity enshrined in Basic Law also includes the right to a minimal dignified existence, including both the positive and negative aspects of the right. This right means that “a person will be guaranteed the minimum of material resources that will allow him to sustain himself in the society in which he lives[.]” (HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. The Minister of Finance [2005] IsrSC 60(3) 464, 482 (hereinafter, “CPSJ Case”)). It was held that this right is at the core and nucleus of human dignity:

“Living in starvation and without shelter, while constantly searching for handouts, is not a dignified life. A minimal dignified existence is a condition not only to preserving and protecting human dignity, but also to exercising other human rights. There is no poetry in a life of poverty and deprivation. Without minimum material conditions, a person lacks the ability to create, aspire, make his choices and realize his freedoms.” (Hassan Case, Paragraph 35 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

It was further held that the right to a dignified life is not a right derived from the right to human dignity, but a right that constitutes a tangible manifestation of human dignity. (Hassan Case, Paragraph 36 of the opinion of President Beinisch; CPSJ Case, on p. 479).

40.The right to a dignified life is protected by the State using a variety of measures, systems and arrangements, and there is no doubt that the welfare legislation and allowances of the National Insurance Institute constitute a considerable and significant part of the realization of this right. The child allowances also constitute an additional tool to realize the right, since families living in poverty due to, inter alia, the expenses of raising children, can gain much assistance from these allowances and rise above the threshold that enables a dignified life. It should indeed be kept in mind that child allowances are universal allowances given according to the make-up of the family, and are not dependent on the family income. Therefore, the object of realizing a dignified life will not always be relevant to these allowances, compared to income assurance, for example, which is an allowance whose main purpose is to create a lasting safety net for families that need it. (Hassan Case, Paragraph 44 of the opinion of President Beinisch). However, there might be cases in which families on the edge of the last safety net will fall below it if they are denied the child allowance. The assumption is that “the gamut of the welfare arrangements granted in Israel provide the ‘basket’ required for a minimal dignified life.” (Hassan Case, Paragraph 46 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

41.Despite the aforesaid, I believe that in the case at bar, the petitioners have not presented a sufficient factual foundation to prove the existence of a violation of the right to a dignified life resulting from the Amendment to the National Insurance Law. As is known, a person who claims a violation of a constitutional right bears the burden of proving such violation. (Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Constitutional Interpretation 374 (Vol. 3, 1994)). The petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that after examination of the range of services provided to the family, reduction of the child allowances will cause harm to the dignity of families whose material living conditions will fall short. At the very least, and under the lenient approach, they should have presented individual cases that indicated the alleged harm; then, the burden of proof would have shifted to the State. (See the comments of President Beinisch in the CPSJ Case, on p. 492-493; HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, Paragraph 48 of the opinion of President Beinisch (June 14, 2010) (hereinafter, “Yekutieli Case”)). In the CPSJ Case, it was held that the mere reduction, even if it is a significant reduction, in income assurance allowances, does not in itself  prove a violation of the right to a dignified life, and it is necessary to examine the gamut of services and arrangements granted as a safety net in the State of Israel. “The examination is always concrete and consequential.” (CPSJ Case, Paragraph 19 of the opinion of President Barak; see also PHR Case, on p. 334; HCJ 10541/09 Yuvalim S.D.I. Ltd. v. The Israeli Government (January 5, 2012)).

42.The above is all the more relevant to the case before us. First, the petitioners did not point to any data proving their claim regarding the violation of the right to a dignified life of families to whom the Amendment will apply. The reduction in the child allowance cannot, in and of itself, establish a foundation for proving the violation. “The right to dignity, as well as the right to a dignified life, is not the right to a monthly allowance in a certain amount.” (CPSJ Case, on p. 485).

Second, this case concerns child allowances, distinguishable from income assurance allowances. As I stated, while the central purpose of the latter is to create a safety net for the realization of the right to a dignified life, this is merely one of the purposes of the child allowance. Therefore, while there are grounds to assume that denying income assurance allowance for reasons other than the existence of different sources of income violates, under the appropriate circumstances, the right to a dignified human existence of the person whose allowance was denied (see Hassan Case, Paragraph 46 of the opinion of President Beinisch), it is difficult to make a similar assumption with respect to the denial of the child allowances, and certainly with respect to their reduction. The case of child allowances therefore requires even more data-based proof of the violation of the right to a dignified life.

Third, and perhaps most important, most of the reduction in the child allowances for families who do not vaccinate their children is made after an increase of a similar amount of the child allowance, as it was prior to the Amendment. The Amendment increased the child allowance for the second, third and fourth child by NIS 100 per month for each child. At the same time, the reduction due to non-vaccination is NIS 100 per month for each child. It should be emphasized that for a family with more than three children the reduction is capped by the Amendment at NIS 300 per month, such that the reduction will be paralleled by a NIS 300 per month increase of the child allowances for that family (for the second, third and fourth children). The increase was also taken into account for families with two or three children, because for these families the maximum reduction will be NIS 100 and NIS 200 per month, respectively, equal to the increase in the child allowances that these families will receive. The only difficulty pertains to a family with a single child. In such a family, a reduction may be made in the sum of NIS 100 per month if the child is not vaccinated with the MMRV vaccine without such family receiving an increase in the child allowance to which the family is entitled. However, even with respect to such a family, it cannot be said that a violation of the right to a dignified life has been proven. As said above, data showing such a violation for a family of this type was not presented. In the absence of data, it may also be assumed that families with one child are less at risk of deprivation compared to large families. (See data thereon in the article of Yoram Margalioth “Child Allowances”, the Berenson Book on 733, 747-748 (5760)). Finally, weight should be given to the fact that even for such a family, the child allowance to which the family is entitled is merely reduced and not fully denied. In any event, “a deduction from a person’s income . . . is not the same as not granting a benefit.” (Betzedek Case, on p. 409). Where the main reduction is made following an increase of a similar amount in the allowance, it should be deemed as not granting a benefit, not as a deduction from a person’s income.

The conclusion is therefore that the Amendment does not violate the right to a dignified life.

43.I should note that insofar as the petitioners claim a violation of the right to social security, as distinguished from the right to a minimal dignified existence, they did not provide any support for its existence as a constitutional right, and made no argument as to the content of such right as distinguished from the right to a minimal dignified existence. This Court has not yet discussed the status and scope of the right to social security in Israeli law. (See HCJ 5578/02 Manor v. The Minister of Finance [2004] IsrSC 59(1) 729, 737 (hereinafter, the “Manor Case”); PHR Case, on p. 333). The petitioners did not expand on this issue, and it appears that some of them did not specify the differences between the two rights at all. Hence, I saw no room to discuss the issue of violation of this right separately. This is also the case with respect to the claim of violation of the property right. The question of whether the constitutional right to property applies to child allowances has not yet been decided in the judgments of this Court. (See the comments of Justices (formerly) Grunis and Rivlin in the Manor Case). The petitioners in HCJ 7245/10 raise this claim in a laconic and unsubstantiated manner, and I therefore also did not expand on this claim. In addition, I should note that the contractual assertion raised by the petitioners should be dismissed. No link is required between the insurance contributions collected by the National Insurance Institute and the allowances paid to entitled persons in respect of the various grounds for entitlement. (Lahav Case, Paragraph 57). Therefore, no harm is caused to the expectation of parents who pay national insurance contributions and whose child allowance will be reduced as a result of not vaccinating their children and a fortiori when the reduction in the child allowances almost fully corresponds to the increase in the amount of the allowance by the Amendment.

The Violated Rights – The Right to Autonomy and Parental Autonomy

44.The petitioners in HCJ 908/11 raised, at the center of their arguments, the violation of the right to autonomy, the right to parental autonomy and the right to parenthood. “One of the most important basic values is the value of the individual’s freedom of will” (Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – General Theory of Interpretation, 301 (vol. 1, Ed. 3, 1998)). This value of autonomy constitutes part of human dignity and is constitutionally protected by the Basic Law (HCJ 4330/93 Ganam v. The Israel Bar Association [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 221, 231 (hereinafter, the “Ganam Case”)). The meaning of the right to autonomy is the right of every individual to decide on his actions and wishes, according to his choices, and to act according to such choices:

 A person’s right to shape his or her life and fate encompasses all the central aspects of his or her life: place of residence, occupation, the people with whom he or she lives, and the content of his or her beliefs. It is a central existential component of the life of every individual in society. It expresses recognition of the value of every individual as a world unto him or herself. It is essential for the self-determination of every individual, in the sense that the entirety of an individual’s choices constitutes his or her personality and life.

(CA 2781/93 Ali Daka v. Haifa “Carmel” Hospital [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 526, 570 (hereinafter, the “Ali Daka Case”). The right to autonomy is a framework right from which many other rights are derived. (See Ganam Case; HCJ 7357/95 Barki Feta Humphries (Israel) Ltd. v. State of Israel [1996] 50(2) 769; see also Ali Daka Case, on p. 572). The importance of the right to autonomy was recognized especially in the context of giving or avoiding medical treatment, and it gives rise to a separate cause of action which entitles the claimant to damages. (Ali Daka Case).

45.One of the aspects of the right to autonomy is the right to parental autonomy. Parents are the natural guardians of their children. (Section 14 of the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962 (hereinafter, the “Legal Capacity Law”)). As such, they have the “obligation and the right to care for the needs of the minor, including his education, studies, training for work, occupation, and employment, as well as preserving, managing and developing his assets; also attached to this right is the permission to have custody of the minor and authority to represent him and to determine his place of residence.” (Section 15 of the Legal Capacity Law). The parents are obligated to ensure the “best interests of the minor [in the way that] devoted parents would act under the circumstances.” (Section 17 of the Legal Capacity Law). This Court’s rulings have recognized a very broad autonomy of parents in raising their children. Several reasons are presented as underlying this recognition. First, this recognition derives from the natural connection between a child and his parents. Second, it is commonly assumed that the parents, who are in charge of the family unit and know it from every aspect, will make the best decisions for the children. The supplementary assumption is that outsiders will not always be able to make the best decisions for the minor because the decisions often entail emotional aspects. Third, often these are issues on which there is no social consensus. Finally, the fact that the parents are those who will need to cope with the practical repercussions of the decision is taken into account. (LCA 5587/97 The Attorney General v. John Doe – Minor, PDI [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 830, 860 (1997)). However, it should be emphasized that the autonomy of parents vis-à-vis their children is not absolute and is limited by the principles of the child’s best interests and his rights.

46.Nevertheless, I do not believe that any harm to autonomy or parental autonomy will be recognized as constitutional harm which requires compliance with the terms and conditions of the limitation clause. Obviously, the closer the harm is to the core of the right, the greater the inclination to recognize it as constitutional violation. (See the comments of Deputy President Rivlin in CA 8126/07 The Estate of the Late Bruria Tzvi v. Bikur Holim Hospital (January 3, 2010)). “Overexpansion of the extent of the constitutional right should be avoided. Sweeping expansion of the limits of the constitutional right at the first stage, and “automatically” proceeding to the tests of the limitation clause in any case in which it is argued that legislation violates that right, may lead, in the overall balance, to an erosion of the protection granted by the basic laws.” (Hassan Case, comments of Justice U. Vogelman). It appears to me that two parameters may be examined to determine whether or not the violation will be recognized as a constitutional violation of the right to autonomy. First, the essence of the choice denied the individual should be examined. The more the harm to autonomy pertains to aspects concerning personal expression and self-realization of the person, the greater the inclination to deem it as a violation of a constitutional right. Denying a citizen of the State the possibility to marry the love of his life is not the same as denying another the option to choose the type of facilities that will be installed in the public park next to his home. A second parameter that should be examined in my opinion is the extent of coercion and denial of will. A prohibition that entails a criminal sanction is different from the denial of a minor financial benefit.

47.In the case at bar, I am not convinced that a violation of the constitutional right to autonomy or to parental autonomy has occurred. Even if I assume that the first parameter regarding the essence of the choice denied is met, the second parameter regarding the extent of the coercion is not fulfilled. The Amendment does not create an obligation to vaccinate children, nor does it impose a criminal sanction on non-vaccination. The monetary reduction that accompanies non-vaccination of children is not high and can range between NIS 100 and NIS 300 per month at most. Even if I do not disregard the fact that for some families this amount is significant, as mentioned above, it is, for the most part, a reduction of the same amount that was added to the child allowances in the Amendment to the National Insurance Law. Hence, I do not believe that the reduction in the Amendment may be deemed to violate the right to autonomy in its constitutional sense.

The Violated Rights: The Right of Equality

48.Much has already been said in the rulings of this Court on the right of equality, its status and importance, and it has been widely extolled:

The principle of equality is one of the building blocks of the law and constitutes the backbone and ‘life-blood’ of our entire constitutional regime. (Justice Landau in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. The Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693, 698; HCJ 4805/07 Israel Religious Action Center of the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism v. The Ministry of Education, Section 70 of the opinion of Justice A. Procaccia (July 27, 2008) (hereinafter, “IRAC Case”); HCJ 11956/05 Bashara v. The Minister of Construction and Housing (December 13, 2006)). The right of equality was recognized in our legal system in the early days of the State, when it received a place of honor in the Proclamation of Independence, and it was further established in various laws that were enacted by the Knesset over the years, and in the case law of this Court, which deemed it a ‘regal right’ and a principle which is ‘high above the other principles’.” (HCJ 2671/98 The Israel Women’s Network v. The Minister of Labor and Social Welfare [1998] 52(3) 630, 650; HCJ 2911/05 Elchanati v. The Minister of Finance, Section 17 of the opinion of Justice E. Hayut (June 15, 2008)); APA 4515/08 State of Israel v. Neeman, Paragraph 17 of my opinion (October 6, 2009) (hereinafter, “Neeman Case”)).

And elsewhere I stated:

            “It appears that no one disputes that equality is the keystone of a democratic regime and a central aspect of the relations between the individual and the State. No society can be maintained in a democratic state without equality, which is one of the derivatives of justice and fairness. Equality is a synonym for justice and fairness, as it appears to members of society in a certain period. Equality leads to justice, equality whose path is fairness. (See HCJ 7111/95 Federation of Local Authorities in Israel v. The Knesset [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 485, 502)” (HCJ 6298/07 Rasler v. The Israeli Knesset, Paragraph 18 of my opinion (February 21, 2012)).

The importance of the right of equality has been recognized and emphasized numerous times with respect to the distribution of budgets or resources of the State. “The resources of the State, whether land or money, as well as other resources, belong to all citizens, and all citizens are entitled to benefit from them according to the principle of equality, without discrimination on the basis of religion, race, sex or any other prohibited consideration.” (HCJ 1113/99 Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Minister for Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164, 170).

49.The right of equality, which creates the duty not to discriminate, does not mean equal treatment for everyone. It is a complex right which results from the fact that the common concept of equality seeks to give equal treatment for equals and unequal treatment for unequals. Equality does not require things to be identical. (HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 61 (1) 619, 677 (hereinafter, the “MQG Case”). Not every difference between people justifies distinguishing between them, but only a difference that is relevant to the matter in question. (HCJ 200/83 Veted v. The Minister of Finance [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 113, 119 (hereinafter, the “Veted Case”)). “The difference between wrongful discrimination and a permitted distinction depends, as is known, on whether a relevant difference exists between the groups that received different treatment from the authority.” (HCJ 6758/01 Lifshitz v. The Minister of Defense [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 258, 269; Yekutiel Case, Paragraph 35, 37 of the opinion of President Beinisch). In order to determine that the right of equality has been violated, it is necessary to examine who is the group of equals for the purpose of the matter at hand. The group of equals will be decided according to the purpose of the examined norm and the nature of the matter and the circumstances, as well as in accordance with common social conceptions. (HCJ 8300/02 Nasser v. The Israeli Government, Paragraph 37 (May 22, 2012) (hereinafter, the “Nasser Case”; Neeman Case, Paragraph 18 of my judgment; MQG Case, on p. 677; HCJ 1213/10 Nir v. The Speaker of the Knesset, Paragraph 14 of the opinion of President Beinisch (February 23, 2012) (hereinafter, the “Nir Case”; HCJ 4906/98 “Free Nation” for Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education & Culture v. The Ministry of Construction and Housing [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 503, 513); Veted Case, on p. 119, 122; Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 36 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

In the case before us, it appears to me that it is possible to say that the right of equality   has been violated. As described above, child allowances are universal allowances that are granted to every family according to its composition. Their purpose is to assist in financing the expenses of raising children, and to prevent the family in general and the children in particular from becoming impoverished. Therefore, adding a condition to the receipt of the allowance that is dependent on the vaccination of the family’s children is foreign both to the structure of the allowance and to its purposes. Indeed, the child allowance serves the best interests and welfare of the children, and the assumption is that vaccinating the children is also in their best interests and protects their health. It is still a stretch to say that the condition is naturally integrated with this allowance. The main and natural condition to receiving the allowance is the number of children. Additions and conditions beyond that (apart from conditions such as residency, and without going into the issue of conditioning the allowances on income) would be foreign to the allowance, and therefore violate the right of equality. The fact that the allowances are intended for the best interests of the children also has repercussions for the determination that the right to equality has been violated. In fact, children whose parents decide not to vaccinate them are harmed twice, both by their non-vaccination and by the decision to reduce the allowances intended for their benefit. The equality group, therefore, is all parents who are insured pursuant to the National Insurance Law.

50.The petitioners argue that in principle, the national insurance allowances, the main purpose of which is social-welfare, should not be made contingent upon conditions intended to regulate behavior and achieve other social objectives that do not have a direct and close connection to the allowance granted. They emphasized that the allowances are not a prize for proper behavior. They also raise an understandable concern about the expansion of the conditions to the point of absurdity. Will it be possible to condition the granting of child allowances on the parents not smoking? On maintaining proper nutrition? On installing bars on home windows? Where will the line be drawn between behavior that ought to be encouraged through the conditioning of child allowance and that for which conditioning will not be the correct and constitutional tool? (See the comments of Members of the Knesset at the Finance Committee’s discussion on June 24, 2009).

51.“The main purpose of social insurance is to realize the State’s obligation to ensure a minimum standard of living for all of its residents, so that no person falls below the threshold of a dignified life. Social insurance, and the statutory frameworks intended to realize it, are an important component in realizing the idea of a society based on foundations of justice, equality and social care for the needy.” (Lahav Case, Paragraph 44; Johnny Gal

52.However, our work does not end here. Since we are concerned with primary legislation of the Knesset, it is necessary to examine the issue and ask whether the violation of equality in this case is a violation in the constitutional sense, i.e. whether it amounts to a violation of the right to human dignity enshrined in the Basic Law. “The Knesset has broad discretion in the task of legislation, and there are situations in which broader protection may be afforded against a violation of equality caused by an administrative authority than to one inflicted by the legislator.” (Nasser Case, Paragraph 43). In the MQG Case, an interim model was adopted for interpretation of the term human dignity in the Basic Law:

The interim model does not limit human dignity merely to humiliation and contempt, but it also does not expand it to all human rights. According to this model, human dignity includes those aspects of human dignity which find, in various constitutions, manifestation in special human rights, and are characterized by having, according to our perception, a pertinent and close connection to human dignity (whether at its core or in its margins). According to this approach, human dignity may also include discrimination that is not humiliating, provided that it is closely related to human dignity as expressing the individual’s autonomy of will, freedom of choice and freedom of action, and other such aspects of human dignity as a constitutional right.

(MQG Case, on p. 687). Not every violation of equality, therefore, amounts to a constitutional violation. In order to prove a violation of the constitutional equality, it is necessary to demonstrate that the violation of equality has a pertinent and close connection to human dignity (whether at its core or in its margins). (See also Nir Case, Paragraph 11 of the opinion of President Beinisch; HCJ 9722/04 Polgat Jeans Ltd. v. The Israeli Government (December 7, 2006); HCJ 8487/03 IDF Disabled Veterans Organization v. The Minister of Defense [2006] IsrSC 62(1) 296, Paragraph 23; Nasser Case, Paragraph 44; Lahav Case, Paragraph 76).

53.It appears that the discrimination in this case violates the constitutional right of equality as part of human dignity. The fact that a small group of residents is excluded from the group of all residents with children because of its choice not to vaccinate its children violates the human dignity of this group. The gap created between the two groups creates a sense of discrimination of the latter group, and has a close connection to human dignity. (See, similarly, Lahav Case, Paragraph 92). The violation is comprised of both the lack of respect for the belief or choice of this group not to vaccinate its children for various reasons, and the sense that other parents, whose actions may harm the best interests of their children or the best interests of the public in other ways, continue to receive full child allowances. The sense is that the legislator focused specifically on this group and on this social objective, which is the only one for which a condition is imposed on the child allowances, harming the dignity of the chosen group. (See Nasser Case). The consequence that this reduction has on the distinction between groups of children also contributes to the conclusion that the right of equality has been constitutionally violated.

However, it appears that there is no need to rule on this issue, in light of my conclusion that the above violation satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause. I will proceed, therefore, to examine the violation through the lens of the limitation clause in Basic Law.: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

The Limitation Clause

54.It is well known that the right of equality, like other rights, is not an absolute right, and as such it requires a balancing with other rights and interests relevant to the issue in question. This balance is formed in the limitation clause set forth in Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

President Barak stated the importance of the limitation clause in the MQG Case:

This provision plays a central role in our constitutional structure. It is the foothold on which the constitutional balance between the individual and the general public, between the individual and society, rests. It reflects the concept d. (See D. Hodgson, Individual Duty Within a Human Rights Discourse (2003)). It reflects the concept that the human rights set forth in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are not absolute but rather relative. They are not protected to their full scope. The limitation clause emphasizes the concept that the individual lives within the confines of society, and that the existence of society, its needs and tradition, may justify a violation of human rights. (See re. United Mizrahi Bank Case, p. 433; re. Investment Managers Bureau Case, p. 384; APA 4436/02 Ninety Balls – Restaurant, Members Club v. The City of Haifa, PDI IsrSC 58(3) 782, 803 (hereinafter, “re. Ninety Balls Case”) (re. MQG Case, on p. 691-692).

55.The limitation clause contains four conditions, only upon the cumulative fulfillment of which will the non-constitutionality of the prejudicial law be prevented. The first condition is that the violation of the human right was made in or by a law or by virtue of explicit authorization therein. The second condition is that the prejudicial law befits the values of the State of Israel. The third condition is that the prejudicial law is intended for a proper purpose. The fourth condition is that the law violates the right to an extent no greater than is required.

56.There is no dispute that the first condition is satisfied. In addition, the petitioners did not raise claims with respect to the satisfaction of the second condition. Therefore, all that remains is to examine the existence of a proper purpose and the proportionality test.

57.“The purpose of a law that violates human rights is proper if it is intended to achieve social objectives that are consistent with the values of the State in general, and exhibit sensitivity to the place of human rights in the overall social fabric.” (MQG Case, on p. 697). It was further held that the more important the right violated, and the greater the harm, the stronger the public interest needed to justify the violation. (MQG Case, on p. 698-700; Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 44 of the opinion of President Beinisch; Nir Case, Paragraph 19 of the opinion of President Beinisch; Hassan Case, Paragraph 55 of the opinion of President Beinisch). Part of the petitioners’ claims regarding the satisfaction of the proper purpose condition focuses on the violation alone and not on its purpose. In addition, the petitioners argue that the purpose of increasing the vaccination rate is extraneous to the purpose of the allowances and may create a dangerous precedent of reducing allowances on various grounds. As I stated above, I do not believe that every conditioning of allowances is prohibited, and the fear of a slippery slope is a matter for the proportionality test. It appears to me that the purpose of increasing the rate of vaccination among children is a proper purpose which promotes an important social objective of caring for public health in general and children’s health in particular. The purpose underlying the Amendment does not focus only on children that have not yet been vaccinated, but also on additional populations that may be harmed as a result of non-vaccination of such children, including newborn infants whose time to be vaccinated has yet to arrive, populations who are unable to be vaccinated for various medical reasons, a certain percentage of the population whom the vaccination does not protect, despite being vaccinated, etc. As stated above, the diseases against which the vaccines protect might cause serious complications that compromise a person’s health and in rare cases might even cause his death. In this sense, the purpose of the Amendment has a close connection to the right to health and life. Therefore, even if we say that the Amendment seriously violates an important right, the purpose of the Amendment is sufficiently strong and important to justify the violation.

58.I further add that the purpose of the Amendment also expresses the principle of mutual guarantee. A separate question is whether encouraging vaccination could be deemed as a proper purpose if we were concerned only with the best interests of the children who have not yet been vaccinated. However, the purpose does not concern only the best interests of the children who have not been vaccinated or whose parents do not intend to vaccinate them, but the best interests of a broader population, as described above. The non-vaccination of such children may have an effect not only on their health and life, but on the health and life of a broader population. The principle of mutual guarantee, alongside the said purposes, justifies deeming the purpose of the Amendment as a proper purpose. It should be noted that this principle is not extraneous to the National Insurance Law, but rather, as I already mentioned, underlies it, albeit in a different context.

The conclusion is therefore that the proper purpose condition is satisfied. All that remains is to examine is whether the violation meets the proportionality test of the limitation clause.

59.The determination that the purpose of the violating law is proper does not mean that all of the measures taken to achieve it are legitimate. The end does not always justify the means. (Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 47 of the opinion of President Beinisch). The proportionality test was created for this situation. The test is divided into three subtests, all three of which must be satisfied in order to hold that the violation is proportionate. The first subtest is the “compatibility test” or the “rational connection test”. In accordance with this test, a connection of compatibility is required between the end and the means. The second subtest is the less harmful means test. According to this test, the legislator is required to choose a measure which achieves the legislative purpose and which least violates the human right. The third subtest is the proportionality test in the narrow sense. It examines the proper relation between the benefit derived from achievement of the proper purpose and the scope of the violation of the constitutional right.

60.It appears to me that the Amendment satisfies the rational connection test. It should be noted that several means might achieve the end. In addition, there is no need to prove that the means will definitely achieve the end, and a reasonable degree of probability of achieving the end is sufficient. (MQG Case, on p. 706; Hassan Case, Paragraph 59 of the opinion of President Beinisch). It should further be emphasized that there is no requirement that the means chosen achieve the end in full, and partial achievement, not minor or negligible, of the purpose following the use of the means chosen is sufficient. (Nir Case, Paragraph 23 of the opinion of President Beinisch; Hassan Case, Paragraph 59 of the opinion of President Beinisch). Indeed, it is impossible to know for certain whether the Amendment will achieve its objective and whether the percentage of vaccinated persons will rise significantly and create “herd immunity”, or at the very least create a broader protection for the public. However, it is possible to say that there is a sufficiently high probability that such objective will be achieved. The respondents presented data regarding the success of similar programs in countries worldwide and about the support of the World Bank for such programs. (See also Gal, on p. 256-257; report of the Knesset Research and Information Center of June 23, 2009 regarding increasing and conditioning the child allowances). In addition, data was presented regarding a similar program implemented in Israel that made the receipt of maternity allowance contingent upon delivery in a hospital in order to reduce the phenomenon of home births. The respondents report that following this legislation, the number of home births in Israel decreased significantly. Past experience therefore indicates a substantial probability of achieving the objective with this measure. It should also be added that the assumption is that some parents who do not vaccinate their children are not acting based on ideological reasons, and that there is a “free rider problem” whereby parents are in no hurry to vaccinate their children and rely on the vaccination of the entire public to protect their children against outbreaks of diseases. The respondents also indicated the difficulty of late vaccination of children, which the Amendment might solve by incentivizing parents to vaccinate their infants on time. Finally, I note that after the Amendment is implemented and real data collected regarding its repercussions, it will be possible to reexamine the reality created, and it might transpire that this reality does not meet the rational connection test or another proportionality test. (See HCJ 9333/03 Kaniel v. The Israeli Government [2005] IsrSC 60(1) 277, 293).

61.The Amendment, in my mind, the second subtest, the less harmful means test. It should be kept in mind for the implementation of this test that the court does not put itself in the shoes of the legislator, and that it will intervene only when it is convinced that the expected purpose may be achieved through the use of less harmful means –

When examining the severity of the violation and whether there is a less harmful means through which it is possible to achieve the purpose of the legislation, the court does not put itself in the shoes of the legislator. The assumption underlying the test of need is that there is maneuvering space in which there may be several methods for achieving the objective of the legislation, from which the legislator can choose one method. So long as the chosen method is within this maneuvering space, the court will not intervene in the legislator’s decision. The court will be prepared to intervene in the method chosen by the legislator only where it is possible to demonstrate that the harm is not minimal, and that the purpose of the legislation may be achieved through the use of less harmful means.”

(Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 45 of the opinion of President Beinisch). Indeed, there is a range of means for achieving the purpose of encouraging vaccination. Some of these means are more harmful than the means adopted by the legislature, and therefore are irrelevant for the purpose of the test in question. This is the case with respect to criminal sanctions on anyone who fails to vaccinate his children, as proposed by some of the petitioners, and for denying school attendance for those who cannot provide confirmation of vaccination, as is done in the United States. (James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, “School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social and Legal Perspectives” 90 Ky. L.J. 831 (2001-2002)). It should further be emphasized that the economic sanction used in the Amendment is very similar to the denial of a benefit, since in the majority of cases, the reduction that will be made in the child allowance of parents who have not vaccinated their children is equal to the increase in the child allowances in the same Amendment. The petitioners refer to additional means that concern informational activities and increasing accessibility to Family Health Centers. With respect to informational activities, this is certainly an appropriate means, but it is included and precedes implementation of the Amendment itself. The respondents stated that a campaign is planned for informing the population about the law, in which the importance of vaccination will also be emphasized. Obviously, the sanction of reduction of child allowances will not be used against those who are convinced by the informational activity and vaccinate their children. Therefore, the informational means is also incorporated into the means chosen. The concern, of course, is that the informational means are insufficient in view of the vaccination “market failure,” whereby, as aforesaid, a child who is not vaccinated may be protected against the outbreak of diseases due to the vaccination of the population around him, but this failure may cause the non-vaccination of a certain population, which will cause the outbreak of an epidemic therein.

62.Regarding the accessibility of the Family Health Centers, this difficulty pertains to the Bedouin population in the Negev, and mainly to the population of the unrecognized villages in the Negev. Due to this difficulty, which the respondents recognize, the implementation of the Amendment was postponed in order to make arrangements and increase the accessibility of Family Health Centers to this population. However, the steps specified in the respondents’ response are satisfactory with respect to the level of accessibility achieved and the efforts being made to further increase it. The respondents report that there are currently forty-five Family Health Centers spread throughout the southern district, twenty-five of which service the Bedouin community: thirteen centers in permanent settlements, eight portable centers for the Bedouin villages, and centers in the Jewish settlements which also service the Bedouin population. There is also a special mobile family health unit to provide vaccinations for the Bedouin population. This mobile unit travels every day through a different location in the unrecognized villages and is intended to vaccinate children of families who have not visited Family Health Centers. The unit is operated five times a week between 8:00 and 16:00. Three centers in Bedouin settlements which were closed have been reopened and a petition filed on the matter was dismissed with consent. (HCJ 10054/09). The respondents are also working to encourage hiring of male and female nurses for Family Health Centers in the south and in the Bedouin settlements. To this end, it was decided to increase the financial incentive for such personnel, to add administrative personnel and security positions for the centers, and to add positions to make the services accessible to the population that finds it difficult to come to the centers. In June 2011, an incentive plan was formed for the personnel of the Family Health Centers in the Bedouin sector in the south of Israel, including payment of an encouragement bonus, payment of a persistence bonus, reimbursement for rent in certain cases, consideration for travel time to and from work, increased overtime pay, and provision of a mobile telephone to nurses. The respondents further state that mediators are brought in to make the services culturally accessible, and their role includes providing information about the importance of early registration with a Family Health Center. A special program financed by the Ministry of Health was established at Ben-Gurion University to train nurses from the Bedouin sector. The program’s students undertake to work in the Bedouin sector upon completion of their studies.

The current data regarding vaccination of the Bedouin population in the Negev with the MMRV vaccine should also be taken into account. According to the data, the vaccination rate for this vaccine in the Bedouin population is higher than in the Jewish sector, the rate in the unrecognized villages is 90%, and in the permanent settlements 93.5%.

It therefore appears that the less harmful means for achieving the purpose of encouraging vaccination have been exhausted, and the next step on the ladder for achieving the purpose may be at the economic level, as was done in the Amendment. The second subtest is therefore also satisfied.

63.The last question that we must ask is whether we ought to go one step further on the ladder, after previous steps have not yet achieved the desired objective. This is an ideological question, which is based on principles of balance and examines the relationship between the benefit in achieving the proper purpose and the damage that will be caused by the violation of human rights. (See MQG Case, on p. 707; Hassan Case, Paragraph 69 of the opinion of President Beinisch). In my opinion, the Amendment also satisfies this test. We should not disregard the harm that will be caused to parents who do not wish to vaccinate their children, who will be discriminated against compared to the group of child allowance recipients and will either need to be satisfied with a reduced allowance or act against their will and vaccinate their children. There is also difficulty in the distinction that may be created between strong groups in the population which can allow themselves to waive part of the child allowance in order to realize their desire not to vaccinate their children and weak groups which will be forced to choose between aggravated poverty and waiving their desire not to vaccinate their children. Conversely, consideration should be given to the fact that the violation of equality in this case is not arbitrary and is not based on any suspect distinction between different sectors. In addition, the harm was limited to reduction of the child allowance, and was also limited to a maximum amount that can be reduced. Further arrangements in the Amendment, including a right of appeal, prior notice, and increasing the allowances after vaccination also support the proportionality of the violation. On the other side is the benefit, as I have already stated, that may be significant and important to the health of those children who have not yet been vaccinated, and more importantly, to the public at large. The effect of each and every individual on the public justifies a balance which harms the individual to a limited and restricted extent for the benefit of the public. It is impossible to ignore that the individual lives within society and sometimes his acts or omissions impact the society around him:

A person is not solitary individual. The person is a part of society. (HCJ 6126/94 Sanesh v. The Broadcasting Authority, on p. 833). A person’s rights are therefore his rights in an organized society; they concern the individual and his relations with others. (HCJ 5016/96 Chorev v. The Minister of Transport, on p. 41). Hence, a person’s dignity is his dignity as a part of society and not as an individual living on a desert island. (Cr.M 537/95 (hereinafter, “Cr.M Ganimat”), on p. 413; LCA 7504/95 Yassin v. The Registrar of Political Parties, on p. 64; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, on p. 365)” (hereinafter, the “CPSJ Case, on p. 496-497).

A balance is therefore required between the rights of the individual and the best interests of society, a balance, which in my opinion, is proportionate in the case at bar, and within the bounds of proportionality afforded to the legislator.

Conclusion

  1. The constitutional examination of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law revealed that the Amendment indeed violates the right of equality enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. However, this violation satisfies all of the terms of the limitation clause, such that a proper balance is struck with other rights and interests. Hence, the Amendment is proportionate and this Court will not intervene. I will mention that this Court does not examine what it would have done in the legislator’s shoes and what its preferences would have been in such a matter, but merely examines whether the legislator’s choice is within the boundaries of the range of proportionality available to the legislator. (See HCJ 1715/97 The Bureau of Investment Managers in Israel v. The Minister of Finance, [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367, 386). I mentioned that most of the reduction in the child allowances will be executed simultaneously with the increase in the allowances set in the Amendment. I further noted the importance attributed to the vaccination of the children, not only for the health of the children themselves, but also for the health of the environment, society and the public. Thus, the conclusion I have reached is that the violation resulting from the Amendment satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause and therefore, the petition should be denied. I did not see fit to an order for costs.

If my opinion is heard, the petition will be denied and as aforesaid, there will be no order for costs.

 

  •  

Justice D. Barak Erez

  1. The petitions before us raised fundamental issues pertaining to the manner in which the State fulfills its responsibility for the health of the public in general and the welfare of children in particular. They also raised the basic issue of conditioning rights and eligibilities. In general, I concur with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague, Justice E. Arbel, and I too believe that the petition should be denied. Nevertheless, I wish to clarify my position with respect to some of the reasons that support this conclusion.

The Legal Issues

  1. In fact, the discussion of the issue that has been placed before us—conditioning a part of the child allowances on the children’s vaccination within an amendment to a law—raised several secondary issues. The first question concerns the examination of the essence and legal status of the child allowances, the conditioning of which is at the center of our discussion. Specifically, the question in this context is whether the eligibility for child allowances is an “ordinary” legal right, conferred merely by a law, or whether it constitutes a manifestation of constitutional rights. Insofar as the argument is that the child allowances embody constitutional rights, it is necessary to examine what is the constitutional right they represent. This question is important because the violation of a constitutional right is not tantamount to the violation of a legal right that does not enjoy a super-statutory status. The second question revolves around the essence and purpose of the condition for granting the allowance: the requirement to vaccinate the children as infants. As part of this question, it is necessary to examine what is the purpose of the vaccination requirement is and whether there is a link between this purpose and the objective of the child allowances. The third question focuses on the legal regime that applies to the conditioning of rights. This question is related to the first question, since the conditioning of legal rights and the conditioning of constitutional rights should not be addressed in the same manner. The fourth question is whether the distinction that was made in legislation between parents who vaccinate their children and parents who do not amounts to a violation of the constitutional right of equality. The fifth question, derived from the former questions, is how the above normative scheme affects the constitutional judicial review of the amendment to the law, in accordance with the constitutional tests of the limitation clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Child Allowances: History and Purpose

  1. As we mentioned, the first question with which the discussion should begin revolves around the essence and objective of the child allowances, as were set in the National Insurance Law. (5755-1995 (hereinafter, the “National Insurance Law”). Because the basis for a discussion on constitutional review of the validity of a law is the status of the right violated, we should begin and by examining if, and to what extent, the eligibility to receive a child allowance is a right that enjoys constitutional protection.
  2. My colleague, Justice Arbel, articulated the purpose of the child allowances as part of the fabric of Israel’s social legislation. To this I would like to add a review of the historic development of the arrangements in the field, a development that sheds light on the ongoing use of the child allowances as a tool for promoting of social policies.
  3. In general, the child allowances were subject to many changes from the time they were first introduced in the format of legislation until the regulation thereof in our time. Generally speaking, a clear process of strengthening the universal element in granting the allowances can be pointed out. The intention is to grant child allowances to each and every family for each of its children, without taking into consideration economic data or other distinguishing criteria (distinct from past practice when they were only granted to some families or some children based on distinguishing criteria).
  4. Before the establishment of the State, payment to parents for their children was made in the form of an increase to the employees’ salary. (See Johnnie Gal, Social Security in Israel, 97 and 102 (2004) (hereinafter, “Gal”)); Abraham Doron “Policy on Child Allowances in Israel” Spotlight on Social Policy Series 1, 2 (2004) (hereinafter, “Doron, the “Allowances Policy” ”)).
  5. After the establishment of the State in 1950, the Kanev Committee submitted the Inter-Ministerial Report on Social Security Planning (1950), which included reference to a “children’s grants” plan (See Abraham Doron, In Defense of Universalism –The Challenges Facing Social Policy in Israel, 128-129 (1995) (on the report and its importance)). The report determined that this plan would only be implemented in the last stage of the introduction of social insurance in Israel because its performance was not economically feasible in the immediate future. Nevertheless, striving to increase the birth rate in Israel, the then prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, introduced a monetary prize to families with ten children and more. (Gal, on p. 103). Starting from the early 1950’s, proposals were made to grant allowances, and in the second half of that decade, the government began to demonstrate preparedness to consider the idea. (Meir Avizohar, Money to All – The Development of Social Security in Israel 67 (1978) (hereinafter, “Avizohar”)).
  1. The first piece of legislation that dealt with child allowances was adopted in 1959 as an amendment to the National Insurance Law. (National Insurance Law (Amendment) (No. 4), 5719-1959 (hereinafter, “Amendment 4”)). The initiator of the legislation was the Minister of Labor, Mordechai Namir (hereinafter, “Namir”). In the background was a mass immigration from Middle Eastern countries that included large families whose breadwinners did not, at the time, adequately integrate into the labor market. The legislative initiative was thus derived from the social-economic gap created between the immigrant families and long established families in Israel, which were characterized by a smaller number of children on average. (Knesset Minutes 27, 2693-2642 (1959); Giora Lotan, Ten Years of National Insurance – An Idea and its Fulfillment 38 (1964)). Some argue that the Wadi Salib events in 1959 were a material catalyst to the enactment of the law (Gal, on p. 103, Avizohar, on p. 68-70) and this appears to have partial support in a discussion that was held in the Knesset (Knesset Minutes 27, 2642 (1959)). More generally, it can be said that the payment of the allowances was the first stage of a process that increased the involvement of the National Insurance Institute in reducing poverty and economic and social gaps in the population. (Ester Sharon, The Child Allowances System in Israel: 1959-1987 Where did it come from and where is it going? 3 (1987) (hereinafter, “Sharon”)).
  2. The allowance payments were consistent, in principle, with the basic principles of national insurance in Israel, in the sense that they were granted on a universal basis, independent of income level. However, the allowance was initially granted only to families with at least four children, and only for children under the age of fourteen. (Michal Ophir and Tami Eliav, Child Allowances in Israel: A Historical View and International Perspective (2005) (hereinafter, “Ophir and Eliav”)). Minister Namir explained that these conditions were imposed for budgetary reasons, and that the aspiration was to lay down an infrastructure that would be expanded gradually. The deliberations on the scope of Amendment 4 were not particularly heated despite reservations on its small scope. Knesset Members supported Amendment 4 and expressed their hope that the terms of eligibility would be expanded in the future, and that it would presently succeed in encouraging births, eradicating poverty and enforcing equality among the various groups in Israeli society. (Knesset Minutes 27, 2667-2680 (1959)).
  3. In 1965 the child allowances were expanded in several respects. First, the allowances were paid for all minor children, with no age distinction (that is, until the age of 18). Second, the allowance paid by the National Insurance Institute was accompanied by an employees’ children allowance that was only paid to salaried employees by their employers for their first three children, and was financed by the National Insurance Institute. Therefore, this allowance, unlike the regular child allowance, was deemed as taxable income. (See: The National Insurance Law (Amendment Number 12), 5725-1965, Statutes 461, 208; The National Insurance Regulations (Employees’ Children Allowance) (Part-Time Employees and Employment Seekers), 5725-1965 which were promulgated by virtue of Sections 31K and 115 of the National Insurance Law, 5714-1953; Gal on p. 103). In addition, in the early 1970s, an additional allowance was introduced for families with four or more children, if a family member served in the security forces (hereinafter, the “Military Veterans Allowance”). This payment was made directly from the National Insurance Institute and was exempt from tax. (Regulations on Grants to Soldiers and their Families, 5730-1970, Regulations 2605, 2180, promulgated by virtue of Section 40(B1)(2) of the Discharged Soldiers Law (Reinstatement in Employment), 5709-1949). In 1975, this payment was expanded to also apply to families with three children. (Regulations on Grants to Soldiers and their Families (Amendment), 5735-1975, Regulations 3298, 1001). Over the years, payments were also made to additional families, who did not fulfill the statutory condition of a military service; ultra-orthodox families received additional payments from the Ministry of Religion and families of new immigrants received such payments from the Jewish Agency. (Gal, on p. 104; Eliav and Ophir, on p. 5-6; Yoram Margaliot “Child Allowances” Berenson Book, Second Volume – Beni Sabra 733, 745 footnote 40 (Editors, Aharon Barak and Haim Berenson, 2000) (hereinafter, “Margaliot”)).
  4. We can therefore summarize that in general, in the first half of the 1970’s, financial support was provided to relatively large families in several formats: first, universal child allowances were given by the National Insurance Institute; second, additional allowances were given in the Jewish sector to families for their children (whether Military Veterans Allowances or other allowances); third, employees’ children allowances were paid to salaried employees by their employers, and were taxed. These mechanisms were added, of course, to other welfare payments to which the families were eligible based on their individual economic condition. Additionally, families with a relatively high income enjoyed tax benefits which took the family size into consideration. However, this benefit was only enjoyed by families with a relatively high income, whose income was taxed. The incompatibility at the time between the various benefits and the understanding that families with many children constitute a more impoverished group together were a catalyst to a reform in the system. (The National Insurance Bill (Amendment Number 12), 5733-1972, Government Bill 1022, 30; The Amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance Bill (Number 18), 5733-1972; The Government Bill 1022, 31; The National Insurance Law (Amendment Number 12), 5733-1973, Statutes 695, 142; Raphael Rotter, The Reform in Child Allowances in Israel (1972); Arieh Nitzan, Twenty Years of National Insurance in Israel (1975) (hereinafter, “Nitzan”)).
  5. The policy with respect to allowances underwent further turmoil following the recommendations of the Ben-Shahar Committee on the subject of the income tax reform in 1975. (Report of the Committee for Tax Reform – Recommendations for Changes to the Direct Tax, 25A-26A (1975)). Pursuant to the committee’s recommendations, the double treatment of the child allowances—within tax law and national insurance law—was discontinued, and it was decided to grant tax-free allowances on a universal basis to all families of salaried and non-salaried employees for all children in the family, starting with the first child, until they reach the age of 18. (National Insurance Law (Amendment Number 17), 5735-1975, Statutes 773, 152; Sharon, on p. 9-11).
  6. The trend of expanding eligibility changed in the 1980’s to the desire to reduce public expenditure. The scope of allowances was reduced. In addition, the child allowances for the first two children, in families of up to three children with a marginal tax rate on the main breadwinner’s salary of at least 50%, were taxed. (Amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance (Number 59) Law, 5744-1984, Statutes 1107, 64; Sharon, on p. 11-12). In 1985 a tax was also imposed on the child allowance for the third child in families with up to three children and the marginal tax rate was reduced. In addition, the universal payment of the child allowance for the first child was revoked, except for low-income families. (The Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy, 5746-1985, Statutes 1159, 20; Sharon, on p. 12-13). The 1985 arrangement was supposed to remain in effect for only one year, but it “survived” (with various changes pertaining to the income test’s threshold amount) until 1993. (Ophir and Eliav, on p. 8; Sharon, on p. 12-13).
  7. The pendulum swing child allowances policy continued in full force in the 1990’s. At first, the trend of reducing the universality which characterized the granting of the allowances at the end of the last decade continued, and the eligibility of small families not defined as “in need” was significantly reduced. Later, the trend was one of expansion, while strengthening universality in granting the allowances. In this decade, the following changes occurred: the conditioning of eligibility for the allowance on the family size was revoked; the Military Veterans Allowances were gradually cancelled; the allowances for large families were gradually increased. (The Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy (Amendment Number 15), 5750-1990, Statutes 1328, 188; The Arrangements in the State Economy Law (Legislative Amendments), 5751-1991, Statutes 1351, 125 (Indirect Amendment to the Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy, 5746-1985); The Income Tax Law (Temporary Order), 5753-192, Statutes 1407, 22 (Indirect Amendment to the Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy, 5746-1985); The Arrangements in the State Economy Law (Legislative Amendments for Attaining the Budget Goals), 5754-1994, Statutes 1445, 45 (Indirect Amendment to the Discharged Soldiers Law (Reinstatement in Employment), 5709-1949); Dalia Gordon and Tami Eliav “Universality v. Selectivity in the Granting of Child Allowances and Results of Performance Limitations” 50 75, 78 Social Security (1997) (hereinafter, “Gordon and Eliav”)).
  8. The turmoil continued, even more forcefully, in the following decade. In 2001, the child allowance rate for large families was significantly increased—starting with the fifth child. However, shortly thereafter, a gradual cutback began in all allowances, including the child allowances, in order to reduce public expenditure. Another fundamental change that occurred in this period was equalizing the allowance given for each child in the family, irrespective of his birth order. At the same time, the attempt to reinstate the Military Veterans Allowances failed. (See Doron “The Allowances Policy”, on p. 4; Abraham Doron “Multiculturalism and the Erosion of Support for the ‘Welfare State’: The Israeli Experience” Studies on the Revival of Israel 14 55, 63-64 (2004)); Knesset Research and Information Center, Child Allowances in Israel: A Historic Review – an Update 8 (2008)).
  9. The issue before us is related to an additional stage in the development of the policy on child allowances within Amendment No. 113 of the National Insurance Law, which was enacted as part of the Economic Streamlining Law. (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009 (hereinafter, the “Amendment”)). As part of the Amendment, the allowances for the second, third and fourth child in the family were gradually increased by 100 shekel per month for each child, and eligibility to receive the full amount of the allowance was made contingent on the vaccination of the children.
  10. This short historical review of the eligibility for child allowances reveals several important things. First and foremost, it demonstrates how eligibility for child allowances has always served as a platform for the promotion of national public objectives (for example, the encouragement of births and reduction of social gaps), which go beyond the narrower purpose of supporting the family’s finances. For example, in a discussion held in the Knesset on Amendment 4, which gave rise to the child allowances for the first time, Minister Namir stated the following:

The law was intended to achieve three goals that are social demographic and economic in nature: a) to ease the difficulties in the social condition of weak parts of society; b) to stop signs of negative trends in our demographic development c) to remove several errors and anomalies in the field of employment and distribution of wages in the factories, in relation to the employees’ family status.” (Knesset Minutes 27, 2639 (1959)).

  1. The legislative history also demonstrates the fact that over the years, the child allowances expressed a different and changing welfare policy. In other words, the tool remained one, but into it were cast various objectives, or at least secondary objectives. The goal of reducing poverty among children hovered, throughout the year, over legislation concerning the child allowances indirectly and directly. However, in each of the periods reviewed, alongside the purpose of eradicating poverty stood additional purposes. In fact, even Amendment 4, which gave birth to the child allowances, was intended to provide a response, according to its legislators, to demographic data regarding births in Israel. An additional purpose at the time was bridging the social gaps created between various groups of immigrants in order to promote their integration in Israel.
  2. The recurring oscillation between the expansion of eligibility for allowances for small families, and its reduction for large families, marks the tension between the perception that, in general, the State’s role is to contribute towards the cost of raising children ,together with their parents (Doron “The Allowances Policy”, on p. 2), and the perception that child allowances provide a way to fulfill other roles the State has taken upon itself, such as reducing unemployment and gaps in society and encouraging births. (Margaliot, on p. 734-754). In practice, we have learned that child allowances constituted, throughout the years, a means of realizing various social and economic goals that were placed at the top of the political agenda in each period. For our purposes, it is important to note the following information: child allowances are supposed to promote the welfare of families raising minor children. However, the child allowances are not paid in correlation with the family’s economic situation (and in this they differ from income assurance payments). (Compare: HCJ 5578/02 Manor v. The Minister of Finance [2004] IsrSC 59(1) 729 (hereinafter, “Manor Case”), in which former President A. Barak referred to the old-age pension and held that unlike the income assurance allowance, this one is not intended to guarantee a dignified minimal existence). At most, it might be said that they are provided according to the estimated needs of families raising children. (Compare: Abraham Doron, The Welfare State in an Age of Change 72 (1987)). Additionally, the purpose of promoting the economic welfare of families who are raising children is not the sole purpose of the allowances.
  3. Thus, it can be determined that in view of the many aspects of eligibility for child allowances, as well as the changes it has undergone through the years, the objective of the allowances is a broad objective of striving to promote the welfare of the children in the Israeli society, as well as to promote the social policy of the government at a given time. This insight is important in continuing the discussion on the legal status of the allowance.

Child Allowances: Legal Rights or Constitutional Rights

  1. Child allowances are currently given by virtue of a law—the National Insurance Law. Does the right to receive child allowances as it they are granted today constitute an exercise of a constitutional right? Like my colleague, Justice Arbel, I too believe that it was not proven before us that this is correct at this time.
  2. The ruling on this issue is relevant to the continuation of the constitutional examination process, since the conditioning of the legal means for exercising the constitutional right is not tantamount to the conditioning of the constitutional right itself. Indeed, without legal means for exercising the constitutional right, the right may remain as an empty normative shell, void of content. There may certainly be situations where either the conditioning or denial of the means to fulfill the constitutional right will amount to a violation of the right itself. However, this should be examined in each and every case. This can be compared to a two-story building: on the upper floor is the constitutional right itself; on the lower floor are the means for its fulfillment. Too severe of an injury to the foundations of the lower floor, by conditioning or otherwise, will result in harm to the upper floor, the floor of the constitutional right, and undermine protection. Thus, the question is whether the petitioners have successfully shown that conditioning eligibility for child allowances amounts to a violation of a constitutional right. Additional examples that illustrate the importance and relevance of this distinction can be found in case law regarding the violation of the right of access to the courts. For example, it has been held that a person does not have a vested right to exercise the right of access to the courts through a specific procedural proceeding. Therefore, limiting the ability to file a class action does not necessarily amount to a violation of the right of access to the court. (See and compare: HCJ 2171/06 Cohen v. The Chairman of the Knesset, paragraphs 21 and 24 (August 29, 2011)).
  3. Child Allowances and the Right of Dignity – Indeed, this Court’s rulings have repeatedly emphasized that the protection of the right to a dignified human existence falls within the scope of the protection of the right of human dignity enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and that its protection is identical to the protection given to the other basic rights. (HCJ 366/03 The Association for Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. The Minister of Finance, [2005] IsrSC 60(3) 464, 482-484; HCJ 10662/04 Hassan v. The National Insurance Institute (February 28, 2012), paragraphs 34-36 (hereinafter, “Hassan Case”)). However, a distinction should be drawn between the constitutional right and the legislative and administrative means that are used for its fulfillment. The right to dignified human existence does not have to be fulfilled through the payment of child allowances, and in the present legal situation it is not even clear that this is the purpose for which they are paid. As a matter of policy, and in order to promote various national public objectives, the Israeli legislature has chosen to provide for the welfare of families with children, irrespective of their economic situation.
  4. In legislative conditions in which the State does not provide a means of existence for weakened populations, payment of child allowances may, de facto, guarantee their dignified existence. Nevertheless, at this time, it has not been proven to us that eligibility to receive child allowances was intended to maintain a dignified human existence or that it is essential to its protection, and therefore, under these circumstances, conditioning the eligibility is not in itself conditioning of a constitutional right. Nothing in the aforesaid negates the possibility to prove that, in a specific case, or following other changes in the welfare system in Israel, cutbacks in child allowances will violate the rights of individuals to basic conditions of a dignified existence. As mentioned, this has not been argued before us and was consequently not proven. It should be added that Section 68(c) of the National Insurance Law orders an increase in the regular child allowance payment for the third and fourth child when the parent is eligible for an income assurance allowance or support payments through National Insurance, but the amendment to the law before us has no ramifications on this special increment and does not derogate therefrom.
  5. Child Allowances and the Right to Property – The petitioners also argued that the eligibility for child allowances is a property right protected by the constitutional protection of property under the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, through application of such protection to “new property.” Indeed, through the years, the term “property” has been attributed a broader and more realistic understanding. Currently, rights vis-à-vis the State (the right to a license, the right to an allowance) are no less important to a person’s financial situation than classic rights of property, and their importance may even exceed that of classic property rights, as demonstrated by the scholar Reich in his classic article on the issue. (Charles Reich, New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964)). The legal protection of new property was also recognized in the judgments of this Court. (See HCJ 4806/94 D.S.A. v. The Minister of Finance, [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 193, 200-202; HCJ 4769/95 Menachem v. The Minister of Transport [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 235, 275), which also recognized certain welfare allowances as new property (Manor Case, on p. 739). However, recognizing rights vis-à-vis the State as property cannot be identical in all characteristics to the protection of traditional rights of property. When the State wishes to expropriate a plot of land owned by a person it is a violation of property that requires constitutional justification and is required to satisfy the tests of the limitation clause. It would be improper to apply precisely the same legal regime to a situation in which the State is seeking to reduce eligibility given to a person by the State treasury. The eligibility for child allowance payments for example, expresses, inter alia, the economic and social policy in place at the time the eligibility was granted. Adopting the approach that the scope of eligibility for an allowance as it was set in the past has become a property right in its classical sense, would lead to the conclusion that the State is very limited, more than it should be, in the possibilities available to it to change its social and economic policy. (Compare: Daphne Barak Erez, Administrative Law, Volume A, 50-52 (2010) (Barak Erez, Administrative Law); Daphne Barak Erez, Citizen-Subject-Consumer – Law and Government in a Changing State 32-33 (2012) (hereinafter, “Barak Erez, Citizen-Subject-Consumer”). This perception is contrary to the democratic perception to practical needs, and to the justified recoiling from “sanctifying” the status quo (which occasionally may also reflect unjustified bias toward strong groups that acted in the past to enact laws that benefitted them). Obviously, if the eligibility for child allowances was required for the protection of dignified human existence, this would have been a good reason to impose restrictions on its reduction. In addition, rights to receive allowances from the State must be protected in that they must be granted equally and changes to them must take into consideration legitimate reliance upon them. Furthermore, there may be room for additional distinctions such as a distinction between an allowance based on an insurance mechanism or a feature of savings via mandatory payments that were made over the years (such as an old-age pension; see Manor Case, on p. 739), and an allowance that was granted in the form of a one-time grant (compare Daphne Barak Erez “The Defense of Reliance in the Administrative Law” Mishpatim 27, 17 (1996); HCJ 3734/11 Haim Dudian v. The Knesset of Israel, paragraphs 24-25, (August 15, 2012)). In any event, the argument that “what was will be”, in itself, cannot be sufficient.
  6. To emphasize further, holding that there is no constitutional right to receive support from the State in the form of child allowances, does not mean that this eligibility is not significant. Moreover, once the State has chosen to pay child allowances under law, it is required to do so in a manner that complies with constitutional standards and in this context to ensure, among other things, that payment of the allowances will be made equally and indiscriminately (as distinct of course, from the setting of legitimate conditions to the receipt of the allowances), as will be explained below.
  7. As Justice Arbel mentioned, the argument regarding violation of rights was also raised before us with a special emphasis on an alleged violation of the rights of the children for which the allowances are to be paid, separately from their parents’ rights. This argument is supported by the current perception that recognizes children’s rights and does not merely support a paternalistic protection of their interests. (Compare: CA 2266/93 John Doe, Minor v. John Doe [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 221, 251-255; Yehiel S. Kaplan “The Child’s Rights in Israeli Case Law – The Beginning of the Transition from Paternalism to Autonomy” Hamishpat 7 303 (2002)). This development is indeed very significant. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot change the framework of the discussion. First, it is important to note that the distinction between the rights of children and protecting their best interests without asking their opinion is important in situations where it is possible to consider the child’s autonomy of will. However, our case focuses on young infants who, undisputedly, cannot take an autonomous and rational stance on the question of whether to be vaccinated. It should be emphasized in this context that the statutory scheme explicitly orders the continued payment of the allowance even if the children were not vaccinated, once the early infancy period proper for vaccination passes. Second, the petitioners’ argument regarding the amendment’s violation of the child’s rights was made generally without stating which of the rights has been violated. The discussion we conducted clarifies that the contingent reduction of the child allowances does not violate, in itself, a constitutional right, including constitutional rights of children (unless it will be invalid for another reason, such as discrimination, an issue that will be examined separately below). To a certain extent, the argument of a violation of the children’s rights in this case wishes to repeat the argument regarding the violation of the parents’ autonomy to make decisions with respect to their children’s best interests. This tension frequently underlies decisions on the best interests of children and repeatedly arises, for example, in relation to decisions regarding the children’s education. (Compare: Yoram Rabin, The Right of Education 121-124 (2002)).

The Objective of the Vaccination Requirement: Between Rights and the Public Interest

  1. Based on all that has been said thus far with relation to the legal status of the child allowances and the objective underlying them, it is necessary to address the second question regarding the objective of the Amendment that conditions part of the eligibility for the allowance on vaccinating the children.
  2. The policy on the vaccination of young children is currently considered a very important tool in the protection of children’s health – both from the aspect of each child’s right to good health and the aspect of the public interest in eradicating epidemics which claimed many victims in the past. (See for example: David E. Bloom, David Canning & Mark Weston, The Value of Vaccination, 6 World Economics 15 (2005); Saad B. Omer and others, Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360(19) New England J. Medicine 1981 (2009)). The State of Israel has excelled since its establishment in operating Family Health Centers, which were an important element in ensuring the population’s health. This public health operation ensured the vaccination of children, for their benefit and for the benefit of the population as a whole.
  3. Through the years, criticism was voiced against the sweeping policy of child vaccination. Some parents refrain from vaccinating their children for various reasons—both because of a belief that vaccinations are dangerous to children’s health and because of a position that prefers “natural” immunization, acquired over the years via “natural” contraction of diseases. So long as those refraining from vaccinations are a minority, choosing this alternative is ostensibly a rational alternative for the relevant persons because of the effect known as “herd immunization;” that is, the phenomenon wherein those who are not vaccinated are in fact protected from contracting diseases when most of the people around them are properly vaccinated. Thus, there is a risk of free riders here, and if it increases it may eventually compromise “herd immunity,” which weakens as the rate of non-vaccinated persons rises. In fact, the decision to vaccinate has characteristics of the “prisoner’s dilemma:” it is a decision that must be made in conditions of uncertainty with regard to the acts of others, and whose benefit from the perspective of the individual also depends on the behavior of such others. Individuals facing the decision whether to be vaccinated will always tend not be vaccinated (provided that others are being vaccinated), purely out of promotion of self-interest. This is a classic case of a “market failure” that justifies intervention. (See also Christine Parkins, Protecting the Herd: A Public Health, Economics, and Legal Argument for Taxing Parents Who Opt-Out of Mandatory Childhood Vaccinations, 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 437 (2011)). De facto, there is a decline in child vaccination. The professional opinion of the Ministry of Health, supported by clear professional opinions on the matter, is that the decline in child vaccination constitutes a health risk, both to the children themselves and to the population as a whole (due to the risk of contracting diseases from children who were not vaccinated and later contract serious diseases).
  4. The new Amendment to the law was intended to provide a response to the problem presented above. This problem is also present in other countries, and a spectrum of responses to situations of non-vaccination of children can be pointed to. (See in general: Daniel Salmon and others, Compulsory Vaccination and Conscientious or Philosophical Exemptions: Past, Present and Future, 367 Lancet 436 (2006)). Among the well-known examples, the United States and France represent a rigid approach to the enforcement of the vaccination obligation. In France, the Code of Public Health (Code de la Sante Publique) states that parents and guardians of children are personally responsible for their vaccination, and proof of proper vaccination must be presented upon the child’s acceptance to an educational institution. (Section L3111-2 of the code). Alongside the aforesaid obligation, criminal sanctions of up to six months imprisonment and a fine were set forth. (Section L3116-4 of the code). A mandatory vaccination policy is also common in the United States. The means employed, as well as the scope of the limited exemptions granted on religious freedom or freedom of conscience grounds, vary between the different states, as these issues are regulated on a state, and not a federal, basis. However, it appears that a central means used is the imposition of a limitation on the enrolment of children in schools when they are not vaccinated in accordance with the basic vaccination plan, because of the concern that others will be infected. Constitutional petitions that challenged laws that imposed vaccination obligations were rejected, based on the recognition of the importance of vaccinations to public health. (See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (a general discussion of the vaccination obligation); Zucht v. King, 260 US 174, 176-77 (1922) (a specific discussion on the conditioning of school enrollment on vaccination). Alongside the aforesaid, additional sanctions were used over the years, including setting a statutory vaccination obligation whose violation entails a fine and cutbacks in municipal education budgets. In the city of New York, for example, it was decided to impose fines on schools that accept unvaccinated children, even when they fall within one of the exceptions that allow parents not to vaccinate their children. The fine is imposed for each day in which an unvaccinated child was present on school grounds. In this manner, the city of New York wished to create an incentive for parents to vaccinate their children, since failing to do so compromises the school’s budget and the level of education it is able to provide. (See further: Alan R Hinman, Walter A Orenstein, Don E Williamson & Denton Darrington, Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J. L. Med. & Ethics 122, 123 (2002); Gary L Freed, Victoria A Freeman & Alice Mauskopf, Enforcement of Age-Appropriate Immunization Laws, 14(2) Am. J. Prev. Med. 118 (1998); D. Isaacs, H. A. Kilham & H. Marshall, Should Routine Childhood Vaccinations be Compulsory?, J Pediatr. Child Health 40(7) 392, 395 (2004); Anthony Ciolli, Religious & Philosophical Exemptions to Mandatory School Vaccinations: Who Should Bear the Costs to Society?, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 287 (2009); Ross Silverman, Litigation, Regulation, and Education – Protecting the Public's Health through Childhood Immunization, 360(24) New England J. Medicine 2500 (2009)).
  5. Unlike in the United States, there is no norm of mandatory vaccination as a condition to the acceptance of children to school in Canada. In fact, only two provinces of Canada, Ontario and New Brunswick, have a statutory vaccination requirement. Nevertheless, an inspection of the education legislation of Ontario shows that alongside the requirement to vaccinate children as a precondition to their enrollment in the education system, a fine of up to $1,000 is also imposed on parents who fail to vaccinate their children. (Education Act, SNB 1997, c E-1.12, s 10; Immunization of School Pupils Act, RSO 1990, c I.1, s 3-4).
  6. A different approach prevails in Australia, where monetary incentives are given to parents who respond to the vaccination plan. This is, to a certain extent, in the spirit of the solution chosen by the Israeli legislator. This approach is recognized in academic literature as more respectful of the parents’ autonomy, and ethically appropriate, insofar as it does not endanger the lion’s share of welfare payments for children. (See David Isaacs, An Ethical Framework for Public Health Immunisation Programs, 23(5-6) NSW Public Health Bulletin 111,114 (2012).
  7. The comparative law was reviewed merely to illustrate the variety of means employed by other legal systems in a similar context. Obviously, these examples themselves cannot dictate the outcome. However, they emphasize several points that ought to be discussed. First, they show that the issue of child vaccination and imposing sanctions in this context (even when they may indirectly harm the children themselves) are also present in other systems to promote the welfare of the children themselves and the welfare of the public. Second, other systems went as far as imposing sanctions, which may be deemed harsher than those methods adopted by the Israeli legislature. These sanctions may indeed serve more closely the purpose of achieving the result of vaccinating children (due to their weight), but they simultaneously entail more severe harms to the children and their parents (including the imposition of fines or prevention of the children’s studies in educational institutions). I will mention these alternatives again when addressing the limitation clause.
  8. And now: the Amendment discussed before us was intended to achieve a double purpose of protecting the health of infants, for whom contracting the diseases against which the vaccine protects may be dangerous and at times even lethal, and protecting public health as a matter of national medical policy through the creation of  “herd immunity”. This double purpose will also be important for our later discussion regarding the limitation clause. At this point it can also be said that the double purpose of the law does not mandate a direct confrontation with the discussion on the limits of paternalism. As is known, the classification of a legal rule as paternalistic is made through the prism of the grounds underlying it. Therefore, the more the legal rule intervenes in the individual’s autonomy of will for the sole purpose of protecting him and his welfare from his own actions, the more likely we are faced with a paternalistic rule. More specifically, in our case we have a paternalistic rule which intervenes in the parents’ autonomy of will in order to stop them from making a mistake, as the issue is perceived by the Ministry of Health. The question of the appropriate limits of paternalism has been extensively discussed and this framework is too narrow to discuss it. (See, for example: John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Arieh Simon, Translator, 1946); Peter De Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, 34(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 68 (2006); Gerald Dworkin, Moral Paternalism, 24(3) Law and Philosophy 305 (2005)). For purposes of the current discussion it is important to state on this issue the following two points. First, it is evident that those engaged in the legislative work were aware of the difficulties caused by over-intervention in the decisions of individuals. Thus, for example, the drafters of the law refrained from setting a statutory vaccination requirement, the breach of which entails a punitive sanction; instead, they were satisfied with the creation of an economic incentives scheme, which leaves parents a wider array of choices. The fact that it is only the increase in the allowances that is made contingent on the vaccination of the children, while leaving the base allowance intact suggests the same. Second, it is certainly doubtful whether we have before us a paternalistic rule in the full sense of the word, considering that the Amendment was intended not only to protect the children and their parents from themselves, but also to protect the general public against the outbreak of diseases. It seems that the duty of the Ministry of Health to institute preventive measures to eradicate diseases that threaten public health cannot be disputed.
  9. Moreover, since the Amendment was intended to promote the protection of the health of children in the State of Israel, it should not only be deemed as a means that violates rights (in the name of an important public interest), as the petitioners argued, but also as a means intended to promote rights in a positive manner—in this case, the children’s right to health. The above fits in with the general perception of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, pursuant to which the protection of basic rights is not merely reduced to a negative protection against the damaging power of government, but also extends to a positive protection which reflects the government’s duty to operate in an active manner for the protection of basic rights. While according to Section 2 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such” (and here the negative protection of these rights is expressed), according to Section 4 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty “[a]ll persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity (in other words, the government is also required to positively promote these rights).” Although the question regarding the scope of the constitutional right to health has yet to be decided, there is no doubt that striving to guarantee basic conditions of good health falls within the boundaries of the right to human dignity. In addition, it can be deemed as a derivative of the right to life and of the protection of the person’s body. (Compare: Eyal Gross “Health in Israel: Right or Product”, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Israel (Yoram Rabin and Yuval Shani, Editors, 2004); LCA 4905/98 Gamzo v. Yesha’ayahu [2001] IsrSC 55(3) 360, 375-376; HCJ 3071/05 Luzon v. The State of Israel (July 28, 2008), in paragraphs 9-17; HCJ 11044/04 Solometkin v. The Minister of Health (June 27, 2011), in paragraphs 11-16). Legislation seeking to create incentives for child vaccination is legislation that falls not only into the category of laws that limit rights, but also that of promoting rights in general and children’s rights in particular. Section 4 of the Basic Law expresses a clear position that rejects the perception that the State is at its best when it does not intervene. Article 25 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 also states the obligation of the member states to act for the promotion of children’s health, including “to develop preventive health care.” (Article 25(6)).

Conditioning of Rights: The Normative Framework

  1. The third question of those I mentioned in the beginning is the legal question at the heart of the petition: to what extent can conditions be imposed on rights vis-à-vis the State and more specifically, is it possible to condition rights on requirements which the recipient of the right is required to fulfill?  What is the supposed novelty of setting conditions? The law frequently defines rights and eligibilities as such that include restrictions and conditions to their fulfillment, either paternalistic conditions seeking to protect the holder of the right from himself or conditions seeking to protect the public interest. However, the other side of the coin is that imposing conditions on rights raises a concern of weakening those specific rights and eroding the concept of a right until it is turned into a benefit given by the grace of government.
  2. An important distinction that should be drawn at the outset is the distinction between constitutional rights and legal rights. The main concern regarding the conditioning of rights pertains to the conditioning of constitutional basic rights. The liberal doctrine of rights is based on the perception that constitutional basic rights are the individual’s shield against government’s power, and thus they are supposed to be, in the usual case, autonomous of any and all limitations. The history of the democratic fight for rights is tied to the perception that rights are also conferred on those who are not perceived as “normative persons,” violators of law, and those who are not deemed, ever or at the time, to be “model citizens”. On the contrary, many battles for rights were shouldered by those whose opinions outraged others and were a thorn in the side of people in authority.
  3. Does this mean that conditions may never be imposed on constitutional rights? In fact, since I have reached the conclusion that payment of child allowances does not reflect, at least for the time being, a protection of a constitutional right, I am no longer required to answer this question directly, and therefore I will address it relatively briefly. In general, the position regarding the setting of conditions on the exercise of constitutional rights should be suspicious and minimizing. However, attachment of conditions to the exercise of a constitutional right cannot be rejected at the outset and in advance (as distinct from conditions aimed at denying the constitutional right itself), if only because of the perception that rights are relative for the most part, and not absolute, as indicated by the limitation clauses included in the basic laws. For example, exercising the right of access to courts can be made contingent upon payment of a fee (subject to exceptions guaranteeing that the payment of the fee does not bar persons without means from conducting legal proceedings). (See for example, LCA 3899/04 The State of Israel v. Even Zohar [2006] IsrSC 61(1) 301, 319-321; LCA 2146/04 The State of Israel v. The Estate of The Late Basel Naim Ibrahim [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 865, 868; M.C.M. 457/01 Karlitz v. The Officer of the Elections for the City of Beer Sheva 1998 [2001] IsrSC 55(3) 869, 872)). Similarly, the income assurance allowance, which is generally the legal manifestation of the constitutional right to a dignified human existence, can be contingent upon the requirement to “exhaust earning capacity.” In both cases, the conditions are not “foreign” to the purpose of the relevant rights considering that the payment of a fee assists in making sure that the use of the right of access to the courts will not lead to inefficient use of the important public resource of the judicial system, and that the requirement to exhaust earning capacity contributes to the proper use of the limited resource of support for those who cannot ensure their basic sustenance.
  4. In any event, the case before us falls within a different category: the conditioning of legal rights vis-à-vis the State (by virtue of legislation, as distinct from super-statutory constitutional basic rights). Because the conferral of rights pursuant to the law is supposed to also serve public interests and public policy, the conferral of this type of right is often accompanied by conditions. Below I will refer to standards which should guide the legislature, and later the court, in outlining the proper framework for the conditioning of legal rights.
  5. Presumably, the conditioning of rights available to individuals vis-à-vis the State does not necessarily raise a constitutional difficulty. We should remember that the law often defines rights and eligibilities as such that include restrictions on and conditions to their fulfillment. The aforesaid notwithstanding, in practice the imposition of conditions on legal rights may also be problematic on the constitutional level, when the essence of the condition is a waiver of a constitutional right. For example, conditioning of a legal right, such as eligibility for an allowance, on the recipient’s waiver of his right to freedom of speech or his right to freedom of religion and conscience is problematic even though, theoretically, the government may choose not to grant such an allowance at all. The reason for this is concern about an indirect limitation of constitutional rights. In American constitutional law, the accepted term for discussing the problem of eligibilities given by the government based on a (supposedly voluntary) waiver of constitutional rights is the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. (See for example: Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144 (1968); Allen Redlich, Unconstitutional Conditions on Welfare Eligibility, Wis. L. Rev. 450 (1970); Richard A Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989); Cass Sunstein, Is There An Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 337 (1989); Brooks R. Fundenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 371 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quamire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 Fla. ST U. L. Rev. 913 (2006); Renee Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Board, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 775 (2007); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 Va. L. Rev. 479 (2012)). We are not bound, of course, by the details of this doctrine, and some aspects of its scope and application are still in dispute in American law itself. Nevertheless, it does indicate the caution necessary in conditioning legal eligibilities, which may indirectly violate constitutional rights. In this spirit, and without exhausting discussion in the matter, I wish to present primary relevant considerations in examining such conditioning. As I will clarify below, these considerations will ultimately be included in the formal constitutional examination performed within the context of the limitation clause.
  6. Relevance of the Condition and its Affinity to Eligibility – Essentially, conditions to eligibility are supposed to have a relevant connection to the policy the eligibility is intended to promote. In order to clarify the nature of the discussion, let us consider two hypothetical examples that may be discussed in relation to framing the eligibility for income assurance allowances: first, conditioning eligibility for receipt of the allowance on the applicant not having a bad traffic record; second, conditioning eligibility on the applicant’s active desire to re-join the employment circle by visiting the employment bureau each week. Our intuition suggests that the second condition is legitimate, as it is consistent with the purpose of the income assurance allowance and it comports with the public interest underlying it—the re-integration of a person who has been excluded from the employment circle, while providing a last residual protective net on the way there. (Hassan Case, in paragraphs 6-7 and 57). The translation of this intuition into a legal principle tells us that the condition should derive from the same legal circle within which the conditioned right is operated. In other words, the purpose of the condition and the public interest promoted through it must be derived from the same normative field in which the conditioned right is rooted. The weaker the connection between the two becomes, the more the conditioning becomes constitutionally illegitimate. For example, although there is no dispute that eradicating driving violations and creating a system of incentives to promote this are desirable from perspective, these have absolutely nothing to do with eligibility for income assurance allowance. The purposes underlying each of these arrangements are foreign to one another. This foreignness indicates the arbitrariness of the conditioning and the flaw in combining them with each other. Sometimes, the question of the relevance of the conditioning may also be examined with respect to the question of whether the condition is paternalistic and seeking to promote the best interests of the holder of the right himself, or a condition seeking only to protect a wide public interest. Sometimes, of course, the conditioning of the right may encapsulate more than one reason within it.
  7. An auxiliary test that may assist in examining the nature of the affinity and the connection between the purpose of the condition and the conditioned right focuses on the date the condition was imposed and the legislative history behind it. Generally, insofar as the condition was imposed on or about the time the right was granted, the conditioning will be classified as part of the definition of the right and delineation of its scope. Insofar as the condition is added, or should we say “pasted,” at a later date, adding it should be deemed as external conditioning of the normative content of the right. This is of course merely an auxiliary test and no more. Situations can also be conceived where a new statutory eligibility is “born” with an attached foreign and inappropriate condition.
  8. Without making a final determination, an example seemingly close to our case is the birth grant given by the State, which is contingent on the mother having chosen to give birth in a hospital and not in her home. (Sections 42-43 of the National Insurance Law). In this context too, the State wishes to help the mother but at the same time promotes a public policy that the delivery will take place in the hospital, which is, as the State and professionals perceive it, in the best interests of the mother and the newborn as well as in the best interests of the public as a whole. In addition, the condition attached to the eligibility is in affinity the general purpose of the eligibility, promoting the welfare of the mother and her family.
  9. Voluntary Choice – A distinction must be made between voluntary conditions, which give the individual freedom of choice, and conditions that refer to inherent identity characteristics that a person is unable to change or that it would be inappropriate to require him to change (such as religious or national origin). The importance of this consideration cannot be exaggerated. Conditioning rights on a requirement that contradicts identity characteristics will, by its nature, cause difficulties, and raise a heavy suspicion of discrimination. Obviously, between the extreme situations of full choice on the one hand, and coercion and lack of choice on the other hand, there may be interim situations in which the incentives that accompany the choice affect whether the condition violates a right. 
  10. Scope of Conditioning – Another consideration that should be taken into account concerns the scope of conditioning: that is, the extent of exposure of the right to the restricting power of the condition. In this context, both the scope of coverage of the condition and whether it applies to the entire right or perhaps only to part of it are significant. Similarly, it may be examined whether the condition pertains to an addition to an existing eligibility, or perhaps results in the derogation therefrom.

Imposition of Conditions on Rights: From the General to the Particular

  1. The application of these standards to the case before us makes clear that the Amendment in our case does not create an arbitrary connection between a legal right and the promotion of a public interest.
  2. Pertinence of the Condition and its Affinity to Eligibility – The State grants child allowances to everyone (in other words, over and above what is required for the purpose of guaranteeing the right to a dignified human existence of children who grow up in conditions of poverty) in order to promote the welfare of the families who raise children and the children who are raised by them in particular, including the promotion of their health, alongside other public purposes. Thus, in this case, the conferral of the right to receive a child allowance was made contingent upon a condition that has a direct and unequivocal affinity to the purpose for which the right was conferred in the first place; the condition is based on an opinion of independent professionals who indicate that the best interests of children and of society require that they be vaccinated. In these circumstances, in which the right to the allowance is contingent upon a condition that is directly and clearly entwined with the best interests of its beneficiary, it is not difficult to hold that the condition is pertinent. The child allowances are not only granted in order to provide for the children, but for their welfare, including other basic rights they have such as education and health.
  3. Indeed, an inspection of the comparative law may serve as a basis for the argument that a condition that links the acceptance of children to schools and their vaccination expresses a stronger affinity between the condition and the right than as distinguished in our case where eligibility for child allowances was made contingent upon their vaccination. However, in practice, and following further inspection, this argument is unconvincing. De facto, the only difference between the American conditioning model and the Israeli conditioning model is the time the children’s vaccination condition was imposed, not the intensity of the link between the condition and the eligibility. Both models see the need to protect the children themselves and the need to protect those who come into daily contact with them. However, the Israeli legislator wished to move up the date of the condition that incentivized children’s vaccination as a preventive measure, and thereby make redundant the future dilemma with which health policy makers in the United States and Canada are dealing, namely, when parents are required to enroll their children in the education system. In addition, earlier vaccination of infants appears to be more effective from a preventive medicine standpoint, and if so, it is more logical to create an incentive to vaccinate the children at an earlier stage, prior to sending them to the education system. In fact, insofar as the main purpose is to prevent the infection of other children, it makes sense to make the connection to the time of entrance into the educational institution. However, insofar as the purpose is the promotion of the best interests of the children themselves, an earlier date is preferable.
  4. Some of the arguments advanced by petitioners attempted to undermine the assumption that conditioning the allowances indeed promotes the children’s health and their general welfare. One argument made before us on this issue is that there are views that vaccination of children does not serve their best interests and that the route of natural immunity is preferable. A second argument raised in this context is that conditioning the right to child allowance constitutes “double punishment” of the relevant children. First, they are not being vaccinated and thus their health is compromised. Second, the State does not pay their parents the full child allowance amount, and thus their welfare is also harmed. These arguments should be dismissed. The first argument, pertaining to the uselessness of vaccination for the children’s health cannot be accepted because of the factual basis underlying it. The medical opinion underlying the vaccination policy is a solid one supported by many studies. The petitioners’ arguments regarding the existence of other approaches have their due respect, but the formulation of national policy is supposed to be based on the position of the professional bodies of the government, founded on studies and examinations. Nothing in the petitioners’ arguments undermines the firm basis underlying the policy, at least for the time being. The second argument should also be dismissed. This argument is based on the assumption that conditioning part of the eligibility for child allowances on vaccinating the children is merely a sanction and cannot direct behavior. This assumption remains unsubstantiated. Moreover, the Amendment was enacted in a format that inherently attests that it was intended to direct behavior. The reduction of child allowances is not imposed as a sanction in an irreversible manner. This reduction applies only during the period in which the parents are supposed to vaccinate the child with the vaccine they avoided. During the vaccination period the parents receive several notices and warnings on the consequence of failure to vaccinate the children. Furthermore, once the suitable period for giving the vaccine passes, the allowance returns to its regular amount. Thus, it may be said that the Amendment is phrased in a manner intended to create a means for directing behavior, and at least at this stage, there is no reason to believe that it will not succeed to do so. In any event, this cannot be pre-assumed.
  5. Voluntary Choice – The Amendment to the law assumes, in practice, that the impediment to vaccinating children derives from the parents’ choice not to vaccinate, and not from the fact that the State does not guarantee reasonable access for the entire population to this essential service, in terms of both location and cost. The aforesaid is particularly important in view of the fact that one of the petitions before us was filed by Adala Center, which alleged insufficient dispersion of Family Health Center services among the Bedouins in the Negev region. If indeed there was no reasonable access to the vaccination services for the entire population, then the Amendment is problematic because this would mean the denial of eligibility for child allowances is in fact arbitrary and does not in practice promote the purpose of the Amendment. In order to avoid this inappropriate result, the Amendment should be interpreted pursuant to its objective and denial of the eligibility for child allowances should only apply in situations where parents choose not to vaccinate their children, and not in situations in which the parents refrain from doing so due to lack of reasonable access to health services. De facto, the State’s arguments painted a positive picture of improvement in the level of accessibility to Family Health Center services in the Negev region, and the State is presumed to continue to act in this direction. In addition, the State has undertaken, both in writing and orally, that the vaccination fee will be cancelled, so that the cost of vaccination will not be a barrier for those who lack financial means.
  6. Scope of Conditioning – conditioning eligibility for child allowances on the children’s vaccination does not apply to the entire allowance but only to part of it. Failure to fulfill the condition does not deny the entire child allowance (like it does not deny all other means that the social laws in Israel provide for the fulfillment of the child’s right to a dignified existence).
  7. Thus, it may be concluded, at this time, that the imposition of conditions on eligibilities relies on solid foundations, at least when (like in the case before us) the eligibilities discussed are eligibilities pursuant to a law that promote public policy (as distinguished from constitutional rights), the condition set is related to the purpose of granting the eligibility, the fulfillment of the condition depends on the free choice of the relevant party, and especially because the conditioning does not apply to the entire eligibility.

Equality in Granting Eligibilities

  1. The fourth question that should be examined, according to the order of things, also relates to the content of the conditioning, and in this context focuses on the level of equality. The petitioners argue that the Amendment to the law discriminates in issue granting full payment of child allowances between those who vaccinate their children and those who do not vaccinate their children. Is this really the case?
  2. My colleague, Justice Arbel, accepts the petitioners’ argument on this matter, based on the assumption that the condition placed upon the allowance is foreign both to the structure of the allowance and to its purposes (paragraph 49 of the opinion of Justice Arbel). In my opinion, the starting point for the discussion on this issue should be different. In fact, as the discussion on the history of the child allowances makes clear, these allowances embodied several purposes throughout the years, and they are seeking, inter alia, to promote the welfare of children in Israel in general. Examining things from this perspective, it cannot be said that a condition that promotes the vaccination of children in Israel, and thus protects their health (according to the prevailing perceptions in the scientific community), is a condition foreign to the purpose of the allowances (as I explained above in paragraph 48).
  3. Furthermore, it is also possible to observe the matter through a comparison of the children who receive vaccinations and those who are denied vaccinations by their parents. The conditioning of the child allowances expresses the State’s commitment to also care for the latter.
  4. On a wider perspective, an important question hovering in the background is whether whenever the law distinguishes between people or groups, it is right to deem the distinction as a violation of the right to equality, and then to examine through the limitation clause; or whether there are “relevant” distinctions that would not be considered, a priori, a violation of the right to equality. For example, does the payment of child allowances only to parents of children constitute justifiable “discrimination” because it is done for a proper cause and satisfies all other conditions of the limitation clause, or is it a distinction that does not amount to a violation of the right to equality from the outset?
  5. Ultimately, I am of the opinion that a ruling on these issues is not necessary in the case before us because a link exists between the distinction made and the relevant individuals’ autonomy of will. According to the judgments of this Court, the right of equality is constitutionally protected as part of the right to human dignity in those situations where the distinction projects on the individual’s autonomy of will. (See HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 61(1) 619, 680-691; HCJ 7052/03 Adala Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of Interior [2006] IsrSC 61(2) 202, 303-304). Since the Amendment has ramifications for decisions that express the parent’s autonomy of will with regard to the upbringing of their children, even if the Amendment does not violate the autonomy of will, the fact that underlying the distinction is the autonomous choice of the relevant individuals justifies holding that the Amendment violates equality in a manner that requires to examine whether it satisfies the limitation clause.
  6. It is important to add that it cannot be said, based on the data placed before us, that the Amendment imposes a discriminating reality that wrongfully distinguishes between infants from the Jewish sector and infants from the Bedouin sector. Against this argument made by Adala Center the State presented figures (updated as of 2009) in which the rate of unvaccinated Bedouin children (nine percent) is similar to the rate of  unvaccinated Jewish children (seven percent), insofar as we are referring to children between the ages of two and five ( three percent in the Arab sector). In any event, the Amendment should be interpreted in a way that excludes from the condition anyone who wishes to vaccinate his children, but to whom vaccination services are not made reasonably accessible by the State. In this sense, the petitioners’ path will be open to argue against the implementation of the law (as distinct from against its constitutionality) insofar as the access to the vaccination services is not adequately available.

The Amendment to the Law through the Limitation Clause

  1. Based on the above, I wish to discuss the fifth and concluding question: does the Amendment include a violation of a constitutional right, and does this violation, if any, satisfy the constitutional tests of the limitation clause.
  2. Like my colleague Justice Arbel, I showed that the majority of the petitioners’ arguments regarding the violation of constitutional rights are unconvincing. In the absence of a violation of a constitutional right, the discussion ends before it begins, and all that remains is criticism (right or wrong) of a public policy that was embodied in an act of legislation and whose place is in the public sphere. The eligibility for child allowances is part of a welfare policy currently serving the best interests of many children across the country in the immediate future, as well as the best interests of the public as a whole in the long term. However, there is no constitutional right to receive it in one specific form. The State can also care for the welfare of people in general and people living in poverty by paying other allowances and introducing changes to the current allowance policy, which is not “sacred” or “set in stone.” No factual foundation has been laid out before us for the argument that child allowances are essential for the dignified human existence of their recipients, and even more so, no factual foundation has been laid out before us to establish that those who avoid vaccinating their children are people who particularly need these allowances. It should be further noted that in most cases (except when the unvaccinated child is an only child), even parents who refrain from vaccinating their children, whatever their motivations might be, are left with the eligibility for the basic child allowance. They are not denied the latter, but only the increase provided by the Amendment. The strongest argument for a violation of a constitutional right in this case was the argument on the alleged violation of the right to equality. Even if a violation of the right of equality was found, it would satisfy the tests of the limitation clause (pursuant to Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), as I will demonstrate briefly.
  3. Under the circumstances of this case, it can easily be seen that the first three conditions of the limitation clause are satisfied almost prima facie. The classification of the eligibility for child allowances was set in an explicit amendment to the law. The purpose of the law is proper, both in the with respect to the right to health of each one of the children to be vaccinated and with respect to the sense of the national interest of public health. In any case, legislation that promotes such important purposes befits the values of the State of Israel as a state that wishes to promote the welfare of its citizens. Thus, it remains to discuss the question of proportionality, which focuses on the means chosen to achieve the purpose. A proper purpose is not enough; the means chosen to achieve the purpose must also be appropriate, suitable and proportionate.
  4. The first sub-test of proportionality is the rational means test that asks, whether the means chosen are indeed expected to achieve the purpose of the legislation. The answer to this question is positive, as we stated earlier, at least for the time being. A legislative practice of granting monetary incentives (positive and negative) to promote various behaviors, by conditioning various eligibilities (in the areas of taxes and welfare) is a common matter. Underlying each and every one of these acts of legislation is the assumption that incentives direct behavior. There is no reason to believe that things will be different in our case. If different information accumulates later on, the legislature will be required to assess it.
  5. At most, it may be said that the application of the first sub-test of proportionality in the case before us presents the following paradox: the means used (conditioning the eligibility on an act of vaccination) is expected to achieve the purpose, but may achieve it less effectively than harsher means (such as prohibiting acceptance of unvaccinated students to educational institutions). This is why the petitioners characterize the means used as some kind of a “sanction” and not as means of enforcement: because it cannot be guaranteed in advance that the parents will respond to the incentive the conditioning seeks to create. Using a harsher means could have guaranteed the achievement of the purpose with more certainty, but it would have come at the price of a more severe violation of rights, and in this sense would have created more difficulty within the framework of the second sub-test and the third sub-test of proportionality, discussed below.
  6. The second sub-test of proportionality examines whether the chosen means are the less harmful means. It seems to me that the case before us is a clear instance where the act of legislation is based on a careful and meticulous thinking process with regard to the means chosen as compared with other possible alternatives. In the course of deliberation, arguments pointed out alternative methods that were used elsewhere or that might have been used, such as preventing unvaccinated children from studying in educational institutions (as in France and the United States) and imposing punitive sanctions, .It can easily be seen that the majority of these means are actually harsher and more harmful than the route chosen by the Israeli legislature. Preventing unvaccinated children from studying in educational institutions is a very harsh step with regards to the scope of the damage to the children. It also comes at a relatively late point in time considering the optimal age for vaccination according to the policy of the Ministry of Health. Imposing a punitive sanction on people who choose not to vaccinate their children is certainly an offensive step, which does not respect those who are deeply convinced that the vaccination will harm their children. Thus, only the tool of advocacy remains, whose value cannot be exaggerated in this sensitive context in which the parents’ level of conviction is essential to obtaining the goal of wide-scope vaccination. (Compare Michal Alberstein and Nadav Davidowitz “Doctrine of Therapeutic Law and Public Health: An Israeli Study” Mehkarei Mishpat (26) 549, 571-578 (2010)). However, the Amendment to the law was enacted after the advocacy approach failed to produce sufficiently effective results according to the Ministry of Health. It may be added that having said that refraining from vaccinating is a seemingly rational act for the promotion of self-benefit in an environment in which most people are vaccinated, the creation of a monetary incentive (if only limited) to be vaccinated is thinking in the right direction because it creates a counterbalance to the benefit entailed in the decision not to vaccinate. (Compare to the discussion in Parkins’ paper above). Perhaps an incentive that is not directly related to child allowances could have been used, and perhaps this type of an incentive should have been preferred. A “vaccination bonus” or a similar benefit could have been established for parents who vaccinate their children. Practically speaking, there is no significant difference between these two methods because in both cases the result is the denial of a benefit from a family because the parents choose not to vaccinate their children. In conclusion, the petitioners failed to indicate a measure of lesser harm that would have achieved the legislative purpose to a similar extent. (See in this context: Aharon Barak, Proportionality in the Law 399 (2010)).
  7. Another consideration in assessing the existence of alternative means pertains to the fact that the basic Vaccination Program to which the Amendment applies includes vaccinations for diseases whose consequences are very severe on one hand, and the contraction of which cannot usually be prevented through other means on the other hand. This consideration is important seeing as part of the vaccination plans enforced in other countries are aimed at diseases, contracted through sexual relations or blood donations that can also be prevented in other ways. (See Note, Toward a Twenty-First Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1820 (2008); Marry Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B Mandate for Infants and Young Children, 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 39 (2012)).
  8. The third sub-test of proportionality, the narrow proportionality test, examines the appropriate relationship between the means chosen and the purpose, as “the end does not justify all means.” I believe that the Amendment to the law before us also passes this final sub-test relatively easily. The purpose which the Amendment to the law seeks to promote is highly important—promoting the health of young children in Israel, as well as promoting the public’s health in the face of serious diseases that break out during times when vaccination enforcement is lax. The means chosen to promote this purpose—a partial reduction of child allowances for a limited period as a means to encourage parents to vaccinate their children—is relatively mild. In addition, it should be kept in mind that currently the Vaccination Program is limited to only four vaccines (given in one concentrated shot), such that the condition to receiving the allowances is essentially limited. It was further determined that the process is reversible in the sense that once the child is vaccinated or the maximum age for vaccination passes the reduction will be cancelled and the allowance recalculated. Furthermore, the reduction of the allowance was capped and proceedings to contest and appeal the institution’s decision to limit the allowances have also been established. The importance of the purpose alongside the relatively minor harm caused by the sanction, speaks for itself. The relatively minor violation of rights in this case constitutes a counterbalance to the recognition that employing a harsher means could have created a tighter link between the means and the purpose within the first sub-test of proportionality as specified above.

Conclusion: About Rights and the State’s Responsibility

  1. An overview of the petition reveals a fundamental tension between the expectations the various individuals have of the State. On the one hand, there is an expectation that the State minimize its intervention in decisions of its citizens. On the other hand, there is an expectation that the State operate in an active manner to promote the citizens’ welfare. (On the discrepancies between the various expectations from the State, compare Barak Erez, Administrative Law, on p. 54-55; Barak Erez, Citizen-Subject-Consumer, on p. 34-35). The tension that exists between these expectations might lead to a conflict, like in the case before us. When the State takes an active stance with respect to child vaccination, it is intervening in personal decisions. Thus, it is ostensibly intervening in the private sphere. However, the means used by the State in this case pertain to the granting of child allowances, the mere granting of which expresses the State’s involvement in the family sphere. Moreover, intervention in the private sphere is not necessarily bad, particularly when it is done to promote the rights of the weak individuals in the family unit, those whose voice is not always heard—in this case the children whose parents did not act to vaccinate them.
  2. There may be a dispute on the scope of the requirement to vaccinate children and perhaps, over the years, changes will even occur in the perceptions that direct the policy in this area. However, on principal, the starting point with regard to the State’s intervention in promoting children’s welfare does not always have to be suspicious. Essentially, taking an active stance on the issue of child vaccination is not the State riding roughshod over rights, but rather evidence of the State’s commitment to the welfare of the children in Israel, a commitment whose importance cannot be exaggerated.
  3.  

Justice E. Hayut:

  1. I agree with the result reached by my colleagues, Justice E. Arbel and Justice D. Barak Erez, that the three petitions should be denied. Like them, I too believe that the petitioners in each of the petitions did not show a violation of the constitutional right to property or to a dignified human existence, and in this context I saw no need to add to the explanations in my colleagues’ opinions. As for the constitutional right to equality, Justices Arbel and Barak Erez determined that Amendment No. 113 to the National Insurance Law ([Consolidated Version], 5755-1995 (hereinafter, the “Amendment to the Law”) violates the right of equality, but further held that despite this violation, the petitions should be denied because the violation satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. My route to the same result is different. For the reasons I will specify below, I believe that the petitioners in the three petitions failed to show a violation of the right to equality. However, before we examine the question whether the right to equality has been violated, we should inquire what is the group of equals that should be referred to in this context.
  2. One of the arguments raised by the petitioners in HCJ 7245/10 is the argument that the right to child allowances a right conferred upon the child and not his parents. (compare CA 281/78 Sin v. The Competent Authority under Nazi Persecution Disabled Persons Law, 5717-1957 [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 408) and thus the relevant group of equals is the group of children who were given the right to the allowances specified in the National Insurance Law when they came into the world. According to this approach, the essence of the violation of the constitutional right to equality is that, with regard to the child allowances, it is improper to distinguish between children who were vaccinated and those who were not vaccinated. On the contrary, this type of distinction, it is argued, constitutes a double harm to the children: not only did their parents fail to vaccinate them, but the allowance for which they are eligible is reduced because of it. This argument is captivating but it appears to have no real basis in the provisions of the law. Section 66 of the National Insurance Law states that “an insured parent is eligible for a monthly child allowance under this chapter for each child.” This indicates that the right set forth in the law is the parent’s right, provided that the child for whom the allowance is paid is in the custody of that parent. (See Section 69 of the National Insurance Law). Another provision that supports this conclusion that the right to the allowance set in the National Insurance Law is the right of the parent and not the child, is Section 68(b) of the National Insurance Law, which determines a differential payment of the allowance for each of the children in the family according to the birth order. It is obvious that such differential payment is improper if the right to the allowance is the child’s right, since there is no justification to discriminate between the children with regard to the extent of social support they will receive from the State, based only upon the time they were born relative to the other children in the family. In contrast, if the allowance is the parent’s right, it makes sense and is justified to consider, with regard to the social support the cumulative amount available to the family, and therefore setting different allowance amounts for children, based on their birth order does not constitute discrimination. It should further be mentioned that in the past, a tax, in various amounts and under various conditions, was imposed on the child allowances, treating them as parents’ income. (See for example: Taxation of Allowance Points Law (Temporary Provision), 5744-1984; for support of the continuation of child allowances taxation policy see Yoram Margaliot “Child Allowances” Berenson Book Second Volume – Beni Sabra 733 (Editors, Aharon Barak and Haim Berenson, 2000); and for a historical review of child allowance taxation see paragraphs 8-15 of the opinion of Justice D. Barak Erez). The National Labor Court has also adopted the opinion that the person eligible for the child allowance is the parent and not the child. (See NIA 1117/04 Azulai v. The National Insurance Institute (November 2, 2006)). The starting point in examining the question of discrimination raised in the petitions before us is that the right to child allowance is the parents’ right, and that the parents therefore constitute the relevant group of equals.
  3. Does the Amendment to the law, which is the subject matter of the petition, discriminate between the different groups of parents?

“The obligation to act with equality means giving equal treatment to equals and different treatment to those who are different.” (See, for example, HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, paragraph 35 (June 14, 2010) (hereinafter, “Yekutieli Case”)). Since the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the right to equality has been recognized as part of the person’s right to dignity in the sense that discrimination, even if it is unaccompanied by humiliation, will be deemed as a violation of the constitutional right to equality which enjoys the constitutional protection conferred under the Basic Law. (HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 61(1) 619, paragraphs 40-43 of the opinion of President Barak (hereinafter, “re: MQG Case”)). The obligation not to discriminate, which is imposed first and foremost on government authorities, is nothing but a mirror image of the person’s right to equality; therefore, a law that discriminates between equals in the aforementioned aspects may be invalidated as unconstitutional, unless the violation of equality can be justified as a violation that satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause in Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

The uniqueness of the petitions before us is in that the petitioners are not arguing that it is unjustified to prefer the group of vaccinating parents over the group of non-vaccinating parents; they focus their arguments instead solely on the manner in which the legislature has chosen to express this preference. For example, the arguments of two out of the three groups of petitioners (in HCJ 7245/10 and HCJ 8357/10) make clear that they consider it very important that the population of children will indeed receive the MMRV vaccine according to the Ministry of Health’s vaccination program (hereinafter, the “Vaccination Program”), and they also deem it justified to set a policy that incentivizes parents to give their children this vaccine, in order to protect the general population from spreading of dangerous epidemics. The petitioners in HCJ 908/11 argue that the effectiveness of the vaccines is uncertain, but they do not argue that simply creating an incentive to vaccinate the children creates an irrelevant and unequal distinction, and focus their arguments on the discrepancy they believe exists between this distinction and the objective of the child allowance. It appears that there is no dispute that the State is entitled, and perhaps even obligated, to use the means available to it to maintain public health, and that according to the medical data in the State’s possession (the accuracy of which the petitioners in HCJ 908/11 dispute), the Vaccination Program is effective and essential in the prevention of dangerous diseases. From this derives the conclusion that the legislature is allowed to treat the group of parents who vaccinate their children differently than the group of parents who do not vaccinate their children, and from the arguments in all three petitions it is clear that had the legislature chosen, for example, to give a monetary bonus to the parents who vaccinate their children rather than reduce the allowance for those who do not vaccinate their children, the petitioners would have had no argument regarding a constitutional violation of the right to equality. In other words, the petitioners do not dispute the fact that the legislator may give different treatment to each of the aforesaid groups, and that it is permitted to do so, inter alia, through an economic incentive.                

  1. Does the fact that the economic incentive enacted by the Knesset was incorporated into the child allowance mechanism by way of reducing the allowance (a negative incentive) cause, in itself, a violation of the constitutional right to equality?

Justice Arbel believes that the purpose of the child allowances is to help fund the families’ expenses in raising children, and thus the denial of a part of the allowance for reasons unrelated to the number of children in the family “would be foreign to the allowance, and therefore violate the right to equality.” (Paragraph 49 of her opinion). Justice Barak Erez believes that the “strongest argument, relatively, of a violation of a constitutional right in this case was the argument on the alleged violation of the right to equality,” and although she doesn’t explicitly determine that such a violation indeed exists and or indicate what makes it strong, she holds that “in any event, even if a violation of the right to equality was found, it would satisfy the tests of the limitation clause.” (Paragraph 61 of her opinion, and see also paragraphs 57-58 of her opinion).

I disagree.

The fact that the legislature amends an existing law, and at the same time creates a new distinction between the groups of those entitled to receive all rights pursuant to the amended law, does not, in itself, constitute a violation to equality, unless we believe that the groups designated as entitled persons in the original law must never be changed. It appears to me that such a rigid approach is uncalled for, and it seems that the question that ought to be examined in this context, like in other cases in which we try to identify wrongful discrimination, is whether the new distinction between the groups of entitled persons created by the law in its amended form treats equals differently. The common method in case law to identify the “group of equals” whose members are entitled to equal treatment is to examine the “objective of the law and essence of the matter, the fundamental values of the legal system, and the special circumstances of the case.” (See for example HCJ 6051/95 Rekant v. The National Labor Court [1997] IsrLC 51(3) 289, 346; HCJ 3792/95 National Youth Theater v. The Minister of Science and Arts [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 259, 281; AA 343/09 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. The City of Jerusalem, paragraph 41 of the opinion of Justice Amit (September 14, 2010)). In other cases it was stated that the question of whether this is a prohibited discrimination or a permitted distinction will be examined according to the “accepted social perceptions,” (HCJ 721/94 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. V. Danilowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749, 779; HCJ 200/83 Watad v. The Minister of Finance [1984] IsrSC 38(3), 113, 118-119; MQG Case, in paragraph 27 of President Barak’s judgment). The fundamental values of our legal system recognize legislative models in which the legislator incorporates into a law intended for a specific main objective, secondary objectives intended to promote important social purposes, even if there is not necessarily a tight link between them and the main objective of the law. For example, the main purpose of the Income Tax Ordinance is “[to] ensur[e] income for the public authority’s treasury,” but the legislature has also used the ordinance and taxation provisions to promote additional social purposes through which “[S]ociety fights phenomena that are perceived as negative. It encourages acts that it wants to encourage and deters acts it wants to prevent.” (Aharon Barak “Interpretation of Tax Law” Mishpatim 28, 425, 434 (1997); For example, see HCJ 2651/09 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Minister of Interior, paragraph 31 of Justice Danziger’s opinion (June 15, 2011)). The above also applies to customs laws intended mainly, to increase the State’s income, but at the same time serving additional purposes including the “regulation of the demand and the protection of local production and products.” (CA 2102/93 The State of Israel v. Miron Galilee Industrial Plants (MMT) Ltd. [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 160, 167). The objective of the National Insurance Law is to “guarantee proper means of existence for the insured, their dependents and survivors, whenever their income is reduced or disappears for one of the reasons set by the law.” (CA 255/74 The National Insurance Institute v. Almohar [1974] IsrSC 29(1), 11, 14). However, this law, like the other acts of legislation mentioned, promotes additional social purposes as well, such as incentivizing the social and public interest of delivering children in hospitals rather than at home (Section 42 of the National Insurance Law), performing amniocentesis for pregnant women aged thirty-five to thirty-seven (Section 63 of the National Insurance Law), and encouraging the integration of disabled persons into the workforce. (Section 222C of the National Insurance Law; and see in general, Abraham Doron “The Erosion of the Insurance Principle in the Israeli National Insurance: The Effect on the Functioning of the Israeli Social Security Scheme” Social Security 71, 31 (2006)).                   

  1. Does each additional social purpose promoted by a law necessarily violate the constitutional right to equality by discriminating with respect to its general purpose? Of course not. The main question that ought to be examined in this context is not what is the relationship between the general purpose of the existing law and the additional purpose the legislator is seeking to promote, but whether, according to the general tests set in the Rekant Case and other cases which we mentioned above, the legislator has wrongfully discriminated between equals for the promotion of such purpose. For example, it was held in the past that granting tax benefits that are not based on pertinent distinctions or criteria is constitutionally discriminatory and wrongful. (Former) President Beinisch articulated this as follows:

            Granting of tax benefits is tantamount, in economic terms, to granting public funds to selected individuals. Although it is true that the State does not directly transfer funds to taxpayers (and therefore it is commonly deemed as indirect support), essentially, the indirect support is tantamount to charging all taxpayers with tax payment, and in the second stage repaying it to selected individuals only. Such a distribution of public resources, without criteria, constructs a reality in which selected individuals are preferred over others, despite the fact that there is no relevant difference between them. This amounts to a blunt disrespect for a person’s equal status before the law.

            (HCJ 8300/02 Nassar v. The Government of Israel, paragraph 46 (May 22, 2012) (hereinafter, “Nassar Case”) From the positive one can deduce the negative: the tax benefits intended to direct social behavior, although they do not directly derive from the objective of income tax, are not wrongful in themselves, unless they give preference to a group which is not relevantly different from another group.

  1. The petitioners focused on the main purpose of the child allowances, i.e. the provision of social-financial support to those who are parents of children (this purpose also underwent many changes over the years, as arises from the comprehensive review of the legislative history in this regard, specified in the opinion of Justice Barak Erez). Based on this purpose, the petitioners argued that the relevant group of equals is all of the insured, as defined in Section 65(a) of the National Insurance Law, who are parents of children.

Indeed, this probably was the purpose of the child allowances on the eve of the Amendment to the law. However, the legislature has now revealed its view that it wishes to add a secondary purpose, which will affect a certain derivative of the increased allowance set in the Amendment (up to NIS 300 per family)—increasing  the rate of vaccinated children in the population in order to promote the health of children and the public. As far as the normative ranking, this additional purpose does not differ from the objective of the child allowances before the Amendment, and in this sense the former purpose has neither priority nor exclusivity for the purpose of defining the relevant groups of equals. Because the normative ranking is identical, the examination of the argument of discrimination with regard to the Amendment to the law is different from an argument of discrimination in regulations or procedures of the executive authority, in that we are often required to examine the latter in reference to the purpose of laws ranking higher on the normative ladder. (See for example HCJ 9863/06 Organization of Fighter Leg Amputees v. The State of Israel – The Minister of Health, paragraphs 11-14 (July 28, 2008); HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. The Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221, 240-242; HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. The Minister of Defense [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94, 108-110). On the constitutional level, it has been held in the past that legal provisions are discriminatory with respect to the purpose of the same law when a distinction irrelevant to the purpose for which the law was intended was made. (Nassar Case, paragraphs 39-42, 50-52 of the opinion of (former) President Beinisch; Yekutieli Case, paragraph 39 of President Beinisch’s opinion. In these cases, it was a law whose clear purpose pertains to a wide group, but whose clauses were “hiding” conditions that reduce its applicability to a specific group. (On hidden discrimination, see for example HCJ 1113/99 Adala Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164, 175; HCJ 1/98 Cabel v. The Prime Minister of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 241, 259-262). This is not the case here. The Amendment to the law which is the subject matter of this petition has altered the purpose of the child allowance in the sense that, similar to the tax legislation which promotes various public purposes, it includes the purpose of incentivizing child vaccination, incidental to promoting its general purpose as articulated above.       

  1. This does not complete the examination of the violation of the constitutional right of equality. As aforesaid, the group of equals is defined not only with respect to the purpose of the law, but also with respect to the essence of the issue, the fundamental values of the legal system, the special circumstances of the case and the prevailing social perceptions. Had the legislature sought to add to the child allowance scheme another purpose that created a distinction between groups that are not relevantly different from one another pursuant to these tests, such an addition would have violated the constitutional right to equality. For example, had the distinction been between groups, the belonging to which does not depend on choice but rather derives from various characteristics of the parents, it would have been justified to wonder whether these characteristics are relevant, according to the fundamental values of the legal system and the prevailing social perceptions. In such a theoretical case, it could not have been argued that the purpose of the Amendment to the law is to promote proper behavior of the parents, and it would have therefore been necessary to deeply examine whether there is indeed a relevant distinction that would justify preferring one group over the other. In addition, regarding the aspect of providing an incentive—positive or negative—for certain behaviors, it should be examined whether the distinction between the various behaviors justifies a distinction between the legal consequences that accompany them in accordance with the tests established in case law. However, in the case before us, not only did the petitioners not support the argument that these are equal groups according to the acceptable tests accepted in case law in this context, but, de facto, they agreed that this is a distinction between groups that may justifiably be treated differently because it is necessary to protect public health, at least according to the studies held by the Ministry of Health. Hence my conclusion that in this case, the distinction set forth by the Amendment to the National Insurance Law between parents who vaccinated their children and parents who refrained from doing so, with regard to the reduction of a set amount of child allowance, does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right of equality of the parents who chose not to vaccinate their children.
  2. In HCJ 7245/10, an argument was raised on the discrimination of the Bedouins in the Negev based on the fact that this sector’s access to Family Health Center services is very limited and this sector consequently finds itself in an impossible situation where it has no access to vaccines and yet is being told to vaccinate. In my opinion, this argument does not establish constitutional grounds for a violation of equality; and insofar as it indeed transpires that pursuant to the Amendment any child allowance belonging to a parent who wished to vaccinate his child but was unable to do so due to lack of suitable access to a Family Health Center was reduced, this would, in my opinion, be a good argument to raise in the contestation and appeal proceedings set forth in Sections 68(i) and 68(j) of the National Insurance Law. Without addressing the argument on the merits, it should be noted that while these petitions were being deliberated, the respondents acted to increase access to Family Health Centers in the Bedouin sector in the Southern District (see details in paragraph 62 of the opinion of Justice Arbel), and the respondents have also presented figures that show that the vaccination rates in this sector are similar to the rates in the other sectors. Therefore, the discrimination argument insofar as it was raised with regard to the Bedouin sector should be rejected in this case.
  3. Before concluding and, I would like to make two notes. One pertains to the nature of the reduction contemplated in the petition. Unlike my colleague, Justice Barak Erez (paragraphs 37-53 of her opinion), I believe that a reduction of child allowances by a set amount as a result of failing to vaccinate according to the Vaccination Program is a sanction and not conditioning. As I understand it, there is an obvious difference between the reduction set by the Amendment to the law and the conditions set forth with regard to eligibility for child allowances, including: the child’s presence in the State of Israel, the child’s age is below eighteen (Section 65(a) of the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5755-1995), the child is, generally, in the custody of an eligible parent (Section 69 of the National Insurance Law), and the parent is an “Insured” within the definition of Section 65(a) of the National Insurance Law. These and others are conditions to the receipt of child allowances, which guarantee that the allowance will be given to families whose characteristics fulfill the purpose of the child allowance. However, the nature of the reduction set by the Amendment to the law is different from these conditions in several respects. First, the amended law grants an increment to the allowance and alongside such increment also determines that certain amounts of this increment will be deducted from the allowance paid to the parent if the required vaccine is not given by the date set forth in the Vaccination Program. In the words of the provision, if the child is not vaccinated “the monthly child allowance paid for him will be reduced by the sum of NIS 100.” (Section 68(d)(1) of the National Insurance Law; the emphasis has been added). A “reduction” is, as its name suggests, the denial of a right that has been granted, and therefore, it seems that the words of the law and the mechanism chosen support the viewpoint that this is a sanction. Second, this is a reduction that is intended to motivate parents to vaccinate their children using a negative economic incentive that denies part of the allowance amount due to conduct that is inconsistent with the goal the legislature seeks to promote. Such a negative economic incentive bears, by its essence and purpose, the characteristic of a sanction and has a punitive hue that is directed against someone who chooses to jeopardize the health of his children and the health of the general public. In view of my position that we are faced with a sanction and not conditioning, I did not deem it necessary to address the doctrine and the auxiliary tests, which my colleague chose to develop at length in her opinion, with respect to the issue of conditioning. I will further note in this context that the position that we are faced with conditioning was not raised by any of the litigants, and in any event was not discussed and deliberated in the petitions at bar. For these two reasons, I believe this issue may be left for the opportune moment.
  1. Another remark I would like to make as a side note follows. In my opinion, while the reduction at the center of the petitions neither violates the constitutional right to equality nor other constitutional rights and, thus there is no need to grant the remedy sought in the petitions—invalidating the Amendment to the law which sets the reduction—it is difficult to avoid the impression that in the case at bar, the legislature chose a “shortcut” in order to promote the Vaccination Program of the Ministry of Health. The fact that the legislator chose to enforce an administrative Vaccination Program, set by the Director General of the Ministry of Health (Section 68(d)(3) of the National Insurance Law) through a reduction in child allowances derives mainly, it seems, from considerations of efficiency. These considerations were expressed in the Statements of Raviv Sobel, (Former) Deputy Director of Budgets at the Ministry of Finance, in a deliberation held before the Finance Committee of the Knesset:

            The data presented by Dr. Kedman regarding the ineffectiveness of the criminal supervision . . . PM Oron says that we will send an army of policemen, an army of controllers, and they will get the job done, but we see that this is not working . . . there are worse things for which the State of Israel does not indict people; and if someone thinks that the criminal tools are those through which all problems can be solved, just like they discovered around the world that this is not the way, it also became clear in Israel that this is not the way. Criminal tools are not enough. Therefore, certainly, financial incentives are also a tool.

            (Minutes of the Finance Committee’s meeting of June 24, 209, on p. 44; Annex 2 to the preliminary response to the petitions on behalf of the Knesset).  

Indeed, it is difficult to dispute the assumption that the imposition of a sanction based on the data relied upon by the authority, without having to confront the difficulties of its execution, makes the sanction highly efficient. However, without derogating from the importance of considerations of efficiency, it may have been proper to also take additional considerations into account. Perhaps, based on such considerations, it would have been appropriate to first enact a law that creates a vaccination requirement before imposing a sanction on its breach, which would also be set out in the same law. In other words, perhaps it would have been appropriate to take the statutory “highroad” and to regulate the entire issue of vaccination in a single act of legislation. In this context, it is noteworthy that if, for example, a criminal prohibition had been imposed on refraining from vaccinating children it would not have been possible to collect fines imposed on child allowances since national insurance allowances are non-attachable. (Section 303(a) of the National Insurance Law; Section 11 of the Tax Ordinance (Collection); and see also, Pablo Lerner “On the Attachment of Salaries in the Israeli Law”, Hapraklit [48] 30, 46 2005); David Bar Ophir, The Procedure and Case Law of Execution 893-894 (Seventh Edition, 2012)). Furthermore, the right to child allowances is a central and basic social right. This was expressed in both the petitioners’ arguments and in deliberations of the Knesset’s Finance Committee. For these reasons, and for other reasons that can be raised in this context, I believe that it would be appropriate to consider the use of other means to promote the proper purpose of encouraging child vaccination, such as through granting a positive economic incentive to those who vaccinate, or alternatively, through the use of different sanctions. In any event, because I have not found that the manner in which the legislature has acted violates a constitutional right, I concur with the result reached by my colleagues, Justices Arbel and Barak Erez, that the three petitions should be denied.

 

The conclusion of the judgment as per the opinion of Justice E. Arbel.

 

Issued on this date, 26 Sivan 5773 (June 4, 2013).

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United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village

Case/docket number: 
CA 6821/93
Date Decided: 
Thursday, November 9, 1995
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law was adopted by the Knesset in 1992, as part of an attempt to rehabilitate Israel’s agricultural sector following a severe economic crises. To that end, the law established a body called the “rehabilitator,” which was granted broad authority to settle, restructure and cancel debts that had been created up to the end of 1987. In 1993, the Knesset found it necessary to intervene again, and amended the law. Among other changes, the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993, redefined the debts subject to the law, and extended the applicable time period so that debts incurred until the end of 1991 also fell within the scope of the law and the authority of the rehabilitator.

 

Following the adoption of the Primary Law, but prior to the adoption of the Amending Law, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Section 10 of the Basic Law stated that the Basic Law “shall not affect the validity of any Law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.

 

CA 6821/93 concerned a suit brought by the appellant in the District Court against the respondents who had guaranteed the debt of the Cooperative Agricultural Fund Ltd. The respondents requested that the matter be transferred to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator, in accordance with the Amending Law. The Court granted the request. The appellants argued on appeal that the Amending Law violated their property rights under s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and was contrary to s. 8 of that Basic Law, which establishes that there shall be no violation of rights under the Basic Law except “by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required, or by regulation enacted by the virtue of express authorisation of such Law.”

 

LCA 1908/94 concerned debts incurred by the appellants for the rental of agricultural equipment. The District Court held that the provisions of the Amending Law that extended the period of debts were incompatible with s. 8 of the Basic Law and were void. While the Amending Law served a proper purpose, the Court found that it applied selectively to a part of the public and was therefore incompatible with the values of the State of Israel.

 

LCA 3364/94 addressed the District Court’s decision to reject the request of the appellants to transfer their matter to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator. The Court found that the debt had been incurred in 1988 and thus did not fall within the scope of the Primary Law. The stay of proceedings and the transfer of the debt to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator were a result of the Amending Law. The Court held that the Amending Law infringed creditors’ rights beyond what was established in the Primary Law. While the Primary Law was immune to review under the provisions of s. 10 of the Basic Law, those provisions did not apply to the Amending Law, which was, therefore, subject to review under s. 8.

 

The three cases represented the first instances in which Israeli courts annulled a law passed by the Knesset on the grounds of unconstitutionality due to a violation of fundamental rights established in a Basic Law. Inasmuch as the three cases raised the same fundamental questions of constitutional law, the appeals were heard together before an expanded bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court.

 

In deciding the appeals, the Supreme Court was called upon to address the questions of whether or not the Knesset possessed constituent authority to frame a constitution and limit its own legislative authority thereby, and whether Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset enjoy supra-legislative status. After establishing the place of Basic Laws in the legislative hierarchy and the ramifications of a conflict between regular legislation and Basic Laws, the Court addressed the specific issue of whether the Amending Law violated rights established under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and whether the violation was incompatible with s. 8 of that law, and the consequences of such a violation.

 

Each of the nine judges wrote a separate opinion. The primary approach of the Court is set out in the opinion of President Barak. According to President Barak, the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution derives from the doctrine of constituent authority. The Knesset derives its constituent authority from the First Knesset by means of constitutional continuity. This view of the Knesset’s constituent authority best reflects the national consciousness and legislative history of the State of Israel. The Knesset, therefore, acts in two capacities. It enacts laws as a regular legislature, and it adopts Basic Laws in its capacity as constituent assembly. Basic Laws so enacted enjoy supra-legislative, constitutional status. Judges Bach, Goldberg, Levin, Mazza, Tal, and Zamir concurred in their separate opinions.

 

Former President Shamgar based the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution upon constituent authority deriving from the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty. It is the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty that underlies its authority to frame a supra-legislative constitution that can limit the legislative power of future Knessets.

 

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cheshin agreed that the First Knesset was granted the power to frame a constitution, but argued that the First Knesset’s constituent authority was not transferable, and it was not transferred to subsequent Knessets. Moreover, According to Cheshin, J., constituent authority must be unequivocal, yet Court precedent and Israel’s legislative history do not reflect such a clear view of the Knesset’s authority, and the legislative history of the Basic Laws does not support a conclusion that the Knesset believed it was adopting legislation of a constitutional nature in enacting them.

 

The Court unanimously held that although the Amending Law violated the property rights of creditors, the provisions of the Amending Law were consistent with the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The appeal in CA 6821/93 was therefore dismissed, and the appeals in CLA 1908/94 and CLA 3363/94 were upheld and the decisions of the District Court were set aside.

 

(Per Shamgar, P.) The Basic Law did not infringe pre-existing laws, but applies only to laws adopted following its entry into force. The Amending Law was adopted following the entry into force of the Basic Law.

 

Two primary theories explain the Knesset’s power to enact legislation of a constitutional nature: The theory of unlimited sovereignty and the theory of constituent authority. Of theses two theories, that of unlimited sovereignty more accurately expresses Israel’s legislative history, its accepted legal concepts, and the case law of the Supreme Court.

 

The Knesset has the power to enact laws of every type and content, and can formally or substantively entrench the fundamental values of the State of Israel, and thereby limit its own power and that of subsequent Knessets. The extent of the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a question of constitutional policy. Both the theory of unlimited sovereignty and that of constituent authority recognize the Knesset’s power to limit itself.

 

In terms of preferred law, a Basic Law should be changed only by another Basic Law. In this regard, a distinction must be drawn between changing a right as opposed to infringing it. An infringement does not change the basic right.

 

(Per Barak, P.) The Knesset’s power to adopt a constitution derives from its constituent power. The source of the Knesset’s constituent power is the sovereign, that is, the people. This approach can be grounded upon three models: 1) constitutional continuity, 2) the recognition rule, 3) the best explanation for the socio-historical and legal history of the system.

 

Regardless of the legal situation that existed following the dissolution of the First Knesset, and even if there never was a Constituent Assembly, Israeli law currently recognizes the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution. This is supported by the Knesset’s understanding of its role, the platforms of the various political parties, the consensus of opinion of jurists and legal scholars, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the Knesset’s reaction to those decisions.

 

Due to the fact that a Basic Law is of a higher normative level, it can only be changed by another Basic Law.

 

In wielding its constituent power, the Knesset can limit its authority to change Basic laws, and thus create “rigidity” of constitutional provisions. The Knesset’s power to limit itself and thus entrench the provisions of a Basic Law derives from its authority to adopt a formal constitution.

 

The theory of constituent power addresses the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit its own power when wielding constituent power, but it does not provide an answer to the question of whether the Knesset can limit itself when it employs its normal legislative power. This question can be left for further review. We can also leave for further review the question of whether there is a substantive difference between the entrenchment of a regular law that requires an absolute majority, as opposed to a provision requiring some greater majority.

 

True democracy recognizes the constitutional power to entrench basic human rights against the power of the majority. This limit upon majority rule does not infringe democracy, but rather realizes it. Granting the majority the power to harm the rights of the minority is undemocratic. Protecting the individual, the minority, and the fundamental values of the legal system against the power of the majority is the democratic act.

 

A democracy of the majority alone that is not accompanied by a democracy of values is but a formal, statistical democracy. True democracy limits the power of the majority in order to protect society’s values.

 

The human rights defined in the Basic Laws in absolute terms are relative rights. Human dignity, liberty, property, movement, privacy and freedom of occupation are not absolute rights, but can be infringed in order to preserve the social framework. The constitutionality of the infringement does not diminish the constitutional status of human rights. The constitutionality of an infringement means that a regular law that meets the conditions established by the constitution can infringe a constitutionally protected human right.

 

When the Basic Laws do not state the remedy for the infringement of a constitutional right, legal tradition provides the conclusion that the remedy for an unconstitutional law is abrogation by the courts.

 

A law is presumed to be constitutional, and a party seeking to challenge that presumption bears the burden of proof. As for the constitutionality of an infringement, the burden falls to the party arguing that the infringement is constitutional. This is the appropriate approach, as it places the burden upon the party best suited to bear it, viz. the state. However, inasmuch as the issue does not arise in the case before the Court, it can be left for further review.

 

(Per Cheshin, J.) In addressing the question of whether the Knesset possesses constituent power, a distinction must be drawn between the power to adopt a formal constitution and the power to adopt entrenched laws. The power to adopt entrenched laws does not, in and of itself, imply constituent power.

 

When the Constituent Assembly – the First Knesset – completed its term without adopting a constitution, the Knesset’s right to adopt a constitution in accordance with the Declaration of Independence ceased. The only continuity that was preserved was in regard to legislation, not constitutional issues. The Constituent Assembly’s authority to adopt a constitution was a one-time, non-transferable power.

 

The Knesset does not have constituent authority, nor does it enjoy unlimited sovereignty. The Knesset is the Knesset, and it possesses only legislative authority.

 

Insofar as the Knesset’s power to limit itself, a distinction must be drawn between procedural limitation by requiring a special majority, and substantive limitation.

 

Once the Knesset has established legislative procedures, it must follow those procedures until it expressly repeals them and replaces them with new procedures. The establishing of new procedures must be carried out in accordance with the old procedures. In other words, the Knesset is limited by the procedures that it establishes in regard to legislative procedure.

 

The question of quorum and that of voting are matters of organizational procedure. The voting rules are established in Basic Law: The Knesset, which establishes that the Knesset decides in accordance with the democratic principle of majority and minority, and that the votes of absent and abstaining members are not counted. In the absence of a constitution that establishes otherwise, the Knesset can decide upon any combination of the variables of quorum, absentees and abstainers, and any combination will be legitimate and legal. The one limitation is that of the principle of democracy. The basic democratic principle of “majority” must be preserved.

 

A requirement of an absolute majority of sixty-one votes is not only consistent with the majority principle it is the principle itself. An absolute majority is not a special or privileged majority, but rather it is the true majority derived from the democratic theory of majority. A requirement of an absolute majority is not an instance of self-limitation. Such a requirement limits the possibility of abstention or setting off, but the ability to abstain or to arrange a set off is not one of the elected representative’s rights.

 

In the current legal regime, and in the absence of the power to adopt a constitution, a provision requiring a majority greater than sixty-one votes is manifestly undemocratic. A sixty-one vote majority is the upper limit, and in establishing anything beyond that the Knesset deviates from its authority.

 

The power to abrogate Knesset legislation should be reserved exclusively to the High Court of Justice. The doctrine that applies to secondary legislation is not appropriate to primary legislation.

 

Once it has been shown that a law infringes a basic right, the burden of proof falls to the party claiming that the law is constitutional. The presumption that the law is constitutional applies to the secondary evidentiary burden, as opposed to the burden of proof that must be born by the governmental authorities.

 

(Per D. Levin, J.) The Basic Laws constitute chapters of the Israeli constitution. The framers of Israel’s Declaration of Independence intended that legislation be effected on two parallel levels: A constitution to be adopted by the constituent authority, which would express the fundamental human rights on the basis of the vision of Israel’s prophets, and the regular, day-to-day legislation to be conducted by the legislature.

 

The Declaration of Independence indicates that the source of the Knesset’s authority to adopt a constitution is its constituent power. The fact that there have been delays in the process of adopting a constitution since the election of the Constituent Assembly does not change or influence the source of the legislature’s authority in advancing constitutional legislation. Constituent power continues to exist until the task of adopting a constitution is completed.

 

The party claiming the infringement of a basic right or who challenges the lawfulness of a law due to such infringement bears the burden of showing that a constitutionally protected basic right was infringed. If that burden is met, then the burden of showing that the law meets the justifying conditions passes to the party seeking to uphold the law.

 

(Per Zamir, J.) The Knesset’s power to limit itself, both formally and substantively, derives from its status as a constituent assembly. The theory of constituent power provides an adequate theoretical explanation and a practical tool for the Knesset and the Court to address constitutional issues, and is the preferable theory.

 

(Per Bach, J.) In principle, there is no difference between a requirement of a sixty-one-vote majority to amend or repeal a law and a more extreme requirement. A law is adopted by a regular majority of those participating in the vote. Absence or abstention is the right of every Knesset member. If the Knesset is not empowered to adopt constitutional legislation, and if a subsequent Knesset can repeal any law by the normal means, then it is difficult to understand why a law requiring a sixty-one-vote majority would be an exception.

 

The fear of negative phenomena that may materialize in the future by recognition of the Knesset’s unlimited power to employ Basic Laws to limit the power of subsequent Knessets to change or amend Basic Laws is more theoretical than real. It may be assumed that in a proper democracy, certain things will not occur.

 

The question of who bears the burden of proof is very relevant to the question of whether the Amending Law meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and should be addressed. Once established that the law infringes the right to property, it is necessary to ask who must bear the burden of showing that the law meets the requirements of the Basic Law.

 

A law that infringes liberty or property or some other basic right is not presumed, a priori, to be void, and it will not be deemed void unless proven otherwise. The presumption must be that a law has been duly enacted, unless it is shown that it infringes a basic right and does not meet the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law. Anyone claiming that a law should be declared void must convince the court of the facts of the infringement and show that the law does not meet the conditions set out in the Basic Law.

 

(Per Tal, J.) The case before the Court does not require that the Court decide upon the fundamental questions regarding the powers of the legislature and its status, and they may be left for the appropriate time. For the purpose of the matter before the Court, it is sufficient to establish the normatively superior status of the Basic Laws by which the Knesset’s regular legislation is reviewed.

 

(Per Goldberg, J.) Harmony amongst the branches of government requires drawing a “red line” between judicial review of legislation and involvement in legislation. The court must be careful not to cross the line. The court is not a substitute for the legislature, and it does not supplant the legislature’s discretion with its own. Therefore, only a finding that the legislature did not meet the conditions of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty requires that a law be declared unconstitutional. Any other intervention by the court would blur the borders required by the separation of powers.

 

In examining the constitutionality of a law, the presumption is that the law is constitutional, and any doubt must weigh in favor of upholding the law rather than voiding it. Therefore, the party arguing against the law must bear the burden of proof that the law is unconstitutional. That party must show that the law extremely deviates from the scope of a reasonable infringement intended for a proper purpose. The burden also includes the secondary evidentiary burden of showing that there is a specific alternative that would realize the proper purpose while inflicting substantially lesser harm to the protected right.

 

(Per Mazza, J.) In terms of the burden of proof, the state bears the burden of convincing the court that the infringement is intended for a proper purpose, and that the means chosen are appropriate to achieving that purpose. The party claiming that the infringement is unconstitutional bears the burden of showing that the government should have chosen a less harmful alternative. However, it is not clear that this must always be the case. It may be that this is the correct approach only in regard to economic harm, whereas the infringement of other basic rights may justify placing the entire burden upon the state.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 
CA 6821/93

LCA 1908/94

LCA 3363/94

 

United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.

 

v.

1.         Migdal Cooperative Village

2.         Bostan HaGalil Cooperative Village

3.         Hadar Am Cooperative Village Ltd

4.         El-Al Agricultural Association Ltd.                                                 CA 6821/93

 

1.         Givat Yoav Workers Village for Cooperative Agricultural Settlement Ltd

2.         Ehud Aharonov

3.         Aryeh Ohad

4.         Avraham Gur

5.         Amiram Yifhar

6.         Zvi Yitzchaki

7.         Simana Amram

8.         Ilan Sela

9.         Ron Razon

10.       David Mini                                                                            

 

v.

 

1.         Commercial Credit Services (Israel) Ltd

2.         The Attorney General                                                                      LCA 1908/94

 

1.         Dalia Nahmias

2.         Menachem Nahmias

 

v.

 

Kfar Bialik Cooperative Village Ltd                                                           LCA 3363/94

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals

[November 9, 1995]

Before: Former Court President M. Shamgar, Court President A. Barak, Justices D. Levine, G. Bach, A. Goldberg, E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, Y. Zamir, Tz. E Tal

Appeal before the Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals

 

Appeal against decision of the Tel-Aviv District Court (Registrar H. Shtein) on 1.11.93 in application 3459/92,3655, 4071, 1630/93 (C.F 1744/91) and applications for leave for appeal against the decision of the Tel-Aviv District Court (Registrar H. Shtein) dated 6.3.94 in application 5025/92 (C.F. 2252/91), and against the decision of the Haifa District Court (Judge S. Gobraan), dated 30.5.94 in application for leave for appeal 18/94, in which the appeal against the decision of the Head of the Execution Office in Haifa was rejected in Ex.File 14337-97-8-02. The applications were adjudicated as appeals.

The appeal in CA. 6821/93 was rejected. The appeals in LCA 1908/94 and 3363/94 were accepted, and the files were returned to the District Courts to continue adjudication.

 

 

Editor’s Synopsis

 

The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law was adopted by the Knesset in 1992, as part of an attempt to rehabilitate Israel’s agricultural sector following a severe economic crises. To that end, the law established a body called the “rehabilitator,” which was granted broad authority to settle, restructure and cancel debts that had been created up to the end of 1987. In 1993, the Knesset found it necessary to intervene again, and amended the law. Among other changes, the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993, redefined the debts subject to the law, and extended the applicable time period so that debts incurred until the end of 1991 also fell within the scope of the law and the authority of the rehabilitator.

 

Following the adoption of the Primary Law, but prior to the adoption of the Amending Law, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Section 10 of the Basic Law stated that the Basic Law “shall not affect the validity of any Law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.

 

CA 6821/93 concerned a suit brought by the appellant in the District Court against the respondents who had guaranteed the debt of the Cooperative Agricultural Fund Ltd. The respondents requested that the matter be transferred to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator, in accordance with the Amending Law. The Court granted the request. The appellants argued on appeal that the Amending Law violated their property rights under s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and was contrary to s. 8 of that Basic Law, which establishes that there shall be no violation of rights under the Basic Law except “by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required, or by regulation enacted by the virtue of express authorisation of such Law.”

 

LCA 1908/94 concerned debts incurred by the appellants for the rental of agricultural equipment. The District Court held that the provisions of the Amending Law that extended the period of debts were incompatible with s. 8 of the Basic Law and were void. While the Amending Law served a proper purpose, the Court found that it applied selectively to a part of the public and was therefore incompatible with the values of the State of Israel.

 

LCA 3364/94 addressed the District Court’s decision to reject the request of the appellants to transfer their matter to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator. The Court found that the debt had been incurred in 1988 and thus did not fall within the scope of the Primary Law. The stay of proceedings and the transfer of the debt to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator were a result of the Amending Law. The Court held that the Amending Law infringed creditors’ rights beyond what was established in the Primary Law. While the Primary Law was immune to review under the provisions of s. 10 of the Basic Law, those provisions did not apply to the Amending Law, which was, therefore, subject to review under s. 8.

 

The three cases represented the first instances in which Israeli courts annulled a law passed by the Knesset on the grounds of unconstitutionality due to a violation of fundamental rights established in a Basic Law. Inasmuch as the three cases raised the same fundamental questions of constitutional law, the appeals were heard together before an expanded bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court.

 

In deciding the appeals, the Supreme Court was called upon to address the questions of whether or not the Knesset possessed constituent authority to frame a constitution and limit its own legislative authority thereby, and whether Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset enjoy supra-legislative status. After establishing the place of Basic Laws in the legislative hierarchy and the ramifications of a conflict between regular legislation and Basic Laws, the Court addressed the specific issue of whether the Amending Law violated rights established under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and whether the violation was incompatible with s. 8 of that law, and the consequences of such a violation.

 

Each of the nine judges wrote a separate opinion. The primary approach of the Court is set out in the opinion of President Barak. According to President Barak, the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution derives from the doctrine of constituent authority. The Knesset derives its constituent authority from the First Knesset by means of constitutional continuity. This view of the Knesset’s constituent authority best reflects the national consciousness and legislative history of the State of Israel. The Knesset, therefore, acts in two capacities. It enacts laws as a regular legislature, and it adopts Basic Laws in its capacity as constituent assembly. Basic Laws so enacted enjoy supra-legislative, constitutional status. Judges Bach, Goldberg, Levin, Mazza, Tal, and Zamir concurred in their separate opinions.

 

Former President Shamgar based the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution upon constituent authority deriving from the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty. It is the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty that underlies its authority to frame a supra-legislative constitution that can limit the legislative power of future Knessets.

 

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cheshin agreed that the First Knesset was granted the power to frame a constitution, but argued that the First Knesset’s constituent authority was not transferable, and it was not transferred to subsequent Knessets. Moreover, According to Cheshin, J., constituent authority must be unequivocal, yet Court precedent and Israel’s legislative history do not reflect such a clear view of the Knesset’s authority, and the legislative history of the Basic Laws does not support a conclusion that the Knesset believed it was adopting legislation of a constitutional nature in enacting them.

 

The Court unanimously held that although the Amending Law violated the property rights of creditors, the provisions of the Amending Law were consistent with the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The appeal in CA 6821/93 was therefore dismissed, and the appeals in CLA 1908/94 and CLA 3363/94 were upheld and the decisions of the District Court were set aside.

 

 

(Per Shamgar, P.) The Basic Law did not infringe pre-existing laws, but applies only to laws adopted following its entry into force. The Amending Law was adopted following the entry into force of the Basic Law.

 

Two primary theories explain the Knesset’s power to enact legislation of a constitutional nature: The theory of unlimited sovereignty and the theory of constituent authority. Of theses two theories, that of unlimited sovereignty more accurately expresses Israel’s legislative history, its accepted legal concepts, and the case law of the Supreme Court.

 

The Knesset has the power to enact laws of every type and content, and can formally or substantively entrench the fundamental values of the State of Israel, and thereby limit its own power and that of subsequent Knessets. The extent of the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a question of constitutional policy. Both the theory of unlimited sovereignty and that of constituent authority recognize the Knesset’s power to limit itself.

 

In terms of preferred law, a Basic Law should be changed only by another Basic Law. In this regard, a distinction must be drawn between changing a right as opposed to infringing it. An infringement does not change the basic right.

 

(Per Barak, P.) The Knesset’s power to adopt a constitution derives from its constituent power. The source of the Knesset’s constituent power is the sovereign, that is, the people. This approach can be grounded upon three models: 1) constitutional continuity, 2) the recognition rule, 3) the best explanation for the socio-historical and legal history of the system.

 

Regardless of the legal situation that existed following the dissolution of the First Knesset, and even if there never was a Constituent Assembly, Israeli law currently recognizes the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution. This is supported by the Knesset’s understanding of its role, the platforms of the various political parties, the consensus of opinion of jurists and legal scholars, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the Knesset’s reaction to those decisions.

 

Due to the fact that a Basic Law is of a higher normative level, it can only be changed by another Basic Law.

 

In wielding its constituent power, the Knesset can limit its authority to change Basic laws, and thus create “rigidity” of constitutional provisions. The Knesset’s power to limit itself and thus entrench the provisions of a Basic Law derives from its authority to adopt a formal constitution.

 

The theory of constituent power addresses the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit its own power when wielding constituent power, but it does not provide an answer to the question of whether the Knesset can limit itself when it employs its normal legislative power. This question can be left for further review. We can also leave for further review the question of whether there is a substantive difference between the entrenchment of a regular law that requires an absolute majority, as opposed to a provision requiring some greater majority.

 

True democracy recognizes the constitutional power to entrench basic human rights against the power of the majority. This limit upon majority rule does not infringe democracy, but rather realizes it. Granting the majority the power to harm the rights of the minority is undemocratic. Protecting the individual, the minority, and the fundamental values of the legal system against the power of the majority is the democratic act.

 

A democracy of the majority alone that is not accompanied by a democracy of values is but a formal, statistical democracy. True democracy limits the power of the majority in order to protect society’s values.

 

The human rights defined in the Basic Laws in absolute terms are relative rights. Human dignity, liberty, property, movement, privacy and freedom of occupation are not absolute rights, but can be infringed in order to preserve the social framework. The constitutionality of the infringement does not diminish the constitutional status of human rights. The constitutionality of an infringement means that a regular law that meets the conditions established by the constitution can infringe a constitutionally protected human right.

 

When the Basic Laws do not state the remedy for the infringement of a constitutional right, legal tradition provides the conclusion that the remedy for an unconstitutional law is abrogation by the courts.

 

A law is presumed to be constitutional, and a party seeking to challenge that presumption bears the burden of proof. As for the constitutionality of an infringement, the burden falls to the party arguing that the infringement is constitutional. This is the appropriate approach, as it places the burden upon the party best suited to bear it, viz. the state. However, inasmuch as the issue does not arise in the case before the Court, it can be left for further review.

 

 

(Per Cheshin, J.) In addressing the question of whether the Knesset possesses constituent power, a distinction must be drawn between the power to adopt a formal constitution and the power to adopt entrenched laws. The power to adopt entrenched laws does not, in and of itself, imply constituent power.

 

When the Constituent Assembly – the First Knesset – completed its term without adopting a constitution, the Knesset’s right to adopt a constitution in accordance with the Declaration of Independence ceased. The only continuity that was preserved was in regard to legislation, not constitutional issues. The Constituent Assembly’s authority to adopt a constitution was a one-time, non-transferable power.

 

The Knesset does not have constituent authority, nor does it enjoy unlimited sovereignty. The Knesset is the Knesset, and it possesses only legislative authority.

 

Insofar as the Knesset’s power to limit itself, a distinction must be drawn between procedural limitation by requiring a special majority, and substantive limitation.

 

Once the Knesset has established legislative procedures, it must follow those procedures until it expressly repeals them and replaces them with new procedures. The establishing of new procedures must be carried out in accordance with the old procedures. In other words, the Knesset is limited by the procedures that it establishes in regard to legislative procedure.

 

The question of quorum and that of voting are matters of organizational procedure. The voting rules are established in Basic Law: The Knesset, which establishes that the Knesset decides in accordance with the democratic principle of majority and minority, and that the votes of absent and abstaining members are not counted. In the absence of a constitution that establishes otherwise, the Knesset can decide upon any combination of the variables of quorum, absentees and abstainers, and any combination will be legitimate and legal. The one limitation is that of the principle of democracy. The basic democratic principle of “majority” must be preserved.

 

A requirement of an absolute majority of sixty-one votes is not only consistent with the majority principle it is the principle itself. An absolute majority is not a special or privileged majority, but rather it is the true majority derived from the democratic theory of majority. A requirement of an absolute majority is not an instance of self-limitation. Such a requirement limits the possibility of abstention or setting off, but the ability to abstain or to arrange a set off is not one of the elected representative’s rights.

 

In the current legal regime, and in the absence of the power to adopt a constitution, a provision requiring a majority greater than sixty-one votes is manifestly undemocratic. A sixty-one vote majority is the upper limit, and in establishing anything beyond that the Knesset deviates from its authority.

 

The power to abrogate Knesset legislation should be reserved exclusively to the High Court of Justice. The doctrine that applies to secondary legislation is not appropriate to primary legislation.

 

Once it has been shown that a law infringes a basic right, the burden of proof falls to the party claiming that the law is constitutional. The presumption that the law is constitutional applies to the secondary evidentiary burden, as opposed to the burden of proof that must be born by the governmental authorities.

 

(Per D. Levin, J.) The Basic Laws constitute chapters of the Israeli constitution. The framers of Israel’s Declaration of Independence intended that legislation be effected on two parallel levels: A constitution to be adopted by the constituent authority, which would express the fundamental human rights on the basis of the vision of Israel’s prophets, and the regular, day-to-day legislation to be conducted by the legislature.

 

The Declaration of Independence indicates that the source of the Knesset’s authority to adopt a constitution is its constituent power. The fact that there have been delays in the process of adopting a constitution since the election of the Constituent Assembly does not change or influence the source of the legislature’s authority in advancing constitutional legislation. Constituent power continues to exist until the task of adopting a constitution is completed.

 

The party claiming the infringement of a basic right or who challenges the lawfulness of a law due to such infringement bears the burden of showing that a constitutionally protected basic right was infringed. If that burden is met, then the burden of showing that the law meets the justifying conditions passes to the party seeking to uphold the law.

 

 

(Per Zamir, J.) The Knesset’s power to limit itself, both formally and substantively, derives from its status as a constituent assembly. The theory of constituent power provides an adequate theoretical explanation and a practical tool for the Knesset and the Court to address constitutional issues, and is the preferable theory.

 

 

(Per Bach, J.) In principle, there is no difference between a requirement of a sixty-one-vote majority to amend or repeal a law and a more extreme requirement. A law is adopted by a regular majority of those participating in the vote. Absence or abstention is the right of every Knesset member. If the Knesset is not empowered to adopt constitutional legislation, and if a subsequent Knesset can repeal any law by the normal means, then it is difficult to understand why a law requiring a sixty-one-vote majority would be an exception.

 

The fear of negative phenomena that may materialize in the future by recognition of the Knesset’s unlimited power to employ Basic Laws to limit the power of subsequent Knessets to change or amend Basic Laws is more theoretical than real. It may be assumed that in a proper democracy, certain things will not occur.

 

The question of who bears the burden of proof is very relevant to the question of whether the Amending Law meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and should be addressed. Once established that the law infringes the right to property, it is necessary to ask who must bear the burden of showing that the law meets the requirements of the Basic Law.

 

A law that infringes liberty or property or some other basic right is not presumed, a priori, to be void, and it will not be deemed void unless proven otherwise. The presumption must be that a law has been duly enacted, unless it is shown that it infringes a basic right and does not meet the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law. Anyone claiming that a law should be declared void must convince the court of the facts of the infringement and show that the law does not meet the conditions set out in the Basic Law.

 

 

(Per Tal, J.) The case before the Court does not require that the Court decide upon the fundamental questions regarding the powers of the legislature and its status, and they may be left for the appropriate time. For the purpose of the matter before the Court, it is sufficient to establish the normatively superior status of the Basic Laws by which the Knesset’s regular legislation is reviewed.

 

 

(Per Goldberg, J.) Harmony amongst the branches of government requires drawing a “red line” between judicial review of legislation and involvement in legislation. The court must be careful not to cross the line. The court is not a substitute for the legislature, and it does not supplant the legislature’s discretion with its own. Therefore, only a finding that the legislature did not meet the conditions of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty requires that a law be declared unconstitutional. Any other intervention by the court would blur the borders required by the separation of powers.

 

In examining the constitutionality of a law, the presumption is that the law is constitutional, and any doubt must weigh in favor of upholding the law rather than voiding it. Therefore, the party arguing against the law must bear the burden of proof that the law is unconstitutional. That party must show that the law extremely deviates from the scope of a reasonable infringement intended for a proper purpose. The burden also includes the secondary evidentiary burden of showing that there is a specific alternative that would realize the proper purpose while inflicting substantially lesser harm to the protected right.

 

(Per Mazza, J.) In terms of the burden of proof, the state bears the burden of convincing the court that the infringement is intended for a proper purpose, and that the means chosen are appropriate to achieving that purpose. The party claiming that the infringement is unconstitutional bears the burden of showing that the government should have chosen a less harmful alternative. However, it is not clear that this must always be the case. It may be that this is the correct approach only in regard to economic harm, whereas the infringement of other basic rights may justify placing the entire burden upon the state.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

 

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ss. 1, 1A, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11,12

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1992)

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994), ss. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11

Basic Law: The Knesset, ss. 4, 8, 9A, 9A(A), 19, 21 (c), 24, 25, 34, 44, 45, 45A

Basic Law: The Judiciary: ss. 10, 17, 22

Basic Law: The Government: ss. 42, 50 (c ), 50 (d), 56, 56 (d), 59

Basic Law: The Army

Basic Law: The President of the State: s. 25

Basic Law: The State Economy: ss. 3, 7

Basic Law: Israel Lands

Basic Law: The State Comptroller

Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 3)

Basic Law: Jerusalem, The Capital of Israel

 

Legislation Cited

 

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1993.

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1992,
ss. 7(b)(1),11,12,15, 16, 17, 19 (a), 20, 20 (b)(3)(a), 21, 22.

First Schedule, Second Sc hedule, Third Schedule.

Interpretation Ordinance [New Version] ss. 16 (4), 37.

Rules of the Knesset.

Holders of Public Office (Benefits) Law, 1969, s. 1.

Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, ss, 2(b), 7 (a), 9, 9 (b), 10 (a), 11.  

Transition Law, 1949, ss. 1, 2 (a), 2 (d).   

1990 Supervision (Products and Services) (Amendment No.18) Law.

Transition Law, 5709-1949.

The Knesset (Number of Members in Committees) Law 5754-1994.

Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] 1969, s. 86 (e).

Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 1984, ss. 64, 108.

Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law.

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 1949, ss. 1, 3.

Law of Return, 1950.

Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951.

Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 1948, ss. 1,2,(d), 3.

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, ss. 1, 2(d), 3.

Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 1951, ss. 1, 5, 6, 9, 10.

Elections Financing Law, 1973.

Knesset (Confirmation of Validity of Laws), 1969.

Standards Law, 1953.

Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets, 1984, s. 3.

Companies Ordinance (New Version) 1983.

Bankruptcy Ordinance, 1980.

Agency Law, 1965, s. 16.

Emergency Regulations (Jurisdiction Constitution) 1948.

Interpretation Law, 1981, ss. 15, 17 (a), 20.

Planning and Building Law, 1965.

Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version], s. 41.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

  1. LCA 1759/93 Cohen v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 143.
  2. HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Committee of the Knesset [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 118.
  3. HCJ 1/49 Bejerano v. Minister of Police [1948] IsrSC 2 80.
  4. HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90.
  5. HCJ 75/76 ‘Hilron’ Ltd v. Fruit Production and Marketing Board (Fruit Board)  [1976] IsrSC 30(3) 645.
  6. CA 723/74 HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 281; IsrSJ 9 226.
  7. HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 337.
  8. EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections for Eleventh Knesset; Avneri v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83.
  9. HCJ 428/86; HCJApp 320/86; Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6 1.
  10. HCJ 89/83 Levi v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 488.
  11. HCJ 256/88 Medianwest Medical Center Herzliya Ltd v. Director of Ministry of Health [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 19.
  12. HCJ 107/73 ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd [1974] IsrSC 28(1) 640.
  13. HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 794.
  14. HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Knesset  [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 556.
  15. HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13.
  16. FH 9/77 Israel Electric Corporation v. HaAretz Newspaper Ltd [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 337; IsrSJ 9 295.
  17. CF 27/76 Stein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60.
  18. CA 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer [1963] IsrSC 17 2541.
  19. HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4)1; IsrSJ 8 21.
  20. HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60.
  21. HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 259.
  22. HCJ 669/85 Kahana v. Knesset Speaker [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 393.
  23. HCJ 119/80, OM 224/80 HaCohen v. Government of Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(4) 281.
  24. HCJ 3385/93, 4746/92 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1994] IsrSC 48(5).
  25. FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 430; IsrSJ 4 112.
  26. EA 1/88 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177.
  27. CrimA 282/61 Yihye v. Attorney-General [1962] IsrSC 16 633.
  28. HCJ 4031/94 ‘Bezedek’ Organization v. Prime Minister of Israel [1994] IsrSC    48(5) 1.
  29. HCJ 131/65 Sevitzky v. Minister of Finance [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 369.
  30. LCA 7112/93 Tzudler v. Yosef [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 550.
  31. FH 4/69 Noiman v. Cohen [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 229.
  32. HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186.
  33. HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 41(4) 169.
  34. LCA 3466/92 Artrekt Bankrupts v. Bankruptcy Trustee [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 573.
  35. HCJ 852/86; HCJApp 483/86; 1/87 Aloni v Minister of Justice [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 1.
  36. HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 365.
  37. HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 441.
  38. CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 355.
  39. HCJ 243/67 Israel Broadcasting Studios Ltd v. Gary [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.
  40. HCJ 163/57 Lubin v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [1958] IsrSC 12 1041.
  41. HCJ 120/73 Tobis v. Government of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 757.
  42. HCJ 7/48 Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [1953] IsrSC 2 5.
  43. HCJ 10/48 Ziv v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 85; IsrSJ 1 68.
  44. CA 239/92 Egged Israel Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 66.
  45. HCJ 1225/94 ‘Bezeq’ – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 661.
  46. CrimApp 6654/93 Binkin v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 290.
  47. HCJ 5394/92 Huppert v. Yad VaShem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353.
  48. EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3) 365.
  49. HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141.
  50. HCJ 5364/94 Welner v. Chairman of Israeli Labour Party [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 758.
  51. HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Register, Ministry of Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.
  52. HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229.
  53. HCJ 732/84 Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 141.
  54. HCJ 287/69 Miron v. Minister of Labour [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 337.
  55. HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324.
  56. HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 217.
  57. HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 412.
  58. HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC 49(5) 1.
  59. EA 2/88 Ben-Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 221.
  60. CA 673/87 Salah v. Liquidator for Peretz and Issar Construction and Investments Co. Ltd (in Liquidation) [1989] IsrSC 43(3) 57.
  61. CrimA 74/58 Attorney-General v. Hornstein [1960] IsrSC 14 365; IsrSJ 3 71.
  62. CA 549/75 A v. Attorney-General [1976] IsrSC 30(1) 459.
  63. HCJ 761/86 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 868.
  64. CA 450/70 Rogozinsky v. State of Israel [1972] IsrSC 26(1) 129.
  65. HCJ 889/86 Cohen v. Minister of Trade and Welfare [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 540.
  66. HCJ 7/55 Yanowitz v. Ohr [1953] IsrSC 9 1252.
  67. CA 219/80 Beit Hikiya, Workers’ Village for Cooperative Arrangement Ltd v. Efrati [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 516.
  68. CA 87/50 Liebman v. Lifshitz [1952] IsrSC 6 57.
  69. HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. President of Israel [1951] IsrSC 5 801; IsrSJ 1 75.
  70. HCJ 180/52 Dor Heirs v. Minister of Finance [1952] IsrSC 6 908.
  71. HCJ 6290/93 Zilka v. General Manager of Ministry of Health [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 631.
  72. HCJ 491/86 Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Minister of Interior [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 757.
  73. HCJ 356/83 Lidor, Association for the Protection of Homeowners, Apartments and Private Property in Israel v. Minister of Construction and Housing [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 602.
  74. HCJ 108/70 Manor v. Minister of Finance [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 442.
  75. CA 511/88 Mandelbaum v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Rishon LeTzion [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 522.
  76. HCJ 311/60 Y. Miller, Engineer (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport [1961] IsrSC 15 1989.
  77. HCJ 49/83 Consolidated Dairies Ltd v. Israel Dairy Board [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 516.

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

  1. OM (Jerusalem) 1635/92 – unreported.
  2. OM (Tel-Aviv) 1229/93 – unreported.
  3. OM (Tel-Aviv) 49299/88 – unreported.
  4. OM (Tel-Aviv) 1657/89 – unreported.

 

Australian cases cited:

  1. Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214.
  2. Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29.
  3. Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel (1943-44) 68 C.L.R. 261.

 

United States cases cited:

  1. Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
  2. Louisville Bank v. Radford 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
  3. Wright v. Vinton Branch 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
  4. Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
  5. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
  6. Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
  7. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
  8. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
  9. United States v. Baellin 12 S. Ct. 505 (1891).
  10. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
  11. United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
  12. McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
  13. Kovacs v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
  14. New York Trust Co. v. Fisher 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
  15. Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
  16. Rio Rico Properties v. Santa Cruz County 834 P. 2D 166 (1992).
  17. Illinois Elections B.D. v. Socialist Workers Party 440 U.S. 173 (1979).

 

English cases cited:

  1. Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) [1991] ALL ER 70  (C.J.E.C. and H.L. 1).
  2. MaCarthy Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 180 (C.J.E.C.).
  3. Bribery Comr. v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172 (P.C.).
  4. Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [1969] ALL ER 384 (P.C.). 
  5. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319.

 

International cases cited:

  1. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [1979] 2 E.H.R.R.
  2. Costa v. Enel (1964) E.C.R. 585.

.

German cases cited:

  1. 6 BverfGE 32 (1957).
  2. 7 BverfGE 377 (1958).

 

South African cases cited:

  1. Harris v. Minister of Interior (1952) 4 S.A.L.R. 428.
  2. S. v. Mekwanyana (1955) 6 B.C.L.R. 665.

 

Indian cases cited:

  1. Kesavande v. State of Kerala [1973] A.I.R. 146.

 

Canadian cases cited:

  1. R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
  2. R v. Big M. Drug Mart. Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.

 

  1. Jones v. The Queen [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.

 

Jewish law sources cited:

 

  1. Leviticus 26, 10.
  2. Genesis 1, 27; 24, 27.
  3. Deuteronomy 15, 1-11; 27, 9.
  4. Exodus 1, 22; 19, 10-11, 14-20; 16.
  5. Shemot Rabba (on Exodus), 29.
  6. Isaiah 10, 15; 30, 15.
  7. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia (Damages, second part) 106b.

 

.

 

For the appellant in HCJ 6821/93 — M. Asif.

For respondent 1 in LCA 6821/93 — A. Vinder, Z. Slilat.

For respondent 2 in LCA 6821/93 — Z. Moshe.

 

For respondent 3 in LCA 6821/93 — M. Cohen.

For respondent 4 in CA 6821/93 — Y. Amitai.

For petitioners in LCA 1968/94 — D. Dinai, M. Dinai.

For respondent 1 in LCA 1908/94 — A. Posner, E. Golan.

 

JUDGMENT

President (Ret) M. Shamgar

1.    The provisions of the Principal Law.

The central question in each of the appeals before this court is identical: Does the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993 (hereinafter – the Amending Law) violate the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and should it therefore be regarded as void. Consequently, we have consolidated our hearing of the three appeals.

2.  As indicated by its title, the Amending Law amends the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law, 5752-1992 (hereinafter – the Principal Law), which came into force on August 13, 1993.

 

As stated in the Explanatory Note cited in the draft law of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law, 5752-1991, the Principal Law purported to forge a new framework for alleviating the deep crisis that had already beset the agricultural sector a number of years earlier. Generally, its thrust was, on the one hand, to facilitate the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, being premised on the preference of rehabilitation over liquidation, and on the other hand, it avoids the channeling of public funds for purposes of rehabilitation.

 

Legislative intervention in formulating arrangements for the agricultural sector is apparently unavoidable, given the failure of the various arrangements that preceded it.  Its proponents contend that “they left the agricultural sector in a deep crisis and at times even exacerbated the situation” (draft law of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law, p. 92).

 

(b)   The provisions of the Principal Law stipulate that a ‘rehabilitator’ may be appointed for ‘an agricultural organization,’ for agricultural corporations connected thereto, or for ‘agricultural associations’ included in the organization and its members, or for what the law refers to as ‘a rehabilitation zone.’ The ‘rehabilitator’ does precisely that. He is charged with compiling the data pertaining to the debts, ascertaining resources, and settling debts. An ‘agricultural association’ is a cooperative association classified as a moshav ovdim (=workers arrangement), a moshav shitufi (=cooperative arrangement) or a kfar shitufi (=cooperative village). The law further relates to all of the kibbutzim (=collective arrangements) in the Golan, the Jordan Valley, and in the other locations specified in the First Schedule, and the corporations specified in the Second Schedule. An ‘agricultural organization’ is a cooperative association whose members include agricultural associations, as specified in the Third Schedule of the Law.

 

(c )  The Principal Law provided that a proceeding dealing with a basic debt or the guarantee of a basic debt could neither be initiated nor continued save in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned law (s. 7 of the Law). The rehabilitator was to determine both the basic debt and the total sum owed by each agricultural unit, in accordance with the all the information at his disposal. The terms ‘debt’ and ‘basic debt’ were defined in s. 1 of the Principal Law, as follows:

“‘debt’ – principal, linkage differentials, interest, compounded interest, commission and expenses’;

 basic debt – a debt incurred during the period that terminated on the determining date, or a debt incurred in order to pay a debt as stated, or a debt as stated, determined in a judgment, even if given after the determining date, and which is one of the following: (1) a debt of an agricultural association; (2) the debt of an agricultural organization; (3) the debt of an agricultural unit, apart from an agricultural association and an agricultural organization, which stems from his business as an agriculturalist”  emphasis mine – M.S.)

“the determining date” is the 10th Tevet 5748 - 31 December 1987. This means that, in essence, the Law dealt with debts incurred until that date.

 

(d) Where a proceeding was transferred to the rehabilitator as stated, other proceedings being conducted against the same debtor relating to the basic debt will also be transferred to the rehabilitator.

 

(e)   A creditor or debtor in a proceeding for collection of the basic debt or a guarantee for the basic debt may notify the person conducting the proceeding that the provisions of the aforementioned law are applicable to him. If such notice is given, the person conducting the proceeding will order the discontinuation of the proceeding and its transfer to the rehabilitator, if satisfied that the conditions for its discontinuation have been satisfied Where the debtor is an agriculturalist, or member of an agricultural association, he may inform the person conducting the proceeding that he does not desire the application of the provisions of the law.

 

3.    Section 15 of the Principal Law prescribes that if the rehabilitator determines the value of the basic debt of the agricultural unit, he shall deduct a sum equal to twenty percent of the debt. Should the rehabilitator determine in a reasoned decision that special, justifying circumstances obtain, he may reduce an additional sum which may not exceed ten percent of the debt.

 

Section 21 of the Principal Law both adds to and broadens the authority for cancellation of debts:

 

‘“21. Cancellation of Debts:  Where the rehabilitator deems that the debtor is unable to repay his debt even after the realization of his assets under section 20, he is authorized to cancel the additional debts, at a rate that does not exceed forty percent of the debt in arrangement. Where the debtor was an agricultural association which is a border arrangement, a member of the said association, or an agriculturalist resident on the border, the rehabilitator shall cancel the balance of the debt that the debtor is unable to repay.”

 

Regarding the handling of debts, s. 11 of the Principal Law completes the picture, providing the following determinations which the rehabilitator may make for each agricultural unit, in accordance with the provisions of the law: (1) the sum of his debts to the various creditors; (2) his repayment capacity; (3) the sum of the debt that will be paid, either in cash or installments; (4) the sum of the debt by reason of the replacement of the guarantee under section 16 of the Principal Law; (5) the sums of the reductions under the aforementioned s. 15; (6) whether assets are to be realized for payment of the debt; (7) whether part of the debt should be cancelled, and if so, at what rate; (8) the manner in which the debt is allocated between the various creditors, and the manner of allocating the consideration received from realization of assets.

 

Where the rehabilitator determines all of the above, it will be regarded as the arrangement of the agricultural unit’s debt, and the rehabilitator will notify the creditors and the debtors of the balance, to which they may object within thirty days after notice has been given. Where special circumstances obtain, the rehabilitator is permitted to extend the period.  Where an objection is filed, the rehabilitator rules on the debts and rights following a hearing, after which he informs the parties of his decision.

 

Provisions of the Law – The Amending Law

4.The explanatory note to the Amending Law of 5753 (Explanatory Note to Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law 5753-1993), which preceded the Amending Law, summarily states that “in the wake of judgments pertaining to the debt, it became necessary to clarify a number of matters that were stipulated in the proposal….” (ibid p.292)

 

Section 1 of the Amending Law prescribes new definitions for the terms “debt,” “tax debts,” and “total debt” (which in the wake of the amendment were included in section 1 [of the Principal Law], as follows:

“debt” – a financial obligation irrespective of whether its date of payment has arrived or not, including the principal, linkage differentials, interest, compound interest, commission, and expenses, including tax debts; “tax debt” – any sum owed by a person pursuant to any legislation concerning the imposition of tax or compulsory payment that the Finance Minister charged with implementation of collection thereof; “total debt” – the debt of a financial unit as of the 24th Tevet 5752 (31 December 1991) and with respect to an agriculturalist and a member of an agricultural association – any debt as stated, provided that it stem from his occupation as an agriculturalist, provided that regarding a debt owed by a member of an agricultural association to the agricultural association of which he is a member, any debt as stated, unless the agricultural association proves that a particular debt did not stem from his occupation as an agriculturalist

 

In the definition of the “basic debt” the concluding section was amended, and it now states that the aforementioned term includes “a debt that was incurred after the determining date for payment of the debt (in accordance with its definition in the opening part of the said definition – M.S), including as a result of an arrangement or the recycling of the debt.”

 

As mentioned above, s. 7 of the Principal Law deals with the freezing of proceedings, and by force of the Amending Law, it deals with the “total debt” – a term which as stated, was defined anew.  Instead of referring to the basic debt as referred to in the Principal Law, the components of the debt for arrangement were enumerated anew in section 17, as they were amended in the Amending Law, as follows:

 

“The debt for Arrangement:              17 (a)      the rehabilitator will fix the arrangement debt in accordance with the total debt, after having deducted, for purposes of the arrangement, the reductions stipulated in section 15, and having added the guarantee substitute pursuant to section 16, all of the above to be re-valued as of 24th Tevet, 5752 (31 December 1991) (hereinafter – “arrangement debt”).

 

(b)        The reduction will be re-valued in accordance with the consumer price index and the addition of 7% linked annual interest.

 

(c)        The arrangement debt will be re-evaluated until the arrangement date by being linked to the consumer price index, according to the rate of the increase in the index as known on the arrangement date, as opposed to the index for the month of November 1991, and the addition of linked interest as stated, at the rate of 5% per annum.

 

(d)       Where a arrangement debt was re-evaluated pursuant to sub-section (c), all other debts owed by reason of that debt, beginning as of 29 Tevet 5752 (31 December 1991), due to interest, linkage differentials, exchange rate differentials, commissions, and obligations for which any creditor customarily charges all of his debtors, apart from commission for issuing a credit line with those creditors who normally charge such commission – shall be void.”

 

The law also introduced many other additional adjustments that need not be enumerated here.

 

The thrust of the Amending Law is thus expressed in the extension of the period during which the debts incurred are to be handled by the rehabilitator - hence the date 31 December1997 was replaced by 31 December 1991.  It further provided for the reevaluation of debts as stated in the aforementioned definition of “the arrangement debt,” and it introduced additional changes that are not merely technical.

This brings us to the appeal at hand.

 

The Judgment of the Lower Court

5.    In LCA 1908/94, which we treated as if leave for appeal had been granted, application for leave for appeal was filed against the decision of the Tel-Aviv Jaffa District Court (CF 252/92; Motion 5025/92*). The appellants contest the lower court’s determinations as they relate to the provisions of the Amending Law, to the extent that they broaden the rehabilitator’s authority to clarify the debts defined as a “basic debt” and to settle them, while concurrently denying that authority to the court.  The claim is that these determinations do not satisfy the requirements of the limitation clause of section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and are therefore void; and that the appellants’ rental debts for which payment is due after the 31 December 1987 cannot be considered as a basic debt.

 

The proceedings began when the respondent (hereinafter – “Credit Services”) filed a monetary action against the appellants (the moshav and nine of its members), for a debt incurred for the renting of equipment, and a further request for the return of the equipment. The appellants filed an application for a stay of the proceedings and their transfer to the rehabilitator, pursuant to provision 7 (b)(1) of the Principal Law, as per its wording at the time, namely that a basic debt is a debt of an agricultural entity incurred during the period that terminated on 31 December 1987.

 

Credit Services opposed the request, arguing that the claim related to the balance of the debt as of 15 December 1991, as a result of which it could be not be considered as a “basic debt.” The Amending Law was published on 13 August 1993. The Amending Law broadened the provisions of s. 7 so that a stay of proceedings could be sought in respect of a debt that wholly or partly constituted a total debt or a guarantee for a total debt. As mentioned, a total debt is a debt of an agricultural entity as of 21 December 1991. In other words, the requirement to grant an application to transfer proceedings to the rehabilitator extends for an additional four years after time of the amendment. The claim in the case at hand relates to a debt dated 15 November 1991, hence it falls within the period to which the Amending Law applies. Credit Services argued that the provisions of the Amending Law were invalid, and that the court was not obliged to stay proceedings pertaining to the overall debt. Moreover, it was argued that the distinction between a basic debt and a non-basic debt was still valid and relevant for purposes of ruling on the application for a stay of proceedings.

 

Credit Services argued in the lower court and before this court that the Amending Law infringes a right protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and does not satisfy the requirements stipulated in s. 8 which provides that

 

‘There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.’

As stated, the violated right is the right conferred by s. 3 of the Basic Law, which provides that there shall be no violation of a person’s property. In the instant case, the violation affects the creditors, including the Credit Services.

 

Section 10 of the Basic Law provides that the Basic Law will not affect the validity of any law (din) in effect prior to the commencement of the Basic Law, i.e. on 20 Adar Beth 5752 (25 March 1992). The preliminary question addressed by the lower court was, therefore, whether s. 10 also applied to amendments of a law already in effect before 25 March1992, if they came into force after the commencement of the Basic Law. The lower court opined that the legislation of new provisions for existing laws, following the commencement of the Basic Law, is subject to review in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law; this was the legislative intention as evidenced in Basic Law. In this context, the court distinguished between provisions without which the existing law (protected by s. 10) could not be applied, and provisions that constituted a new arrangement, not essential for the continued activity under the existing law. 

 

The court noted that it was inconceivable that the Basic Law protected rights infringed by laws enacted after the Basic Law, but did not offer such protection if the later infringing law was enacted as an amendment of an existing law, and was not essential for the implementation of the existing law. Any other interpretation would render meaningless all the provisions of Basic Laws which restrict the scope for violating a Basic Law, such as s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. According to this test, the Principal Law would be protected by force of s. 10, but that protection would not extend to the aforementioned amendment of 5753 [1993], which actually broadened the infringement of property rights.

 

The District Court further commented that the aforementioned s. 8 is not an entrenched provision of a Basic Law, but nonetheless, a Basic Law by definition enjoys normative supremacy, and all subsequent legislation must adapt itself to the provisions of the Basic Law, in accordance with its limitation clause. This premise yields the conclusion that the court is authorized to examine the consistency of the later law with the Basic Law, and to draw conclusions from its inconsistency with the provisions of the Basic Law. The Amending Law was enacted after the enactment of the Basic Law, and as such, the court is empowered to examine whether its provisions violate a right protected under the Basic Law. Should the answer be in the affirmative, it continues to examine whether the provisions of the Amending Law satisfy the requirements enumerated in s. 8 of the Basic Law. In accordance with that examination the court can determine the constitutionality of the Amending Law.

 

The lower court dismissed the argument of the appellant’s learned attorney, that the Amending Law did not infringe the right of property. He pointed out that the Amending Law broadened the range of creditors included in the purview of the law under discussion, and even broadened the scope of infringed property rights. In doing so, it abrogated the court’s authority to preside over proceedings concerning debts created during four years additional to those stipulated in the Principal Law, ordering instead that they be transferred to the rehabilitator.

 

According to the lower court, just as the Principal Law included far reaching provisions that infringe the property rights of creditors with respect to the basic debt by preventing them from litigating before the court and subordinating them to the rehabilitator’s authority, so too, the Amending Law contains similar, far reaching provisions that infringe the property rights of those creditors included within its purview, for debts created during the four years added on to the years stipulated in the Principal Law. In doing so, the Amending Law negated the right of these creditors to litigate with respect to their property rights in these debts, subordinating them to the rehabilitator’s authority. This is a violation of the creditor’s property rights (LCA 1759/93 Cohen v. Hapoalim Bank Ltd, [1])

 

The lower court held that the infringement of the creditor’s property rights in a debt other than a basic debt finds expression in the duty to transfer the debt for treatment by the rehabilitator, and denying him the option of having it adjudicated in court and of enforcing it in the Execution Office. The infringement is the result of the conferral of authority upon the rehabilitator to spread debt payments and to give instructions to foreclose on the debtor’s assets, thereby limiting the creditor’s right to foreclose on the asset, as he could have done in the Execution Office. The rehabilitator is also authorized to cancel part of the debtor’s debt.

 

This led the court to examine the provisions of s. 8 in order to examine whether the violation of the property right in the Amending Law satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause under s. 8. In doing so, the court erred in its description of the background facts. The District Court mistakenly thought that the Principal Law was not applicable to the entire kibbutz sector. It also deviated from examining the provisions of the Amending Law only, and instead examined the conformity of the Principal Law to the conditions of s. 8 of the Basic Law. The court concluded that comparison of the statute’s provisions to its declared purpose in the Explanatory Note reveals an unexplained and imbalanced preference for that part of the agricultural sector that is governed by the provisions of the Principal Law and the Amending Law, and discrimination against the sector to whom the provisions do not apply. The court ruled that, against the background of the Explanatory Note that presents the law as a panacea for the entire sector, the unexplained preference for a certain sector is inconsistent with the democratic principles of the State of Israel.

 

Instead of ensuring that the financial burden flowing from the provisions of the Principal Law and the Amending Law would be born by the entire public, it was only imposed on part of the public (i.e. on the creditors of debtors belonging to the agricultural sector, to whom the law applies). Placing the burden on only a part of the public creates inequality. The lower court contended that the derogation from contractual undertakings and the duty of keeping promises is anathema to an appropriate societal-value based arrangement. Legislation of this kind is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel.

 

The legislature’s attempt to rescue and rehabilitate the agricultural sector is a commendable goal, but imposing this goal on just a part of the public amounts to the realization of that goal in a manner that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. Regarding the question of whether the Amending Law serves an appropriate purpose, the lower court noted that there was nothing to indicate that broadening the violation of property rights by way of the Amending Law was done for an appropriate purpose, i.e. an objective that could not have been attained by way of the Principal Law.

 

No indication was given of the consideration of other alternatives for achieving that objective, apart from the arbitrary violation of private property. Consequently, it has been neither explained nor proved that the infringement of the Amending Law is to an extent that does not exceed that which is necessary. In the lower court’s view, the absence of balances in the Amending Law and the critical mass of violations of rights, warrant the conclusion that the law is inconsistent with the values of the State and that its infringement exceeds that which is necessary.  

 

Under the above analysis, the provisions of the Amending Law, to the extent that they broaden the rehabilitator’s exclusive authority to examine arrangement debts that are not considered as basic debts, do not fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Accordingly, these provisions are void. In view of this, the court ordered the respondents to present evidence showing that the debt at issue was a basic debt, as defined in the Principal Law (i.e. prior to the commencement of the Amending Law).

 

6.    In CA 6821/93, the lower court adjudicated an action against nine defendants, based on their guarantee to the bank for a debt of the Collective Agricultural Fund Ltd in liquidation). The five respondents filed notice regarding the discontinuation of the action and its transfer to the rehabilitator, in reliance on s. 7 of the Principal Law. In view of the section’s amendment and its coming into force on 13 August 1993, they argued that it would be improper to continue proceedings concerning the debt guarantee, save in accordance with the Amending Law, given that if it was proven to the court’s satisfaction that part of the debt was a guarantee for the total debt, then it would be bound to discontinue the proceedings regarding the guarantee and transfer them to the rehabilitator.

 

The court noted that whereas the debts of the farmers and the members of the agricultural association included in the purview of a total debt are only those which stemmed from the debtors’ work as farmers, this restriction did not apply to an agricultural entity not defined as a farmer and a member of an agricultural association. Any debt of an agricultural entity, which is not a farmer and member of an agricultural association, is a total debt, irrespective of its source and how it was created, provided that it existed on 31 December 1991.

 

It is not disputed that the respondents incurred their debt, the subject of the action, by force of their guarantee to a private company, which was not an agricultural company, and hence its debt was not a total debt. The question requiring our decision is whether the debt of an agricultural entity as of 31 December 1991, which arose from a guarantee for a debt that was not a total debt, is nonetheless a “total debt” for the purposes of the law. According to the definition of the term “total debt” in Amending Law, the answer is in the affirmative. As explained above, a total debt is any debt of an agricultural entity, apart from that of a farmer and a member of an agricultural association of 31 December 1991, regardless of its source.

 

What emerges is that the court’s view was that the statement of claim indicated that the proceeding related to the respondents’ total debt. The proceeding should therefore be discontinued and referred to the rehabilitator. This was the grounds of the appeal before us. It was only upon appeal that the appellant claimed that the Amending Law contravened the provisions of s. 8 of the Basic Law, and that this was grounds for invalidating it.  We therefore joined this appeal to the current litigation.

 

7.    In LCA 3363/94, an application for leave of appeal was filed against the District Court’s decision (LCA 18/94), in which the application for leave of appeal against the decision in Execution File (Haifa) 02-14337-978 was adjudicated as the appeal itself. We adjudicated the application as if it were the appeal itself.

 

In the lower court’s aforementioned decision, it decided not to stay the proceedings against the appellants, not to transfer them to the rehabilitator, and to overturn the decision of the Head of the Execution Office. The court held that the litigation related to a debt that was incurred in 1988. The need to establish a date resulted from the fact that the total debt in the main file was, in the lower court’s view, only vaguely defined. It will be recalled that it referred to “(1) the debt on a particular date, as determined by the rehabilitator…”; and in sub-section (2) “regarding an agricultural corporation – the debt on a particular date as established by the rehabilitator…”. In the lower court’s opinion this definition yielded an unsatisfactory result, because it would in fact lead to discrimination between different categories of debtors (as well as between the different creditors) inasmuch as one standard date was not fixed for all of them. The Amending Law accordingly fixed a standard date for all of the debtors.

 

The court noted that the actual fixing of the date on 31 December1991 in the definition of the total amended debt did not infringe the creditors’ property rights. The basis of the infringement derived from the fact that fixing this date forced the creditors to terminate the proceedings (or not to commence them) with respect to the debt, if it was proven to the satisfaction of the court, the head of the Execution Office, the Registrar or the arbitrator, that the debt under adjudication was either partially or entirely a total debt or a guarantee for a total debt. Under the Principal Law, the proceedings would only be frozen if it were proven that the basic debt was incurred after the period ending on 31 December1987.

 

The court mentioned that from the moment that the proceedings were frozen and transferred to the rehabilitator, the latter was authorized to do the following:

 

1) to rule that the debt would be spread out for payment over a period that would not exceed seventeen years and six months from the date of the arrangement (s. 19 (a) of the Principal Law after its amendment by the Amending Law). The court regarded this as infringing the creditors right to foreclose on their property during the period of debt installments because, had the adjudication not been transferred to the rehabilitator (under the Principal Law), the duration of the installments period would not have been fixed. 

 

(2) Under s. 20 of the Principal Law after its amendment by the Amending Law, the rehabilitator was entitled to order foreclosure on the non-agricultural assets of the debtor, apart from on his residential dwelling, providential funds, and assets for production as specified in ss. (b)(3)(a). The provisions of this section similarly infringe the creditor’s property when they are not consistent with the other rules governing foreclosure, receiving or execution proceedings.

 

There was a similar broadening of the authority to strike out debts at a rate that did not exceed forty percent of the settled debt, and there was a concurrent broadening of the basis for the debts to be settled, which also related to the total debt and not just to the basic debt. It therefore follows that the Amending Law infringes the creditors’ property, above and beyond the provisions of the Principal Law.

 

The commencement date of the Principal Law preceded that of the Basic Law. However, s. 10 of the Basic Law does not relate to legislative amendments enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law, and does not exclude them from the category of provisions that require examination and assessment in accordance with s. 8 of the Basic Law. The normative entrenchment appears in the “limitation clause” of the Basic Law, which restricts the legislature’s authority in accordance with the provisions established therein. Relying on the limitation clause, the court considered itself authorized to declare the invalidity of the law that postdated the Basic Law, and which in the court’s view did not satisfy the conditions stipulated in the limitation clause. In view of the invalidity of the Amending Law, the court ruled that the new final date should be ignored, i.e. 31 December1991, and that the provision in the Principal Law that allowed the rehabilitator to determine a specific date for each single debtor should be restored, (s. 12 of the Principal Law). Consequently, the lower court cancelled the decision of the Head of the Execution Office, and returned the file to the Execution Office instead of transferring it to the rehabilitator. This gave rise to the current appeal.

 

8.    In conclusion, each the three files, briefly summarized above, raise an identical question, namely: What is the legal validity of the Amending Law in view of the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and is the infringement of property therein constitutional?

 

9.    Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

 

(a) The examination of the three files forming the subject of our deliberations will proceed in the following order:

 

(1) Section 10 of the Basic Law provides that nothing in the Basic Law shall detract from the validity of the law that was in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law. Accordingly, we will first examine the application of the Basic Law to an amendment of the existing law, in so far as the Basic Law is not applicable to the existing law itself. Should we conclude that s. 10 of the Basic Law applies to an amendment, it terminates our discussion of the question of constitutionality, because the import of such a conclusion would be that the Amending Law is protected by s. 10, and the substantive provisions of the Basic Law are not applicable to it. Should we conclude that the Amending Law does not fall within the purview of s. 10 then we will proceed to the following stages of examination:

 

(2) At the second stage we will examine the principles guiding constitutional legislation.

 

(3) At the third stage we will examine the application of s. 3 of the Basic Law (protection of property) to the Amending Law.

 

(4) Should we conclude that s. 3 of the Basic Law is applicable to the instant case in the sense that the Amending Law infringes the right of property, we will proceed to the final stage of the examination: We will have to decide whether the Amending Law satisfies the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law, which bears the title “Infringement of Rights,” and which enumerates the conditions for the validity of a law, notwithstanding its infringement of basic rights as evidenced by its provisions.

 

(b)   For clarification of the data, we reiterate that our concern is with an amendment to the Principal Law.

 

The Principal Law came into force on the 12 March 1992. The Basic Law came into force on 25 March 1992, and the Amending Law came into force on the 13 August 1993.

 

In other words, the Principal Law came into force prior to the Basic Law, but the Amending Law was enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law. Our first question will therefore be the question of the application of the Basic Law to the Amending Law.

 

The Application of the Basic Law to the Amendment of the Existing Law

 

(a) Section 10 of the Basic Law provides as follows:

 

     

Validity of Laws          This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.

 

Regarding the applicable law before the effective date of the Basic Law, i.e. 25 March 1992, no question arises in the present context. The Principal Law came into effect on 12 March 1992, admittedly, just a few days before the commencement date of the Basic Law. Nonetheless, the unequivocal wording of s. 10 removes the Principal Law from the category of laws that might be influenced, for good and for bad, by the Basic Law’s provisions. 

 

The question that must occupy us concerns the implications and the influence of the Basic Law on the Amending Law in this case. In terms of the pertinent dates, the picture is simple. The Amendment came into force on the 13 August 1993, i.e. a date following the commencement of the Basic Law. Plainly, therefore, the Amendment is governed by the Basic Law. The Basic Law does not affect the validity of the law in existence prior to its own commencement, from which one can infer that it does apply to all legislation enacted after its commencement, and may even derogate therefrom. The Amending Law did not exist before the commencement of the Basic Law, and so, by the wording of s. 10, the Basic Law is applicable to the Amending Law. Needless to say, this still does not affect the validity of the Amending Law, for even if subject to the Basic Law, it is still necessary to conduct the examination in accordance with sections 3 or 8 of the Basic Law, or both of them.

 

(b)   Firstly, however we will dispose of the more far-reaching arguments, which attempt to support the respondents’ claim that the Amending Law is not governed by the Basic Law despite the fact that it was enacted after it. They claim that a legislative amendment follows the principal law; it relates to its provisions and does not deviate from the principles established therein, irrespective of whether its adjustments and changes are of a practical nature, or on the level of law or principle. The ancillary follows the principal, and an amendment should therefore be regarded as part of the principal law. Just as the principal law is not subject to the Basic Law, so too the amendment at issue before us should be exempt. 

 

Alternatively, it was claimed that there may be cases in which an amendment constitutes a substantive change and innovation in the law, and should be regarded independently. Thus, every amendment must be examined in accordance with its substance. The argument in our case is that the amendment is not a substantive one, and that the Amending Law treats of the same subjects as the Principal Law, of which it forms a part.

 

11.  From a legal standpoint, I cannot accept the arguments treating of the application of s. 10 to the Amending Law as cited above, that are intended to persuade us that the Basic Law does not apply to the Amending Law. Furthermore, the proposed hypothesis also raises numerous practical difficulties.

 

The innovation of the Basic Law was its establishment of criteria for the examination of the constitutionality and validity of a law. It created new, substantive criteria, unprecedented, apart from the beginning of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. It established norms for the examination of the contents of a law, and subjected all governmental agencies to the duty of abiding by those norms. Needless to say, the court, too, is a governmental agency, serving as the judicial branch, which is one of the three branches of government under our constitutional structure (HCJ Flatto Sharon v. Knesset Committee, (hereinafter the Flatto Sharon case, [2], at p. 141).

 

The legislature drafted s. 10 because it was aware that laws enacted prior to the Basic Law contradicted it. The legislature did not wish a sudden upheaval of the existing law, preferring legal stability. In its view, the existing law required systematic, cautious examination, assessment and screening, prior to subjecting it to the norms of the Basic Law. This process is not required with respect to a statutory amendment, just as it is not required with respect to a new law. The legislative stage is the appropriate stage for the examination and assessment of new legislation or statutory amendment, in terms of consistency with the protection of human rights afforded by the Basic Law, as is the legislature’s custom with draft laws. 

 

A principal law and a statutory amendment exist in their own right. The legislative authority deliberates over any statutory amendment from the time of its inception, just as it examines all primary legislation. Indeed, each of its provisions operates as primary legislation irrespective of its substantive connection to the provisions of the existing law. Adoption of a statutory amendment that refers to existing legislation, instead of enacting separate and independent legislation lacking a substantive connection to the existing legislation, results from the desire to organize the law in a rational, organized manner, concentrating all of the provisions treating of a particular matter in consolidated legislative frameworks, and preventing contradictions between them. The old and the new are connected both nominally by their title, and substantively, in terms of their content, but in terms of their validity, the law presenting the amendment is valid in its own right, as a separate, independent legislative act, deriving its power directly from the legislature’s act. The attachment of the amending statute to the amended statute is expressed primarily by the statute’s title, but does not reflect the essence of the amendment. An amendment may be technical or formal, effecting no substantive change, or it may amend – and change – the existing law. In other words, the title of the amendment does not attest to its content, but rather to the desire to create organized legislative frameworks, all dealing with a defined issue under the same rubric.

 

Establishing distinctions and differences in accordance with the contents of an amending law generally creates dilemmas and anomalies. Needless to say, even a seemingly technical, formal amendment may have far reaching consequences in terms of its substantive results. Consider, for example, emergency economic measures enacted for a period of three months, that have been extended by an amending law for a period of five years. There can be no doubt regarding the change in the meaning and implications of the amendment in comparison with the principal law, despite the fact that the change was ostensibly just an extension of validity of an existing provision.

 

13. Summing up: The above leads to a double conclusion that derives from the wording, the essence and purpose of the Basic Law: (a) In terms of its wording, we observed that the Basic Law states that its provisions do not affect the validity of the law in force prior to its coming into effect. This means that a law that was not in force prior to the coming into force of the Basic Law, but only thereafter, will not be subject to the reservation regarding the inapplicability of the Basic Law. If s. 10 does not apply, it means that the legislature’s plain and simple intention is that the criteria of the Basic Law, and the human rights safeguards therein, must be complied with..

 

(b)   In terms of its purpose, the Basic Law attempted to maintain the existing law, at this stage, but did not extend its aegis to new law, by which it would have divested itself of its content and purpose. Adoption of a rule that the application of s. 10 to new law would be assessed in accordance with the law that existed prior to the Basic Law would mean that the adornment of any new law with the title of a statutory amendment would suffice to exempt it from the application of the Basic Law. Needless to say, on a practical level, this would present no problem. The totality of laws is sufficiently broad to accommodate the placement of all new legislation in the formal framework of the existing law. However, this approach would be inconsistent with both intention and the act of the legislature, which created the Basic Law to be complied with, and not to be divested of content. The presumption is that the legislature does not waste words, nor enact a law, especially not a Basic Law, in vain.

 

The bottom line is that a statutory amendment, like any other statutory provision, is a separate, new legislative act, to which the non-application clause of s. 10 of the Basic Law does not apply.

 

14.  As a matter of practice too, we must establish clear demarcation lines, rather than be drawn into vague distinctions. An attempt to determine the degree of substantive innovation in a statutory amendment, and its new implications for the entire legal system would give rise to unending litigation and interpretation. Instead, a simple and unequivocal boundary must be established, based on the date of the amendment. The water-shed date is the date of adoption of the Basic Law.

 

In other words, as explained above, it would be a particularly onerous undertaking to conduct a separate substantive examination of the contents of each provision of each and every statutory amendment, and even of the component parts of each provision (because, conceivably, an innovation may derive from part of the provision). On a practical level, such a proposal would trigger endless legal debate and prevent establishing clear, sharp legal distinctions. It would contribute to legal uncertainty, rather than achieve the desired opposite result..

 

The import of legislation must be clear and readily intelligible in terms of its content and implications, and should not be complicated by leaving it open to a debate – which would be imperative in each and every case – upon the applicability of the normative limitations in the Basic Law.

 

15.  In view of this I think that the Amending Law is subject to the provisions of the Basic Law.

 

16.  Having ruled that the Basic Law applies to the Amendment, the first imperative is an examination of the classificatory principles governing the various forms of legislation. Inter alia, this involves discussion of the status of the Basic Law in our legal system, and the status of regular legislation in the light of the various forms of constitutional legislation. We will now proceed to examine the guiding principles that determine the various legislative formats and the distinctions among them.

 

The Connection Between a Regular Law and a Basic Law

17.  The need to examine legislative principles stems from our conclusion that the Amending Law – being a regular law rather than a Basic Law – is not exempt from the scope of application of the Basic Law. We must examine the question of the standing of a regular statute enacted after the Basic Law came into force, if its provisions appear to infringe rights protected under the Basic Law. As stated, our concern is with a statutory amendment that is a regular law, and not a Basic Law, and that does not specifically state that it violates a protected right.

 

Our examination will proceed from the general to the specific. In other words, the subject will first be addressed on a theoretical level, beginning with a discussion of the fundamental legislative structure. For the moment, I will avoid expressing an opinion on whether the specific statutory amendment under discussion contravenes the Basic Law.

 

Following this, we will proceed to the second stage, and examine the status and significance of the Basic Law applicable in the instant case – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

At the third stage we will apply our conclusions and examine the Amending Law in terms of its relationship to the provisions of the Basic Law.

18.  The two Basic Laws enacted about three years ago – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – were intended to constitute an integral part of the Israeli bill of rights. Prior to the commencement of the Basic Laws, these basic rights were anchored in precedent that has formed part of positive Israeli law since the establishment of the State.  In the framework of statutory interpretation, the case law has repeatedly emphasized that the various basic rights included in our positive law enjoyed a unique status as criteria guiding the crystallization of the law’s political and legal conceptions, as the guiding light in the formulation of the law and as guidelines for judicial review of the acts of courts, secondary legislation, and the various agencies of the executive branch (see HCJ 1/49 HCJ 1/49 Bejerano v. Minister of Police [3]; HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4] ; HCJ 75/76 ‘Hilron’ Ltd v. Fruit Production and Marketing Board (Fruit Board) [5], at p. 653 opposite letter E; CA 723/74 HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [6]. at p. 295 opposite letter E; HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [7]; EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections for Eleventh Knesset; Avneri v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [8]. Today, some of these rights, belong to the constitutional section of our statutory law, by force of their inclusion in Basic Laws: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In the determination of substantive criteria for primary legislation they were preceded by s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. The two new Basic Laws took a broader approach in aiming to define basic rights in creating a statutory bill of human rights for Israel. Just as s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset established substantive conditions for future legislation in the matters regulated by s. 4, the two new Basic Laws establish guidelines for all regular legislation pertaining to the rights in their scope. Judicial review has thus been extended. It is now possible to review the lawfulness of primary legislation enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law, in accordance with the criteria established in the aforementioned Basic Laws.

This means that not only were basic rights defined as such in primary legislation, being upgraded from common to statutory law, but they were also endowed with supra-normative status, in relationship to both primary and secondary legislation, in the manner and to degree stipulated by the provisions of the Basic Law. The realization of the decision adopted by the First Knesset – the Harrari Decision – to which we shall shortly return, has thus proceeded from the stage of defining the sovereign authorities, their powers and their functions, to the formulation of a bill of rights.

For the first time, basic civil rights have been clearly and directly expressed in constitutional legislation.

Though there is still no complete, comprehensive bill of rights encompassing all basic rights, two initial, important chapters have now attained statutory status. An important part of the definition of liberty has been firmly established in the law in written constitutional form.

A fundamentally important conclusion is that it is now possible to judicially review the constitutionality of primary legislation in light of statutorily established constitutional norms, by examining the constitutionality of the legislation under the criteria of the Basic Laws.

The Normative Hierarchy: Basic Law, Statute, Secondary Legislation

19.  An understanding of the new Basic Laws requires reference to the principles for interpreting the relationships among various legislative acts. We will examine the relationship between statutes, between regulations and between regulations and statutes. The typical case is that in which the regular law establishes a provision that may protect a particular right. Let us imagine that a subsequent law stipulates that there is no protection for that right. In other words, it removes the protection or derogates from its scope or depth. The later law may absolutely negate the right or divest it of its content (i.e. a “variation” including the “annulment” of the right); Alternatively, the later law may restrict the protection conferred to the right without varying or annulling it (i.e. an “infringement” of the right). Incidentally, later on in our comments we will expand on the concepts of “variation” and “infringement” and the distinctions between them.

In both cases (“variation” and “infringement”) the later law may either vary or infringe the right protected in the earlier law. The earlier law recedes in the face of the later law, in the words of the dictum lex posterior derogat priori (“and bring forth the old because of the new”; Leviticus, 26:10) [117]. The most recent legislative pronouncement is usually the decisive one.

The analytical starting point is that when the legislature wishes to vary or infringe a protected right it does so either explicitly, or by way of a clearly contradictory stipulation in the wording of the new provisions, which is inconsistent with its predecessor. In any case, an attempt should be made to uphold laws dealing with the same subject matter and to reconcile them. Thus, the interpretative presumption is that a right protected by a regular law is not changed or infringed by later regular legislation, unless otherwise stated or implied (see HCJ 428/86; HCJ App 320/86; Barzilai v. Government of Israel, [9] at p.542). In other words, the interpretative presumption is that the two laws, one later and one earlier, are consistent with each other. The wording of the later law may refute this presumption, but if the presumption is refuted, the valid positive law is the law determined in the later law. The presumption is that the later law is the most up-to-date expression of the legislative intention and reflects the current objective of the legislative system. In other words, the prima facie rule is that statutes do not contradict each other (one statute versus another statute) but if that rule is contravened, either explicitly or implicitly, the later statute has the upper hand.

The aforementioned rule is qualified by an exception: If the earlier law is a specific law as opposed to a later more general one in terms of the issue at hand, then the specific law takes precedence over the general one: lex specialis derogat generali. This rule applies when dealing with two regular laws containing conflicting normative provisions, and the difference between them is expressed by the degree of specificity of their provisions. 

The rules described above are guidelines that elucidate the relationship between two legislative acts, but they are not exhaustive. Another presumption with roots in our system is that the legislature protects and promotes basic rights, and this is a guiding presumption in legislative construction (see e.g. HCJ 75/76 [5] supra, and CA 723/74 [6] supra). Together with that presumption, we are also assisted by the aforementioned doctrinal rules governing the relationships between statutes: an earlier statute versus a later statute, a specific statue versus a general statute.

20.  A conflict similar to the one described above may also arise between two provisions of secondary legislation, in the form of regulations enacted by administrative or other agencies competent to enact regulations. The presumption is that the regulation is legitimate from an administrative perspective. The question is what happens when two regulations conflict. The theoretical construct governing the decision in the case of contradictory regulations is identical to that of contradictory statutes. An effort must be made to reconcile them or to reach a conclusion as to their validity or invalidity, having reference to the particular laws by force of which the regulations were enacted. The rules outlined above are similarly applicable to secondary legislation: hence a later regulation supersedes an earlier regulation; a specific regulation supersedes a general regulation.

21.  Another, distinct question is what the law is when a regulation contradicts the provisions of a statute. The question becomes even more acute when dealing with the question of the law of a special and later regulation that contradicts a general law that preceded it. Prima facie, a simple application of the interpretative principles adumbrated above leads to the conclusion that the special provision should override the general provision. Moreover, later legislation should override earlier legislation. Reasoning a fortiori, a later, specific provision should therefore prevail over an earlier, general one. The conclusion is that any later, specific provision would unequivocally prevail over any earlier, general provision. However, this conclusion does not apply to circumstances in which a regulation contravenes statute, for a statute is always of superior normative status. A derivative question is what the rule is where a special or later regulation is in conflict with a statute. The answer is that the regulation is of inferior status. The rules pertaining to the primacy of later legislation over earlier legislation or the primacy of a special provision over a general one only apply within the same legislative framework, in other words, statute versus statute or regulation versus regulation.

The reason for this is that our legal system, like any system of law, is based on a normative hierarchy. The normative hierarchy results from and reflects various forms of power. We will proceed to clarify this point.

The legal structure is based on the axiomatic assumption of a stratified system of norms; each strata or level derives its validity from the power that engendered the norm, as in the case of primary and secondary legislation (i.e. regulation). A statute is positioned on a higher normative level than a regulation, and hence it need not surprise us that when in conflict, the statute prevails. Absent specific authorization in the primary law, secondary legislation can neither vary nor infringe statutory provisions. In this context it is irrelevant whether the regulation preceded the law or post dated it. It is similarly irrelevant if the regulation is specific or general with respect to the matter regulated therein. In any case, a regulation is normatively subordinate to a statute and therefore a regulation that contradicts a statute is subject to the remedies of administrative law, which provide for full or partial annulment. Logically, the regulation’s subordination to the statute, derives from the formal, fundamental conception of normative hierarchy in any legal system. To the extent that it relates to the connection between a regulation and a statute, the normative hierarchy is formally expressed in section 16 (4) of the Interpretation Ordinance [New Version], which provides that:

Enactment of Regulations:    “16: Where the law confers on the authority the power to enact regulations, the regulations enumerated in the following provisions shall apply to the enactment and the effect of such regulations unless another intention is implied:

…..     

    (4)    A regulation shall not contradict the provisions of any law.

The reference here is to “any law” (my emphasis M.S) and not just the law conferring the power to enact specific, conflicting regulations, the legal validity of which are being assessed. This is an additional expression of the general distinctions made under the legislative hierarchy.

In this context it bears special mention that even absent the provision in s. 16(4), a regulation purporting to vary or infringe a statute would be subject to the hierarchical principles explained above, which are the guiding principles in the examination of the validity of a law.

What is the source of the principle of the normative hierarchy of legal norms? As mentioned, the answer lies in the types of powers that confer authority to legislate or promulgate regulations, respectively. The legal system endows various authorities with the power to establish legal norms, in other words, legally binding rules of conduct. These powers are systematically organized, deriving their force from the essence of the empowerment. The power to enact primary legislation is not analogous to the power to promulgate secondary legislation, which can only stem from a specific empowering provision included in the primary legislation. The legislative branch – the Knesset – has the power to legislate laws of all kinds; the executive branch generally has the power to enact secondary legislation, by force of its empowerment in primary legislation. However, the Knesset, too, is empowered to enact secondary legislation, e.g. the Knesset Regulations (s. 19 of Basic Law: The Knesset) or decisions pertaining to pensions of office holders, which constitute secondary legislation (see HCJ 89/83 Levi v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee,[10]). In other words, there are cases in which the same authority is empowered to establish different legislative norms, belonging to different normative hierarchies. This means that the same institutional source is empowered to pass legislative acts of varying obligatory power, and it also establishes the connection between them and their subordination to one another

In view of the network of powers described, with all due respect, there is no foundation for the doctrine of the institutional pyramid developed during the sixties (Prof B. Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments at p.40) whereby each normative level of legislative authority has a sole and exclusive institutional coordinate, meaning that every stage on the normative hierarchy of legislation has a unique counterpart on the institutional ladder, and that in principle, different stages on the normative hierarchy can never flow the same level of the institutional hierarchy. As observed above, the same institution may be empowered to establish norms on different levels. Hence the Knesset’s power to enact secondary legislation, as mentioned above, is universally accepted. The existence of a mutually exclusive connection between each stage of the normative hierarchy and the institutional ladder empowered to create legislation, is a doctrine that is alien to our legal system, and is inconsonant with the allocation of powers among law- making institutions. The normative legislative hierarchy finds expression in the subordination of each level to the level above it, and not by reference to its correlate on the ladder of institutional sources. The same institution may establish both the supreme norm and the lower norm. Any theoretical doctrine that analyzes a functioning legal relationship must anchor itself in the legal reality; it cannot exist in a vacuum, but must have reference to the existing legal structure, which is an inescapable given. It cannot sever itself from the subject it seeks to analyze, and any thesis that ignores it is unrealistic. From this we can only conclude that the pyramid theory described by Professor Akzin, is contradicted here (and not only here) by the existing structure of the power network.

22.(a) The authority to enact secondary legislation is included in the primary legislation of the legislature. A minister cannot enact legislation in the absence of statutory empowerment; an authority cannot enact bylaws in the absence of statutory empowerment, and the Knesset is not authorized to make decisions pertaining to salary or pensions without an empowering clause such as s. 10 of Basic Law: Judiciary, s. 1 of the Holders of Public Office (Benefits) Law, 5729-1969 or similar laws.

Secondary legislation is the product of empowerment in primary legislation. A law enacted by the legislative authority is superior to a regulation of the Knesset itself, or of any other statutory or executive authority, because the regulation can only be enacted by force of the power conferred in the primary legislation. In other words, the conferral of differentiated legislative functions to the same institution does not create a situation in which all of the powers coexist, side by side, ostensibly on the same level. Conferral of a number of functions to the same institution leaves intact the need to establish a hierarchy that defines the legal or constitutional status of those powers above one another. The normative legislative hierarchy is the soul of an appropriate constitutional structure.

(b) As we noted, secondary legislation can neither vary nor infringe a statutory provision. To complete the picture we will add that the assertion pertaining to the hierarchical relations between a law and a regulation is prima facie contradicted by the existence of another form of regulations that can infringe a law, namely – emergency regulations. As stated in the law conferring the power to enact them, “An emergency regulation may alter any law, suspend its effect or modify it…” (s. 9 (b) of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948). (An “ordinance” is a law passed by the Provisional Council of State, see s. 7 (a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance; and see also s. 2 (a) of the Transition Law, 5709-1949, and compare with what is now s. 50 of the new Basic Law: The Government, enacted in 1992). What this means is that the Minister’s authority to invalidate a law by force of emergency regulations is exceptional, but it too is explicitly conferred in primary legislation and qualified by the restrictions delineated therein. This power of secondary regulation to alter a law does not derive from the secondary legislation itself, but rather from the law that empowered the government or a minister to enact it. In the absence of explicit statutory empowerment to enact secondary legislation that infringes the law, secondary legislation cannot alter or infringe a law (in this context see the Supervision (Products and Services) (Amendment No.18) Law, 5750-1990, following our judgment in HCJ 256/88 Medianwest Medical Center Herzliya Ltd v. Director of Ministry of Health [11]. If it varies or infringes it, it will be subjected to the remedies granted by the judicial forum regarding secondary legislation that deviates from its defined boundaries.

23.  Summing up: The subordination of secondary legislation to the law flows from the secondary legislator’s subordination to the conditions of empowerment explicated by the primary legislative authority, i.e. the sovereign legislature – the Knesset. Incidentally, in using the term “sovereign” my intention is not to interpretations taken from public international law. In our conception, the sovereign is the people. In my understanding, the Knesset is “sovereign” i.e. independent and supreme, in the sense that no other authority, legislative or otherwise, prevails over it in its power and its authorities. The reason lies in the source of its power: It was elected by the people, which as stated, is the sovereign.

The hierarchy of norms thus derives from the nature of the powers. The normative system is not one-dimensional, but rather hierarchical – a ladder with different levels. Primary legislation is on a higher normative level than secondary legislation (i.e. “regulation,” “bylaw,” “order” and the like).

The Position of Constitutional Legislation

24.  On a normative scale, the constitutional act is on a higher level than the regular law. By its essence and purpose, it is designated to operate at a supreme normative level. In terms of constitutional theory, in a possible conflict between the constitution and a law, the constitution has the upper hand. It is inappropriate for a regular law to override a constitutional provision. A regular law cannot override a constitutional provision other than by way of an explicit constitutional provision included therein, or by way of a constitutional provision (constitution or Basic Law) that generally defines – not necessarily in relation to a specific constitutional provision – the possible forms of infringement. See for example, s. 12 of the proposal for Basic Law: The Judiciary (27 Hapraklit (5731) 140,141), which discusses “a claim against the validity of a law.” And see also s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, of 1994, which states the following:

Effect of nonconforming law   8.    A provision of a law that infringes the freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it was included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, and which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement unless a shorter duration has been stated therein

This means that the general constitutional principle laid down in the Basic Law, Freedom of Occupation can be infringed by regular legislation, provided that it is done in the manner set forth in the aforementioned section 8. Section 8 is not only prescriptive – it is also proscriptive, in the sense of invalidating regular legislation that infringes freedom of occupation, if it does not satisfy the conditions of section 8. This is the import of the wording of s. 8, and this is the rule for a law that does not conform to its provisions. Subject to such changes as are necessitated by the transition from one specific subject to another, our comments here regarding Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation apply to the relationship between any regular law and a constitutional provision currently included in a Basic Law, which contains qualifying provisions regarding its variation or infringement, and regular legislation.

Summing up this point: Some Basic Laws lack qualifying provisions regarding regular legislation that changes or infringes their conditions. These laws do not fully express their supreme normative status vis-à-vis variation or infringement, and an entrenched or privileged status represents an appropriate and desirable ideal. Other Basic Laws, such as the two Basic Laws enacted in 1992, which include restrictions that entrench their normative hierarchy, are already a reality.

The Constitutional Norm – Structure and Form

25. (a) The basic assumption of our approach is that the primary legislator is the supreme source of authority in the legislative realm, by virtue of which he is authorized to enact laws of differential normative authority on the hierarchical scale. He is authorized to enact constitutional legislation and authorized to enact regular legislation. He is the direct source of all primary legislation, and in a small number of cases, as noted, he is also the source of secondary legislation; indirectly – he is the source of all secondary legislation.

(b)   As mentioned above, constitutional legal theory recognizes the existence of a normative legal level above that of the regular law, referred to variously as “constitution” or “Basic Law.” The Harrari Decision of 1950, to which we shall return, distinguished between a Basic Law and a constitution. In our comments below, for simplification, we will, as far as possible, use the word “constitution”

The people have the power to frame a constitution. This assertion derives from the accepted conception that sovereignty resides with the people. Constitutional legislation is the product of the people’s decision by way of its elected representative – the sovereign Knesset.

Incidentally, according to German constitutional interpretation, which naturally relates to the constitutional structure there, the absence of a direct, unmediated decision by the people to adopt a constitution by way of a referendum does not diminish the validity of a constitution enacted by way of legislation, and to that end it is sufficient that the constitution be enacted by the representative parliamentary body (see Von Muench/ Kunig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Band 1., 4, Verlag Beck (Muenchen, 1992) 11, but cf. V. Mangoldt, Klein, Starck, Das Bonner Grundgesetz, 3 Aufl. Band 1 Anm. Vl 11). Naturally, the approaches to this subject are not uniform and different countries have adopted a variety of approaches.

26. (a) All of our comments above regarding the nature of the normative hierarchy apply mutatis mutandis to the relationship between a regular law and the constitution. The power of regular law to alter or infringe constitutional provisions may be conferred by force of the constitutional provision itself, as for example, s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, cited above. Arguably, the absence of any such provision may indicate that the legislature chose not to complement the creation of a supreme normative level with a provision qualifying the validity of any contradictory regular legislation. This was the case with the legislative proceedings of Basic Law: The Knesset, which designated the provisions limiting conflicting legislation to a small number of its sections only, leaving the majority of its sections with no substantive position on the validity of conflicting regular legislation. The same conclusion similarly arises from the wording of most of the other Basic Laws, which treat of the institutions of government and their branches, as well as with the judiciary.

As a result, the Knesset amended provisions in Basic Laws by way of a regular law (see e.g. The Knesset (Number of Members in Committees) Law 5754-1994, which repealed s. 21 (c ) of Basic Law: The Knesset; s. 86 (e) of the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] 5729-1969 which contradicts s. 17 of Basic Law: The Judiciary. This same is true for s. 64 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 5744-1984. This court has also ruled on a number of occasions in the past that nothing prevents the amendment of a Basic Law by means of a regular law (see e.g. HCJ 107/73 ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd (hereinafter – the Negev case) [12]) (Justices Berinson, Witkon, H. Cohn); In HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice, (hereinafter – the Kaniel case) [13]), President Agranat, Justices Landau and Kister, addressing this point, stated: “We find no support in the language of the Basic Law… that an implied change under the concluding section of s. 46 (of Basic Law: The Knesset – M.S.) must be accomplished by means of a Basic Law or a special law” (ibid, at p. 796). In my view, this ruling should be seen in the context of its period, and as an interpretation that did not anticipate the legislative constitutional developments and the emergence of a comprehensive constitutional doctrine.

However, as we will presently see, the two new Basic Laws of 1992 provide a fuller expression of the normative constitutional hierarchy, as indicated by the Knesset’s general tendency in the legislation of the Basic Laws. Following the change in the Knesset’s legislative policy, as expressed in both of the Basic Laws, and which anchored a new, appropriate conception of the normative hierarchy, it is now possible to apply a standard legislative criterion by which there can no longer be any variation of any Basic Law other than by another Basic Law.

There are grounds for presuming that with the enactment of Basic Law: Legislation, this subject will be regulated comprehensively with respect to all of the Basic Laws. In view of the Knesset’s legislative policy as expressed in the two aforementioned Basic Laws, nothing prevents us from already laying down the appropriate legislative procedure, and in doing so to delineate the principles required to give commensurate expression to the legislative hierarchy manifested in the enactment of the constitutional provisions. Further on we will devote some attention to the import of the new Basic Laws, in terms of legislative policy and the basic constitutional conception of the Knesset.

(b)   Freedom of occupation has merited protection in our statute law insofar as it has been imbued with constitutional status in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In the absence of a standard constitutional provision applicable to all Basic Laws, this Basic Law established certain provisions pertaining to a change or infringement of its provisions. The structure of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (which is the appropriate constitutional structure, that should be followed in all Basic Laws) prevents the possibility of an ordinary law changing or infringing a right that was established in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The constitutional strictures were established in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, providing as follows:

‘There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law’

The wording of s. 8, treating of the validity of a law deviating from the aforementioned provisions, was cited above.

The import of this is that the validity of a regular law that infringes the freedom of occupation is conditional upon its fulfillment of the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned s. 8, and failure to fulfill those conditions renders the regular law invalid. Only where the regular law satisfies the necessary conditions (the required majority for the adoption of the law; an explicit qualification) can it suspend, for a fixed period, the validity of a constitutional provision with respect to the area of application of that law. Needless to say, the conclusion emerging from the aforementioned is that the Knesset recognized the existence of a normative hierarchy by the very adoption of sections 4 and 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. These two sections of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation enable the “infringement” of a protected right, subject to the conditions enumerated by the Basic Law, and therefore deny the validity of an infringement that fails to satisfy the conditions established by the Basic Law.

As opposed to this, a “variation” of a Basic Law – as opposed to an “infringement” of one of its provisions – requires the application of the proceeding under s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

   Entrenchment          7. (a) This Basic Law shall not shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.

With respect to a variation, the normative hierarchy is expressly stated in the entrenchment of the provisions of the Basic Law.

The basic constitutional distinction between a “variation” and “infringement” is worthy of further in-depth examination, and we shall address it further on.

“Variation” versus “Infringement”

27. (a) In examining the arrangements of the supreme normative hierarchy, a distinction must be made between the “variation” of a protected right, and its “infringement.” Our concern is with a right protected in a Basic Law. Any variation of the right (restriction or expansion, supplementation or annulment) requires legislative action on the Basic Laws level. The requirement that a change or variation be effected in or by way of a Basic Law stems from the analytical basis of the legislation of Basic Laws in our legal system. By force of the normative legislative hierarchy, any variation of an act on a particular (normative) level must be effected by an act on the same or a higher normative level. Secondary legislation cannot change a law. Regular legislation cannot change a Basic Law, which is located at the apex of the normative scale.

The Basic Laws are the cornerstone of the Israeli Constitution. This was also the Knesset’s explicit position in its decision on 13 June 1950 (the Harrari Decision). As such, a distinction ought to be made, for purposes of constitutional and legislative clarity, between basic legislation, which provides the constitutional foundation, and regular legislation. This concludes our discussion in regard to “variation.” I am aware of the statements of this Court (Justice Berinson, Witkon, and H. Cohn) in the Negev case [12], the Kaniel case [13] (Justices Agranat, Landau, and Kister) and HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Knesset (hereinafter – Ressler case [14]) (Justices Etzioni, Y. Cahn, and Asher), according to which Basic Law: The Knesset provided no grounds for the assertion that a (implied) change of a Basic Law must perforce be effected by the enactment of a Basic Law, and that it could also be effected in the form of regular Knesset legislation. They were expressing the existing situation in which many of the Basic Laws were not formally entrenched.

(b)   As the development of the constitution progresses, and with it the imperative of establishing an analytical basis for the adoption of constitutional legislation, it is appropriate, as emphasized above, that we adopt a new direction that expresses the existence of a normative legislative hierarchy. In other words, against the background of the two new Basic Laws that directly deal with the protection of fundamental rights, this expanded bench now has the opportunity to establish an entire system, adjusted to our present constitutional umbrella, as this Court did in a different context in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance (hereinafter “the Bergman case”) [15]). From now on, all Basic Laws should be governed by a legislative policy that expresses the doctrine of normative hierarchy, by which a Basic Law can be varied only by another Basic Law.

(c)   This brings us to the term “infringement.” An infringement does not purport to alter the scope of the right itself. The thrust of the infringement is that it ‘enables the normative existence of a legislative act that infringes the arrangements provided by the Basic Law’ (as per my honorable colleague, the President: A Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.3, Constitutional Interpretation (Nevo, 5754) 48). By its very nature, an infringement is special and defined, i.e. localized.

According to this fundamental distinction between “variation” and “infringement,” the first Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law, 5729-1969, which was the subject of the Bergman case, included an “infringement” of the principle of equality entrenched in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which states:

 Section 4: System of Elections: The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall not be amended, save by a majority of the members of the Knesset’ [emphasis mine– M.S.]

The Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) Law did not purport to vary the aforementioned section 4. The purpose of the financing law was not to establish that there would no longer be equality in the electoral system. It infringed the principle of equality in a specific, clearly delineated area. In other words, the result of the Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law was an infringement of the principle of equality set forth in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. 

In the Bergman case [15], the Supreme Court gave a broad construction to the requirement of a special majority in Basic Law: The Knesset. Firstly, the Court’s unanimous view was that the requirement in the concluding part of s. 4 places a hurdle before any “variation” of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset in the form of the requirement for a special majority. Accordingly, the principle of equality in elections cannot be annulled other than by a majority of the members of the Knesset, meaning that the election system can only be changed by force of special majority. Secondly, by implication the court inferred that the requirement of s. 4 also presents an obstacle to any “infringement” of the protected value in the Basic Law. In other words, s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset includes a quasi “override clause” with respect to a variation. Its essence is formal, and its form is the requirement of a special majority pursuant to s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. This clause is anchored in the constitutional provision and inherently creates the constitutional tool governing cases of possible infringement of the principle from among those stipulated in the aforementioned s. 4. The override clause in the concluding part of s. 4 enables an infringement of the protected value, provided that it be effected by way of a special majority. Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, as opposed to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, of 1998, and similar to s. 4 thereof, does not posit a requirement of specificity, as one of its conditions for the validity of an infringement of a protected value. The infringement will be valid even without explicitly derogating from the Basic Law (i.e. it may be done “implicitly,” provided that it is adopted by a special majority).

Summing up, theoretically speaking, a variation is distinct from an infringement. However, in the Bergman case [15], the Court also applied the limitations regarding the variation of a Basic Law to legislative provisions that contradicted the principle of equality in the Basic Law, in other words, that only infringed it. This point is of particular interest because in the context of retrospective constitutional critique it has often been argued that in the Bergman ruling [15] the Supreme Court attempted to curtail the scope of judicial intervention dictated by the normative constitutional hierarchy. However, the decision itself indicates that in viewing the Local Authorities (Elections) (Financing, Restriction of Expenses and Auditing) Law as invalid by reason of not having been adopted by the requisite majority, the Court not only adopted an innovative, broad approach, without any explicit authorization, but also broadened the scope of the aforementioned section 4, and included regard of any “infringement” as a “variation” referred to in the Basic Law. Needless to say, in my view, the Court acted lawfully and within the scope of its powers.

The Knesset was aware of the distinction between a variation and an infringement, which explains why Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation uses the term “there shall be no infringement” in its limitation clause. The purpose of the provision in s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is to establish criteria for reviewing legislation that infringes the provisions of the Basic Law, in an attempt to circumvent the principles established in the Basic Law. The provision does not establish criteria for the variation or abrogation of a Basic Law. The variation of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is explicitly governed by s. 7.

What has been said thus far in regard to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation demonstrates the general theses. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and its variation or infringement will be treated below, at the appropriate juncture.  

28. (a) The thesis presented regarding the normative legislative hierarchy indicates that the appropriate legal approach is that from now on, a regular law can neither vary nor infringe a constitutional provision, in the absence of explicit authorization in a constitutional provision. If the statutory provision varies or infringes a constitutional provision then the conflicting statutory provision will be subject to the counter remedies originating in constitutional law. Such a remedy may be the annulment of the conflicting statute. It may be a more restricted remedy than the extreme remedy of annulment, such as partial annulment (application of the “blue pencil” rule), where such a remedy is available, having consideration for the overall constitutional context. The remedy may also be of a relative character in terms of the time dimension (of retroactive, or prospective application), in terms of application, etc. At all events, we deem it settled law that where a normative provision of a lower status deviates from a higher normative provision, the court seized of the matter is authorized to conduct a procedure of judicial review, and to provide a constitutional remedy.

(b)   The judiciary shoulders the burden of upholding the rule of law, if a matter is submitted for its decision in the statutorily prescribed ways. Implementing the rule of law includes maintaining the sources of authority and the hierarchy of norms. It follows that if secondary legislation contradicts the law, the court is authorized to grant a remedy. Similarly, if a law contradicts a constitutional provision, the court is authorized to grant a remedy. As we mentioned, what was once the ideal situation with respect to constitutional legislation in general has largely become the real position with respect to the two Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset in 1992, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

29. We elaborated on the description of the appropriate constitutional structure, and it should be added that our concern is not merely with the demarcation of formal legal structures. A structure is designed for its contents. Division into normative hierarchies does not just express the distinction between a substantive legal rule (a law) and the methods of implementation and legal procedures (secondary legislation). The apex of the normative pyramid (the Basic Law) is the statutory expression of the institutional values of our fundamental political and social views. It is the repository not only of the definitions and power divisions among the central branches of government, but also for the bill of human rights. It proclaims and protects those rights that make us into a society premised on liberty, human dignity, and equality, and expresses the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. As such, the enactment of two new Basic Laws is an important stage in the development of a constitution, and in the transformation of values that constitute part of our common law, as an expression of precedent, into statutory law of privileged and unique status. In my minority opinion about twenty years ago in CA 723/74 [6], I addressed the issue of the meaning and interpretation of the basic rights that form part of our common law. As written there (ibid: ­294-295):

The absence in Israel of a unique piece of legislation of preferential legal status that embodies its constitutional principles does not mean that we have no statutes with constitutional content, or that constitutional legal principles defining the basic rights of man and the citizen are absent from our system of law. The law in Israel embraces, according to our understanding and concepts, basic rules concerning the existence and protection of the liberties of the individual, even before the proposed Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights is enacted.

The new draft Basic Law is intended to formulate principles and to designate their boundary lines. Its central task is to fix them firmly in statute so as to ensure their protection against the ravages of time. Its purpose is to express the values by which the ordinary citizen should be educated and to stand in the way of those who would seek to trespass on his rights. But even now, basic rights are protected in our basic legal conception, and form a substantive part of Israeli law. First and foremost among these is freedom of expression. It is no secret that the integration of these rights into our law derives from the system of government that we covet (H.C. 73/53, 87/53, Kol Ha’Am Co. v. The Minister of the Interior [3], at p. 876), but the obligation to honor them in practice is not merely an expression of political or social morality, but has legal status.

Any limitation of the boundaries of such a right and of its scope, which arises from legislation, will be narrowly construed so as to give the aforesaid right maximum effect and not to restrict it in the slightest beyond what is clearly and expressly required by the legislature’s words (HCJ. 75/76, “Hilron” v. The Fruit Production and Marketing Board, at p. 653). Freedom of expression and a provision of law that limits it do not enjoy equal, identical status, but rather, to the extent consistent with the written law, one should always prefer the maintaining of the right over a provision of law that tends to limit it. In sum, the standard for protecting freedom of expression as the primary consideration when it clashes with another right should be given full expression not only when the legislature enacts the law’s provisions, but also in the interpretation of the law and the application of its provisions in circumstances in which its substance and effect are tested in practice.

See also FH 9/77 Israel Electric Corporation, Ltd., et al v. “Ha’aretz” Daily Newspaper Ltd, [16], following the earlier minority opinion in HCJ 75/76 [5] and in FH 27/76 Hilron” v. The Fruit Production and Marketing Board [17], which discussed a basic right similar to the subject under discussion – freedom of occupation.

 

The Source of Constituent Authority

30. (a) The question deriving from our comments above, and which now requires our attention is whether Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and similarly – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, are located at the apex of the normative hierarchy, commanding the power to define what is permitted and what is forbidden in regular primary legislation.

(b)   Methodologically, it would be appropriate to begin with a preliminary question of general application beyond these two specific Basic Laws, and that is fundamental to the entire doctrine of a normative hierarchy. The question asks what is the source of the Knesset’s authority to create acts of supra-legal standing, and to enact laws that limit the scope of the Knesset’s authority to enact regular laws in the future, or Basic Laws of specific content or significance. The principle of legality states that in the absence of the authority to enact a normative act of defined content, a body is powerless to create it. An administrative agency cannot enact a law. Were it to draft a normative act, which it calls a “law,” such an act would lack the normative effect of a law. The reason is that the administrative agency lacks the authority to enact laws. The Knesset alone is the legislative branch, and it enacts the laws. This brings us back to the original question: What is the source of the Knesset’s authority to create legislative acts of differing hierarchical levels, in other words, secondary legislation, primary legislation, and constitutional legislation. Is there any basis for the analytical thesis that the Knesset lacks the legal power to frame a constitution, or any other supra-legal legislation that is normatively superior to regular legislation? 

(c) The second question pertaining to the examination of the Knesset’s constitutional authority is whether the Knesset has the authority to limit its own authority and that of subsequent Knessets by passing legislation of a supra-legal character, applicable to constitutional and regular legislation of the Knesset, and thereby limit the Knesset’s legislative authority in the future.

(d) An examination of these issues requires at least a cursory review of our constitutional history, to which the following comments are devoted.

31. (a) The Declaration of Independence

The declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel on 5 Iyar 5708 (14 May1948) – the Declaration of Independence – was a political act of legal import, under both public international and municipal law. It was promulgated by the People’s Council that convened on the eve of the State’s establishment. The Declaration of Independence related to the establishment of initial governmental authorities, and stated, inter alia, that:

‘WE DECLARE [emphasis in source – M.S] that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, (emphasis mine – M.S ). The People’s Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People’s Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called Israel

The People’s Council became the Provisional Council of State and the People’s Administration became the Government until the establishment of elected bodies pursuant to the constitution which was to be adopted by the elected Constituent Assembly.

The Provisional Council of State became the first parliament of the independent state, and the Government was responsible to it (under s. 2 of the concluding section of the Law and Administration Ordinance). The Provisional Council of State was the supreme body, with unlimited authority. In the words of Prof. H. Klinghoffer “The Establishment of the State of Israel: Historical – Constitutional Survey” Klinghoffer Volume on Public Law, Y. Zamir, ed.(Harry and Mishael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 1993) (hereinafter – Klinghoffer Volume), 53, 74-75:

‘The absence of any statement of its powers is evidence that those powers were not intended to be limited. From this we may conclude that the basic norm of the State of Israel can be found in this statement, which transforms the People’s Council into the Provisional Council of State.’  

Professor Klinghoffer noted (ibid, at p. 75) that a literal construction of the Declaration of Independence would lead to the simultaneous existence of the Provisional Council of State and the Constituent Assembly. In the author’s view this structure was the result of an oversight on the drafter’s part. In any event, the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 5709-1949 clearly stipulates that the Provisional Council of State was to dissolve immediately upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly. The result was that the Constituent Assembly remained as the exclusive body that was also responsible for regular legislation. Had the constitutional structure continued to exist in the format established in 1949, then the same institution, i.e. the Constituent Assembly, would have been charged with both constitutional legislation and regular legislation.

As it turned out, the First Knesset enacted all of the regular laws as well as laws which were constitutional in terms of content and substance (such as the Law of Return, 5710-1950, or Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5710-1951).

  1. The Constituent Assembly

The provisions of the Declaration of Independence regarding the establishment of a constituent assembly, pursuant to the United Nations resolution of 29 November 1947, lead to the enactment of the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 5709-1949. The Provisional Council of State correctly regarded itself as authorized to initiate constitutional deliberations, and even appointed a committee for that purpose.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly were not held on the date scheduled by the Declaration of Independence, and the date was deferred by the Provisional Council of State (s. 1 of the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 5709-1949). The elections were held at the beginning of 1949 and as mentioned, by force of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, the Provisional Council of State was dissolved.  

The Constituent Assembly immediately changed its name, and in the first law that it adopted – The Transition Law – it determined that the parliament of the State of Israel would be called the “Knesset” and that the Constituent Assembly would be called the “First Knesset.” From this statutory provision as well as from statements of Knesset members it can be inferred that a single legislative body was created, to which the authorities of the Constituent Assembly were also transferred.

What this means is that there was a single parliament that adopted the role imposed upon the Constituent Assembly in the Declaration of Independence, assumed all of its powers and authorities, which were never actually defined beyond what was stated in the Declaration of Independence and in s. 3 of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance (‘The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it not itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional  Council of State’), and which simultaneously continued to carry out its regular legislative functions.

As Professor Klinghoffer describes in the aforementioned article, at p. 75-76.

…This deviation from the Declaration of Independence was effected by force of a special law enacted by the Provisional Council of State, in other words: by legally changing the arrangement set forth in the Declaration of Independence.  And finally, the most important question: Did the Constituent Assembly comply with the directive of enacting a constitution, and if not – did it abandon the conception of legal continuity that was grounded in the Declaration of Independence.  The Constituent Assembly, which after convening changed its name to the “First Knesset,” complied with that requirement at the very most by its adoption of laws with constitutional content, the legal status of which was not superior to that of regular laws…the Declaration of Independence did not specify a period of time within which the constitution must be enacted, and the transfer of the powers of the Constituent Assembly to the Second Knesset and every subsequent Knesset was authorized by a special legal arrangement. This is a sort of continuing transfer, which, so long as it remains in place, confers upon the Israeli legislature, as a perpetual inheritance, the authority to enact a constitution (emphasis mine – M.S)

Professor Klinghoffer was clearly expressing the idea of a continuing, direct chain of authority, by which the authority of the Constituent Assembly in its entirety was transferred to the Israeli parliament, i.e. the Knesset as such, endowing it with the authority to enact constitutional legislation, in addition to its authority to enact regular legislation.  As such, the Knesset was vested with the authority to enact a constitution.

(c)   The Transition Law and the Harrari Decision

Needless to say, the Transition Law itself, which was the only legislative act of the Constituent Assembly in that capacity, did not bear the title of “Basic Law,” being no different at all from regular legislation in terms of its name, its method of adoption, or any other relevant aspect.  Nonetheless, its contents are constitutional. Hence, having discarded the title expressing its constitutional nature and creating constitutional continuity, the legislative authority at that time failed to establish any clear expression indicating the distinction between regular and constitutional legislation.

(d)  At no stage did the Knesset abandon the task of enacting a constitution for the State. The preeminent expression of the Knesset’s power, and its aforementioned task is the Harrari Decision of 13 June 1950, which provided:

The First Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee with the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution will be composed of chapters, with each chapter comprising a Basic Law unto itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset if and when the Committee completes its work and all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution for the State (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 1743 (emphasis mine –M.S.).’

 

It is unlikely that the Knesset members assumed that all the chapters would be prepared during the tenure of the First Knesset. Presumably they understood that this was an ongoing enterprise. Returning to the legislative history as expressed in the Knesset protocols, there are grounds for assuming that most of them were interested in that continuity. This found expression in the provisions of s. 5 of the Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 5711-1951, that provided that the Second Knesset and its members were to have all the powers, rights, and duties which the First Knesset and its members had. This provision was supplemented by s. 10, which provided that the Transition Law would apply mutatis mutandis to the transition to the Third and any subsequent Knesset for as long as the Knesset does not adopt “another law” concerning the matters dealt with by the Transition Law. The question of whether Basic Law: The Knesset fits the definition of “another law” for purposes of the aforementioned s. 10 is disputed.

Since then, the Knesset has adopted eleven Basic Laws. It functioned as a legislative system with integrated goals, authorities and powers that enabled it to concurrently exercise legislative powers for constitutional and regular legislation. The legislative authority is also the constituent authority and the latter is also the legislative authority. The conception of an integrated legislative system wherein one institution operates both as a regular legislative authority, and a constitutional authority, is mentioned by Professor Kelsen.

Professor Kelsen wrote: (H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (Berkley, 1967) 223): 

It is possible that the organ specifically and formally authorized to create, abolish or amend ordinary statutes having the character of a constitution is different from the organ authorized to create, abolish or amend ordinary statutes. For example, the former function may be rendered by an organ different from the latter organ in composition and electoral procedure, such as a constituent national assembly. But usually both functions are performed by the same organ. [Emphasis mine - M.S]

In other words, according to Kelsen, the same institution is capable of fulfilling two distinct functions (regular and constituent). This view is also taken by Prof Uri Yadin, the first head of the legislation department of the Ministry of Justice, and thereafter  head of legislative planning, in a lecture given on 6 March 1949 (See “On the Transition Law,” Uri Yadin Volume:, The Man and His Work, vol. I, A. Barak and T. Shpanitz, eds.  (Bursi, 1990) (hereinafter – Uri Yadin Volume, at p. 93-94):

We now proceed to the sections of the Transition Law dealing with the rules governing the Knesset. The first section provides that the parliament of the State of Israel will be called the “Knesset” and that the constituent assembly will be referred to as the “First Knesset.”  While it would seem that these sections deal only with issues of language, in fact their import extends beyond conferring appellations. The Constituent Assembly, elected as a single-task institution, was given the same name as the parliament, which was a permanent institution to be elected on a periodic basis.  This largely divested the Constituent Assembly of its temporary character, and it was incorporated as the first link of the chain of parliaments that would operate as the legislative branch of the State [emphasis mine M.S.

In other words, the powers of the Constituent Assembly were subsumed within the powers of the legislative authority. In view of this, I unreservedly recognize the Knesset’s continuing authority to enact constitutional legislation.

The Doctrine of the Knesset’s Unlimited Sovereignty and the Doctrine of the Constituent Authority

32. (a) We now return to the question presented above: What was the source of Knesset’s authority to enact constitutional legislation? I will preface my remarks by mentioning that there are those who altogether deny the Knesset any authority to enact constitutional legislation. The unique element of a constitution is that it establishes the formats and the rules for what is permitted and forbidden in future legislation. According to this approach, the Knesset lacks the authority to establish limitations that are prospective, or even limitations that require the votes of more than a majority of the Knesset members.  I do not accept this approach.

I have read the opinion of my honorable colleague, Justice Cheshin, who attempts to establish a theoretical basis for his thesis that the Knesset lacks constituent authority, and that as a result, it is similarly powerless to enact statutory provisions that curtail the legislative branch with respect to its future legislation, as detailed and elaborated in his opinion. I cannot accept his approach.  Forty five years have elapsed since the aforementioned Harrari Decision, in which the Knesset charged its Constitution, Law and Justice Committee to prepare, in its own words, a proposed constitution for the State, which would be composed chapter by chapter. During the intervening years, the Knesset has enacted eleven Basic Laws in the framework of fulfilling its constitutional mission. To cast doubt today on the Knesset’s legislative-constitutional authority contradicts, in my view, the most reasonable legal interpretation of the State’s parliamentary development and the law that has developed in the interim. Furthermore, the view that all constitutions are formed in accordance with same, standard format, dictated exclusively by the nature of the subject at hand, cannot be reconciled with the facts of diverse constitutions emerging in each state as the product of its own discretion, considerations and specific circumstances. There are no standard formats in this matter.

 (a) The Knesset defines its own powers and capacities, in accordance with the mandate granted to it by the nation, a mandate renewed in periodic general elections, conducted in accordance with constitutional legislation. The demarcation of the powers and capacities of the Knesset is anchored in the life of the State and the law. The Knesset does not derive its power from any external supra-statutory legislation (cf. e.g. A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London, 1924) 106.  It is the Knesset that establishes the various categories and fields of legislative provisions from beginning to end. The critical views of Knesset members regarding the course and mode of the framing of Israel’s constitution, cited by my honorable colleague should be viewed against the background and in the context of the time and place in which they were expressed. One must not forget that the majority of Knesset members who were critical at the time of the slow pace of the framing of the complete constitution, or even of the failure to execute a single, immediate constitutional act, subsequently gave their full support to the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset and the other Basic Laws, as chapters in the gradually emerging constitution, in their belief in the Knesset’s power to enact constitu­tional legislation, according to its choice and decisions.

 

To my mind there is, at the present stage, no legal justification to support either the diminution of the Knesset’s powers, or the assertion regarding any inherent limitation of their scope:

 

(b) On the other hand, there are approaches that view the Knesset as authorized to enact constitutional legislation. The constitu­ent authority of the Israeli legislature stems from the power consolidated in its hands during the course of its legislative history, from the basic norm that emerged in the early stages of the State’s existence, and from legislation that charted Israel’s constitu­tional path in framing a constitution, first as a single act and thereafter as a task to be executed in stages.

 

(c) Two principle doctrines acknowledge the Knesset’s authority to enact constitutional legislation. The first is the doctrine of the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty. The second is the doctrine of constituent authority. The two doctrines are not exclusive. There are others, some variations of one of them, and some separate doctrines that stand alone. I will devote a few words to each of the two aforementioned theories.

 

(d) The doctrine of the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty proceeds from the assumption that the Knesset is the supreme legislative authority and that its powers are unrestricted, barring such limitations as it may estab­lish for itself. No legislative body is superior to the Knesset, and it is empowered to enact any law, whether constitutional or regular. Its authority also comprises and integrates the authority to enact constitutional legislation that was not exhausted from the establishment of the State and subsequent to the elections for a Con­stituent Assembly.

 

In other words, the Knesset, as such, consolidates and merges all the powers of the Provisional Council of State, the Constituent Assembly, the legislature estab­lished according to the Transition Law, of the Second Knesset (Transition) Law, and of Basic Law: The Knesset. All of these were transferred to each and every Knesset and thus exist and are maintained.

 

Inter alia, all the powers of the constitutional legislature were transferred to the Knesset. Its legislation creates the various normative hierarchies. The Knesset operates in that capacity without any internal allocation or division into different institutions based on one body’s supremacy over another. The Knesset has discretion to decide whether its legislative product will belong to the supreme constitutive level or the regular legislative level, and in enacting constitutional legislation, by virtue of its unlimited powers, it also establishes the supremacy of the constitutional law over the regular law, and is authorized to determine conditions applicable to regular legislation for the purposes of adjusting it to the norms determined in the constitutional legislation.

 

All legislative acts are performed by the Knesset in that capacity. It is the supreme and all-powerful legislative authority of the State. This is the monistic conception of the Knesset’s powers, as a monolithic body capable of performing various categories of acts, at its own discretion.

 

The Knesset’s powers are not truncated and disjointed from constitutional developments, but have always faithfully represented and reflected them. Its great, multifaceted powers are the result of its unifying the entirety of the powers transferred to it in the course of our constitutional history. It is not required to divide itself up, or change its image, form or legal status in order to exercise its broad powers.

 

Justice Berenson’s description is most appropriate: 

 

‘There can be no doubt that under this state’s constitutional regime, the Knesset is sovereign. It is empowered to pass any law, and to determine its contents as it sees fit.’ (CA 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer [18], at p.2547.

 

Incidentally, Justice Berenson’s demurer in that judgment with respect to the Knesset’s authority to invalidate a law, did not relate to an entrenched statutory provision, such as s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. See the Bergman case [15], decided by a panel of which Justice Berenson was a member. 

 

Consequently, the Knesset is authorized to enact laws on two legislative levels, both on the constitutional level (a complete constitution or Basic Laws) and on the regular legislative level. As noted above, it also assumed the authority to enact certain forms of secondary legislation. In the framework of its unlimited authority, the Knesset is at liberty to determine conditions and qualifications that are applicable to future legislation, whether constitutional or regular.  This is our “constitutional arrangement” as anchored in Israel’s constitutional history, in its actual legislative development, and in the case law of this Court. Constitutional continuity has never been interrupted, and the Knesset has the authority to continue to complete the task of the Constituent Assembly which was nipped in the bud, and which by force of the Harrari Decision became the continuing and ongoing mission of the Knesset.

 

In summary, in my view the Knesset has the authority to enact not only Basic Laws, but even a complete constitution.

 

I also think that it is appropriate for it to do so, and fervently support it. In the framework of a symposium debate on the subject with Lord Diplock (M. Shamgar “On the Written Constitution” 9 Israel Law Review (1974) 467 at p.471) I wrote the following:

 

 ‘…the consolidation of the position of the Knesset as a supreme law-giver and the merger of the Constituent Assembly and the Knesset, decided on by the First Knesset, enhanced the supremacy of the Knesset.’

(e) The doctrine of constituent authority asserts that the powers of the Constituent Assembly were transferred to the Knesset that, it follows, alternatively wears “two hats” or “two crowns.” There are times when it acts as a constituent authority, superior in terms of normative status to the Knesset as a regular legislative authority. As a constituent authority the Knesset is competent to enact constitutional legislation. There are times when it acts as a regular legislative body, and as such it is – in the hierarchy of authority – on a lower level than the Knesset when acting as a constituent authority [see e.g.: C. Klein “The Constituent Authority in the State of Israel” 2 Mishpatim, (1970) 51; C. Klein, “A New Era in Israel’s Constitutional Law,” 6 Israel Law Review (1971) 376; C. Klein, “Special Majority and Implied Change,” 28 Ha-Praklit, (1972-73) 563; C. Klein, “Semantics and the Rule of Law – Reflections and Appeals on HCJ 66/77 Y. Rassler v. Chairman of Central Knesset Elections Committee,   9 Mishpatim (1978) 79; C. Klein, “Human Dignity and Liberty – Initial Normative Assessment” 1 Hamishpat (1993) 123).]

 

The constituent assembly doctrine finds expression in academic literature in two forms, or perhaps with two point of emphasis: In other words, it is a single doctrine, with different versions that give primacy to different aspects. Among its proponents there are those who view the separation between the constituent authority and the legislative authority not just as a functional separation but also as an institutional separation. On the other hand, there are those for whom the doctrine is based on a functional separation, creating different levels on the normative hierarchy.

 

The conception of institutional division was first expressed in the writing of M. Sternberg, in his essay, “An Additional Law or a Supreme Normative Layer, 16 Molad (1958) 284, 287), where he wrote:

 

Consequently, the collective of persons known as the Knesset also functions as a body known as the constituent body, functioning parallel to the Knesset itself, its fundamental objective being to frame a constitution’ [emphasis mine – M.S].

 

Apparently, Professor Akzin took a similar view in the aforementioned book, at p.40 where he writes:

 

…When the same group of people fulfils these two roles, they should be viewed as operating as two separate institutions….if we are unwilling to adopt such a “formalistic” view of this process, the singular character of the constitution as opposed to the laws may lose its significance.

 

I used the term “apparently” because the examples that the learned author later provides for his thesis might give the impression that the abovementioned description is more sharply defined than the factual foundation on which it rests. At all events, Professor Akzin’s aforementioned description relies on his theory of the correlation between the scale of legislative authorities and the institutional scale. In other words, each authority has an exclusive institutional correlate authorized to exercise that authority.  As explained above, I reject that approach.

 

According to the thesis presented by Sternberg and Akzin, the two institutions exist in tandem, or one as part of the other, and operate alternately as legislative authorities. In terms of its essence and normative classification, a legislative act is classified in accordance with the cloak (or “hat”) worn by the legislative authority at that time. What this means is that from time to time there is an institutional metamorphosis, dictated by the nature of the legislative material being dealt with by the legislature.

 

As opposed to the conception premised upon institutional division, there is another approach, according to which there is no institutional division, but rather a functional legislative division, which affects the position of the legislation on the normative legislative hierarchy. Under the alternative conception of the analytical foundations of constituent authority, the Knesset is a single institution that provides the anchor for both constituent authority and regular legislative authority. By virtue of the Knesset’s standing as a constituent authority, the Basic Laws were enacted. Consequently, they constitute the supreme norm in the light of which the constitutionality of a regular law is examined. The normative level reflects the nature of the function performed by the Knesset when it enacts the relevant legislative provision.

 

(f)   Of these two principle doctrines - the doctrine of the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset and the doctrine of constituent assembly - I definitely prefer the first, namely, the doctrine of the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset. To my mind, it more accurately reflects the legislative history, the accepted, recognized legal approaches and this Court’s case-law (see M.Shamgar, “The Knesset’s Authority in the Constitutional Realm, 26 Mishpatim (1995) 3).

 

I considered whether it would be appropriate in this opinion to cite the reasons, and by implication also the arguments for and against each of these two doctrines. I decided in the end that such a discussion is unnecessary in the present circumstances, because it is not necessary in order to examine the conformity of the amending statute to the provisions of the Basic Law. The main point is that, in my opinion, each of the two doctrines answers the question that I posed above, namely, whence the authority of the Knesset to produce legislative acts of constitutional standing. Therefore I leave this matter to be dealt with at the appropriate place and time.

 Self-Limitation of the Knesset

33. This brings us to a second, separate question, namely, whether the Knesset is competent to enact legislative provisions that limit its own future legislative powers. In my opinion, the Knesset holds every authority including the authority to limit itself by means of legislation. This is essential for the creation of a sound constitutional framework. In order to confer entrenched, elevated status upon fundamental rights there is a need to limit the future regular legislative authority and-to subordinate its legislation to the normative values that constitute the various fundamental rights. In the absence of the power of limitation, constitu­tional provisions that define fundamental rights are left with no stable protection for the future. At least since the Bergman case [15], we have acknowledged that this Court is competent to decide on the validity of legislation that contradicts or violates a Basic Law

The question of whether parliament can bind itself by entrenching laws in either a procedural or a substantive manner derives primarily from the classic English constitutional doctrine, which at the time rejected the theory that Parliament could bind itself or any subsequent parlia­ment. The clear enunciation of the theory that Parliament cannot limit its own legislative authority is often demonstrated by citing from the comments made by Lord Bryce, one of the ministers in the Gladstone government in England, who explained in an address to Parliament in 1886:

There is no principle more universally admitted by constitutional jurists than the absolute omnipotence of parliament. This omnipotence exists because there is nothing beyond parliament, or behind parliament… There is one limitation and only one upon our omnipotence and that is that we cannot bind our successors. If we pass a statute purporting to extinguish our right to legislate on any given subject, or over any given district, it may be repudiated and repealed by any following parliament – aye even by this present parliament on any later day’  [emphasis mine – M.S.].

 

These comments from Parl. Deb. (4th Ser.) 1218-1219 (1886 305) were cited for example by Prof. B. Nimmer in his study “The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel’s Quest for a Constitution” 70 Colum.L.Rev (1970) 1217, 1227-1228, and remained a firmly entrenched tenet of English jurisprudence until the last two decades. They are the foremost hallmark of the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy in accordance with the Dicey school (see for example, in the tenth edition Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed. London (1959) by E.C. Wade; G. Phillips “Constitution and Constitutional Law, 7th ed. 1963 London) and many others.

Echoes of this approach in Israeli academic writing can be found in the article of A. Likovski, “The Court and the Legislative Supremacy of the Knesset,” 3 Isr.L.Rev. (1968) 345, 364; See also: A. Likovski, Can the Knesset Adopt a Constitution which will be the Supreme Law of the Land, 4 Isr.L.Rev. (1969) 61; Prof. A. Rubinstein, “Israel’s Piecemeal Constitution” 16 Scripta Hierosolymitana (1966) p.201; Prof. B. Akzin, “Problems of Constitutional and Administrative Law,” International Lawyers Convention in Israel  (Jerusalem 1959) 163;

My answer to this problem is anchored in the Knesset’s power – as the sovereign assembly – to enact all manner of legislation, of any content, including legislative entrenchment (procedurally or substantive) of fundamental values of the State of Israel, and in so doing, to bind itself and any subsequent Knesset, subject to the power to amend or revoke that limitation in the manner stipulated by the Knesset. The distinguishing characteristic of these values is a broad social consensus. On the face of it, this theory entails the diminution of the absolute legislative power of the Knesset, since by a single constitutional act one Knesset can limit both its own legislative power, and that of another Knesset. How­ever this is the classic constitutional paradox of the sovereignty of the legislature: assuming that the Knesset is sovereign, it is permitted to perform any act, including the imposition of limitations on the Knesset. In other words, the limitation of the Knesset detracts from the sovereignty of the Knesset. However, this effect is the result of the actions of the Knesset itself. It is the Knesset that legislates and in so doing it imposes limitations, and it is the Knesset that is authorized to remove the limitations on its power by means that it has established for itself.

From a logical perspective, the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a possible and logical solution (Prof. Y. Englard, Introduction to Jurisprudence (Yahalom, 1991) at p. 110)  In fact :

Nothing prevents a legal norm from relating not only to particular forms of conduct of people but also to its own validity and the manner of its change. Just as the legislature can determine the limits of applicability of a norm in terms of time and place, it can determine that a particular norm cannot be repealed or changed, whether by itself or by any other entity (ibid, at p. 110-111).

The issue was also addressed by Professor Hart in his book The Concept of Law (2nd ed. Oxford, 1994) at p.149, where he states:  

Under the in­fluence of the Austinian doctrine that law is essentially the product of a legally untrammelled will, older constitutional theorists wrote as if it was a logical necesssity that there should be a legislature which was sovereign, in the sense that it is free, at every moment of its existence as a continuing body, not only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but also from its own prior legislation. That Parliament is sovereign in this sense may now be regarded as established, and the principle that no earlier Parliament can preclude its “successors” from repealing its legislation constitutes part of the ultimate rule of recognition used by the courts in identifying valid rules of law.

 

It is, how­ever, important to see that no necessity of logic, still less of nature, dictates that there should be such a Parliament; it is only one arrangement among others, equally conceivable, which has come to be accepted with us as the criterion of legal validity. Among these others is another principle which might equally well, perhaps better, deserve the name of ‘sovereignty’ This is the principle that Parliament should not be incapable of limiting irrevocably the legislative competence of its successors but, on the contrary, should have this wider self-limiting power. Parliament would then at least once in its history be capable of exercising an even larger sphere of legislative com­petence than the accepted established doctrine allows to it. The requirement should be that from the moment of its existence Parliament should be free from legal limitations including even those imposed by itself, is, after all, only one interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence. (emphasis mine – M.S.)

According to Professor Hart a system in which the parliament is authorized to limit itself is an even better reflection of the concept of “sovereignty,” which is the adjective he uses when relating to the [English] Parliament. In other words, according to Professor Hart, a parliament that is also authorized to limit its power by force of its own legislation gives expression thereby to its unlimited power and authorities, which stem from and within itself, and not by force of any other external abstract hierarchy.  According to Professor Hart, the Knesset’s power to limit itself need not flow from another body, of a higher institutional status, but rather can stem from the same institutional source, i.e. from the parliament as such.

 

The border line of the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a function of constitutional policy. The solution presented here is that the Knesset is permitted to limit itself in accordance with its own discretion. It can restrict both the form of the legislation and the content of legislation. The judicial branch has given legal effect to the Knesset’s desire to restrict its power.

 

Furthermore, Dicey’s classical doctrine that parliament cannot limit itself has lost ground even in the country of its conception (see P. Craig, “Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law,” 106 L.Q.Rev. (1990) 105). In other words, the English system – a constitutional system from which we have drawn extensively – imposed restrictions on the legislative power of the legislature. These restrictions were imposed in the framework of the United Kingdom ratifying the European Communities Act, 1972 and especially by reason of sections 3 (1) and 4 (2).  In case law, see: Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2 (1991) [102], at 108; MaCarthy Ltd. v. Smith (1981) [103], at 200. English academic writing on the English law on this point is rich: see e.g.: G. Winterton, “The British Grundnorm. The Parliamentary Supremacy Re-Examined” 92 L.Q.Rev. (1976) 591.  Professor Akehurst provided the following summary of the legal position in England (“Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Supremacy of Community Law,” The British Yearbook of International Law – 1989 (Oxford, 1990) 351, 357, in the following words:

 

English courts will apply an act of Parliament which expressly states that it is intended to violate or repudiate a rule of community law, or to repeal, amend or limit the application of the European Communities Act; but in all other cases they will recognize the supremacy of community law over the sovereignty of the British Parliament. (emphasis mine – M.S.)

As stated, the subordination of the English legislature to normative provisions that curtail its legislative power was done by force of the Parliament’s own legislation. English law recognizes a provision of superior normative standing, its supremacy having been conferred by the legislature in the wake of England’s joining the European Community.  All the same, the supremacy is relative in the sense that the legislature can override it by force of explicit legislation.  Similarly, the Knesset, too, can override the standing and the content of a constitutional provision by force of later constitutional legislation, or legislation enacted by force thereof, that complies with the conditions and qualifications specified in the constitutional legislation. Naturally, the English constitutional arrangements are not the same as ours. Nonetheless, in this context I would like to draw attention to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.  Here, too, we find a situation in which if the language of the later legislation is explicit, the self-limitation of the legislation does not create a constitutional barrier. 

 

The source of the Knesset’s competence to submit its own legislative power to substantive limitations may be derived from the doctrine of the constituent assembly or it may be derived from the doctrine of the inherent unlimited authority of the legislature to enact any law, including a law whereby it limits itself. Both doctrines lead to the conclusion that our House of Representatives has authority in the constitutional realm, that is: in principle, it is within the Knesset’s power to frame a constitution and even to demarcate the contents of future legislation, and this circumscription complies with the principle of legality.

 

      I made my comments above to show that the doctrine by which the Knesset is unable to limit itself, for example by way of a requirement of an entrenched majority, also had its supporters in our own legislature and scholarly literature. The scholarly sources of the opponents of the Knesset’s power of self-limitation derive from the English legal tradition, which has itself changed in the interim in its own way..

 

Self – Limitation in Case Law

34.(a) Our constitutional tradition supports the proposition that the Knesset is empowered to limit itself with respect to fundamental issues. It can limit itself on a formal level in terms of the method of adopting a new law (such as a requirement of a special majority – s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, and sections 9 (a) and 34 of Basic Law: The State Economy; s. 54 of Basic Law:  The Government of 1992; sections 44 and 45 of Basic Law: The Knesset; s. 42 of Basic Law: The Government of 1968, and s. 56 of Basic Law: The Government of 1992; s. 25 of Basic Law: The President of the State; s. 22 of Basic Law: The Judiciary). The limitation may occur on a substantive level (for example, s. 4 (opening words) of Basic Law: The Knesset or s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation).

(b)   Case-law has not challenged the proposition that the Knesset has the power to issue normative acts with supra-legal status.  This Court adjudicated the subject of the entrenched provisions of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset in the Bergman case [15], and the subject arose again in HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority (hereinafter – the Derech Eretz case) [19]. Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset came to the fore once again in HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker (hereinafter – Rubinstein  [20]. In HCJ 142/89. Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker,  on page 571 Deputy President Elon stated that by force of its constitutional sovereignty, the Knesset had the authority to pass any legislation that it deemed appropriate, and we have no license to question the legislative act.

In the Laor case [21], my distinguished colleague President Barak noted that the entrenchment bestowed on the provisions of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset ‘is binding in our legal system, because we acknowledge the Knesset’s authority to act as a constituent authority and to prepare Basic Laws that will become the various chapters of the State Constitution’ (ibid,  at p. 539). Nothing in that paragraph contests the Knesset’s authority to establish entrenched provisions in the constitutional realm, or the Supreme Court’s power to invalidate a law that contravenes an entrenched provision (see my comments in HCJ 669/85 Kahana v. Knesset Speaker [22]). 

35.  In my view, based on all of the above we can conclude that our constitutional tradition has in fact endorsed the Knesset’s power to limit itself, and in fact the Knesset’s self-limitation has merited sovereign approval, in the first stage by formal self-limitation and at the second stage by substantive limitation.  With respect to formal self-limitation, the first guiding rule is the Bergman [15] rule. A law presuming to violate the principle of equality that was not adopted by the required majority is defective, and subject to a constitutional remedy. The legislative authority – the Knesset – accepted this Court’s ruling in Bergman[15]. It removed the inequality that affected the new lists participating in the elections, and passed the Elections Financing Law, 5733-1973, together with the Elections to the Knesset (Confirmation of Validity of Laws), 5729-1969. In the course of the years, a constitutional custom and understanding has been established that the Knesset is endowed with the power of self-limitation with respect to formal aspects. This constitutional custom has the merited seal of approval of all of Israel’s branches of government – the legislative branch, the executive branch and the judicial branch (Derech Eretz [19], Rubinstein [20], Laor [21]. 

The recognition of the Knesset’s ability to limit itself on the formal level led to the conclusion regarding the power of the Knesset to limit itself on the substantive level. Indeed, rationally, there is no room to distinguish between formal and substantive limitations. As Prof. Nimmer correctly pointed out in the article cited above, at p. 1231:

 

            Logically, there can be no ground for distinguishing between the powers to fetter future parliaments substantively and procedurally, either there is power to do both or there is power to do neither (emphasis mine – M.S.).

 

At the same time, the limitation is not unrestricted. Patently, boundaries must be imposed on the extent to which the legislature may be fettered. It is not necessary to delineate these boundaries here, as there is consensus that in relation to basic rights such as those found in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – no difficulty is posed by the fundamental recognition of substantive or content-related limitation. In other words, we do not need to delineate these boundaries for the purpose of the discussion before us, and we may leave this issue open. In any event, on one hand, it is possible to take into account fundamental principles of our system as a Jewish and democratic state. On the other hand, tension exists between the principle of protection and the stability of fundamental principles and the need for flexibility. These and other arguments are serious and persuasive. Thus, for example, there is a view which holds that broad and substantive fettering of the Knesset may violate the principle of majority rule to an inappropriate extent (for details see R. Gavison, “Controversy over Israel’s Bill of Rights,” 15 Isr. Y. H. R. (1985) 113, 127).

 

Summing up this point, there is no logical obstacle to the Knesset limiting itself procedurally or substantively. Likewise, in so far as concerns fundamental rights and the principles of our constitutional regime, there is currently no legal or substantive hindrance or indeed obstacle of a legal policy or constitutional nature precluding the Knesset from limiting itself procedurally or substantively.

 

Summary regarding constitutional legislation

 

36. In summary, the phenomenon of Basic Laws in our legal system, viewed precisely discloses the following: the Knesset pursues a constitutional program. This program is being executed on a chapter by chapter basis. The Basic Laws form the constitutional infrastructure of the State of Israel. Today, most of their provisions do not possess normative supremacy by virtue of their own status, albeit they are “constitutional laws” by nature and description. The Knesset may decide, even at present, that some of these Laws or parts of them will possess normative supremacy. It did so, for example, in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It was also entitled to do so in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is the twin brother of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and some of the provisions of which (Section 1 and the amendment to Section 8) were adopted on 20th Adar 5724 (9.3.94) as part of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation of 1994.

 

The methodology of constitutional legislation

 

 

 

 

37.  (a) Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were born together, and it is possible to learn about one from the other, both in terms of similarities and in terms of disparities.

(b)   Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a simple and direct entrenchment provision such as that found in s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In order to classify Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty we must consider the general interpretive sources that are ordinarily available to us. First, it is titled “Basic Law,” and as such it is directly connected to the Harrari decision. This per se is sufficient to categorize it.

Following the Harrari decision, legislation was formulated in this country bearing the title “Basic Law.” This heading clarifies the status of the law. In the absence of such a sign of recognition, is it possible to turn to an examination of the specific law in order to try and learn about its constitutional nature from its language and its contents, including from its status, purpose and objectives? Is it perhaps the case that there can be no constitutional provision save one that bears the title “Basic Law”? According to every legal and historical thesis, the Transition Law was enacted by the Constitutive Assembly. It does not bear the title “Basic Law.” Is it a constitutional provision?

What is the status of the Law of Return and the Women’s Equal Rights Law that were enacted by the First Knesset, which directly and expressly wielded the powers of the Constituent Assembly? Both are of a manifestly constitutional nature; however, do they form part of our constitutional legislation?

These are difficult questions, but I shall leave them aside as not pertinent to the present case. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to set out a number of guidelines for future constitutional legislation, as even if we assign the enactment of a constitution to a constituent authority, we are still left with the question of the line which that authority must follow when identifying appropriate issues for inclusion in a constitution and the method of legislation and substantive classification that it must adopt.

38.  (a) First, there are a number of principal characteristics which distinguish a constitution from an ordinary law. A constitution deals with fundamental principles. It seeks to accord the principles a guiding status in so far as concerns other legislation and the acts of the state authorities in general. This principle is known in German constitutional theory as Vorbehalt Des Gesetzes (see Sections 1(3), 20(3) and 79(3) of the German Basic Law; New Challenges to the German Basic Law, C. Starck, ed. (Nomos,   1991) 162; R. Herzog, Staat und Recht im Wandel (Keip, 1993) 150. The constitution is the outcome of the will of the nation, and accordingly it is generally adopted, in other legal systems, in a unique one-time process. A constitution is occasionally characterized by relative inflexibility in relation to ways of amending it. A constitution is occasionally characterized by limitations on the possibility of infringing rights protected by it (and on occasion even by the absence of any possibility of “infringement”). Nonetheless, there are systems, such as that of New Zealand, in which the bill of rights does not have special status compared to ordinary legislation.

Second, the language of a Basic Law itself should indicate that it has a special normative status. For example, if a law states unequivocally that it has special or entrenched constitutional status, then we are dealing with a law possessing formal constitutional status (i.e., possessing normative superiority relative to ordinary legislation). This is also true if the law establishes exact conditions for the validity of a law which seeks to infringe a protected right. In other words, a Basic Law’s attitude, revealed in its contents, regarding its own status carries paramount weight in determining the normative classification of the Basic Law.

Put differently, a constitution possesses certain substantive aspects (the structure of the regime, fundamental rights and principles) and certain fundamental aspects (such as the manner of adoption and amendment of the constitution, the name of the law, its language, style, formulation, concepts). A constitution is characterized by the conciseness of its formulation. A constitution is characterized by abstractness.

Third, it is possible to examine the manner in which the law is integrated into the constitutional structure of the system. Constitutional structure is examined in the light of the constitutional history. It is examined through the constitutional acts performed by the Knesset. A constitutional law serves a certain purpose – it is designed to alter a certain normative reality. Understanding the law requires that we examine the legal situation that the law is intended to change. We must aspire to realize its purpose. If it is a Basic Law, understanding it requires that it be situated logically and harmoniously within three primary circles. The broad, external circle is that of the fundamental principles of our system. The second circle is that of constitutional legislation – the “Basic Laws.” Our narrow specific circle is, in the present case, the integration of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty with its twin – Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – within our constitutional system.

These two Basic Laws are the first in the bill of rights (as distinct from the institutional Basic Laws). They entered our legal world in close proximity in terms of time and circumstances, and they were even amended concurrently. To a large extent, therefore, they coexist. It is particularly important that they be interpreted harmoniously.

Fourth, an understanding of the substance and purpose of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty requires that appropriate weight be given to the legislative intent and the constitutional history of the Basic Law. The constitutional history and legislative intent are discerned from the legislative history and incarnations of the bill, from hearings in the Knesset, from the changes introduced into the Basic Law during the second and third readings in the Knesset, and from the law’s record after its enactment. Special importance must be attached to the legislative intent in the present circumstances. These remarks are not directed at the literal interpretation of any particular idea but to the overall concept.

The legislative will, in so far as it can be ascertained, should provide the starting point. The difficulties in ascertaining it are indeed many, but we should not be tempted to exaggerate them. In most cases, it is at least clear what the legislature did not want. (Prof. A. Levontin, “Interpretation: Climes and Synthesis,” Klinghoffer Volume, at pp. 269, 277-278).

From a determination of the characteristics of the legislation we now turn to the tests applicable to the Basic Law before us. Does it establish statutory arrangements that reflect its place on the normative hierarchy, or will its protections of fundamental rights sway in every wind in so far as variation or infringement of its provisions? Is it similar, in this sense, to the provisions of most of the Basic Laws that preceded it, which lack entrenchment clauses?

Basic Laws: Variation and Infringement

39. (a) The Basic Laws form the constitutional infrastructure of the State of Israel in the spirit of the Harrari decision and its realization. Had the issue of “variation” arisen in the present case, i.e., had the Amending Law been intended to change the Basic Law, I would immediately have presented the principle whereby, according to correct constitutional theory, variation of a Basic Law must always be effected by a Basic Law. The concept of a normative constitutional hierarchy presented above leads to the conclusion that a more highly positioned statute cannot be varied in form or content by legislation lower in the constitutional hierarchy. This is not true of the converse position. In other words, legislation higher in the constitutional hierarchy can amend a statutory provision lower in the constitutional hierarchy. In this context, the issue of “implied amendment” may arise. However, I shall not address that issue, and will leave it for the appropriate opportunity. The same conclusion emerges from the practice of the Knesset. In this regard, note should be taken of the amendment to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty that was effected in 1994 by means of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

As mentioned, we are not concerned here with a “variation.” The question arising concerns an “infringement.” Each of the Basic Laws sets out express provisions in regard to possible infringement of a fundamental right: Sections 4 and 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. First, it is necessary to examine whether there is an infringement of a fundamental right. If the answer is affirmative, then did the law comply with the conditions of the limitation clause or not? What is the outcome where there is an infringement that is incompatible with the requirements of the relevant limitation clause, which establishes the limitations and conditions for valid legislation notwithstanding its infringement of a fundamental right?

(b) The issue of “infringement” is a complex one. There are numerous alternative theories regarding the distinction between an infringement that is contrary to law and one that complies with the requirements of the law. I shall present them and indicate the one that I believe should be preferred.

The first theory holds that every ordinary law of the Knesset may infringe a right protected by a Basic Law. According to this view, the relationship between a Basic Law and every ordinary law is no different than the relationship between any two ordinary pieces of legislation of the Knesset. This first possibility is based on the Negev case [12] (at p. 642, opposite letter G). It follows from the Negev case [12] that an ordinary law (Standards Law, 5713-1953) may infringe a principle established by a Basic Law (Basic Law: the Government), when the relationship between the two is a regular interpretive relationship between two pieces of legislation (such as a special law vis-à-vis a general law). As Justice Berenson stated there: “the fact that the Standards Law is a special law compared to Basic Law: the Government which is a general law, accords the special law priority over the general law” (see also the Kaniel case [13] and the Ressler case [14]).

Judgment was reserved concerning the Negev case [12] in later case-law: in HCJ 119/80 OM 224/80 HaCohen v. Government of Israel [23] at p. 283, the question of the possibility of a provision of a Basic Law infringing a later ordinary law was left open (ibid, at p. 283). In my view, the Negev judgment [12] was not intended to refer to normative constitutional hierarchy but to the status of a specialized statutory provision versus the provision of a general law, and no more. Further, the judgment referred to a Basic Law that was not accorded any entrenched status whatsoever, either directly or impliedly by virtue of its provisions.

To summarize, the first possibility holds that, in the absence of a qualifying provision, there is no normative difference between an ordinary law that seeks to infringe a Basic Law and a Basic Law that seeks to do the same.

The second thesis holds that a Basic Law enjoys limited normative priority. According to this view, an ordinary law may infringe a Basic Law, however, this should properly be done by the Knesset in an express manner. An infringement of a law that is not expressly made has no legal force. A law that infringes a right protected by a Basic Law, without an express statement to that effect, does not have the legal force to do so. Such a law is subject to constitutional remedies by virtue of its unconstitutionality. This thesis has been accepted by a number of scholars. It has been approved by former Deputy President Elon, who stated that “reason dictates that a statute that seeks to vary a provision of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty should state that it is made notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law, or some similar expression, but no more” (M. Elon, “The Way of Law in the Constitution: The Values of the Jewish and Democratic State in Light of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,” 17 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1993) 659, 662). This view has been accepted by Ms. J. Karp, (J. Karp, “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,” I Mishpat uMimshal (1993), 323, 332). She writes that the supremacy of the Basic Law is merely relative:

This does not mean complete negation of the legislature’s power to override a Basic Law and dismantle it. In the same way as formal entrenchment does not restrict the legislature in relation to the content of its legislation, but only in relation to the process of variation (the requirement of a special majority), so too implied entrenchment is capable of restricting the legislature only in relation to the procedure of the variation, i.e., on condition that there is an express statement by the legislature regarding its desire to override the Basic Law (ibid, at p. 324; emphasis mine – M.S.).

In her opinion:

The Basic Law embodies a compromise: the court is indeed accorded the power to adjudicate regarding the invalidity of the law. However, this power is limited and ends in the face of an express statement by the legislature regarding its desire to deviate from the Basic Law… (ibid).

These comments are prima facie also applicable to the case of “infringement” only. Prof. Weisman too, accepts the second possibility as the correct interpretation of the validity of the infringement enacted in a Basic Law: “as the provision in Section 8 (of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – M.S.) is not entrenched (in the same way as the other sections in this Basic Law were not entrenched) it follows that the Knesset is not precluded from enacting statutes in the future, the contents of which cannot be reconciled with the limitations established in Section 8 of the Basic Law, provided that this is done expressly and clarification of this intention is given” (Y. Weisman, Property Law The Institute (Sacker Institute for Legislative Research & Comparative Law, 1993) 38; emphasis mine – M.S.).

The third possibility acknowledges the supremacy of a Basic Law per se and strengthens it. According to this view, a lawful “infringement” of the Israeli bill of rights is possible only if it meets the requirements consistent with the theory of a normative hierarchy. This thesis is premised on the unitary nature of the bill of fundamental rights, i.e., of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and other Basic Laws that may be enacted by the Knesset in the future in regard to basic rights. These Basic Laws will form a unified whole. The Knesset expressed its desire regarding the normative classification of the Israeli bill of rights. Following the Harrari decision, it presented these rights in the form of Basic Laws. In so doing, it assigned them to a constitutional normative hierarchy. A variation or infringement outside the framework of the limitation clause, which too forms part of the Basic Law, may only be carried out by a law of equal status, i.e., by means of a Basic Law or on the basis of an authorization in a Basic Law (see s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation of 1994, which not only illustrates this interpretive approach but also shows that the Knesset adopted it in practice).

These are the three principal options relating to the normative classification of a Basic Law in relation to the possibility of an “infringement” of a protected right that does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause.

My choice is the third option. I have already mentioned above that in view of the constitutional policy of the Knesset, as expressed in the two new Basic Laws, it is appropriate from now on to hold that no variation of any Basic Law may be carried out save by a Basic Law, and it would be right to hold that no “infringement” of a Basic Law may be carried out save by a Basic Law or by virtue of an authorizing provision therein.

We must now turn from presenting the general approaches to an examination of the question before us regarding the application of the specific Basic Law with which we are presently concerned to the Amending Law. For this purpose, we shall examine a number of provisions in the Basic Law.

The Basic Law versus the Amending Law

The Supremacy Clause

40.  (a) Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a supremacy clause, nor does Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not even contain an entrenchment clause, like s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which provides that:

This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.

The absence of a clear supremacy clause does not compel the conclusion that the status of a Basic Law is equivalent to that of an ordinary statute.

A supremacy clause, had one existed, would certainly have been persuasive of the fact that the law possesses supreme status. The Canadian Constitution stated that it was ‘the supreme law of Canada.’ Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, declares unequivocally: ‘The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada.’ This normative supremacy engenders the constitutional remedy whereby: ‘any law that is inconsistent with the clauses of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect’ (Section 52(1) – final clause of the Constitution Act). The Canadian Constitution was taken into consideration by the drafters of the Basic Law (Karp, in the article cited above, at p. 331).

The German Basic Law (the Grundgesetz) provides in Section 20(3) –

‘Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.’

Translated:

The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.

By the way, the German legal commentary is aware of the tautology expressed in the words “law and justice.”

Section 1(3) of the German Basic Law, which is similar to Section 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Section 5 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, provides:

Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht.

Translated:

The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.

The German constitution subjects the activities of the legislature, executive and judiciary directly to the provisions of the constitution. It is undisputed that the German Basic Law manifestly embodies the notion of supremacy.

It is possible to adduce numerous additional examples (for example, s. 140 of the Austrian constitution of 1920 – the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG)).

(b)   As noted, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a supremacy clause. The Basic Law does not incorporate a provision to the effect that it is a supreme law in the State of Israel.  The draft bill Basic Law: Legislation, as may be seen from its history since it was first published in 1971 (see (1971), 27 HaPraklit 140; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1976; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1978; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1992; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1993) was intended to establish the subservience of ordinary legislation to basic legislation, however, the proposal has not yet developed into law.

(c)   The Basic Law that we are examining also does not contain a provision, as proposed, to the effect that “a law will not contravene a Basic Law save if passed in the Knesset plenum by the votes of two-thirds of the members of the Knesset and unless it expressly states that it is valid notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law” (s. 5(d) of the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1992).

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation states that a statutory provision that infringes freedom of occupation will be valid in certain circumstances, even if it is incompatible with s. 4 (i.e., even if it does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause). The explicit affirmative also implies its negative, namely that ab initio, a statutory provision that is repugnant to sections 4 or 8 of the Basic Law is invalid. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation therefore addresses the question of the validity of laws that infringe a provision in a Basic Law (similar to the European Union Convention, Article. 177(B), Costa v. Enel (1964) [108] at 590). As we shall see below, a similar conclusion follows from the provisions of sections 8, 10 and 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

To summarize this point, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation does not contain a supremacy clause, albeit it refers to the manner of its variation and the validity of infringing legislation. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a supremacy clause, but it refers expressly to the validity of infringing legislation and thereby designates a mandatory route and binding standards. In s. 8, this Basic Law defines the boundaries of possible infringement and thereby impliedly establishes its supremacy relative to infringing legislation.

Rigidity

41. (a) Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not enjoy rigidity. There is no express provision that a special majority is needed to vary the Basic Law. The variation is a statutory act by virtue of which the scope of protection accorded to certain rights varies for good or for bad. Indeed, we have already repeatedly clarified that the “variation” is distinct from the “infringement.” Variation undermines the right itself. “Infringement” does not vary the protected right. It merely enables the infringing statute to circumvent the constitutional remedy in given circumstances.

As noted above, in consequence of the ‘variation’ it is conceivable that the protection accorded to a right will be more restricted; for example, by amending the Basic Law by restricting its scope, repealing a particular provision in it or repealing the entire Basic Law. On the other hand, the protection can also become broader by reason of the variation, for example, by the addition of protected rights or by elevating the normative supremacy of the protected values.

(b) We have seen that there is no requirement for a special majority or for a special process to vary the Basic Law before us.

Subject to future legislation (such as Basic Law: Legislation), the process for changing a Basic Law follows the same stages of legislation as an ordinary law, i.e., a draft Basic Law is published in the same way as an ordinary bill. The draft Basic Law is enacted in three readings. Every Knesset member may table a Basic Law through a private member’s bill, in the same way as every Knesset member may table any ordinary private bill. The Knesset Regulations apply to the enactment of a Basic Law, just as to the enactment of an ordinary statute. Indeed, this is “the unbearable lightness of legislating and amending Basic Laws” (Dr A. Bendor, “Flaws in Enacting Basic Laws” 2 Mishpat uMimshal (1994), 443, 444). The absence of any element of rigidity is of interpretive significance. My distinguished colleague the President referred to the inherent importance of rigidity as a distinctive feature of a constitution. The rigidity of a constitution demonstrates its supremacy over an ordinary law, “so that in the event of a contradiction between the provisions of a constitution and the provisions of an ordinary law, the constitution will prevail (A. Barak, Judicial Discretion (Papyrus, 1987) 319).

For an illustration of the frequency of rigid provisions in a constitution it is possible to turn, for example, to the Constitution of the United States (Article V); the Constitution of Canada (Art. 52(3) of the Constitution Act, and Part Five of that Act); the Constitution of Australia (Art. 128 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act); the German Constitution (Art. 79 of the Grundgesatz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which creates absolute rigidity in regard to its provisions ); the Constitution of Ireland (Art. 48). Were it not for considerations of space, it would be possible to list a number of articles in each of the existing constitutions in order to demonstrate the approach to rigidity that each employs, whether by way of entrenchment or some other approach.

d) Rigidity as a Recognized Constitutional Characteristic in Case Law

With the establishment of the right to freedom of occupation in a Basic Law, it has achieved supra-legislative status. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this special status ... is the relative entrenchment of that right even against the mighty hand of the legislature (HCJ 3385/93, 4746/92 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [24] at p. 259).

Indeed, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is a typical constitutional creation, as stated s.  7 of that law states: “This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.” No similar provision exists in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

42.  The relative weight of the absence of rigidity generated either by formal entrenchment or otherwise, is strengthened in the light of three arguments:

 a) First, the absence of entrenchment was not an error on the part of the legislature. The absence of entrenchment is conscious and deliberate. The draft Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty included a provision regarding formal entrenchment. This provision was not approved. It failed by a single vote during the process of voting on reservations preceding the final adoption of the Basic Law. In contrast, as noted, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation incorporates a formal entrenchment provision. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation are closely related. This relationship is substantive and chronological. “Substantive” – because these two normative creations deal for the first time with protected basic rights. “Chronological” – because these two creations evolved within the framework of the first specific process of legislation of a charter of human rights in our legal system (what Karp termed the “atomization” of basic rights, in her article cited above at p. 338). These Basic Laws were debated in the Knesset at around the same time, and were subsequently addressed in the same legislative process in 1994. The normative reality is that the Knesset chose to reject the proposed entrenchment of the Basic Law. This is a fact – the situation was not one of an oblivious legislature. Nonetheless, as noted, the law does contain additional provisions that are of significance in regard to the effect of other legislation that infringes its provisions.

b) Second, we explained that “variation” of the protected right (including its repeal or nullification) is a graver and more serious act in terms of its significance than “infringement” of that right. This is undisputed. Reason dictates that the actions required to “vary” the protected right are of greater significance than the actions required to locally “infringe” that right. On the assumption that the legislature is consistent and logical, it is difficult to believe that the converse will become true, so that the grave (the variation) will become simple (ordinary majority) and the simple (infringement) will become grave (special majority and express). In other words, the absence of rigidity in relation to variation has ramifications for the absence of rigidity in relation to infringement.

This point is worthy of elaboration. We have considered the requirement for a clear distinction between “variation” of the right and the possibility of “infringing” it. The logical constitutional structure is that the process of “variation” be more complex and intricate. This is the most profound infringement of fundamental principles and the structure of the system. In contrast, the logical constitutional structure requires that the process of “infringement” of a protected constitutional right be simpler than that of “variation.” It is difficult to accept the interpretive solution that “infringement” requires more severe conditions than “variation.” In contrast, a proposition to the effect that identical conditions are required for “variation” and “infringement” may be reconciled with a coherent constitutional theory (see the Bergman case [15]). However, the higher the hurdle facing an “infringement” compared to that of a “variation,” the weaker the logic of the interpretive solution. In other words, the more severe the legal requirements for an “infringement” compared to those applicable to a “variation” – the more the interpretive approach loses internal strength.

Third, a possible conclusion regarding the absence of rigidity is tied to our constitutional tradition prior to the enactment of the Basic Laws in 1992. To my regret, our constitutional approach has not yet adopted the thesis that the very labelling of an act as a “Basic Law” vests it, per se, with normative supremacy. Our system takes the view that a Basic Law that is not formally entrenched is almost indistinguishable – in terms of its formal normative status – from an ordinary law. I used the word “almost” because the Knesset has seldom varied a Basic Law by means of an ordinary law. Nonetheless, we gave examples above of how it enacted provisions in an ordinary law that conflicted with a Basic Law. Moreover, from our current and developing constitutional perspective, it cannot be said that the fate of a non-entrenched Basic Law is identical to that of an ordinary law for all intents and purposes. On the contrary, our Basic Laws form the basis of the constitution of the State of Israel. The Basic Laws treat of the structure of the state regime and its powers. Following the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, the Basic Laws also treat of fundamental human rights in Israel. Consequently, I take the view that ‘in our interpretive approach, we must refer to the Basic Laws as “constitutional laws”‘ (Barak, in his book cited above, Judicial Discretion, at p. 520). The “constitutional plan” of the State of Israel, as I termed the realization of the ideal of constitutionalization, is the consolidation of the Basic Laws into a general, uniform treatise – ‘all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution of the State’ (the Harrari decision, at p. 1743). On the path towards this consolidation, Basic Law: Legislation will be enacted, and this will “immediately vest preferred status upon all the constitutional provisions in the Basic Law relative to any other legislation and protected or entrenched status from the point of view of the constitutional possibility of varying them or indirectly curbing the scope of their application” (M. Shamgar, “Legislation, Adjudication and Civil Rights,” 37 HaPraklit (1987) 5, 6).

However, in the present situation, in the absence of a statutory provision, the Basic Law, ipso facto, has no entrenched status. It enjoys no formal or inherent rigidity or supremacy. In the absence of statutory entrenchment, the prevailing perception has been that a statutory provision does not possess special, privileged status merely because of its inclusion in a Basic Law. Provisions that enjoyed supremacy were characterized by rigidity. The classic example in shaping our constitutional thinking was Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

43.  To summarize, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty lacks the typical feature that accords supremacy, namely, an express statutory provision, whether as a provision in the Basic Law itself or a general provision in a Basic Law of general application, such as Basic Law: Legislation, which is in preparation. A constitution reflects fundamental principles. Fundamental principles are guiding rules of policy. Accordingly, they are characterized by stability and do not lapse and vary. The constitution is characterized by being entrenched against the winds of change. The interpretive outcome whereby we have before us a constitution that is open to modification by any majority is disappointing, as it does not appropriately express the constitutional logic and purpose that it should comprise. In other words, there is no doubt that the Basic Law is a constitutional act that is a chapter in the constitution being developed according to the Harrari decision, however, this alone is insufficient to decide that it is possible to invalidate any law repugnant to its provisions.

Nonetheless, as we have shown and shall see, there are other provisions in the Basic Law before us that grant it privileged, special status, and that compensate for the absence of other constitutional traits, as described above. We shall now turn to a discussion of these.

 

The Limitation Clause

44.Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (“violation of rights”) provides that:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by such a law enacted with explicit authorization therein.

Section 8 of the Basic Law before us is a principal provision that treats of the normative status of the Basic Law

It is undisputed that this provision is of great importance insofar as concerns preventing possible attempts to infringe a protected right by secondary legislation. Until the adoption of the Basic Law, fundamental rights were protected against infringement by secondary legislation, by means of the case law alone. In the Mitrani case [7] I stated that ‘the fundamental objective is clear, namely that it is right and appropriate, from the point of view of the existence of the right to freedom of occupation, that only the words of the primary legislature may restrict it’ (ibid, at p. 352). If this is true in relation to freedom of occupation, it applies a fortiori to human rights. No restrictions may be imposed upon a fundamental right that derives from our being a “free society” ‘except under an express provision of statute’ (ibid, at p. 353). This principle has become rooted in our legal approach. The Basic Law anchored it in a “constitutional” law – a Basic Law; ‘there shall be no violation’ except by law.

However, the dispute does not revolve around the significance of the limitation clause in connection with secondary legislation. Possible disputes may arise in connection with the significance of the limitation clause in relation to primary legislation. Primary legislation that meets the conditions of the limitation clause does not, of course, pose a problem. The potential difficulty, and the source of the dispute that I seek to address revolves around a law that does not comply with the limitation clause. In other words, what is the fate of a statute that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? Take a statute which is compatible with the values of the State of Israel, but the goal of which is to advance an improper purpose – what is its fate? Take a statute that is compatible with the values of the State of Israel and the purpose of which is proper, but at the same time is not “proportional” – it violates a protected right ‘to an extent greater than is required’ – what is it’s fate?

 The answer is unequivocal. A literal reading shows that a statute incompatible with the conditions of the limitation clause does not have the power to infringe a protected right. Accordingly, it should not be accorded operative significance, and its validity should not be recognized if it purports to infringe a protected right. This interpretation follows the “plain meaning.” From the “affirmative” (the possibility of a infringement if the statute complies with the conditions of the limitation clause), it infers the “negative” (the absence of the possibility of infringement if the limitation clause is not complied with). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – the set of “affirmatives” comprises all the cases in which it is possible to infringe a protected right. The “negative” constitutes all those cases in which it is not possible to infringe a protected right.

The very enactment of the provisions of s. 8 elevates the Basic Law to a higher status, from which we may critically observe and examine other, non-Basic legislation that treats of issues addressed by the aforesaid Basic Law. The aforesaid interpretive rule grants the Basic Law its vitality. This is particularly true when we seek to utilize the interpretive rule to achieve the far-reaching result whereby an “ordinary” law – enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law, and which does not meet the conditions of the “limitation clause” – is of no effect. In view of the language of s. 8, it is immaterial in this regard if this “ordinary” law was enacted with an “ordinary” majority or a “special” one. Likewise, it is immaterial whether or not this ordinary law states expressly that it was enacted “notwithstanding the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.”

The following is unequivocal: Whatever the language of a later ordinary law may be, if the law does not satisfy the “validity condition” (“limitation clause”) of the Basic Law, or it is not legislation of the appropriate normative level, i.e., a Basic Law – it has no force. The creation of the aforesaid normative barrier to legislative variation reflects the adoption of a broad substantive interpretation of constitutional legislation. We are acquainted with the comments of the late President Agranat that, ‘when the issue relates to a document that determines the framework of the state regime, the court must take a “spacious view” of the powers that the document enunciates’ (FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [25] at p. 442). A constitutional text must be interpreted from a spacious view and with the intention of giving force to the constitutional imperative embodied in it. Its construction should not be narrow, technical or formalistic, but  as broad as the horizon. The view must embrace the substance, which is reflected in the human rights that are at the heart of our constitutional principles.

45.  According to the plain meaning, the aforesaid s. 8 carries great weight. It says ‘there shall be no violation.’ We are trying to specify the normative character of the Basic Law. On our scales, the section weighs heavily in countering the absence of rigidity in the Basic Law.

The Validity of Laws Provision

46. Section 10 of the Basic Law is the only provision in the Basic Law that employs the language “validity of any law.” It provides that ‘This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law (din) in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law’ (emphasis mine – M.S.). The negative implies the affirmative. It follows that s. 10 impliedly provides that this Basic Law can affect the validity of any law (din) enacted subsequently to the entry into force of the Basic Law. This means that the Basic Law has the power to affect the validity of a law enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law. The very existence of this provision shows that the Basic Law is capable of influencing the “validity of a law,” as were it not for the fact that the Basic Law could influence the validity of a law there would be no need whatsoever for a provision preserving the validity of certain laws. In other words, it is only the power of the Basic Law – by its nature and related consequences – that compelled the establishment of a qualifying provision regarding earlier laws, such as that contained in the aforesaid s. 10.

The provision in s. 10 informs us that the validity of a “law” which is enacted following the commencement of the Basic Law is subject to judicial review according to the standards set out in the Basic Law. If a person were to argue that the intention to preserve exiting law underlying s. 10 is more restrictive and the section is directed solely at the interpretive rule whereby “an earlier law retreats before a later law,”  the answer would be that it cannot possibly be the legislative purpose. First, there is no evidence of this in the legislative record (e.g.  the Knesset Proceedings). Second, it is difficult to assume that this is the objective purpose of the Basic Law, for if it were, the law would appear valueless. According to this reasoning, a law enacted prior to the Basic Law preserves its validity, under s. 10, notwithstanding any provision in the Basic Law, whereas a law subsequent to the Basic Law supersedes the Basic Law, according to this view, because it is later. What, then, did the Basic Law add by its enactment? In my view, the provision in s. 10 informs us that the Basic Law possesses normative supremacy, as it can affect the validity of a law. It does not define the scope of the supremacy and its degree; this is dealt with by another provision of the Basic Law. Section 10 does not delineate the boundaries of the possibility of violation that ensues from this supremacy, but it is difficult for a faithful interpreter to dispute that it indicates normative supremacy.

The Principal Law is shielded from judicial review by virtue of the Basic Law. The Amending Law, i.e., the amendment to the Principal Law, which is the subject of our review, is subject to review by virtue of the Basic Law, i.e., the Basic Law has the power to violate the Amending Law, which was enacted after the Basic Law.

A further lesson may be learned from the “validity of laws” provision: the application of the Basic Law is immediate. The law is not directed entirely at the distant future, i.e., the date of consolidation of all the Basic Laws into a single, complete constitution. It is not an interpretive pillar-of-fire. The Basic Law has immediate operative effect. This is the rule in our legal system: upon publication in the Official Gazette, the law enters into force, if not otherwise stated in the law itself. The validity of laws provision reinforces this clear, inevitable conclusion. The Basic Law has immediate effect. It is not merely declarative.

The Respect Clause

47. Section 11 of the Basic Law provides that: “All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law” (cf. s. 1(3) of the German Basic Law quoted above). The Basic Law refers to this provision by the marginal title “Application,” i.e., it defines the scope of application of the law. This provision is commonly referred to as “the respect clause.”

There are three “branches of government” – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In principle, the directives of the legislature will naturally fetter the executive and the judiciary. The application clause is unnecessary in order to achieve that result. The application clause is needed – apart from its didactic aspect – in order to clarify that the legislature, too, is subject to the provisions of the Basic Law in regard to ‘the rights under this Basic Law.’ It guides the legislature and in a way limits it.  The legislature cannot disregard the Basic Law, as it too is obliged to respect it.

This provision indeed requires that respect be accorded by ‘each of the governmental authorities,’ even if it is not as unequivocal and clear in terms of its wording as its counterparts in the German and Canadian constitutions. It does not refer expressly and in detail to the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. It does not state that the legislature is subordinate to it (in contrast to s. 32(1) of the Canadian constitution).

Respect requires, first and foremost, reference to the Basic Law and the rights protected in it. This obligation is embodied in the very duty to respect. This provision does not negate the power of the supreme legislature to enact laws, but it provides the conceptual and positive basis for the requirement that a violation of the provisions of the Basic Law must take a unique form. It is not possible to enact a law repugnant to the respect provision. Indeed, this could have been expressly stated, and in this regard see s.  8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

To remove all doubt, I would add that the inferior drafting, in comparison to foreign legislation, does not detract from the weight that should be accorded to the statutory provision of s. 11.

48.  To summarize this point, the respect provisions set out in s. 1 (‘these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel’) and in s. 11 of the Basic Law with which we are concerned, guide the legislature to enact laws in the light of the rights protected in the Basic Law. This legislation should, appropriately, be conscious  and deliberate, express and not implied.

The Ceremonial Element – Basic Principles and Purpose

49.  A constitution is a ceremonial act. The Constitution of the United States begins with a ceremonial Preamble. This is true of most of the principal constitutions that can provide a basis for comparison. The ceremonial preamble of the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France is famous. The same is true of the constitutions of India, Germany and others.

       Section 1 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides, in ceremonial, historic language, that:

Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, and the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

Section 1A is supplements the above, setting out the purpose of the Basic Law, stating:

The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

This preamble is characteristic of a constitutional act that inherently determines not only the place of the law in the normative hierarchy, but also its internal force and the spirit in which other laws will be reviewed. An ordinary legislative act does not open with a general, ceremonial declaration. Section 1 instructs us to respect basic rights ‘in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel., Before us is a constitutional act, both by reason of the festive, historical language of s. 1, and because of the referral to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. This declaration is our “Declaration of Independence,” which is both the birth certificate and the identification card of the state as an independent, political, sovereign entity.

In this context, it is proper to recall that the Declaration of the Establishment of the State also included a reference to the intention to adopt a constitution. In other words, the principle of constitutionality was born with the establishment of the State, and the reference to the entire complex – i.e., the Declaration – in the final clause of s. 1 of the Basic Law also expresses the historical constitutional link to the details in the Declaration, and the intention to adopt a constitution.

50.  In conclusion: Section 1 of the Basic Law presents – in a substantive manner – the constitutional supra-statutory aspect of the Basic Law in two ways. First, s. 1 of the Basic Law is, by its title and content, a section of “basic principles.” It serves as a guide to the details of the constitutional act. It is clear that an ordinary law, possessing ordinary normative status, does not open with a ceremonial declaration of the basic principles of the State of Israel. There is no law or Basic Law that adopted this language apart from Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Indeed, there is consensus that Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, too, possesses normative supremacy, and the legislation of the Knesset in 1994 emphasized this: The interpretive connection between these two Basic Laws is strengthened in the light of the incorporation of amendments to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty within the enactment of the new version of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It may conceivably be argued that the provisions that were added to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in s. 11 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the new s. 1 and the final clause of s. 8) are subject to s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which provides for rigidity in relation to variation of the Basic Law. However, this question, too, may be left open.

In any event, an act comprising a provision treating of the basic principles of the legal system possesses unequivocal constitutional ramifications. Second, it displays a clear, commonly accepted characteristic of every constitution around the world, i.e., the name and ceremonial preamble that presents the basic values of the State of Israel. Third, the reference to the Declaration of Independence provides an indication of the constitutional task imposed on the Knesset. As we have seen, we do not need further identification of the Basic Law as such, as its name testifies to its character. However, we are searching for provisions by which to discern that its force is superior to other primary legislation, and the declarative provisions at its beginning strengthen the ratio legis of these provisions, which we find in ss. 8, 10 and 11 of this Basic Law. To allay any misunderstanding: we are not seeking ratification of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law, but rather of its superior force.

51.  As earlier noted, alongside the section treating of basic principles (s. 1 of the Basic Law), we find the provisions of s. 1A,  which address the purpose of the law. Section 1A represents a shift from the general to the particular. The purpose of the Basic Law is to anchor “human dignity and liberty.” “Anchor” means establish, strengthen and create. The concept “human dignity and liberty” must be construed together with the name of the Basic Law (“Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty”). In other words, the protection is accorded to the basic principle of human dignity and liberty. This principle is divided into its components, i.e., into the basic rights themselves. The purpose provision – which is a general provision – must not be interpreted as if it merely applies to some of the provisions of the Basic Law, i.e., the last clause of s. 2 (“preservation of life, person and dignity”) and s. 5 (“personal freedom”). The protection of “human dignity and liberty” is understood in light of the title and substance of the law – as protection of the entire fabric of rights set out therein. The anchoring is not established in an ordinary law. It is carried out by means of the mechanism of a Basic Law (‘in order to anchor in a Basic Law’). The purpose provision – like its older sibling (the basic principles provision) – goes to the very foundations of our legal system: ‘the principles of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’. The principles of our system are a synthesis between the State of Israel being a “Jewish state” and the State of Israel being a “democratic state” (see Elon, in the article cited above). The State of Israel is a Jewish state. The State of Israel is a democratic state. I will recall here what I said in a similar case, Election Appeal 1/88 Neiman et al v. Chairman of the Election Committee to the Twelfth Knesset [26] at p. 189, in connection with the integration of these two values:

‘There is no truth in the argument regarding an imagined contradiction between the different clauses of s. 7A.  The existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people does not negate its democratic nature, just as the French character of France does not negate its democratic nature. The great principle expressed in clause (1) does not negate the one in clause (2) and the two can coexist in perfect harmony.’

The absence of any contradiction, as claimed, was already emphasized in President Agranat’s remarks in the above Election Appeal 1/65 at p. 385:

There can be no doubt – as is clearly shown by the statements made in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State at the time  that not only is Israel a sovereign, independent nation that aspires to freedom, and  is characterized by the rule of the people, but that it has also been established as a Jewish state in the land of Israel, because the act of establishment was carried out, primarily, by virtue of the natural and historical right of the Jewish people to live like any other people, in its own right in its sovereign state, and this act represented a realization of the aspiration of generations for the redemption of Israel.

My esteemed colleague Deputy President Elon also referred to this in the above Election Appeal 2, 3/84, at p. 297:

The democratic nature of the State of Israel was expressed in the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of the complete equality of social and political rights for all citizens, without distinction of religion, race or sex, and guarantees freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. These principles are our guiding light. The Jewish nature of the State of Israel was expressed in the Declaration of Independence by the very definition of the state as a Jewish state, and not merely a state of Jews, by opening its gates to Jewish immigration and the ingathering of the exiles (as manifested itself later in the Law of Return, 5710-1950, etc.). These principles too are guiding lights for us. The totality of these rights is the crucible in which the special image of the Jewish state was forged. The leading thinkers of Zionist philosophy, its movements and streams, Jews holding different points of view, citizens of the State of Israel, members of different ethnic groups and religions, all debated and continue to debate the significance and application of the totality of principles found in the Declaration of Independence to the practical life of the Jewish State.

Judaism’s perception of human dignity ensues from what is said in Genesis 1:27 [B], according to which man is created in the image of God, every human being is created in the Divine image, all are equal, and all are worthy of human dignity.

52. The provisions introducing the Basic Law embody, as aforesaid, a clear constitutional message. In this context, two points must be emphasized: the ceremonial opening is common to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Both contain a basic-principle provision and both contain the purpose provision. The language of the respective provisions is identical. This is clear, objective evidence of the conceptual similarity between the two Basic Laws. These two laws are cut from the same cloth. They are different organs of the same body. Thus, we must aspire to harmony between them, subject to variations clearly ensuing from the purpose – objective and subjective – of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The second point concerns the nature of a constitution as a didactic document. A constitution possesses educational value. ‘A significant matter, – writes Deputy President Elon, referring to the provisions of the Basic Law, ‘for education and learning, educators and students, young and old’ (Elon in the article cited above, at p. 682). True, I wrote that ‘the proper protection of a certain freedom is not achieved solely by declaring its existence,’ however, I added that ‘we should not underestimate the didactic value of the declarative statement…’ (Miterani case [7], at p. 355). One of the principles of a constitution is its inherent educational value.

Protection Against Emergency Legislation

53.  The provision regarding the stability of the law (s. 12 of the Basic Law) states : -

This Basic Law cannot be varied, suspended or made subject to conditions by emergency regulations; notwithstanding, when a state of emergency exists, by virtue of a declaration under section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, emergency regulations may be enacted by virtue of said section to deny or restrict rights under this Basic Law, provided the denial or restriction shall be for a proper purpose and for a period and extent no greater than required.

The entrenching provision against emergency regulations is vital to a constitutional act. The constitutional act deals with the fundamental principles of each system. Emergency legislation (“emergency regulations”) may supersede protected rights if it is limited in terms of time, purpose and proportionality (relativity). The protection against emergency regulations is found in other provisions in our law (such as s. 42 of Basic Law: the Government of 1968, s. 44 of Basic Law: the Knesset, s. 25 of Basic Law: the President of the State. A constitutional provision is characterized by the fact that it also incorporates special protection against emergency legislation.

The aforesaid s. 12 must be read together with s. 50(d) of Basic Law: the Government of 1992, which regulates the promulgation of emergency legislation, repealing s. 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance (s. 59 of Basic Law: the Government of 1992). Section 50(d) provides that: ‘(d) Emergency regulations may not prevent recourse to legal action, or prescribe retroactive punishment or allow infringement upon human dignity’ (emphasis mine – M.S.). In other words, following the entry into force of the new Basic Law, there is no possibility of violating “human dignity” by way of emergency legislation. The aforesaid s. 50(d) meshes in substance with the s. 12 before us. Clearly, the aforesaid s. 50(d) is intended to add to s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and not to detract from it.

The Mission of the Basic Law

54.  A constitution is characterized by abstract, short, laconic provisions. A constitution does not treat of technical details. It is not tax legislation.

The normal legal structure of every system is characterized by the fact that the higher one climbs on the normative ladder, the more abstract and general the provisions, the lower one descends on the normative ladder, the more detailed and concrete the provisions (Englard, in the book cited above,  p. 13 et seq.). An ordinary law is of a less abstract character than a constitution. Secondary legislation (regulations) is less abstract than a law.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is an example of a typical constitutional act in the declarative language of the Basic Law; the concise drafting of its provisions, and the degree of abstractness. The Basic Law indeed lacks some of the identifying characteristics included in its twin Basic Law, i.e., Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. However, this does not detract from the fact that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is quintessentially constitutional: it concerns protected fundamental rights; it treats of the protection of the most basic values of our society. These values are of those of human dignity.

The values that the Basic Law protects are the basic value of the State of Israel as ‘a Jewish and democratic state.’

55.  A distinction must be drawn between hierarchical supremacy and a determination of the tools for implementing that supremacy. The supremacy of a Basic Law over ordinary legislation ensues from the status of this law in the normative hierarchy. However, its power to annul the validity of another law is effected by virtue of the provisions contained in it: the limitation provision (s. 8), the validity of laws provision (s. 10), and the respect provision (s. 11). These three are the principle cornerstones by virtue of which the principle of supremacy progresses from theory to practice. All have the power to show – on the level of objective interpretation – that notwithstanding the absence of formal rigidity, we are not confronting a legislative act that is similar to most of the provisions of the other Basic Laws. We are facing a new juridical phenomenon: a legal document that not only possesses hierarchical supremacy and priority in the normative hierarchy, but also contains mechanisms upon which the standards for implementing that supremacy are shaped. 

Legislative Intent

56.  The legislative intent can be learned from the language of the law, which includes an expression of the purpose established by the legislature. From inception and entry into legal force, the law – in its content, structure, place in the legal system, and relationship and approach to other laws – faithfully reflects the intention of the legislature. The purpose arises from the law and not from an external source. ‘What is important,’ in the words of the late Justice Silberg, ‘“is not what the legislature wanted to say but what it said’ (CrimA 282/61 Yihye v. Attorney-General [27] at p. 636). At the same time, it is possible to discover trends and reservations by reference to preparatory work or Knesset deliberations. In this regard, I wrote in HCJ 4031/94 ‘Bezedek’ Organization v. Prime Minister of Israel [28] at pp. 11-12:

5. (a) The contents of the deliberations in the Knesset provide a backdrop to the trends and doubts of the members of parliament. As will be recalled, the law must be interpreted in accordance with its language as adopted by the Knesset, however, the travaux preparatoires or the deliberations in the legislative chamber that preceded legislation, often provide aids to further understanding of the processes and trends driving the wheels of the legislation. (Civil Appeal 486/85 Manager of Purchase Tax and Compensation, Haifa v. Ethiopian Commerce Co. Ltd. et al, at p. 407; HCJ 151/82 Bar Ilan et al v. Manager of Land Betterment Tax, Netanya, at p. 659).

Legislation does not occur in a vacuum. (HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior et al, at p. 513; A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. B, Interpretation of Legislation (Nevo, 1993) 351). It grows and emerges from within the political, social or legal reality, or is designed to serve their needs. ‘The exigencies of the reality within  which legislation is enacted is important for the interpretation of the legislation’ (Barak, ibid.; see also HCJ 547/84 Ha’emek Poultry, Cooperative Agricultural Society v. Ramat Yishai Local Council et al, at p. 143). But note that when we turn to the legislative history, including the deliberations at the preparatory stage, we do not consider the personal interpretation of any particular member of Knesset regarding certain expressions contained in the law. The public utterances of the members of Knesset cannot replace the interpretive act of the court, which relies on the language of the law and its purpose. A review of the comments of a member of Knesset may illuminate the general purpose of the legislation. However, it is of less value than the meaning of the law as adopted at the conclusion of the legislative process (see also HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker, at p. 544).

The authoritative interpretation is not to be found in the comments of members of the Knesset but in the statements of the court, and relies first and foremost on the language of the law as enacted by the Knesset upon the conclusion of the deliberations and legislative process (FH 36/84 Y. Teichner et al v. Air France Airways, at p. 619).

Accordingly we said:

The ultimate, decisive construction of a law at  any given time is in the hands of the court…’ (HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset House Committee at p. 141 opposite letter E)

57.  The legislative history is important. Yet, ‘from what was said (in the instant case – M.S.) in the Knesset it is difficult to reach any conclusions regarding the thought processes, agreements or consensus concerning the normative status of the Basic Law….’ (Karp, in the article cited above at p. 365). It is absolutely clear that the language of the Basic Law is the product of compromise. One of the architects of the Basic Law was the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, MK U. Lynn. He noted that: ‘this law was prepared in the understanding that we must reach a consensus among all the parties in the house’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 125 (1992) at p. 3782). The message of compromise appears throughout the deliberations of the Knesset: ‘There were far reaching concessions compared to every other constitution in the world, because we wished to reach that general agreement that we indeed attained’ (ibid., at p. 3783). During the First Reading, the members of the Knesset voted on the status of the Basic Law as a constitution. However, this perception relied upon the rigidity provision that appeared in the draft law and was ultimately omitted from the Basic Law as enacted. MK E. Haetzni said: ‘actually we are starting a process of a written constitution. This is not a simple matter, and we must know what we are doing here’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 124 (1992) at p. 1528). The Minister of Justice, Dan Meridor, insisted during the First Reading that the proposed Basic Law ‘establishes protection against the arbitrariness of a law that is enacted and contravenes and violates human rights…’ (ibid., at p. 1531). The principal deliberations took place during the Second Reading. I have already mentioned that the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee opened by stating that the Basic Law was prepared over the course of many sessions of the Constitution Committee: ‘and I emphasize: the Constitution, Committee, that is the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee by virtue of its being the Constitution Committee of the Knesset of Israel’ (ibid., 125, at p. 3782). Prima facie, this is an unequivocal statement. However, later the Chairman of the Committee states:

We are not transferring the weight to the Supreme Court. We are not doing what was once proposed in Basic Law: the Legislature or in Basic Law: Human Dignity. We are not establishing a Constitutional Court, or a court with the power to invalidate laws (ibid., at p. 3783).

MKs Eitan and Haetzni question the Chairman of the Constitution Committee regarding the organ that would determine the compatibility of ordinary legislation to the Basic Law (s. 8 of the Basic Law). The Chairman of the Committee responds: “the legislature decides and the court decides.’ However, he immediately adds: ‘this is the system existing today and there is no other’ – ‘even today the court can interpret laws.’ To the question posed by MK Eitan regarding the invalidation of laws, the Chairman of the Constitution Committee responds:

There is no need to invalidate laws. One does not invalidate a law. The law must be made for a proper purpose, not merely an arbitrary law.

The question returns: What is the fate of an “arbitrary law”? MK Lynn concluded that:

The power has not been transferred to the court system.  The power remains in this House; and if, heaven forbid, it appears from our experience with this law that we made a mistake, and the interpretation given to the law does not coincide with the true intention of the legislature, the Knesset has the power to change the law (ibid., at p. 3788).

Minister of Justice Dan Meridor took a different stance, expressly asserting the normative supremacy of the Basic Law: ‘The power of the Knesset to legislate is not unrestricted because in every democratic regime there are limits on what it is permissible for the majority to do’ (ibid., at p. 3788). The bill – the Minister of Justice stated – ‘is very important because it establishes a balance among the branches in Israel, and it certainly establishes an area or boundary beyond which human rights cannot be violated’ (ibid.).

From the above it follows that the Basic Law was intended to be a compromise. Its contents do not reflect the optimum that it could have comprised. It was intended to be a more moderate act than the proposed Basic Law: The Legislature. That is the reason why the Knesset did not adopt the rigidity provision.

58.  In consequence of the comments made during the deliberations in the Knesset, I would add that clearly the creation of a constitution is not equal in theoretical significance to the transfer of competence to engage in judicial review to the Supreme Court. However, patently, a provision regarding the normative hierarchy which enables a decision to be made concerning the lack of validity of a law accords immediate jurisdiction to the court. The judicial branch is an important device for the practical existence of a constitution. It ensures that the constitution is not a purely declarative political document, as well as that the review of constitutionality will not be confined to self-review by the Knesset (autocontrole in the terminology of Prof. Nikilitz in L. Favoreu & J. A. Jolowicz, Le Controle Jurisdictionnel Des Lois ((Paris & Aix-en-Provence, 1986) 79). In view of the provisions of Basic Law: The Judiciary and in the absence of any other provision, there is no other entity – apart from the court (general or special) – which can decide upon the constitutionality of a law, i.e., its compatibility with norms and conditions set out in the Basic Law. I said in the Flatto-Sharon case [2] at p. 141:

Each of the branches of government is required, on occasion, to interpret a statute, because the implementation of primary legislation frequently – and in practice always – involves a position being taken on its substance and content. However, the final, conclusive interpretive decision regarding the law, like its validity at any given time, is within the province of the court, and regarding issues brought for examination within the court system, it is within the province of the supreme judicial instance.

The Supreme Court is the competent interpreter of the language of the law, as well as its condition at any given time.

The enactment of a constitution means the transfer of power to society, to its values and to its principles. The Supreme Court in a constitutional regime is a tool for enforcing the will of the legislature, which is the elected representative of the people, upon all those who continue to enact laws or perform governmental acts, including the primary legislature itself.

The distinction between the primary legislature and the other entities lies in the fact that the primary legislature is also empowered to determine ways for removing the fetters by which it chains itself. The court only places before the legislature a tablet upon which the legislature’s own words are engraved, accompanied by a competent interpretation. It is the function and competence of the court to indicate what is within the realm of the permissible and what is completely prohibited. As a judicial authority, the court is the faithful, competent construer of the words of the legislature.

In so doing, the court does not subordinate the legislature to values and principles that are separate from its own, since the values and principles of the court are the very ones that express the concepts of the state and society. These are in essence the values formulated by the legislature itself, or are formulated in the law since the establishment of the state in the Declaration of Independence and by virtue of s. 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance. The court subordinates the legislation to the values and principles of the constitution, the one that has been written and the one that is essentially part of our positive law. The court is the principal tool for ensuring the existence and respect of the constitution.

59.  The draft bill Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty opens with an Explanatory Note, stating at p. 60: ‘This bill is intended to provide constitutional protection to the basic human right to life, freedom, integrity of the person and human dignity’ (ibid., at p. 60; emphasis mine – M.S.). I assume that the Knesset members were cognizant of the full significance of the explanatory remarks and of the Basic Law itself. Indeed, as is customary, from a procedural point of view, the Basic Law was adopted in accordance with the ordinary regulations of the Knesset. The Basic Law was not passed by a vote of the majority of the members of the Knesset but only by the vote of the majority of those participating. No public debate preceded the vote. In this, the Basic Law is distinct from other constitutions. Most constitutions are created upon the establishment of the state or in an open, public process following profound ideological debate. A constitution is formed in moments of “constitutional enlightenment.” A constitution is formed, generally, following an event of historic importance (independence and sovereignty; revolution, political change).

Some of the members of Knesset sought to accord the Basic Law formal constitutional status (like the sponsor of the Basic Law, MK Amnon Rubinstein, and the then Minister of Justice Dan Meridor). Some perhaps were not aware – at the time – of all the legal ramifications of the Basic Law that immediately arose from its provisions. It will never be possible to establish all the individual intentions of the members of Knesset so as to shape the collective will of the legislature from them. In practice, there is always a range of subjective desires in a democracy. Many are the thoughts in the mind of man [Proverbs 19:21]. Any subjective purpose does not negate the conclusion regarding the objective legislative purpose arising from and within the Basic Law, as explained above.

Integrating Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in the Constitutional Structure

60. Fundamental human rights in Israel were entrenched in the case law of the Supreme Court from the dawn of the State of Israel, as is well known. The ordinary position is that the legislature drives the wheels of legislation in order to accomplish a particular social goal. This presumption provides the foundation for the supremacy of the Basic Law, even when it merely seeks to provide statutory approval to a normative reality. The change achieved by means of a Basic Law is the addition of a tier to the protection of human rights in the State of Israel. This is the protection against legislation. We have recognized human rights since the establishment of the state before the Basic Law. They were afforded broad interpretation before Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Their protection led to the invalidation of secondary legislation and administrative acts without the Basic Law. Prior to the Basic Law, their protection did not lead to any invalidation of primary legislation. This is a new possibility contributed by the Basic Law. Removing this contribution from it deprives it of its added value relative to the situation that preceded Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In other words, the immediate question that would arise is what does the Basic Law provide which did not exist prior to and without it.

61.  Recognition of the normative supremacy of the Basic Law is consistent with the affiliation of the State of Israel to the countries of the free world. The vast majority of the countries of the free world possess a constitutional structure, i.e., possess a supreme normative structure that regulates the basis of the regime and the fundamental rights of the citizen. Even Great Britain is now subject to a system of constitution review system within the European framework.

The State of Israel’s membership in this family of nations contributes to the conclusion that this time our legislature sought to realize the granting of supremacy to the Basic Law.

62.  A very important point for the interpretation and understanding of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, is to see it in the light of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This view is anchored in the perception of the two Basic Laws as a single complex. Technically, we have before us two pieces of legislation. Substantively, we have before us a single act. Accordingly, these two pieces of legislation must be treated as statutory twins. The entrenchment provision (s. 7) in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation grants a stable, well-protected status to the rights ensured by that Basic Law. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is a clear constitutional act. It is difficult to understand the rationale for the absence of a provision similar to the aforesaid s. 7 in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The aspiration for statutory and constitutional harmony is an institutional cornerstone of our legal theory. This concept captivates us. It is right that there be appropriate constitutional harmony between these two Basic Laws. These two acts are two branches emerging from the same trunk. Their basic principles are identical; their purpose is identical; their language is almost identical; their application is identical; their substance is identical. Against this background, the inclusion of ss. 4 and 7 in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is logical. It enables moderate, temporary and limited violation of a protected right without the need to take the step of changing the Basic Law itself. Engaging in frequently repeated changes to the Basic Laws is an undesirable phenomenon. A developed state does not amend its fundamental normative frameworks on a daily basis. This possibility provides the appropriate breathing space to the Knesset.

The Basic Law before us does not contain a provision similar to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which deals with a nonconforming law. It follows that no law may be enacted which violates rights in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty that does not meet the conditions and limitations contained in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, save by means of varying the Basic Law. A Basic Law is varied by means of a Basic Law.

The Status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty - Summary

63.  The detailed examination set out above shows that in terms of its structure and character, the name, content and form of the Basic Law present a set of characteristics that accord it a special constitutional status as compared to the institutional Basic Laws. It is also clear that there is no basis for the thesis that the Basic Law does not belong to the supreme normative tier because it lacks the additional markers declaring supremacy or entrenchment. This also follows from a consideration of the legislative purpose within the customary legal meaning of that term (i.e., what follows from the language and purpose of the law, as distinct from the subjective motives of any particular member of the legislative branch).

I have pointed out that determining the status of the Basic Law as opposed to other legislation should properly be carried out by granting appropriate weight to the legislative purpose. I mentioned that the legislative purpose that was formulated by the legislature: ‘The public and the courts owe loyalty to “the legislative intent” as it appears in the statute books, and an intention that cannot be found expressed in the statute itself is not law’ (HCJ 131/65 Sevitzky v. Minister of Finance [29] at p. 378). Interpretation in accordance with the purpose of the law is carried out with loyalty to the intention of the legislature. Indeed, we are not entitled to grant a constitution the status of complete normative supremacy without this being anchored in the will of the Knesset. However, the same reverse is also true. We cannot deprive a constitution of its status in the normative hierarchy because this contravenes the will of the Knesset, as reflected in the Basic Law, its language and content. Loyalty to the will of the Knesset binds us, whether we believe the law to be good or bad. This is the empathic aspect of adjudication (Levontin, in the article cited above, Klinghoffer Volume, at p. 290).

Before us is a tier of the Israeli constitutional structure, whose place in the constitutional normative hierarchy finds concrete expression in the limitation that it imposes on other legislation.

Variation of a Basic Law: Summary

64. (a)         The time has come to summarize our view regarding both the manner of enacting constitutional legislation in general, and the manner of lawfully changing the two Basic Laws treating of human rights or infringing their provisions.

(b)   There are two aspects to the issue of the amendment of a basic right included in a Basic Law: the substantive theoretical aspect and the formal constitutional aspect. There can be no doubt that the substantive aspect has ramifications for the formal constitutional aspect, and that the two are intertwined. With regard to the substantive aspect, I said in the Mitrani case [7] (at p. 355, opposite letter C):

Establishing defined, special ways for amending a basic right is, to a great extent, the principle means, guaranteeing that the matter be examined properly from a substantive point of view. A right should not be restricted other than after careful consideration and debate, because curtailing the scope of the right may lead, as a consequence, to a degree of distortion of the character of the social or political regime. We have said that the place of a basic right in a given legal system mirrors the degree to which the substantive rule of law exists, and amending the scope of the right will inevitably affect the continued existence of the rule of law. From this ensues the importance of establishing defined statutory ways, through which alone it is possible to change the application and scope of the basic right.

From here we move to the constitutional rules. The starting point is that legislation entails a normative hierarchy. The hierarchy is built on three principle rungs, according to the order of their importance on the ladder of legislative values: secondary legislation, ordinary primary legislation, constitutional primary legislation (i.e., a Constitution or Basic Laws). Changes in legislation, from the point of view of content and form, may only be accomplished by means of statutory activity on the same or a higher normative rung. This means that a Basic Law cannot be changed by the enactment of an ordinary law; ordinary, primary law can be changed solely by ordinary, primary legislation or by a Basic Law (which, as noted, is at a higher normative rung in the normative constitutional hierarchy). “Change” for this purpose, includes repeal, amendment, addition or derogation.

(c)   Change generally refers directly to a provision that is to be changed. However, it is conceivable that a provision will be enacted in a Basic Law that contradicts an existing Basic Law or violates it, but is not expressed in the form of a direct amendment of the existing Basic Law (such as a provision in one Basic Law that effects changes in the Knesset electoral system, without providing for compatibility of language in s. 4 of Basic Law: the Knesset). Indeed it is preferable to have an express statement that the new contradictory provision changes the existing provision, however, this should not be seen as a legal requirement, inasmuch as the solution to the contradiction can be attained, in any event, and as is customary, by way of legal interpretation, for example, by adopting the guideline whereby later legislation is preferable to earlier legislation, and special legislation is preferable to general legislation, or by way of the rules governing implied repeal, or by other rules of construction that seek to examine the question whether the new can be reconciled with the old, and if not, what is the conclusion that must inevitably be derived from this. The remarks here concerning change apply to infringement of a provision in one Basic Law, by means of a provision in another Basic Law. There is no legal obstacle to the creation of circumstances of infringement, and the solution to a question such as this will be achieved by the customary modes of interpretation, as mentioned above.

(d) There is no need for a special majority of members of Knesset in order to vary a Basic Law, save if this is expressly required, as a precondition, in the Basic Law being amended or in another Basic Law that sets out general provisions regarding the variation of Basic Laws (such as Basic Law: Legislation, the enactment of which is now being considered). Limitations on the manner of varying a Basic Law can only ensue by virtue of legislation in a Basic Law.

So far we have considered the connection between one Basic Law and another. We now turn to the question of the relationship between an ordinary law and a Basic Law.

Violation of a Basic Law by an Ordinary Law Summary

65. (a)         We have made it clear that the adoption of the theory of the normative hierarchy leads to the conclusion that it is not possible to vary a Basic Law by means of ordinary primary legislation, i.e., by an ordinary law, but only by a Basic Law. Is it possible to infringe the provisions of a Basic Law by means of regular primary legislation?

(b) An infringement of a Basic Law can be the indirect outcome of the language of the Basic Law, and principally of its abstract character, expressed in general, broad language, that often require reconciling, and consideration of practical daily life and the concrete needs of the public and the individual. Let us take the example of arrests: every arrest contravenes the clear, unequivocal provision of s. 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, whereby:

There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or by any other manner.

The meaning of this statement is clear – there is no arrest. Can an organized political framework exist without arrests in certain circumstances, even if these are of the most limited and narrow nature? The answer to this is – no. A statutory provision is required that enables arrests. However, a provision that enables arrests, which is not shaped in the form of a Basic Law, violates the provision of the said Basic Law. It violates the basic right defined in s. 5 of the Basic Law. The way to reconcile the general, broad provision of the Basic Law and the needs of state and society is to permit the violation of the principle set out in the Basic Law, in defined, contingent circumstances.

(c)   It follows from the above that, notwithstanding the existence of basic rights, in particular rights that are broadly defined, it is essential to preserve the possibility to enact laws in defined cases, while deviating from the important principle expressed in the definition of the basic right in the Basic Law. It is right to ensure that the violation of the Basic Law that is deemed to be lawful and permissible, will be cautious and circumspect in terms of the extent to which it infringes the great principle of protection of the basic right found in the Basic Law.

(d)   Creating the possibility for deviation from full, unqualified protection that ensues from the inclusion of a basic right in a Basic Law, can assume various forms. A violation of a basic right is only possible by virtue of law (see the Mitrani case [7] at p. 360 opposite letter A). There are constitutions that create basic rights together with  accompanying provisions whereby a law may determine otherwise. Thus, for example, s. 49 of the draft proposal of Basic Law: Bill of Human Rights, states that: ‘Every person is entitled to enter into a contract; this right shall not be violated save by law’ (emphasis mine – M.S.). The significance of this is that every law can vary or limit the scope of the basic right.

There are those who criticize the described, insufficiently restricted system, that attaches a provision to a basic right whereby every law can set out a different provision (see Dr P. Lahav and Dr D. Krezmer, “The Bill of Human and Civil Rights in Israel: A Constitutional Achievement or a Sham,” 7 Mishpatim (1976) 154; Dr Shiloh’s reply, “On ‘Absolute Rights’ in the Proposed Basic Law: Bill of Human and Civil Rights,” at p. 539, and the authors’ reply, “Who’s Afraid of ‘Absolute’ Rights?” at p. 541).

(e)   Another method – and I do not intend here to exhaust the alternatives – sets out detailed guidelines regarding the substance of the statutory provision in which, and by virtue of which, there may be a violation of a basic right contained in the Basic Law, which will be constitutional notwithstanding its violation of the Basic Law. An example of this is s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

An identical provision may be found in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In other words, it is not sufficient that the violation of the basic right be carried out in a statute or by virtue of explicit authorization therein, there is an additional substantive condition that the content of the law meet the additional conditions set out in s. 8 or s. 4 above, as appropriate.

(f)   Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation added an additional array of circumstances in which an ordinary law can violate a basic right and still be regarded as constitutional. Section 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, titled “Effect of Nonconforming Law,” states:

A provision of a law that violates freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it has been included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement unless a shorter duration has been stated therein.

The two identical provisions – s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – and s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (which does not have an equivalent in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), are provisions that permit violations of a basic right. One (identical ss. 4 and 8, respectively) sets out substantive conditions for permitting the violation. The second (s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) sets out conditions of form and length of duration of the nonconforming law.

(g)     A violation of a basic right which has been defined in a Basic Law is possible, therefore, according to conditions contained in the Basic Law and subject thereto.

Is it conceivable to have a violation in a manner not delineated in advance in a Basic Law? In other words, can an ordinary law violate a basic right defined in a Basic Law without meeting the conditions detailed, for example, in s. 4 and s. 8 above, or s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, all of which deal with violations of rights in the Basic Law? The answer to this is no, as we shall explain.

The answer to this question follows from our previous remarks concerning the normative hierarchy, and indeed is inescapable – impliedly – by reason of the 1992 legislation. When the Knesset sought to add a statutory provision enabling a deviation from the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and a deviation as noted goes beyond what is permitted according to the existing provisions of the said Basic Law, it believed that it had to amend the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and, by means of a new Basic Law, add an additional provision that would enable a deviation from the provisions contained in the initial version of the Basic Law of 1992. In other words, an amendment to the Basic Law is possible only by means of a Basic Law, and a deviation from the principles of a Basic Law requires the existence of provisions in the Basic Law enabling it. Accordingly, in 1994, the Knesset added the aforesaid s. 8 to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The Knesset delineated the additional exclusive means by which it is possible to violate a basic right contained in a Basic Law, beyond what is stated in the aforesaid sections concerning violation already contained in the Basic Laws; this and no more. The Knesset does not lack competence to vary the Basic Laws, to add to them or detract from them, or, as we have seen, even to enact a provision (such as the one known in legal terminology as the “notwithstanding clause” in the Canadian constitution), whereby it is possible to violate a basic right even without meeting the requirements of ss. 4 and 8, respectively, in the two Basic Laws. However, such legislation is in the nature of a variation of the Basic Law, and requires the enactment of an authorizing provision in the Basic Law. An authorizing provision as aforesaid may be unique to a particular Basic Law or general for all the Basic Laws, and may enable the enactment of laws without limitation of number, provided only that they are enacted in the manner established by the authorizing provision and for the period set out therein (if such conditions are provided). It is also possible that the amendment to the law will authorize the Knesset to legislate on a specific matter while violating the Basic Law. However, amendments to the Basic Law must always be carried out by a Basic Law.

In conclusion, the violation of a basic right may only arise from a provision which authorizes such an enactment, set out in a Basic Law, and after the conditions set out by the Knesset in the Basic Law have been met. This means, expanding the possible types of violation of a basic right defined in a Basic Law, requires a variation of the Basic Law, and a variation of a Basic Law can only be carried out by a Basic Law. An ordinary law that does not meet the criteria of the limitation clause cannot violate a protected basic right, even if it is expressly states that it is doing so, if there is no express provision in a Basic Law permitting this method to be adopted.

(h)   The conditions set out in s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation point to the extent to which the Knesset is stringent when establishing additional conditions for deviating from a basic right defined in a Basic Law. It requires both a special majority and an express statement, and even limits the validity of the law to four years from the date of commencement.

So far we have referred to the general guidelines regarding variation of a Basic Law or violation of its provisions. We shall now turn to the two Basic Laws with which we are here concerned.

Application of the Rules to the Two Basic Laws

66. (a)         Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation are in the nature of constitutional legislation. These are laws that are titled Basic Laws. That is to say, these Basic Laws are directly connected to the constitutional mission of the Knesset according to the Harrari decision, and as such, join the array of Basic Laws adopted by the Knesset since then. This should be seen as integration into our constitutional system, i.e., legislation that has been enacted in accordance with the approach that has developed in our constitutional tradition. It is possible to learn from this that these Basic Laws constitute a link in a chain of constitutional acts on the way to the formulation of the complete constitution. From the point of view of their formal status, there is general agreement that these are Basic Laws that constitute chapters in what, in accordance with the Harrari decision, will ultimately form a single, complete constitution.

(b)   As opposed to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is not entrenched, and is similar to the majority of the Basic Laws and the majority of provisions contained therein. This does not detract from the formal, normative status of the Basic Laws per se, as were it we to say so – we would be disregarding the clear, manifest, declared activity of the Knesset since the Harrari decision.

(c)   We have already mentioned that consideration must be given, inter alia, to the constitutional coupling between Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law before us. Both herald the transformation of basic rights into enacted constitutional norms. We have seen this, if such be necessary, as support for the normative status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to disregard the express difference in the provisions of the two aforesaid Basic Laws at the point that is most relevant to our examination. Whereas one Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, establishes an entrenchment provision in relation to the variation of its provisions (s. 7) and separately in its s. 8 regarding provisions that violate its provisions beyond what is stated in s. 4, the second refrains from doing so. This was because of the approval of a reservation at the time of voting on the Second Reading in the Knesset, which removed the entrenchment provision that had been included in the bill.

The coupling described at the time of original enactment and at the time of the amendment in 1994, thus, preserved a difference at a point material for our purposes. This does not alter the determination that a Basic Law cannot be varied save by a Basic Law and that its provisions cannot be violated save by virtue of a provision in a Basic Law delineating methods for doing so.

(d)   The constitutional nature that is emphasized – from the point of view of the content of the Basic Law before us – finds methodical expression, inter alia, in the chain of provisions that singles out the connection between the Basic Law and other statutory acts and grants special status to all the provisions contained in it. I am referring here to s. 8 (Violation of Rights), s. 10 (Validity of Laws), and s. 11 (Application) of the Basic Law. This series of provisions in the Basic Law (ss. 8, 10 and 11) shows that the law established provisions that directly impact upon the manner of legislation permitted in the future.

(e)   The very legislation of the Basic Law led to a change in the normative reality. As we have already noted, even before Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the freedoms it enumerates were part of our positive law, however, it was not possible, according to the decisions we had handed down until then, to engage in judicial review that would subject a statute (in contrast to secondary legislation or administrative acts) to judicial examination of its constitutionality, save if it contained an entrenchment provision that allowed an examination of the extent to which it was being formally respected in the concrete case before the court. Since the Bergman case [15] an examination of the legality or constitutionality of a statute is carried out by means of judicial review. Adoption of this process over many years, on repeated occasions, without objection, creates an accepted pattern of constitutional action.

(f) What conclusion must be drawn from the contents of the aforesaid ss. 8, 10 and 11 in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty?

 Section 8 – to which we referred above in detail – limits legislation that violates a right protected in a Basic Law. This is a central provision in relation to the normative status of the Basic Law. It follows from it that a statute that violates a basic right among those enumerated in the Basic Law, and that does not meet the conditions set out in s. 8, is invalid. This conclusion is strengthened in light of the statement in s. 10, whereby the Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law. The significance of this is that the Basic Law can affect the validity of a law enacted subsequent to the commencement of the Basic Law. What can impugn the validity of a law? Failing to meet the provisions of the Basic Law. This conclusion is strengthened in light of the provisions of s. 11, whereby all the government branches, including the legislature, are required to respect the rights under this law. Respect for rights also includes refraining from violating them, save to the extent permitted under s. 8.

If we were to say that such an aforesaid law, which violates a basic right, can be valid without relying upon statutory authorization or a special pronouncement of the legislature, even if it does not meet the demands of the said s. 8, it would be as if we were to say that the aforesaid s. 8 is of a purely declarative nature. In other words, it is as if we were to hold that s. 8 is a statement that cannot be legally enforced or that it is, in practice, devoid of meaning. This conclusion contravenes the clear intention of the Knesset and contradicts the manifest statutory purpose. Such an interpretation is also contrary to the rules that apply in such cases. According to these rules, the utterances of the legislature must be upheld and given effect, and an attempt must even be made to reconcile provisions that prima facie contradict each other (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).

Accordingly, the aforesaid s. 8 may be seen as an effective restriction on legislation that seeks to violate those basic rights set out in the Basic Law before us. This restriction has legal ramifications, i.e., it has power to affect the validity of a law. The aforesaid s. 8 is a provision within the Basic Law. In other words, s. 8 is a provision that belongs to the constitutional normative tier. Accordingly, it cannot be repealed or varied save in the appropriate constitutional way, i.e., by means of a Basic Law.

(g)   It is not necessary to have a special majority in order to vary Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and no other procedural or substantive provisions dictate the manner of legislation, apart from the rule relating to legislation in accordance with the constitutional hierarchy mentioned above.

(h)   Can the Knesset enact a law that violates a basic right contained in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? The answer to this is affirmative, but subject to conditions, as will be explained below:

(1)The Knesset is competent to enact a Basic Law that violates a basic right: the question of a violation by a subsequent Basic Law will then be clarified through the customary means of interpretation applicable to the interpretation of two pieces of legislation at the same constitution level, or, in the alternative –

(2)The Knesset can enact ordinary legislation that violates a basic right, within the boundaries authorized by the Basic Law, enumerated in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, or s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, as appropriate. The Basic Law sets out the conditions for the validity of ordinary legislation as aforesaid.

A question that remains open is the extent to which the Knesset is entitled, either as a constituent assembly or as a monolithic legislative branch, to violate a fundamental right, even by way of a Basic Law, and the scope of judicial review over the same. We shall leave this question open.

The Basic Law and the Amending Law

67.  The Amending Law with which we are dealing in this judgment is not an amendment to the Basic Law. The Basic Law before us also does not contain a provision similar to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

The significance of this is that the Amending Law will only be valid if it does not violate ab initio one of the basic rights protected in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In the event that it does violate a right as aforesaid, it will only be valid if it meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Accordingly, we must now examine, first, whether the Amending Law violates the property of a person. If our conclusion is negative, then there was no room for the conclusions of the court of first instance in two of the cases being considered here jointly, and in the arguments of the appeal in the third case, the hearing of which we joined with the two applications for leave to appeal, in which we were asked to declare the invalidity of the Amending Law. If our conclusion is affirmative, i.e., that the Amending Law does infringe a protected basic right, we will be compelled to move to the next stage of the examination, in which we shall examine whether the Amending Law meets the conditions set out in s. 8 of the Basic Law, i.e., whether it should be regarded as valid and enforced, notwithstanding the violation of the property of a person stemming from it.

 

Protection of Property – Section 3 of the Basic Law

68.  Section 3 of the Basic Law provides as follows:

Protection of property    There shall be no violation of the property of a person.

Two questions arise in connection with this section. The first is general and concerns the nature of a violation of property; the second is particular, namely, whether the specific law before us, i.e., the Amending Law, violates the right to property. The question who is a “person” for the purpose of s. 3 does not arise in the case before us.

69.  Accordingly, we shall turn to the question of the violation of the right to property.

(a)   What is property for the purpose of the said s. 3? This question is prima facie difficult, because the Basic Law, consistent with its concise language, does not set out a definition of the term “property.” This concept has many facets, and one scholar has even drawn an analogy between the concept of “property” and an iceberg in which the invisible part exceeds the portion open to view (K. M. Minogue, “The Concept of Property and its Contemporary Significance,” XII (1980) Nomos 10). Thus, it is appropriate to interpret this concept in every case on the basis of the relevant purpose and context.

In order to establish the correct boundaries of the term we must balance its fundamental purposes:

On one hand, we are concerned with a constitutional provision. It is intended to protect private property and the individual’s right to property. It is significant in terms of the social concept upon which it is based. The right is one of the expressions of liberty. It is a type of guarantee of the right of ownership. The character of the protection of property, as an act guaranteeing human liberty is what connects this right with the right to human dignity, as a guiding principle in our worldview in general and in the Basic Law in particular: freedom to act in the area of property guarantees the right to self determination and prevents the individual from being transformed into a mere object (Muench/Kunig, Grundgesetz, supra, at 824). It is intended to prevent the deprival or dilution of the individual’s to property. It must be afforded effective protection. As a constitutional provision, it must be interpreted in a broad and general way.

Accordingly, the term “property” for the purpose of the issue before us, applies prima facie both to a right in rem and to a right in personam. For the purpose of preventing the deprival of an individual’s property right it is irrelevant whether one is a depriving a right in real property or in another appropriate right, whether one is negating a right in rem or whether one is suspending the right of a person against a defined debtor only. As my esteemed colleague Justice Cheshin stated in LCA 7112/93 Tzudler v. Yosef [30], “property” in the Basic Law also applies to rights that are not property rights in the classic sense (see the comprehensive and instructive article by Prof. Y. Weisman, “Constitutional Protection of Property,” 42 HaPraklit (1995) 258, 267).

The emphasis is, as noted, on the purpose, and focuses principally on preventing the deprivation of a person’s possessions. This is the violation that the Basic Law seeks to prevent. Accordingly, for the purpose of constitutional protection, the term “property” goes beyond the definition used in other areas of property law (see Prof. Y. Weisman, 16 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1990) 53). In my view, it also includes the denial of obligatory rights.

       (b)        As we are concerned with the first proceedings in this court in connection with s. 3 of the said law, I will make a number of general comments regarding the approach taken to this issue in other countries. When the term “violation” is used, the intention in this context is generally to the consequences of the economic and fiscal activities of the state that play a significant role in the implementation of the needs of the state. In this area, i.e., violation of property, it is customary, for example in the United States, to follow the guiding policy that has been adopted in recent years in the interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Under this interpretative approach, at the stage of judicial review, great weight is given to the policy underlying the words of the legislature, provided that it is possible to show due process of law and a rational connection to the legislative purpose. Thus, for example, American case law generally restricts intervention in tax legislation (The Constitution of the U. S. of America, Analysis and Interpretation, Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, 1973) 1170, 1174; M. R. Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty,” 13 Cornell L. Q. Rev (1927-28) 8, 24; Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) [85]). According to the approach pursued in the United States, the court should not be transformed into a body that will act as the supreme overseer of the economic and fiscal policy expressed in statute. Voice has even been given to the extreme view that the only matters subject to review are ‘deprivations of property that are arbitrary in the sense that they serve no legitimate governmental objective or that they are viciously motivated’ (Frank I. Michelman, “Property as a Constitutional Right,” Wash. and Lee L. Rev (1981) 1097, 1098).

German constitutional interpretation, too, expresses reservations regarding intervention in tax law, save if extreme irregularities are found – Uebermaessige (Konfiskatorische) Besteuerung, i.e., excessive taxation of a confiscatory nature (see the comments of Muench / Kunig, supra at 839; Herzog, supra at 282).

However, it is clear that the reference to other constitutions and their implementation is comparative only. In the protection it extends to the rights under its aegis, every constitution expresses its own unique hierarchy of social values and the conceptions of its society. It is unnecessary to add that there is also an entire range of political considerations that accompany the formulation of a constitution. Thus, for example, in Canada it was decided to refrain from including a prohibition on infringing property in the Charter of Rights.

The drafters of the Canadian constitution refrained, at the conclusion of the deliberations, from including an express statement regarding the protection of the right to property in the Charter, because of the fear of the consequences of allowing judicial review over the substance of economic legislation.

The range of considerations that come before the courts in this context has been discussed in the foreign legal literature. Thus Allen stated:

Clearly, an extremely generous view of the constitutional provisions would severely hamper the ability of the legislature to govern. Property cannot extend to every right or interest, even of an economic nature; neither can every act which affects property be considered a deprivation of property. Nevertheless, the courts have generally advocated giving property a wide scope. Those limitations of the guarantees which have arisen are found in the interpretations of “deprivation” or “acquisition”‘ (T. Allen, “Commonwealth Constitutions and the Right Not to Be Deprived of Property” 42 Int. & Comp. L. Q. (1993) 523, 527 (emphasis mine – M.S.), and see also N. K. Komesar, “A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society,” 86 Mich L. Rev. (1987-88) 657, 662).

Professor Hogg (Canada) states his view in the same spirit:

The reason that generosity should give way, rather than the stringent standard of justification, concerns the policy-making role of the courts. If the scope of the guaranteed right is wide, and the standard of justification is relaxed, then a large number of Charter Challenges will come before the courts and will fall to be determined under section 1. Since section 1 requires that the policy of the legislation be balanced against the policy of the Charter, and since it is difficult to devise meaningful standards to constrain the balancing process, judicial review will become even more pervasive, even more policy-laden, and even more unpredictable than it is now. While some judges will welcome such extensive powers, most judges will be concerned to stem the wasteful floods of litigation, to limit the occasions when they have to review the policy choices of legislative bodies, and to introduce meaningful rules to the process of Charter review. These purposes can be accomplished only by restricting the scope of Charter rights (P.W. Hogg, “Interpreting the Charter of Rights: Generosity and Justification,’ 28 Osgoode Hall L. J. (1990) 817, 819-820; emphasis mine - M.S.).

          German constitutional interpretation comments in connection with the legislature’s decisions regarding economic, social and welfare matters:

In Bezug auf Prognosenentscheidungen des Gesetzgebers belaesst das BVerfG dem Gesetzgeber im wirtschafts, sozial-und gesellschaftspolit. Bereich einen weiten (Prognose-) Spielraum: “Die Verfassung billigt dem Gesetzgeber bei der Einschaetzung der fuer die Allgemeinheit drohenden Gefahren einen Beurteilungsspielraum zu; er ueberschreitet ihn nur dann, wenn seine Erwaegungen so offensichtlich fehlsam sind, dass sie vernuenftigerweise keine Grundlage fuer gesetzgeberische Massnahmen abgeben koennen” (BVerfGE 38, 61)’ (Muench / Kunig, supra at 60).’

And in translation:

With regard to the decisions that include future assessments by the legislature, the Basic Law leaves the legislature broad room to maneuver, in relation to the economic, welfare and social areas: “The constitution grants the legislature wide room, in so far as relates to assessment of the anticipated risk to the public. It (the legislature) only exceeds its boundaries if its considerations are so clearly and visibly erroneous, that they cannot provide reasonable grounds for taking legislative steps” (judgment of the Constitutional Court 38, 61).

In other words, the court will intervene if the considerations of the legislation are so clearly and visibly erroneous that they cannot be regarded as providing a reasonable basis for statutory intervention.

So far we have referred to the views in a number of other countries that, in similar circumstances to ours, call for caution and restraint and for preserving the areas that are intended for judicial review as an outcome of the Basic Law.

(c)   On the issue of taxes here, see the different views as expressed in the articles of Prof. A. Yoran, “The Constitutional Revolution in Taxation in Israel,” 23 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 55, 60 (1992) and of Prof. Y. M. Edrey, “Constitutional and Normative Obstacles for the New Tax Legislation,” 8 Taxes Vol. 6 (1994) p. a20.

(d)   The form of examination acceptable here is one which marches one step at a time along the route delineated in ss. 3 and 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. However, the application of the powers vested in the court should properly be exercised in a way that refrains from turning the court into a body that actively shapes the economic policy that it deems to be more correct or preferable.       

The court does not invalidate economic or other legislation by reason of the fact that it is incorrect in its view, or that its provisions seem to the court to have undesirable economic ramifications. The court examines the constitutional aspect, i.e., the aspect of human rights as translated into the conditions of ss. 3 and 8 of the Basic Law. I also accept the view taken by the interpreters of the German constitution whereby there will be no intervention save if the approach is so clearly and visibly erroneous that it is not possible to regard it as a reasonable basis for legislative intervention.

The main focus of the great rule in s. 3 is actually not the definition of the term “property” but the link between the object of the legislation and the activity applicable to it. In other words, the subject of the provision in s. 3 is “violation of property.” Violation of property for our purpose was illustrated by reference to constitutional acts possessing substantive personal repercussions, for example, those by virtue of which the property of a person is confiscated, without proper compensation, in an arbitrary or other substantive breach of his rights. It is not intended that the court will exercise its constitutional rights in respect of the imposition of every fee or stamp tax that is not onerous, merely because, in the nature of things, it imposes a duty to make some payment. If every marginal issue such as this were to be made the subject of examination under s. 8, the courts would become engaged in long, tiring debates in every case of insignificant changes of tax rates, the State would be required to adduce evidence justifying the tax, and the courts would, in practice, become seals of approval or disapproval for every fiscal act. Such a development is undesirable.

The implementation of the powers of the court should properly be carried out while preserving the balance between the principle of the separation of powers, on one hand, and the duty of the court to review constitutionality, on the other hand. Vesting of power to engage in judicial review must be exercised without any tendency to decide about all matters, lock, stock and barrel. On one hand, caution is necessary in order not to paralyze the wheels of the economy, and on the other hand openness is required to hear the cry of the injured individual. This requires professionalism and wisdom. The core of judicial review in relation to property is human rights, and not the reshaping of economic policy.

In conclusion, in my view, the tendency of constitutional legislation in the area of property is not for the court to turn into the supreme reviser of the economy and financial system and examiner of the wisdom of the economic policy. It is not intended that within the framework of constitutional supervision the court will reorganize the economic order in a manner that it deems more just or more sensible.

70.  We will now turn to questions that arise in relation to the Amending Law that is before the Court. As learned counsel for the state argued, the Amending Law was born in order to correct flaws and operating difficulties in the Principal Law:

The interpretation of the courts and the flawed language of the Principal Law created a complex, inefficient process, leading to duplicate proceedings, superfluous expenses, legal and economic uncertainty and the deferral of the issue of a final “rehabilitative judgment,” which is the goal of the Principal Law: comprehensive and swift ordering of the debts of the agricultural unit.

According to the argument of the State, the Amending Law was designed to remove the lack of clarity, in order to cast off the difficulties created by contradictory judgments of the courts and doubts regarding the proper interpretation of different definitions in the Principal Law. As described in the beginning of our comments, the definition of “basic debt” was expanded; inter alia the definition of the term “debt” was changed; it was clarified that no distinction should be drawn between “debt” and “obligation”; the definition of “total debt” was changed by expanding it and applying it to debts existing on 24 Tevet 5752 – 31 December 1991; a reformulation was enacted of s. 7 of the Principal Law which clarified the provisions regarding the cessation of any proceedings concerning a debt or guarantee.

Naturally, reference is not only to the elimination of uncertainties. The essence of the matter is not the language of the amendments but their substance and significance. They contain an expansion – both for the purpose of clarification and also primarily in consequence of lessons learned – of the arrangements in the agricultural sector to which the law applies, and discontinuation of every process to collect debts ordinarily applied in our system. The purpose is to replace the ordinary legal process with a statutory arrangement that includes the possibility of wiping out debts. According to the Amending Law, the latter possibility is broader than that established in the Principal Law. The right of a creditor may be cancelled completely or to a considerable extent.

In this regard it is unimportant that similar arrangements were in place prior to the Principal Law or prior to the Amending Law. We have clarified that the Amending Law stands on its own feet, for our purposes, because it was enacted following the commencement of the Basic Law. The establishment of an absolute duty to transfer processes regarding debts to the Rehabilitator, and the possibility of engaging in a wider elimination of debts than was previously available, comprises a violation of property. It is sufficient for this purpose to turn to the provisions of ss. 21 and 22 of the Principal Law, as amended by the Amending Law.

In this context, I said in LCA 1759/93 [1], at pp. 150-151:

In reducing and spreading the debt there is, of course, a violation of the property of a third party to whom the agriculturalist owes his debt, and this constitutes a change of the arrangement originally established between the parties. This violation is post-contractual and therefore is doubly serious. In this connection it is important to recall that a third party is not necessarily a bank or other financial body (as was intended in the beginning, as stated in the Explanatory Note: “a debt originating in credit given to an agricultural unit by a bank…” – M.S.) but may also be a private person who lent money to that agricultural unit for the purpose of his business as an agriculturalist or granted him any service, and now the amount of the debt to which he is entitled is being reduced: for example, a private person who performed any work for that agriculturalist or supplied him with commodities, such as transport or seed supplies, carried out for the purpose of the agricultural activities of the debtor – will receive only part of the consideration.

My opinion was a dissent. However, this was not the case in so far as concerned the above characterization of the Principal Law, or any other similar provision that amends and expands it. See also in this context Louisville Bank v. Radford (1935) [86] (hereinafter: the Radford case [86]) and cf. Wright v. Vinton Branch (1937) [87], there Justice Brandeis stated at pp. 456-457, summarizing the Radford case [86] (in which he also gave judgment):

‘The decision in the Radford case did not question the power of Congress to offer to distressed farmers the aid of a means of rehabilitation under the bankruptcy clause. The original Frazier-Lemke Act was there held invalid solely on the ground that the bankruptcy power of Congress, like its other great powers, is subject to the Fifth Amendment; and that, as applied to mortgages given before its enactment, the statute violated that Amendment since it effected a substantial impairment of the mortgagee’s security. The opinion enumerates five important substantive rights in specific property which had been taken. It was not held that the deprivation of any one of these rights would have rendered the act invalid, but that the effect of the statute in its entirety was to deprive the mortgagee of his property without due process of law’ (emphasis mine – M.S.).

The nature of the Amending Law as one similar to bankruptcy law does not detract from the conclusion stated above. The existing bankruptcy laws are protected by s. 10 of the Basic Law. Their nature as provisions enabling the debts to be wiped out, i.e., violation of the right to property, would have been the subject of examination had they been enacted following the commencement of the Basic Law. Naturally, this does not affect the examination under s. 8 of the Basic Law, an examination which is the outcome of our conclusion according to s. 3 of the Basic Law.

71.  A legal arrangement regarding the cancellation of debts of significant scope amounts to a taking of property from the holder of a debt and accordingly possesses the character of a violation of property. For this purpose, it is immaterial that even in the absence of this arrangement, the creditor would have had other legal measures available to him for collection that also would conceivably have included the possibility of a certain cancellation of debts – such as bankruptcy proceedings.

What is decisive in relation to s. 3 is the character and consequences of the legislation under examination, and not the question of the existence of similar legal alternatives. This is not the case in relation to s. 8 of the Basic Law, to which we shall return.

72.  The burden of persuasion regarding the existence of a violation of property is on the party claiming it, and he must prove his version of events on the balance of probabilities (FH 4/69 Noiman v. Cohen [31], at p. 290) and not beyond any reasonable doubt as is customary in criminal proceedings.

73.  The conclusion that follows from the aforesaid is that the Amending Law violates the right to property. As explained, the determination that particular legislation contains a violation of property is not the end of the story from the point of view of the constitutionality of the legislation. The door is still open to prove that notwithstanding the violation, the Amending Law falls within the range of cases in respect of which s. 8 of the Basic Law provides that the violation does not lead to the invalidation of the legislation. We shall therefore turn to the said s. 8.

Violation of Rights – Section 8 of the Basic Law

74.  Section 8 of the Basic Law provides as follows:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

These are the cumulative elements of the aforesaid constitutional provision:

(a)The violation is carried out by means of a law or under a law by virtue of express authorization in it;

(b)The law fits the values of the State of Israel;

(c)The law is designed for a proper purpose;

(d)The violation is to an extent no greater than required.

75.  Section 8 reflects a balance between the constitutional interests and the interests reflected in the legislation that is subject to constitutional review. The determination regarding the existence of the right in the Basic Law and the duty to safeguard and respect it does not create absolute conclusive protection, which one cannot exclude and to which there are no exceptions. Rights are not absolute. They are constructed on a reality of a balance between the rights and the needs of all the individuals making up society, and the right of the state and society in general to exist.

The significance of this is that in every discussion regarding a constitutional right, a balanced view is required that takes into account not only the right of the person complaining of the violation, but also the rights of others who might be harmed by the unique, unbalanced grant of the right. This does not mean that rights are always equal and that it is not possible to determine preferences and priorities among them. The cry to save human life has priority over the right of a person to enjoy his afternoon rest. There are circumstances in which freedom of speech supersedes the right of a person to his good name. The solution is obtained, as noted, by means of balances that play a substantive role in every constitutional theory. Section 8 presents the substantive and principal balance required for recognition of rights under the Basic Law before us.

Deputy President Elon referred to the relativity of a basic right in HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [32], at p. 242, stating:

… It is an important rule that a basic right is not absolute but relative, and its existence and preservation are maintained by finding the suitable balance between the various legitimate interests of the two individuals or of the individual and the public, interests that are all anchored and protected by law.

My esteemed colleague President Barak writes:

Human rights are not absolute. These are relative rights that are dependent on the existence of a social framework that maintains them. The limitation clause expresses the social character of human rights set out in the Basic Law. These rights do not look at the individual as an isolated island; they do not deal with the individual’s relationship with himself. Human rights set out in the Basic Law look at the individual as part of society. They deal with the individual and his relationship with others. They assume the existence of close connections between individuals. According to the view of the limitation clause, the individual is a social creature. Indeed, the very existence of human rights assumes the existence of human society, in which mutual relations exist among the individuals in it. However, the limitation clause goes a step further. It also assumes the existence of a state that needs to realize national goals. It is based on the existence of government, which is designed to promote national purposes. Its premise is that the power of government given to the state is essential to its existence and to the existence of human rights themselves. The limitation clause reflects a national compromise between the power of the state and the right of the individual (Barak, in the work cited above, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 3., at p. 745).

This is the reason why the aforesaid s. 8, which sets out conditions limiting the validity of legislation that violates a right set out in the said Basic Law, also limits thereby the protection afforded by the Basic Law, as it sanctions a violating provision and leaves it valid. In other words, it is possible to have a violation of a basic right that will be regarded as valid because it satisfies the conditions of s. 8.

Section 8 governs cases where there is a violation of a right – such as in the instant case where we have concluded from the substance of the law that it contravenes the provisions of s. 3 of the Basic Law. Section 8 prevents the invalidation of the law on constitutional grounds, if it meets the requirements of balance that it enumerates. Section 8 therefore contains a provision possessing a dual load: one negative and the other positive.

The limitation clause, in the words of my esteemed colleague President Barak, ‘assumes the violation of a human right that is intended to protect a human right’ (ibid., at p. 476). The components of the limitation clause must be interpreted in this spirit: the significance and purpose of the conditions that are intended to create a balance between contradictory legitimate rights and create a hierarchy of preferences among various interests, all of which are designed to safeguard the essential values needed to maintain human dignity and liberty. A legitimate social interest may also be included in this zone, because – as noted – there may be circumstances where the violation of the right of a person is an act that is essential to save or succor many others. By the way, from this point of view, the legal structure described has a certain similarity to the standards applicable to the defense of “necessity strictu senso” in criminal law.

Breach of Law or by Law

76.  A provision that seeks to restrict a basic right must rely on an express statement in a law or ensue from an act that relies on an express authorization in a law (see also the Mitrani case [7]). The reliance on a statutory provision or on a provision relying on an express statement in a law is intended to formally anchor the provision in the written words of the primary law in Israel, in contrast to the abstract legal rule learned from the law. This is a qualification as to form that envelops a trend relating to content. The issue of form embodies – by virtue of its nature – the formality that relies on legality, and strengthens it.

With regard to the law that we are examining here, i.e., the Amending Law, the answer to the above requirement is clearly visible: The Amending Law is a law of the Knesset, and as such it meets, without any shadow of a doubt, the first condition of s. 8.

A Law Befitting the Values of the State of Israel

77.  No rights under the Basic Law before us may be violated save by a law ‘befitting the values of the State of Israel.’ We learn of the values of the State of Israel for our purposes from ss. 1 and 1A of the Basic Law, which state:

Section 1 Basic Principles:             Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be respected in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

Section 1A Purpose:                       The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’

The values of the State of Israel are the values of a Jewish and democratic state. A reminder of the principles underlying these values is set out in s. 1A, which is quoted above. Thus, the requirement that a violation of a basic right – in order for it to be regarded as a lawful violation – will rely on statute that is not general and vague. Not every law contains a limitation that exempts a violation of a basic right from its constitutional ramifications. Only a law that, from the point of view of its character and substance, meets the criteria embodied in s. 8 will satisfy the conditions of the aforesaid component of the statutory provision with which we are dealing.

   78. In my view, the Amending Law – like its predecessor the Principal Law – befits the values of the State of Israel. Everyone acknowledges that a very grave crisis has befallen the agricultural sector, a crisis that has already lasted a number of years. Faced with the possible collapse of thousands of agricultural household units, the human suffering entailed in this, many agriculturalists’ loss of property and future – and consequently also the potentially substantial harm to the entire agricultural sector – the legislature chose to implement the option of an arrangement accompanied by rehabilitation, which it regarded as preferable to mere bankruptcy. In creating the idea of an arrangement with creditors that involves injury to creditors and their property, the law is not innovative. This possibility already exists under the laws of bankruptcy and corporate liquidations. However, the existence of a similar earlier model is not sufficient per se to deprive the new legal measure of its character as violating property. The new, innovative elements in the Principal Law and in the Amending Law are those that deny the status of the court and establish the form of the rehabilitation arrangements. As an aside it may be said that the idea of rehabilitation also gradually entered the field of bankruptcy and liquidation law (in the meantime through practical court guidance and not through comprehensive legislation).

Legislative action to save an economic sector has also been undertaken in other democratic countries, so that here too, the law before us does not represent anything new, see for example, the American Bankruptcy Judges, U. S. Trustees and Family Farmer Act, 1986. The intervention of the legislature, in the words of the bill which preceded the Principal Law (Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Draft Bill), in order to find arrangements for the agricultural sector became even more vital after earlier arrangements failed to prove themselves, and left the agricultural sector in a deep crisis, that, it has been argued, even aggravated that crisis.

The legislation before us reflects the values of a society that believes in the responsibility of the state for the fate of its citizens, and that nurtures the sense that the citizens of the state are also responsible for each other. Paying attention to the fate of the working person is a worthy and even essential attribute of a regime possessing humane values, which recognizes the equality of human beings and is willing to provide the legal tools needed to provide possible solutions to their problems. Clearly, a debt arrangement is often dependent upon the cancellation of some debts or putting in place a moratorium of a similar character, and these violate the rights of the creditors.

79.  It seems to me that the courts whose decisions stand before us within the framework of CLA 1908/94 and 3363/94 expanded the court’s role to a degree greater  than was necessary in  inquiring into the question whether the legislation befits the values of the State of Israel. The court does not sit in judgment in order to administer the State economy. It does not rewrite the law. It does not transform secondary into primary in order to determine that legislation that it deems defective or otherwise wanting is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. The court is not called upon to declare what, in its opinion, would be a more fitting or enlightened legislative solution. The court is called upon to determine, in the context of s. 8, whether the subject statute, according to its general purpose, grosso mondo, is consistent with a Jewish and democratic state. Justice Black of the Supreme Court of the United States said in this regard:

‘Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy…’

The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns and like cases – that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely – has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, “We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.” Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to “subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure” (Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963) [88], at 729-730 (per Black, J., for unanimous Court) (The case references have been omitted – M.S.).

I am aware of the fact that the approach to the argument regarding the violation of property rights is not uniform in every country, and that the various constitutional systems reveal a range of approaches, beginning with Canada’s complete avoidance of the constitutional debate on this issue, through the determination of a low level of willingness to intervene in matters of violation of property in the Supreme Court of the United States, and ending in courts that are active and intervene more in the review of political economic measures.

The approach whereby there is room to expand the scope of intervention, by entrusting the court with the task of an economic and material examination of every detail, condition and qualification in a law, in contrast to a substantive examination of the law will, in my opinion, grant the court powers that should be reserved to other branches, i.e., it will place the court in the position of a quasi-supreme legislative chamber which conducts supreme supervision for the sake of it, and holds the power of veto over policy (as distinct from constitutionality) expressed in the law being considered by it.

   An example of the approach that I find unacceptable is the determination by one of the courts in the matter before us, that the Amending Law does not befit the values of the State of Israel by reason of the fact that it only applies to the moshavim (arrangements) (and not to the kibbutzim (collective arrangements)). This determination – which, by the way, is also imprecise factually – is an example of a misguided basic approach, according to which only if the scope of the general application of the law meets the court’s satisfaction, can it be concluded that it is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. Economic legislation resulting from economic policy determines the scope of its application in light of the legislature’s discretion and in light of various economic factors that are not within the court’s knowledge or expertise. It is not for this that the power to engage in constitutional review was granted to the court, whether in Israel or in any other place where constitutional review of this type is conducted. In this context we should recall the decision of the Canadian legislature not to include the subject of infringement of property in the Charter.

80.  Let us now turn from the general to the particular. The courts of first instance found a series of flaws in the law, which led them to conclude that it does not befit the values of a Jewish and democratic state:

(a)As noted, the law only regulates the problem of a part of the agricultural sector, i.e., the moshavim, and in the opinion of the court, this is a violation of equality.

(b)The burden is imposed only on what the court termed a “random” and “unidentified” section of the public, i.e., on the creditors of the agriculturists who participate in the arrangement, as distinct from the imposition of the burden on the public as a whole. According to the court, this too amounts to a violation of equality.

There is no substance to the view taken by the lower court in CLA 1908/94 to the effect that the operation of the program which the law seeks to serve, by the imposition of debts on the creditors alone, amounts to a process that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. The belief that the values of the State of Israel require that the entire tax-paying public bear the burden of covering the insolvency of defined public sectors has no basis. Had the Principal Law and the Amending Law not been enacted, the execution laws or the bankruptcy laws or both would have applied to the collection of the debts and the attempts to reach an arrangement. Would the financial loss ensuing from partial or non-existent collection of the debts of those unable to pay what they owed been imposed under these laws upon the public as a whole? Clearly, the answer to this is – no; and no one has ever suggested that this be done.

The same is true in relation to the argument, which is factually wrong, concerning the failure to cover the debts of the kibbutzim. As mentioned, the law applies to the debts of a certain number of named kibbutzim. Moreover, other measures have been taken to deal with the debts of the kibbutzim, then and now. However, even if the issue of the debts of the kibbutzim had not been included in the arrangement before us, this would not have deprived the law of its character as a law befitting the values of the State of Israel. The question facing the court was whether the law, which sought to settle the debts of thousands of households within the agricultural sector, was compatible, in terms of purpose and substance, with a democratic and Jewish state. The answer to this is affirmative, because the arrangement of debts in a broad economic sector is a worthy activity, both here and in other democratic countries in which farmers encounter similar difficulties. The legislature saw fit to choose, from among the alternatives, a solution that is not applied to all the citizens who have encountered economic hardship. This does not lead to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional.

With regard to the covering of debts by way of partial cancellation or the covering of debts using public funds, a law may establish an arrangement with creditors on the basis of cancelling debts and violating property without this being regarded as a conclusion that does not befit the values of the State of Israel or of any other state in the free world. For example, Jewish law in relation to the cancellation of debts (Deuteronomy, 15, 1-11 [A]) of course harms only creditors and not the entire public. The same is true of the modern laws of bankruptcy throughout the world. This is an economic necessity.  Achieving rehabilitation by means of arrangement of debts, even if this involves cancelling some of those debts, is on occasion the only way out, but this still does not mean that all the tax payers, as distinct from those who maintained connections with the debtor as part of their livelihood, are required to cover the debts and be responsible for their arrangement.

In conclusion, the court was mistaken in its belief that only a law that settles the debts by imposing the burden on the entire public, and which encompasses in its provisions all types of agricultural debtors (and why only agricultural?), is a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, and that every other law is deprived of this attribute and so-to-speak violates equality. As mentioned, the approach of the court reveals, to a large extent, an incorrect assessment of the function of the court and its discretion in relation to the issue under discussion. Instead of a relevant and realistic assessment of the law that was enacted, the court decided that constitutionality attaches only to modes of enactment that are optimal in terms of their wisdom or justice, according to the court’s view; in so doing, the court did not act within the scope of s. 8, but beyond and outside it.

In this context I accept the comments of Prof. F. Raday (“Privatizing Human Rights and the Abuse of Power,” 23 Mishpatim (1994) 21, 52) as also cited in the Attorney General’s response:

… In the choice between the various concepts of justice in the privatization of human rights, different pictures are seen by the court and the legislature. This fact leads them to choose different versions of justice: the legislature – the macro-socio-economic version of justice and collective justice; and the court – the legal-formalistic and individualistic version of justice. According to the principles of constitutional democracy in Israel, when there is a clash between these versions, the court must respect the policy of justice chosen by the legislature, being the version of justice that cannot be accused of not being for a proper purpose or of being inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel.

See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955) [89], 489, where it was held:

The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind…  The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others... The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination…

And at pages 487-488:

… the law needs not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.

To summarize this point: a reasonable, non-arbitrary solution expressed in a law can befit the values of the state, even if the court would have chosen a solution that would have been more just or sensible, in its opinion, had it been given the choice. The error of the court in cases such as the one before us lies in the search for a single solution, which it views as optimal, and only in which, it identifies the law that befits the values of the State of Israel. The court must be cognizant of the fact that there may be a wide variety, in the nature of a zone or area, of possible alternative solutions, and that every type of provision contained therein may fit the values of the state. Only a law that completely exceeds the array of legal alternatives will be rejected as lacking the attribute of compatibility.

Intended for a Proper Purpose

81.  The words “proper purpose” describe a purpose that is positive from the point of view of human rights and the values of society, including the purpose of establishing a reasonable and fair balance between the rights of different people who hold interests that are sometimes inconsistent with each other. A proper purpose is one that creates a foundation for living together, even if entails a compromise in the area of granting optimal rights to each and every individual, or if it serves interests that are essential to the preservation of the state and society. In the event that the law possesses a number of intertwined purposes, great, albeit not decisive, weight will be accorded to its dominant nature. At the same time, the secondary purposes should not be disregarded and their ramifications for human rights should be examined.

Thus, in order to satisfy the condition of s. 8, it is necessary to examine whether the legislation that violates the basic right – and which is examined under s. 8 – is of sufficient importance and weight to justify the violation of the right. It is not possible to ascribe importance and weight to a trivial purpose, whose constructive value is negligible, if the outcome is a substantive violation of a basic right. In order to justify a violation of a right, appropriate importance and weight must attach to the sought for purpose. In other words, the desired purpose must be important and essential in order to justify a violation of a right (see also the Canadian judgment R. v. Oakes (1986) [114]).

The purpose that emerges from the law may become visible between its lines upon perusal and examination only; however, it must be discernable, even if it is not declared, in order for it to be weighed against the violation and its significance. As mentioned, the persuasive burden rests upon the party claiming the existence of a proper purpose.

Moreover, the proper purpose must emerge upon examination by the court. For this purpose, the court is not bound exclusively by purposes borne in mind by the legislature. Certainly, there is a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith, and in any event we must not search for the concealed motives of individuals making up the legislative branch, in contrast to the purpose considered by the legislature as a collective legislative organ (see HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [33], at p. 187). The court examines the purpose that guided the legislature, as expressed in the reasoning of the person who proposed the law and in the majority opinion as formulated. At the same time, it may also become apparent at the time of examination of the final draft of the law and its ramifications.

82. (a)         In CLA 1908/94 the court held that the purpose of the Amending Law is not proper. According to the court, there was no indication of the fact that broadening the violation of the property rights of the creditors by the Amending Law was done for a proper purpose that could not have been achieved and realized by the Principal Law. The court stated that the Explanatory Note to the bill did not contain any details regarding the reasons for the amendment, and also at the time of the presentation of the issue in the Knesset, no relevant details were given regarding the difficulties of operating the Principal Law.

In the words of the court:*

… there is no explanation in the Amending Law why, in order to save the agricultural sector, it is necessary to broaden the violation of the fundamental principles of our society and the basic rights of its citizens…

In consequence of this, the court concluded that, in addition to the above, it also had not been proved that the violation was “to the required extent,” an issue that we will address separately.

(b)   I find the argument that the purpose of the Amending Law is the same as the purpose of the Principal Law to be reasonable. Both treat of the same issue, i.e., the effort to resolve the crisis in the agricultural moshav sector. This purpose is not ‘a violation of the basic principles of our society.’ The Amending Law did not introduce anything new to the basic purpose, but sought to reconcile difference, remove doubts, perfect methods and make modes of operation more efficient, in the light of the lessons of the past. As we have explained, the non-application of the Basic Law to the Principal Law does not deprive the court of its ability to examine the compatibility of the Amending Law to the principles of the Basic Law, so as to determine whether the Amending Law has a different purpose than that espoused by the Principal Law, in respect of which the explanations were fuller and more detailed.

Indeed, provisions that are not invalidated in the Principal Law, by reason of the provision in s. 10 of the Basic Law, may be invalidated in the Amending Law, which does not enjoy a similar provision regarding non-application. However, a close examination of the provisions of the Amending Law does not lead to the conclusion in the present case that the purpose, i.e., the solution to the crisis in the agricultural sector, is unworthy or that the purpose which is worthy per se is nonetheless flawed by reason of the fact that no details are given of the problems and difficulties ensuing from the operation of the Principal Law that required it to be amended. It should be clarified – as guidance for the future – that it would have been appropriate to inform the court of the cases in which the various courts had handed down decisions that were not uniform or were restrictive and which made it difficult to implement the provisions of the law. In the hearing before us, the following decisions, inter alia, were mentioned: OM (Jerusalem) 1635/92 [78]; OM (Tel-Aviv) 1229/93 [79]; LCA 3466/92 Artrekt Bankrupts v. Bankruptcy Trustee [34]; OM (Tel-Aviv) 49299/88 [80]; OM (Tel-Aviv) 1657/89 [81].

The term “basic debt” was interpreted in different ways, the question of the interest led to dispute, there were decisions regarding the severance of the hearing between the court and the Rehabilitator and further derivative matters, which required a clearer and more precise statement of the solution to the disputes raised before the court, in order to allow the attainment of the purpose set out by the legislature in the Principal Law.

As noted, it would have been correct, from the point of view of the State, to have presented in greater detail to the lower court the vast case-law which, so it was claimed before us, was contradictory and problematic. However, even if, regrettably, this was not done (and in the future it would be appropriate to follow this course) this, on its own, does not render the single and unequivocal purpose invisible and outside the judicial knowledge of the court. Indeed, in this case the court itself had dealt with some of the previous disputes that turned the legislative wheels and led to the enactment of the Amending Law.

To summarize this point: the purpose that faced the legislature was proper. There was no room for the conclusion that the delineation of the measures chosen to deal with the purpose confronting the legislature was unreasonable or fell outside the “zone” of proper purposes and measures. A decision regarding non-intervention by the court need not rely on the ratification of the one-and-only optimal solution. There may be a number of solutions, each of which serves a proper purpose.

Violation to an Extent No Greater than is Required

83.  This component of s. 8 addresses proportionality. It examines if the degree of the violation of a right is reasonably proportional to the purpose ensuing from the legislation (see also Prof. Z. Segal, “The Grounds for Disproportionality in Administrative Law,” 39 Hapraklit (5760) 507).

The purpose deals with the idea, the basic policy and the violation per se; in contrast, the ‘extent no greater than is required’ deals with the scope of the violation, measures and modes. It should be recalled that s. 8 treats of cumulative conditions: the conclusion that the purpose is proper is not enough. In addition, the means adopted must be within the realm of proportionality.

What is examined is whether the means adopted are essential and required in order to achieve the purpose, and whether they are in reasonable proportion to the purpose. A number of alternative measures may be possible to achieve a certain purpose, each of which meets the conditions of being essential and required. The court will invalidate a means that exceeds what is required or is not suitable to achieve the desired purpose.

In this connection, Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States put forward the following premise in the case of Vance v. Bradley (1979) [90] at 97:

The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.

The German constitutional system describes the essential points of proportionality (Verhaeltnismaeszigkeit) in four stages:

1.         Der Eingriff darf nur im Interesse des Gemeinwohls und nicht zu sachfremden Zwecken erfolgen (Gemeinwohl);  2. Die im Gesetz angeordnete Masznahme musz ein brauchbares Mittel zur Erreichung des vom Gesetz angestrebten Zweckes sein (Eignung); 3. die im Gesetz angeordnete Masznahme darf sich durch keinen milderen Eingriff ereichen lassen, d.h. die Masznahme musz das schonendste Mittel zur Erreichung des Gesetzeszweckes sein (Erforderlichkeit); 4. Mittel und Zweck muesen in einem angemessenen Verhaeltnis zueinander stehen (Zumutbarkeit; Verhaeltnismaeszigkeit im engeren Sinne) (Muench / Kunig, supra, at 54).

 

And in translation:

1.         Intervention may only be carried out for the benefit of the public and not for extraneous purposes (the benefit of the public).

2.         Performing the step ordered by the law must be an efficient measure (efficacious, performable) in order to achieve the purpose to which the law aspires (compatibility).

3.         The step ordered by the law is not achievable by utilizing a less serious measure. In other words, the step must be the less harmful measure needed to achieve the purpose of the law (necessity).

4.         The measure and the purpose must have a suitable relationship to each other (compatibility, proportionality in the narrower sense).

In other words, the following conditions are required:

1.The legal measure adopted must be for the benefit of the public;

2.It must be a usable and suitable measure to achieve the purpose of the law;

3.It must be the least harmful measure to achieve the statutory purpose;

4.The measure and the purpose must be reasonably related to each other.

84.  In the above-cited work on Interpretation, my esteemed colleague President Barak suggested three sub-tests for examining proportionality (Interpretation in Law, Vol. 3, at p. 536). I shall set out their gist below:

(a)Is the measure suitable or unsuitable to achieve the purpose? A connection of suitability is required between the purpose and the measure.

(b)Is it possible to achieve the same purpose using other measures that are less harmful to the protected human right?

(c)Is the violation of the right so serious that we should relinquish the achievement of the full, proper purpose and adopt measures that are significantly less harmful to the protected human right (even though the full purpose will not be achieved)?

 Test (c) above is, in my view, more a conclusion than a standard. In any event, in my view, it raises difficult questions in the area of judicial review of economic legislation: Will the court decide, for example, that the proposed taxation is too high in order to achieve a particular purpose that is found to be proper, and cancel it completely? Or perhaps it will set a lower tax ceiling? Will it decide, for example, that a moratorium will only apply to 25% of the debts and not to 40% of them? The court faces a proper purpose. The measure is suitable to achieve it. There is no reasonable measure that is less harmful to achieve the proper purpose. Is it conceivable that, in such circumstances, the court will order a retreat from the proper purpose that has been adopted as the economic policy of the legislature, i.e., order that the achievement of the proper economic purpose be renounced in whole or in part?

 In my opinion, the court should examine whether the measure is  substantially related to the proper purpose and whether the measure adopted is rationally related to the proper purpose. The substantive test corresponds to subsection (b) above. The logical test corresponds to test (a) above. The court examines whether the measure chosen is related substantially and rationally to the proper purpose.

Put differently, in my opinion it is necessary to establish as a cumulative test by which a measure will be regarded as being of appropriate proportionality if it:

 (a) is related substantially to the purpose, i.e., the test of compatibility; and that

 (b) it is rationally related to the purpose; and

 (c) among the array of measures to achieve the purpose, there is no similar or close measure, which is included in the zone of reasonable possibilities, that can achieve that purpose.

85.  With regard to the aforesaid test (c) which is the product of the theory of stages (Stufentheorie) it should be added and clarified that we are referring to a search for a less harmful measure within a range or zone of similar or close possibilities, and it is not necessarily possible to stay at the bottom of the ladder, i.e., apply the most lenient option. Moreover, in order to search for the measure that is least harmful, the court does not redraft the purpose and does not redraft the program. Facing it is a purpose and measures as formulated by the legislature, and it examines them in terms of their substance, consequences and ramifications. If the purpose is proper, and if the measure is suitable to achieve the purpose and is substantially related to it, and if the measure is rationally related to the purpose, and if there is no measure less severe that falls outside the zone of admissible alternatives, then the court is entitled to regard it as a measure that does not exceed what is required.

This is the place to add a clarification regarding the burden of persuasion in connection with the “appropriate extent.” The sweeping duty to show the application of s. 8 rests on the party claiming its existence. However, within the framework of the specific examination of the element of the “appropriate extent” the evidentiary burden shifts to the party claiming the existence of a violation. What does this mean? The state adduced evidence regarding the existence of the other elements, namely, that the violation was carried out by means of a law or under a law; the law befits the values of the State and the law is intended for a proper purpose. The party claiming the existence of less severe alternatives beyond the zone of possibilities adopted by the legislation bears the burden of bringing the evidence. In other words, the State presents the path chosen by it, and of course the set of factors underlying that choice. However, it does not have to, and cannot, of its own initiative, lay out the entire range of endless other possibilities that could have been pursued to achieve the same objective. This is something that is completely unfeasible. The party asserting the existence of another course of action, which is less grave, fairer, more reasonable, and which can justify the intervention of the court to invalidate the conditions authorizing the legislation, as these arise from s. 8, bears the burden of bringing evidence, and if he does not show the existence of such alternatives, we will be compelled to conclude that the path chosen by the legislature does not exceed the appropriate degree.

To summarize the discussion of this element of s. 8, I would emphasize again that the court must not take upon itself the general function of reshaping purposes and economic or fiscal policies, respectively. This is not justified in a healthy constitutional relationship between the branches. The legislature determines the policy, and on that basis delineates the purposes and measures. In the words of my esteemed colleague the President, ibid., at p. 553, the question that the judge must ask himself is not what is the law that draws a proper balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of the whole which ‘I would have enacted had I possessed the power.’ The question that the judge must ask himself is: ‘does the law that was in fact enacted draw a balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of the whole in a manner that satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause.’ If the answer to this question is positive, the judge must acknowledge the validity of the law and its power to legally violate a protected human right, even if the choice of purpose or means does not seem desirable to the judge and he would have chosen a different mode of action. As already mentioned, the judge is not responsible for examining the wisdom of particular legislation but only for examining its constitutionality.

86.  We shall also consider the measures before us in accordance with these tests. I am not persuaded by the contention that the measure exceeds the degree necessary and required, is greater than required and that it is possible to achieve the required solution by another means. Every state arrangement of debts entails a search for exhaustive means of paying the debts, while attempting, in so far as possible, to preserve the economic unit to which the arrangement applies. Arrangement of debts often entails the relinquishment of some of the debts or suspension of collection. This is the general framework that was adopted here. It serves the purpose. It is consistent with the purpose that has been found to be proper, and there are no grounds for invalidating it.

87.  To summarize: The Amending Law satisfies the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law, and therefore the violation of property ensuing from the Amending Law must be regarded as a constitutional violation. Accordingly, in my view, there was no room for the declaration of the invalidity of the Amending Law.

88.  We have written at length. The primary reason for this is the need to try to present the guidelines that will serve us in the future when examining the constitutionality of laws under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

In this context, it is proper to recall that in countries possessing a constitutional tradition longer than our own, it is customary to examine claims of unconstitutionality with caution and restraint. Unique rules have been shaped to serve the courts that are asked to decide upon the invalidity of legislation on constitutional grounds. Justice Brandeis dealt with this issue extensively in his judgment in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) [91].

The Ashwander case [91] concerned the purchase of facilities, land and stored energy by the Tennessee Valley Authority from the Alabama Power Company. Some of the stockholders in the Alabama Company brought an action for the invalidation of the contractual transaction, inter alia, on the grounds that it exceeded the constitutional powers of the Federal Government.

Justice Brandeis reiterated the rules requiring restraint when engaging in an examination of constitutionality, stating:

Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.  Blair v. United States 250 U.S. 273, 279.

The Court has frequently called attention to the “great gravity and delicacy” of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress’ (ibid., at 341, 345).

He added a series of guidelines (ibid., at pp. 345-346), which were based on previous extensive case law, and which can also provide us with material for thought, after independent sifting and harmonization.

89.  These are the guidelines set out by Justice Brandeis:

(a)The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in nonadversary proceedings, because deciding such a question is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. Inter alia, the judge noted that a party beaten in the legislature could not transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.

(b)The court will not customarily decide questions of a constitutional nature unless it is absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.

(c)The court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the concrete facts before it to which it is to be applied.

(d)The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented, if there is some other ground upon which the case may be disposed. If a dispute can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question based on statutory construction or general principles, the court will decide only on the basis of the ground of the second type.

(e)The court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

(f)The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute upon complaint of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

(g)When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that the court first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

With regard to the fifth rule above, both here and in England and in the United States, the right of standing has been expanded in contemporary times, and it has also been granted in defined circumstances to persons who have not been directly injured by the action of the authority (see here: HCJ 852, 869/86; HCJApp 483, 486, 487, 502, 507, 512-515, 518, 521, 523, 543/86, 1, 33/87 Aloni v Minister of Justice [35]; HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [36]; HCJ 428, 429, 431, 446, 448, 463/86; HCJApp 320/86, [9]; and see also H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford, 5th ed., 1982) 583; Dr Z. Segal, Right of Standing in the High Court of Justice (Papyrus, 2nd ed., 1994).

90.  As noted, the fundamental approach expressed in the rules, and the spirit emerging from them are worthy of attention and thought, because the experience gathered in other places in the area under discussion here can assist us. We do not reject comparative study and research in any field of law, and generally it proves valuable.

91.  In CA 6821/93, the appellant raised an alternative argument whereby ‘even if the court decides that the amendment is valid and applies to these proceedings, under the law in its amended format the provisions of the Gal law should not be applied to the respondents.’ According to the appellant ‘the decisive question in this case is the identity of the principal debtor, and the fact that the guarantor is obliged to pay the debt by virtue of his guarantee does not turn the debt into the debt of the guarantor and thereby lose its connection to the principal debtor.’ The appellant adds that the construction whereby the debt of the guarantor who is an agricultural unit is deemed to be a “total debt,” contravenes the restrictive policy that the Supreme Court ascribes to the provisions of the law.

The appellant’s contentions must be dismissed. The purpose of the law, i.e., the attempt to resolve the severe crisis affecting the agricultural sector by way of creating a new framework that would enable the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, and the clear language of the law (see the definition of “debt” and “total debt” in s. 1 of the Principal Law), show that whereas the debts of an agriculturalist and a member of an agricultural association, which are included within the definition of a “total debt,” are limited to those that stem from the business of these debtors as agriculturalists, no such restriction is placed in relation to an agricultural unit, that is not an agriculturalist and member of an agricultural association. Every debt of an agricultural unit, that is not an agriculturalist and member of an agricultural association, is a total debt, without distinction as to the source from which it stems and how it accrued, provided, however, that it existed on 31 December 1991.

Conclusion

92.  The principle findings in my judgment are as follows:

(1)Legislation in Israel is constructed on the basis of a normative hierarchy.

(2)At the top tier of the normative hierarchy stands constitutional legislation.

(3)Our constitutional legislation is expressed today in the Basic Laws. These will eventually be combined in a single, complete, unified constitution.

(4)Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are constitutional legislation.

(5)The supreme sovereign legislature is the Knesset: it is the Knesset that is empowered to enact constitutional legislation and to enact ordinary legislation. It is also empowered to promulgate regulations if it so determines in law.

(6)No provision contained in one of the said Basic Laws may be varied or repealed, save in a Basic Law or by virtue of it. It is right to adopt this principle in relation to all the Basic Laws.

(7)A provision contained in one of the said Basic Laws cannot be violated save by a Basic Law or by virtue of it. It is right to adopt this principle in relation to all the Basic Laws.

(8)The Knesset is empowered, through its legislation, to place restrictions on future legislation whether that legislation be constitutional or ordinary. The self-limitation may be formal or substantive.

(9)An amendment to an existing law that was enacted after the commencement of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is subject to the provisions of the said Basic Law.

(10)The court is competent to engage in judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.

(11)The Amending Law being considered in these appeals violates property; however, it meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and accordingly is valid.

93.  The Basic Laws are the defensive shield of the citizen’s rights. Their interpretation within the framework of this judgment will clarify and strengthen, preserve and entrench them. This was the intention of the legislature when enacting the Basic Law, and this is the purpose of the interpretation undertaken by the court.

94.  Accordingly, I would uphold the appeals in CLA 1908/94 and 3363/94 and set aside the judgment of the lower court and dismiss the appeal in CA 6821/93.

There is no order as to costs.

 

President A. Barak

In March 1992, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The enactment of these two Basic Laws effected a substantive change in the status of human rights under Israeli law. Such rights became constitutionally protected and were accorded supra-legislative constitutional status. They cannot be changed by ‘regular’ legislation. A regular law cannot infringe a protected human right unless the constitutional requirements set forth in the Basic Law have been met. The failure of a regular law to meet those requirements renders it unconstitutional. Such a law is constitutionally flawed and the Court may declare it void.

 

Israel is a constitutional democracy. We have now joined the community of democratic countries (among them the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy and South Africa) with constitutional bills of rights. We have become part of the human rights revolution that characterizes the second half of the twentieth century. The lessons of the Second World War, and at their center the Holocaust of the Jewish people, as well as the suppression of human rights in totalitarian states, have raised the issue of human rights to the top of the world agenda. International accords on human rights have been reached. Israel has acceded to them. International tribunals have been established to address issues of human rights. The new constitutions include extensive sections treating of human rights – particularly at the head of those constitutions and in their unique entrenchment provisions. Judicial review of the constitutionality of laws infringing human rights has become the norm in most countries. This revolution has not passed us by. We joined it in March 1992.

 

A. The constitutional revolution in human rights

 

1. The constitutional revolution occurred in the Knesset in March 1992. The Knesset endowed the State of Israel with a constitutional bill of rights. This revolution was many years in the making and was the result of a multi-dimensional legislative process. At its foundation rests the recognition that the Knesset is the body that has the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. The Knesset is not only empowered to adopt ‘regular’ legislation; it is also empowered to adopt a constitution. The Knesset exercised this authority in enacting two Basic Laws on human rights. In so doing it created a supreme, supra-legislative constitutional norm. In the normative hierarchy that was thereby created, the two Basic Laws treating of human rights stand above regular legislation. A conflict between a provision of one of these two Basic Laws and a provision of a regular statute leads to the invalidation of the offending statute.

 

2. When it enacted the Basic Laws pertaining to human rights, the Knesset expressed its position with regard to the supreme legal-constitutional status of those laws. Today the Supreme Court expresses its legal position confirming that supreme status. Thus the legislative branch is in accordance with the judicial branch. The constituent authority coincides with the judicial authority. An order has been established regarding the constitution in general and regarding the human rights set forth in the Basic Laws in particular. The Knesset did not create the Basic Laws ex nihilo. Rather, the Knesset enacted the two Basic Laws in accordance with its constituent authority. This authority is granted to the Knesset, as is evident against the background of the Declaration of Independence, the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the Harrari Decision, and the ten Basic Laws that the Knesset has enacted from 1958 until the enactment of the Basic Laws dealing with human rights (Basic Law: The Knesset; Basic Law: Israel Lands; Basic Law: The President of the State; Basic Law: The Government (old and new); Basic Law: The State Economy; Basic Law: The Army; Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel; Basic Law: The Judiciary ; Basic Law: The State Comptroller). The Supreme Court did not create something ex nihilo. Our decision today is consistent with established precedent, beginning with the Bergman case (HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [15]). As recently as last year, we recognized the Knesset’s authority in this regard (see HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [37]). Today we continue on the same path.

 

3. The constitutional revolution in the field of human rights is built upon the foundation of judicial precedent. The Knesset has used its constituent authority to endow a number of legally protected human rights with constitutional supra-legislative status. Without the established legal underpinning, the constitutional change could not have been effected. ‘We would not have arrived at the secure position that human rights occupy today without the strong foundation established by the judges who preceded us’ (CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [38], at p. 414). It would not have been possible to construct a constitutional framework in the area of human rights had not the established judicial precedent been in place. Without judicially protected human rights, constitutionally protected human rights would be unknown to us. Without Israel’s democratic past there is no basis for Israeli constitutional democracy in the present or the future. The constitutional revolution in the area of human rights is the product of the jurisprudential developments in the protection of human rights. This constitutional structure is built upon a foundation of legal precedent. In this way, clear expression is given to the ‘ongoing cooperation’ between the Court and the Knesset (Justice Agranat, The Contribution of the Judiciary to the Legislative Enterprise, 10 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1984) 233). Moreover, the new constitutional law must be interpreted against the backdrop of the general national experience. Constitutionally protected human rights must be understood in the context of established judicial precedent. This precedent does not diminish in power. It continues to be a source of interpretive insight in construing constitutionally protected human rights.

 

4. The constitutional revolution is not manifested by the simple recognition of human rights. This recognition has long been established in Israeli judicial precedent. Rather, the constitutional revolution is seen in the changed constitutional status of human rights; the constitutional revolution is seen in the establishment of constitutional status for ‘basic principles’ according to which ‘fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon a recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life and the principle that all persons are free...’ The constitutional revolution is expressed in the determination that human rights ‘will be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel’ (s. 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; s. 1 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). The constitutional revolution is expressed in the granting of constitutional status to the clause that a person’s honor and freedom must be protected ‘in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1A of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; see also s. 2 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). Accordingly, the legal rights of a person in Israel are no longer unwritten (Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 Israel Broadcasting Studios Ltd v. Gary [39] at p. 2415). They have become constitutional rights, engraved upon the pages of the constitution and enjoying normative supremacy. A regular law that infringes a constitutional right in a manner that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, that does not serve a proper purpose, and that violates the right to an extent greater than is required is an unconstitutional law and may be declared void. When a regular law infringes a constitutional right protected in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause and provides – expressly or implicitly – that it is intended to infringe a human right, such a law is unconstitutional and the Court may declare it void. This is the essence of the constitutional change. This is unprecedented. Until now the prevailing view in Israel was that ‘the all-powerful legislature may permit harm to citizens without any legal or judicial limits.’ (Justice Sussmann in HCJ 163/57 Lubin v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [40], at p. 1079; ‘This is the decree of the legislature; if it leads to discrimination, such discrimination is sanctioned by legislation and is therefore lawful and not invalid’ (Justice H.H. Cohn in HCJ 120/73 Tobis v. State of Israel [41], at p. 359). Justice Berinson has summarized this as follows:

 

It is beyond doubt that according to the prevailing constitutional rule of the State, the Knesset reigns supreme and it is within its power to enact any law and fill it with content at its whim. One may not consider the possibility that the clauses of a legally enacted law might be declared invalid for one reason or another. (HCJ 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer [18], at p. 2547).

 

This constitutional outlook has now changed. The Knesset is no longer all-powerful in exercising its legislative authority. In the area of human rights, the Knesset has limited its legislative powers by exercising its constituent authority. This is the basic constitutional change. For the first time, in March 1992, the Knesset established a range of constitutional human rights that limit the legislative power of the Knesset and that condition their infringement upon the realization of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. For the first time the Supreme Court affirms the constitutional supra-legislative effect of the Knesset’s action. In light of the novelty of this issue, because of the different opinions on this matter and against the background of the comprehensive decision of my colleague President Shamgar, it is fitting that I address various questions that arose before us in an attempt to answer them.

 

In the first part of this decision I discuss the constitutional framework. In this section, I address the question of whether the Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. I will answer this question in the affirmative, for the Knesset has not only legislative power, but also the power to enact a constitution for Israel; in other words, it is endowed with constituent authority. In the context of this section I address the question of how the Knesset makes use of its constituent authority and whether, in fact, it did so properly in enacting the two Basic Laws treating of human rights. I answer this question affirmatively as well. I examine the normative status of the two Basic laws and their relation to regular legislation. I then conclude the examination of the legislative framework with the question of whether, in light of the two Basic Laws, judicial review can lie of the constitutionality of regular legislation. The answer to this question is also affirmative.

 

In the second section I concentrate on the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. I begin with an examination of its constitutional implications. I briefly discuss the scope of the protected rights, and will concentrate primarily on the nature of the right of property, which the Appellants claim has been violated. I consider the Knesset’s power to infringe protected rights by analyzing the limitation clause.

 

In the third and final section of my decision I consider whether the provisions of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law infringe constitutionally protected rights. I answer this question in the affirmative. Against this background I consider whether the law, which infringes those rights, meets the requirements of the limitation clause. I answer this question affirmatively, as well.

 

B. The constitutional framework

 

I) The source of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel

 

a) The doctrine of constituent authority

 

5. The opening question is, of course, whether the Knesset is endowed with the authority to enact a constitution for Israel (‘constituent authority’) and, if so, what is the source of this authority. President Shamgar has proposed several views on this matter. Choosing between them is not necessary in order to decide the issue before us in this appeal. I will therefore present my opinion in this matter.

 

It seems to me that that most appropriate view is that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. This power derives from the central constitutional fact that Knesset was given the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. The Knesset does not create this authority for itself. It is not granted to the Knesset by a Basic Law or by any other law enacted by the Knesset. In order to frame a constitution, which will be placed above the law in the normative hierarchy, there must be an Archimedean foothold located outside the constitution or the law, which provides the Knesset with the authority to adopt a constitution. The constitution cannot create the authority by which it will be created. Statute cannot create a constitution to which statutes will be subject. Nor can legislation create the authority by which it will be created. The enactment of a constitution always requires a foothold outside the legislative body. This foothold must come from the people, whose will is supreme. Thus, the doctrine of the Knesset’s constituent authority is based upon the principle that this authority derives from the sovereign, i.e. the people. Constituent authority endows the Knesset with the power to enact a constitution for Israel (as embodied in the Basic Laws). This authority endows the Knesset with the power to enact regular laws as well as to act in other ways (for example, to supervise the government). Indeed, the Knesset wears a number of ‘hats’ or ‘crowns,’ among them the crown of constituent authority – under which the constitution is adopted (by enactment of the Basic Laws) –  and the crown of legislative authority,   under which legislation is adopted. Three legal models may illustrate this view. Each model stands alone as a basis for the doctrine of constituent authority. That all lead to the same conclusion lends that conclusion greater weight. I will begin with a brief introduction to each of the three models. I will then present the constitutional facts that sustain the models.

 

b) Presentation of the three models

(i) Constituent authority is derived from the basic norm

 

6. The first model is based upon the importance of constitutional continuity. Under this model, the basic norm for Israel (the Grundnorm, according to Kelsen, see H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Knight trans. 1967), at p. 193) is that the Provisional Council of State is the supreme authority of the State of Israel (see I.H. Klinghoffer, “The Establishment of the State of Israel: Constitutional History,” Klinghoffer Book on Public Law, (ed. I. Zamir, 1993), at p. 74). The Provisional Council of State declared in the Declaration of Independence that a constitution would be drawn up ‘by the elected Constituent Assembly’ In addition, the Provisional Council of State declared itself the legislative body (in the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948).

 

The Constituent Assembly was elected (on January 25, 1949), and with its establishment the Provisional Council of State was dissolved. Its powers passed to the Constituent Assembly (Transition Law, 5709-1949). The Constituent Assembly therefore had two main powers: constituent authority and legislative authority. The same entity was given two functions, two ‘crowns’ or ‘hats’ as it were: one constituent (to adopt a constitution), and the other legislative (to enact ‘regular’ legislation). This arrangement, in which constituent and legislative authority are granted to the same entity, is widely accepted (see Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments, vol. 2  (1966), at p. 35; Klein, ‘Constituent Authority in the State of Israel,’ II Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 52 (1970)). The Constituent Assembly provided (in the Transition Law) that ‘the legislature of the State of Israel will be known as the “Knesset.” The Constituent Assembly will be known as the “First Knesset.” The delegates will be known as “Members of Knesset.”’
(s. 1). The First Knesset (i.e. the Constituent Assembly) devoted considerable time to debating the matter of the constitution. These debates concluded with a compromise decision (the “Harrari Decision”), according to which:

The First Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee with the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution will be composed of chapters, with each chapter comprising a Basic Law unto itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset if and when the Committee completes its work and all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution for the State’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 1743).

 

Before it dispersed, the First Knesset provided that all of its powers would pass to subsequent Knessets (Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 5711-1951). To avoid doubt, it was emphasized that this transfer would also include all powers of the Constituent Assembly (see s. 9). The Second Knesset dealt with the preparation of Basic Law: The Knesset but did not succeed in adopting that law. Only the Third Knesset succeeded in adopting the first Basic Law: Basic Law: The Knesset. Since then, Basic Laws have been enacted by the various Knessets. From this brief survey, the first model concludes that the constituent authority of the Constituent Assembly has rested continuously in the hands of the Knesset.

 

(ii) Constituent authority is derived from the rule of recognition

7. The second model supporting the Knesset’s constituent authority is not based upon constitutional continuity. Rather, this model examines the constitutional structure as it exists at any given time. It is based upon the thesis of Professor Hart. Professor Hart distinguishes between primary and secondary norms. Secondary norms determine how the primary norms are created, how they may be changed and how disputes concerning them may be resolved. Among the secondary norms the “rule of recognition” occupies a preeminent position (see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (second edition, 1994), at p. 100). This rule determines how primary norms are created as well as their relative status – which is a superior norm and which is subordinate. The rule of recognition is determined by the Court, which does not make this determination at its own whim. Rather, it reflects the views of the community as to the way in which norms (including constitutional norms) are created. Under this model, one may determine that the rule of recognition of the State of Israel is that the Knesset is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority. This determination does not reflect a subjective judicial position. It reflects an objective position as to the “system of national life” of the State of Israel (Justice Agranat in HCJ 87/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4], at p. 884). The basic understanding of today’s Israeli community – expressing our entire national experience – is our national consciousness that the Knesset is the body authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. This consciousness originated before the establishment of the State, and in the preparations for the framing of a constitution. This consciousness was crystallized in the Declaration of Independence. It took on real form in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. It was consolidated in the socio-legal understanding that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. It became part of our political culture. Based on these factors the Justices of the Supreme Court determine today that according to the rule of recognition of the State of Israel, the Knesset was given constituent and legislative authority; that the Knesset is authorized, in using its constituent authority, to limit its regular legislative authority; and that the constituent acts of the Knesset stand above its legislative acts. The historic journey – upon which the first model is based – is an important factor in the second model as well. Constitutionality and the constitution are not merely formal instruments. They are not mere law. They are the product of the national experience, of society, education and culture. They reflect the national experience. Our national experience, in today’s comprehensive view, leads to the conclusion that the Knesset has the authority to enact the constitution.

 

(iii) Constituent authority is the best interpretation of social and legal history

 

8. The third model for the constituent authority of the Knesset is also an empirical model. It seeks the best interpretation of the entire social and legal history of a given system at a given time. This is Professor Dworkin’s model (see R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, 1986); R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London, 1990)). Under this model one may conclude that a given body (such as the parliament) is empowered to enact the constitution for a country if that conclusion is the best interpretation of the body of social and legal history of that country. In applying this model to Israel, it appears that the interpretation that best fits the entirety of Israel’s social and legal history since its establishment is that the Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution for Israel. This conclusion is based upon the same factors as those underlying the first and second models. Thus the best interpretation of our constitutional history is not that the Knesset wasted its time by spending over forty years preparing a constitution; the best interpretation of our constitutional history is not that some of the entrenched provisions of the Basic Laws are unenforceable; the best interpretation of our constitutional history is not that the various judicial decisions dealing with the Basic Laws miss their mark. On the contrary: in interpreting our legal and social history, its ways and its traditions, as that history presents itself today – against the background of the Declaration of Independence, the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the Harrari Decision, the election campaigns in which the stated goal of the parties was the adoption of a constitution, the enactment of twelve Basic Laws that include entrenchment and limitation clauses, judicial precedent and the reaction of the Knesset thereto, and the position of the legal community – the inescapable conclusion is  that the most fitting interpretation of our history is that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. This is the most fitting explanation for the Knesset’s power to establish that a Basic Law may only be changed by another Basic Law, that the regime anchored in a Basic Law may be amended only by a law passed by a specified majority (a majority of the Members of Knesset or other greater majority) or by a law that meets substantive requirements, that the Knesset is empowered with constituent authority such that it may create a constitutional norm that limits the ways in which it may be changed and entrenches itself against regular legislation. Indeed, the most fitting interpretation of the entirety of the socio-legal history of the State of Israel is that deeply ingrained in the social and legal consciousness of the Israeli community is the perception that the Knesset is empowered to adopt a constitution for Israel. This is part of our political culture. This is the most fitting interpretation of our social and legal history from the establishment of the State until today.

 

c) The constitutional data underlying the three models

(i) Survey of the constitutional data

 

9. The three models do not derive from the judge’s subjective perception. They do not arise from his personal desire to recognize or refuse to recognize a constitution for Israel. They are the result of an objective analysis of the constitutional history of the State of Israel. They result from the constitutional recognition of the Israeli community against the background of our short legal history. They result from an understanding of the social facts upon which the Israeli system is built. These are the constitutional facts from which the three models derive, each from its own perspective. I will now present these factors. I open with those factors that evidence constitutional continuity (paragraphs 10-18). These factors are particularly important in the context of the first model, which sees constituent authority as derived from the basic norm. Of course they serve the other two models as well. I then move to the Knesset’s perception of itself (paragraphs 19-31). This is also an empirical factor that provides the basis for the Court’s conclusion according to each of the three models. From there I will focus on the understanding of scholars and commentators (paragraphs 32-34). This factor is an important one, for it presents the view of the Israeli legal community as to the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel. This is important in all three models, particularly the second and third. Finally I will discuss the judicial caselaw of the Supreme Court (paragraphs 35-37). Two Supreme Court decisions have adopted the doctrine of constituent authority in its entirety. In the context of these constitutional factors, I will discuss the body of judicial precedent, which implicitly recognizes the normative supremacy of the Basic Laws. I will complete this analysis with a number of conclusions that are common to all three models and which arise from this objective data.

 

(ii) Constitutional continuity

 

10. May 15, 1948 is the point of departure for the view that the Knesset has constituent authority. On that day the State of Israel was established. The basic norm of the State – its superior norm, which is not itself part of the body of positive law, but provides a basis for the other legal norms of the state – is that the Provisional Council of State is the supreme legislative institution of the State (see Stemberg, “The Basic Norm of the Law In Israel,” 9 HaPraklit (1952) 129. Professor Klinghoffer suggested this in stating that:

 

In order to claim constitutional continuity in Israel’s present legal system, one may look at how authority was transmitted in the past. The Declaration of Independence does not refer to the powers of the Provisional Council of State until the statement in which the National Council declares itself the Provisional Council of State. There is, however, no doubt that the Provisional Council of State was seen as the supreme authority of the new state. The absence of any statement of its powers is evidence that those powers were not intended to be limited. From this we may conclude that the basic norm of the State of Israel can be found in this statement, which transforms the National Council into the Provisional Council of State’ (Klinghoffer, ibid., at p. 74).

In a similar vein, Professor Rubinstein states:

 

The Council’s authority to delegate to itself this power in the Declaration is without precedent. This is the beginning of the process of original creation that characterizes the inauguration of a new governmental regime which does not derive its existence from any previous or other regime’ (A. Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, (expanded fourth ed., vol. 1 (1991)), at p. 42).

 

The Provisional Council of State decreed in the Declaration of Independence that a constitution would be enacted by the Constituent Assembly, which in turn would be elected no later than October 1, 1948. It thus gave expression to the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 28 November 1947, according to which ‘the constituent assembly of each State will enact a democratic constitution for its respective State.’ As stated in Israel’s Declaration of Independence:

 

We hereby declare that as of the termination of the Mandate at midnight, this night of the 14th and 15th May, 1948, and until the setting up of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly not later than the first day of October, 1948, the present National Council shall act as the provisional administration, and shall constitute the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, which shall be known as “Israel.”

 

The Provisional Council of State published the proclamation and enacted the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948. This statute provided, inter alia, that ‘the Provisional Council of State is the legislative authority’ (s. 7(a)). The Provisional Council of State similarly enacted the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance. In the course of its activity, it appointed a special committee on the constitution headed by Mr Z. Warhaftig. ‘The committee’s function was to collect, clarify and organize proposals and material and to prepare a draft constitution that would be submitted with comments and criticism by the minority of the committee for the use of the Constituent Assembly’ (Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 44). Indeed, the accepted view then was that the Assembly would prepare and draft a constitution for Israel. The Supreme Court expressed this view in the Al-Carbotelli case [42], in the context of a review of existing precedent as to the status of the Declaration of Independence (HCJ 10/48 Ziv v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [43], at p. 85). It stated that ‘the Court did not accept the claim that the Declaration of Independence is a constitution, against which the validity of legislation will be measured until the Constituent Assembly enacts a constitution as provided in the Declaration’ (HCJ 7/48 Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [42], at p. 13).

 

11. The Constituent Assembly was elected on January 25, 1949. As stated in the Declaration of Independence, its role was to draft a new constitution for the State. According to the original plan, and as envisioned by the Declaration, upon its election the Constituent Assembly was to have existed simultaneously with the Provisional Council of State. These two were to have been separate entities, each with its own composition and its own function. The Provisional Council of State was to have continued to exist in its role as legislative body. Its role was to enact the laws of the new State as they were needed. As evidenced by its name, this was to have been a provisional entity, which was to have been replaced by the ‘duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution’ (Israel’s Declaration of Independence). The Constituent Assembly, whose only role was to enact a constitution for the State, was meant to operate alongside the Provisional Council. The Provisional Council of State was not elected by all the citizens and its composition was set by the Law and Administration Ordinance. The Constituent Assembly was chosen by a general election in which all the members of the Israeli community participated. In fact, the parallel existence of both of these bodies was not long lasting, for with the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State was dissolved. This dissolution was not an unexpected step. It was planned in advance. It was clear to all that the Constituent Assembly would be engaged in both legislative and constituent activities. This was reflected in the campaigns and proposals of the candidates for election to the Constituent Assembly, which related to all the issues on the national agenda and not constitutional matters alone.

 

12. The next link in the chain of constitutional continuity was the decision of the Provisional Council of State to dissolve itself. Professor Yadin has discussed the factors on which this decision was based:

 

According to the Declaration, the tenure of the Council of State was to have ended on October 1, 1948. From that day, at the latest, the activities of the elected and regular authorities were to have commenced in accordance with the Constitution, which was to have been adopted in the meantime by the Constituent Assembly. However, the specified date passed without the adoption of a Constitution and without the establishment of regular, elected governmental bodies. According to the Declaration of Independence, the Provisional Council of State and the Provisional Government were to have continued to function not only until the election of the Constituent Assembly, but until the establishment of new governmental bodies in accordance with the new Constitution. The role of the Constituent Assembly was limited to the preparation and adoption of the Constitution, and the task of regular legislation was to have remained in the hands of the Provisional Council of State until after the Constituent Assembly completed its work. Until that time, the two entities were to have existed in tandem and the Provisional Government was to have continued to function until after the election of a parliament in accordance with the new Constitution. This plan was tied to the cut-off date of 1 October1948; all phases were intended to have been implemented within only four months (between 15 May 1948 and 1 October1948). The drafters of the Declaration cannot be criticized for this plan. They signed the Declaration before enemy aircraft appeared in the skies over Tel Aviv (albeit only one day earlier), before seven nations invaded the State, and they could not have foreseen the events of the next few months. In retrospect, in light of the events that took place following the establishment of the State, it is clear that the original plan could not have been implemented. The existence of the Provisional Council of State could no longer be reconciled with the simultaneous existence of the Constituent Assembly. It was therefore necessary to impose upon the Constituent Assembly all of the functions of the Council of State’ (Sefer Uri Yadin, Barak and Shefnitz, eds. (1990), at p. 80).

 

Together with its decision to dissolve, the Provisional Council of State decided that all of its powers would pass to the Constituent Assembly. This transfer was effected by the legislative action of the Provisional Council of State, in the form of the Constituent Assembly Transition Law, 5709-1949. This law provided that ‘the Provisional Council of State shall continue in office until the convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel; upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly the Provisional Council of State shall dissolve and cease to exist’ (s. 1). It was further provided that the Constituent Assembly ‘shall, so long as it does not itself otherwise declare, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional Council of State’ (s. 3). Similarly it was provided that the Constituent Assembly would act ‘in accordance with the rules governing the meetings of the Provisional Council of State, with the necessary changes, as long as the Constituent Assembly has not otherwise decided’ (s. 2(d)). The Provisional Council of State debated whether or not to provide in advance that the Constituent Assembly was required to prepare a constitution and whether to prescribe the period within which such a constitution should be adopted. It was suggested that the law provide that ‘the Constituent Assembly will adopt a basic constitution for the State and, during the period of its operation, will be the legislative body of the State.’ A majority decided, however, not to issue any directives in this regard. ‘We will therefore leave the Constituent Assembly absolutely free as to both its function and its term’ (Sefer Uri Yadin, ibid., at p. 81). It should be emphasized that the decision regarding the dissolution of the Provisional Council of State and the passing of its authority to the Constituent Assembly was taken during the term of the Provisional Council of State. The members of the Provisional Council of State – and accordingly all Israeli citizens who voted in the elections for the Constituent Assembly – were aware that they were electing a body that would have both legislative and constituent authority, and would be authorized to oversee the government as well.

 

13. With the dissolution of the Provisional Council of State and the transfer of its powers to the Constituent Assembly, the latter was endowed with dual authority – legislative and constituent. Again, the original scheme of two entities with different powers was not realized. Henceforth, the constitutional basis would lie in a single entity – the Knesset – that acted with various powers (legislative and constituent, as well as others). The same body (the Knesset) therefore has two roles, or two main functions (‘two hats’). It is authorized to enact a constitution and it has the powers that were given to the Provisional Council of State. ‘Thus the Constituent Assembly, which was endowed by the Declaration with only one function – drafting the Constitution – took on the additional role of legislative authority’ (Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 43). ‘It was the Provisional Council of State that, upon its dissolution, presented the Constituent Assembly with an established fact: the unification of both functions within one framework’ (Rubinstein, at p. 448). There is no doubt that the Constituent Assembly (which has both constituent authority and regular legislative authority) was authorized to enact a Constitution. The fact that, with the dissolution of the Provisional Council of State, the Constituent Authority also became endowed with regular legislative authority does not negate its authority to enact a constitution. It should be noted that it is a common practice the world over for the Constituent Assembly to serve as a legislative authority as well (see Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 448). Professor Kelsen discussed this as follows:

 

It is possible that the organ specifically and formally authorized to create, abolish or amend statutes having the character of a constitution is different from the organ authorized to create, abolish or amend ordinary statutes. For example, the former function may be rendered by an organ different from the latter organ in composition and electoral procedure, such as a constituent national assembly. But usually both functions are performed by the same organ’ (H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (1967), at p. 223).

 

As Professor Akzin has stated:

 

Under the democratic model, even if a proposed constitution is destined to be approved by referendum, it is prepared by the constituent assembly, which is chosen by electoral procedures similar to those by which the members of the legislative body will be chosen, or – in the case of a revolution – according to the system preferred by the provisional authority. In such cases the constituent assembly acts as both the entity that prepares the constitution and, if the state is governed by a parliamentary system, as the legislative body and overseer of the government as well’ (Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments, vol. 2 (1966), at p. 35).

 

In a similar vein Professor Klein has noted:

 

The constituent body may continue to function for an extended period; during this period the constituent body functions as a legislative body as well. This may be described as a transitional period. The constituent body is not required to adopt the constitution as one document, and it may adopt a number of separate constitutional laws’ (Klein, ‘Constituent Authority in the State of Israel,’ II Hebrew Uni. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1970) 52).

 

Recently Professor Ackerman has reiterated:

 

There is nothing sacrosanct about a special constitutional convention. Although such a convention is likely to take the task of constitutional formulation seriously, many plausible texts have also been produced by constituent assemblies that have exercised plenary power on normal legislative matters as well’ (B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, (1992), at p. 59).

 

Thus the federal constitutional model of the United States, in which there are two separate institutions – a constitutional convention that adopts the constitution, and a regular legislature (Congress and the state legislatures) that enacts regular laws – is not the only way in which a constitution may be adopted. Even in the United States, state constitutions (as opposed to the federal constitution) have been adopted by constituent authorities that functioned as legislative authorities as well (see III Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (1953), at p. 245). It is interesting to note that in more than one Eastern European state that has recently undergone constitutional changes, constituent and regular legislative activities have been carried out by the same body. In most cases it was the regular parliament that was endowed with constituent authority. In Israel the Constituent Assembly was given the additional authority of regular legislation, as well as all the powers of the Provisional Council of State.

 

14. The next stage in constitutional continuity was the enactment of the Transition Law, 5709-1949. This was the most important piece of legislation enacted by the Knesset (now acting as both the constituent and legislative authority). This statute provided that ‘the legislative body of the State of Israel will be known as the “Knesset.” The Constituent Assembly will be known as the “First Knesset.” A delegate to the Constituent Assembly will be known as a “Member of Knesset”’ (s. 1). It also provided that an enactment by the Knesset would be denoted “law” (s. 2). The Transition Law 1949 did not affect the dual authority of the Constituent Assembly (now the “First Knesset”). Indeed the First Knesset engaged in lengthy debates on the subject of the Constitution (see Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 714). No claim was made that the First Knesset was not empowered to do so. All agreed that the Knesset, as the constituent assembly, was authorized to enact a constitution for the State. The ensuing debate dealt with whether the Knesset was required to enact a constitution, and with the proposed content of the constitution. This debate continued for several months. It took place both in the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee and in the First Knesset plenum (for a report of these debates see The State Constitution – Report of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in the Matter of the Constitution for the State and the Debate in the First Knesset Plenum, published by the Knesset in 1952). It is common knowledge that the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, opposed a constitution. Nonetheless, he did not deny the Knesset’s authority to enact one, stating as follows:

 

No one could, and even today no one can say that there will be no constitution. The matter depends upon the Knesset’s decision. If the Knesset decides that there will be a constitution – there will be a constitution. If the Knesset decides that for now there will be no constitution – there will be none’ (supra).

 

The First Knesset (i.e. the Constituent Assembly) concluded this debate with a compromise decision adopted on June 13, 1950. This decision was initiated by MK Harrari and is therefore called the Harrari Decision, which provides as follows:

The First Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee with the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution will be composed of chapters, with each chapter constituting a Basic Law unto itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset if and when the Committee completes its work and all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution for the State’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 1743).

 

This was a compromise decision. It left several options open. On the one hand, it accepted the principle that there would be a formal constitution and that the idea of a constitution would not be abandoned. On the other hand, it accepted the principle that the constitution would not be enacted immediately as one discrete document, but rather chapter by chapter, over the course of time, which would certainly extend beyond the term of the First Knesset. Nevertheless, after this decision no one disputed the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel. The Harrari Decision was not intended to negate the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution and, as a “decision” of the Knesset, it could not negate this authority. Thus, the significance of the Harrari Decision was, as it stated, that the Constitutional Committee would prepare a constitution for the state in “installments.” It was clear to all that this would not be an immediate procedure. It was clear to all that it would not be completed by the First Knesset. Professor Rubinstein has rightly noted that:

 

There can be no doubt as to the First Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution or laws of a constitutional character that stand above regular legislation. The change in the name of the Constituent Assembly certainly did not constitute a change in its nature. Even the consolidation of its functions – legislative and constituent – did not change anything’ (Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 448).

 

The First Knesset dispersed without the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee having prepared a proposed constitution, and without any part of a constitution having been brought before the Knesset plenum.

 

15. During the term of the First Knesset – i.e. the Constituent Assembly – no constituent action was undertaken. The Knesset had to enact a special law to decide upon its dissolution. In so doing, the Knesset was aware that it had not only regular legislative powers, but also constituent powers. It sought to ensure that all powers with which it was invested would pass to subsequent Knessets as well. This act seems superfluous to me. The powers given to the Knesset were given to every Knesset. As the central organ of the State, the Knesset endures forever. There is no need for special provisions as to the Knesset’s continuity other than those dealing with issues of secondary character (such as the continuity of draft laws). The reference to the “First” and “Second” Knessets and so on is only theoretical and reflects the first steps of the Israeli parliamentary system. In principle, a change in the composition of the Knesset cannot be considered a change in the Knesset. The Knesset is one body; elections and changes in the members of the Knesset do not require a formal passing of authority from one body to the next. Apparently this matter had not yet been clarified in the early days of the State and therefore – purely for caution’s sake – the Second Knesset Transition Law was enacted in 1951. That law provided for continuity between the end of the First Knesset’s term and the beginning of the Second Knesset’s term (s. 1). Thus, ‘the Second Knesset and its members will have all the powers, rights and obligations as the First Knesset and its members’ (s. 5). It provided further that the Second Knesset would act in accordance with the charter, decisions, precedent and procedures of the First Knesset (s. 6). Moreover, it provided explicitly in s. 9 that:

 

Wherever in any law reference is made to the Constituent Assembly or the First Knesset, such reference shall, from the day of the convening of the Second Knesset, be deemed to refer to the Second Knesset, unless the context requires a different meaning.

 

Thus it was provided that ‘this law will also apply, with the necessary changes, to the Third and any subsequent Knesset, so long as the Knesset does not adopt a contrary law dealing with this matter’ (s. 10). It is interesting to note that a number of Members of Knesset suggested that the law expressly provide that the ‘role of the Second Knesset is to enact a basic constitution for Israel’ (see Knesset Proceedings, vol. 8, at p. 1576). MK Bar-Rav-Hai, in the name of the majority of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, opposed such a provision. He noted that ‘the suggested change is an empty declaration without any practical purpose. The legislative inheritance of the First Knesset is located in the records of the Knesset and is automatically transferred. The Second Knesset is sovereign. It will attend to matters at its own will ... Because there is no practical value to this change, and because the Second Knesset itself will decide whether to continue to enact Basic Laws where the First Knesset left off, or to begin this chapter anew – there is no place and no need to provide for this matter in the Transition Law’ (ibid., at p. 1579).

 

16. The First Knesset – which was also the Constituent Assembly elected for the express purpose of drafting the constitution – was dissolved. The Second Knesset was elected. Was the Second Knessset also invested with constituent authority, empowering it to enact a constitution for Israel? This is not a simple question. Had it been brought before the Supreme Court at the beginning of the Second Knesset’s term, the matter could have been decided either way. On the one hand it could have been argued that constituent authority was given to the Knesset, to every Knesset, regardless of its composition. The Constituent Assembly itself provided in the Second Knesset Transition Law that each Knesset is empowered with constituent authority. This edict of the Constituent Assembly must be heeded. It is not appropriate for the Court to declare that the Constituent Assembly itself deviated from its own authority in such a central matter. Similarly, it could have been claimed that the Harrari Decision – which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly – determined that the constitution was to have been enacted chapter by chapter; clearly this process would not have been completed during the term of the First Knesset. Constitutional continuity must be recognized in order to give effect to this decision of the Knesset. On the other hand it could have been contended that the Constituent Assembly derived its authority from the people – and therefore with the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly it was necessary to turn again to the people for its reelection. The Constituent Assembly was not “authorized” to transfer its authority. Thus it might have been argued that the Harrari Decision required that the powers of the First Knesset could only have been transferred to the Second Knesset by Basic Law and not by regular law.

 

Had I been asked to decide this constitutional question at the beginning of the Second Knesset’s term, I would have asked the following question: what are the underlying beliefs of the Israeli community at this time as to the enactment of a constitution and the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution for Israel? I would have inquired as to the best interpretation of the legal and social history in the matter of the constitutional undertaking with the convening of the Second Knesset. In this context I would have examined the flow of constitutional continuity from the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, I would have asked whether the party platforms in the elections for the Second Knesset dealt with the continuation of the constitutional undertaking and with the continuation of the Knesset’s activities in endowing Israel with a constitution. An affirmative answer to these questions would have enabled me to determine even then that, despite strong assertions to the contrary, the Second Knesset was endowed with constituent authority, whether because of constitutional continuity (under Kelsen’s model), or because it had become generally recognized that the Knesset was invested with constituent authority (Hart’s model), or because that was the best interpretation of the legal practices of the Israeli community at that time (Dworkin’s model).

 

I have now undertaken this examination. Thus, for example, I have studied the election platforms of all the political parties that participated in the elections for the Second Knesset. Most of the platforms include statements regarding the constitution and its implementation. Often this is a central issue. The platform of the Workers of Israel Party (“Mapai”) stated that ‘the Second Knesset must see the completion of the enactment of the Basic Laws as one of its first objectives.’ This was followed by a long list of proposed constitutional arrangements, such as the division of powers among governmental bodies and various human rights. The platform of the Organization of General Zionists, the Centrist Party (“Z”), stated that ‘adoption of the Basic Laws for the State is an absolute necessity for the protection of the fundamental rights of every citizen.’ The platform of the United Labour Party (“Mapam”) provided that ‘the Second Knesset must correct what the First Knesset distorted and enact a Basic Law for the State, so as to ensure, inter alia…’ – and here follows a comprehensive list of matters that must be provided for in the constitution. The platform of the Herut Party (“H”) asserted that ‘Mapai and its supporters intentionally prevented the Constituent Assembly from fulfilling its first function: providing a basic constitution for the State. The Second Knesset must correct this dereliction.’ The platform then sets forth the content of the ‘basic constitution.’ The Progressive Party (“P”) platform stated that ‘in order to protect the democratic and popular nature of our State, a constitution must be enacted. The Progressive Party regretfully notes that the First Knesset did not complete this task. Even the First Knesset’s decision, as proposed by the Progressive Party representative, that the basic constitution would be constructed chapter by chapter, was not realized. The Progressive Party will fight in the Second Knesset for a constitution of deep social content, which will strengthen the rule of law in the State.’

 

The Platform of Agudath Yisrael provided that ‘as long as a majority of the representatives of the legislative institutions do not recognize the authority of the Torah as the supreme law, which may not be contravened, Haredi Judaism will oppose the adoption of a formalized basic constitution for the State.’ The platform of Mizrahi and the Nonaligned Religious Party (“B”) did not mention the issue of the constitution. The platform of the Israeli Communist Party (“C”) stated that ‘since the establishment of the State we have fought for a republican, democratic and secular constitution.’ The list of HaPoel Mizrahi (Torah Ve’Avoda) (“V”) provided that ‘HaPoel Mizrahi sees as the job of the Second Knesset the completion of the Basic Laws for the procedures of the government and its powers, the rights and obligations of the individual, the order of justice and the social foundations of the State. HaPoel Mizrahi will fight so that these laws will be an expression of a true democratic way of life in the spirit of the Torah of Israel.’ The list of the Sepharadim Ve’Edot HaMizrah (“SD”) stated that they supported the policy line of the Organization of General Zionists, the Centrist Party. The platform of Association of Yemenites for Israel (“L”) did not refer to the constitution.

 

17. It follows that there can be no doubt that the issues of the constitution and the Basic Laws were on the national agenda, were discussed in the elections, and were the subject of clear positions taken by the various parties. It is true that the matter of the constitution and the Basic Laws was not the only subject on the national agenda. But that is of no account. It is enough that the question was brought to the attention of the voter, who gave his opinion on the question of the constitution. If in the next Knesset election a constitution for the State were presented, and the people demanded, by electing the various parties, in light of their various platforms, to either approve or disapprove the constitution – would anyone contend that the people did not thereby express its will as to the constitution? The determining factor is clearly the understanding of the community and, consequently, the understanding of the Court. Such an understanding existed in the elections for the Second and subsequent Knessets. There is therefore no reason to negate constitutional continuity, and to deny the Second Knesset – on the basis of the arguments that we have brought – the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. Accordingly, with the convening of the Second Knesset (on December 22, 1952), the new government presented its outline plan. The first clause of the outline – before any other clause, including the clause referring to ‘the concern for the security of the state and the ingathering of exiles’ – provides that ‘with the series of the Basic Laws that will form the basic constitution of Israel, the democratic government of the State will be strengthened and secured.’ This is followed by a long list of subparagraphs, constituting approximately half of the outline, as to the content of the future constitution.

 

18. The question of the constitutional continuity of the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution did not come before the Supreme Court in 1951, with the convening of the Second Knesset. We do not have a judicial determination of this matter. The constitutional question arises before us today, in 1995 during the term of the Thirteenth Knesset. I have no doubt that our decision today must be unequivocal: constitutional continuity was not interrupted. The Second Knesset was given the powers of the Constituent Assembly. Any other conclusion is inconsistent with our national experience. Forty-four years have passed since the Second Knesset was convened. The matter of the constitution has appeared on the agenda and has been included in all the campaigns for each of the many elections that have been held since then. During all those years the Knesset continued in the constitutional undertaking and has enacted eleven Basic Laws; it has continued to see itself as authorized to enact a constitution for Israel; it has continued to entrench the clauses of the Basic Laws against infringement by regular legislation. During all those years teachers and scholars of law have continued to see the Knesset as the authority empowered to enact a constitution for Israel. They have raised generations of students and teachers of law who, in their turn, see the Knesset as empowered with both constituent and legislative authority.

 

In the intervening years the Supreme Court has ruled that the entrenchment provisions of the Basic Laws have constitutional power and may invalidate contrary provisions of regular legislation. In my opinion, these facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that constitutional continuity persists. By general recognition, the Knesset – the Second Knesset and each subsequent Knesset – is authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. Today’s Knesset has constituent authority. The Knesset has “two hats”: the hat of constituent authority and the hat of legislative authority.

 

My position relies, therefore, on all of the factors that attest to a continuous constitutional history, beginning with the convening of the Second Knesset. I will continue with a description of that constitutional continuity, the constitutional understanding of the legal community, and the position of the Supreme Court up until now. I am doing so for two reasons: first, because constitutional continuity links the constituent authority of today’s Knesset with that of the First Knesset (the Constituent Assembly); and second, because these objective normative facts support my conclusion that according to the rule of recognition of the Israeli legal system, our Knesset – every Knesset – is endowed with constituent authority. That is the best interpretation of the entirety of our legal and social history.

 

(iii) The Knesset’s understanding of itself as invested with constituent authority

 

19. As discussed above, the Knesset’s constituent authority is based upon the objective fact of constitutional continuity. This is not only the reasoned conclusion of the disinterested observer; it is the understanding of the Knesset itself. My claim is not, however, that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority solely because it sees itself as so endowed. The Knesset may not empower itself with constituent authority by its own decision. My claim is that the Knesset’s – every Knesset’s – perception of itself is itself an objective factor that, in the context of the entirety of the evidence, supports the foundation on which the Court builds its legal structure. This construction is a judicial function, which is undertaken by the judge – and the judge alone. This is the great significance of the Knesset’s understanding of itself. I do not claim that there is a legal obligation to enact a rigid constitution. My only claim is that the Knesset saw itself as empowered to enact a rigid constitution. Of course, the Knesset was also entitled to refrain from using this authority and enact a non-rigid constitution or no constitution at all. Thus, the Second Knesset and each subsequent Knesset saw itself as empowered to enact a constitution. They based this authority primarily on the idea of the Constituent Assembly, on the Harrari Decision, and on the status of each Knesset as a body utilizing its constituent authority. I will begin with the Second Knesset, which, as mentioned, is the more problematic.

 

20. The Second Knesset dealt with the preparation of the first chapter of the Constitution of the State, Basic Law: The Knesset. The proposed law was published on October 23, 1953 by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Second Knesset. The proposal was debated by the Second Knesset plenum. In presenting the draft law for a first reading, the Chairman of the Subcommittee for Basic Laws, MK Bar Yehuda, referred to the Harrari Decision and the dissolution of the First Knesset and continued as follows:

 

But a relatively short time thereafter, in April 1951, came the decision to elect the Second Knesset. The Second Knesset began its work at the end of August 1951. More than two years have passed since then, while the gristmill of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee ground the proposals sufficiently to enable presentation of the first in the series of the Basic Laws. During this period we have passed a number of laws that are clearly Basic Laws by their nature, even if not in form; I refer for example to the Law of Return and the Judges Law. But these laws were put forth by the government, and the work was done in the course of the Knesset’s regular routine and in the regular manner. From the point of view of fulfilling the obligation  that was imposed at the time on the First Knesset in its role as the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel, and which was passed on to the Knesset together with the latter’s regular legislative work, this law is the first section of the Constitution of the State to be presented before the Knesset. It is now presented for a first reading and unfortunately I cannot know how long it will take until we reach a second reading – in other words, debate on the revised proposal – after which there will be a binding decision’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 15, at p. 57).

 

A review of the other speeches reveals that the speakers considered themselves – as members of a body endowed with constituent authority – empowered to enact a constitution. Basic Law: The Knesset was not enacted by the Second Knesset because the political will to do so was lacking. No one contended that the Knesset lacked the legal authority to enact such a law. All participants in the ‘political game’ of that period were aware that they were empowered to enact a constitution.

 

21. The Second Knesset finished the debate with a first reading of the proposed Basic Law. The proposal was passed to the Committee and the Second Knesset thereby finished its term without adopting any Basic Law. The debate on the proposed Basic Law: The Knesset was renewed in the Third Knesset. The proposed Basic Law: The Knesset was published anew and it was thoroughly debated. No one contended that the Third Knesset was not empowered to adopt a constitution. The Third Knesset’s debates were seen by all as fulfilling the Knesset’s role according to the Harrari Decision, which was the decision of the Constituent Assembly (the First Knesset) to adopt a constitution for Israel. MK Harrari himself reiterated this (on October 8, 1956) when he stated that:

 

In accordance with the decision of the First Knesset, we are not now dealing with individual laws, but rather with the chapters of the constitution of the State of Israel’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 21, at p. 4).

 

MK Harrari read the Harrari Decision before the Knesset plenum and added that ‘[we] are therefore debating today one of the chapters of the proposed constitution for the State – the chapter that deals with the Knesset’ (ibid., at p. 6). MK Harrari concluded his remarks by stating as follows:

 

I hope that despite the slow pace of the Knesset’s work, we will succeed in completing at least two articles of the constitution for the State in this, the Third Knesset. We must not forget that when the Knesset accepted the proposal to prepare a constitution for the State it was aware of the fact that other states worked for many years in preparing their constitutions. Eleven years passed before the complete adoption of the United States constitution, which has existed for so many years; preparation of the Soviet Russian constitution lasted for thirteen years. There is therefore no reason for us to despair or to feel that the extended period of preparation has diminished our chances for an organized, orderly constitution that will be the glory of the State of Israel’ (ibid., at p. 6).

 

Thus it is clear that the Knesset saw itself as authorized to enact a constitution, and that it considered the Basic Laws to be part of the constitution. Upon completion of the first reading debate, the proposal passed to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. The proposal was presented for a second reading on February 11, 1958. MK Nir-Refalkes presented the proposal in the name of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, noting that:

 

The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee takes particular satisfaction in presenting to the Knesset for a second reading Basic Law: The Knesset, which will be a chapter of our basic constitution, in accordance with the June 1950 decision of the First Knesset.’

 

In the course of the second reading the comments of several members of Knesset were adopted and a number of formal entrenchment provisions were inserted into the Basic Law. It was provided that section 4, which sets forth election procedures, ‘shall not be altered save by a majority of the members of the Knesset.’ Section 44 entrenched the Basic Law against the effect of emergency regulations. Section 45 provided that ‘Section 44, or this section, shall not be altered except by a majority of eighty members of the Knesset.’ During the debate on these entrenchment provisions, several opinions were expressed as to their meaning. No contention was made that the Knesset was not empowered to entrench provisions of a Basic Law. It must be noted that more than a year after the adoption of the Basic Law: The Knesset, on February 12, 1958, the Knesset debated Amendment (No. 3) to the Law. The purpose of this amendment was to provide that ‘The majority required by this Law to for a variation of section. 4, 44 or 45 shall be required for decisions of the Knesset plenary at every stage of law-making.’ This amendment was adopted. During the course of the debate, MK Zadok opposed the proposed amendment, arguing that the Knesset was not authorized to limit itself (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 27, at p. 2961). As mentioned above, the proposed amendment was adopted.

 

22. The Fourth Knesset did not enact any Basic Law. This concerned several Members of Knesset. MK Nir-Refalkes tabled a motion in this matter. He asked that the process of enacting a constitution be accelerated and referred to the Harrari Decision of the Constituent Assembly. He noted that ‘meanwhile ten years have passed, during which period the Committees on the Constitution, Law and Justice of the First, Second and Third Knessets have enacted only one Basic Law – Basic Law: The Knesset, which was enacted in 1958. Our experience proves that this method of enacting a constitution has led to an anomalous situation. Twelve years have passed since the establishment of the State and not only do we have no constitution, but there is no chance that we will have one in the next fifty years’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 28, at p. 585).

 

MK Nir-Refalkes noted that the government manifesto provided that ‘the Fourth Knesset should complete the enactment of the Basic Law, which will be consolidated to form the basic constitution of the State.’ He added that all factions of the house were united in this view and he requested that the preparation of the constitution be accelerated. The government response was given by the Minister of Justice, Mr Pinhas Rosen. The Minister also mentioned the Harrari Decision and the government platform. He expressed the hope that the Fourth Knesset would indeed complete the work of preparing the constitution. The debate passed to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. However, the Minister of Justice’s hopes were not realized. The Fourth Knesset enacted only the Basic Law: Israel Lands. The Fifth Knesset enacted Basic Law: The President of the State. In the Sixth Knesset, the focus on the enactment of Basic Laws was intensified. On November 23, 1965 the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee established a subcommittee that dealt solely with the constitution. This subcommittee was headed by MK Zadok and succeeded in preparing one Basic Law, Basic Law: The Government, which was passed by the Seventh Knesset.

23. Between the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset in 1958 and the enactment of the two Basic Laws dealing with human rights, the Knesset passed another nine Basic Laws. Some of them included provisions (albeit minor) that formally entrenched certain provisions of the Basic Laws. The enactment of these provisions presented the Knesset with no legislative difficulty. When the Eighth Knesset was presented with a first reading of the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, 5736-1976 – the proposal that entrenched all of the Basic Laws and provided for judicial review of the constitutionality of regular legislation – it had no practical difficulty with this entrenchment. Aside from a few isolated Members of Knesset, all factions of the house were in agreement as to the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel and its power to entrench provisions of the constitution. Many of the speakers expressly noted that the Knesset was thereby acting in accordance with the Harrari Decision (see Knesset Proceedings, vol. 76, at p. 1704; Knesset Proceedings, vol. 78, at p. 954). This was the case when the draft Basic Law: Legislation was presented to the Ninth Knesset for a first reading (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 83, at p. 3975). The third proposal of the Basic Law: Legislation was debated in a first reading in the Thirteenth Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, second session, at p. 4302; third session, at p. 936). Aside from several isolated members of Knesset, no objection was raised as to the entrenchment of the Basic Laws. There was a debate, of course, as to the strength of the entrenchment, but the common position of most members of the Knesset was that this was a political and not a legal question, since the Knesset was empowered to entrench the Basic Law if it so desired.

 

24. I will now address the question of continuity and the constituent authority of the Knesset as to the Basic Laws dealing with human rights. Proposals dealing with human rights were already included in draft laws presented to the Committee on the Constitution of the Provisional Council of State. However, legislation in this area did not proceed. With the completion of Basic Law: The Knesset, the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee announced that the next Basic Law would deal with human rights. This did not occur. Against this background, on January 15, 1964 MK Klinghoffer presented to the Fifth Knesset the proposed Basic Law: Charter of Basic Human Rights, 5724-1963. This was a comprehensive, impressive proposal for a constitutional settlement with regard to human rights in Israel. The proposal provided for substantive and formal entrenchment. It provided that ‘this law may be amended only by a majority of two thirds of all members of Knesset’ (s. 73). It provided for the possibility that human rights could be infringed by regular legislation, but only if that legislation met substantive standards. In the comments to the proposal that were submitted to the Knesset, MK Klinghoffer referred specifically to the Knesset’s constituent authority to enact a constitution for Israel:

 

In the matter of the authority to adopt a fixed constitutional law, it must be noted that this authority passed from the First Knesset (which was elected as the Constituent Assembly) to the Second Knesset, and thereafter from Knesset to Knesset’ (Second Knesset Transition Law, ss. 5 and 10) (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 801).

 

The government opposed this initiative. The Minister of Justice, Mr Dov Yosef, argued forcefully against MK Klinghoffer’s initiative. He noted, inter alia, that ‘I do not think that there is a law that stands “above the regular legislature.” We do not have two legislatures. We have only the Knesset, and in my opinion, a law of the Knesset cannot limit its right to legislate, and if there is such a provision in a law, the Knesset is entitled, in my opinion, to cancel the clause that ostensibly limits its rights’ (ibid., at p. 789). The Justice Minister added that it would be otherwise if we had a constituent assembly. MK Begin retorted that ‘We have a Constituent Assembly as well.’ (ibid., at p. 789).

MK Klinghoffer also responded to the Justice Minister as follows:

 

The Knesset is the heir to the Constituent Assembly. The Fifth Knesset is empowered with the authority of the Constituent Assembly to enact a constitution, and this is in accordance with the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance and the Second Knesset Transition Law’ (ibid., at p. 793).

MK Klinghoffer’s proposal failed (on January 15, 1964).

 

25. A number of years passed. The public climate changed (see Lahav and Kretzmer, “The Charter of Human and Citizen’s Rights in Israel: A Constitutional Achievement or Hocus-Pocus,” 7 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1976) 154). The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Seventh Knesset continued with the work of the Subcommittee on Basic Laws. The Committee was headed by MK B. Levy. The Committee held comprehensive debates. The draft Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights was published by the Committee. The proposed law set forth certain human rights and limited the power of statue to infringe those rights except under certain conditions. It included provisions according to which ‘contradictory statutory provisions that are adopted after the effective date of this Basic Law – are void’ (s. 20(a)). At the same time, the Basic Law did not contain entrenchment provisions. The proposal was not substantively debated in the Seventh Knesset. With the convening of the Eighth Knesset the debate on the proposal continued in the Subcommittee for Basic Laws headed by MK B. Levy. It was submitted on June 4, 1974 for a first reading. In presenting the proposed Basic Law for a first reading, MK B. Levy referred to the Harrari Decision and noted that, in enacting the Basic Law, the Knesset was acting within its constituent authority:

 

Constituent authority, i.e. the authority to enact a constitution for the State, was transferred from the Constituent Assembly, i.e. the First Knesset, to the Second Knesset and every Knesset thereafter, including the Eighth Knesset. As the Second Knesset Transition Law provides ... In enacting the Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights we are therefore acting in accordance with the constituent authority of the Knesset’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 70, at p. 1566). 

 

An extended debate on the draft law ensued. The Minister of Justice, MK Zadok, participated in the debate. He expressed his opinion that the Basic Law should be entrenched in order to prevent infringement of basic rights by regular legislation. MK Zadok noted that:

… I agree that the Knesset must be given broad latitude and room to maneuver in its legislative work, but this sovereignty should not be interpreted to permit arbitrariness as to basic principles. It seems to me that the doctrine of the rule of law, which we all espouse, means that everyone is subject to the law – the government, the administration, the President, the State Comptroller – and the Knesset as well. Just as the other state institutions are endowed with a limited array of authorities, so should the Knesset’s legislative powers be similarly limited, albeit with greater flexibility. The primary form taken by this limitation is the Citizen’s Rights Law, in which are anchored and expressed those basic principles that form the basis for government itself

(Knesset Proceedings, vol. 70, at p. 2485).

 

MK Zadok further insisted that the proposed law was intended to ‘raise the Basic Law on citizens’ rights to the level of a preferred norm against which the validity of regular laws will be tested’ and therefore it must be treated with great care (ibid., at p. 2485). As to entrenchment of the Basic Law against regular legislation that does not meet its requirements, MK Zadok noted that:

 

The laws that have been enacted before this Law takes effect have been enacted by the sovereign Knesset under its unlimited legislative power. They are the statutory regime under which we live and they cannot be called into question. This is not so as to laws that will be enacted by the Knesset in the future, after the establishment of the norms set forth in the Basic Law on Citizens’ Rights, with the Knesset aware of and restricted by those norms the validity of those future laws will be tested against the Basic Law.

 

The debate in the Knesset was comprehensive. The Knesset debated the question of whether to entrench the Basic Law – in the same way that s. 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset was entrenched – so that the Law could be amended only by a special majority. The various rights were discussed as well. The draft law passed the first reading and was handed over to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. The debate in the Committee concentrated primarily on the question of whether to entrench the Basic Law. It was decided to defer the debate on this question until a decision was reached as to the fate of the Basic Law: Legislation – which was being studied by the Committee at the same time – and which included general entrenchment provisions. What is clear is that the Members of Knesset – the plenum as well as the committee – had no doubt as to the power of the Knesset to entrench the clauses of the Basic Law: Human and Citizens’ Rights. Many of the Members of Knesset referred to the Declaration of Independence, the Harrari Decision and the constitutional undertaking, and pointed to constitutional continuity. It occurred to none that the constitutional continuity was interrupted. No one contended that the Knesset was not entitled to entrench its instructions. The primary debate centered on the question of entrenchment as one of political policy  (was it desirable?), and not as a legal problem (was it possible?) (see Lahav and Kretzmer; see also B. Bracha, “The Protection of Human Rights in Israel,” 12 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1982) 110); R. Gavison, “The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights,” 15 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1985) 113).

 

26. The Eighth Knesset continued to debate the proposed Basic Law: Human and Citizens’ Rights. MK Aridor headed the subcommittee. The proposal prepared by the Committee provided that previously enacted statutes repugnant to the Basic Law would be invalidated. The proposal did not advance in the legislative process.

 

27. In the Tenth Knesset, MK Professor Rubinstein renewed Professor Klinghoffer’s proposal. It was put forth (on June 2, 1982) as a private draft law (Proposed Basic Law: Bill of Human Rights, 1982). In his comments on the proposal Professor Rubinstein wrote that:

 

Since (the dismissal of Professor Klinghoffer’s proposal – A.B.), it has become clear to various sectors of the community that there is a need for the enactment of a Basic Law dealing with human rights, for it is fitting that these substantive issues be entrenched in a Basic Law that stands above regular legislation.

 

In his speech before the Knesset plenum MK Rubinstein added that:

 

This draft law is intended to restrain the legislature. It is also intended to protect the citizen from legislation that infringes his basic rights, for this is the implicit meaning of the word constitution. The very word constitution means restraint of the omnipotence and sovereignty of the Knesset as a legislative body’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 94, at p. 2682).

 

Minister of Justice, MK Nissim – unlike his predecessor of eighteen years earlier, Minister Dov Yosef – agreed to pass the proposal to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. In his reply, Minister Nissim noted that:

 

Today, I too say that it is right for a constitution to be fixed and entrenched. There is no value whatsoever in laws, even those denoted Basic Laws, that are not fixed both as to their adoption and as to their amendment ... Since we are discussing a group of Basic Laws that will together form a constitution, they must be fixed and entrenched’ (ibid., at p. 2682).

 

The proposal passed to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. The subcommittee on Basic Laws that examined the proposal was headed by MK S. Aloni. The subcommittee held extensive debates. It examined the previous proposals that were debated by previous Knessets. It studied the European Convention on Human Rights. It examined the German Basic Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It heard from Professors Klinghoffer, Klein and Akzin. The Committee’s debates were published (Debates of the Committee on the Basic Laws of the Tenth Knesset). An examination of the Committee’s debates reveals that the participants shared the view that the Knesset is empowered and entitled to entrench human rights as constitutional supra-legislative rights. At the conclusion of the debates it was decided to present the proposal for a first reading. The proposed Basic Law: Bill of Basic Human Rights was tabled for a first reading (on March 1, 1983). The comments noted that ‘there is a need for the enactment of a Basic Law on the subject of human rights, for these substantive issues should be entrenched in a Basic Law that stands above regular legislation’ (ibid., at p. 111). In his words of introduction, MK Rubinstein emphasized that:

This proposed law is based upon the principle of entrenchment of basic human and civil rights. It also sets forth a program that, in conjunction with the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, will enable judicial review of violations of this entrenchment, of harm to the idea that human and civil rights stand above the desires of the majority and above regular and routine legislation.

 

At the conclusion of his comments, MK Rubinstein noted that the debate on this proposed Basic Law continues the constitutional undertaking:

 

This proposed law, if adopted, will come close to completing the task of adopting a constitution, which the Declaration of Independence imposed upon the Constituent Assembly, later the First Knesset. As we recall, Members of Knesset, the Constituent Assembly did not complete this important task. Instead of fulfilling its assignment the Constituent Assembly provided that the constitution would be given chapter by chapter by means of the Basic Laws that would be combined to form one constitution. It seems to me that when the Knesset adopts... this proposed law and the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, it will complete the work of composing the constitution. If this happens, our Knesset, the Tenth Knesset, will be remembered as the body that finally fulfilled the important task of enacting a constitution for the State of Israel, and this will be its honor and its glory, that it completed what the other Knessets did not’ (ibid., at p. 1514).

 

MK Aloni – the Chair of the Subcommittee – supported the proposed law. In her comments she referred to the Constituent Assembly (ibid., at p. 1515). MK Shahal also supported the proposed law. He emphasized that ‘the most important thing is the control exerted by these basic principles over the regular legislation of the Knesset ... The safeguarding of human rights in a Basic Law implies a normative preference for these principles over the clauses of a regular law of the Knesset’ (ibid., at p. 1518).

 

With the conclusion of the debate the proposal passed to the Committee on Constitution, Law and Justice to be prepared for second and third readings. The renewed debate before the Committee was comprehensive and fundamental (see Debates of the Committee on Basic Laws of the Tenth Knesset). The entire debate proceeded, of course, on the basic assumption – which was expressly repeated more than once – that in the context of the constitution in general, and in the case of human rights in particular, the Knesset is empowered to entrench the clauses of the constitution, whether by formal or substantive entrenchment. The proposal was not presented for second or third readings because early elections were called.

 

28. The debate on Rubinstein’s proposal continued in the Eleventh Knesset, following the applicable continuity rules. Nonetheless, the debate on the proposal did not conclude with the enactment of the law (for an analysis of the reasons, see Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 706). A significant change occurred in the Twelfth Knesset. The new Justice Minister, MK Dan Meridor, presented to the government the draft Basic Law: Human Rights. This proposal did not advance. Against this background, Members of Knesset Rubinstein and Aloni presented proposals of their own. MK Aloni presented the proposal of the subcommittee that she chaired, which had not reached the stage of second and third readings in the Tenth Knesset. In presenting her proposal, MK Aloni commented that:

 

In the Declaration of Independence we provided that there would be a constitution. The First Knesset decided to defer this issue chapter by chapter – and in the meantime, so that there would not be a vacuum, we adopted the laws that were previously in effect… and step by step we began to prepare the constitution of the State of Israel. However, the Basic Law: Human Rights was rejected. Still, with the passage of time, the need to adopt this law has grown’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 115, at p. 401).

 

MK Rubinstein adopted the Justice Minister’s proposal. This proposal provided for both formal and substantive entrenchment. The proposal provided for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws that improperly infringe protected human rights. The Justice Minister sought to set aside MK Aloni’s proposal. He announced that the government would permit discretionary voting for MK Rubinstein’s proposal. He himself – who had by his efforts advanced the Basic Laws as to human rights – explained the key points of his proposal and sought to unite the Members of the entire house in supporting it. MK Aloni’s proposal was set aside. MK Rubinstein’s proposal – which was also the Justice Minister’s proposal – passed to the Committee. The Committee did not submit the proposed law for second and third readings.

 

29. Towards the end of the term of the Twelfth Knesset, MK Rubinstein, who must be credited with advancing the efforts for constitutional human rights, took a new step. He “deleted” from Minister Meridor’s proposal – which had been debated by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee – a number of rights, and submitted them for a preliminary reading as a separate Basic Law. He placed upon the Knesset table, inter alia, the draft Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the draft Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. At the end of the Twelfth Knesset these two laws completed the legislative process. Thus were enacted the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (see the debates on the first reading in Knesset Proceedings, fourth session, at pp. 1235, 1527; on the second and third readings, ibid., at p. 3781) and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (see the debates on the first reading in Knesset Proceedings, fourth session, at p. 2595; on the second and third readings, fourth session, at p. 3390); for an analysis of the Knesset debates, see Karp, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,” I Mishpat uMimshal (1993), 323). In presenting Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty for second and third readings, the Chairman of the Constitution Law and Justice Committee, MK A. Lin – who contributed greatly to the enactment of the Basic Laws in the Twelfth Knesset – emphasized that the Basic Law is part of the State constitution, noting that:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was prepared in, the course of many meetings of the Committee on the Constitution, and I emphasize this: the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in its capacity as the committee on the constitution for the Knesset of Israel’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 125, at p. 3782).

 

30. In March 1994 the Knesset voided the original Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and enacted in its stead a new Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This Basic Law also revised several provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In presenting draft Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation for second and third readings MK Zucker noted that the debate on the Basic Law took place in the context of the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly, stating that:

I would like to remind you that today’s debate is taking place while we sit as a constituent assembly. We thereby continue the long tradition of debates held in this house in its role as Constituent Assembly. We are thus continuing to fulfill the Harrari Decision, which states: we will complete the constitution of the State of Israel chapter by chapter, by means of the Basic Laws.... Since 1948 the Knesset has essentially neglected part of its duties by failing to complete the enactment of a constitution for Israel, an assignment that it undertook both in its role as Constituent Assembly and in its role as the body charged with fulfillment of the Harrari Decision. It is true that this Knesset has almost completed the institutional portion of the Israeli constitution – those Basic Laws that deal with the government and the Knesset, the army, the Israel Lands Administration, the State Comptroller, the President of the State, etc. Even though these laws are not yet entrenched and have no preferred status over regular laws, nonetheless, the Knesset, as Constituent Assembly, has taken significant strides forward in this area ... The greatest failing of the Knesset has been in the field of human rights. Only two years ago did the Knesset begin the work that was supposed to have been undertaken in 1949, the enactment of a bill of rights for the Israeli citizen. Two years ago, this Knesset, in a significant and revolutionary step forward, enacted two Basic Laws, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This step has aptly been called a constitutional revolution, which is only now beginning’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 136, at p. 5362).

 

MK Y. Katz attacked the Knesset’s work in its role as Constituent Assembly. He insisted that:

 

Every first year law student is told that we are a constituent assembly, from the First Knesset through all of the Knessets until today. We are a constituent assembly because we have the authority to enact a constitution and the Basic Laws are part of the same future constitution’ (ibid., at p. 5426).

 

In the course of the entire debate it was clear to the members of Knesset that the Knesset was exercising its constituent authority; that they were enacting a portion of the constitution, and that they were empowered to entrench it (with formal or substantive entrenchment). They debated whether it was desirable to enable a majority of the Knesset to change the Basic Law. MK Meridor suggested that the required majority be eighty members of Knesset (ibid., at p. 5426). His suggestion was rejected. No contention was made that the Knesset was not empowered to provide for such entrenchment.

 

31. Before completing this analysis of the Knesset’s understanding of its constituent authority, I will mention five points. First, in every Knesset election the matter of the constitution was included as part of the party platforms. I verified this as to the passage from First to Second Knesset. In their article, Lahav and Kretzmer note that in the elections for the Eighth Knesset most of the parties promised to work towards enactment of a Constitution or Basic Laws as to human rights (see Lahav and Kretzmer, ibid., at p. 153). I did not check the party platforms for other Knesset elections. It seems that this is a well-founded assumption, inasmuch as  the matter of the constitution in general, and human rights in particular, found a central place in the party platforms. This is very significant. It indicates that recognition of the Knesset’s constituent authority was an item on the national agenda, was debated in the political forum, and was determined by means of election results. When the Knesset dealt with the matter of the constitution and enacted the various Basic Laws, it drew its power from the people. The Basic Laws were not enacted without the people’s knowledge.

 

Second, in four instances the Supreme Court invalidated regular legislation that conflicted with entrenched provisions of the Basic Law: The Knesset (see paragraph 35, infra). In accordance with those decisions the Knesset subsequently revised its regular legislation to conform to the entrenched provisions of the Basic Law. We are therefore presented with a new aspect of the Knesset’s understanding of the matter. The Knesset, in exercising its legislative authority, understood well that it was bound by limitations it had imposed in accordance with its constituent authority.

 

Third, all of the entrenchment provisions were enacted within the framework of the Basic Laws, in the context of the constitutional process. Only in one case has a formal entrenchment provision been included in a regular law. This is in s. 3 of the  Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984. That section provides that ‘this law may not be changed nor may the appendix be revised unless by a majority of the Members of Knesset.’ It should be noted that during the debate on the first reading of this proposed law a number of Members of Knesset expressed the view that this self-limitation was not binding since it was not included in a Basic Law. MK Rubinstein took this position, noting that:

 

Previous Knessets have discussed the question of whether the Knesset can entrench laws against changes by simple majority, and the position has been more or less accepted – although it is still disputed – that when we are talking about the Knesset as a constituent authority,  i.e. when it is acting as the framer of the constitution, when it is enacting a section of the constitution, then it can deem a particular law of superior status. If we enact, for example, a law as to human rights ... then in such a law, which is a Basic Law in the constitution, it is appropriate to provide that the constitution stands above other laws. This is recognized by jurists. This has been implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court. However, is it possible that a regular financial law be accorded such status? How can it be provided that a financial law will stand above regular legislation in future Knessets? If so, then tomorrow or next week – at some date closer to elections – the Knesset may enact a law that will forbid any change to the State budget or salaries or investments or allotments to religious institutions or allotments to settlements, unless by a majority of eighty or ninety or one hundred and twenty Members of Knesset. Why not? After all, on the eve of elections “anything goes”; this is popular and may not be opposed. Does anyone believe that this will be upheld in court? Does anyone believe that such a law will be considered a constitutional Basic Law? Does anyone believe that this is serious? This section is not worth the paper on which it is written’ (Knesset Proceedings, at p. 2790).

 

The second and third readings took place on the same day. MK Rubinstein’s questions remained unanswered. They evidence an attitude that was well accepted in the Knesset, which distinguished between Basic Laws (fruit of the Knesset’s constituent authority) and regular laws (fruit of the Knesset’s legislative authority). I will note also – incidentally – that in the words of introduction of Members of Knesset S. Aloni (Chair of the Subcommittee on Basic Laws) and A. Kulas (Chair of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee) to the pamphlet on the Debates of the Committee on Basic Laws of the Tenth Knesset (1984), the two noted that:

The Constituent Assembly elected in 1949 in accordance with the “Declaration of Independence” decided not to enact a constitution and not to dissolve itself. It declared itself the First Knesset, and the task of preparing the constitution was passed to it and to subsequent Knessets, which would prepare “Basic Laws” chapter by chapter. The Basic Laws would, upon their completion, be consolidated to form the constitution of the State. This decision gave the Knesset the status of the Constituent Assembly, and in this way the enactment of “Basic Laws” and their consolidation to form the constitution became subject to the initiative of the Members of Knesset and to the initiative of the government, or at least to its readiness to cooperate with the appropriate Knesset committee, the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee and the Committee on “Basic Laws.”’

 

All this is evidence for the widely held understanding of the Knesset that it is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority, and that the enactment of a constitution is the realization of the Knesset’s constituent authority. In the context of this authority a supra-legislative constitutional norm may be created.

 

Fourth, in the first years after establishment of the State there were many references to the Constituent Assembly, the Declaration of Independence, and the “Harrari Decision.” With the passage of time – and changes in the composition of the Knesset – the rhetoric changed. This is natural. A generation goes, and a generation comes, but the national memory did not change. The connection to the past was not severed. The Knesset continued to see itself as the heir of the Constituent Assembly, and as endowed with constituent authority.

 

Fifth, it is clear from the Declaration of Independence that the role (and authority) of the Constituent Assembly was to enact a constitution (‘in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly’). The intention underlying this provision was that a “formal constitution” would be adopted, in other words, that ‘the form of these norms would differ from that of other norms, particularly that of “regular” laws. This difference in form is expressed as a difference in the identity of the institution creating the norm (“constituent institution” as opposed to “legislature”) or at least in the process of its creation. Its goal is to emphasize the normative preference for the constitution over the other norms in the State’s system of positive law’ (Akzin, ibid., at p. 230). As to his understanding of the term “constitution” in the Declaration of Independence, Professor Akzin writes:

 

It is well known that the great majority of the founders of the State were convinced that at the apex of the legal system of Israel would stand a formal constitution that would provide a binding framework for the statutes and other legal norms of the State. This understanding was vividly expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and a first step in its implementation was taken by the Provisional Council of State, which on 1 Tamuz 5708 (July 8, 1948) established the Constitution Committee’ (Akzin, ibid., at p. 231).
 

In a similar vein, Professor Rubinstein notes that ‘the framers of the Declaration intended a formal constitution. We must also remember their clear objective that the Declaration accord with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations’ (ibid., at p. 44). Professor Uri Yadin described this well in an article that appeared the day before elections took place for the Constituent Assembly:

 

Tomorrow, there will be elections for the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel, the first elections since the State was established, and the most important for a long time to come. We are not about to elect a regular parliament, one of the many that will subsequently be elected to enact laws dealing with the many routine issues of our daily lives, but a special parliament, unique in its importance, which will be charged with endowing the State with one preeminent law that will stand as a cornerstone throughout the democratic life of the State – the Basic Law, the Constitution’ (Sefer Uri Yadin, ibid., at p. 82).

 

Thus the authority of the Constituent Assembly was not defined, but its task was clear: the enactment of a (formal) constitution for the State, i.e. the creation of a supra-legislative constitutional framework. At the same time, it seems to me that the Knesset was entitled not to enact any constitution, or to enact only a “substantive” constitution. This is a political question that is not determined by law.

(iv) The understanding of writers and commentators

 

32. I will now discuss the views of writers and commentators. I do so first and foremost because of the great importance that every legal system attributes to its scholars. Of course, the Court provides definitive interpretation. But it is natural for the judge to draw inspiration from the words of scholars. There is also a second and more compelling reason to turn to these views. From the understanding of writers and commentators one may learn about the basic approach of the Israeli legal community to constituent authority. Clearly this does not constitute decisive proof. Nonetheless, it is important evidence which, when seen together with other factors – the objective facts as to constitutional continuity, the political debates before the elections, the Knesset’s understanding of itself, the legal precedent and the Knesset’s reaction thereto – grounds the foundation upon which the Court may and should determine that the Knesset – every Knesset – is endowed with constituent authority; that by the principles of Israeli law, the Knesset – every Knesset – is empowered to enact a constitution for Israel; that this is the most appropriate interpretation of the social and political history of Israel.

 

33. Most of Israel’s scholars have viewed and continue to view the Knesset as endowed with constituent authority and therefore authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. It is true that in the past some disputed this position (see Nimmer, “The Use of Judicial Review in Israel’s Quest for a Constitution,” 70 Col. L. Rev. (1970) 1217. It is particularly fitting to mention Dr Likhovsky, who maintained that the Knesset – like the British Parliament – was not entitled to limit itself (see Likhovsky, “Can the Knesset Adopt a Constitution which will be the Supreme Law of the Land,” 4 Isr. L. Rev. (1969) 61; see also Hornstein, “Entrenchment of the Basic Laws,” 25 HaPraklit (1969) 648; Scheftler, “Reflections on Constitutional Questions,” 26 HaPraklit (1971) 6). These views were debated, analyzed and rejected. They remain the minority position. Since the end of the nineteen-fifties (with the enactment of the Basic Law: The Knesset) and the end of the nineteen-sixties (with the decision in the Bergman case [15]) the recurrent theme in Israeli constitutional literature has been that the Knesset has constituent authority, and that it is therefore authorized to adopt a constitution that will limit the Knesset in its role as legislature. Generations of law students have been inculcated with this view since the nineteen-sixties. First credit should be attributed to M. Sternberg (M. Sternberg, “A New Law or a Supreme Judicial Course,” 16 Molad (1958) 284). Sternberg’s essay was written shortly after the enactment of the Basic Law: The Knesset. The author wrote:

 

In approving the Basic Law, the Knesset functioned not merely as a legislative authority, but as a constituent assembly charged by the Declaration of Independence with adopting a constitution for the State. The Knesset always saw itself as a supreme institution as well, authorized to fulfill the function of enacting a constitution, and on several occasions expressly declared this to be so. In section 1 of the Transition Law the Knesset provided that the Constituent Assembly would be known as the “First Knesset” and that a delegate to the Assembly would be known as a “Member of Knesset.” This shows that the Knesset saw as its primary task the enactment of the constitution, and, it would seem, as its secondary task, the enactment of laws. The Second Knesset Transition Law provided that “wherever the law refers to the Constituent Assembly or the First Knesset it as if it referred to the Second Knesset.” Section 10 of that law provides that “this law will apply, with the necessary changes, to the Third Knesset and every subsequent Knesset.” Thus the group of people known as the Knesset constitutes another body as well, known as the Constituent Assembly, and it coexists, parallel to the Knesset itself, as a body whose purpose is construction of the constitution’ (p. 286).

 

A number of years afterward, with the enactment of the first two Basic Laws, Professor Akzin expressed his opinion on the matter before us (Akzin, “Basic Laws and Entrenched Laws in Israel,” 17 HaPraklit (1961) 230). Professor Akzin noted that in his opinion the Knesset exercises its constituent and legislative authority simultaneously. In his view, the Basic Laws are of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the Harrari Decision. Professor Akzin writes:

 

We do not maintain, as has been claimed from time to time in the Knesset and the press, that even if the Basic Law provided for preferential status it could not thereby tie the hands of a future Knesset: such a claim is pure sophistry and conceptual nihilism. While this claim may be true as to England, there it is consistent with the English rejection of a formal constitution superior to the regular legislature. It has already been decided that this claim cannot stand in a country where the idea of a formal constitution has gained currency. We are referring to South Africa, whose public law is based upon English law. The public law of the State of Israel has been based, since the Declaration of Independence, upon the proposition that a constitution may be established beside the regular laws. This proposition has never been rescinded; rather, it has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the decisions of the Knesset since 1950. If there is any significance to the term “constitution,” it is that the constitution itself authoritatively determines the relations between it and the other norms of the State’ (ibid., at p. 236).

 

In 1969, the first edition of A. Rubinstein’s seminal work The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel was published. In this book, Dr Rubinstein elaborates on the constituent and legislative authority of the Knesset and on its power, in exercising its constituent authority, to enact a constitution that will limit the regular legislation of the Knesset. The author writes:

 

The Constituent Assembly, after it changed its name to the “First Knesset,” extensively debated the question of the constitution. No doubt was cast on the fact that it was indeed authorized to enact a written, formal constitution. The great dispute revolved around the question of whether it was required to do so... There can therefore be no doubt as to the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution or laws of a constitutional character that stand above regular legislation… The First Knesset dissolved before its time, without adopting a single chapter of the constitution of the State in accordance with the Harrari Decision. The First Knesset’s powers passed to the Second Knesset ... From this it is clear that the powers of the Constituent Assembly passed from the First Knesset to the present Knesset and to every future Knesset... No defect in this continuity can be shown, nor has the power to enact a constitution disappeared; rather it is conferred upon every Knesset’ (ibid., pp. 167-168).

 

The author reiterated this position in all four editions of his work, and the young jurists of the State of Israel were inculcated with this view.

 

34. A significant contribution in the area of Israel’s constitution, the constituent authority of the Knesset and its parliamentary status, was made by Professor Klein (see, inter alia, Klein, “The Constituent Authority in Israel,” 2 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1970) 51; Klein, “On the Legal Definition of the Parliamentary Government and Israeli Parliamentarism,” 5 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1976) 308; Klein, “A New Era In Israel’s Constitutional Law,” 6 Isr. L. Rev. (1971) 373). The author wrote in 1970:

 

The concept of constituent authority undoubtedly exists in the constitutional law of Israel. Constituent authority was conferred upon the Constituent Assembly, i.e. the First Knesset. The First Knesset did not relinquish this authority, but transferred it to the Second and every subsequent Knesset’ (Klein, “The Constituent Authority in Israel,” II Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1970) 51, 53).

 

Professor Klinghoffer has expressed a similar view. We have discussed his position, as he expressed it in the Knesset. He reiterated this position in his above-mentioned article as well:

 

The Declaration of Independence did not specify a period of time within which the constitution must be enacted, and the transfer of the powers of the Constituent Assembly to the Second Knesset and every subsequent Knesset was authorized by a special legal arrangement. This is a sort of continuing transfer, which, so long as it remains in place, confers upon the Israeli legislature, as a perpetual inheritance, the authority to enact a constitution’ (Klinghoffer Book on Public Law, Y. Zamir, ed., (1993) at p. 763); the article itself was first published in 1961)).

 

This is also the position of Professor Gavison. In an article devoted to the dispute on the Basic Law: Human Rights, Professor Gavison writes as follows:

 

I accept the analysis suggested by both Klein and Rubinstein that even if the Knesset is not under such a duty, it maintains parallel powers – legislative and constituent – and that it may limit its own legislative powers while exercising its constituent powers. This analysis seems to be the most appropriate one, despite the undesirability of the length of the period for which these two kinds of distinct powers exist, and the fact that the Knesset itself is not keen on distinguishing between the kinds of power which it exercises’ (Gavison, “The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights,” 15 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1985) 118).

 

In a similar spirit, Dr Maoz noted that the Knesset enacted the Basic Laws as to human rights as an exercise of its constituent powers, and thence stems their primary normative status (see Maoz, “Constitutional Law,” Yearbook on Israeli Law, 1992-1993, A. Rosen-Tzvi, ed. (1994) 143). A similar position is expressed in numerous books and articles on this subject (see, e.g. Lahav and Kretzmer; ibid., at p. 158); it undoubtedly reflects the position of the legal community in Israel. It is sufficient to mention that the academic faculty of the Tel Aviv University Law Faculty proposed a draft “Constitution for Israel” to the Knesset. This proposal had great influence on the advancement of the constitutional undertaking in recent years. The proposed “Constitution for Israel” was based on the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution, entrench it and thereby limit the powers of the regular legislature. Note, however, that there were those who believed that there was no room for a fixed constitution. There were those who believed that it was not desirable for the constitution to include a chapter on human rights. President Landau’s position in this regard is well known (Landau, “A Constitution as the Primary Law for the State of Israel,” 27 HaPraklit (1971) 30). But even those voices did not base themselves upon a contention that the Knesset lacked the authority to enact a constitution. Rather, they were of the opinion that it was not wise to invest the Knesset with such power. Again, this short survey is not sufficient to show that only one conclusive position exists. I am aware that the judicial task is an independent one, which derives sustenance from the wisdom of others, but recognizes the personal responsibility of the judge to decide legal questions. The purpose of this survey is to show that the judicial determination, which recognizes the position that the Knesset is endowed with constituent powers, is not arbitrary, deriving from the subjective outlook of the judge, but rather is a reasonable conclusion, premised upon an objective outlook that reflects the basic opinions of the (legal) community in Israel. Another layer is therefore added to our ultimate conclusion that recognition of the constituent authority of the Knesset is the best, most fitting interpretation of Israel’s legal history.

 

(v) Judicial precedent of the Supreme Court

 

35. The Supreme Court recognized the power of the Knesset to entrench the clauses of a Basic Law against regular legislation, as set forth in four decisions rendered before the March 1992 enactment of the Basic Laws as to human rights (see HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [15], at p. 693; HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [19], at p. 7; HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [20], at p. 141; HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [21], at p. 529). At first, the matter was left for further review, but with time it was addressed clearly and explicitly. In the Laor Movement case [21], I noted as follows:

 

A law of the Knesset – whether a “regular” law or a Basic Law – that seeks to change an “entrenched” provision without having been adopted by the necessary majority contradicts the entrenchment provision of the Basic Law. In light of its legal effect, the “entrenchment” provision takes precedence. In this clash between the entrenchment provision and the clause that seeks to change it without meeting the necessary majority requirement, we do not apply the standard rules of construction, according to which a later enacted law invalidates an earlier enacted law. In this clash we apply the principle that gives normative precedence to the entrenched Basic Law’ (HCJ 142/89 [21], supra, at p. 539).

 

Thus the Court has recognized the Knesset’s power to ‘entrench’ the Basic Laws against change or infringement. Otherwise, we cannot explain the invalidation of four “regular” laws for violating the principle of election parity set forth in the Basic Law: The Knesset, when these invalidations stemmed from the failure of those laws to meet a formal requirement (the special majority) set forth in s. 4 of the Basic Law. It is true that in these decisions (except for the Laor Movement case [21]) the Court did not employ the rhetoric of constituent authority. We cannot conclude from these decisions that this specific doctrine was before the Court at that time. However, it is clear that the Court recognized the normative primacy of the entrenched Basic Laws. This primacy is certainly consistent – and as I will explain, only consistent – with the constituent authority of a Knesset empowered to enact a constitution for the State. In the fourth case in this series, I discussed the Knesset’s status as a constituent authority, noting as follows:

 

This “entrenchment” applies in our system, for we recognize the Knesset’s power to function as a constituent authority and to prepare Basic Laws that will constitute the various chapters of the State constitution. It is in this context that  we recognize the power of the Knesset,  acting as a constituent authority, to entrench provisions of a Basic Law against changes – whether by “regular” or Basic Law – that are adopted by a “regular” majority…’ (Laor Movement case [21], at p. 539).

 

36. Since the enactment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the question of the normative status of these Basic Laws has arisen in an incidental manner in the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has taken the position that these two Basic Laws enjoy constitutional supra-legislative status. Justice D. Levin concluded that this was so in the first decision to address the constitutionality of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Justice Levin wrote:

 

In March 1992 a significant change occurred in Israeli law. Two Basic Laws were adopted and came into force that define and raise to a constitutional level basic civil rights .... These two Basic Laws were debated in the Knesset of Israel, as a constituent authority, and consequently, the revised version of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and a revision to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were enacted, and came into force on March 9, 1994 ... When these two Basic Laws came into being they erected, by their own force and in conjunction with various basic rights that had been scattered here and there throughout our case law, the foundations and walls of the Israeli constitutional edifice. This construction has not, however, been completed, and there remains more to be drafted and enacted so that the constitution may stand in its full glory, radiating its light on the institutions of government and law in Israel. Nonetheless, the work that has been done is the construction of a stable constitutional structure, protected under the aegis of the principle and values anchored in the Declaration of Independence’ (HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [37], at pp. 463-464).

 

Thus, in the first decision to deal with the status of the Basic Laws, the Supreme Court decided – and in this regard the decision was unanimous (by Justices Levin, Strasberg-Cohen and Tal) – that the two Basic Laws on human rights were adopted by the Knesset in the exercise of its constituent authority, and they therefore enjoy constitutional supra-legislative status. In a similar vein, the Justices of this Court stated obiter dicta their position as to the constitutional supra-legislative status of the two new Basic Laws. My colleague Justice D. Levin so opined as to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the right to freedom of occupation when he stated, in another case, as follows:

 

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation ... endowed this right with formal constitutional recognition and supra-legislative status. It is transformed into a protected basic right and placed on a higher normative level than “regular” legislation or “Israeli” common law…’ (HCJ 239/92 Egged Israeli Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [44], at p. 71).

 

In a similar spirit, my colleague Justice Mazza stated as follows in another case dealing with the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation:

 

The safeguarding of the right to freedom of occupation in a Basic Law has conferred upon that right supra-legislative status. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this illustrious status ... is in the entrenchment of that right even against the mighty hand of the legislature. Again, it is not enough that a law that limits the right be explicit and unequivocal; rather, in order to effectively limit the freedom of occupation, the law must also meet the requirements of the last part of section 1, that is,. the limitation must be required for a “proper purpose and for the general good”...’ (HCJ 3385/93, 4746/92, G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [24], at p. 259).

 

In another case, Justice Strasberg-Cohen decided as follows:

 

These laws changed the normative status of freedom of occupation in Israel. There were two primary changes: first, the possibility of invalidating a law that does not meet the criteria of the Basic Law, a possibility that did not previously exist; and second, a change in the relative status of the law, on the one hand, and the basic right on the other. If, prior to the Basic Law, it was possible to limit the basic right by means of a law that did so clearly and explicitly, and if, prior to the Basic Law, the basic right and its limitation were tested in light of the law limiting that right, now the right (for our purposes, freedom of occupation) has been given preferred status above the law that limits it, and requires an analysis into whether the limitation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, was enacted to serve a proper purpose, and is not more restrictive than necessary’ (HCJ 1225/94 “Bezeq” – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications [45], at p. 679).

 

37. The Justices of the Supreme Court took a similar approach, obiter dicta, as to the constitutional supra-legislative status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In one of the cases, which dealt with the freedom of movement (protected by s. 6 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty) I noted as follows:

 

This right is invested with constitutional supra-legislative status. A regular law enacted after the effective date of the Basic Law that infringes the basic right and does not meet the requirements of the “limitation clause” (s. 8 of the Basic Law) is an unconstitutional law. The Court is entitled to apply the appropriate remedies. One of those remedies is to declare the law void, and set forth the effective date of the invalidity (retroactive, active or prospective)’ (CrimApp 6654/93 Binkin v. State of Israel [46], at p. 293).

 

In another case I noted:

 

With the enactment of the Basic Law, a significant change occurred in Israel. The normative status of a number of basic human rights has changed. They have become part of the State constitution. They have been accorded constitutional supra-legislative status’ (CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [38], at p. 410).

 

In one of the cases, Justice Or analyzed the principle of equality. He determined that this principle may be safeguarded by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Therefore, in his opinion, the following conclusion is required:

Such a safeguard signifies the elevation of the principle of equality to a normative constitutional supra-legislative level’ (HCJ 5394/92 Huppert v. Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [47], at p. 362).

 

It must be emphasized that most of the decisions discuss the constitutional supra-legislative status of the Basic Laws. There is no express reference to the Knesset’s constituent power. There was no need for such an express reference, since this question was not at issue. I do not contend, therefore, that one may conclude from these decisions that the Court explicitly adopted the doctrine of constituent authority (aside from the decision in the Laor Movement case [21], and the unanimous decision in the case of Clal Insurance Co. Ltd [37]). My contention is that the Court recognized the normative supremacy of the Basic Laws, and their constitutional supra-legislative status. In so doing, the Court did not adopt those constructions that see the Basic Laws as occupying the same normative level as regular legislation.

 

(vi) The Knesset’s constituent authority: conclusions

 

38. The socio-historical journey is at an end. This journey was vital. Constitutionality and the constitution are not merely formal documents. They are not mere law. They are the product of the national experience. They are society and culture. A constitution is indeed a reflection of the national experience. The words of Justice Agranat still resonate:

 

For it is a well known axiom that a nation’s law must be viewed through the lens of its national experience’ (HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4], supra, at p. 884).

 

Our system of national life, our national experience, from the establishment of the State until today, is that the Knesset is perceived by our national consciousness as the body authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. That consciousness originated before the establishment of the State and the preparations for framing a constitution. That consciousness was crystallized in the Declaration of Independence. It took on real form in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. It was consolidated in the social-legal understanding that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority and is empowered to enact a constitution for Israel. The rhetoric of constituent authority and constituent power was particularly strong during the first years following the establishment of the State. This rhetoric weakened with the passage of time. That is natural. Nonetheless, the basic understanding that the Knesset is endowed not only with regular legislative authority but also with constituent authority accompanied the Knesset from its inception. This is evidenced by the repeated references to the Harrari Decision. The renewed rhetorical reference to the Knesset as endowed with constituent authority in the context of the enactment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in 1994 shows this as well. Indeed, the view that the Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution is deeply embedded in the social and legal consciousness of Israeli society. This is part of our political culture. On the basis of this view, we, the judges of Israel are entitled to declare today that according to the rule of recognition of the State of Israel, the Knesset is endowed with legislative and constituent authority, and that the Knesset may, in exercising its constituent authority, limit the exercise of its legislative authority.

 

In truth, the rule of recognition at the outset of the Second Knesset might have been different had the Supreme Court determined that constitutional continuity had been severed. But this did not happen. In my opinion this would not have happened even had the question arisen before the Court at that time. In any event, today’s socio-legal reality enables the Supreme Court – in whose hands rests consolidation of the rule of recognition (see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, at pp. 147-154 (2nd ed., 1994)) – to identify and declare that our Knesset is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority; that it wears ‘two hats’; that in enacting the constitution it may limit its regular legislative power; that its constituent actions stand above its legislative actions. Of course, while the Knesset’s lawmaking power (its “legislative hat”) is continuous and everlasting, its power to enact a constitution (its “constituent hat”) is temporary and will terminate when the Knesset, as a constituent authority, determines that the constitutional undertaking has been completed. The constitution itself will set forth the means by which it may be revised and amended. This conclusion – the product of the rule of recognition – is also the best interpretation of our socio-legal history from the establishment of the State until today.

 

39. The common denominator of these three models is that the constituent authority of the Knesset always rests with the people. A constitution is not a government act that bestows a constitution upon the people. A constitution is an act by the people that creates government. It is the people that determines – according to the social philosophy developed over the course of its history – who exercises the highest authority of the State, and its rule of recognition. The Court gives expression to this social determination. The Court is the faithful interpreter of the people’s will as expressed in the constitution. The Court attempts to give the best possible interpretation of the totality of the national experience. The existence of a constitution is not a logical matter but a social phenomenon. The Court interprets the ‘social facts’ and infers from them the constituent power of the Knesset. This interpretation is not the product of intellectual construction. It is an expression of the social reality. It reflects actual experience. It is an expression of the moral and political foundation upon which the system is based. It is the product of the historical, political, social and legal history of the system. It is the consequence of the social contract based upon the communal consensus in Israel (the Laor Movement case [21], supra, at p. 554). The Court attempts to give the best interpretation of the totality of the national experience. At times, the constituent authority remains in the hands of the people itself, which then acts directly and enacts a constitution by referendum. In most cases the nation delegates constituent authority to a governing body. At times this is a special governing body. Generally it is an existing governing body, which is also the body authorized to enact laws. That is the case in Israel.

 

 

d) Review and critique of Justice Cheshin’s position

 

40. My colleague Justice Cheshin rejects the Knesset’s constituent authority. In his view, a Basic Law is “regular” legislation to which the label “Basic Law” has been appended. The Knesset may not limit itself. The Knesset is not omnipotent, inasmuch as it is subject, inter alia, to the will of the majority. A statutory clause (including that set forth in a Basic Law) providing for a formal majority “limitation” is not binding, unless the required majority is 61 members of Knesset (which is not a true limitation). A statutory clause providing for a substantive limitation in regard to the content of the provision (such as that appearing in the limitation clause) may be changed by later legislation despite noncompliance with the limitation requirement, as long as the subsequent law expressly provides for the change. Essentially, this is the classic English position, which represents the accepted view of the Westminsterian model as it is understood today in England. The legal construction that my colleague proposes in requiring an express change was raised many years ago by Professor Klein, and I referred to it myself years ago. My colleague’s position that, in principle, limitation is not possible is the antithesis of the view held by my colleague President Shamgar, according to whom limitation is possible. My view – based upon the Knesset’s constituent authority – falls in the “middle.” It is opposed to Justice Cheshin’s position on entrenchment and self-limitation in the Basic Laws. We do share basic principles – which I would like to reserve for future review – as to the effect of limitation clauses in regular laws, but that is not now the issue before us.

 

41. I will state at the outset that I disagree with the position held by my colleague Justice Cheshin. I agree with the view of my colleague Justice Shamgar in this matter. Indeed, consider the result: there is no constitution and the Basic Laws are but regular laws; the constitutional undertaking of more than forty years has been, so far, an unsuccessful experiment; the provisions of s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset, according to which the Knesset may extend its term only by a law enacted by a majority of eighty members of Knesset, are invalid; the provisions of s. 45 of Basic Law: The Knesset (according to which ss. 9A, 44 and 45 may be amended only by a majority of eighty members of Knesset), are invalid; the limiting provisions included in all drafts of Basic Law: Legislation based upon the principle that a Basic Law may not be enacted or amended unless by a majority of two-thirds of the Knesset, will not be constitutional if adopted; the clauses set forth in the Basic Laws requiring a Knesset majority – which, in the view of my colleague Justice Cheshin, are lawful – are imperiled, for it seems to me according to his underlying premise they should be invalidated. If we wish to enact a constitution and Basic Laws, we will have to start again from the beginning. And, apparently, even such a beginning is not at all simple. Certainly we will not aspire to ‘blood and fire and pillars of smoke’ [Joel 3:3]. If we wish to adopt a constitution by non-violent means, we are faced with considerable difficulty. The Knesset would not be empowered to enact a law establishing a constituent assembly. Even presenting a proposed constitution to be adopted by the Knesset (or a body established by it) for a national referendum would pose problems that could not be easily surmounted. Indeed, my colleague places us in the same position in which England is found today – without our being part of the European community and without our being subject to the European Convention on Human Rights – and he places before our legal system the same difficulties facing England today. In my opinion all this is unnecessary, for our history is unlike England’s. Our Knesset has constituent authority, by means of which it may achieve constitutional arrangements not easily realizable in England. I say this not because I desire a constitution, just as my colleague does not take his position because he desires that we not have a constitution. I take this position because it accords with my best professional understanding; it is based upon my best efforts to be objective in light of the constitutional structure and contemporary constitutional understanding. Indeed, I would consider a Knesset decision to discontinue the constitutional undertaking as legitimate, imbued with the same force as a decision to continue the enterprise. However, as long as the Knesset has not decided to abandon the constitutional undertaking, the Court must give constitutional force to that enterprise without regard to the judge’s personal opinion.

 

42. Accordingly, the most important question remains whether the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. My colleague’s claim rests upon the view that the Constituent Assembly’s constituent authority expired with the dissolution of the First Knesset. Most of his contentions have been made before. Professor Nemer, Dr Likhovsky, Mr Shefter and Mr Hornstein raised these arguments in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. My colleague returns to them. Some of these claims are stronger, some less so. As I mentioned in my opinion, had these questions arisen at the time that the Second Knesset convened (in 1951) they would have posed a problem that was “by no means simple.” I added that even then these problems could have been surmounted. Certainly these claims have weakened over the years. With the current reinforcement of the constitutional enterprise they lack real force.

 

43. I have addressed most of my colleague’s claims in the course of my opinion. I will therefore not repeat my answers but will address a number of points that merit further discussion.

(a) My colleague stresses that the First Knesset – which everyone agrees was empowered to adopt a constitution for Israel – was not authorized to transfer that power to the Second Knesset, and even if the First Knesset was so empowered, it did not intend to effect such a transfer. My simple answer is that the principle of transfer or agency, according to which an agent is not a principal does not apply here. The Knesset was given the power to enact a constitution by means of the basic norm and according to the basic understanding of the Israeli community. This power was given to every Knesset. The First Knesset did not pass powers to the Second Knesset, just as the Twelfth Knesset did not pass legislative power to the Thirteenth Knesset. A later Knesset is not the agent of an earlier Knesset. The Knesset is the central organ of the State, and according to our constitutional structure it is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority. In any event, even according to my colleague’s line of thinking, I have sought to show that the First Knesset intended (subjectively) to see the Second Knesset as its heir, and that intention was successfully implemented.

 

(b) My colleague has returned again to the old claims that the passage of constituent authority from the First to the Second Knesset was effected by regular laws and not by Basic Laws. This question does not arise as to the Transition Law, 5709-1949, which was enacted before the Harrari Decision. Personally, I see in this a constitutional provision, as it was indeed dubbed (“minor constitution”). Professor Yadin noted that the Transition Law was an ‘act of basic legislation in the sphere of the national constitution’ (Sefer Yadin, at p. 90). As to the Transition to the Second Knesset Law, it was enacted after the Harrari Decision, and should have been enacted as a Basic Law. It is unfortunate that this was not done. Does the entire constitutional structure therefore collapse? I have already noted that in my opinion this law was unnecessary; it was declarative in nature, emphasizing the passage from transitional to permanent status.

 

(c) My colleague Justice Cheshin cites as a weakness of the doctrine of constituent authority that it must distinguish between constituent and legislative acts, and that it is likely to require a determination as to whether certain provisions set forth in the Basic Law deviate from constituent authority. My answer is threefold. First, according to the doctrine of constituent authority the distinction between constituent and legislative acts is straightforward and clear, and is subject to a simple formal test. In this my position is similar to Justice Cheshin’s position, which is also subject to a simple test calling for a majority of 61 members of Knesset and no more than that. Second, indeed it may be necessary to test the constitutionality of the use of the term ‘Basic Law.’ I sought to leave this matter for further consideration and I maintain this position. I will note, however, that it is well accepted for courts to test the constitutionality of amendments. More than one such amendment has been invalidated as unconstitutional, and this has been not only for ‘formal’ reasons (such as a failure to meet majority requirements) but for substantive reasons as well (see the opinion of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Kesavande v. State of Kerala [113]). Consider, in this regard, the following words of the Constitutional Court of Germany:

 

Laws are not constitutional merely because they have been passed in conformity with procedural provisions... They must be substantively compatible with the highest values of a free and democratic order, i.e. the constitutional order of values, and must also conform to unwritten fundamental constitutional principles as well as the fundamental decisions of the Basic Law’ (6 BverfGE 32 [109]).

 

The literature on this matter is plentiful (see Barak, Parshanut BeMishpat, vol. 3, (1994), at p. 566, and also infra). Third, the need for judicial review under these circumstances is not unusual. It seems to me that even my colleague Justice Cheshin applies judicial review in similar circumstances. Thus, for example, in his view, the Constituent Assembly (the First Knesset) was unsuccessful in its attempt to transfer authority to the Second Knesset. Is this not an example of the Court setting constitutional limits? My colleague Justice Cheshin determines that the Knesset’s enactment of a law (even a Basic Law) extending its term beyond four years would be unconstitutional. Is this not a case in which the Court determines the boundaries of constituent authority? It is worth noting as well the words of my colleague President Shamgar, who noted that ‘there should be no doubt as to the existence of judicial review’ even as to the constitutionality of the constitutional legislation itself (see paragraph 46 of his opinion).

 

44. My conclusion is therefore that my colleague Justice Cheshin has presented the old arguments (some better, some less so) that were raised in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. All these contentions have been answered. The answers were sufficient when they were made. They are certainly sufficient today. As I have attempted to show, the Knesset’s constituent authority does not come to it merely by inheritance from the original Constituent Assembly (according to Kelsen’s view). I have reiterated that the recognition of the Knesset’s constituent authority reflects the general rule of recognition of Israeli law today (according to Hart’s view). This is the best interpretation of the entirety of the legal and national history of Israel, as it is understood today (according to Dworkin’s view). Indeed, regardless of the legal climate at the time the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, even had there been no Constituent Assembly at all, the question remains – what is the rule of recognition of Israeli law today? Does today’s Israeli law recognize the Knesset’s authority to endow Israel with a constitution? I have answered this question affirmatively. To support my position, I have presented the Knesset’s understanding of itself; the party platforms from various elections, which manifest the subjects on which the nation gave its opinion in those elections; the words of scholars and academics reflecting the professional consensus; the opinions of the Supreme Court; and the Knesset’s response to them. All these together – with no possibility of viewing any individual element as providing the answer – provide a “factual basis” for my legal conclusion that today, as in the past, the Knesset’s power to endow Israel with a constitution is recognized. My conclusion as to the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution is based upon a broad “factual basis.” It is the result of the constitutional history, the Knesset’s understanding of itself, the basic understanding of scholars and authors, the understanding of the electorate that voted in the various elections, the decisions and dicta of the judges and the response of the Knesset. This is where my criticism of Justice Cheshin’s position lies. His position does not accord with the understanding of today’s Israeli community. It is not the best explanation for the entirety of the social and legal history of the State of Israel. It does not grapple with the constitutional problem.

 

45. Professor Dworkin’s position is germane. He addresses the question of whether the British Parliament is empowered to adopt a bill of human rights that would limit the Parliament’s legislative power and prohibit Parliamentary amendment of the bill of rights, except by special majority. Professor Dworkin considers whether the Parliament’s decision is in itself sufficient to create entrenchment and self-limitation, and he concludes that the answer to this question is no. He notes that the principle of parliamentary supremacy:

[D]oes not owe its authority to any parliamentary decision, because it would beg the question for Parliament to decide that its own powers are unlimited.’

 

He continues:

 

British lawyers say that Parliament is an absolute sovereign because that seems (for most of them intuitively and unreflectively) the best interpretation of British legal history, practice and tradition. But legal history and practice can change with great speed’ (R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990), at pp. 26-27).

 

And I ask: when a Justice of the Supreme Court regards our legal history, its ways and traditions, as it appears before us today – against the background of the Declaration of Independence, the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the Harrari Decision, the election campaigns in which the parties reiterated their aim to enact a constitution for Israel, the enactment of twelve Basic Laws including entrenchment and limitation clauses, the case law and the Knesset’s response thereto, and the position of the legal community – does this not demand a determination that today the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority; that today, alongside its legislative authority, lies the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution? Is this not the best interpretation of our national history? Is this not the best explanation for our “system of national life” (in the words of Justice Agranat in HCJ 87/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4], supra, at p. 884)?

 

46. We will now consider the question of the Knesset’s power to limit its authority to amend the Basic Laws – whether the best explanation for this arrangement, against the background of our entire constitutional history is my colleague’s explanation as to the nature of majority and the method of counting abstentions, or my explanation that this power is the expression of the Knesset’s constituent authority. My colleague seeks to address this question from within the Knesset’s enactments and its internal rules. In my view we cannot solve this problem without looking outside the Knesset. This problem may be solved according to our present understanding of the entirety of Israel’s legal history. The best explanation for this understanding is that the Knesset sought to limit its legislative power as to constitutional matters; that it saw itself as functioning within the scope of the constitutional undertaking; that it saw itself as preparing a constitution for Israel. We will consider as well the entrenchment provisions of the Basic Law: The Knesset. In light of our legal and social history, is the best explanation for this requirement that the Knesset was thereby attempting to count abstentions and non-participating votes as “votes against,” out of a desire to provide for a “regular” majority? Perhaps the better explanation is that this was an attempt to create a constitutional supra-legislative norm, intended to ensure the stability of the system. Consider Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Is the best explanation for this Basic Law that the Knesset sought to prevent infringement of those basic rights by a later Knesset without consciously and expressly setting out its intention to do so (according to the position of my colleague Justice Cheshin)? Perhaps the better explanation is that the Knesset sought to prevent infringement of those basic rights by a later Knesset not fulfilling the requirements of the entrenchment provision, thereby preventing a later Knesset – one that explicitly announces its intention to deviate from the Basic Law – from achieving its goal? Is not this explanation – my explanation – the only one that reconciles the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty with the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which includes an express instruction – intended to achieve my colleague’s interpretation in the context of this law – regarding the override clause, when such a provision is absent from the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? Is the best explanation for our legal history that the use of the term “Basic Law” is merely formal, without any underlying significance? Or is the best explanation for use of the term ‘Basic Law’ that the matter is substantive in character, and reflects the preeminent normative status of the Basic Law? Consider s. 1A of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides that ‘this Basic Law’ – this and not an item of regular legislation – ‘is intended to protect Human Dignity and Liberty, in order to safeguard in a Basic Law’ – in a Basic Law and not in regular legislation – ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’ Is it not artificial to consider the term ‘Basic Law’ in this section as merely formal? Should it not be seen as the expression of a more profound legal and social outlook under which the Knesset is engaged in preparation of a constitution, in the context of which it seeks to protect human rights in order to safeguard the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? It should be noted that I do not claim that the issue is “black-and-white.” I am well aware of the contentions of the various Members of Knesset that were raised against the constitutional enterprise; I am aware of the authors who argued against it. But when a judge must ask himself – while taking into account the entire picture – what is the outlook of Israeli society today, against the background of the multi-faceted constitutional enterprise undertaken since the establishment of the State, and in light of the two latest Basic Laws and the reactions to them, my answer is that the Israeli Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. Indeed the judge’s task is to give our legal and social history the explanation that best accords with the legal and social data.

 

47. Running through Justice Cheshin’s opinion is his determination that recognizing the Knesset’s constituent authority violates Israeli democracy. In his view, ‘it is unthinkable that the representatives of a majority of the nation would take a position, but be prevented from achieving their aim of amending a Basic Law by our having erected a legal construct of dual authorities’ (paragraph 69). ‘It seems to me that obstructing the majority is a patently anti-democratic procedure’ (paragraph 69). “True” democracy, in the view of my colleague, Justice Cheshin, is democracy in which all decisions are adopted by a majority (an absolute majority) of the Members of Knesset. ‘A determination that a statute cannot be voided, amended or infringed except by a majority of more than 61 votes ... is a patently anti-democratic determination’ (paragraph 97). ‘When majority rule is removed, the spirit of democracy is extinguished’ (paragraph 101). ‘A statute enacted by the Knesset is the law of Israel, as long as it does not injure the heart of democracy, the principle of majority rule’ (ibid.). In my opinion this is a one-sided and fragmented approach to democracy. I discuss this at greater length in that section of my opinion dealing with the basis for the judicial review of constitutionality. My basic position is that the Knesset’s legislative authority to amend its laws should not prima facie be limited. Such limitation violates the principle of majority rule, without which there is no democracy. Such limitation enables the past to reign over the present on day-to-day matters. Such limitation enables the present majority, which chose today’s Knesset, to limit a future majority, which will choose the future Knesset. One generation may thereby dictate the day-to-day behavior of another generation. In the absence of a social agreement expressed in the implicit rules of the system, such a result should not be allowed. Up to this point, Justice Cheshin and I are of the same opinion. But, at the same time, my position is that “true” democracy recognizes the power of the constitution – fruit of the constituent authority – to entrench the fundamental human rights and the basic values of the system against the power of the majority. Such a limitation of majority rule does not violate democracy but constitutes its full realization (as discussed above). In this I join my colleague President Shamgar, and with him disagree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Cheshin. Indeed we are adjudicating the matter of the constitution as well as constitutional human rights. In this context, endowing the majority with the power to infringe the rights of the minority is an undemocratic act. Protecting individual rights, minority rights and the fundamental values of the legal structure against the power of the majority is a democratic act. Justice Jackson noted this as follows:

 

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections’ (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette [92], at p. 638).
 

Indeed, “true” democracy cannot exist without limitation of the power of the majority so as to protect the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and so as to protect the fundamental values, of which human rights are primary. Democracy of the majority alone, unaccompanied by a democracy of values is formal, “statistical” democracy. True democracy limits the power of the majority in order to protect the values of society, ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state,’ and the ‘recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free’ (s. 1 of the Basic Law). Of course, it is possible to think otherwise. It is possible to be satisfied with “formal” democracy. But the State of Israel chose differently. Since the Declaration of Independence and up to the present day we have chosen the constitutional path. We sought to endow ourselves with a constitution that would limit the power of the majority in order to fulfill the fundamental values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This choice was not made by judges. It was made by the nation. Once this choice is made, the judges are required to uphold it regardless of their own personal opinions (see B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 272 (1991); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 228 (1983)). The fundamental values and basic human rights are so deep and so important that the courts of various countries are prepared – without any constitutional text – to negate parliamentary power to infringe those values. Indeed, in a number of common-law legal systems the recognition is slowly developing that certain fundamental values cannot be infringed by the legislature, even in the absence of a written constitution. The bitter experience of Nazi Germany, inter alia, has contributed to the understanding of this issue (see my opinion in the Laor Movement case [21]; Tal, “The All-Powerful Legislature: Indeed?” 10 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1984) 361; Woolf, Droit Public - English Style Public Law (1995), at p. 57; and P. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993), at pp. 444, 454). The matter has progressed so far that, at times, courts are prepared to negate the effect of a baseless constitution (see H.H. Cohn, “Faithful Interpretation – A Third Conclusion,” 7 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1976) 5; EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset [48]). We need not go so far. We have a constitutional text. We have a national history of recognizing fundamental values that stand above regular legislation. All that is left is judicial recognition that the law is constitutional. We grant this recognition today.

 

48. My colleague Justice Cheshin reiterates that the nation was not consulted, ‘and we did not ask the nation’ (paragraph 67). My colleague asks again, ‘And where was the nation? Is it not fitting that we seek its opinion? On the contrary, we should turn to the nation and ask its opinion’ (paragraph 63). Indeed, in a democratic state sovereignty rests in the hands of the people. The Knesset does not have sovereignty; neither does the government, nor the courts. The nation has sovereignty. The entire social and legal structure is based upon this principle. The constitution and the Basic Laws arise from the nation and depend upon the nation, and the nation may change them. The Knesset’s constituent authority stems from the nation, and is recognized by the nation; the Knesset does not exercise this authority behind the back of the nation. My opinion is but an attempt to declare that the idea of the constitution and its implementation are not the province of ‘jurists and a few other high-brows – two or three at most’ (paragraph 71), but rather that this idea is a reflection of the national consciousness; that the idea of the constitution and its preparation began with the Declaration of Independence, which was borne on the nation’s shoulders; that it took form with the elections for the Constituent Assembly; that the idea of the constitution and its preparation did not evaporate with the dissolution of the original Constituent Assembly, but continued on in the Second Knesset. The party platforms, on the basis of which the people voted in all of the elections, attest that the idea of the constitution and its preparation continued and developed in every Knesset, and that in accordance with this idea, the Knesset enacted twelve Basic Laws; that in the various elections the nation was told that the parties sought a constitution for Israel; that based upon these declarations the nation went to the polls; that there were debates in the Knesset and among the public as to the content of the constitution and the need to continue its preparation. All these together enable the Court to declare today that in Israel the nation’s basic understanding is that the Knesset is endowed with the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. Indeed, many do not know what the ‘Constituent Assembly’ is, nor are they aware of the significance of constituent authority. But the vast majority of the members of the public know that our Knesset is the institution from which the constitution will derive and from which it has derived.

 

49. It is true that no special appeal was made to the public to approve the text of the Basic Laws, as it developed in the course of the Knesset debates over the years. But such an appeal was not necessary. It may be desirable, but it is not indispensable. Direct appeal to the nation is one method of adopting a constitution, and perhaps the most desirable. But this is not the only method and it involves considerable difficulty. The constitutional history of many nations recognizes constitutions that derived authority from the nation but were not presented for direct national approval. Every nation has its history; every nation has its constitutional development. Our political and legal culture is not based upon a special appeal to the nation by means of a referendum. No referendum has taken place in the past. Our political and legal culture is not built upon “direct” democracy, but upon “representative” democracy.

Our political and legal culture also maintains that the appeal to the nation takes place in the context of the elections for the Knesset. Such elections took place in Israel, and the issues of the constitution and the Basic Laws were on the agenda. The nation was asked; nothing was done without its knowledge. Indeed, this did occur in the elections for the First Knesset – the Constituent Assembly. Preparation of the constitution was but one of the many subjects addressed in those elections. This does not negate the First Knesset’s constituent authority. The nation went to the polls many times. Every time the issue of the constitution and the Basic Laws appeared on the national agenda. The nation had its say in all of the elections, with different levels of intensity, according to the subjects that were then on the national agenda. Never was the constitutional ember extinguished. I do not see a substantive difference – from the perspective of the rule of recognition of today’s Israeli legal system – between the elections for the Constituent Assembly, and all other elections. In the elections for the Constituent Assembly it was clear that the subject was election of an entity with dual authority, legislative and constituent. This was the case in the other elections as well. I agree, of course, that in the first elections constituent authority was emphasized. This is appropriate, and in this regard, there is, of course, a difference between the first and subsequent elections. But I do not think that this difference is so significant as to conclude that the first elections bestowed constituent authority upon the body elected while subsequent elections did not.

 

Consider the matter of the Basic Laws on human rights. Can it seriously be claimed that they were adopted without the nation’s participation? The Knesset has concerned itself with the question of human rights for more than thirty years. Beginning with Professor Klinghoffer’s 1962 proposal, the Knesset and the Israeli public have reckoned with the question of human rights. Problems of religion and state have been debated at length. The status of Israel as a Jewish state and as a democratic state have been debated and tested. The Twelfth Knesset adopted Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Thereafter, elections for the Thirteenth Knesset took place. The issue of the Basic Laws was raised in the party platforms. The Thirteenth Knesset was elected and enacted a new Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

Indeed, the public debates did not take place only in the Knesset. Broad segments of the public expressed their opinions as to the “constitutional revolution.” The issue was discussed in primary schools and high schools. The issue penetrated the public consciousness. All of these factors have constitutional significance. A constitution is not merely a legal document. A constitution expresses the national experience. A special appeal to the nation is only one of the many ways in which such a program for national life can be developed. The nation was asked and the nation answered that it desires a constitution, and that it desires constitutional human rights. Indeed, the primary dispute in the nation – and such a dispute exists – is not as to constituent authority but as to the content of the constitution. Of course this matter requires national consensus. This agreement is expressed in the enactment of the Basic Laws. The Court must give effect to this agreement. Again, I do not claim that constitutional development in Israel is ideal. The constitutional enterprise could have been arranged differently. A “national seminar” on the content and details of the constitution would have been appropriate. Increased public awareness of the public debate would have been appropriate as well. But that is not the question before us. Our task today is not to plan the constitutional enterprise in advance. We are dealing with an analysis of the constitutional enterprise in retrospect. It cannot be said that the nation did not participate in the constitutional enterprise, and that the Members of Knesset acted behind the nation’s back. Everything was done openly, in the public eye. The public expressed its opinion in the elections, and chose the parties that it desired, according to many factors, including party positions on the constitution. Now, the Court must give constitutional effect to the constitution. That is what we are doing today.

 

e) The Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution – Summary

 

50. I have come to the conclusion that the Knesset is authorized to provide Israel with a constitution; that it is empowered to ‘entrench’ the clauses of the constitution (whether by substantive or formal entrenchment). This authority is granted to the Knesset because it is vested with constituent as well as legislative authority. I have noted the many difficulties that stand in the way of any other construction. Fortunately, there is no need to deal with these other constructions in light of the explanation that the Knesset is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority. Indeed it may be said of constituent authority that if it had not been established as a constitutional fact it would have had to be invented, as a constitutional construct, since it provides the best explanation for the legal history of Israel. However, in our case, this doctrine is established and it is reflected in our constitutional history. There is no need to invent it. It expresses our social contract since the establishment of the State until today. Without it, constitutional continuity would be severed, and the effect of all the entrenched Basic Laws creating superior norms would be called into question. Their legal status would be diminished and the constitutional enterprise would lose its operative significance. Human rights in Israel would not be elevated to constitutional supra-legislative status. The expectations of generations for a constitution and supra-legislative human rights would be frustrated. All hope for a constitution would be lost. I am aware of the difficulties that underlie the doctrine of constituent authority. Nonetheless, these difficulties are not so insurmountable as to overturn the doctrine.

 

51. The doctrine of constituent authority affords significant advantages. First and foremost, it reflects the governmental history, the social contract and the basic viewpoints of the Israeli community. Second, it provides an appropriate instrument for accomplishing the task. The doctrine does not deal with the Knesset’s general power to limit itself. It does not take a position as to the Knesset’s ability to limit itself as to matters that are not constitutional. It treats only of the process of creating a constitution and this process alone, and it provides an answer that justifies this activity. It provides an Archimedean foothold, outside of the constitution that enables its enactment.  It makes it possible to turn to the people – if such is their will – in order to strengthen the ties between the people and its constitution that have weakened in past years. Third, it accords with the constitutional experience of most countries throughout the world, which have followed a similar path in preparing their constitutions. It does not transform a “regular” law into a “special” or “elevated” or “important” or “extraordinary” or “exalted” law. It does not deal with fine distinctions as to the scope of the limitation, the essence of the ‘regular’ or ‘special’ majority, or the status of abstentions. It takes the high road in determining that a Basic Law is not a “law” at all but rather a constitution. As a result, the way is paved for a systematic and orderly development of the body of constitutional rules connected with the constitution. It facilitates Israel’s entry into the democratic constitutional community. Finally, it expresses the centrality of the Knesset in the fabric of Israeli democracy. The Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. It is true that in exercising its legislative authority the Knesset is subject to limitations that arise from the basic perceptions of the community as safeguarded in the constitution and the Basic Laws, which represent our national will. Nonetheless, when the Knesset exercises its constituent authority, it is free to enact a constitution for Israel. The Knesset, endowed with constituent authority, was entrusted by the Israeli community with the fate of the constitution.

 

II) Basic Laws and regular legislation

a) Continuation of the constitutional enterprise and its problems

 

52. The Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution. This authority was granted to the Knesset with the establishment of the State. At that time it accompanied a revolutionary process of national emancipation. The original authority did not immediately come into effect. It was already clear to the Provisional Council of State that preparation of the constitution would be protracted. The Harrari Decision provided that the constitution would be adopted in stages. Because of the political situation, the constitution was at times enacted not only ‘chapter by chapter’ but ‘atom by atom’ (see Karp, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,” I Mishpat uMimshal (1993), at p. 323). As a result, the constitution was adopted without any connection to a particular event. As in many countries – such as Canada, Sweden, and Spain – our constitution is the product of natural social development. It results from a continuing ‘evolution,’ not a one-time ‘revolution’ (see B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (1992), at p. 47; E. McWhinney, Constitution Making (1981), at p. 13; R.R. Ludwikowski and W.R. Fox, The Beginning of the Constitutional Era: A Bicentennial Comparative Analysis of the First Modem Constitutions (1993), at p. 194). Moreover, preparation of the Israeli constitution took place over an extended period without parallel in the constitutional history of other countries. Constitutional preparation commonly continues for many years. It is unusual for the constitutional enterprise to continue for more than forty years. For a variety of political and social reasons this has occurred in Israel. At times, the political will to establish the constitutional authority was lacking. At other times, the matter was prevented by circumstances. Indeed, we are different from other nations, even in the enactment of our constitution.

53. This prolonged constitutional enterprise is accompanied by a number of difficult problems. The various Basic Laws differ in the generality of their language. A small number of them contain ‘limitation’ provisions, limiting the process by which the laws may be amended; most are silent as to amendment procedures. Some Basic Laws include ‘entrenchment’ provisions, dealing with the power of subsequent laws to infringe the arrangements set out in the Basic Laws. Most are silent on this matter as well. This normative reality gives rise to difficulties of interpretation and to a lack of clarity as to the constitutional scheme. There is no alternative, therefore, but to clarify the constitutional picture. Without such elucidation, we cannot understand the status and scope of the Basic Laws in general, and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in particular.

 

b) The normative order

 

54. The Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. By that authority the Knesset enacted a constitution for Israel. It did so chapter by chapter in accordance with the Harrari Decision. Each of the Basic Laws constitutes a chapter in the constitution of the State of Israel. Each chapter stands at the head of the normative pyramid (cf. B. Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments, vol. 1 (1963), at p. 120). Thus, the State of Israel has a constitution – the Basic Laws. Below the constitution stand our statutes, the product of the Knesset’s legislative authority. Beneath the statutes stands secondary legislation, the product of authority conferred by statute. The status of each norm in the normative pyramid is determined by the nature of the authority by which it is created, which, in turn, is grounded in the pyramid of institutions. Limitation does not create normative supremacy. Even when a statute can limit itself it cannot elevate itself (see Salmon, Jurisprudence, 12th ed. (1966), at pp. 85, 87). Normative supremacy reflecting the constitutional nature of the norm derives only from the existence of constituent authority. A constitutional democracy is, by its nature, ‘dualistic’: the constitution is created by the nation, whether directly (such as by referendum) or indirectly, by granting constituent authority to a governmental body (such as a special constituent assembly or an established legislative body). Statute is created by the nation, acting through the legislative authority. Constituent authority is supreme and ranks above legislative authority. It does not constitute mere self-limitation of the legislative authority (Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), at p. 223). In Israel, constituent authority is given to the Knesset. This authority exists alongside the Knesset’s legislative authority. This dual authority in the hands of the same body raises a number of questions that must be answered.

 

c) The use of constituent authority is effected by means of the Basic Laws

 

55. The Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution for the State. How does it do this? When does the norm created by the Knesset have constitutional status and when can it be said that the norm is a ‘regular’ law? In my opinion the answer is that the Knesset uses its constituent authority (committing a “constitutional act,” in the language of Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 451) when it gives external expression in the name of the norm, denoting it a “Basic Law” (without specifying the year of enactment). This formal standard is consistent with the parliamentary experience. The Knesset did not denote as “Basic Laws” legislative enactments that were not of a constitutional nature. The Knesset was careful in the past to limit the term “Basic Law” to the chapters of the constitution, in accordance with the Harrari Decision. The Knesset attributes great importance to the use of the term “Basic Law.” Thus, for example, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty expressly states:  ‘The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State’ (s. 1A). The double emphasis of the Law is not coincidental, and it reflects the uniqueness of the Basic Law. The parliamentary reality underscores this singularity as well. A committee was established – the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee – to deal with the enactment of the Basic Laws. At times a subcommittee on the constitution was established as well.

56. Moreover, every time that a Basic Law is submitted for a preliminary or first reading before the Knesset plenum, it is emphasized that another chapter in the constitution of the State is being brought before the Knesset.

Some examples follow:

(a) In submitting the proposed Basic Law: The Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 15 (1953) at p. 57), MK Bar-Yehuda noted as follows:

 

In other circumstances I might see this moment as worthy of particular note in the annals of Israeli legislation. You, Members of Knesset, even those of you who were not members of the First Knesset, certainly recall the very long debate between the supporters of the Basic Constitution and the Basic Laws as to the relative value of those two, as to their unique means of protection and the need to distinguish between Basic Constitution or Basic Laws and ordinary laws.’

 

MK Bar-Yehuda analyzed the history of the Harrari Decision and presented the first Basic Law.

(b) The second Basic Law was adopted in the Third Knesset. This was Basic Law: Israel Lands. In presenting the proposed law for a first reading, the Minister of Finance, Mr Levi Eshkol, noted as follows

 

It is not without deep feelings of respect that I make use of the privilege and obligation bestowed upon me to present before you and explain these laws connected with Basic Law: Lands of the Nation. I feel that with my words and participation, I stand as though beside a well from which we have drawn for generations, a well “which the nobles of the people delved” [Numbers 21:18].  And now at the close of the first decade and the beginning of the second decade of the State, we approach that well to deepen it, broaden it and fit it to the new conditions that have arisen with the establishment and existence of the State of Israel’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 27, at p. 2839).

 

(c) In presenting the proposed the Basic Law: The President of the State – the third Basic Law – for a first reading, Minister of Justice Dov Yosef noted as follows:

 

Today I am honored to bring before the Knesset the proposal for a law that will constitute another layer in the construction of the Basic Constitution of the State’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 36, at p. 963).

 

(d) The fourth Basic Law is the Basic Law: The Government. It was adopted by the Sixth Knesset. At that time the Knesset moved to new premises. The first ceremonial session in the new premises was devoted to a first reading of the Basic Law: The Government. In presenting the law, the Prime Minister, Mr Levi Eshkol, stated as follows:

This festive day, on which the Knesset inaugurates its new home, should be noted in a distinguished piece of legislation, which deals with the rules of law and governance in the State. Basic Law: The Government is a distinguished chapter in the future Israeli constitution. The constitution that the Knesset obligated itself to enact by a fundamental decision made in June 1950... The government’s view is that the time has come for the Knesset to devote a considerable part of its legislative work to completing the missing chapters of the Constitution’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 46, at p. 2504).

 

(e) The sixth Basic Law is Basic Law: The Army, which was adopted in the Eighth Knesset. In presenting the proposed Basic Law: The Army for a first reading, Minister of Justice Mr Zadok emphasized that:

The government has toiled for a number of years to conclude the preparation of a system of Basic Laws that will be combined to form a complete constitution. It is therefore natural that the subject of the army, which is addressed in every written constitution, be dealt with in Israel in a Basic Law, which, as mentioned, will constitute one of the chapters of the Constitution’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 74, at p. 4002).

 

(f) The ninth Basic Law is Basic Law: The Judiciary, which was adopted by the Ninth Knesset. In presenting the proposed Basic Law: The Courts for a first reading, the Minister of Justice, Mr Tamir, noted that:

I am honored to bring before the Knesset the proposed Basic Law: The Courts, a law that is intended to define the constitutional principles by which the judicial authority will function in Israel… Recently the Ministerial Committee for Legislation completed Basic Law: Legislation, including the entire issue of the Constitutional Court. In addition, in the coming week we will renew the debates on the Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights. Thus we have proceeded with important and expeditious steps toward the great objective of endowing the State of Israel with a constitution’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 83, at p. 3216).

 

57. Moreover, the Knesset debates on the Basic Laws were of a singular nature. The Knesset was aware that it was preparing an additional chapter for the State constitution. The members of Knesset were aware that they were not enacting regular legislation, but constitutional legislation, with far-reaching, long-term consequences as to the law and the character of the State. The debate was ceremonial. When the Basic Laws were enacted all were aware of the importance of the moment. The unique nature of the legislation was formally expressed by the designation of the proposal and law as “Basic Law.” This designation constituted an agreed-upon sign that the matter was constitutional; that constitutional continuity extended from the days of the Constituent Assembly and the Harrari Decision; that this legislation was not like all others; that the moment was unique. The designation of legislation as a “Basic Law” is not a formal technical matter. It is the substantive expression of the process by which the constitution was enacted.

 

58. Of course, all this has no formal expression, beyond the requirement that the legislation be designated as “Basic Law” without a specified year of enactment. But this is not significant. The constitutional answer often derives from the constitutional system and constitutional precedent even if they have no formal anchor. Moreover, our constitutional legislation is formally anchored. This formal test – the use of the term “Basic Law” – is simple. It provides security and certainty. This test raises two questions that I would like to set aside for further consideration. The first question is what is the constitutional status of legislation that preceded the Harrari Decision and that is not designated as “Basic Law”? Primarily, should not the Transition Law of 1949 be considered part of the State constitution? I am inclined to the view that there is constitutional legislation – the result of constituent authority – before the Harrari Decision as well. That said, this question may be reserved for further consideration. The second question concerns the role of future Knesset legislation that might abuse the term “Basic Law” by designating as such regular legislation with no constitutional content. This question is by no means simple; its answer extends to the very root of the relationship between the constituent authority (of the Knesset) and the judicial authority (of the courts). This question, as well, I would like to set aside for further consideration.

 

d) Amendment of one Basic Law by another Basic Law

 

59. A Basic Law is a chapter in the State constitution. It derives from the Knesset’s constituent authority. In establishing a Basic Law, we find ourselves at the highest normative level. It therefore follows that a Basic Law, or any of its provisions, can be amended only by a Basic Law. A Basic Law may be amended by regular law only if the Basic Law contains an express provision to that effect. It is, nevertheless, true that the Supreme Court has held in the past that a Basic Law may be amended by regular law (HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee [14]). That decision aroused criticism (see Klein, ‘On Semantics and the Rule of Law – Reflections and Appeals of HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of the Knesset Central Elections Committee’ 9 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1978) 79). Later decisions left this entire question as requiring further consideration (see HCJ 119/80 HaCohen v. Government of Israel [23]).

60. In my opinion, one Basic Law may be changed only by another Basic Law. This is also the position of my colleague Justice Shamgar. Professor Akzin correctly noted that:

 

A law that has been formally designated as a Basic Law cannot be changed, except by a law that has also been formally designated as a Basic Law (Akzin, ibid., at p. 237).

 

Professor Klein also took this position, emphasizing that:

 

Supremacy does not derive from the majority requirement but from the authority creating the norm. Accordingly, even unentrenched Basic Laws are superior to regular legislation and, if it wishes to amend them, the Knesset must do so by means of the appropriate amendment procedures, and not by means of enacting a different, later law.

 

Indeed, if the Knesset wishes to amend the clauses of a Basic Law – for example, changing the system by which the Knesset or the Prime Minister is elected – it must do so in a Basic Law. The only case in which this is not so is when the Basic Law itself provides for a different amendment procedure. Amendment of a Basic Law by another Basic Law may be explicit or implied. Indeed, two Basic Laws occupy the same normative level and therefore must be construed according to the principles governing two norms of equal status.

 

61. As I mentioned above, the prevailing view in the past was that a Basic Law could be amended by a regular law. In an opinion that I handed down more than fifteen years ago, I raised doubts as to that approach (see HCJ 119/80, OM 224/80, HaCohen v. Government of Israel [23], supra). As set forth in that opinion, a Basic Law may not be amended except by another Basic Law. Therefore, the provisions of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which establishes the electoral system, may be changed only by Basic Law. It is true that the clause itself provides that ‘this section shall not be varied, save by a majority of the members of Knesset.’ I suggest that we determine that this provision relates to infringement of the electoral system – similar to infringement of the principle of equality in the Bergman case [15] and its offshoots – and not to changing the electoral system itself. It is clear that if the subject were a change in the electoral system – such as a change from proportional representation to regional elections – then not only would a Basic Law be required, but also a ‘majority of the members of Knesset’ as set forth in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

 

I am aware that in the past Basic Laws were amended by regular legislation. I do not seek to challenge the force of such amendments, which were supported by the decisions of this Court. Thus, what was done in the past will remain in force. But henceforth, a Basic Law may be changed only by another Basic Law. In order to permit amendment of a Basic Law by regular legislation, the Basic Law must include an express provision to that effect, which must explicitly provide that it deals not only with infringement of the arrangement set forth in the Basic Law – as I will discuss later – but also with amendment of the Basic Law.

 

e) Limitation of the Knesset’s power to amend one Basic Law through another Basic Law (“the problem of rigidity”)

 

62. When the Knesset exercises its constituent authority, is it empowered to limit its constituent authority to amend the Basic Law in the future, thereby ‘fixing’ its constitutional enactment? Thus, for example, is the provision of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, by which ‘[t]his Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset’ (s. 7), constitutional and binding? Is the clause of s. 45 of the Basic Law: The Knesset (according to which ss. 9A, 44 and 45 of the Basic Law may not be revised except by a majority of eighty Members of Knesset) binding? Is the Knesset authorized to provide in Basic Law: Legislation that a Basic Law may not be adopted or amended except by a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Knesset? In my opinion, the answer is yes. In exercising its constituent authority the Knesset may limit the future use of its constituent power. This derives from the very essence of the constituent function. This function aims to create a document that entrenches norms that may be altered only in a special way. The constituent function is intended by its very nature to create a formal constitution, the inherent significance of which is the establishment of provisions as to the means by which the constitution may be amended, and which may themselves be amended in accordance with these provisions, failing which the amendment is unconstitutional (the “unconstitutional constitutional amendment’). Indeed, the power of the Knesset – when it exercises its constituent authority – to limit itself, and thereby “entrench” its provisions, derives from the very grant of its authority to enact a formal constitution.

 

63. Most Basic Laws do not include limitation clauses. The “rigidity” of Basic Laws is expressed in only a few of the Basic Laws. We may conclude that in the absence of a “rigidity” provision, a Basic Law may be amended by a Basic Law adopted by a regular majority. Thus, for example, Basic Law: The Judiciary  or Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty may be amended by another Basic Law adopted by a regular majority. Note that the absence of a limitation clause does not detract from the normative status of the Basic Law as a superior norm in the Israeli legal system. The absence of a limitation clause negates the rigidity of the Basic Law in relation to other Basic Laws, and permits its amendment or infringement by a Basic Law enacted later by a regular majority. The absence of a limitation clause does not lower the status of the Basic Law to the level of regular law. A non-rigid Basic Law is still a Basic Law. It is not a “regular” law and it cannot be amended by regular legislation.

 

f) Basic Law and regular law

 

64. A Basic Law is a chapter in the constitution. It stands “above” regular legislation. As we have seen, a regular law cannot amend a Basic Law. Can a regular law affect the arrangements set forth in the Basic Law? The apparent answer is that the regular law cannot do so unless the Basic Law so permits. This conclusion follows from the supremacy of the Basic Law. Such supremacy prevents a regular law from affecting the arrangements of the Basic Law. At the same time, this supremacy itself leads to the conclusion that a Basic Law may provide for conditions and circumstances under which regular legislation may infringe the arrangements set forth in the Basic Law. The hand that gave is the hand that hath taken away. The presumption is therefore that regular legislation may not impinge upon the arrangements set forth in a Basic Law unless the Basic Law expressly provides otherwise. However, the case law of the Supreme Court has upset this presumption. The Court has decided that in the absence of an ‘entrenchment’ provision – i.e. a provision entrenching the Basic Law against infringement by regular legislation – the latter may encroach upon the arrangements set forth in the former (see HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [13]; HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee [14], supra; HCJ 107/73 ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel [12]. This precedent has developed from the directive contained in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. Under that section, the election system provided for in the statute may not be changed ‘except by a majority of the Members of Knesset.’ This is an instance of “formal entrenchment” that protects the Basic Law against infringement by regular legislation, but permits possible infringement by legislation enacted by the special majority set forth in the Basic Law. In light of the entrenchment provision set forth in s. 4, the Court concluded that regular legislation may infringe other arrangements set forth in a Basic Law when the Basic Law does not provide for entrenchment. If this were not the case, the clauses of a Basic Law that are silent as to entrenchment would be more strongly safeguarded against infringement by regular legislation than the clauses of a Basic Law protected by a special entrenchment arrangement that was certainly intended to strengthen rather than weaken the safeguard. While this conclusion is possible, it is not mandatory. The Court could have concluded that in the absence of an entrenchment provision, the provisions of a Basic Law may be infringed by regular legislation, but only where that infringement is explicit. It would therefore have been possible to continue to emphasize the superior normative status of the Basic Law, while at the same time maintaining the appropriate distinction between a Basic Law providing for entrenchment and a Basic Law that is silent in this regard. I would like to reserve this issue for further consideration, since Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty contains an entrenchment provision. The entrenchment called for in the Basic Law is not formal, requiring a particular majority in order to pass the infringing law. Rather, the entrenchment is substantive, permitting infringement by means of regular legislation only if the regular legislation meets the substantive requirements. The limitation clause set forth in section 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides for substantive entrenchment. Under that provision, regular legislation may not infringe the human rights protected by the Basic Law unless it fulfill the substantive requirements of content. This entrenchment provision is binding. It is legal. It negates the power of non-complying regular legislation to infringe the human rights safeguarded by the Basic Law.

 

g) Substantive entrenchment provisions in the Basic Law and express infringement in regular legislation

 

65. A Basic Law provides that no legislation may infringe its provisions unless certain substantive requirements are met (substantive entrenchment). A regular law expressly infringes the clauses of the Basic Law without meeting the required substantive requirement. What is the fate of the regular law? In my opinion this regular law is unconstitutional. It may be declared void.

 

Indeed, just as a regular law may not implicitly infringe the clauses of an entrenched Basic Law – because it is on a lower normative level than the entrenched Basic Law – so it may not explicitly encroach upon those provisions. The express provision of the regular law emphasizes its constitutional position, enabling the judicial conclusion that the law indeed infringes the arrangement set forth in the Basic Law. Of course, this conclusion does not apply when the Basic Law expressly provides that despite non-compliance with the substantive entrenchment provision, the Basic Law may be infringed by regular legislation meeting certain formal conditions. Such a provision may be found in the override clause set forth in section 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Thus, in order for regular legislation that infringes a Basic Law to be constitutionally valid, the Basic Law must contain an express provision to that effect. The fact that the Basic Law is silent in this regard precludes such infringement. The constitutional difference between an entrenched Basic Law and non-entrenched Basic Law is therefore made manifest. Both are Basic Laws. Both occupy the primary normative level. Nonetheless, they are different. The arrangements of an entrenched Basic Law cannot be infringed by regular legislation unless the entrenchment requirements are met. In contrast, the arrangements of a non-entrenched (or silent) Basic Law may be infringed by regular legislation. This distinction between the different Basic Laws will, of course, disappear with the entrenchment of all the Basic Laws, as recommended in the draft of  Basic Law: Legislation.

 

h) Limitation in regular legislation

 

66. What is the rule in regard to a limitation clause included in a “regular” law, under which such law may not be amended or infringed except by regular legislation meeting specified requirements (as to form or content)? For example, what is the rule in regard to s. 3 of the Law for Protection of Public Investment in Israel in Financial Property, 5744-1984? This section provides that ‘this law may not be amended nor may the appendix be revised except by a majority of the Members of Knesset.’ Is there a difference in this context between a limitation that calls for ‘a majority of the Members of Knesset’ and one that calls for ‘a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Knesset’ or of eighty Members of Knesset? The answer to this question highlights the substantive difference between the doctrine of unlimited Knesset supremacy and the doctrine of constituent authority. According to the former doctrine, the Knesset may exercise its unlimited supremacy in order to limit its own legislative authority. In contrast, the doctrine of constituent authority recognizes the Knesset’s power to exercise its constituent authority in order to limit its power.

 

The doctrine of constituent authority does not address the question of whether the Knesset is empowered to exercise its legislative authority in order to limit its future use of this authority. Because this question does not arise in the appeal before us I would like to reserve it for further consideration. I will note only that recognizing that the Knesset may effect such a limitation by means of its constituent authority does not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that the Knesset may effect such a limitation by means of its legislative authority. As we have seen, the constitutional limitation prevents today’s majority from changing arrangements adopted in the past. This is justified by the nature of the constitution and the rationale upon which it is based. The constitution deals with the basic issues of governmental structure and human rights. It seeks to prevent their infringement by regular legislation. It treats of the constitutional institutions – the Knesset, government and courts – whose stability must be ensured. It treats of the basic values that society endeavors to secure. A society that seeks a constitution, seeks by means of the constitution to remove certain values from the reach of the “regular” majority (see J. Rawls, Theory of Justice (1983), at p. 228; B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991), at p. 272). In contrast, recognizing the power of regular legislation to limit itself prevents today’s majority from changing the day-to-day arrangements adopted in the past. Such recognition would require that we consider why one generation should be granted the power to dictate the day-to-day behavior of another generation. Indeed, recognizing the Knesset’s power as a legislative authority to limit its legislative power requires a supporting constitutional doctrine. Because this question has not arisen before us, I would like to reserve it for further consideration.

 

67. In this regard, I would also like to reserve for further consideration the question of whether there is a substantive difference between a limitation requiring a “majority of the Members of Knesset” (an “absolute majority”) and a limitation requiring a greater majority. This distinction stands at the base of my colleague Justice Cheshin’s approach. For myself, I harbor grave doubts that an “absolute majority” requirement is the simple result of a democratic arrangement. According to such a requirement, an abstaining MK is seen as voting no. This abrogates the right to abstain of the MK who is truly not prepared to vote yes or no. This is a most serious abrogation. I question whether it falls within the rubric of the democratic outlook. The MK’s “right” of non-participation is similarly denied, for every non-participation is construed as a vote against. The possibility of a ‘setoff’ between votes for and against is also denied, for the significance of every such setoff arrangement is that both are seen as votes against. All these raise most serious questions. On the surface, the “democratic majority” is a majority of the Members of Knesset actively voting. This is the case in the various parliaments around the world (see Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Methods of Voting,” 32 Constitutional and Parliamentary Information (1982) 179, 203). A change in the voting system requiring a majority of all Members of Knesset (and six Members) on its face calls for justification by a constitutional doctrine. It is not derived from the “voting rules” themselves (see United States v. Baellin [93], at pp. 507, 509). We need not decide this question in this appeal. Our issue is the entrenchment provision of a Basic Law, not the limitation clause of a regular law. I therefore wish to reserve this question for further consideration.

 

i) The Basic Law regarding human rights and regular legislation

 

68. Until this point, I have examined the status of the Basic Laws as such. I will now turn to the two Basic Laws on human rights. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were – as their names signify – were enacted by the Knesset under its constituent authority. They therefore occupy the highest normative level. They cannot be amended by regular legislation (either explicitly or implicitly). Can regular legislation infringe the provisions in those laws? The answer is that these two Basic Laws are not silent Basic Laws. They include entrenchment provisions. They provide for an express, detailed scheme as to the power of regular legislation to infringe the arrangement safeguarded by the Basic Laws. This scheme is constitutionally valid, and must be given effect. It is not subject to change or infringement except by Basic Law. This unique scheme is given expression in the two central provisions common to both Basic Laws, the application clause and the limitation clause. The scheme is also expressed in a third provision, the override clause, which appears only in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

69. The application clause of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation provides as follows:

 

All governmental authorities are bound to respect the freedom of occupation of all Israeli nationals and residents’ (s. 5).

 

The parallel provision in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides:

 

All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law’ (s. 11).

 

Similar provisions appear in other constitutions (see s. 1(3) of the German Basic Law and s. 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). The application clause applies to all government authorities. It applies to the legislative authority, the executive and the judiciary. It applies to the central and local authorities. It applies to every authority granted power by law. This is a central provision. It declares the direct legal effect of the Basic Laws upon the governmental authorities. It weaves the basic rights into the fabric of all governmental decisions. Above all, it obligates the legislature – one of the governmental authorities – to honor human rights. The “regular” laws are therefore subject to human rights. The regular legislature is not all-powerful. The legislative power given to the legislature is subordinate to its obligation to honor human rights. The application clause breaches the silence of the two Basic Laws as to human rights. It substantively entrenches the clauses of the Basic Law against infringement by regular legislation. It thereby expressly declares that regular legislation must honor human rights, and certainly may not infringe them, except as provided in the Basic Laws themselves. The application clause is not merely declarative. It is a substantive provision that constitutes an important axis upon which the constitutional structure depends. It is similarly expressed in other legal systems (such as Canada and Germany), in which comparable provisions are found.

 

70. The “limitation clause” of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation provides as follows:

 

There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law (s. 4).

 

A parallel provision appears in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, as follows:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required (s. 8).

 

These are the key provisions in both Basic Laws. The limitation clause – as its name indicates – limits both the legislature and human rights. This is a substantive entrenchment provision. Its purpose is twofold: the constitutional protection of human rights while providing the constitutional criteria that permit infringement of human rights. These criteria – set forth in a preeminent constitutional document – provide the means by which the legislature may legally infringe human rights. Expression is thereby given to the normative relationship between Basic Laws and regular legislation. Regular legislation cannot – explicitly or implicitly – infringe the human rights safeguarded by these Basic Laws unless it meets the requirements of the limiting clause. In his analysis of the limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Dr Maoz notes that this provision takes precedence over all legislation. He adds:

This preference derives not from the legislature’s intention not to infringe the limitation clause, but from the entrenchment – or limitation – in which the constituent authority garbed the limitation clause. In forbidding the legislature to enact a provision infringing the human rights safeguarded by the Basic Law, except in accordance with the conditions set out in the limitation clause, the constituent authority obviously nullified the legislature’s power to do so, be the legislature’s intent what it may (Maoz, ibid., at p. 149)

 

71. The third provision that provides constitutional arrangements as to the relationship between the two Basic Laws and regular legislation is the override clause, which is found only in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and provides as follows:

 

A provision of a law that violates freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it has been included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement, unless a shorter duration has been stated therein (s. 8).

 

This provision is unique. It expresses formal entrenchment. It was influenced by a similar provision in the Canadian Charter (s. 33) but includes several important changes. It permits the regular legislature – under certain conditions – to enact a (regular) law infringing the freedom of occupation even if the law does not fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause. The two conditions are as follows: first, the regular law must expressly provide that it has effect notwithstanding the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation; and second, the regular law must be enacted by a majority of the Members of Knesset. When these two conditions are met, constitutional validity will be granted to a law that infringes the Basic Law for a period of four years. At the end of that period the law expires. Thus another route is opened – parallel to that provided in the limitation clause – to permit the infringement of a basic right (freedom of occupation). In using its constituent authority, the Knesset thus expressed its view that regular legislation – which does not meet the requirements of the limitation or override clause – may not infringe the freedom of occupation. No similar provision appears in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In this respect, the human rights set forth in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are more strongly protected against the effects of regular legislation than the freedom of occupation.

 

j) Legislation that lawfully infringes a protected human right

 

72. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation therefore set out the legal status of regular legislation that infringes the human rights safeguarded in the Basic Laws. If a regular law fulfills the entrenchment requirements (formal and substantive) set out in the Basic Law, the regular law is constitutional. This expresses the central idea that human rights – set forth in the Basic Laws in absolute terms – are relative rights. Human dignity, freedom, property, movement, privacy and freedom of occupation are not absolute rights. They are subject to infringement in order to protect the social framework. It should be noted that the constitutionality of the infringement does not make the infringing law part of the constitution. The constitutionality of the infringement does not lower the constitutional status of human rights. The constitutionality of the infringement means that the constitutional human right is subject to infringement by regular legislation if such legislation meets the criteria set forth in the constitution. There is a substantive difference between amendment of the constitutional human right and its infringement. Amendment of the human right constitutes amendment of the constitution, and requires legislation at the same normative level, i.e. by means of a Basic Law. Infringement of a constitutional human right may be accomplished by means of regular legislation that meets the requirements of the constitution. There is no need for a constitutional edict, since the constitutional right itself does not change. Regular legislation is sufficient, as long as it fulfills the parameters set forth in the Basic Law itself.

 

73. The status of regular legislation that infringes a protected human right is therefore different according to each of the two Basic Laws. The right protected in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is subject to infringement by two alternative means. First, if the infringing legislation accords with the limitation clause; second, if it is enacted in accordance with the override clause. Regular legislation that does not meet either of these alternatives is unconstitutional and therefore void. Accordingly, regular legislation adopted by a regular majority that infringes freedom of occupation and does not fulfill the requirement of the limitation clause is unconstitutional, even if such a law expressly states that it infringes freedom of occupation. The rights safeguarded in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are subject to infringement only by means of the limitation clause. The Basic Law does not provide a second path in the form of an override clause. There is also no possibility of creating a judicial override clause, nor any need to. Therefore, regular legislation – by whatever majority it is enacted – that infringes a human right protected by this Basic Law, that expressly provides that it is adopted ‘notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law’ or that it is expressly intended to impinge upon its arrangements, will not be constitutional if it does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause. In the absence of an override clause, there is no means by which this express provision can save the regular law from unconstitutionality. On the contrary, an express provision such as this points up what is in fact the constitutional status of the law, facilitating the judicial determination that the law indeed violates a protected human right.

 

The result, therefore, is that the human rights safeguarded in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enjoy more comprehensive protection than that afforded freedom of occupation, insofar as the matter concerns infringement by regular legislation. The picture changes when the infringement (or amendment) is based upon a Basic Law. A special majority (‘a majority of the members of the Knesset’) is required in order to amend Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (s. 7). A regular majority is sufficient to amend the human rights safeguarded in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This is, without doubt, anomalous. This may be corrected by Basic Law: Legislation, which will make all of the Basic Laws, and the arrangements safeguarded therein, subject to identical requirements as to amendment or infringement.

 

III) Judicial review of constitutionality

a) Constitutional supremacy and judicial review

 

74. The constitution is the superior norm of the legal system. A regular law may be permitted to conflict with the clauses of the constitution only if it meets the criteria provided in the constitution itself. What is the fate of a law that does not meet these criteria? What is the remedy for an unconstitutional law? (For a discussion of these questions see A. Shapira and B. Bracha, “The Constitutional Status of the Rights of the Individual,” 5 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1972) 20, 42). The answer to these questions depends first and foremost upon the provisions of the constitution itself. Often the constitution establishes – and is empowered to establish – the legal sanctions imposed upon an unconstitutional law. Thus, for example, the “Supremacy Clause” of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s.(1)52) invalidates conflicting legislation that does not meet the requirements of the Constitution, as follows:

 

The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the clauses of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.

 

Similar provisions are found in many modem constitutions, particularly those of European countries after the First World War. Such provisions proliferated in the constitutions of European countries after the Second World War and the victory over the Nazis. One of the lessons of the Second World War was that constitutional supremacy and judicial review of constitutionality are potent weapons against the enemies of democracy (see E. McWhinney, Judicial Review (1960); M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1971); M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989); A. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1983)).

 

But what is the rule when the constitution is silent in this matter? The answer to this question depends upon the culture and tradition of the legal system. It is determined by the adjudication rule of the particular legal system (see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ibid., at p. 96). Thus, for example, it may be recognized – as was the tradition in nineteenth century Europe – that the constitution binds the institutions of the government. However, noncompliance with a constitutional directive does not lead to invalidation of the law, and the Court is not empowered to impose the sanction of voiding such legislation. According to this view, the obligation to ensure compliance with the constitution rests with the government institutions themselves, and if they violate this obligation, the sanctions are in the hands of the public on election day (see Akzin, II The Doctrine of Governments, ibid., at p. 9). But this is not the only view, nor is it the most widely held. Today this is the minority view. Indeed, a particular legal tradition and culture are likely to lead to the conclusion that constitutional silence in this matter should be interpreted as calling for the invalidation of conflicting legislation and to the concomitant conclusion that the determination of whether such a conflict exists rests not with the legislature but with the court. Under this view, constitutional silence requires judicial review and authorizes the court to declare unconstitutional legislation void. We will now examine this tradition.

 

b) The case of Marbury v. Madison

 

75. The American legal tradition – since the 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison [94] – is that a statute that conflicts with the clauses of the constitution is void, and any court is empowered so to declare. The United States Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite the absence of an express provision to that effect in the Constitution of the United States. Justice Marshall wrote:

 

The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

 

Indeed, the constitution is intended to limit the legislature. This limitation is meaningful only if a regular law cannot prevail over the constitution. There is no middle ground: either the constitution is supreme and may not be amended by regular means, or it has the same status as a regular law, which the legislature may change at its whim. Justice Marshall added:

 

If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? ... It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

 

Since that decision, it is beyond doubt in the United States that legislation conflicting with the Constitution is void, and it is the role of the court – in interpreting the Constitution and the law – to determine the existence of a conflict, as well as its consequences. Thus arises the doctrine of the judicial review of constitutionality. This doctrine is a cornerstone of the American constitutional system. Remove it and the entire structure collapses.

 

c) Judicial review of constitutionality – the modern experience

 

76. The American experience with judicial review of constitutionality has spread well beyond that country. That experience has influenced constitutional thinking throughout the entire world. It has dominated the various constitutional systems established since the Second World War. It has been accepted as the guideline in all of the Eastern Bloc states since the liberation from Soviet control (see Schwartz, “The New East European Constitutional Courts,” 13 Mich. J. Int. L. (1992) 741). This may be the central contribution of American constitutional thought to constitutional thinking throughout the world.

 

As we have seen, express provisions in this regard appear in the constitutions that have been adopted by many states after the Second World War (see, e.g., the constitutions of Germany, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Cyprus, India, and Turkey). Even in states whose constitutions do not include express provisions in this regard – and that are part of the common law legal culture – the view has become accepted that an unconstitutional law is invalid, and the court is empowered so to decree (see, e.g., Cowen, “Legislature and Judiciary,” 15 Mod. L. Rev. (1952) 282; 16 Mod. L. Rev. (1953) 273). An increasing number of states have recognized the judicial review of constitutionality. Justice Frankfurter justly noted that the conclusion reached by the American Supreme Court in the Marbury case [94]:

 

[H]as been deemed by great English speaking courts an indispensable, implied characteristic of a written Constitution’ (F. Frankfurter, “John Marshall and the Judicial Function,” 69 Harv. L. Rev. (1955) 217, 219).

 

Indeed, a long list of judicial decisions throughout the common-law world has recognized – in the absence of an express constitutional provision – judicial review of constitutionality (see, e.g., Harris v. Minister of Interior [111]; Clayton v. Heffron [82]; Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe [104]; Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [105]. See Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel (annotated second edition, 1974), at p. 281).

 

d) Judicial review of constitutionality in Israel

 

77. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty do not explicitly address the consequences of a law that infringes a constitutionally protected right and does not comply with the requirements of the Basic Laws. The proposed Basic Law: Legislation includes general provisions in this regard. That proposal, however, has not yet completed the legislative process in the Knesset. The two Basic Laws contain no ‘supremacy clause.’ What is the law in such a situation? It seems to me that our legal tradition requires us to conclude that the remedy for an unconstitutional law is its invalidation, and that the courts have been endowed with the authority to declare it invalid. Just as a regulation that conflicts with statute is void and may be declared as such by the court, so too should be the case when a regular law conflicts with a Basic Law; the law is void and the court is empowered to declare it so.

 

Important judicial developments have led to the recognition of this conclusion in Israel. The question arose first in the case of Bergman v. Minister of Finance [15]. The court noted that it would leave for future consideration the determination of whether or not the relationship between an entrenched Basic Law and a conflicting regular law that did not meet the entrenchment requirements was a justiciable question. Over the years a number of decisions were handed down, the majority of which effectively voided regular laws that did not meet the entrenchment provisions of a Basic Law. As time passed, this tradition became established (see Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [19]; Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [20]). In the Rubinstein case [20], Justice S. Levin noted:

As the number of instances increases in which the court is asked to decide issues of constitutional significance of this nature, so does the likelihood decrease that the court will stay its hand from deciding them, particularly when the Attorney-General will in the future raise similar questions (p. 148).

 

As I noted in a previous case:

In seeking to amend an “entrenched” provision without having been adopted by the necessary majority of Members of Knesset, a law of the Knesset – whether a “regular” law or a Basic Law – contradicts the entrenchment provisions of the Basic Law. In view of its legal force the “entrenchment” provision will prevail. In a clash between the entrenchment provision and the clause that purports to amend it without meeting the necessary majority requirements, we do not apply the usual principles, according to which a later-enacted statute invalidates an earlier statute. In this conflict we apply the principle that grants normative supremacy to the entrenched Basic Law. We find that legislation that seeks to change an entrenched Basic Law without meeting the necessary majority is null and void. The court is empowered to declare such nullity. Indeed, the very inclusion of an entrenchment provision calls for the court, as an independent institution, to review the legal validity of legislation that purports to amend an entrenchment provision without meeting the special majority requirement… The existence of an entrenchment provision implies that there will be judicial review, and that the court is therefore empowered to determine that a statutory provision – whether set forth in a “regular” or a Basic Law – when enacted by a “regular” majority and not that set forth in the entrenchment provision, is null and void. The court has decided according to this view in the past’ (Laor Movement case [21], at pp. 539-540).

 

This approach accords with our tradition. It is consistent with our general legal culture. It is accepted in the Israeli community (see Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 461; see also Burt, ‘Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America,’ 10 Cardozo L. Rev. (1989) 2013). It is required by the application clause included in both Basic Laws. Indeed, if the Knesset is ‘required to respect the rights under this Basic Law’ (as stated in s. 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), then this is not merely a ‘political’ obligation of the Knesset but also a ‘legal’ obligation. If this is so, then it is necessary that some body other than the Knesset – i.e. the Court – determine whether in fact the rights set forth in the Basic Law have been honored.

 

e) The rationale for judicial review of constitutionality

(i) Judicial review and the rule of law

 

78. The doctrine of judicial review of constitutionality is based upon the ‘rule of law,’ or, more correctly, the rule of the constitution or the law (see L. Sheleff, “The Two Meanings of ‘The Rule of Law’,” 16 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1991) 559). The central role of the court in a democratic society is ‘to protect the rule of law. This means, inter alia, that it must enforce the law in the institutions of the government, and it must ensure that the government acts according to the law’ (Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee [14], at p. 462). When a given legal system includes a constitution, the “rule of law” requires that the sovereignty of the constitution be protected. Thus the Knesset, in using its constituent authority, endowed the State with Basic Laws. In the normative hierarchy, the Basic Laws are paramount. In order to fulfill the Knesset’s directives, regular legislation that conflicts with a Basic Law must be invalidated, in the same way that a regulation that conflicts with law is invalidated. In presenting the proposed Basic Law: Legislation for a first reading, the Justice Minister, Mr Zadok, maintained as follows:

I agree that the Knesset must be given broad latitude and room to maneuver in its legislative work, but this sovereignty should not be interpreted to permit arbitrariness as to basic principles. It seems to me that the doctrine of the rule of law, which we all espouse, means that everyone is subject to the law: the Government, governmental agencies, the President, the State Comptroller, and the Knesset as well. Just as the other state institutions operate within a limited framework of authority, such a framework, albeit broader, must be established for the Knesset’s legislation (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 76, at p. 1705).

 

Thus, in declaring invalid a law that does not meet the requirements of the Basic Law, the court fulfills the Basic Law. The constitution and the Basic Law themselves legitimize the judicial review of constitutionality. As MK Menahem Begin described it during the debate on the constitution in the First Knesset:

One of the two: either it will be a constitution that is superior to all other law, or it will be a worthless piece of paper (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4, at p. 737).

 

Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of the law is the soul of the constitution itself. Strip the constitution of judicial review and you have removed its very life. The primacy of the constitution therefore requires judicial review. As Professor Kelsen has noted:

The application of the constitutional rules concerning legislation can be effectively guaranteed only if an organ other than the legislative body is entrusted with the task of testing whether a law is constitutional...(H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Wedberg, trans. (1961), at p. 157).

 

(ii) Judicial review and the separation of powers

 

79. Judicial review of the constitutionality of the law derives from the principle of separation of powers. The legislature’s authority is to enact laws. In order to do so it is authorized to interpret the constitution itself. When the resolution of a dispute between litigants requires interpretation of the constitution, such interpretation is in the hands of the Court. The Court’s interpretation is binding. Within the framework of the separation of powers, interpretation of the constitution is the responsibility of the Court (see Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset House Committee [2], at p. 141). As I noted in a different case:

 

In a democratic system, based upon the separation of powers, the authority to interpret all legislation – from Basic Laws to regulations and regulatory orders – is the province of the Court ... Any other approach violates the essence of judicial power and utterly distorts the principle of the separation of powers and the checks and balances between them’ (See Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [49], at p. 152).

 

Thus, judicial review of constitutionality both derives from and gives expression to the principle of separation of powers. As Chief Justice Burger noted:

 

In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution .... Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison ... That [it] is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is ... Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government (see United States v. Nixon [95], at pp. 703-704).
 

The Court’s constitutionally mandated role of interpreting the constitution leads to the adjudication of disputes according to the constitution. Adjudication according to the constitution, rather than according to the law, can incidentally lead to the invalidation of a law. This invalidation is not a violation of the separation of powers, but rather its realization. Indeed ‘separation of powers does not mean the absolutism of each power in its own area. Such absolutism violates freedom, the realization of which is the very basis for the separation of powers’ (HCJ 5364/94 Welner v. Chairman of Israeli Labour Party [50], at p. 790). The creation of the constitution in accordance with constituent authority requires a concurrent grant of interpretive authority to the judicial branch. To judge means to interpret. Constitutional interpretation must naturally and inevitably result in the determination that a law in conflict with the constitution is invalid. This is the role of the judicial branch in a tripartite system.

 

(iii) Judicial review and democracy

 

80. But is judicial review democratic? Is it democratic that the court –whose judges do not stand for election by the people and do not present a social and political platform – be empowered to invalidate a law enacted by elected officials? (For a discussion of this question in the American literature, see Lahav, “The American Doctrine of Judicial Review: Themes and Variations,” 10 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1984) 491; Horowitz, “American Legal Thought After World War II – 1945-1960,” 16 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1991) 445, 452). The formal answer is simple. The court, in its judicial review of the constitutionality of law, gives effect to the constitution and the Basic Law. Hamilton addressed this point over two hundred years ago (in The Federalist No. 78) in discussing the judicial review of constitutionality in relation to the constitution itself:

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental (Hamilton and Madison et al., The Federalist Papers (1788; Mentor ed. 1961) 467-468).

 

In a similar spirit, Rawls stated the following:

 

A supreme court fits into this idea of dualist constitutional democracy as one of the institutional devices to protect the higher law. By applying public reason the court is to prevent that law from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities, or more likely, by organized and well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their way. If the court assumes this role and effectively carries it out, it is incorrect to say that it is straight-forwardly antidemocratic. It is indeed anti-majoritarian with respect to ordinary law, for a court with judicial review can hold such law unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the higher authority of the people supports that. The court is not anti-majoritarian with respect to higher law when its decisions reasonably accord with the constitution itself and with its amendments and politically mandated interpretations (J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (1993), supra, at p. 233).

 

However, a formal answer alone is not sufficient. There is a substantive answer as well. The substantive answer is that the judicial review of constitutionality is the very essence of democracy, for democracy does not only connote the rule of the majority. Democracy also means the rule of basic values and human rights as expressed in the constitution. Democracy strikes a delicate balance between majority rule and the basic values of society. Indeed democracy does not mean formal democracy alone, which is concerned with the electoral process in which the majority rules. Democracy also means substantive democracy, which is concerned with the defense of human rights in particular (see Y. Shapira, Democracy in Israel (1977), at p. 35). Professor A. Rubinstein has addressed this matter, noting:

 

The true meaning of democracy includes not only the principle of the will of the majority but also the limitation of the will of the majority. The constant tension between these two poles – the power of the majority and its limitations – is the axis of the democratic process. It may prefer a minority or the individual, as such, to the majority in granting certain rights.(A. Rubinstein, “Israeli Law in the Seventies,” 2 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1972) 271, 274).

 

In a similar vein, Professor Dworkin has noted:

 

True democracy is not just statistical democracy, in which anything a majority or plurality wants is legitimate for that reason, but communal democracy, in which majority decision is legitimate only if it is a majority within a community of equals. That means not only that everyone must be allowed to participate in politics as an equal, through the vote and through freedom of speech and protest, but that political decisions must treat everyone with equal concern and respect, that each individual person must be guaranteed fundamental civil and political rights no combination of other citizens can take away, no matter how numerous they are or how much they despise his or her race or morals or way of life (R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain, supra, at p. 35).

 

In fact when the majority strips the minority of its human rights, democracy is infringed (see J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of Judicial Review, (Cambridge 1980)). Judicial review of constitutionality therefore prevails over what is known as the ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma.’ One way to accomplish this is by emphasizing that when judges interpret the constitution and invalidate contradictory laws they give expression to the fundamental values of society that have developed over time. Thus the court safeguards constitutional democracy and maintains the delicate balance upon which it is based. Remove majority rule from constitutional democracy and its essence is harmed. Remove the sovereignty of fundamental values from constitutional democracy and its very existence is called into question. Judicial review of constitutionality enables a society to be true to itself and to honor its basic conceptions. This is the basis for the substantive legitimacy of judicial review. This is also the true basis for the principle of constitutionality itself. We are bound by the constitution that was enacted in the past because it expresses the fundamental outlook of modem society. It may therefore be said that each generation enacts the constitution anew. By means of judicial review we are loyal to the fundamental values that we took upon ourselves in the past, that reflect our essence in the present, and that will direct our national development as a society in the future.

 

It is therefore no wonder that judicial review has become more common. The majority of enlightened democratic states have judicial review. It is difficult to imagine the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, Spain, Italy, and many other nations without judicial review of constitutionality. The twentieth century is the century of judicial review. It imparts real meaning to the principle of constitutionality, to constitutional democracy and to the proper balance between majority rule and human rights, between the collective and the individual. It may be said that whoever argues that judicial review is undemocratic is in effect arguing that the constitution itself is undemocratic. To maintain that judicial review is undemocratic is to maintain that safeguarding human rights is undemocratic. To maintain that judicial review is undemocratic is to maintain that defending the rights of the individual against the majority is undemocratic. The democratic nature of the state is not determined by the representative nature of each of its branches but rather by the democratic nature of the government as a whole. In examining the democratic aspect of judicial review, it must be noted that every constitution provides for methods by which it may be amended. As long as these methods are not rigid they allow today’s majority to realize its aspirations. The methods by which a constitution may be amended reflect the balance that the society wishes to maintain between past and present, between long-term values and short-term aspirations, between value and policy. These methods are set forth in the constitution itself and are shaped by political forces. To the extent that these methods are not unduly rigid, they allow today’s majority to express its perceptions and thereby blunt the argument that bases itself on the formal conception of democracy.

 

This argument is further weakened – in effect to its very core – in those legal systems (such as Canada and to a limited extent Israel) that include an override clause. Indeed the override clause (s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) provides a constitutional means by which today’s political majority may lawfully infringe the constitution. This is not a constitutional amendment, for legislation that infringes the constitution does not change the latter’s provisions. Nevertheless, a constitutional apparatus is created that allows today’s majority to realize its aspirations in a constitutional manner even as it affects values and rights that the constitution wishes to protect (see L.E. Weinrib, “Learning to Live with the Override,” 35 McGill L. J. (1990) 541). Through the override clause, the legal system may prevail over the democratic argument which enables formal democracy to prevail in certain conditions over substantive democracy. Excessive use of this method will, of course, ultimately result in the frustration of the constitutional enterprise itself.

 

(iv) Judicial review and judicial objectivity

 

81. Judicial review expresses the values of the constitution. By means of judicial review the judge makes manifest the ideals of the society in which he lives. He expresses the fundamental conceptions of society as it moves through the shifting sands of history. The judge in particular, who does not face election and who benefits from judicial independence, is worthy of this task. It is precisely because the judge is not elected by the people and does not present them with a social and political platform that  qualifies him express society’s profoundest perceptions without being influenced by the needs of the moment. For this purpose he must operate with judicial objectivity. He must express the outlook of society even if it is not his personal outlook. As I have noted in a previous decision:

 

The judge must reflect the long-term beliefs of society. He must avoid imposing on society his private creed .... This requirement for objectivity places a heavy burden upon the judge. He must be able to distinguish between his personal view of the ideal and the present day reality of society. He must establish a clear division between his personal beliefs and his judicial perceptions. He must recognize that his personal beliefs may not be those of society at large. He must distinguish clearly between his personal credo and that of the nation. He must be self-critical and restrained in his views. He must respect the shackles that bind him as a judge (Efrat v. Director of Population Register, Ministry of Interior [51], at pp. 781-782).

 

Declaring a law unconstitutional is a serious matter. Such a declaration would seem to undermine the will of today’s majority. It may be justified by the supremacy of the constitution and its values. The justification applies when the judiciary gives expression to the values of society as they are understood by the culture and tradition of the people as it moves forward through history. This justification does not, however, operate when the judge expresses his subjective beliefs. Indeed, judicial objectivity is part and parcel of the basis of judicial review of constitutionality. In granting weight to different considerations, the judge aspires to the best of his ability to achieve judicial objectivity. He reflects neither his personal values nor his personal considerations. The judge reflects ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [52]). Indeed, this extremely difficult task can be achieved only by the professional judge, who has absorbed through years of experience the need to guarantee judicial objectivity, and enjoys total independence. As I noted in a previous case:

 

A professional judge is qualified to shoulder this burden. His education, his experience, and the judicial culture of his time internalize the values of independence and the ability to distinguish between personal views and the requirements of his position. None more than the professional judge is mindful of the limitations placed on him in a democratic society. “Do you imagine that I offer you rulership? It is servitude that I have offered you”‘ (Talmud Horayoth 10a-b (Efrat, supra, at p. 782)).

 

This charge may be undertaken only by a judge, whose outlook is that ‘judging is not a task but a way of life’ (HCJ 732/84 Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [53], at p. 148). It may be undertaken only by a judge, whose entire education brings him to abstract thought, which is based upon reason and not power, the weight of the claim and not the identity of the claimant. Only a judge, who daily experiences the tension between abstract principle and its operation in the mundane life of the litigant before him, may accomplish this difficult task. All of these require an independent judiciary, which develops from the people and reflects the basic social consensus, but does not stand for election every few years, as do Members of Knesset (see M. Perry, Morality, Politics and Law, (1988), at p. 147). In a similar vein, Professor Bickel has stated:

 

When the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high enough [legislators] will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view ... Not merely respect for the rule of established principles but the creative establishment and renewal of a coherent body of principled rules – that is what our legislators have proven themselves ill equipped to give us. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society ... [The court can] appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry (A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, (1962), at pp. 24-26).

 

Indeed the judge neither wields a sword not controls the purse strings. All he has is his independence. His daily bread is none other than the basic values, which he balances objectively. He does not seek power, nor does he crave to rule. He does not seek to impose his personal views on society. He wishes only to do justice in the case before him and to adjudicate each case justly.

 

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the High Court of Justice has stood – and with it the entire community of Israel – as the bastion of Israeli democracy. The words of Justice Berinson are well known: ‘the court is the most secure and objective refuge that the citizen has in his dispute with the establishment’ (HCJ 287/69 Miron v. Minister of Labour [54], at p. 362). This role was enhanced with the enactment of the Basic Laws regarding human rights. Additional bulwarks have been erected to protect these human rights. The court has been entrusted with the constitutional task of guarding the basic tenets and fundamental values of Israeli society as they are expressed in the Basic Laws (see Wellington, “Standards: Some Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Notes on Adjudication,” 83 Yale L. J. (1973-74) 221). It must balance between the basic values of Israeli society (as they are expressed in the Basic Laws) and the short-term needs of day-to-day life (as they are expressed in regular legislation). It is entrusted with the task of ‘exposing the basic values while rejecting the temporary and transient’ (Efrat, supra, at p. 780).

 

f) Judicial review of constitutionality – Summary

 

82. Neither Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation nor Basic Law: Human Dignity includes an express provision – in the guise of a supremacy clause – addressing the fate of a law that infringes a protected human right without fulfilling the requirements of the Basic Law. This silence – against the background of the recognition, limitation and override clauses – calls into play the basic principles of Israeli law as to the relationship between superior and subordinate norms. These principles include the tenet that the superior norm reigns (lex superior derogat inferior). The court is competent to declare the contradicting norm void. In this manner the court gives expression to the ideals of democracy and the separation of powers. Indeed if the constitution itself is democratic, then judicial review is democratic.

 

On this basis we can now proceed to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which serves as a superior norm, in light of which we will examine the provisions of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993.

 

C. The Basic Law and the constitutional test derived therefrom

I)  Stages of the constitutional analysis

 

83. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty defines human rights and sets out the limitations imposed upon them. The rights are defined in absolute terms (‘There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person’; ‘There shall be no violation of the property of a person’; ‘There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person’). The limitations imposed do not attach to the rights themselves, but rather are derived from the limitation clause. When a judge encounters a claim that legislation contravenes the directives of the Basic Law, he must conduct a three-phase examination: first, he must determine whether the law indeed infringes a protected human right. In order to do so, the judge must interpret the basic right on the one hand (constitutional interpretation), and the legislation on the other hand (statutory interpretation). The level of proof required is that required in a civil trial, i.e. a preponderance of the evidence or the balance of probability. If the judge concludes that the regular law indeed infringes the basic right, he must move on to the second stage of the examination. He must determine whether infringement of the basic right is lawful, i.e. whether the statute meets the requirements of the limitation clause. Here as well, the level of proof required is that required in a civil trial, i.e. a preponderance of the evidence or  the balance of probability (see R. v. Oakes [114], at p. 137). In order to meet this burden it is sometimes necessary to present a factual basis supporting constitutionality of the law. In some cases, common sense and life experience are sufficient in order to persuade the Court that the infringing law meets the requirements of the limitation clause. If the judge concludes that the infringing law does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause, he must then proceed to the third stage of the examination. In this phase the court examines the constitutional remedy. It goes without saying that human rights not safeguarded by Basic Law enjoy the same status accorded them before enactment of the Basic Laws. That certain human rights are anchored in a Basic Law does not detract from the force of the other human rights.

 

II) Burden of proof

 

84. Who bears the burden of proof in the three phases of the constitutional examination? There is no dispute that in the first phase – on which infringement of the constitutional human right is based – the burden of proof is borne by the party claiming injury to a constitutional right. A law is presumed to be constitutional (see HCJ 98/69 Bergman v Minister of Finance, supra, at p. 699), and the party who seeks to rebut this presumption bears the burden of proof. The question arises as to the second phase, which examines the constitutionality of the injury to the constitutional human right. It is commonly accepted that in this phase the burden of proof rests upon the party claiming that the injury was constitutional. This is the rule in Canada (see Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed., 1992)) and New Zealand (see P. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993) at p. 861). The first decision of the constitutional court of South Africa adopted this view as to the infringement of human rights safeguarded in the new constitution of South Africa (see S. v. Mekwanyana [112]). This approach was adopted in the opinion of Justice D. Levin in the Clal case (HCJ 726/94, Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [37], supra). On its face, this approach seems to me to be correct. It shifts the burden to the party that should and can bear it – the government. At the same time, this question does not arise in this appeal, and I am therefore prepared to reserve it for further consideration.

 

III) Constitutional examination and the old rule

 

85. The three phases of constitutional examination apply only to legislation enacted after the adoption of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The old law is protected under the validity of laws clause, according to which:

This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law (s. 10).

 

Although the effect of the old law has been preserved, it must be interpreted in the spirit of the provisions of the Basic Law (cf. Section 10 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation; see also CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [38], supra). The validity of laws clause does not preclude the violation of any constitutional right. Neither does it provide that infringement of the Basic Law fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause. The clause does provide a constitutional umbrella for legislation that infringes the Basic Law without fulfilling the requirements of the limitation clause. This clause raises difficult questions. One of them is whether the clause applies to a new law (enacted after the Basic Law came into force) that amends an old law (in effect when the Basic Law came into force). This issue has been discussed extensively by my colleague President Shamgar and I agree with his analysis.

 

II) The first phase: the scope of the right and its infringement

a) The scope of the right

 

86. The scope of a right is determined by its interpretation. This is constitutional interpretation. It is sensitive to the unique character of the document under examination: indeed ‘it is a Constitution we are expounding’ (see McCulloch v. Maryland [96], at p. 407). ‘The interpretation of a regular provision is not the same as the interpretation of a basic constitutional provision’ (EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [8], at p. 306). The constitution is interpreted in accordance with the constitutional purpose. The constitutional interpretation must be made ‘from a “broad perspective”‘ (President Agranat in FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [25], at p. 442). The constitutional purpose may be discerned from language, history, culture and basic principles. A constitutional provision is not enacted in a vacuum and it does not develop in a constitutional incubator. It constitutes part of life itself. Justice Dickson noted as follows:

 

The purpose of the right of freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and, where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be ... a generous, rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for the individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection. At the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must therefore ... be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd [115], at p. 344).

 

Interpretation from a broad perspective is flexible rather than technical; it is substantive and to the point, rather than legalistic or pedantic (see Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth [83], at p. 81; Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [106], at p. 329). In the following case I discussed interpretation of a human right when it is given constitutional protection in a Basic Law:

 

Now that is has been given a constitutionally enacted basis, it must be interpreted from a “broad perspective” ... “and with the understanding that we are dealing with a directive that dictates a way of life ... we are dealing with human experience, which must suit itself to a changing reality... Therefore the constitutional directive must be interpreted “from a broad perspective” and not in a technical manner ... Hence arises the approach – accepted in enlightened democratic states – that constitutional directives must be interpreted “generously” ... from a “substantive” rather than a “legalistic” approach ... through an approach that treats of the specific issue rather than by a “technical” or “pedantic” approach… (HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [55], at p. 470).

 

In a similar spirit, Justice Strasberg-Cohen noted as follows:

 

The interpretation of a constitutional text must be undertaken from a “broad perspective” and “generously.” The approach should not be technical, “legalistic” or “pedantic”‘ (HCJ 1255/94 “Bezeq” – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications  [45], supra).

 

Indeed, constitutional interpretation must be based upon constitutional unity, and not upon constitutional disharmony. It reflects the role of the constitutional text in the structure of government and society. It endows it with the meaning that enables it to fulfill its role in the present and future in the most suitable manner (see HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [9], at p. 595).

 

b) The right to property

 

87. It is in light of this view of interpretation that we must approach the analysis of the constitutional right to property. This right is set forth in s. 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides ‘[t]here shall be no violation of the property of a person.’

 

The right to property is thereby given constitutional status. This is an important right. ‘The right to property is the cornerstone of the liberal system. It occupies a central place in liberal ideology, as security for the existence of other rights’ (Lahav, “The Power and the Dominion: The Supreme Court in the First Decade of its Existence,” 14 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1989) 479, 498).

 

Nonetheless, the right to property – like the other rights set forth in the Basic Law – is not absolute. It may be infringed, so long as the infringing law fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause. Indeed, property has a “role” in both the private and public spheres. The Basic Law does not define ‘property.’ It is incumbent upon the Court to interpret this right according to its purpose (see Weisman, “Constitutional Protection for Property,” (1995), 42 HaPraklit 8). The word “property” has different meanings, depending upon the context in which it appears. It seems that in the constitutional realm, the basis of the right is the protection of possessions. Property is every interest that has a financial value. Thus property refers not only to “property rights” (in the sense accorded to them under private law – for example, ownership, leasing and easements) but also obligations and rights with property values acquired by public law. ‘The property referred to in the Basic Law is interpreted to include rights that are not property rights in the classic sense’ (Justice M. Cheshin in HCJ 7112/93 Tzudler v. Yosef [30]). Indeed, the right to property guarantees the individual financial freedom. It enables interpersonal cooperation. It enables a person to exercise the autonomy of his personal will. Hence the connection between the protection of property and the protection of human dignity (see J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (1993), at p. 298). It follows that, in general, expropriation infringes property rights. Just compensation does not remove the infringement but it is likely to be constitutional if it fulfills the conditions of the limitation clause. And I note: the constitutional prohibition applies to the infringement of property. Every infringement violates the prohibition, and shifts the constitutional review to the limitation clause. At the same time, when the infringement of property is incidental or minor – if it can be classified as de minimis – then it will not be regarded as an infringement and there is no need to embark upon the constitutional review of the second phase (cf. Jones v. The Queen [116]). Theoretically it can be said that the right to property is infringed when the property value of an interest is less than its value before the legislation. At the same time, the regular day-to-day activities of the government may influence the value of an individual’s property. Should such activities be viewed as an infringement of property rights, calling for constitutional review under the limitation clause, or should their categorization as an infringement be precluded? We will deal with these questions in the future. I would therefore like to leave for further consideration the “siting” of the discussion that my colleague President Shamgar conducts regarding the enactment of the tax, and whether it ought to be included in the definition of the term “infringement.”

 

88. Determining the scope of the freedom of property is an important task imposed upon the judicial authority. In fulfilling this task it is, of course, appropriate to turn to comparative law. In this matter, a threefold “warning notice” is required. First, the constitutional structures of the various countries differ from one another. The structure of a constitution influences its interpretation. Thus, for example, the constitution of the United States does not protect property in the same way as does our Basic Law. The constitutional structure of the right to property in the American constitution arises from the prohibition against taking without just compensation, and applies to various arrangements that are not related to taking. Similarly the American system lacks an express limitation clause. This makes development of full protection of property difficult in the United States and complicates the constitutional law (B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution, (1977), at pp. 3, 113, 189; Sax, “Takings and the Police Power,” 74 Yale L.J. (1964) 36). Second, the scope of the constitutional right is derived from society’s understanding of its importance. Thus, for example, in the United States – for a variety of historical reasons – constitutional protection of property has been given a relatively low status. Justice Frankfurter discussed this as follows:

 

Those Liberties of the individual which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements’ (Kovacs v. Cooper [97], at p. 95).

 

In contrast, the German system endows this right with primary status. It is viewed as a central right (see D.P. Currie, The Constitution of the Republic of Germany, (1944), at p. 290). In France, the constitutional right to property is safeguarded in the Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (s. 17). French constitutional rhetoric endows this right with great social value. In practice, however, significant infringements are permitted (see J. Bell, French Constitutional Law, (1992), at p. 176). Third, the status of the right, and the balance between the right and the general good is determined, inter alia, by society’s attitude toward the national interest and by the status of the State and the government. The American approach in this regard is unlike the French approach. And both the American and the French approaches differ from that of Israeli society. We see in the State the fulfillment of the dream of generations. Our attitude towards the State is not negative. We do not fear the State. Yet we must ensure that the State does not harm the individual. The balance between individual and community therefore reflects the unique outlook of Israeli society. Great caution is therefore required in considering comparative law in this particular area. However, comparative law is of great importance. It reveals the possibilities concealed in the text. It sheds light upon the arrangements accepted in constitutional democracies. It gives the judge confidence that his interpretation is accepted and functions well in other places. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to transform the servant into a master. We must not enslave ourselves to comparative law. Its strength is in its ability to inspire, and this power is limited. Indeed, we must bear in mind the social and cultural differences between the various communities. We must consider the unique history of the legal system and the different emphases given to particular issues. The words of Justice Holmes in this regard are apt: ‘A page of history is worth a volume of logic’ (New York Trust Co. v. Fisher [98], at p. 349). This is especially so when discussing protection of property, an issue that in most legal systems is immersed in history and social change. Thus, the uniqueness of the right of property in the Israeli constitutional fabric must be determined according to its place in the system of human rights in Israel.

 

 

III) The second phase: the limitation clause

a) The importance of the clause and the relativity of the human right

 

89. The limitation clause (s. 8) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is a key ingredient in the protection of human rights. It delineates the limits of the right and the limitations upon the legislature. The role of the limitation is twofold. It protects human rights and licenses their infringement, at one and the same time. It expresses the notion of the relativity of human rights. It reflects the basic outlook that human rights exist in a social context that maintains them. It mirrors the underlying view that human rights do not view the individual as an island, but as part of a society with national goals. It is the product of the recognition that while basic human rights must be realized, the national framework must be protected as well. It is intended to permit infringement of human rights in order to maintain the social framework that itself protects human rights. Indeed, the constitutional right and its lawful infringement emanate from the same source (R. v. Oakes [114], at p. 135). Both the constitutional right and its limitation are subject to the same basic principle underlying Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (s. 1) and its purposes (ss. 1A and 2). The limitation clause provides the foundation for the constitutional balance between private and public, individual and community. It reflects the viewpoint that alongside human rights there are human obligations; that the normative world is not only one of rights but also of obligations; that alongside each right of a human being stands his duty to the community.

 

b) The elements of the limitation clause

 

90. The limitation clause provides four cumulative tests that determine the constitutionality of a law that violates a constitutional human right. The four tests are as follows:

(a) the infringement is made by law or in accordance with law and by means of an express authorization;

(b) the infringing law must be consistent with the values of the State of Israel;

(c) the infringing law must be intended for a proper purpose;

(d) the law may infringe the human right to an extent no greater than is required.

 

In the future, the Supreme Court will be required to define each of these tests. Thus, for example, the requirement that the violation be by law or according to law reflects the principle of legality (see Garibaldi, “General Limitations on Human Rights: The Principle of Legality,” 17 Harv. Int. L. J. (1976) 503. This principle is not merely formal in nature (see Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [107], at pp. 245, 270). The second test refers to the values of Israel as a Jewish state (in the context of both Jewish tradition and Zionism) and as a democratic state. Indeed, we are different from other nations. We are not only a democratic state but also a Jewish state. The Basic Law comes to ‘establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1A) (see Elon, “The Way of Law in the Constitution: The Values of the Jewish and Democratic State in Light of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,” 17 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1993) 659). One of the important innovations of the Basic Law is its provision that ‘[t]he purpose of the Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1). Those values were thereby given constitutional supra-legislative status. The meaning of the values of the State as a Jewish and democratic state, and a solution to the clash between those values, will certainly occupy us greatly in the future.

 

‘A proper purpose’

 

91. The third element of the limitation clause requires that the purpose be fitting. This element, too, raises significant difficulties, which we may reserve for future consideration. In essence, a purpose is fitting if it serves an important social objective regarding human rights. Thus, legislation intended to protect human rights is certainly intended for a proper purpose. Legislation intended to serve general social goals, such as welfare policies or protection of the public interest is fitting as well. In American constitutional law, distinctions are drawn among the various human rights in determining whether a purpose is worthy. The courts there have created different levels of constitutional scrutiny. Thus, for example, when the injury is to freedom of movement, freedom of expression or racial equality, the highest level of scrutiny applies. In such cases, a purpose will be deemed fitting if it is intended to fulfill a compelling state interest or a pressing public necessity or a substantial state interest. When the harm is gender or age-based discrimination, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies. In such cases the purpose will be deemed fitting if it serves an important governmental objective. The third and lowest level of scrutiny applies when the injury is to economic rights. Here the true test is whether the objective is reasonable.

 

In contrast to the three levels of American law, Canada has developed a unified test. The purpose of the law is fitting if it is directed towards social needs of fundamental importance. It is premature to determine what the Israeli rule will be as to the limitation clause and whether our test should comprise a single level (as in Canada) or multiple levels (as in the United States). It seems to me that for the purposes of the matter before us it is sufficient to determine that the purpose is fitting if it is intended to fulfill important social goals for the establishment of a social framework that recognizes the constitutional importance of human rights and the need to protect them. The normative scope of this importance will be determined with time, in the decisions of the Supreme Court.

 

92. In analyzing the nature of the “proper purpose” my colleague President Shamgar notes that this purpose includes that which was apparent to the legislature (‘the Court examines the purpose that guided the legislature’) as well as that determined by the Court at the time of its opinion (‘it may also become apparent at the time of examination of the final draft of the law and its ramifications’). My colleague notes furthermore that as to determining the purpose that was apparent to the legislature ‘there is a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith, and in any event we must not search for the concealed motives of individuals making up the legislative branch, in contrast to the purpose considered by the legislature as a collective legislative organ’.’ Finally, my colleague notes that the purpose of the law is weighed ‘against the violation and its significance.’ This position raises a significant number of problems, which, in my opinion, may and should be reserved for further consideration. My colleague suggests that two ‘purposes’ be examined – that which was apparent to the legislature and that which is revealed to the Court. There are different positions as to this approach in the comparative literature. There are those who believe that, in determining the constitutionality of a law – as in determining the constitutionality of a regulation (when it is claimed that the regulation was adopted out of improper motives) – we must consider only the historic purpose that was before the legislature. Others believe that we must consider both the historic and the modem purposes. Furthermore, if we consider the subjective purpose, we are faced with the problem of examining the legislature’s motive. My colleague the President states that ‘we must not search for the concealed motives of individuals making up the legislative branch, in contrast to the purpose considered by the legislature as a collective legislative organ.’ We must, of course, agree with this. Should we, however, consider the expressed motives of the Members of Knesset? There are differences of opinion as to this issue in the comparative constitutional literature. How can it be proven that legislation was impelled by improper motives (such as discriminatory motives) if we do not permit examination of the motives? Of course, more difficult questions arise as to the means of proof. Finally, my colleague emphasizes the purpose and adds, obiter dictum, that the purpose is balanced ‘against the violation and its significance.’ Here as well, serious problems arise. Some believe that only the purpose is significant and the harm itself should not be considered. An invalid motive invalidates the legislation even if the result is positive. Others believe that the determinant is the effect of the legislation and not its purpose (With regard to all these issues, see Ely, “Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,” 79 Yale L.J. (1970) 1205; Brest, “Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,” Sup. Ct. Rev. (1971) 95; Alexander, “Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality,” 15 San Diego L. Rev. (1978) 925). As noted, these questions are difficult – some of the most difficult in constitutional law. We have no experience in dealing with them and I therefore suggest that they be reserved for further consideration.

 

‘To an extent no greater than is required’

 

93. The final element of the limitation clause is that the injury to the human right must be to an extent no greater than is required. If the previous factor examines the motives of the infringing legislation, this factor examines the means chosen by the legislature. This is a proportionality test. This test examines whether the means chosen by the legislature are appropriate for achieving its objectives (the proper purpose). In the past we have made use of the doctrine of proportionality in the field of administrative law (see HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [56], at p. 217; HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [57]; HCJ 3477 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture & Sport [58]; HCJ 1255/94 “Bezeq” – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications [45], supra; see also Segal, “The Claim of Lack of Relativity in Administrative Law,” 39 HaPraklit (1991) 507). It has now been given constitutional status. The constitutionality of a statute will now be examined in light of the doctrine. In comparative law too, this test began its development as a test used in administrative law. It is most accepted in European administrative law (see J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (1992), at p. 677). The doctrine developed particularly in German administrative law (see Zamir, “Israeli Administrative Law in Comparison to German Administrative Law,” 2 Mishpat uMimshal (1994) 109, 130; and Sing, German Administrative Law (1985), at p. 88; Nolte, General Principles of German and European Administrative Law – A Comparison in Historical Perspective, 57 Mod. L. Rev. (1994) 191). From there it moved to the constitutional law of most of the countries of Europe, and elsewhere as well. It is the central test in Canada (see Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (3rd ed., 1992), at p. 875, as well as in South Africa under its new constitution (see S. v. Makwanyana [112], at p. 665)).

 

94. A law infringes a protected human right. The law accords with the values of the State of Israel. It is intended for a proper purpose. How must we decide whether the law infringes human rights ‘to an extent no greater than is required?’ When does a law that infringes a constitutional human right achieve the required proportionality? In comparative law an attempt was made to concretize the principle of proportionality. It seems to me that we should learn from this attempt, which is common to Canada, Germany, the European Community and the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg, for the principle of proportionality does not reflect a unique social history or particular constitutional position. Rather, it is a general analytical position according to which we may examine a law infringing constitutional human rights.

 

95. Comparative law indicates that the examination of the “extent necessary” is divided into three sub-tests. The first sub-test determines that a legislative means that infringes a constitutional human right is fitting if it is appropriate to achieving the purpose. This is the fitness test (geeignt), or the “rational relationship” test. There must be a suitable connection between the goal and the means. The means must be tailored to achieve the objective. The means must lead, in a rational manner, to fulfillment of the goal. The second sub-test establishes that the legislative means that infringe the constitutional human right are fitting only if the goal cannot be achieved by other means that would result in a lesser injury to the human right. This is the middle test of “minimal harm” It is sometimes described as the “principle of need.” The third sub-test requires a balancing of the public good against the private harm arising from the means. There must therefore be a suitable relationship between the means and the purpose (“proportionality in the strict sense”). These three sub-tests were nicely summarized in the leading Canadian case, as follows:

 

There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test; first the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should infringe “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question ... Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures, which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” (R. v. Oakes [114], at p. 138).

 

It must be noted that the second sub-test is the most important of the sub-tests for proportionality. That the protected right be infringed as little as possible is the very essence of the requirement that the means be to an extent no greater than is required. This requirement is also textually connected. Indeed, in many cases the purpose is fitting and there is a rational relationship between the purpose and the means chosen. The determining question centers upon the question of whether the legislature chose the means that would result in the most minimal injury. In this regard, the image of rungs on a ladder is commonly employed. The Court determines whether the legislature chose the lowest rung of the ladder. This is the “step theory” (stufentheorie) (see D. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, (1989), at p. 290). In the Pharmacy case [110] – dealing with a limitation of the freedom of occupation – the German constitutional court adopted the theory of steps or rungs. The court determined that infringement of the freedom of occupation can be permitted:

 

[O]nly to the extent that the protection cannot be accomplished by a lesser restriction of freedom of choice. In the event that an encroachment on freedom of occupational choice is unavoidable, lawmakers must always employ the regulative means least restrictive of the basic right’ (translation by Kommers, ibid., at p. 288).

 

Constitutional latitude

 

96. The limitation clause imposes upon the Court a difficult task. It requires sensitivity to the necessity of balancing between the rights of the individual and the public interest. It requires the judge to understand his constitutional role. The directives of the limitation clause may be fulfilled in various ways. A type of ‘limitation margin’ is created (similar to the margin of reasonableness) or ‘margin of harm.’ The Court must protect the boundaries of that margin. It must refrain from crossing the margin. The choice between the various possibilities that lie within the bounds of the margin rests in the hands of the legislature. The principle of the separation of powers places the task of choosing – the task of lawmaking within the margin – upon the legislative authority. The legislature is endowed with the power to choose between the various policy options that fulfill the directives of the limitation clause. The question that the judge must ask himself is not what law would he have enacted, had he been a member of the legislature, in order to properly balance private and public needs. The question that the judge must ask himself is whether or not the balance chosen falls within the limitation margin. The Court must determine the constitutionality of the law, not its wisdom. The question is not whether the law is good, efficient, or just. The question is whether the law is constitutional. A “socialist” lawmaker and a “capitalist” lawmaker may enact different and contradictory laws, all of which fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause. The legislature must be accorded a “margin of appreciation” or “latitude for discretion” along the boundaries of the limitation zone. There must be reasonable room to maneuver, enabling the legislature to use its discretion in choosing between (a proper) purpose and means (that infringe to an extent no greater than is required). Every lawmaker has reasonable room to maneuver (see Hogg, ibid., at p. 882; Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, (1984), at p. 585). I discussed this in the matter of the administrative authority, as follows:

 

In applying the principle of proportionality – particularly in examining the means causing the least harm – we must recognize the latitude given to the governmental authority. There are a number of ways in which the proportionality requirement may be fulfilled. Often the matter is borderline. In such cases, the authority’s margin of appreciation must be recognized. This margin is similar to the executive authority’s margin of reasonableness.... This recognition of the governmental margin of discretion is based upon the institutional advantage that the governmental authority enjoys in examining the possible alternatives, and in fulfilling its national responsibility – a responsibility imposed by the principle of separation of powers – to implement the proper purpose (Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [58], supra).

 

These words apply with even greater force when the applicable governmental authority is the legislature. Indeed, the determination of social policy – on economic and other matters – is in the hands of the legislature, and the legislature must be given broad legislative latitude. The Court does not determine social policy. That is a matter for the legislature. But if the policy is not constitutional, that is a matter for the Court. Indeed, if the lawmaker deviates from the boundaries of the limitation, there is no recourse but to take a clear judicial stance. In criticizing the American approach to economic rights – which leaves it to the legislature, as the expert in this area, to determine the content of the law without the Court’s constitutional intervention – Tribe writes:

 

But such a belief would hardly justify wholesale abdication to the political process since there exists no type of legislation that can be guaranteed in advance to leave important constitutional principles unimpaired, and there is simply no way for courts to review legislation in terms of the constitutional without repeatedly making difficult substantive choices among competing values, and indeed among inevitably controverted political, social, and moral conceptions. Nor can it suffice to dismiss constitutional review of socioeconomic regulation as uniquely ‘political’; all significant constitutional judgments ... are inescapably political (L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, second edition, 1988), at pp. 583-584).

 

97. My colleague the President has cited Professor Hogg’s approach, according to which the various rights should be given a narrow interpretation in order to ensure a careful examination of the legislation in the context of the limitation clause. Professor Hogg reached this conclusion after the experience of some ten years in the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On its face, it seems to me that this approach is unsuitable. It will ultimately lead to constriction of the right as well as to laxity in guarding against its infringement. At the same time, it seems to me too early at this point to reach any conclusion in the matter of our Basic Law. The case law should be allowed to develop without a priori declarations that certain provisions must be given a broad interpretation while other provisions must be interpreted narrowly. Each provision should be given the interpretation that will fulfill the objective upon which it is based.

 

98. In addressing the question of whether a piece of legislation violates a protected human right to an extent no greater than is required, it is sometimes necessary to examine alternative means. Thus, just as the proportionality test requires that the Court examine the various alternatives that present themselves to the administrative authority, so the Court must examine the various alternatives that were available to the legislature. This is not a task that is beyond the Court’s ability. Constitutional examinations of this nature are undertaken in many countries around the world. ‘Social facts’ and “legislative facts” are brought before the competent court as evidence of the various alternatives. In describing these facts, Hogg notes as follows:

 

Legislative facts are the facts of the social sciences, concerned with the causes and effects of social and economic phenomena. Legislative facts are rarely in issue in most kinds of litigation, but they are often in issue in constitutional litigation, where the constitutionality of a law may depend upon such diverse facts as the existence of an emergency, the effect of segregated schooling on minority children, the relationship between alcohol consumption and road accidents, the susceptibility to advertising of young children, or the effect of pornography on behavior (Hogg, op cit., at p. 1292).

 

Evidentiary foundations of this type are presented every day around the world to courts dealing with constitutional problems. Upon this foundation the Court decides, always cognizant that it is not the lawmaker, and that policy is determined by the lawmaker and that the lawmaker is given a wide latitude in which to maneuver. Anyone who reviews the opinions of courts treating of constitutional determinations has studied the wealth of evidentiary material brought before the courts, as well as the courts’ ability to grapple with such problems. In the United States, this practice has been recognized since the beginning of the century. It is known as the “Brandeis Brief,” after the author of the first systematic and scientific document to be submitted to the Court in reliance upon research tools from the field of social sciences. The Court expects the parties – particularly the party bearing the burden of proof – to present an evidentiary foundation that will enable the Court to decide whether the requirement that the legislation be only “to the extent necessary” has been fulfilled. There is substantial literature on this subject throughout the world (see Karst, “Legislative Facts in Constitutional Legislation,” Sup. Ct. Rev. (1960) 75; Baade, ‘Social Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany,’ J. Politics (1961) 421-423). Justice La Forest has discussed this, noting as follows:

 

I must underline as strongly as I can the importance of producing evidence ... One of the major challenges in a s. 1 analysis is to identify and weigh the rights or interests served by a provision impugned as violating a guaranteed right. Particularly in areas outside the ordinary ken of lawyers, evidence will be required to enable courts to deal with the issue at all (La Forest, “The Balancing of Interests Under the Charter,” II N.J.C.L. 133, 143).

 

In order to fulfill its obligation, the Court and the lawyers appearing before it must develop additional skills, which will enable them to grapple with the “social facts.” Antonio Lamer, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, discussed this, noting that the constitutional revolution in Canada in the field of human rights requires the Court and the lawyer to grapple with a new sort of evidentiary foundation:

 

These developments require lawyers and judges to have a whole new range of skills. We need to be able to look intelligently to questions of social policy, to identify the sorts of expertise that the particular problem requires, to deal with material from a wide range of disciplines and to interact effectively with persons who possess many sorts of expertise. In addition to the traditional technical skills of the lawyer, we need a deep understanding of the most fundamental principles of the law, an understanding which is broad enough to relate to a wide variety of other disciplines (Lamer, “Canada’s Legal Revolution: Judging in the Age of the Charter of Rights,” 28 Isr. L. Rev. (1994) 579, 581).

 

Chief Justice Lamer further notes that the courts of Canada developed judicial techniques in order to deal with social facts:

 

Courts now are routinely receiving a good deal of what can be referred to as social fact evidence. This sort of evidence is often directed to questions of what is the impact of legislation on society and what would be the impact of alternative ways of confronting the social problem. This kind of evidence is like that which is relevant in proceedings before a Parliamentary Committee when proposed legislation is being considered. Particularly where the question is whether certain laws are justified in a free and democratic society, debate in the Courts sometimes resembles proceedings before a House Committee in that the benefits and burdens of the legislation and its alternatives have to be weighed in light of the best available information about the needs of society and the nature of the problem addressed (ibid., at p. 582).
 

Just as the courts and lawyers in Canada can undertake such an investigation, so can we. Of course we must always remember that the legislature is endowed with legislative room to maneuver; that the question is not what is the ideal legislative arrangement, but what is the legislative arrangement that can be expected in the context of the Israeli constitutional regime as a whole; that the Court does not determine the constitutional paradigm that it deems best but examines the constitutionality of the legislative formula established by the legislature; that in marginal cases, the legislature must be given reasonable latitude in its legislative choice. The court must be convinced that among the available legislative options, the legislature chose that which least infringed the constitutional right. What is demanded is not an ideal choice.

 

D. The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law 5753-1993

I) Application of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

 

99. The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law 5753-1993 (hereinafter, the “Amended Sector Law”) was enacted after the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty came into effect. Accordingly, the validity of laws clause does not apply to this law. In this matter I agree with President Shamgar’s position. Of course, the original law – which was enacted before the adoption of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – is not subject to constitutional review. It enjoys the normative protection accorded to established law by s. 10 of the Basic Law.

II) The first phase: does the Amended Sector Law infringe a constitutional right?

 

The first constitutional question that arises is whether the Amended Sector Law infringes the right of property. In my opinion there can be no doubt that the answer to this question is affirmative. The Amended Sector Law infringes the ownership rights of creditors. It permits cancellation of unpaid debt, thereby infringing the property rights of the creditors. The infringement is not trivial – whether the debt is significant or insignificant, the creditor’s right is infringed. We must therefore determine whether the infringement of the property right is lawful, i.e. whether it fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause.

 

III) The second phase: whether the Amended Sector Law fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause

a) ‘The law’; ‘the values of the state of Israel’

 

101. Does the Amended Sector Law fulfill the conditions of the limitation clause? It has not been contended that infringement of the property right is not ‘by law.’ This condition has therefore been fulfilled. Is the Amended Sector Law consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? The question is whether the new law, which provides for cancellation of debt – essentially, an extensive bankruptcy arrangement – in order to liberate the agricultural sector from potential ruin by imposing the burden upon the creditors, is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. My colleague answers this question affirmatively. I share his opinion, and for the same reasons.

 

102. My colleague the President criticizes the lower court (in LCA 1908/94 and 3363/94) for not having properly considered the court’s role in determining whether legislation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. My colleague writes as follows:

 

The court does not sit in judgment in order to administer the State economy. It does not rewrite the law. It does not transform secondary into primary in order to determine that legislation that it deems defective or otherwise wanting  is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. The court is not called upon to declare what, in its opinion, would be a more fitting or enlightened legislative solution. The court is called upon to determine, in the context of s. 8, whether the subject statute, according to its general purpose, is grosso modo consistent with a Jewish and democratic state.

 

It is certainly true that the court does not administer the State economy. But the court is required to determine whether the legislation by which the State economy is administered is consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Consider legislation controlling administration of the media, which, it is claimed, infringes freedom of expression. The court does not administer the media, but must determine whether legislation infringing freedom of expression is consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Or consider legislation providing for the manner of execution of judgments, which, it is claimed, infringes the debtor’s freedom or the creditor’s property rights. The court must examine such claims. In these cases, there is, of course, no call for the court to rewrite the law, or to transform the primary into the secondary or vice versa. Nor is the court asked to give its opinion on the wisdom or justice of the legislative solution. Nonetheless, the court is required – and cannot be freed of this requirement – to determine whether the legislation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. My colleague President Shamgar quotes the opinion of Justice Black in the case of Ferguson v. Skrupa [88]. This opinion must be understood in the context of the historical development of Supreme Court’s approach to substantive due process and the case of Lochner v. New York [99] (see J. E. Nowak and R. D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law (4th ed. 1991), at p. 362). This history is foreign to us. The American distinction between basic rights (regarding which constitutional scrutiny is strictest) and the economic freedom of the state (regarding which constitutional scrutiny is most lenient) does not accord with our constitutional structure, in which freedom of occupation, one of the basic human rights, enjoys the same constitutional status as other human rights. The trauma experienced in America as a result of the Lochner case [99] must not bring Israeli law to a standstill. We must, over the course of the years to come, adopt a comprehensive constitutional philosophy, based upon the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. We must determine whether in the context of the limitation clause, different levels of scrutiny should be developed (as to the nature of the appropriate purpose and means) for the different rights, or whether we should adopt a uniform level of scrutiny.

 

103. My colleague President Shamgar criticizes the determination of one District Court that the Amended Sector Law is not consistent with the values of the State of Israel because it applies only to moshavim (and not to kibbutzim). In the President’s opinion, this determination is ‘an example of a misguided basic approach, according to which only if the scope of the general application of the law meets the court’s satisfaction, can it be concluded that it is consistent with the values of the State of Israel.’ My colleague notes further that ‘economic legislation resulting from economic policy determines the scope of its application in light of the legislature’s discretion and in light of various economic factors that are not within the court’s knowledge or expertise. This is not why the court was given the power of constitutional review.’ My colleague cites in this context ‘the decision of the Canadian legislature not to include in the constitution the subject of infringement of property.’ In my opinion, this criticism is too general and too sweeping. The key point is that in Israel, unlike Canada, the right to property is a constitutional right. The court is charged with protecting the right to property, just as it is charged with protecting other constitutional rights. We have not yet been presented with the question of whether all rights enjoy constitutional protection of the same magnitude or whether the level of protection varies according to the nature of the right. It is too early to take a stand on this important question. In principle, the District Courts acted properly in taking into consideration the principle of equality as one of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and in examining the legislation before us in light of that principle. At the same time, I agree with my colleague the President that in the case before us – after extensive consideration – it cannot be said that the arrangements in one sector inherently discriminate against other sectors.

 

b) A proper purpose

 

104. A law infringing a constitutional human right protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is constitutional only if it is intended for a proper purpose. My colleague the President has deemed as fitting the purpose for which the Amended Sector Law was enacted. I agree with this conclusion. Whether we take a subjective approach to this analysis (legislative intent) or whether our approach is objective (legislative purpose), the purpose is fitting according to both criteria. The purpose is to ensure the rehabilitation of certain debtors and to prevent the collapse of their life’s work. This is a sort of emergency legislation intended to protect the existence of the moshav members. This purpose was intended to fulfill an important social goal. It is similar to the legislation in regard to cancellation of debt in bankruptcy. It expresses the policy of the welfare state. It recognizes the constitutional importance of the protection of human rights, and the need to protect them (debtors and creditors). It seems to me that this proposition is sufficient for the appeals before us.

 

c) To the extent necessary

 

105. As we have seen, an examination as to whether the legislation infringes the constitutional right “to an extent no greater than is required” includes three sub-tests. The first test is of “fitness” or “rational relationship.” It is met in our case. The second sub-test is the test of “the 1east intrusive means” or the “needs” test. The law infringes the basic right to an extent no greater than is required if the legislature chose – from the array of means available – the means that infringed the protected human right to the least extent possible. The legislature must begin at the “rung” that does the least harm, and slowly ascend, until it reaches the rung at which the proper purpose can be achieved without infringing the human right more than necessary. In determining the appropriate level we must bear in mind that the legislature has been accorded reasonable legislative latitude. The court must demonstrate flexibility and must recognize the difficult choices faced by the legislature, the effect of its choice on the various sectors of society and the institutional advantage enjoyed by the legislature in examining these factors.

 

106. Does the Amended Sector Law infringe creditors’ rights more than to the extent necessary? Or does this law fall within the bounds of the wide latitude given to the lawmaker? The Attorney-General has described the dilemma that faced the legislature. This dilemma is expressed in the Explanatory Note to the proposed Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law (Hatzaot Hok (Draft Laws), 1992, at p. 92):

 

The proposed law is intended to create a new framework in order to solve the crisis that has loomed over the agricultural sector for quite some years. Its general purpose is to facilitate rehabilitation of the agricultural sector by favoring rehabilitation over dissolution, while at the same time stemming the outflow of money from public coffers. It now seems that circumstances require legislative intervention in presenting a settlement arrangement to the agricultural sector since the various other settlements did not prove to be effective, left the agricultural sector in deep crisis and, at times, exacerbated the situation.’

 

In this context, the 1987 settlement (the “Ravid Settlement”) has been cited, according to which an administration was established which was to determine an arrangement for settling the bank debt of each moshav. Participation was voluntary for debtors and those non-bank creditors who signed the agreement, which included “‘veto rights” for each party as to the administration’s determinations. We have been told that because of the voluntary participation clause and the veto rights, the Ravid Settlement did not succeed, and by its terms only some 30% of the debts of the agricultural sector were settled (approximately one and a half billion shekels). Against this background, there was no alternative to the legislative solution. This solution is based upon ‘radical treatment of the crisis facing the Israeli agricultural system’ (Attorney-General’s Response, at p. 13). Under this “radical treatment” a “receiver” was appointed in order to analyze the debt of the moshav and its members, and to formulate a rehabilitation plan taking into account the debtors’ repayment ability and the magnitude of remaining debt. Against this background – and in light of the experience of the original law – a number of legal questions arose, which the Amended Sector Law attempted to solve, and which my colleague President Shamgar noted in the introduction to his opinion. The Attorney-General contends that these amendments do not exceed the extent necessary, and that they fall within the bounds of legislative latitude. In this regard, the Attorney-General notes that ‘it is clear that the crisis continues’ and demands an expeditious solution. The Attorney-General notes, as well, that the harm does not exceed the extent necessary ‘when, in effect, we are dealing with a creditor arrangement that comes to replace other acceptable arrangements such as bankruptcy, liquidation and dissolution under which creditors’ rights can be infringed’ (ibid., at p. 61). Against this background the Attorney-General contends that ‘the infringement does not exceed the extent necessary, when the infringement itself is unclear, i.e. to what extent can the creditor collect its claim if it is not included within the scope of the law and, on the other hand, infringement of the legislative purpose without the amending law is certain’ (ibid., at p. 62). The Attorney-General emphasized that:

 

The legislature’s efforts to save the agricultural-moshav sector by permitting certain damage to creditors come after attempts to solve the crisis in various ways, both by means of assistance from State and Jewish Agency funding sources and by means of voluntary settlement arrangements. After all of these attempts failed, the legislature enacted the main law, the motive of which was finally to settle the debts of the agricultural sector. The main law is not before the Court today, nor are the clauses of section 15 as to automatic reduction, which is the primary infringement of the main law. Before the Court are the relevant provisions of the amending law, which do not cancel the creditors’ right to collect or sue for collection of the debt, but rather propose a different settlement, which may infringe the possibility of collecting part of the debt. In this situation, when the lawmaker’s intention and purpose are to rescue the agricultural sector and assist in its rehabilitation, the legislature’s choice was made in the context of its “broad legislative latitude.”

 

Alternatively, the Attorney-General requested that – if we are unconvinced that the means chosen do not exceed the extent necessary –

[T]he Court allow submission of a factual and legal foundation in order to prove that the conditions of the limiting clause have been proven, in light of the fact that we are dealing with the invalidation of legislation. The lower court’s decision should not be left in effect merely because the Court was not presented with enough evidence (ibid., at p. 66).

 

107. Against this background, the question before us is whether or not we are convinced that the legislature enacted measures that do not exceed the extent necessary, and, whether or not this instance falls within the bounds of the broad legislative discretion given to the legislature. I have given considerable thought to this question and contemplated the possibility of granting the Attorney-General’s alternative request to return the case to the District Court for renewed consideration. In the end, I am convinced that this is a borderline case that falls within that area permitting the lawmaker to design a legislative arrangement at its discretion, and that further analysis of the “social facts” is not justified. In light of the proper purpose which deals with solving the deep crisis into which the agricultural sector has fallen – it seems to me that the means chosen by the legislature in the Amended Sector Law does do harm to creditors, but that this harm does not exceed the extent necessary and, in any event, falls on the lawful side of the fence. In reaching this conclusion I considered the possibility of voluntary settlement and concluded that it is not a viable alternative (in light of the failed attempt). Similarly, I considered other legislative arrangements proposed by the parties, which must be rejected in the absence of any relevant supporting analysis. In the end, we are left with the legislative arrangement chosen by the Knesset after consideration and examination, and I have not found – after taking the relevant considerations into account – that it goes beyond the domain to be left within the discretion of the legislature in a democratic society. In this regard I have also given weight to the fact that we are dealing with the first instances to come before the courts, and that, in the absence of constitutional experience, the existing evidentiary potential was not realized, nor were all the social data in the hands of the State presented in order to prove its contentions.

For these reasons I concur with the conclusion of my colleague the President that the appeals in HCJ 1908/94 and HCJ 3363/94 should be granted and that the cases should be returned to the lower court for continued review as to the matter itself. Similarly, for these reasons I concur in denying the appeal in HCJ 6821/93. In light of my position, I propose that there be no order of costs.

 

Summary

 

108. I have therefore reached the following three conclusions: First, that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is accorded constitutional supra-legislative status; that this conclusion may be reached in a number of ways and that choosing among them is not necessary for this appeal, although the position that seems to me most fitting is that which recognizes the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution for Israel at the highest normative level (constituent authority); that this Basic Law constitutes a superior norm, in light of which we must examine the constitutionality of ‘regular’ legislation that infringes a constitutional human right protected by the Basic Law, and that the Basic Law may be amended only by Basic Law. Second, that a “regular” law adopted by the Knesset (by whatever majority) cannot infringe a human right protected by the Basic Law unless it fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause. If a “regular” law does not fulfill those requirements it is unconstitutional, whether it explicitly state its intention to infringe a human right protected by the Basic Law, or whether the infringement be implicit. Third, that the Court in Israel is endowed with the power of judicial review of the constitutionality of a law. It must examine (in the first stage) whether the “regular” law (adopted after the enactment of the Basic Law) infringes a protected human right. The Court must determine (at the second stage) whether the infringement fulfills the requirements set out in the limitation clause. If the Court reaches the conclusion that a basic right has been infringed, without the requirements of the limitation clause having been met, it is empowered to prescribe constitutional remedies, among them declaring the law (or part thereof) void. Fourth, that the provision of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty according to which ‘property rights shall not be infringed’ is to be interpreted to include obligatory rights, and therefore legislation that diminishes the right of a creditor to claim his debt violates his right to property. Fifth, that the limitation clause – in requiring that the law infringe a human right to an extent no greater than is required – imposes a test of proportionality, composed of three ancillary tests: rational relationship, need and proportionality (in its narrow meaning), while recognizing the legislature’s broad legislative discretion. Finally, that in the appeals before us, we are convinced that the infringement of the creditors’ property rights fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause.

 

Conclusion

 

109. The enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty brought about a constitutional revolution in the status of human rights in Israel. A number of rights were transformed into constitutional supra-legislative rights. The Israeli politic became, with regard to human rights, a constitutional politic. Israeli law was constitutionalized. Constitutional human rights affect all branches of the law (public and private) and influence their nature and substance. If in the past human rights were derived from the various branches of the law, from now on the various branches of law will be derived from human rights. Moreover, there has been a change in the constitutional discourse. If in the past the legal discourse focused on the question of jurisdiction, power and discretion (legislative, administrative and judicial), from now on the discourse will be one of rights and liberties. No longer will it be the administrative power that determines human rights, but rather human rights, in their correct balance, will determine the power of the administration. This constitutional change was effected by the Knesset, which imposed limitations upon itself as well as upon the other governmental authorities. All of these impose a heavy responsibility upon the governmental bodies, which are obligated to protect human rights. We are now in a difficult transitional period in which we must adapt to a new constitutional framework. There is much uncertainty and doubt. There are dangers, some of which have been pointed out by my colleague President Shamgar. Certainly, the judicial authority must exercise great restraint. It must properly understand its role in a democratic state. This role does not involve determining the social policy of the State. The judicial authority does not determine the national priorities. The judge’s role is to oversee the constitutionality of the policies set by the political bodies. The judge’s role is to zealously protect the delicate balance between majority rule and basic human rights and values. The judge’s role is to defend the constitution and safeguard human rights. It is true that a constitutional determination has political ramifications. Nonetheless, it is not made of political considerations. The judge’s considerations are legal-constitutional in nature. I am convinced that in time we will formulate for ourselves judicial criteria for exercising of our constitutional discretion. Uncertainty will diminish. Doubts will lessen. In consolidating our judicial experience we will act with objectivity, with humility and with the requisite judicial courage. We are not the first to face tests of this sort. Just as other countries have succeeded, it can be assumed that we too will face challenges and that in the end, Israeli democracy will emerge strengthened. Indeed, there is now the possibility that the constitutional change will be internalized; that human rights will become the ‘daily bread’ of every girl and boy; that the awareness of rights – rights of children, the disabled, the elderly, the ill, employees, minorities and women – will increase; and that we will become more sensitive to the rights of human beings as such. The prospect is that rule will be based on law, and not law on rule. The prospect is of increased awareness in the Knesset of its constitutional role, and reinforced recognition by the nation of its central status in framing Israel’s constitution. The prospect is of recognition of the Court’s role as guardian of the constitution, balancing the constitutional values established in the constitution and supervising the constitutionality of administrative activity. The prospect is of the ascent of the glory of human rights, and enhanced goodwill and fellowship among human beings, each born in the image of the Creator.

 

*               P.M. 1994 (3) 243, at p. 263.

full text (continued): 

Justice D. Levin

1. It was with great interest and attention that I reviewed the learned, profound, extensive and edifying opinions of President Shamgar and of President Barak, which deal thoroughly with all the important matters of principle before the Court in the present proceedings. It would appear that if I were to attempt a broad review of the factual background and the legal basis of the questions at hand, I would be ‘bringing coals to Newcastle,’ which would be pointless.

2. In the Clal case [37], I set forth a clear and detailed statement of my own established view of the supra-legislative status of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and their supra-legislative constitutional status as a central part of the Israeli constitution that is being drafted chapter by chapter. My colleagues, Justice Strasberg-Cohen and Justice Tal, concurred with my opinion on all the fundamental and value-related issues and my analysis of the constitutional aspect of the Basic Laws. They disagreed only with my conclusion with regard to the proportionality of the legislation in the circumstances of the said case.

I will now briefly address what was stated in my aforementioned opinion, in so far as is relevant to presenting my views on the issues before the Court.

3. I believe that it is both appropriate and necessary to address, at some length, a number of issues that are at the heart of the case before us, and to express my opinion regarding them. The following are the issues to which I will refer:

(a) The source of the Knesset’s authority to enact Basic Laws on a supra-legislative constitutional level.

(b) The constitutional status of the aforementioned Basic Laws, the relationship between them, and the source of the values and principles that are realized by these laws, either expressly or implicitly.

(c) How should the basic human rights that are protected by these Laws be addressed, and what protection is given to the citizen against infringement of these rights?

(d) What infringement of these basic rights is permitted, and how may the legality of such an infringement be tested under the principles of the limitation clauses set out in each of those two Laws?

(e) How should the Court fulfill its role and exercise its authority in safeguarding the basic rights and values in the aforementioned Laws? What is their appropriate interpretation, and how and to what extent should the Court extend its protection to those enjoying protection under the law, so that their rights not be infringed beyond what is permissible and necessary?

(f) What is the purpose of the Principal Law, and what is the intention of the later, Amending Law? In this context it is necessary that we address the question of the extent to which these laws infringe Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s. 3 of which states:

There shall be no violation of the property of a person.

 

And if there is such an infringement, to what extent may it be tolerated under the principles and criteria of the limitation clause (s. 8) in the aforementioned law?

(g) In light of all that we shall say, what determination is required in the matter at hand?

4. My two colleagues, former President Shamgar and the current President, reach in their opinions the identical conclusion that the Knesset enacted the two aforesaid Basic Laws at the supra-legislative constitutional normative level and established primary basic rights at the constitutional level, which may not easily be infringed. Let me simply and clearly state that my opinion is identical to theirs.

Alongside this essential agreement, there is a difference in their approaches in regard to the important question of the source of the Knesset’s authority to promulgate and grant the people legislation on the said normative level. President Shamgar prefers to define the Knesset’s authority in terms of what he defines as “the theory of Knesset sovereignty,” which, as he explains in his opinion and conclusion, is that the Knesset, as a legislative body in every sense, is empowered to establish different levels of legislation. President Barak prefers to determine that the authority lies in what President Shamgar defines as “the theory of constituent authority.” According to this theory, the Israeli Knesset, acting in its capacity as legislature, carries out its work wearing two hats: one, insofar as ordinary legislation is concerned, represents and signifies the source of its authority in its designated role as the legislative body that is responsible for ongoing legislation; while the other hat, insofar as constitutional or supra-constitutional legislation is concerned, represents its authority and status as a constituent authority that stands in the stead of the Constituent Assembly that was elected to establish a constitution for the state, yet passed from the world without realizing its goal.

Justice Cheshin completely disagrees with both of my aforesaid colleagues, for reasons of his own, which have received a full exposition. I do not agree with his opinion, nor do my colleagues, who disagreed with him for reasons that also express my opinion.

At first glance, one might ask what difference does it make which theory is chosen if both positions ultimately lead to the same conclusion that the Israeli Knesset is empowered to enact legislation on a constitutional level? But this is not the case. This is not a hypothetical debate. This is no mere academic disagreement. My colleagues are not arguing over a semantic question, but rather over a substantive, significant principle concerning values, which is of consequence now and in the future for the framing of a constitution.

5. In my opinion in the Clal case [37], I sided with the proponents of the view that the aforementioned Basic Laws, and all other legislation of a constitutional nature that emanates from the Knesset, are rooted in the Knesset’s status as a constituent authority. It may therefore be said that my opinion in this matter is that of President Barak. In his opinion, President Barak explains why he is of the opinion that the Knesset acts as a constituent authority with regard to constitutional legislation. His opinion relies upon a broad historical and factual foundation and upon the legal logic that derives from and is implied by this foundation. This legal conclusion is strengthened by viewing the issues through the comparative prism of the constitutions of other enlightened democracies.

I adopt his explanation and concur in it, but I am not content with that. I would like to clarify my aforestated position from another angle as well, one which I consider to be of fundamental importance, and worthy of emphasis.

6. The Basic Laws that have been enacted over the years, and which have been granted constitutional status, constitute chapters and blocks in the constitutional temple that will be established upon the foundations and cornerstone of the Declaration of Independence. Every decision in matters of principle and values handed down by this Court over the years that has established binding precedent in relation to protected fundamental rights, and that has aggressively extended their protection, originated in and was inspired by the Declaration of Independence.

Since gaining independence, it has always been our view that the Declaration of Independence provides the clearest expression of the national credo. It identifies Israel as a free nation and an enlightened democracy, founded upon the values that characterize a democratic regime, and upon the essential values of Judaism and its ethical heritage.

7. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence, with all of its ethical content, was never juridically recognized as being of constitutional force, nor ever regarded as binding law. Nonetheless, the Declaration of Independence has always been perceived in our consciousness as accurately reflecting and permanently establishing the fundamental principles and values that, in our view, serve as our guiding light, our Urim and Thummim, when we set out to establish a constitution.

Therefore, from the very start, this Court saw fit to look to the Declaration of Independence as a principal source in interpreting the law and, above and beyond this function, as a spotlight that lights our way in shaping the basic civil rights and their actual implementation in communal life (see in this regard the decision of Justice Agranat in HCJ 73/53, at p. 87 [4]; the opinion of Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 [39]; and also EA 2/84, at p. 3 [8] and EA 2/88 Ben Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [59]).

8. What values, principles, foundations and ideas were explicitly incorporated into the Declaration of Independence or implied by the spirit of the Declaration? I will note only those that I believe to be important in the present context, and not necessarily in the order of their substantive importance:

(a) A constitution shall be established, under which the elected officials and the institutions of the state shall be established and shall function;

(b) The State shall be properly established, in accordance with its constitution and on the basis of its national credo, on the foundations of ‘freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel’;

(c) The State of Israel shall be established on the basis of those democratic principles that shall properly be expressed in the constitution; it shall establish basic civil rights on an ethical footing and shall implement ‘complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture… and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’;

(d) The constitution shall be established by means of an elected Constituent Assembly on or before October 1, 1948, and in the meantime the regular legislation required shall be enacted by the People’s Council as a Provisional Council of State until the regular, elected institutions of the state are established in accordance with the constitution, including, appropriately, the legislative assembly which shall be responsible for the ongoing task of legislation.

It may be concluded from the foregoing that the architects of the Declaration of Independence intended that the task of legislation was to be carried out at two levels and along two parallel paths: a constitution by the constituent authority (the elected Constituent Assembly), in which fundamental human rights as envisaged by the prophets of Israel would receive their expression; while on the other hand the day-to-day legislation would be carried out by a legislature properly so-called (initially by the authority of the Provisional Council of State, and later on under the authority of the legislative body that would be established under the constitution). This is the intention that, in my opinion, arises from the Declaration [of Independence] regarding the matter at hand.

9. As shown in the surveys laid out in the opinions of my colleagues, this original intent was not realized: that is, that the Constituent Assembly, elected by the people, would succeed in establishing a constitution by October 1, 1948. In order to ensure continuity and the orderly functioning of the state institutions in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, the Constituent Assembly became, with the agreement of its members, the First Knesset and, by virtue of the Transition Law, it – and subsequent Knessets under similar legislative provisions – was invested at that time with the powers granted to the legislature, the aim of which was to ensure that, alongside the legislation necessary for day-to-day life, the Knesset would also deal with the framing of the constitution, chapter by chapter, in the form of Basic Laws (see the Harrari Decision, to which my colleagues refer). It may be stated that in fact the Knesset was equipped with two staffs. One was that of constituent authority, which came in place of the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the constitution; and the other was that of the regular legislature, for the enactment of the regular laws, for which purpose the Knesset replaced the Provisional Council of State.

In my view, the actions of the Knesset as a legislature, in the two aforementioned separate paths and at different levels, has existed in the past, exists in the present, and should continue to exist, not only on the basis of the authority granted it in the Transition Laws. Even following the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset, which states nothing explicit in this regard, the authority of the Knesset as regards constitutional legislation derived from its status as a constituent authority. We have seen that the foundations of that view lie in the principles and in the approach that were set out in the Declaration of Independence. That Declaration, as stated, constitutes a principal source for interpretation of the law, including the Basic Laws.

Similarly, in respect to the explanation for the source of the Knesset’s authority to enact constitutional legislation, we are permitted and even required to be guided by the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Independence. There would appear to be no doubt that the Declaration of Independence attributed the utmost importance to the establishment of a constitution, since it was to be established by a constituent authority that was to dedicate itself seriously to drafting this creation and which was particularly endowed with the authority to enrich us with constitutional legislation.

It is right and proper that legislation at this level should be elevated above the work of ordinary legislation and those charged with its enactment.

 10. The establishing of supra-legislative constitutional norms, the creation of fundamental human rights and the crafting of a constitution which grounds the institutions of government and establishes their roles upon a foundation of democratic values are different from enacting everyday legislation on routine matters. The framing of a constitution (and the Basic Laws are none other than chapters in the future constitution) and conferring upon the people is cause for celebration in every enlightened, democratic regime. It is assumed that the task of establishing a constitution is the responsibility of a legislature that approaches its task with humility, trepidation, dedication, and seriousness, holding a staff engraved with the values and principles granted to it in its capacity as a constituent authority. This differs from the task of everyday and ongoing legislation, which should also be carried out faithfully and with the requisite level of care, but the staff of everyday legislation is smooth and normally free of constitutional principles and values.

It is customary, as stated above, to portray the Knesset as a legislative authority that wears two “hats,” one for constitutional matters and the other for ordinary legislation, and I maintain that it is more appropriate to symbolize the duality of the role of the legislature and its members by having them don the cloak of the constitutional legislator as against the ready-made suit of the regular legislator. This graphic description emphasizes the legislative hierarchy that was anticipated in the Declaration of Independence, which accords the constitutional enterprise a different, more radiant appearance, prestige and luster, than that accorded to legislation at the regular normative level. As stated, we are not dealing here with semantics, but with an important, clear distinction between the grayness of the regular law and the power, stability and authority that radiate from constitutional legislation – a distinction between the status of the legislative creator of the regular gray law and that of the legislator who creates eternal constitutional values for the nation.

11. It appears to me that this problematic nature, which was examined in detail by my colleagues, is a function of the extended period of time that has passed from the time that the Constituent Assembly was elected to establish a permanent constitution for the country, and the present. The statement in the Declaration of Independence that the constitution would be established no later than October 1, 1948 (in other words, within the space of a few months) was a worthy aspiration but not a realistic one, since the drafting of a constitution requires in-depth consultation, careful deliberation and profound seriousness regarding every subject and issue that is appropriate to a constitution; adaptation of principles and values to the national political entity just created and renewed; and above all the formation of a broad national consensus and general backing for the constitution. Such a weighty, distinguished legislative task cannot and should not seriously be undertaken in such a short space of time.

The Constituent Assembly reached this same conclusion, and as a result it was decided that the constitution would be adopted in stages, chapter by chapter, so that it would ultimately be combined into a comprehensive constitution. It was assumed that within a number of years the constitutional edifice would stand in all its glory, but unfortunately that was not the case. The delay in the process has ostensibly created a lack of clarity regarding constitutional questions of the highest order and a decline in the values and principles that have guided us since the earliest days of the State, in accordance with the content of the Declaration of Independence. It is therefore fitting to welcome the dramatic, important, albeit overdue, change brought by the enactment of the aforementioned Basic Laws. We can hope that the task of framing the constitution may be completed in the foreseeable future.

Yet the very fact that the completion of the chapters of the constitution has been delayed does not and should not alter or influence the source of authority of the legislature as it promulgates legislation at a constitutional level. As I have already stated, my opinion is that this task was given over to a constituent authority, and that this source exists and shall continue to exist until such time as the task of framing the constitution is completed as anticipated.

As they enacted these aforementioned laws and earlier Basic Laws, Members of Knesset saw themselves acting as a constituent authority; and they had a basis for so believing, as much as the appropriate interpretation of the source of their authority is derived from and inspired by the Declaration of Independence. As I have described, the Declaration envisioned that a constitution would be established by a specific constituent authority. The source of the authority should be interpreted in that spirit. This is what has been done, and this is how we ought to act.

12. The aforementioned Basic Laws stem back to March 1992, when they first came into force. Their enactment brought a substantive change in the status of human rights in Israel, which became basic “supra-legislative” constitutional rights, as President Barak justly noted at the beginning of his opinion. Indeed, there was an important change in Israel.

Yet this change, which was powerful and of immense value from the outset, had a significant follow up with the amendment of the two Basic Laws (primarily Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). These laws, in their updated, amended form, came into force on March 9, 1994; and introduced fundamental principles that were not previously included in these laws.

In s. 1 of each of the two laws, we now find this addition:

Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

 

This preamble, which is typical and even mandatory in a constitution that defines the citizen’s human rights, indeed faithfully expresses the most basic values that are implemented through these laws and realize what was declared in the Declaration of Independence. These basic principles are the motto that sheds its light on these Laws that establish the basic fundamental rights and protect them. Thus the legislature set these laws in a place of honor, power and prestige in the evolving constitution.

This declaration was not enacted as mere window dressing, but rather it expresses – not merely as a hope or abstract credo – binding fundamental constitutional principles and values. If in the past and in the early days the courts looked to the principles and values of the Declaration of Independence as a principal source for interpreting the law, and for support in anchoring basic rights protected by the case law, these Basic Laws brought about a dramatic change in the status of the Declaration of Independence and in the bright light that emanates from it. Now it can no longer be perceived merely as a faithful and appropriate source for the interpretation of the law, but rather its authority has been increased and it can now appropriately be deemed an independent source of human rights. We must assume that the Israeli legislature did not waste words or try to pull the wool over our eyes in adding the said declaration of principles to the Basic Laws, but rather intended to inform Israel’s citizens of the rights to which they are entitled, while emphasizing that the source of these rights lies in the Declaration of Independence which constitutes a normative source for legislation at the elevated constitutional level.

The governmental establishment, as well as the legal community, and equally the general public, must accustom themselves to this revolution that has taken place not only in our ways of thinking, but also in the structure of law in Israel, since:

Respect for basic human rights in the spirit of the principles embodied in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel has become a constitutional mandate. It is now the case that not only do the principles of the Declaration of Independence have legal force, but the requirement to honor basic rights in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of Independence has become a constitutional requirement that a “regular” law cannot oppose. We are thus faced with a substantive change in the legal status of the Declaration of Independence’ (from Professor Barak’s above cited book, Legal Interpretation, vol. 3, at p. 305).

13. We may rightly assume and conclude that the Knesset, as a constituent authority, inserted this amendment into the Basic Laws because it believed that the time was ripe to give meaning and force to the principles and values of the Declaration of Independence. This is how I understand the Basic Laws in their present formulation. One may wonder – and the skeptic might ask – was this indeed the case? Did the Members of Knesset really intend such dramatic and far-reaching legislation? One might also hear reservations and murmurings as to whether the Knesset Members whose votes enacted these laws really appreciated and understood the far-reaching implications of the said Basic Laws. Such people may be answered in the following two ways:

(a) It may be assumed that the legislature, acting as a constituent authority, acts with the appropriate seriousness and responsibility while deliberating constitutional issues, which always exert far-reaching influence over the institutions of the state and its citizens. And if we may speak in symbols, we may say that the legislature does this whilst supported by the staff of the values and principles of the Declaration of Independence. Thus, it is not appropriate to relate to the task of legislation as if it were carried out in a haphazard and inappropriate manner.

True, the legislature is not all-powerful and is not a model of perfection. It is liable, even in its capacity as a constituent authority, to produce legislation that is imperfect or controversial. Yet this does not reduce the force or effect of the legislation. It is always possible to initiate a change and to amend the law, after careful and thorough examination, on the basis of cumulative experience in enforcing the law over time. In principle, it is also possible to amend a constitution and provisions of supra-legislative constitutional laws, as long as this is done in an appropriate manner and with the required majority. Yet amendments to the constitution must not be undertaken as a matter of course, lest the constitution and the constitutional values contained in it be altered and changed with every passing breeze. The stability of the law and, to an even greater degree, the stability of the constitution represent values in and of themselves. The legislature should reflect upon this prior to promulgating a law, and even more so, a constitution, since they establish norms and principles that are meant to guide the citizen over the course of the days and years to come.

(b) Once the task of enactment by the legislative branch has been completed, and the law has taken shape and been enacted with the proper majority, the law is severed from the legislature’s umbilical cord and becomes an independent creation, a living and dynamic entity that stands on its own two feet and develops independently, and becomes the property of the people and of society. The law serves the latter, and it will be interpreted over time not necessarily in accordance with the literal meaning of the words; and not necessarily in accordance with what may be gleaned regarding the thoughts of any particular Member of Knesset while he was dealing with the task of legislation; but rather in accordance with the social purpose that the law was meant to implement in conformity with the time, the place, and the needs of the community.

The Court, when it is asked to interpret such a law, does not ignore the law’s literal text. It will find in the legislative process helpful tools for understanding the significance and meaning of the law. But, first and foremost, the judge will examine the law from an objective and realistic standpoint, with the aim of realizing its normative purpose and values within existing reality. This will be undertaken not in accordance with the judge’s personal world view, but rather through a careful and thorough examination of those protected values expressed by the law – values intended to promote and realize the vision of the Declaration of Independence, according to its spirit and in view of its stated aims.

14. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation are part of the family of the basic rights of the citizen, not all of which have as yet been incorporated into law, although it can be assumed and hoped that they will be expanded over time. Yet since they derive from the same principles and values, they supplement one another and are inter-dependent, and it is thus possible to extrapolate from one to the other, and to use one to complete the principles and values of the other. Both of them together should be read alongside the values and the human rights that were set out in the Declaration of Independence.

In my opinion in the Clal judgment [37], I expanded upon this point and also referred to the words of Prof. Y. H. Klinghoffer in his article “Freedom of Occupation and the Licensing of Businesses” (3 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1983) 582, 605), in which he expressed his view in the following manner:

All basic human rights unite into a body of norms that ensure human freedom. They influence one another, and if we make light of one of them, it is liable to be the first step in the elimination other basic rights and may potentially undermine the delicate, complex structure of freedom as a whole.

 

It follows that when we review the Basic Laws and seek the values and principles expressed in the protected right, we should be guided by the meaning that can be inferred from the two Basic Laws taken together, and also by the interpretation that has already been given, if any, to the provisions of these laws.

15. In my opinion in the Clal judgment [37], I emphasized the commonality of the two laws with respect to the limitation clause that is included in each of them and what can be learned from them. In order to elucidate my point, I shall cite what I wrote there:

Both Basic Laws have in common an aspect that demonstrates that we are concerned with a single subject, and a single family of basic rights; that is, the section defined as the “limitation clause,” which is found in each of the two laws, and is worded as follows: “There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required” (s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom; s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation)…

One should learn from this limitation clause that the Basic Laws that define, safeguard and protect the basic rights of the citizen are not absolute, since it is indeed possible that one basic right may clash with another basic right that is no less important. Thus the right is, in fact, relative and it may need to retreat in the face of other civil liberties. A basic right such as the freedom of occupation may clash with another civil right, just as it may clash with a clear public interest of importance for the entire citizenry. Thus, in such cases the golden mean must be found that balances the competing rights, where in one case the scale will lean towards one basic right and in another case a prudent balance will tilt the scale towards a different one.

 

This balance should be carried out seriously and with great discretion, in accordance with the rules and criteria that have been provided by the legislature itself in the limitation clauses of the Basic Laws (ibid, at pp. 466-467).

 

16. The new approach in Israeli law, conceived in the aforementioned Basic Laws, explicitly or implicitly accords binding, supra-legislative constitutional status to the primary fundamental human rights, as every governmental authority is obligated to respect these rights in accordance with these Basic Laws (s. 5 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and s. 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, viz. the relevant application clauses). I am completely in agreement with the words of our colleague Professor Barak in his aforementioned book Interpretation in Law (vol. 3, at p. 447) regarding the meaning of the “application clauses.” He writes:

The application clause imposes upon the legislature the duty to respect human rights. “Regular” laws are subject to human rights. The “regular” legislature is no longer “all-powerful.” The legislative authority granted to the legislature is contingent upon its duty to respect human rights. From this we derive the principle of the supremacy of the Basic Laws. This supremacy – which is supported by other provisions in the Basic Laws, as well – can also be inferred from the application clause.

 

Nonetheless, as we have stated, although the basic right is formulated in unambiguous, declarative language, a degree of infringement of this right will be permitted when the need arises to balance between conflicting Basic Laws and between the declared human rights and the needs of the public. Even then, when the task of balancing is carried out, it must fulfill what is required by virtue of the basic right itself and from the “permission” granted in the Basic Law to “infringe” this right according to the conditions and the restrictions of the limitation clauses. If this balance has not been struck, the legislation is unlawful and may be struck down unless some other escape route can be found, whether by amendment of the Basic Law itself, with the required majority, or whether, in the case of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, in accordance with the provisions of s. 8 thereof (the override clause), which permits an exceptional infringement of the Basic Law by a regular law.

Therefore, when the Court is required to examine whether and to what extent a regular law that has been enacted contradicts the provisions of a constitutional law, and whether it may in fact be appropriate to declare a law that has been duly legislated in the Israeli Knesset void on account of such an infringement, the Court must examine, first and foremost, the substance of the said constitutional law: the particular basic right that it is intended to protect, the scope of the said right, and its practical expression.

17. Anyone who claims that a basic right has been infringed and who seeks to undermine the force of a regular law for the sake of such an infringement must shoulder the burden of persuading the Court that a protected, constitutional basic right has indeed been infringed. The Court will then examine this claim in the light of the facts of the case as laid out before it, and in accordance with the values that are contained within the protected basic right. If the Court finds that indeed a regular law that has been passed does infringe a safeguarded basic right, the burden of persuading the Court that in this specific case the justifications in the limitation clause exist for such an infringement passes over to the entity defending the validity of the law – usually a representative of the state.

By saying that the burden of persuading the Court passes from the person opposing the infringement of the basic right to the person arguing that the infringement is justified under the limitation clause, I do not mean that the latter must persuade the Court that the legal conclusion required in relation to a theoretical confrontation between a regular law and a constitutional law should fall one way or the other. This task is imposed upon the judge. Nevertheless, before the judge is required to formulate his legal position, the appropriate factual foundation should be laid out before him on the basis of which, the judicial decision will be made applying the law in this specific case according to its circumstances.

It follows that the burden of persuasion with which we are dealing is the burden regarding the required factual foundation, and it is the latter that ought to be laid before the Court.

Once the facts have been laid out, the task of comparing and evaluating the legality of the regular law in the light of the constitutional law requires a sustained intellectual process, step by step: at the first stage, with regard to the issue of the actual infringement of the safeguarded basic right; and at the second stage, with regard to the justification for the infringement according to the various elements of the limitation clause.

18. If at the initial stage no real infringement of a basic right anchored in a supra-legislative constitutional law is proven to have taken place, or if it becomes clear that the infringement is marginal, trivial or insignificant, then the examination is concluded and the petition to invalidate the allegedly infringing law will be rejected. On the other hand, if a real infringement of a basic right anchored in such a law is proven, the existence of the elements of justification in the limitation clause will then be examined on four levels. The party claiming that the infringement is permissible must bring before the Court a persuasive factual basis to show that all of the following exist:

1.The infringement of the basic right is anchored in law or has been established ‘in accordance with the law by a specific authorization made therein’;

2.The infringing legislation is ‘befitting the values of the State of Israel’;

3.The infringing legislation is intended for ‘a proper purpose’;

4.The legislation infringing a basic right does so ‘to an extent no greater than is required.’

The examination and analysis proceed step by step, one stage after another.

First of all, it must be shown that the infringement occurs in or by law. If it becomes clear that the infringement is not so anchored in law, but rather, for example, only in administrative directives or in secondary legislation that does not rely upon a specific authorization in law, then there is no need to continue the examination process, as the infringement is completely unlawful, whatever its underlying motives may have been.

If the infringement is found to be anchored in law, the next question will be whether the infringing provision befits the values of the State of Israel, because if the infringing provision does not befit the principles and the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, it should not remain in force. For instance, an infringement that promotes arbitrary goals of the government as against its citizens (discrimination, denial of rights, deprivation of property, etc.), even if under a color of a regular law, will not be recognized at the constitutional level, since it is those values expressed in the Basic Law that establish the appropriate behavioral norms of government and citizenry, and they may not be weakened or eroded by ordinary legislation.

Should it be found that the infringing provision does not conflict with the values of the State of Israel, and that it may even serve these values, only then may we proceed to the next level of analysis. That is to say, was the infringing legislation enacted for a proper purpose? If it becomes clear that the infringing legislation does not serve a worthy purpose, in that it does not promote national social objectives that benefit the public, or does not strike an appropriate balance between basic rights of equal value, then the infringement cannot be tolerated and is unacceptable.

If we find that the infringing legislation intends to do good, and that it has the potential to promote or preserve appropriate social values, inasmuch as it reflects an appropriate balance between conflicting basic rights, then we may conclude that, in principle, the infringing provision serves a proper purpose.

If that is the conclusion, then we can move on to an additional stage in the examination process. Indeed, a proper purpose is an important element, without which the infringing legislation cannot be tolerated. However, the existence of a proper purpose cannot redress the wrong if, in achieving that purpose, the infringing law permits a violation of the basic right that is severe or greater than required. Not all means are legitimate in the pursuit of a proper purpose. This element in the limitation clause is the final barrier – and perhaps the sturdiest – facing the waves of a law that seeks to erode and even infringe a basic civil right. Even if the infringing provision satisfies all of the other elements of the limitation clause, the legislature would still have to devote significant care and restraint to determining the extent, necessity, scope and depth of the infringing provision in the means adopted. A sweeping infringement of a protected basic right cannot be permitted, and the aim should be to restrict the infringement so that it be as moderate as possible; and in any event that it not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the proper purpose.

If the facts initially examined by the legislature in the course of the legislative process, and later examined by the Court, show that the same proper purpose is attainable in a number of alternative ways, some of which infringe a protected basic right to a greater extent and some to a lesser extent, then the legislature must choose the alternative that is best for the citizen and which least harms the protected right. If the legislature does not do so, or if the Court discovers that the legislature did not consider all of the alternatives, or chose an alternative that severely infringes the right when a less harmful alternative was available, the Court will find that the infringement is greater than required, and will not extend the protection of the limitation clause to that law. It follows that the Court will not be satisfied with an abstract description or a technical examination of the legislative process, but rather the entire factual basis that was examined or that should have been examined must be laid before the Court, so that it can state its opinion.

Some, myself included, view this element of the limitation clause as the core of the entire section.

One may assume that in the overwhelming majority of cases the infringement of the basic right will be approved or rejected on the basis of the degree of the infringement and its scope.

 I would like to believe that in the foreseeable future, the Israeli legislature, founded upon and operating in accordance with enlightened, democratic values and principles, will not enact any legislation that is not anchored in the values of the State of Israel, or that serves the sole purpose of inflicting harm to citizens and denying their protected basic rights without proper cause. Nonetheless, the legislature may unwittingly err unawares, and thus it is appropriate that, in any event, all of the elements of the limitation clause be examined with the requisite thoroughness.

However, with regard to the degree of the infringement, its scope and its necessity, the legislature may certainly err, both in the process and in the conclusion. In cases of such careless and ill-considered legislation, precedence will be given to the basic rights that we are enjoined to protect.

19. I have presented a detailed explanation of my position regarding the burden of proof in regard to the factual basis that must be presented before the Court, whether with respect to the actual infringement of a basic right protected by a Basic Law, or whether with respect to the issue of whether the infringement is tolerable insofar as it conforms to the principles of the limitation clause. I presented this at length because, in my opinion, if we do not act in this manner, but rather presume that the legislature always acts, prima facie, within the bounds of the constitutional law, then we will serve neither the interests of the law nor of the legislature. In our desire to enforce the protected basic rights found in the evolving constitution, we must make sure that, in drafting regular legislation, the legislature always keep the protected basic rights in mind; refrain, insofar as possible and insofar as is required, from any infringement of those rights, and if necessary, make the appropriate effort to ensure that the infringement meet the requirements of the limitation clause, inter alia, that its scope not exceed what is required. Such legislation requires, by its very nature, a careful examination of the various possible alternatives for achieving the purpose that must be proper. Thus, before the legislature has its say, it must examine the relevant factual basis provided by expert research and examination. On that basis, it can formulate a position consistent with the constitutional provision, and draft the law appropriately.

We make no such assumption regarding the actions of the legislature, nor do we assume that its preferences are always appropriate. It is the Court that will have to decide, on the basis of the relevant factual basis that was before the legislature, that – in terms of its strength, premises, and reasonableness – it complies with the conditions of the limitation clause.

If a conflicting set of facts is presented in opposition to those factual grounds by some person whose protected basic right has been infringed – and which indicates that the proper purpose, if any, could have been obtained in a less harmful way – then the burden of proof falls upon the legislature that infringed the right, through its representatives. Of course, the Court does not, nor does it intend to place itself in lieu of the legislature. But it is the Court’s task and obligation to conduct a judicial review of whether the legislature did in fact satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause, whether it has not adopted the easy path, gone too far, or infringed the citizen’s protected basic right more than necessary. The Court, of course, respects the other branch of government operating within the scope of its authority, and will carefully consider, with due respect, any legislation enacted by the primary legislature. However, the Court is also required to ensure the citizen’s basic constitutional rights. Therefore, the citizen bears the burden of proving that his right has been infringed, while the legislature, through the offices of the State’s attorneys, bears the burden of proving that the infringement is tolerable, and that it satisfies all of the elements of the limitation clause. This burden should not be borne by the citizen who has been harmed.

I fear that if, in constitutional matters, we were to adopt the rule of administrative law that assumes that the governmental authority duly acts within the scope of its jurisdiction unless that assumption be proven wrong, we would become lax in regard to protected basic rights, and we would, God forbid, cause the blessing of the aforementioned Basic Laws to fade away. For these reasons, I cannot agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleague Justice Goldberg regarding the burden of proof and regarding the intensity of the infringement required in order to determine that a regular law does not meet the conditions of the limitation clause.

20. In accordance with which criteria will the Court examine the matter of infringement of a basic right and interpret the various elements of the limitation clause? The grounds for a court’s intervention in the administrative decisions of governmental authorities are well known, but should judicial review be carried out in accordance with the same criteria, or must we adopt special rules? It would seem that the rule that should guide us in such a case is that, when examining whether there has been an infringement of a citizen’s basic right, the protected right should be afforded its full ethical and fundamental significance, in the express spirit of the Declaration of Independence and in accordance with the principles of democratic government, while the scope of possible infringement or erosion of such rights should be limited as much as possible. Once an infringement has been established, then, as I stated above, the party that seeks to justify the infringement must show that the infringement is permissible in terms of the principles of the limitation clause. This examination may be carried out in accordance with criteria similar to those employed for the review of the lawfulness of administrative provisions, viz. does the provision reflect actual discrimination, denial of rights, or (Heaven forefend) arbitrariness. But also beyond this, was the provision infringing the basic right promulgated dishonestly or in an irrelevant or unreasonable manner? With due respect for the legislative branch, it is appropriate that we assume that the legislative branch deemed its considerations and reasons for the infringing legislation to be material and honest, yet it is nevertheless incumbent upon the Court to review and examine whether a mistake has been made by the legislature that might endanger rights.

I would say that review of the infringement of the basic right needs to be thorough and firm; and yet when examining the justification of the infringement in accordance with the elements of the limitation clause, the Court can adopt an open, liberal approach toward the legislative process, taking into account the necessary balances regarding each of the elements of the limitation clause. Legislation that is discriminatory, denies rights, or is arbitrary will be rejected absolutely. But in other respects, the interpretation will be flexible with regard to the appropriateness of its purpose, its reasonableness, its integrity, the proportionality of its means, and its necessity. These criteria will guide me in my consideration of the Primary Law and the Amending Law.

21. Over the years, the family agricultural sector fell into an economic crisis of the most extreme proportions. The debts of agriculturalists skyrocketed, and many entered a state of insolvency; and in the absence of assistance, there was a very real danger that the branch would fail and Israel’s agricultural sector would collapse. The State requested, and the legislature agreed, to establish legal arrangements that would prevent, or at least mitigate the catastrophe, so that it would be possible to continue to maintain farms while imposing a legal arrangement for the farmers’ debts. The Primary Law, which came into force on March 12, 1992, restricted itself to arrangements that would resolve primarily the problem of debts due to be repaid on December 31, 1987. Of the many complex provisions of the law, the two that are most important to the matter before us are the following:

(a) Rehabilitators will be appointed in accordance with the Law, who will be granted the legal authority and power to dispose of the agriculturalists’ debts, and discretionary authority to arrange for the repayment of the debts, in accordance with the nature and scope of their authority as determined by the Law.

(b) Regarding those debts to which the Law applies, the jurisdiction of the courts and of the execution offices to consider the debt or execute judgments is revoked. Pending legal proceedings will be halted, and the entire matter will be transferred to be heard and decided by a rehabilitator. 

The rehabilitator shall determine the size of the debt, the ability to repay it, the amount of the debt that shall be repaid and the payment schedule, the realization of assets as payment for the debt, cancellation of debts and other similar provisions that erode the right of the creditor to collect the entire sum of debt owed to him.

22. In reading the law, it is absolutely clear that there is a real infringement of the basic rights of the creditors in their property in two primary aspects: First, they are barred from of the gates of the courts and the execution offices, where they have a right to claim what is owed them by these debtors, as from any other debtor. Secondly, an arrangement has been imposed upon them that may deprive them of rights, in the sense that part of the debt is liable to be cancelled, and part of the debt may be repaid in installments spread out over many years, so that when whatever part of the debt is paid will represent only very partial repayment hardly in accordance with their expectations, needs and rights, and this without any of the recourse to the enforcement authorities that they enjoyed prior to the law.

Thus, we may conclude that the provisions of this law constitute a real infringement of the creditors’ property.

23. Until the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty on March 25, 1992, a person’s property was not recognized as a protected basic right. The protection of this right at the constitutional level was recognized in s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty which states: ‘There shall be no violation of the property of a person.’ This protection is not available to a citizen in the context of the aforementioned law, due to the section on validity of laws in the Basic Law, which states (s. 10): ‘This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.’

Nevertheless, and bearing in mind the general principles of the Basic Laws as a whole, it is appropriate that in treating of matters concerning basic human rights in a law that was in force prior to the Basic Law, the Court construe the law in a manner consistent with the spirit of the Basic Laws. This rule is established under s. 10 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and there is nothing similar to it in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Yet, in my opinion, this approach is also appropriate in our case. In terms of values, as earlier stated, the two laws should be treated equally – especially as from the very outset we have adopted the values and the principles of the Declaration of Independence as our guide, and they also shed light upon the present matter – in construing the law that applies to the citizens of this country. We have done this in the past in establishing and defending basic civil rights, and we should do so in this context.

24. The situation is different regarding the Amending Law, which was passed in the Knesset on August 4, 1993. This law was enacted after Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and it is therefore subject to the provision that prohibits infringement of a person’s property rights. The Amending Law not only infringes the creditors’ rights to the extent that they are infringed by the original law, as explained above, but it is even more extreme. First of all, the Amending Law also imposes the arrangement upon debts that accumulated up until December 31, 1991. In addition, the Amending Law extends the power and authority of the rehabilitator to cancel and reschedule debts. Moreover, according to the Amending Law, a tax debt that is defined as ‘any amount that a person owes according to legislation regarding the imposition of a tax or a mandatory payment that the Minister of Finance is charged with imposing or collecting’ is not included among the debts subject to the aforementioned law.

In other words, while an ordinary citizen is bound by the law’s provisions, and thus his ability to collect the debt is harmed, the State as a creditor is not bound by the law, and is free to continue to collect the debts owed to it. Therefore, I concur with the view of my colleagues, President Shamgar and President Barak, that the Amending Law infringes the right to property of creditors in the proceedings that are the subject of this case.

25. The State argues that the amendment to the law is nothing more than a clarification of the provisions in the Primary Law, and therefore the Amending Law should be treated in the same way as the Primary Law, which is not subject to the Basic Law. This argument was rejected by the President, and I concur in his opinion and his reasoning. I will however add this: Every law, even an amending law, is subject to the rules of the aforementioned Basic Law according to the date of its enactment.

Provisions regarding the maintenance of the status quo were intended to serve only one purpose: to prevent severe harm to the stability of the existing law and radical disruption of the system in force before the Basic Laws came into force. This does not lead to the conclusion that if we find clear that a pre-existing law infringes a basic human right, that law is worthy of continuing for posterity. As stated, even in the case of such a law, it should, as far as possible, be interpreted in the spirit of the principles of the Basic Law. In my opinion, the arrangement in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation that sets limits on the continued application of infringing laws that preceded the Basic Law is preferable. But this is the legislature’s problem, and we cannot, by virtue of our authority, change what the law has expressly established. The conceptual basis for preserving the status quo is absent when we are faced with new legislation.

When the legislature amends an existing law, it must consider the principles and values enunciated in the Basic Laws, and abstain from their unlawful infringement.

26. Having established that the Amending Law infringes the provisions of section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, we must consider whether this infringement is tolerable and permissible under the aegis of the limitation clause.

27. The instant case presents no problem with regard to the first stage of the examination as to whether the infringement was carried out in accordance with the law, inasmuch as the Amending Law was enacted by the Knesset, and the infringing provisions are a part of that law. As for the second stage of the examination – whether the law is consistent with the values of the State of Israel – we can say without hesitation that enlightened democratic states, as well as in Jewish tradition, value the idea of mutual assistance, support of the weak who require assistance by those with means, shouldering the burden of the needs of the state in a progressive manner in accordance with one’s capacity to do so, and imposing tasks upon one part of society in order to relieve another sector of the public, so that we may achieve an enlightened, just society that provides for the needs of society as a whole and for the quality of communal life (I have addressed the subject of nature of value-based democracy, in general and in Jewish tradition, in the different, but relevant context of the Clal case [37], on pp. 474-477. I believe that it is appropriate to refer to the detailed opinion and the sources quoted in detail in that decision).

This is not the first time that the public or some part of the public of a democratic society has been called to the rescue of an economic sector facing collapse. Jewish tradition provides examples of edicts, rules and customs that share the characteristic of extending help to the stranger, the orphan, the widow, the sojourner, the poor, the unfortunate and the despondent. The President has addressed this at length in his opinion and I can only concur in all that he has stated.

Does the infringing law serve a proper purpose? The explanatory note to the draft bill of the Primary Law state, on p. 92, that the bill ‘is intended to create a new framework for resolution of the most difficult crisis to have struck the entire agricultural sector over several years.’ The note also states:

The overall aim [of the bill – D.L.] is to facilitate the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, by giving preference to rehabilitation over liquidation, on the one hand, and the need to prevent a flow of funds from the public purse on the other. The involvement of the legislature in providing arrangements for the agricultural sector appears a necessity at this time, after other arrangements proved ineffective, and left the agricultural sector in deep crisis and sometimes even made things worse.

 

Indeed, the appropriate policy for dealing with commercial enterprises or businessmen in serious economic crisis is not necessarily liquidation of the company or a declaration of bankruptcy, but rather the rehabilitation of the business to the extent possible. In CA 673/87 Y. Salah et al v. Liquidator for Peretz and Issar Construction and Investments Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) [60] at p. 68, I stated as follows:

In my opinion, there is no need for haste (in regard to the liquidation of a business or bankruptcy – D.L.). As long as it is possible to save a business from collapse, we should carefully and responsibly try to do so with daring and resourcefulness. To the extent that the liquidator, trustee or receiver acts under the supervision and guidance of the court to effect the necessary liquidation of a business as an active, vibrant concern, so much the better for the creditors, for the parties to the company, and for the bankrupt as an individual.

Through such action, the purpose of the law is realized. By such an approach, insofar as it is applicable to the circumstances of the case, we promote a just result.
 

 Both the Companies Ordinance [New Version], 5743-1983, and the Bankruptcy Ordinance [New Version], 5740-1980, encourage and promote resolution by an arrangement by which creditors waive part of their claims in order to save the company or the business proprietor from total collapse. One will benefit a little, while the other will give up a little, yet at the end of the day both will be saved.

By way of analogy, we proceed to the matter before us. The collapse of the agricultural sector could have caused untold damage to the national economy, and could have brought many good citizens – who had invested all of their resources, strength and energy in the construction of Israel’s magnificent agricultural sector – to their last crust of bread. They must not be abandoned in their hour of need. Those who, first and foremost, can contribute to recovery and the prevention of collapse are the creditors who have carried out business with the agriculturalists and enjoyed no small profit over the years.

The duty of rescue should not be imposed upon all citizens, but rather on those who have some connection to the matter. The law is intended to promote a proper purpose – to address the social needs of a meritorious community, to achieve social justice, and to enable the state to overcome a dangerous situation that, if not resolved, will seriously harm the national economy.

In this instance, the importance of the aforementioned purpose should not be underestimated because it is not applied equitably across different sectors of the economy. The values of the State of Israel do not require such equality in a case such as this, and such inequality, insofar as it exists, in extending assistance to sectors in distress, or in imposing a burden on a part of the public, is not sufficient to taint that purpose.

28. The question that remains to be answered in the final stage of examination is whether the proffered solution infringes the basic rights of citizens beyond what is absolutely necessary in the circumstances of the case. I harbored some hesitations and second thoughts regarding the proportionality of the infringement.

First of all, I asked myself whether it was appropriate that the Amending Law removes the State from the general group of creditors that will have to bear the burden, considering that the State also enjoyed income from the agricultural sector, and should perhaps contribute from its own resources to rescue the agriculturalists in their time of need.

Should we not regard the imposition of the burden on the other creditors alone as a severe alternative for the creditors as a whole, when a less injurious alternative could have been presented? I have refrained from drawing a conclusion regarding this infringement, since this issue was not addressed in any meaningful way by the parties to the case, and it would be inappropriate for the Court, on its own initiative, to draw far-reaching conclusions, and even question the constitutionality of a law, where the parties had not presented factual and legal arguments before the trial court.

I also asked myself whether the legislature examined different alternatives for resolving the crisis of the agricultural sector and concluded that the aforementioned alternative was the least harmful and the most just.

 Such examination and analysis are necessary, in my view, and if these are not undertaken by the legislature in the legislative process, then it is appropriate that they be undertaken by the Court when it is asked to invalidate the infringing law. However, when all is said and done, it seems to me that, in this matter as well, the infringement does not appear to go beyond what is necessary in the this case. Examination of the original draft bill to which I referred above, examination of the draft bill of the Amending Law and its provisions, and weighing the arguments and explanations advanced by the parties in this regard, especially those of the Attorney-General’s representative, satisfy me that before formulating its infringing provisions the legislature did consider various alternatives.

 

 

The Primary Law only came into being after other alternatives, which did not so severely infringe basic rights of citizens, were tried and failed. The Primary Law attempted a solution similar to existing solutions in the field of private law field (viz. liquidation of companies and bankruptcy, as explained above). The experience accumulated in the application of the original law shows that the arrangements established by the Primary Law, inter alia those establishing that the debt be handled in the manner prescribed by the law as the basic debt that existed on December 31, 1987, do not achieve the desired results, and the powers that were granted to the rehabilitator were insufficient. Thus, the Amending Law arrived only at a later stage, and introduced a more severe infringement of basic rights that apparently became necessary in order to achieve the purpose. Thus, the overall picture supports the conclusion that the infringement, while significant, is nonetheless required in the face of a sad reality, and thus is not excessive.

29. I therefore concur with the opinion of my colleagues that the appeals in LCA 1908/94 and LCA 3363/94 should be allowed, and the appeal in CA 6821/93 should be denied. Inasmuch as disagreements arose among the members of the bench regarding a number of the important issues, and in light of the opinions and positions that I expressed above, I stand in this case behind the conclusion of President Barak in paragraph 108 of his opinion. 

 

 

Justice I. Zamir

1. The constitutional revolution did not begin now, with the enactment of the Basic Laws on human rights. It began a generation ago, with the Bergman decision [15]. As is well known, the Bergman decision first established that the Knesset can bind itself by means of an entrenched provision in a Basic Law, and that the Court is authorized to annul an ordinary law that is repugnant to such a provision. Justice Landau’s opinion in that decision began a revolution, because it came to the legal community as a complete surprise and introduced a fundamental change: it reversed what had until then constituted the axiomatic view of the status of the Knesset, the status of the Court, and the relationship between them. The Court did not resort to theory in order to bring about this revolution. On the contrary, it intentionally refrained from addressing ‘very weighty preliminary constitutional questions regarding the status of the Basic Laws and the justiciability before this Court of the question of whether the Knesset did in fact comply with a limitation that it imposed upon itself...’ (ibid. at p. 696). Nevertheless, the revolution succeeded. It succeeded, as revolutions do, because it occurred at the right time, under the pressure of the eve of elections; because it was implemented through wise tactics that left the government with the means for achieving its ends despite the annulment of the law), either by amending the law or by re-enacting it with a special majority; and perhaps also because it refrained from a debate upon the weighty constitutional questions. In these respects, it is reminiscent of the successful revolution that took place in the United States approximately 200 years ago, also in the area of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature, in the Marbury case [94]. Indeed, the Bergman decision [15] provides additional proof of the famous statement of Justice Holmes that a page of history is worth a volume of logic. 

 

2. The constitutional revolution of the Bergman decision [15] was, like all successful revolutions, only the first stage in a long, complex process. It paved the way for the second stage of the revolution, which commenced approximately three years ago, with Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Although the practical importance of this stage inestimably surpasses the importance of the first stage, it does not represent a theoretical breakthrough. The new Basic Laws do not create human rights, inasmuch as they have long been recognized by the case law. They do not even create a new rule of interpretation, inasmuch as the case law has already established that all laws must be construed in the light of human rights. So what do they accomplish? The laws expand the principle that was established in the Bergman decision [15], and that has since become generally accepted, that the Knesset can limit itself through a Basic Law. Indeed, in the Bergman decision [15] the Court only established the principle of formal self-limitation, that is, self-limitation requiring a special majority of Members of the Knesset. In the case at hand, we are dealing with substantive self-limitation, that is to say, limitation that requires the conformity of an ordinary law to the values and principles that have been established in the new Basic Laws.

 

At this stage, the transition, within the framework of that principle, from formal self-limitation to substantive self-limitation, is simple and straightforward. It is a natural development. Indeed, the idea that the Knesset can substantively bind itself by means of a Basic Law has achieved nearly universal acceptance. This approach finds expression in scholarly literature and in obiter dicta of this Court. Now, in the instant case, it achieves the status of established law. In the words of President Shamgar (supra, at paragraph 35), ‘Logically, there can be no ground for distinguishing between the powers to fetter future parliaments substantively and procedurally.’ That is the whole law stans pede in uno, to be elaborated in future decisions as may be required.

 

3. Nonetheless, the theoretical basis for this approach is contested. What is the source of the Knesset’s power to limit itself? The controversy, which was left unresolved in the Bergman decision [15], has been simmering beneath the surface for many years. It would seem both possible and appropriate to allow it to continue to develop in academic debate until such time as the Court will be required to decide, inasmuch as no determination is necessary to decide the instant case. The fact remains that at the conclusion of the present discussion, the issue remains unresolved.

 

This is true regarding the aforementioned issue, as well as in regard to other important, complex issues that have been addressed at length in this case. In matters of constitutional law, the Court must tread with extreme care lest it stumble. In this area, more than in other areas of law, the Court is establishing societal norms. Often its decisions are not merely guideposts, but pave new roads. This process requires a thorough examination of the terrain and a long-term perspective. Progress should be made inch by inch. A sudden leap may undermine the stability that is essential to progress.

 

The uniqueness of the field of constitutional law also requires that the Court adopt a unique approach. Hence the clearly great importance of the rules proposed by President Shamgar, following Justice Brandeis, when discussing constitutional questions. President Shamgar states (in paragraph 89), inter alia, that ‘The Court will not customarily decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case,’ and ‘The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the concrete facts before it to which it is to be applied.’ I concur. In this spirit, I prefer to leave open various questions that have been discussed in this case, including seminal questions of constitutional law, until the time is ripe.

 

4. Nonetheless, I cannot ignore the fact that the controversy has indeed surfaced, and this decision presents various opinions on basic questions of constitutional law. These opinions, even those that are only obiter dicta, are likely to influence the development of the law. In such a situation, importance is attributed to the relative support expressed for one position or another. Therefore, I think it appropriate that I very briefly express my views regarding two issues.

 

First of all, regarding the question of the source of the Knesset’s power to limit itself, both from the formal and the substantive points of view, I believe that this power emanates from the Knesset’s status as a constituent assembly. The theory regarding constituent assemblies is accepted in many countries and is widely held in Israel. It proposes a theoretical explanation and supplies a practical tool, both for the Knesset and the Court, for the appropriate treatment of constitutional issues. It is, in my view, the preferable approach.

 

Secondly, regarding the issue of proportionality, which was established as the test by the limitation clause in the Basic Law, I believe that it is appropriate to adopt a three-pronged test: conformity, need, and proportionality. This test is accepted in various countries and in international law, as well. It has also penetrated Israeli law, and has become settled law in administrative law. See HCJ 987/94 [57]; HCJ 3477/95 [58]. It is neither reasonable nor desirable to establish a different rule in the field of constitutional law. This is the case because, first of all, there is no sharp boundary dividing constitutional law and administrative law. It is also the case because this Court crossed the line in stating that the requirement of proportionality established in the Basic Law also applies to administrative authorities. See HCJ 987/94 [57]. In other words, the legal rule in this regard is identical in both constitutional and administrative law. Moreover, the law that grounds proportionality on the aforementioned three elements represents, in my opinion, the proper approach. It provides the Court with a sophisticated, efficient tool, based on the experience of other countries and of international tribunals, for the judicial review of laws, secondary legislation and the various types of administrative decisions. 

 

Thus, regarding these two issues, I concur with President Barak.

 

However, I would advise great caution against establishing any hard and fast rules regarding the definition of property and what constitutes an infringement of property rights. Does the Basic Law provide a defense against any new law that may, even indirectly, affect the value of property or pecuniary income? For example, does the protection of property extend to limitations that the law imposes upon labor contracts, such as a provision regarding minimum wage, or requirements concerning property relations between spouses, such as a provision requiring maintenance?

 

 

If every infringement of the value of a person’s property, including infringements of various financial obligations, were deemed an infringement of property rights, then we will discover innumerable laws infringing property. The Court would likely find itself up to its neck in reviewing the legality of every such law, for fear, inter alia, that it infringes property rights beyond what is necessary, and it would be difficult for the legislature to fulfill its role adequately. The broader the scope of the right to property as a constitutional right, the weaker its protection. In this regard, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Therefore, in the matter at hand, it is sufficient that I assume that the Amending Law infringes property rights. Even on the basis of this assumption, I see no need to annul the Amending Law, since the facts and the arguments presented to this Court do not provide a basis for a determination that the Law does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause.

 

5. President Barak sums up the law, insofar as is relevant for a determination in the present case, in paragraph 108 of his opinion. I concur with that summary. I therefore also concur with the result reached by President Shamgar, President Barak and my other colleagues on this bench.

 

 

 

Justice M. Cheshin

1.    I concur with my colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak. Indeed, the Amending Law succeeded in overcoming the hurdles erected  by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and there is no need to  further address the legality or constitutionality of that law.

2.    My colleagues, President Shamgar and President Barak, wielded scythe and the sickle in the field of the Basic Laws, not laying them down until nightfall. But they left  a few stalks standing, and I resolved   to gather a few ears myself, which I will grind and bake into a loaf of my own bread.

One of the fundamental issues that my colleagues addressed at length –and upon which they disagreed – concerns the Knesset’s authority to frame a (rigid) constitution for the State. If you like: the question of the Knesset’s power to “limit” its future authority to legislate in the future by way of the “entrenchment” of laws (formal or substantive entrenchment). Both of my colleagues reached the conclusion that the Knesset has the authority to entrench the laws that it enacts, i.e. to limit its authority to legislate in the future. . However, they follow different paths to that conclusion, and to the extent that their paths differ, my colleagues do not even agree on the question of the scope of the Knesset’s power to entrench laws.

3.    I will begin by stating that in my opinion the Knesset lacks the constituent power to frame a constitution, in the sense that the concept of “constituent power” and the concept of “constitution” appear in the opinions of my colleagues. Moreover, I have grave doubts as to whether a theory that accords the Knesset authority to frame a constitution is appropriate for us, here and now.  Indeed, I believe that the Knesset has the authority to impose on itself limitations upon  future legislation – within limits and bounds that I shall specify and explain – and in this sense, I concur with my colleagues’ views. However because my starting point differs from that of my colleagues,  I find myself arriving  at a  different destination.

4.    The differences of opinion among us in relation to the issue of the constituent authority of the Knesset and the question of Knesset “sovereignty” all constitute obiter dicta. In the matter before the Court, we are of one mind. What was it then that compelled me to burden the public by adding my own (lengthy) obiter dictum to those of my colleagues? I will, therefore, begin with an explanation.

 

5.    First of all, in my view the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit itself (by constitution or law) is the most important  question arising  before the Court in the present case, and its importance far exceeds that of the other matters confronting us.  In comparing them, I would say that say this is one of the giants while those are Lilliputians.

Furthermore, I dare say that since Israel has had a Supreme Court – from its inception  to this very day – no greater or more important question has come before it than the question of the Knesset’s constituent authority to frame a constitution for Israel, the question of whether Israel has  a constitution, even if adopted incrementally In fact, the present case does not require that we decide this question on its merits, and we all concur that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation were enacted lawfully and with the requisite authority.

 

Yet this one question towers over all the other questions before us, and even if only incidental, it is a colossus. The question of the constitution and the question of who possesses the authority to frame a constitution are questions that come exceedingly close to  the grundnorm of the Israeli legal system. Thus, our concern is with a question lying at the bedrock of the Israeli legal system.. And, facing such a preeminent question, we would be hard put not to make some remarks.

 

6. Secondly, and this goes to the heart of the matter: One day the Knesset will pass a law or a Basic Law on a constitutional matter, and that law or Basic Law will provide that it can only be changed  by a majority of seventy or eighty Knesset members (or ninety or a hundred). What legal standing would such a provision have? Would it be valid and binding to the extent that the Knesset could not amend the law (or Basic Law) except by the special majority stipulated in the law? Or might we say that such a provision, which curtails the Knesset’s legislative power, indefinitely is like a broken potsherd, lifeless by reason of its presumption to limit the Knesset’s  legislative power for all time??  According to my colleague President Barak, the limitation would be fully and unreservedly effective (valid?)  provided that it bore the form of a Basic Law, for that legislative act would be within the Knesset’s constituent authority.  Such a law (or constitution) is a “Basic Law,” and its contents comprise all of the constitutional subjects (fundamental principles of the state, governmental structure, the relations among the branches of government, and individual rights). This is also the view of my colleague President Shamgar, although his opinion also hints at a certain limitation of the Knesset’s authority (see par. 35 of his judgment). My view is that a provision for a special majority (the kind of majority provisions we mentioned above) purporting to limit the Knesset’s power to change a law would be invalid ab initio, because the Knesset lacks the authority to pass it.  In my view this kind of statutory provision would be absolutely anti-democratic; this statutory provision places the minority in control of the majority, and as such is a law that the nation never authorized its representatives to enact. In my view, in the absence of a true constitution, this kind of provision presents a clear and present danger to Israeli democracy, both in law and in practice, and I oppose it with every means at my disposal.

 

7. We will further discuss all of these matters below, whereas in this context we wish only to explain why we view the issue of the Knesset’s authority to enact a (rigid) constitution, in other words  the Knesset’s authority to legislate entrenched laws – as an issue that overshadows the other subjects being adjudicated before us. These are the few ears that I have chosen to grind.

 

8.    Our discussion takes the following path: Firstly, we will examine the question of the Knesset’s constituent authority, i.e. the subject of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution. In this chapter we explain why, in our view, the Knesset lacks constituent authority, and why it is powerless to enact a (rigid) constitution for the State of Israel   In that context we will further dwell on the inherent dangers of giving legal approbation to the Knesset’s constituent authority or its unlimited sovereignty without the issue having been placed before the people for its decision and a consideration of the opinions regarding  the advantages and disadvantages attendant to the authority to establish a constitution.  Having reached this conclusion, we further ask ourselves: In the absence of constituent authority, does the Knesset have, as a matter of law, the authority to enact “entrenched” laws? At this junction we will set out our approach, and explain why, in our view, the Knesset does indeed possess that authority and we will delineate its limitations.   We thus begin with the subject of the Knesset’s constituent authority

 

The Constituent Authority – Was it you or was I dreaming?

  1. How does one identify the authority to adopt a constitution? How should we know whether constituent authority was conferred, and if the authority was conferred, who possesses the authority?  How shall we know if a constitution was established, and whether a particular norm is a constitutional norm?  The question of identifying the body with the authority to frame a constitution, and the question of whether a certain norm is a constitutional norm are intertwined, inseparably linked, and are, in fact, one and the same.  The body authorized to frame a constitution frames the constitution, and a norm enacted by the authorized body with the intention of it being a constitutional norm, is a constitutional norm.

Since we know that the constitution comprises the supreme norms of the State, before which even the legislature bows its head in deference, the ineluctable conclusion must be that with respect to the existence of the authority to frame a constitution, and the identity of the body authorized to frame the constitution, there can be no doubt regarding the existence of the authority or the identity of the authorized body. Both are self-evident and any explanation is superfluous.

 

Thus the Jewish people became obligated to its first constitution. The people were first commanded to purify themselves in anticipation of receiving the constitution:

 

And the LORD said unto Moses, Go unto the people, and sanctify them today and tomorrow, and let them wash their clothes. And be prepared for the third day. For in the third day the LORD shall descend upon Mount Sinai for all the people to see. And Moses went down from the mount unto the people, and sanctified the people; and they washed their clothes.  And he said unto the people, Be ready against the third day: come not at your wives (Exod. 19:10-11;14 [120]).

 

For three days (no more and no less) the people waited to receive the constitution, and on the third day the ceremony began in awesome grandeur: 

 

And it came to pass on the third day in the morning, that there was thunder and lightning, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud; so that all the people that were in the camp trembled.  And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God; and they stood at the nether part of the mount.  And Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the LORD descended upon it in fire: and the smoke thereof ascended as the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly. And when the voice of the trumpet sounded long, and waxed louder and louder, Moses spoke, and God answered him by a voice. And the LORD came down upon mount Sinai, on the top of the mount: and the LORD called Moses up to the top of the mount; and Moses went up (Exod. 19:15-20 [120]).

 

Thunder and lightning and thick clouds; the mighty sound of the trumpet. The Almighty descends on the mountain in fire and Mount Sinai is engulfed in smoke, smoke like the smoke of a kiln, and the sound of the trumpet grows louder and louder: “Moses spoke, and God answered him in thunder.” And after all that comes the constitution: “I am the Lord your God.” This is the Sinaitic theophany, the awesome grandeur of receiving the Law; the ceremony of bestowing a constitution upon Israel. There is no doubt as to who grants the constitution; there is no doubt as to the authority of the giver of the constitution; there is no doubt as to the language of the constitution, and there is no doubt that a constitution has been given.  The authority is not disputed, its language is not disputed, and the giving of the Torah is not disputed.

The same idea has also been presented in different terms: 

R. Abahu said in the name of R. Yohanan: When the Holy One Blessed be He gave the Torah no bird chirped, no fowl took wing, no ox lowed, the wheels [of the celestial chariot] did not rise, the seraphim did not say Holy, the sea did not rock, no creature spoke, but the world was quiet and silent, and there was a voice: “I am the Lord your God” (Shemot Rabba 29  [121]).

This is the Torah of thunder and lightning, of thick cloud and the mighty sound of the trumpet, and this is the Torah of the still small voice.

Indeed, this is the hallmark of a constitution, and to the best of my knowledge it has been the hallmark of constitutions throughout human history. As the Bible states regarding the first tablets: (Exod. 32:16) [119]):

The tablets were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, engraved upon the tablets.

In the past, it was God’s finger that engraved the constitution in stone. In our day it is man’s hand that writes, and the text is in blood and fire and columns of smoke, and if not so, then in fire and columns of smoke, and if not that, then in columns of smoke.

10.  The day of giving a constitution is a day of pomp and circumstance.  Everyone knows that the authorized body is about to enact a constitution, for behold a constitution is about to be given, and behold a constitution is now given. “A constitution is given with full awareness,” with the nation willing to assume the yoke of the constitution, even if by way of “holding the mountain over their heads” [Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat (Sabbath) 88a – ed.].

Today we may require a referendum, a constituent assembly specifically designated for that purpose and charged with the task of framing a constitution, or perhaps some other approach.  Most importantly, we must have a clear knowledge of what lies ahead. The question of the authority to grant a constitution is not “just another legal question” demanding a solution. It is the ultimate question, for in relation to bestowing a constitution it is said : “this day you have become a people”(Deut. 27:9 [119]). More prosaically we might say: today you have been privileged to receive a norm that is elevated above all other norms, a norm so majestic that only the grundnorm stands above it. Is it conceivable that a legal requirement  would arise to cite historical and legal circumstances to prove that a particular body had acquired the authority to bestow  a constitution upon a nation  or had so bestowed a constitution? We are familiar with the issue of constitutional interpretation; and with the issue of the court’s authority, or lack thereof, to invalidate statutes that contradict the constitution. Perhaps our perspective is limited, but to date we have yet to hear of a dispute over whether a particular body has the (historical and legal) authority to grant a constitution to the nation. And we certainly have not heard of this question arising as a legal issue given to judicial resolution.  We have enough – more than enough – questions pertaining to the interpretation of the law and the interpretation of the constitution. We would at least have expected there to be no dispute over the actual authority to enact a constitution. The very existence of disputes on this question indicates the tenuousness of the conclusion that the current Knesset possesses constituent authority.

11.  My colleague President Shamgar, and my colleague President Barak, each in his own way, recognize the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution.  President Shamgar premises the Knesset’s authority on the principle he refers to as the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset.  President Barak, on the other hand, builds the Knesset’s constituent authority on three pillars (models). The first is constitutional continuity from??  the Constituent Assembly of the First Knesset. The second is the rule of recognition and the fundamental conceptions of the Israeli legal community. The third is the model of the “best interpretation of the entirety of the social and legal history of the Israeli legal system.”  President Shamgar’s approach differs from that of President Barak, and Barak’s approach is divided into three secondary models, each different from the others with its own unique contours. However, close examination of both approaches indicates unequivocally that in each of their individual odysseys my colleagues rely on the doctrine of constitutional continuity from the Constituent Assembly of the First Knesset, which is the foundation of their conclusions. In other words, both of the edifices constructed by my colleagues, upon which they base the current Knesset’s constituent authority, originate in the First Knesset’s constituent authority and a constitutional continuity from the Constituent Assembly of the First Knesset until the current Knesset. Accordingly, if this is the basic principle – and it is – it is quite natural for our own journey  to begin from there.

We will therefore pose the following questions: Firstly, did the Constituent Assembly of the first Knesset have the authority to frame a constitution for Israel, and secondly, assuming that it had such power, was this power transferred to all subsequent Knessets?

Regarding the establishment of the “Constituent Assembly”

 

12. The establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel - the State of Israel - was declared on the fifth of Iyar 5708, May 14, .1948.   The operative part of the declaration is in the middle, and it comprises two sub-sections, the first of which reads as follows:

.    

Accordingly we, members of the People’s Council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the basis of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

 

In this subsection we find the grundnorm of the State: recognition of the right of the “members of the People’s Council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and the Zionist Movement” to declare the establishment of the State and to determine binding norms for the people of Israel. The second subsection, which relates directly to the matter currently before us, provides as follows:

WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the elected Constituent Assembly no later than the 1st of October 1948, the People’s Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People’s Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called “Israel.”

This portion of the declaration informs us of a number of matters pertaining to the central institutions of the State, all of them at the pinnacle of the State’s norms. Our current concern is with the “elected constituent assembly,” mentioned in the Declaration. Taking a closer look, we discern that this was an interim, short lived entity, with a single purpose of framing a constitution that would include (among other things, apparently) instructions for the election and establishment of “elected, regular authorities of the State.”  The Provisional Council of State, and the Provisional Government (previously called: the People’s Council and the People’s Administration”) were to continue functioning as the central institutions of the State, and the Constituent Assembly was supposed to function parallel to them in the fulfillment of its one and only task: the establishment of a constitution, within a short period of time, measured in terms of just a few months. The constitution would be written (and the Constituent Assembly would disperse); elections for the “elected regular authorities” would be conducted thereunder, and the elected regular authorities would be established. Only then were the Council of State and the Provisional Government to stop functioning, and all powers would be vested in those elected regular authorities.

 

For our purposes, the following two issues are of primary significance: First, the exclusive devotion of the Constituent Assembly to its task, and second, the termination of the activities of the Constituent Assembly within the short, prescribed period. We shall now briefly comment on these two subjects.

 

13. As for the exclusive devotion of the Constituent Assembly to its task, the intention of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State is self evident:  The Constituent Assembly – as such – was not intended to be a permanent organ of the State, or one of its regular authorities. On the contrary, the Constituent Assembly was intended to function separately and distinctly from the other State authorities, and in parallel to them. The State authorities and councils and the Provisional Government were supposed to pursue their own paths, and carry out their respective functions, while concurrently, the Constituent Assembly was supposed to pursue its path and work towards the fulfillment of its own objective.  The purpose of the Constituent Assembly – its one and only mission – was the framing of the State’s constitution.

 

This, in fact, is how the matter was viewed at the time.  Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on January 25, 1949. On January 24, 1949, the day before the elections, the head of the legislation department in the Ministry of Justice, Uri Yadin, delivered a lecture on the subject of the elections to be held on the following day.  In his lecture, Yadin said the following (Uri Yadin Volume, at p.82):

 

Tomorrow elections will be held for the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel, the first elections since the establishment of the State, and the most important ones for a long time. For we are not going to elect a regular parliament, one of many that will come one after another to enact laws in various areas of our day-to-day lives, but rather,  a unique parliament, of singular importance, charged with the task of endowing the State with one preeminent law, to endure for posterity, as the bedrock of  its existence as a democracy– its basic law – the Constitution.

Future parliaments will be elected in accordance with this basic constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly. The constitution will determine, once and for all, the foundations of the elections, including the active and passive right to vote, the electoral system, the calculation of their results, and the number of delegates, and it will establish a prearranged format for elections to be conducted from time to time, for as long as the constitution remains in force.

 

These brief comments are the essence of our comments above, and we have no need to add to them.

 

A number of additional conclusions can be derived from the above. For example, inasmuch as the Constituent Assembly was intended exclusively for the framing of the constitution, and nothing else – to draft and then to disappear – it follows that it was supposed to be free of any personal  interest in the content of the constitution (cf. Karp, in her aforementioned article, at p.328). Furthermore, having been limited for its particular task, the Constituent Assembly was supposed to have/acquire an appropriate perspective regarding/ the foundations that were to construct the constitution: independent, as it were, from the burden of everyday concerns, and equipped with a panoramic view, looking far ahead, and taking into consideration the long term interests of the State and the individual.

 

As for the short period designated for the Constituent Assembly to draft the constitution, a constitution, by definition, should be written over a relatively short time. While it need not be measured in days, weeks or months, by the same token we have never heard of a constitution being written over a period of fifty years. 

 

I imagine that had the members of the People’s Council been told that after forty-seven years the constitutional enterprise would still be awaiting completion, they would have waived their hands in denial, as if to say,  ‘How can that be? That was definitely not our intention’.  They might even have added: ‘We allocated four and a half months for writing the constitution (from May 14, 1948 until October 1, 1948). Under the circumstances as they transpired, another few months might be added, perhaps even a few years, but forty seven years definitely exceeds the limits of imagination’. Presumably, this would have been the response of the founders of the state, and this is also common practice when drafting a constitution. We must remember that a constitution is and should be written at a propitious hour, when the heavens open to hear our petitions, at a momentous turning point in the life of the nation. In the words of David Ben-Gurion in the Knesset (in the debate on the Constitution):

 

The events of Sinai do not occur every day. We had a grand, historical occasion, twenty-two months ago. In our history of four thousand years there have not been many other such occasions.

I don’t think that it is our last historical event. I believe that we can expect another grand event. It might lack the grandeur of Mount Sinai, or of the establishment of the State. This I cannot know. But I sense the possibility of another grand occasion; perhaps we may even hear the voice speaking out of the fire – ‘by prodigious acts, by signs and portents, by war, by a mighty and outstretched arm and awesome power,’ and again a new and glorious chapter of our history will begin.

Until then, we will toil from day to day in faith and in humility, persistently and without hesitation. We will see to security, immigration and settlement, and to all of the major and minor laws they require (Knesset Proceedings, (1950) at p. 820).

 

Indeed, a constitution is bestowed at the crossroads of a nation’s life. A crossroad that spreads over fifty years is no crossroad. The chasm that emerged between the initial intention and the actual implementation might lead us to say: inaction constitutes a deviation from authority that renders an act outside the scope of permissible activity. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

 

14.  Let us pause for a moment and survey our surroundings. Parallel to the Constituent Assembly, a Provisional Council of State was also supposed to operate in the newly established state. This was the People’s Council before it changed its name. The functions of the Provisional Council of State were not defined by the Declaration of Independence, but rather in the Proclamation, issued concurrently with the Declaration on May 14, 1948, and in the Law and Administration Ordinance, which was published on May 21, 1948, but was given retroactive effect from May, 15, 1948. Section 1 of the Proclamation stated that ‘The Provisional Council of State is the legislative authority,’ and the very same words were repeated in s. 7(a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance

Thus, (normatively) two bodies were created: the Provisional Council of State as the legislative authority, and along with it, the Constituent Assembly, which had yet to be established – as the body meant to draft the State’s constitution. In the words of Professor Uri Yadin (in the Uri Yadin Volume, at pp. 80-81)

 

According to the Declaration of Independence, the Provisional Council of State and the Provisional Government were supposed to continue to function not only until the election of the Constituent Assembly, but also until the establishment of the new sovereign authorities in accordance with the new constitution. The role of the Constituent Assembly would be limited to the formulation and ratification of the constitution, and the tasks of ongoing legislation would remain in the hands of the Provisional Council of State until after the completion of the term of the Constituent Assembly.  Until that time, the two institutions were supposed to exist side by side, and the Provisional Government would serve its present composition until after the elections to the permanent parliament under the new constitution.

 

  1. We will now continue briefly recounting the events that occurred and the various legislative acts that were adopted, after which we will attempt to explain and interpret them. As noted, the Constituent Assembly, within its meaning in the Declaration, was intended as a collegial body charged with the sole task of writing a constitution. However, a constituent assembly as per the instructions and the definition of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State never actually materialized. On January 14, 1949, eleven days before the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State published the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, and in s. 3 of the Ordinance it enacted the following powers of the Constituent Assembly

“Powers of the Constituent Assembly

         The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it does not itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional Council of State.”

 

As noted, the original intention of members of the People’s Council was that the Constituent Assembly would write a constitution, that the regular authorities of the State would be elected under that constitution, and that until the convening of the regular authorities, the Council of State would continue in office, fulfilling the legislative role. However, the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance introduced a change: The Constituent Assembly was no longer intended exclusively to frame the State constitution. From now on, it was also to hold the powers of the Provisional Council of State, i.e. it was to fulfill the legislative role. The Constituent Assembly was charged with two tasks: the task of writing a constitution for the State and the task of enacting laws – one body wearing two crowns.

 

16.  In this context we further note that upon the convening of the Constituent authority, the Provisional Council was supposed to disperse and disappear,  as provided in s. 1 of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance:

 The Continuance in Office of the Provisional Council of State

   The Provisional Council of State shall continue in office until the convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel; upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State shall dissolve and cease to exist.”

 

Yet, once the Constituent Assembly had acquired the legislative authority of the Provisional Council of State, in addition to its authorities as a “Constituent Assembly,” what need  could there be for  an additional body with parallel legislative powers? Hence the provision regarding the discontinuation of the Provisional Council of State.

 

17.  The Provisional Council of State enacted the Constituent Assembly (Elections) Ordinance, and elections were accordingly held, but the Constituent Assembly, at least under that name, was short-lived. On February 24, 1949 the Constituent Assembly convened for the first time, and two days later – on February 16, 1949 –the Transition Law was enacted. Section 1 of that Law spelt the end of the name “Constituent Assembly”:

 

Designation of the legislative body and of the members of the legislative body

       The legislative body of the State of Israel shall be called the Knesset. The Constituent Assembly shall be called “The First Knesset.” A delegate to the Constituent Assembly shall be called “a member of Knesset.”

 

And so it was that the Constituent Assembly disappeared, to be replaced by “The First Knesset.”

 

18.  The First Knesset – i.e. the “Constituent Assembly” as it was originally called – did not write a constitution for Israel.   Lively debates erupted over the questions of whether and what kind of constitution it would actually enact. Finally, a decision was adopted that was subsequently known as “the Harrari Resolution,” named after its proponent, Knesset Member Yizhar Harrari. We will comment further on this decision below, but for present purposes it will suffice to say that the Harrari Resolution deferred the adoption of a constitution to an unspecified date. The Harrari Resolution no longer speaks of a “constitution” but rather of “basic laws” as distinct from a constitution. And so it was until the termination of the First Knesset. Nor did anything change thereafter – not in the Second Knesset nor in the Third Knesset, nor in any of the subsequent Knessets – until this very day.

 

19.  This completes our survey of certain legislative milestones. We now proceed to their interpretation and analysis.

       The Knesset as Possessor of Constituent Authority; the Entrenchment of Statutes

 

20.  The issue currently concerning us is whether the current Knesset possesses constituent authority, i.e. the authority to frame a formal constitution for Israel. To that end, a distinction must be drawn between the question of the Knesset’s au­thority to exercise the powers of a constituent assembly, i.e. the power to enact a constitution, and the question of the Knesset’s authority to enact entrenched laws. These powers are not identical, and one power cannot necessarily be inferred from the other. In fact, constituent authority to enact a constitution may, in principle, include the power to enact entrenched constitutional laws, and quite possibly this is its essence. However, the same inference cannot be made in the other direction.. In other words, authority to enact en­trenched laws does not per se indicate the Knesset’s authority as a constituent authority. The Knesset may acquire the authority to enact entrenched laws, but still be lacking in constituent au­thority. As we will explain below in detail, this in fact is our view. The Knesset is empowered to enact entrenched laws – within certain limits – but it lacks the power of a constituent authority.

 

Thus we must differentiate between the two, and we will maintain this distinction throughout. As mentioned, our current concern is not with the authority of the Knesset to enact entrenched laws. Our current concern is solely with the question of whether the Knesset was vested with constituent authority to enact a constitution.

 

Has a Continuity of the Authority of the “Constituent Assembly” been maintained from the First Knesset to the Knessets That Followed

 

21.  The central question concerning us is, as stated, whether the current Knesset possesses constituent authority – the authority vested in the original Constituent Assembly – together with its regular legislative authority. In my view, the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly lapsed long ago. We will now clarify this matter. 

 

22.  It was the Declaration of Independence that provided for the estab­lishment of an “elected Constituent Assembly” to frame a constitution for Israel. As we saw, shortly before the election of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State decided that all its statutory powers would be exercised by the Constituent Assembly, as long as the latter did not decide otherwise (s. 3 of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance). The Constituent Assembly thus acquired regular legislative powers – its legacy from the Provisional Council of State – while retaining its original power to frame a constitution for Israel, which remained unchanged. The Con­stituent Assembly came and went, and no one would disagree that from the outset it possessed both constituent power, i.e. the power to enact a formal constitution, and legislative power, side by side. The constituent power vested in the Constituent Assembly – here, too, we concur – was not diminished in the least by the fact that, immediately upon its convocation, it renamed itself “the First Knesset.”

 

Had the same Constituent Assembly-First Knesset framed a for­mal Constitution for Israel, I would concede that the deed was done and that its constitution was the Constitution. However this was not the case. The First Knesset dispersed without framing a formal constitution. The Second Knesset, too, failed to write a (formal) constitution, and so, too, all the subsequent Knessets from then until today. The question that inevitably arises is: does the current Knesset possess the original authority of the Constituent Assembly to draft a formal constitution? On this question opinions were divided, and this is the question before us.

 

23.  As noted, the theories of the current Knesset’s constituent authority rely on the following two factors: first, the Constituent Assembly’s authority to draft a constitution, and second, the continuity of that authority to frame a consti­tution from the Constituent Assembly –– that changed its name to the First Knesset –– to all the subsequent Knessets. It is undisputed that the Constituent Assembly (First Knesset) possessed the authority of a “constituent assembly,” namely, authority to frame a constitution. The question is whether it transferred that authority to the Second Knesset. Supporters of the theory of the (current) Knesset’s dual authority cite legislation that purportedly preserves that authority and transfers it, in its entirety and as it was, from one generation to the next: from the Constituent Assembly (First Knesset) to the Second Knesset, from the Second Knesset to the Third Knesset, and so forth, until today (see Rubinstein in his book, ibid,  (4th ed) at p. 447ff; Klein, ibid., 2 Mishpatim; Klein, ibid., 1 Hamishpat; Barak, ibid., Interpretation in Law, vol. 3, at p. 43

 

These are the legislative provisions. Initially there was the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, s. 3 of which provided as follows:

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance

The Powers of the Constituent Assembly

          3. The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it does not itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional  Council of State

 

The Constituent Assembly thus acquired the legislative powers of the Provisional Council of State alongside its power to draft a constitution for Israel.

 

The “Constituent Assembly” changed its name to the First Knesset (as per s. 1 of the Transition Law, and towards the end of its term it enacted the Transition (Second Knesset) Law.  Section 5 of the latter provided as follows: 

The Powers etc. of the Second Knesset and its Members

            5. The Second Knesset and its members shall have all the powers, rights and duties which the First Knesset and its members had

 

Section 9 of the law further provided as follows:

Adaptation of Laws

             9. Wherever in any law reference is made to the constituent assembly or the First Knesset, such reference shall, from the day of the convening of the Second Knesset, unless the context otherwise requires, be read as a reference to the Second Knesset.

 

And whereas the provisions of this law referred exclusively to the transfer of authority from the First Knesset to the Second Knesset, s. 10 of the same law established a general norm with respect to transfer of powers:

Application

            10. This Law shall also apply mutatis mutandis to the transition to the Third and any subsequent Knesset, so long as the Knesset does not pass any other Law concerning the matters dealt with by this Law.

 

Supporters of the two-crown doctrine claim as follows:  The  Constituent Assembly was vested with authority to frame a formal constitution for Israel, and that is not disputed. Following that, these statutory provisions were adopted, each at its own time and place, which transferred that authority from one Knesset to the next, until the current Knesset. The legislative crown, and with it the constituent crown, were passed down, as if from father to son, so that today’s Knesset wears the legislative crown together with the crown worn by the constituent authority about 50 years ago. Is that indeed the case?

24. This argument suffers from perplexing doubts. The question of whether authority passed from person to person or from body to body – by the will of the transferors of the authority – is divided into two separate questions. The first question is whether the person or the body that trans­ferred the authority intended to transfer that authority to another, and the second question is whether that authority could, by its nature, be transferred. In other words, was the transferor permitted and authorized to transfer that authority to another. Only if both of these conditions are met may we say that authority was transferred from one to another. In our case, we must answer the following two separate questions: first, did the First Knesset intend to transfer its authority to enact a constitution to the Knesset following it, and second, was the First Knesset permitted and authorized to transfer that authority to the Knesset that followed it, that is to say, did the First Knesset possess the power to transfer its authority? Was its constituent authority transferable, in principle? A closer look at these issues reveals that it is doubtful that these two elements of transfer of authority were present in the case of the Constituent Assembly. However, our concern for now is with the second element, that of the power of the Constituent Assembly to transfer constitu­ent authority to the Knessets following it.

25. Even if we say that, prima facie, the statutory provisions sought to transfer certain powers – as they were – from Knesset to Knesset, the question remains: Which powers could the Constituent Assembly and all the past and future Knessets transfer to one another? After all, we all agree that a person can transfer only such authority that he is permitted and authorized to transfer; and if the “transferor” is not permitted and authorized to transfer, then his intention to transfer is simply of no consequence.

 

Indeed, in my view, when the Constituent Assembly – which was the First Knesset – dispersed  without having framed a constitu­tion for Israel, the Knesset’s right to draft a constitution as established by the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, expired. The continuity that was maintained by the transition provisions quoted above relates solely to matters of legislation, and not to constitutional issues.

 

26.  Today, the 13th Knesset is serving. Israeli Knessets follow one after the other, each one the image of its predecessor. The Constituent Assembly – the First Knesset – was singular and unique. Today’s Knesset, the Thirteenth Knesset, derives its authority from yesterday’s Knesset, the Twelfth Knesset. The authority of yesterday’s Knesset derived from the authority of the Knesset of the day before, and so our journey goes back until the first Knesset.  Here we pause. We draw the veil from the First Knesset and behold we are confronted with the “Constituent Assembly.” As we further retrace our steps we no longer maintain our pace, because unlike the other Knessets, the Constituent Assembly was a demigod, born not of its predecessors, but rather in the minds of the founders of the State. The People’s Council declared the establishment of the State, it decided upon the institutions to be created, and it conceived the Constituent Assembly and assigned it its first task, namely: to frame a constitution for the State of Israel. Recognition of the authority of the People’s Council to establish all of these goes beyond the scope of the Israeli legal system. It constitutes the grundnorm of our (legal) existence as a state.

 

27. We should recall that the same Constituent Assembly – as established by the People’s Council in the Declaration of Independence – was meant to complete its task of writing the constitution within a few months. It was to write it and then disperse. Hence, the Constituent Assembly was singular, exceptional and unique. Knowing this, we also know that the task of the Constituent Assembly to write a constitution was a specific, one-time mission. The authority of the Constituent Assembly to write a constitution could not be viewed as a property right, transferable at its owner’s will. It was a kind of trust that the People’s Council entrusted to the hands of the Constituent Authority, and a trust – as is known – is not transferable from person to person at the trustee’s behest. Indeed, in going to the polls to elect a “Constituent Assembly” – as dictated by the Constituent Assembly (Elections) Ordinance – the nation was meant to have elected a Constituent Assembly whose function it was to frame a constitution for Israel. Concededly, the Constituent Assembly was also supposed to possess regular legislative powers. However these powers existed independently, while its primary function remained as it was, in accordance with the decision of one whose very existence embodies the basic norm. On the face of it, it would seem therefore that the Constituent Assembly was not empowered to transfer its constituent authority to another (see and cf: Nimmer, supra at p 1239-1240). I agree with Professor Nimmer, and would like to add the following comments.

 

28.  A basic legal principle, rooted in common sense, is that agency cannot be transferred. An agent cannot appoint another agent. Delegatus non potest delegare (see e.g. CrimApp 74/58 Attorney General v. Hornstein, [61]). When I repose my trust in someone, such trust by its very essence, is not transferable.  In the absence of the principal’s authorization, an agent is not permitted to appoint another person to perform the agency (see s. 16 of the Agency Law, 5725-1965: “An agent shall not appoint an agent for the object of his agency, unless he has been expressly or implicitly authorized to do so …”). The performance of certain actions is specifically personal, and no person has the power or the authority to transfer them to another (cf: CA 549/75 A v. Attorney General, [64], at p. 465-466).  The “Constituent Assembly” was established by the  People’s Council, and by law it was supposed to be the nation’s agent for the writing of a constitution. Concededly, the people then designated the Constituent Assembly – by force of a law enacted by the Provisional Council of State – as its explicit agent for the writing of the Constitution. This was what the People’s Council legislated and this was what the people chose. However, neither the People’s Council nor the people authorized the Constituent Assembly to transfer its authority to another body. When a king bestows a title of nobility upon a particular person, that person will indeed become a peer, but the title cannot be transferred to another living person, nor be transferred by inheritance unless it was bestowed as a hereditary title.  A noble cannot transfer his title to another, because the title adheres to him and him only.  So it is with the nobility and so it was with the Constituent Assembly that could not transfer to the Second Knesset the authority that originated in the personal trust reposed in it by the electorate.  All of these matters are quite simple

 

29.  It is undisputed that in its capacity as a constituent authority the First Knesset was authorized only to enact a constitution, and nothing else. The Constituent Assembly was a lofty institution that was supposed to occupy itself with  lofty legislation, but this authority was conferred solely for the purpose of enacting a constitution.  The Constituent Assembly may have been all-powerful, but it was all-powerful as a constituent assembly, and could wield its power only within the defined realm of enacting a constitution.  Its omnipotence did not extend to other areas, including the area of transferring its authority to another. It was not granted the authority to transfer its authority, nor did it possess a “natural authority” to do so, nor was it authorized to “regulate itself” for purposes of transferring its authority.  That which is born unique remains unique. The Constituent Assembly is like a queen bee who sits on her in a place of honor, her life task and purpose being to lay eggs and to thus sustain the next generation of bees.  Survival by procreation is the natural objective of living things, and it is the destiny of the queen. Her task is singularly important, incomparably more important than the task of a worker bee, but this task is exclusively hers and she cannot transfer it to others.

 

As a constituent authority, the First Knesset had one and only one purpose – the writing of a constitution. That authority did not include the authority to extend its term, or to transfer  its authority. The Constituent Assembly (The First Knesset) was like the queen bee, but this title was exclusively its own, and it was not authorized to transfer it to any other body.

 

30.I ascribe tremendous importance to the election for the Constituent Assembly.  When the voters went to the polls to elect the Constituent Assembly, their purpose was  to   elect, by law, a body that would grant Israel its constitution. Even were we to say that the issue of a constitution was raised by political parties in various  Knesset elections,  nevertheless, the election for the Constituent Assembly was different from all of the later  elections for the Knesset, because only in that election was the constitutional question put to the voters by force of law. The Constituent Assembly was created for the express purpose of writing the Constitution, and voters therefore “knew” that they were electing a body that would be drafting a constitution. This feature distinguishes the Constituent Assembly, setting it aside from all subsequent Knessets. Indeed, only the election for the Constituent Assembly, as opposed to any future Knesset elections, were held for the election of a body that would draft a constitution Thus, when the Constituent Assembly failed to discharge its task, the opposition was infuriated and harshly criticized  the government. Members of the opposition who expressed themselves on the matter stressed the Declaration of Independence, the nature of the “constituent assembly,” and above all, the fact that the elections had been for a constituent assembly. They were  elections for the purpose of writing a constitution. For example, Knesset Member Menachem Begin had the following to say (all emphases are our own):

I need not rely on the Declaration of Independence. I rely upon the will of the people as it was expressed in the general elections. What did we elect?  A house of representatives? A regular parliament? A regular legislative body? We all went to elections for a Constituent Assembly, and the concept of a “constituent assembly” is a clearly defined, universally accepted juridical concept.

We may continue to debate this point. We went to the Asefa Mechonenet. This is the (perhaps inadequate) Hebrew rendition of the English term  “constituent assembly.” There have been constituent assemblies in all of the countries that have fought wars of independence.  In all of them it was understood that the constituent assemblies would adopt basic laws and then disperse. The legislature, the executive and the judiciary were established on the basis of that fundamental constitution, and orderly political life began.  Therefore, you were under a single obligation: to enact a constitution, and then to disperse and hold new elections.

The question of whether enacting the constitution will take a year or two years is not decisive, being simply a question of what constitutes a reasonable period. But you? What have you done?  You promised the people to discharge the mandate that you received from it, and without asking the people, by force of an automatic majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly, you decided not to enact a constitution and to maintain a situation in which the ministers are free to run rampant.

Should you choose to alter this situation you may do so, but on one condition, that you ask the people.  The people elected a Constituent Assembly, in other words, it charged all of us with framing a constitution for the State of Israel.  You are unwilling to frame a constitution, perhaps on an impulse, or perhaps for some calculated consideration. Let us stand before the people and tell them: We do not require a constitution, we lack the inspiration, we don’t want to bind the coming generations, and so on, and let the people decide…. All of you, without exception, went to the election for the constituent assembly, and none of you informed the people that there will be no constitution.

We therefore demand that you do one of the following:  Either fulfill the duty that the nation imposed upon you to enact a constitution, or conduct a referendum in which all of the Israeli voters will participate, and they will decide again upon the question of the constitution, because your first obligation is to enact a constitution, and that is your  duty. You are not entitled to alter your mandate (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4, pp. 739-740)

 

Similar statements were made by Knesset Member Joseph Serlin: 

 

We were elected as the Constituent Assembly, and the same house that changed its name from the Constituent Assembly to the Knesset was promised that the change of name was merely an expression of  respect due  the Hebrew language.  As a Constituent Assembly, we were charged with the single, fundamental task of adopting and granting the people a constitution. At the very moment when, by force of the majority of the parties that are members of the coalition, this Constituent Assembly, which calls itself “the Knesset” abandoned and evaded its duty to give the people a constitution, its term expired and its authority ended.

It is impossible to come back two years later and to propose that the very same Constituent Assembly serve as the Knesset for another two years.  At the moment at which the Constituent Assembly that became the Knesset failed to fulfill its mission and chose  not to grant the people a constitution, it has betrayed the people’s trust.  It is inconceivable that it should now be given a license to sit for another two years as the Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 7, p. 214).

 

In a similar vein, Knesset Member Meir Wilner stated:

 

This defiance of the people’s will is unacceptable.  During the elections for this Knesset, we all promised to prepare a constitution.  This Knesset was elected by the people as a constituent assembly – as the assembly that was to establish the State, its foundations, and its constitution. Concurrently, it sees to the ongoing affairs of State.  We are not a regular parliament; we are a constituent assembly.  You will recall that when we gave our assembly a name – calling it the “Knesset” – we immediately adopted a unanimous amendment that this would be the First Knesset. The aim was to stress the unique charter of this Knesset – the framing of the Constitution – and that its term would be shorter than that of a regular parliament.  We accepted this obligation prior to the elections. This is the concept of a constituent assembly. It was dictated by the change in the political situation and the change in the composition of the population. The adoption of a constitution within one year, and the conducting of new elections are a critical necessity for the State (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4,  p. 804).

 

And Knesset Member Jacob Kalibnov:

 

Let us recall just how many times in the space of an entire year declarations were made regarding the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution: [It was referred] to by the People’s Council, by the Provisional Council of State, and by the Provisional Government. It began with the Declaration of Independence, and the establishment of a committee to prepare a Constitution in the Provisional Council of State; it was followed by the Elections to the Constituent Assembly Law, the official notification of the results of the election, and then followed by the adoption of the Transition (Constituent Assembly) Ordinance. Can there be any doubt that all of these declarations and actions specifically referred to a constituent assembly and not a regular house of representatives, and that they viewed the Constituent Assembly’s principal task as being the preparation of the Constitution? It is also true that this House was established a year ago and it changed its name, ostensibly expressing its desire to redefine its purpose and role and to transform itself from being a constituent assembly into a regular parliament. Unfortunately we have no higher instance that is authorized to annul the decision of this House (ibid., p. 826).

 

We cited all of the above – and other examples abound – in order to stress that the Constituent Assembly was intended for a particular purpose. It, and only it, was established to frame a constitution,  whether by virtue of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, or  the election for the Constituent Assembly.  This trust placed by the people in the Constituent Assembly was not transferable to anyone else, inasmuch as the people did not authorize it to transfer its authority to anyone else.

 

31. Professor Amnon Rubinstein was one of the first people to write about the Knesset’s authority as a constituent authority (see Rubinstein, 16 Scripta Hierosolymitana, supra, at p.201). Professor Rubinstein addressed the unique character of the Constituent Assembly in his aforementioned book  (4th ed.) at p.449:

 

Another argument relies on the constituent authority not being a right of the house of  representatives, but rather a right of the people that is entrusted to the constituent assembly. When it dispersed without adopting a constitution, its authority lapsed. In order to draft a constitution, an election must be held for a new constituent body, or the constitution must be submitted for approval by referendum.  This is a weighty argument. We also believe that a matter as serious as the adoption of a constitution should be confirmed by the voting public in a referendum, or by presenting the proposed constitution as an issue in the general election to the Knesset. However, from a binding legal perspective it is difficult to see a difference between the First Knesset (the Constituent Assembly) and the subsequent Knessets. All of them were characterized by the same functional duality. In enacting the Basic Laws, the Knesset officially confirmed its inheritance of the constituent authority.

 

This response must be read very closely. Personally, I am unable to find an answer to the claim that the Constituent Assembly – First Knesset was not authorized to transfer its constituent authority to the subsequent Knessets, this authority having been exclusively its own

 

32. Furthermore, the theory that places two crowns upon the Knesset (today) leads to a trap from which I see no escape.  The two-crown theory views the Knesset as possessing two kinds of authority: “constituent” authority – to draft a constitution; and legislative authority – to draft laws.  Depending on the matter at hand, the Knesset – as necessary and as it deems fit – acts as a constituent authority to enact laws of a constitutional nature, or acts in its legislative capacity to enact laws. According to this doctrine, constituent authority transcends legislative authority, and when the Knesset convenes as a constituent authority it is superior to the Knesset sitting as a legislative authority.

 

We will not concern ourselves now with the generally artificial nature of this formulation, we will just mention that it was via regular legislation – transition laws – that the Knesset purported to transfer its authority from one Knesset to the next. Laws qua laws are the product of the Knesset as a legislative authority, that is to say as an authority inferior to the constituent authority. Thus the question arises: How can an “inferior” legislative authority transfer the powers of a superior authority – the constituent authority – from one superior authority to another superior authority?  How can the “mundane” legislature bestow “sacred” constituent authority? Do we recognize the legislature’s power to deal with the powers of a constituent authority? Shall the saw magnify itself against him who wields it [Isaiah 10:15 – ed.]? Indeed, a mundane Knesset cannot establish a constituent assembly. It cannot enact a law that creates an authority higher than the Knesset itself. The saw cannot magnify itself against him who wields it. Just as a person cannot save himself from drowning by pulling himself up by his own hair, the Knesset cannot empower another body to establish a constitution to which the Knesset would be subordinate. And if the Knesset lacks the authority to establish a constituent assembly, does it not follow that it is similarly powerless to transfer the powers of a constituent assembly to itself or to any other body? After all, transferring the authority is tantamount to bestowing the authority to the body to which it is supposed to be transferred. We therefore know that the Knesset in its legislative capacity was not empowered to transfer its constituent authority from one Knesset to the next.

 

We should also bear in mind that the Second Knesset (Transition) Law was enacted only after the Harrari Resolution, i.e. after the Knesset elected to enact “Basic Laws” instead of a single constitution. The Harrari Resolution was adopted on June 13, 1950, and the Second Knesset (Transition) Law was published on April 12, 1951.  As such, why didn’t the Knesset see fit to transfer the authority of one Knesset-Constituent-Assembly to the next Knesset-Constituent-Assembly by way of a Basic Law, if only to signify that it was acting as a constituent authority? I cannot accept the answer that the Knesset was not sufficiently aware of the difference between the two kinds of legislation, and that it should not be called on a mere technicality. Indeed, the Knesset was not aware of this point because there was no need to be aware of something that did not exist. The Knesset was not authorized to transfer constituent authority, and it clearly did not intend to transfer its non-transferable authority. Needless to say, the intention to transfer as such – had it existed – would not have sufficed.

 

We therefore agree with Minister of Justice Dr Dov Yosef, who made the following statement from the Knesset podium:

 

Nor do I believe that there is any law that stands “above the regular legislature.” We do not have two legislatures. We have only the Knesset, and in my opinion, a law of the Knesset cannot limit the Knesset’s legislative power, and if there is such a provision in any law, then, I believe that a regular majority of the Knesset can repeal the provision that purports to limit its rights.

And a constituent assembly enjoys an exceptional and extraordinary status.

 However, after our legislature was established in the way it was established, and we did not establish such a constitution at the outset, I do not think that it is possible to deny the Knesset’s ability to decide upon any law as it sees fit. When we elected the First Knesset, we called it a “Constituent Assembly” in accordance  with the resolutions of the United Nations, but those resolutions were not implemented, and in fact, the first Knesset did not function as a Constituent Assembly at all. On the contrary, we functioned as a regular Knesset, and we dealt with all of the subjects that concern a regular Knesset . We did not function as a Constituent Assembly charged with framing a Constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 789).

 

33.  Our comments above are consistent with the conception of a legal system – any legal system – as a collection of norms, all of them collectively justified by a single “grundnorm,” in accordance with the doctrine of the great Kelsen. A constituent authority cannot establish itself. Its establishment requires a foundation point that is external to the positive legal system: that is the grundnorm. Insofar as the constituent authority cannot constitute itself, neither can it transfer its authority to any other body. Only the body that established it – for example, a referendum – has the authority to authorize the transfer of constituent authority to another body. This is proof, if further proof is required, of why the Constituent Assembly was neither permitted nor competent to transfer its constituent authority. Hence, with the dispersal of the First Knesset, which was elected as the constituent assembly, the constituent authority lapsed.

 

34.  As mentioned above, the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset was distinguished from all the subsequent Knessets, being the sole body with an express legal mandate (in the Declaration of Independence) to frame a constitution for Israel.  The people had chosen the constituent assembly ex lege to compose its constitution, and the Constituent Assembly thus had its roots in the people, from which it directly derived its authority. From this we learn that it was the real constituent assembly, the one and only one that had the authority to give the people a constitution for which purpose it had been chosen by the people. This could not be said of the other Knessets that followed the First Knesset (which had been named at birth “The Constituent Assembly”).

 

The issue of the constitution may indeed have arisen in the elections to the Second and Third Knessets, but then it was only one of a number of questions, and parties drafted their platforms in order to win the hearts of the voters, as has always been the practice, both in our country and all over the world.

 

We all know that in the elections to the Second Knesset and to all the subsequent Knessets, the universally discussed issues were peace and security, adopting an aggressive or moderate policy, the social gap and integration, social welfare and the standard of living. The issue of the constitution assumed modest and unassuming proportions, hovering on the peripheries of the operative programs, even if it featured prominently in the party platforms, and it is doubtful whether the voters seriously considered the issue.  As such, nothing can be inferred from the mandate ostensibly given by the people to the Second Knesset and to those following it to enact a constitution. While that is true in general,  it is even more so the case considering that certain parties totally omitted the constitutional issue from their platforms, and others expressed their opposition to a constitution for Israel.  The division of opinions was so great that it is almost impossible to draw a conclusion that the Knesset elections following the First Knesset were for the purpose of framing a constitution – quite the contrary.  Building a constitution upon party platforms, to the extent that they existed, would be quite a leap.

 

35.  Our comments above indicate that the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset did not transfer its power to the Second Knesset and to the following Knessets. The Constituent Assembly was not authorized to transfer its authority  to others, and the Knesset, as a legislative authority inferior to the constituent authority, was not empowered to transfer its superior constituent authority.  With the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset, the original authority to frame a constitution for Israel lapsed and ceased to exist 

 

This account of the lapsing of constituent authority is strongly reflected in the comments of Knesset members. For example, one member of the Provisional Council of State, Z Warhaftig (Chairman of the Constitutional Committee) asserted that the Constituent Assembly (which at that time had yet to be elected), was unique, and that it would draw its authority directly from the nation. From his statements we learn that the Constituent Assembly would not be able to transfer its authority to another body. This is what he said (the emphases are all our own):

 

The source of the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly is the people, the people’s will. Its sovereignty does not issue from the Council of State. The Council of State can only transfer to the Constituent Assembly what it has, and no more. It is an accepted legal norm that one institution cannot transfer to another institution more rights than it already has, meaning that we can only transfer rights that we have, and we are unable to grant the Constituent Assembly authority that we do not possess. Any other rights will be derived by the Constituent Assembly from the people in elections, in accordance with our decision and notification regarding elections to the Constituent Assembly, by which we placed everything in the hands of the public, and the Constituent Assembly derives its sovereignty from the public. We must remember: “Any addition is a deficiency” (Proceedings of the Provisional Council of State, January 13, 1949, p. 10)

 

MK Joseph Serlin was of the opinion that the Second Knesset and its successors did not and would not have constituent authority. He stated:

 

We were elected as the Constituent Assembly, and the same house that changed its name from the Constituent Assembly to the Knesset was promised that the change of name was merely an expression of the respect due to the Hebrew language.  As a Constituent Assembly, we were charged with the single, fundamental task of adopting and granting the people a constitution. At the very moment when, by force of the majority of the parties that are members of the coalition, this Constituent Assembly, which calls itself “the Knesset” abandoned and evaded its duty to give the people a constitution, its term expired and its authority lapsed.

It is impossible to come back two years later and to propose that the very same Constituent Assembly serve as the Knesset for another two years.  At the moment at which the Constituent Assembly that became the Knesset failed to fulfill its mission and chose  not to grant the people a constitution, it has betrayed the people’s trust.  It is inconceivable that it should now be given a license to sit for another two years as the Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 7, p. 214).

 

The opinion of Knesset Member Menachem Begin, is indicated in the following:

 

I am convinced – and in concluding my comments I wish to express my belief – that the day will come when the people will vote for a government that will fulfill the first promise made to the people upon the establishment of the State, to elect a Constituent Assembly whose central task in any nation that has come into being, is to give the people a constitution, and to adopt the legislative guarantees that ensure the freedom of its citizens and the entire nation (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 20, at p. 2220

 

     MK Osnia also maintained that the Knesset did not have constituent authority, and stated as follows (on behalf of the majority in the Constitution Committee):

 

Let us assume that the Knesset now decides upon such a section, that we will call s. 43A or 44, and then someone – not by chance – follows the same long or short procedure to table a motion suggesting that we revoke the provision that requires a two-thirds majority of 80 votes. Now we are not a “constituent body,” and if we were, in fact, a constituent assembly, we would have to adopt that decision by a majority of two thirds. And so, do you really think that there is any kind of ratio legis whereby through a vote of 54 against 52, or 54 versus 40, we can decide something that in the future would require a decision by a majority of 80? 54 against 40 cannot dictate that only a majority of 80 can change the section.  The members of Knesset could subsequently convene and revoke the section by  a regular majority. This is not a constitutional law in the sense that any of its sections cannot lawfully be changed by another law (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 23 at p. 926).

 

Minister of Justice Dov Yosef, took a similar view:

 

Nor do I believe that there is any law that stands “above the regular legislature.” We do not have two legislatures. We have only the Knesset, and in my opinion, a law of the Knesset cannot limit the Knesset’s legislative power, and if there is such a provision in any law, then, I believe that a regular majority of the Knesset can repeal the provision that purports to limit its rights.

 

Jurists conversant in constitutional law claim that the legislature can be limited by a constitution adopted by a constituent assembly prior to the establishment of the legislature. The constituent assembly establishes the rules that determine how the state will be established and manage its affairs, and the essential content of its laws. The decision of such a body can be viewed as being binding upon the legislature because that is the intention of the people in establishing such a constituent assembly.

…                                                                         

And a constituent assembly enjoys an exceptional and extraordinary status.

 However, after our legislature was established in the way it was established, and we did not establish such a constitution at the outset, I do not think that it is possible to deny the Knesset’s ability to decide upon any law at it sees fit. When we elected the First Knesset, we called it a “Constituent Assembly” in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, but those resolutions were not implemented, and in fact, the first Knesset did not function as a constituent assembly at all. On the contrary, we functioned as a regular Knesset, and we dealt with all of the subjects that concern a regular Knesset. We did not function as a constituent assembly charged with framing a Constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 789).

 

This was also the view of MK Benjamin Halevi:

 

It as though we are adding to all of the Basic Laws – Basic Law: The Knesset; Basic Law: President of the State; Basic Law: Israel Lands; and Basic Law: The State Economy, etc. –  an additional provision that states that this Basic Law that was adopted in the past cannot be amended or contravened or changed except  by a majority of 61 Knesset members. How are we making that addition? Not by a 61 member majority but by a smaller majority. The contradiction here is patent, perhaps not in the legal-technical sense, but certainly in the moral sense. Who gave it legitimacy? We are not a constituent assembly, and we are not composing a constitution. At this point in time there are less than two dozen members sitting in the Knesset. In the presence of two dozen or fewer  Knesset members we presume to curtail the Ninth Knesset, the Tenth Knesset and any other subsequent Knesset so that they can only make changes  by virtue of a special majority. I do not think that this is legitimate. It is not practical. This is not the time to do it. There are serious legal doubts as to whether any Knesset is empowered to act in this fashion (Knesset Proceedings, vol.  78, p. 955).

 

The comments of MK Amnon Rubinstein, one of the outstanding proponents of the two-crown theory, are particularly interesting. This is what MK Rubinstein said in the Knesset:

 

…There was debate in previous Knessets as to whether the Knesset can entrench laws against their amendment by force of a regular majority, and the view that more or less prevailed, though still disputed, was that where it concerns the Knesset’s role as a constituent assembly, that is, when it acts as the drafter of a constitution, when it enacts a chapter of the constitution, it is empowered to establish the superior status of a particular law (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 99, p. 2790)

 

MK Rubinstein admits quite candidly: When sitting as a constituent authority, the Knesset can, in my view, enact a supra-legal statute, but this view, is “still being disputed.” Now if this was the view of MK Rubinstein – who is none other than Professor Rubinstein – is this not sufficient proof for all that the Knesset is not unanimous in regard to the two-crown doctrine, that the Knesset’s opinion wavers on this point and certainly is not firmly anchored?  

 

We have not said, nor will we say that the unanimous view  is and has always been that the constituent authority was not transferred from the Constituent Assembly to the ensuing Knessets. There were those who supported this view, and others who rejected it, and others who were silent on the matter.  The overall picture is, however, that we are a long way from the conclusion that the members of the Knesset have consistently held that the constituent authority of the Constituent Assembly passed down by  inheritance to all of the subsequent Knessets, until the current Knesset.

 

36.  The question of the constitutional continuity of the constituent authority is in fact part of a much larger question: Does today’s Knesset – and in fact any of the Knessets after the First Knesset – have the authority to frame a constitution?  In presenting this question – which is the heart of our discussion – and in reviewing the comments of the Knesset members, it clearly emerges that the position adopted by Knesset members over the generations was far from unequivocal  on  the question of whether the Knesset possesses constituent authority, whether as the heir and successor of the Constituent Assembly, or otherwise, and on the question of the Knesset’s status as a constituent authority with regard to the adoption of a constitution, with regard to the Knesset’s power to limit itself by way of the entrenchment of laws, and with regard to the ancillary and derivative questions flowing from these questions. Regarding each proposition on these matters there are a number of opinions – East, West, North and South – that do not all lead to the same valley. The necessary conclusion from our survey of the material is that the Knesset never took a single, exclusive view of its authority as a constituent assembly. Anyone seeking the “Knesset’s” opinion will receive  a number of responses, as is the Jewish way. So it was in the First Knesset, and so it continues to be.

 

Furthermore, in reading the speeches of the Knesset members we do not know whether their views are “legal” interpretation or whether they are the views of statesmen and politicians (though presumably the political factor is the decisive  one). Against this background, we can understand why Government supporters expressed one view, whereas opposition members expressed another view, and the religiously observant Knesset members had their own view. Indeed, a number of Knesset members who were jurists based their views on legal rationales, but they were few, and we should remember that they too sat in the Knesset as representatives of parties and not as men of law.

 

Lastly, from reading statements made by Knesset members we learn that the question of the Knesset’s constituent authority is inseparably linked to the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit itself by way of entrenchment of laws. In other words, Knesset members alternately refer to the Knesset’s constituent authority and to its power to entrench laws treating of rights, as if the two were identical. Needless to say, this confusion of two dissimilar terms weakens the assertion that the Knesset members themselves supported the notion of the Knesset’s constituent power, when in fact they were referring to the Knesset’s power of self-limitation.

 

37. We will cite some of the statements made by Knesset members on point (emphases are our own):

 

The following statements were made by MK Haim Zadok, a brilliant jurist and later the Minister of Justice:

 

As to the concluding part of s. 4, stating that “this section shall not be varied save by a majority of the members of the Knesset,” i.e. not by a regular majority of those voting but a special majority, we reject this provision, not just because we reject the existing electoral system, but also for a fundamental, constitutionally based reason,  namely that  any  attempt to limit  the Knesset’s authority to change the laws of the state by way of regular legislation is not consistent with the constitutional structure of the State of Israel and the Knesset’s sovereignty.

 

We live in a regime in which the Knesset is sovereign, in other words with a legislature which despite its physical, political, public and moral limitations, is nonetheless all-powerful and unlimited in the constitutional-legal dimension. Arguably, there is only one constitutional limitation to the omnipotence of the sovereign Knesset, deriving from its basic nature as a sovereign parliament – that it is unable to limit the power of subsequent sovereign parliaments.

 

For this reason we utterly reject the provision pertaining to a special majority in s. 4, and for the same reason we reject the provision in s. 45, which stipulates that s. 4 and s. 45 can only be varied by a majority of 80 Knesset members.

 

In addition to the constitutional consideration, I must further add that the qualification appearing in s. 44 requiring a majority of 61 was adopted at the time by a majority of 56 votes versus 54, and the qualification of s. 45, mandating a majority of 80 Knesset members, was adopted by a majority of 43 versus 40. Our opinion was and remains that a regular Knesset majority has no public or moral right to erect a protective wall of a special or weighted majority with respect to a statutory provision adopted by a regular majority.

 

We reject the law in its entirety, and our principled position is that one Knesset cannot tie the hands of the Knesset that follows it, and this position naturally applies to the new provision appearing in the Articles (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 27, p. 2961)

 

This was also the opinion of Knesset Member Akiva Guvrin:

 

Honored Speaker and Knesset. The party faction of Poalei Eretz Yisrael disputed and continues to dispute, both from a public and a moral perspective, the provision adopted by the Knesset with respect to a special majority, that was adopted by a regular, non-special majority. …

           

It is our opinion that the Third Knesset adopted this law – this faulty arrangement – in reliance on its claim – which it correctly makes in this regard – that it was continuing the work of the First and Second Knesset.

 

As such, the Fourth Knesset will have the statutory, moral and public right  to repeal by regular majority, at the nation’s behest, a provision that in our view was neither moral nor publicly justified - the provision concerning a special majority and the existing electoral system.

 

The various factions, which adopted the provision regarding a special majority by force of a regular majority, are apparently aware of what the public sentiment is, how many members, even within their own factions, recognize  the seriousness of the harm inherent in the current electoral system, and so they attempted and continue to attempt to employ another law in order to prevent any examination of the matter (ibid,  at p. 2962)

 

The following statement was made by Knesset Member  Bar Rav-Hai:

 

If they introduced this limitation... there is no power in the State of Israel that will succeed in limiting the will of this House. There is no power in the world that can dictate to this house the position of the majority views of the Sixth and Seventh Knesset… I categorically reject this authority.  We live at a time in which things change far faster than we imagine, and it is impossible  to determine today a format for living  in the next generation, and to compel it to live in accordance with that format established by the wise men of this generation, myself included (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 36, p. 1044).

 

Knesset Member Osnia, for example, contended that the Knesset lacked the authority to entrench laws and, in that manner curtail its own discretion, and he had the following to say regarding Basic Law: President of the State:

 

I would now like to address some of the questions arising in regard  to the proposed law. 

Permit me to say, without going into details of the matter, that the proposal made here to entrench certain sections by requiring a special majority in order to change them is meaningless in the absence of a constitution that, by force of its adoption by a special majority, establishes the principle of a special majority without which it cannot be changed. It is meaningless in respect of any law.  I think that when a law – even a Basic Law – states that there is a requirement for a special majority, another law can propose changing that requirement by way of amendment, and I see no basis for inferring that the adoption of such an amendment would require a special majority. In other words, my intention is that one cannot obtain rigidity of  Basic Laws via the window without first going through the door of attaining a rigid constitution. Absent such rigidity, according to the constitutional conception prevailing in the State of Israel, no attempt to entrench any law will be of any avail (ibid,  at p. 970)

 

Knesset Member Yisrael Yeshayahu-Sharabi took a similar view:

 

We are a state under the rule of law. Israeli law is fully operative, and of that there can be no doubt.

But it is doubtful whether anybody authorized us to shackle the hands and the will of the nation’s chosen representatives by a rigid, entrenched and privileged  constitution, which would deny them the benefit of the same right that we ourselves enjoy, to decide what appears to them as right and just by a simple majority… What makes us more special than them and why should their rights be inferior to ours?

 

In other words, it is not only that we lack the time, and cannot say to the Knesset “Sun, stand thou still at Gibeon” to accommodate a one-time effort to formulate a consolidated and privileged constitution, as proposed by Knesset Member Klinghoffer; we also cannot arrogate to ourselves such far reaching authority. Anyone seeking such authority, must request it from the source of the authority – the people itself (ibid.,  p. 1037).

 

And Knesset Member Bar Rav Hai stated:

 

What I absolutely reject is the possibility of a particular law chaining the hands of the next generation… (ibid, p.  1043)

 

Minister of Justice Dr Dov Yosef adamantly insisted that the Knesset lacked the power to limit itself, and on one occasion made the following statement:

 

Nor am I clear as to the basis for Knesset Member Klinghoffer’s assumption that he can propose that this draft proposal be adopted only if voted for by two thirds of all the Knesset members. The Knesset articles, as of today at least, recognize no limitation on the Knesset’s power to decide by a majority of those participating in the vote. Knesset Member Klinghoffer cannot change this by including a provision for that purpose in his draft proposal. In any event, for as long as the proposal has not been adopted, it certainly is not the law, and its contents are not binding upon the Knesset. In other words, even were a regular majority of voters to support his proposal, it would have the force of law.  Where is the justice in enabling  twenty out of thirty members voting for his proposal to shackle the hands of the Knesset that may sit and deliberate over the same law in another fifteen years?  . The result would be that even a majority of the Knesset at that time, which would be three times more than twenty, would be powerless to change what was determined in his draft proposal. Legislation can be adopted, and as I mentioned, many of our laws have been adopted, by the votes of 15, 18, 20, and 22 Knesset members. What possible logic and moral foundation can there be for coming to the Knesset and saying: limit yourselves? Something that was done  by 15 Knesset members when legislating that law, will be eternally valid, and even 61 Knesset members will be unable to repeal it. According to what kind of justice? What kind of morality? (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 789).

 

The Head of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Knesset Member Moshe Unna, expressed an original view, taking the same path:

 

            Honored speaker and Knesset: The question of the rigidity of constitutional provisions raised by Knesset Members Klinghoffer and Kushnir may possibly be of importance with respect to particular statutes, and I will not deny that I favor rigidity for certain laws. But in what context? When there is a special, substantive reason in the particular provision, such as Basic Law: The Knesset, in which we establish the electoral system and wish to ensure that it not easily be amended.  It must, however, be clear that even in that case the effectiveness of such a provision is inevitably quite limited, because even that kind of provision can be changed by a regular Knesset vote. Nonetheless, it gives expression to the fact that the Knesset deemed this particular provision to be of special importance (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 40, at p. 2025)

 

Justice Minister Dov Yosef responded by saying:

 

Until today, and apart from one case, the rule in the Knesset has been that the Knesset always decides by a majority of votes. In my humble opinion, this rule is vital and must be maintained. Even regarding the particular instance in which the Knesset decided otherwise, as already noted by the Committee chairman, the validity of that particular statutory provision is highly questionable (ibid. p 2025).

 

In another place Knesset Member Ari Ankorin stated as follows:

 

Honorable Speaker, I consider the British system preferable, under which all laws are of equal value and a regular majority is sufficient to change any law, even a law referred to as constitutional…

 

…At the very most – in our debate over the nature of the preference to be given to this Basic Law or any other Basic Law – I would demand that in considering a change in a Basic Law, the Knesset should be required to take note of that fact. In other words, when passing a law that is liable to violate a particular provision of this Basic Law, it should expressly state,  “notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law, it will be so and so.” That is to say that the Knesset should do whatever it does with the knowledge that it is changing something in the existing Basic Law.  But I would not in any other sense limit the right of this Knesset or of any Knesset to legislate. In other words, I support flexibility as opposed to rigidity.

I have already stated and I accept that it would be good  to have a bill of rights, but it should be exactly the same as with the English. Whatever is written in the Magna Carta, in the charter of rights, can be amended by any parliament. It is a separate question whether or not it actually makes any changes, but it is capable of doing so, and any other option is inconceivable.

I think that we ought to follow this example  and avoid casting doubt upon the work of a parliament – of any parliament or of any Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 71, p. 2494-2495).

 

This was also the view adopted by Knesset Member Binyamin Halevi:

 

I have found two statements in Jewish law that are germane to this subject. The first is “A prisoner does not release himself from prison.”  If we limit ourselves we place ourselves in the category of incarcerated prisoners, and we will be incapable of  freeing ourselves unless the court comes along and says that the limitations are not valid. Another principle in Jewish law is “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits.” If the Knesset by  a regular majority  prohibited  itself from amending a Basic Law, the same Knesset can release  itself from those bonds  by force of a regular law. This draft law apparently contradicts these principles, and it would be injudicious to enclose  ourselves in these shackles (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 78, p. 956)

 

This was also the view adopted by Knesset Member David-Zvi Pinkas:

 

Some think that the constitution should be a privileged law, one that cannot be changed or - can be changed only with difficulty. We received explanations regarding the accepted practice among other nations regarding rigid and flexible constitutions. I cannot imagine that we will be able to accept any of these concepts. Regarding a rigid constitution and a constitution enjoying privileged  status, I need only  something we all know about a constitution that was adopted by a stupid king – King Ahasuerus, who ruled over one hundred and twenty seven provinces, from India to Ethiopia. His constitution stated “an edict written in the name of the king and sealed with the king’s ring cannot be revoked.” Shall we adopt a “successful” constitution such as that?

 

Is it conceivable that this House would prevent itself, or subsequent Houses, from deciding and doing whatever may be required at the proper time? (Knesset Proceedings, vol.5 p. 1263).

 

We have cited the comments of Knesset members at length if only to show clearly that the members of successive Knessets have never shared a single view. There have indeed been many who asserted that the Knesset lacked constituent authority, and we cannot ignore this view when deciding on the question of whether the current Knesset has constituent authority.

 

 

The Harrari Resolution

  1. My colleagues view the “Harrari Resolution” as one of the important links in what they view as an unbroken chain that began with the authority of the Constituent Assembly to enact a constitution, and ends (for the time being) with the  authority of the current Knesset to enact a constitution.  I cannot accept their view. Firstly, it should be remembered that the “Harrari Resolution” was only a resolution, and we find it difficult to anchor the authority to frame a constitution in nothing more than a Knesset resolution. Secondly, reading the Knesset Proceedings teaches us that the Harrari Resolution is open to a variety of interpretations, and that each Knesset member relied on it to prove the argument that he found most politically convenient.  The situation was aptly described by Knesset Member Nahum Nir-Refalkes: 

Honored Speaker and Knesset. Knesset Member Yeshayahu found it necessary to return to the debate conducted in the First Knesset over a period of four months, from the beginning of February 1950 until June 13th of that year. If our intention is to renew the debate over whether or not the State of Israel requires a constitution, then I think that after such a long hiatus, we should at least adduce new reasons, such as were not heard thirteen years ago. The only reason we have now heard from Knesset Member Yeshayahu is the same one that was suggested ten or twenty times by the Prime Minister at the time, to the effect that it is  wrong to bind the coming generations by the enactment of a constitution. Meanwhile one generation has passed and a second generation is also passing, and it will never be possible to limit the coming generations, and so we will never have a constitution.

 

Our concern at the time, as it is today, is that nothing compels us to adopt a rigid constitution in the first place. Different states have adopted different paths, such as the possibility of revision of the constitution with every new generation, or every twenty years, so as not to bind the coming generation. The debate terminated with the adoption of that miserable resolution on the 13th of June (the Harrari Resolution – M.C.), which was a compromise decision.

 

The story is told of a wife who consulted with her husband over what kind of shoes to buy – high heels or low heels. The husband told her to buy shoes with high heels, to which she responded: If I buy high heeled shoes I could fall and break a leg. The husband then said: Buy low heels, to which she replied,  they’re not stylish. Then he suggested that she buy a pair of shoes, one with a high heel and the other a low heel. She answered: “Then I’ll limp.” Her husband then explained that nothing could be done about that. It is a compromise, and every compromise  limps.

This was the compromise of Knesset Member Harrari, who, like his colleague Knesset Member Rosen – then serving as Minister of Justice – favored a constitution, and felt that the best decision was one  low heel and one high heel (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 36 p. 1039).

 

Thus, for example, Knesset Member Yeshayahu Forder made the following statement:

 

The debate ended in a compromise. The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee was charged with the preparation of proposals for the Basic Laws that would be submitted to the Knesset one by one. The clear intention was to fill the empty framework, and instead of a rigid constitution, to at least grant Basic Laws with all possible speed (Knesset Proceedings, vol.15, p. 73).

 

In other words, the “Harrari Resolution” put the last nail in the Constitution’s coffin, and replaced it with Basic Laws, in other words, with laws that are not a constitution.

 

This, indeed, was the view taken by Knesset Member Hanan Rubin:

 

Honored Knesset, when dealing with the first of the Basic Laws, I cannot begin my comments without mentioning the fact that we do not have a constitution, and I fear that there is no chance of a constitution being adopted in the near future. As for the entire artificial structure of laws that at the end of days will be “combined” or “incorporated” into a constitution – it goes without saying that this totally contrived theory only serves to camouflage the grave reality that there is no constitution nor is there any desire for a constitution. Three reasons underlie the unwillingness to have a constitution.

 

The first reason is that it suits any incidental majority in the Government and the Knesset for there not to  be any law bearing the title of constitution, a law which fundamentally regulates the workings of the State institutions, and which defines its social regime. It is convenient for it to be able to occasionally change these matters by a simple majority in accordance with its momentary  needs (ibid. at p. 119).

 

Knesset Member Harrari himself contended that the “Harrari Resolution” did not purport to decide whether Israel would have a material constitution or whether it would have a formal (entrenched) constitution. In his own words:

 

In the momentous debate conducted during the first Knesset whether the enactment of a constitution was necessary or not, it was decided that the State of Israel would have a constitution but no decision was made regarding the nature of that constitution, and regarding its priority over any other law. Accordingly, it seems to me somewhat premature to speak today as if it has already been decided that there will be no relative majority.

Admittedly, I am opposed to a special majority and from that perspective I accept all the reasons cited by the Prime Minister against a special majority, but this does not mean that if we fail to decide on a special majority we are abandoning the concept of constitutional supremacy. Conceivably, a regular majority is compatible with the requirement that the law be passed twice or three times within a particular period.  A regular majority can be subjected to certain restrictions in terms of duration, and the like, or similar to our decision regarding the President of the State, that at the same session  no other matter may be discussed, or that notice must be given as to when the discussion of that issue will begin etc. (ibid, at p. 130).

 

Knesset Member Osnia made the following statement:

 

I will sum up as follows: We should expedite the enactment of the Basic Laws. This legislation should rest on three principles: (a) The constitution must be flexible with no requirement of a special majority in order to change it; [it should be] sensitive to the organic development of our democracy, in a manner that accommodates the inclusion of new developments in  the constitutional reality without  obstacles stemming from a  special majority; (b) the constitution must include the accepted  principles pertaining to law and administration in Israel, while conferring  decisions on controversial issues for discussion within the ambit of laws dealing with the disputed matters. Thirdly, Basic Laws must be drafted so that eventually they will make up a single legislative unit (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 21 at p.9).

 

And Knesset Member Benjamin Ha-Levi said the following:

 

In conclusion, I suggest that that our generation is not yet ready to confer supreme status to Basic Laws. I would advise waiting until the consolidation of all of the Basic Laws into a complete State Constitution, at which time the State Constitution would be adopted by a large, special majority, presumably of more than 61 votes but taking a gradual approach, which as I understand it, is the path taken by the Minister of Justice ­with the aim of reaching a complete legislative arrangement – in my view this path is strewn with difficulty and liable to lead to failure. It is preferable to continue as we have been since the Harrari committee and until today, until the work is completed: all the Basic Laws should be examined, winnowed, amended, and then the full constitution would be adopted.  Only then  would they be conferred with status (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 78, at p. 958).

 

Similar comments were made by Knesset Member Nir-Rafalkes (Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee):

 

This resolution was a sort of compromise between the supporters of the constitution and its opponents, and like any compromise, it satisfied no one, and the result of this decision was  that each party explains the decision as if it were adopted to its full satisfaction (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 20 at p. 2216).

 

And in another context:

 

…all of this is the result of the “Original Sin,” the resolution adopted in accordance with the proposal of Knesset Member Harrari, a resolution supported simultaneously by supporters of the constitution and supporters of  no-constitution. The former group relies on the first part, which states that a constitution must be given to the State of Israel, and the others rely on the part that states that it should be given chapter by chapter. And chapter by chapter means that it will take generations (Knesset Proceedings, vol.21, at p. 29).

 

Knesset Member Nir-Rafalkes also stated the following on behalf of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee:

 

Honored Speaker and Knesset. In general, all over the world  there are rigid constitutions and flexible ones. There is no fixed rule that a constitution must be rigid.  There are reasons favoring each position.

 

First of all, we are not adopting a constitution. We are only adopting one Basic Law, which will constitute one chapter of the constitution… We cannot, therefore, statutorily entrench all of the provisions of the law by a two thirds majority. There are general arguments against a rigid constitution, and claims that the adoption of a rigid constitution effectively confers a privilege upon the minority. If we say that it can only be changed by 80 votes, presuming that 78 Knesset members wish to change and 42 do not, then we are giving a certain degree of privilege to the minority. For this reason there is opposition to a rigid constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol.23 at p. 89).

 

This was also the opinion of Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen:

 

I have not despaired of the possibility that  during the term of this Knesset we may arrive at those Basic Laws that will ultimately be incorporated into a constitution, pursuant to the 1950 resolution.

 

 Obviously, even when we undertake this task and even when we arrive at the stage of combining the chapters into one constitution, we will still have to decide the crucial question, over which this house is perhaps divided: whether the constitution will be rigid or flexible. As I am now speaking on behalf of the government, I will not express a personal view,  though my personal view is more or less known (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, p. 586)

 

    We will conclude with statements made by then Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion: (in the debate concerning the Constitution that ended in the Harari Resolution)

 

Our debate is over whether to have a constitution or laws, a fundamental, supreme and comprehensive constitution, or basic laws that, like other laws, establish the character and practices of the regime, and define the rights and obligations of the citizens (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4, p. 812).

 

    In short, we absolutely cannot say that the Harrari Resolution was but a link in the uninterrupted chain of constituent authority, passed on from the Constituent Assembly to  the current Knesset.  Quite the opposite is the case. The Harrari Resolution was a type of compromise, and like all compromises, each party saw in it that they wanted to see. The most that can be inferred from the Harrari Resolution is that in place of one integrated constitution, the Knesset would be enacting basic laws, and that when the time comes, all of the basic laws would be consolidated under one roof.  As to when and how this would be done, or what the formal status of the basic laws would be, these and other related questions were left in limbo, unanswered, and not surprisingly so..  The main thrust of the Harrari Resolution was to halt the race towards a formal rigid constitution. It was not intended to lay down the procedures for adopting a constitution. It should come as no surprise that it did not resolve the question of the formal status of the Basic Laws. . The failure to resolve this question was intentional (and see Karp, ibid., at p. 237).

 

Interpretation of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State: What are a Constituent Assembly and a “Constitution”?

Formal Constitutions and Material Constitutions: Does Israel have a Constitution?.

 

39.  In addition to the arguments and evidence presented above,  there is additional  support for our contention that today’s Knesset does not possess constituent authority. We will now briefly examine some of the arguments made in this context.

 

40. Firstly, we will mention  the question of interpreting the Declaration of the Establishment of the State. The Declaration instructed us regarding the “elected constituent assembly” that  would enact a “constitution” for the State.  Thus far we have assumed that the term “elected constituent assembly,” when linked to the term “constitution,” should be understood as referring to an elected body charged with the establishing of the organs of the state in a uniform, formally rigid “constitution.” It is no secret that, to date, such a constitution has not been adopted, and the question before us is merely whether the current Knesset possesses the authority to adopt the kind of constitution that was envisaged.

 

41. There are grounds for contending  that the Declaration’s original intention was to establish a formal, rigid constitution. Under the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, the People’s Council presumed to base itself not only on “our natural and historic right,” but also upon the “resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.”  An examination of that resolution indicates (according to some scholars) that the United Nations had a rigid and formal constitution in mind (see, e.g., Rubinstein, ibid.,  (4th ed.) at p. 44).  While that may have been the original intention, it was not long before the high road had divided into  numerous and varied secondary roads. It seems that  every possible thesis has  its supporters and its opponents.  The proliferation of opinions is extensive to the point of confusion. Perforce we should stop and wonder aloud whether we can rule with any certainty, and without a quivering hand, that the Knesset is authorized by force of documents formulated some  fifty years ago, to enact a rigid constitution - a constitution under which laws can be invalidated as if they were regulations adopted ultra vires. It appears to me that we must agree  that only an unequivocal legal provision would have the power to confer upon the Knesset authority to enact a constitution to which regular laws would bow down. A Knesset statute is not comparable to an order issued by local authority on the subject of  cleaning yards (our concern here is with the Knesset exceeding its authority, and not with a court’s authority to invalidate laws enacted in deviation from authority. The latter derives inexorably from the role of the judicial branch and the principal of separation of powers). Given the diversity of views, can we so rule? We highly doubt it. In this context we will further examine the citations of  statements of Knesset members.  Those who examine them closely will know and understand.

 

42. Regarding the “Constitution” itself, it may reasonably be presumed that the Declaration of the Establishment of the State envisaged the enactment of a formal, rigid constitution. However, it was not long before other opinions were voiced. Hence, it was asserted that a state’s constitution primarily means a compilation of laws concerning the central institutions of the State and the relations between them. The term “Constitution” should not be interpreted in accordance with the meaning given to it today, i.e. a formal, rigid constitution, but rather a collection of laws treating of a particular subject. Thus, it may be recalled that “The Constitution of Military Jurisdiction” was none other than emergency regulations, the validity of which was extended, but  which was nonetheless referred to as a “constitution” (see:  Emergency Regulations (Jurisdiction Constitution 1948).  These regulations were extended from time to time by order of the Provisional Council of State, and by Knesset legislation. Even the very first law enacted by the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset, namely the Transition Law, was referred to as the Transition Constitution. 

 

Thus, for example, after the Transition Law passed its first reading, the Speaker of the Knesset, Knesset Member Sprinzak made the following statements to the Knesset: 

 

… I hereby determine that we have discharged the duty of conducting a first reading of the Transition Constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol.1, p.16).

 

     Even Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, referred to the Transition Law as the “Transition Constitution” (see below). The Chairman of the Elections Committee, Knesset Member Bar Rav Hai likewise referred to The Elections Ordinance to the Constituent Assembly as “The Elections Constitution for the Constituent Assembly,” and so did the Minister of the Interior, Knesset Member Greenbaum (see Proceedings of the Temporary Council of State, October 28, 1948, p. 22). The Minister of the Interior further added:

 

I believe that I am entitled to say that this constitution is not inferior to election constitutions in other States. This constitution ensures orderly elections…

 

There are countless citations, and we will make do with the examples already mentioned. Thus,  at the time, a constitution did not mean only a formal constitution, but was also a term for a collection of laws concerning a particular subject, and primarily, laws of a constitutional nature. (Here we should point out, particularly for contemporary purposes, that in speaking of a “constituent assembly,” it would seem that the Declaration was only referring to the establishment of the central institutions of state and their mutual relations. These subjects were the central focus of the Knesset debates. This point is particularly salient because the focus today has shifted, and when speaking of a “constitution” today, we are primarily concerned with the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual).

 

  1. Of course, that is important is neither  nomenclature, nor  terminology. The main point is that the blurring of the distinction between a formal rigid constitution and a flexible, material constitution led Knesset Members to claim that the term “constitution” referred to in the declaration of the establishment of the State also applies to an unentrenched constitution. In fact, an examination of the comments of the Knesset members clearly shows that many of the Knesset members felt that the word “constitution” also carries the connotation of a material constitution, which is not entrenched. The citations showing this are too many to count, and we will not take the trouble to cite them.

In the same  context, the Knesset members, among them the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, declared that not only does the word “constitution” in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State mean a material constitution, but also that the Knesset did in fact discharge its duty of providing the nation with a constitution. Having fulfilled its duty, the Constituent Assembly had no legacy to bequeath to the subsequent Knessets. In the words of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion:

 

As for the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration provides  that the People’s Council will operate as the Provisional Council of State, and the People’s Administration as the Provisional Government, until the establishment of the elected, regular institutions of State in accordance with the constitution enacted by the elected Constituent Assembly, no later than the first of October 1948. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were conducted on the 25th of January 1949.On the 16th of February, the Transition Constitution was adopted, and in accordance with that constitution, which was, however, adopted somewhat after the first of October, the elected and regular institutions of the State were established. On the10th of March 1949, the first regular government was approved by the Knesset in accordance with the constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol.4, p.813.

 

   See further: H. Zadok, “The Structure of Government in Israel in Light of Constitutional Law,” Law and Government in Israel (Government Press, Z. Zilbiger, ed., 1954), at 39, 46; Likhovski, supra, 4 Is.L.Rev. at pp. 64-65).

 

Knesset Member Warhaftig spoke in a similar vein:

 

Forgive me if I cite the response of Shalom Aleichem: First of all, we never obligated ourselves [to enact a constitution – M.C.], and secondly, if we did assume such an obligation, then we have already discharged it; and furthermore, if we gave an undertaking in the framework of this Declaration (of the Establishment of the State – M.C.) to grant a constitution – then we rescinded our undertaking by virtue of subsequent decisions…

As to the second question – do we already have a constitution? I think that we have a constitution in accordance with the undertaking given in the Declaration of Independence. That undertaking was not given to the United Nations. We assumed such  a responsibility without any relation to the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and we are under no obligation to ensure conditions that are not subject to change by a regular majority, or that cannot be changed at all. We already have such a constitution, by virtue of our adoption of the Law and Administration Ordinance, the Transition Law, and the Knesset Elections Ordinance, in accordance with which the election was held.  A constitution is a system of laws that regulates matters of law and administration in the State.  We have a system of laws that answers that definition.  Hence we have a constitution.

 

For those who understand the distinction between a written constitution and an unwritten constitution, it might be argued that we do not have a written constitution. But when speaking of a “constitution” in the generic sense, it includes both a written and an unwritten constitution. Constitutional theory  differentiates between a number of categories of constitutions, among them, between a “written constitution” and an “unwritten constitution,” although both of them are referred to by the term “constitution.” If the Declaration of Independence states that we must adopt a constitution, it means that we must make the arrangements required to enable regular and orderly government in the State. This we have done. Concededly, we did not do it by the 1st of October, because the elections to the Knesset were only held in January, but the State does have a regular government, even if it can and should be  improved.  But it cannot be said that we do not have a constitution (ibid, at p. 729-730).

 

  1. We elaborated somewhat in adducing the statements made by the Knesset Members. We have not said - nor will we say - that we concur with their statements. Just as we have not said – nor will we say – that we disagree with their statements. Our sole intention is to assert that there is a multiplicity of views in the Knesset. With respect to what was said in the Knesset, we could say “Turn it and turn it again for everything is in it.” The Knesset is not of one mind, and it will not rescue us in our attempt to interpret the law. Looking into the mirror, the Knesset sees the reflection of a  myriad of  faces.  How can we know which of those many faces to choose?

Interim Summary

45.  Summing up we can say that from the State’s inception, the Constituent Assembly acquired “personal” authority to frame a constitution for the state, and had it fulfilled its mandate we would have  a constitution. However, the Constituent Assembly did not frame a constitution, and after it ceased to exist – with the dispersal of the First Knesset – so too the authority to frame a constitution lapsed and disappeared. The Knessets that followed the First Knesset did not inherit the authority of the Constituent Assembly. Even the Harari Resolution did not and does not substantiate the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution. We also saw that over the years, many Knesset members have expressed the view that the Knesset lacks the authority to frame a constitution.

 

Does the Knesset have the Authority to Frame a Constitution other than as  the Legacy   of the Constituent Assembly?

 

    46.   As I observed at the beginning of my comments, my colleagues have premised the Knesset’s authority to frame a state constitution on a number of pillars. I further noted that careful examination reveals that each one of these pillars relies to a great or very great extent upon the constituent authority of the Constituent Assembly, and upon the continuity of that authority from the Constituent Assembly to the present Knesset.  Now, having concluded that the authority that was vested in the Constituent Assembly did not pass to the Knessets following the First Knesset, the ineluctable conclusion is that the Knesset lacks the authority to frame a constitution.

 

47.  There is however another possibility. My colleagues speak of the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset, the rule of recognition of the system, and the best explanation of Israel’s constitutional history in its entirety. Personally, I have difficulty in relying on general, abstract and vague theories to establish the operative authority of the Knesset to enact a constitution for the State of Israel. In my view, the proofs adduced by  my colleagues are inadequate and lack the requisite power to vest the Knesset with such far-reaching authority as that of the enactment of a constitution. I do not know where the Knesset acquired its unlimited sovereignty. I have found no conclusive, or even sufficient proof that our societal conceptions and social consensus confer upon the Knesset the power to frame  a constitution.  On the contrary, I have searched but have not found any evidence of a contract between the people and the Knesset in which the people intended to bestow upon the Knesset the authority to adopt a rigid constitution. Moreover, as I shall explain below, I do not think that the best explanation of the Knesset’s acts to date necessarily leads to a recognition of the Knesset’s  authority to adopt a constitution.

 

Incidentally, the fact is that in the past the Knesset has changed Basic Laws by means of regular legislation. In other words, the Knesset did not see the Basic Laws as possessing  unique status as constitutional laws, changeable only by force of other constitutional laws.  The same applies to the rulings of the Supreme Court, which have not, in this regard, distinguished between Basic Laws and regular laws (see references in paragraph 131 below). Does not this fact alone indicate that under the rules of recognition of state law there is no conclusive legal distinction between Basic Laws and regular laws? And this is because the best explanation of Israel’s legal history is that Basic Laws and regular laws are all located on the same normative level.

 

In addition to all this, to the extent that my colleagues purport to premise the Knesset’s constituent power on a basis other than the constitutional continuity extending from the Constituent Assembly, they divorce themselves from all of the writers and scholars, from the fundamental conceptions of the Knesset members, and from all the other sources upon which constituent authority might potentially be based.  All of the writers  and scholars, and all of the Knesset members who spoke of  the Knesset  possessing constituent authority, based themselves on constitutional continuity from the – one and only – Constituent Assembly until the currently serving Knesset. My colleagues on the other hand, have divorced themselves from that constitutional continuum, and if this is the case, then my colleagues can no longer rely on the writers  and scholars, or on the comments of Knesset members, or on any other legal or jurisprudential source.

 

48.  My colleague, President Barak purports to buttress the doctrine conferring constituent authority upon the Knesset by relying on the writings of writers  and scholars, and by asserting that the vast majority of the Israeli legal community shares this view. I do not think that this claim substantiates the doctrine of constituent authority.

 

49.  First of all, not all of the writers and scholars are of the same view. Not all of them concur with the two-crown theory. In addition to Professor Nimmer and Dr Likhovski, we should also mention the names of other important authors, judges, and writers who reject the two-crown theory. By way of example, we  cite the view of Prof. I. Englard, who wrote the following in his abovementioned book, at pp.108-110.

 

The Supreme Court recognized …the Knesset’s power to limit itself. What is the theoretical basis of this self-limitation? According to one theory, self-limitation is rooted in the Knesset’s authority to serve not only as a legislature, but also as a Constituent Assembly.

 

Although this explanation was recently relied upon by Justice Barak, in our view it is contrived and does not stand up to critical examination (emphasis added - M.C.). Creation of a higher normative plane by adopting the presumption that Basic Laws have constitutional status does not actually solve the problem of the entrenchment of Basic Laws. If the Knesset also fulfills the role of a Constituent Assembly, then why can’t it change an entrenched Basic Law by a regular majority at any time, simply by declaring that it is functioning in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?  After all, when acting as a constituent assembly the Knesset’s legislation is enacted on the constitutional plane. The answer given is that with the enactment of the first Basic Law concerning the Knesset – the one that established entrenchment provisions – the Knesset exhausted its constituent capacity. It follows, therefore, that the Knesset is no longer entitled to function as a Constituent Assembly, rather,  its task is that of a regular legislature on a lower normative plane. This answer, however, is not adequate, because it, too, assumes that a supreme body can limit itself. In other words, the notion of a constituent body exhausting its capacity by force of a particular act of legislation means nothing other than acceptance of the principle of  self-limitation, this time in  absolute form.

As it turns out this was also the view of the learned professors Shapira and Bracha in their aforementioned articles. It was similarly the opinion of Sheftler in his article, and of Hornstein in his. It would appear that President Landau adopted this view in his article, as well. Secondly, in examining academic  writings, one clearly finds that most  were content to repeat what had been stated by their predecessors, with no further explanation or reasoning, as if it were revealed law granted to us for safekeeping.  Has the Supreme Court ever decided a constitutional or any other matter in this way?

 

In view of all this, let us discuss the reasons adduced by the scholars and writers  rather than their names, the merits of the reasons rather than the merits of their reputations, and the weight of the arguments rather than the weight of their  numbers. .

 

So I have done.   I carefully examined the works of all the scholars, reading them through and through, and I can genuinely say that none of them provide answers to my questions. Some of the scholars – the majority – fail even to address the questions that I have raised. There are others whose answers are unsatisfactory.  At any event, all of them premise their views on what they perceive as the constitutional continuity existing from the Constituent Assembly to the current Knesset. Given our conclusion that such continuity does not exist, the opinions of those scholars are of little help.

 

50.  Furthermore, it is hard to avoid the impression that supporters of the two-crown doctrine, or at least some of them, have confused matters of legal agenda with matters of law, and the ideal law with the real law. And so, in their desire for an Israeli constitution that will protect the individual against governmental power, they seek ways of anchoring such a constitution in the existing law. My heart is with them. I too would like to see an Israeli constitution that treats of the rights of the individual, and the sooner the better.  But I think that first and foremost it is necessary to find a true, certain  anchor for such a constitution in the existing law. We must remember that a constitution means the invalidation of Knesset statutes that violate from the constitution. Before I can agree to nullify Knesset legislation by reason of its deviation from fundamental principles that are also established in Knesset legislation, I require firm grounds for such far-reaching authority.

 

Finally, it is no trifling matter for us to rule today, at the stroke of a pen, that fifty years after the establishment of the State the Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution, and that as a result, the Court is authorized to invalidate Knesset statutes that violate  the basic rights entrenched by the Constitution.  Actually, I view the Court’s authority to invalidate Knesset legislation to be part and parcel with the authority to enact supra-legislation. The question is only whether the Knesset possesses the authority to enact a constitution.

 

51.  Among the other references, Professor Benjamin Akzin is cited as authority for the two-crown doctrine.  I read Professor Akzin’s article, and I found that it supported both the two-crown doctrine and the doctrine of the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty . Professor Akzin does not regard the two doctrines as contradictory, but rather treats both respectfully. .  Can we rely on Professor Akzin’s view in favor of both doctrines? But this is not the issue. 

 

52.  We would all agree that the question of the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution for Israel, i.e. the Knesset’s authority to limit itself by force of entrenched laws, whether as a constituent assembly or otherwise, is one of the most momentous questions. Indeed, as I have pointed out, this is the most important question to have confronted an Israeli Court since its inception. It is so important that any teacher of constitutional law, or of government, should devote one of his first lectures to it. I was Professor Akzin’s student for two years.  In the 1954 term I took his course titled “Theories of Government,” and in 1955 I studied constitutional law with him. In neither of these courses did Professor Akzin teach us anything at all about the Knesset’s authority to adopt a constitution, whether as a constituent assembly or otherwise. Does this not show that, at that time, Professor Akzin did not regard the Knesset as possessing constituent authority to adopt a constitution?

 

53.  The same applies to comments made by Knesset Member Hans Klinghoffer. Professor Klinghoffer, too, was my teacher, and in 1958 and 1959 I was his teaching assistant in Constitutional Law. Professor Klinghoffer also taught nothing that related to the Knesset’s constituent authority to frame a formal constitution (this was also the case in his class on Administrative Law, in which he similarly made no mention of the Knesset’s constituent authority).  Those years – the fifties – were closer to the time of the Constituent Assembly and the First Knesset, and the historical memory of the events was fresher and better.  Nonetheless, the teachers of theories of government and of constitutional law – teachers with a capital “T”  did not imagine that the Knesset held constituent authority. They also had not heard of the two-crown doctrine, nor did we hear of it from them.

 

54.  I am not trying to say that a person is not entitled to change his mind. I have not, and would not say that.  Nor would I say that a person is not continually learning new things and broadening his horizons. If Professors Akzin and Klinghoffer changed their opinions, or broadened their views, that would certainly be praiseworthy.  However, the fact that so many years elapsed between the First Knesset and the introduction of the two-crowns doctrine attests to its being a hypothesis and nothing more. We have demonstrated the internal contradictions inherent in this hypothesis, and we stated that in our view it should not be adopted. Personally, I find it difficult to understand how this hypothesis can, in and of itself, provide the authority to enact a constitution, and to invalidate  laws enacted by the Knesset that violate  the constitution. This is not how one builds a constitution. This is not the way a court acquires the power to invalidate laws. Aside from a general remark of Mr Sternberg in his aforementioned article in 1958 (in the Molad journal), the two-crown doctrine did not appear until the sixties (in the aforementioned article of Dr Rubinstein), and in the seventies, in the aforementioned article of Dr Klein, and in other places.  And it is only during the last few yeas that the doctrine has attained currency among scholars. We should further recall that even in the Knesset itself, different opinions were voiced regarding the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly.

 

55.  It emerges, therefore, that about twenty years after the establishment of the State, the authority for enacting a constitution was suddenly “discovered.” Once revealed, there were those who pounced upon it as if it were a vast treasure.  But is this how one enacts a constitution? Isn’t the very doubt sufficient to dissuade us from endorsing the two-crown doctrine? Is it conceivable that having slept for twenty years a person can wake  one bright  morning to discover that the Israeli Knesset possesses the authority to enact a constitution? This was no forgotten Ottoman Law that we discovered in Young [George Young, Corps de droit Ottoman (1905) – ed.], we discovered the Israeli Constitution! Is that possible?

 

56.  Moreover, a law professor is free to come up with whatever legal theories he desires, and teach his students as he sees fit.  Academic freedom is the air that academics breathe, and no one would tell them what to do.  This is how a teacher speaks to his students: I am presenting you with a theory-hypothesis that I regard as appropriate. In my view, this is the interpretation of the law, and the law should be understood accordingly. The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, and hence it has not considered the matter. I hope that one day the Supreme Court will adopt this hypothesis as the law of the land, because it is appropriate for the State and for us. However, for the meantime, this is my opinion.  This is how a university instructor presents a legal theory  to his students, and if he does so, his students will know their path. And I honor those who honor me.

 

57. Neither have I found any basis for the Knesset’s constituent authority in the case law of the Supreme Court.  In fact, the Court acknowledged the Knesset’s authority to entrench laws against change, as well as the Court’s authority to invalidate laws that violate  the provisions of an entrenched law. That was the case in Bergman [15], Agudat Derech Eretz [19], Rubinstein [20], and Laor¸[21]. Initially, in Bergman[15], the acknowledgment was made without questioning, in  the form of “We will do and we will obey” [Exodus 24:7 – ed.]., however, over time we came to realize that this was indeed the rule, and today no one would contest either the Knesset’s authority to entrench a law by the requirement of a special majority of 61 Knesset members for its change, or the court’s authority to declare the invalidity of a law which substantively contradicts the provisions of an entrenched law, and which was not adopted by 61 Knesset members (cf. Rubinstein, [20] at pp. 147-148, per Justice Levine). I too will not separate myself from the consensus. . I wholeheartedly concur with the Court’s ruling, and in the second part of my judgment I have attempted to provide it with a legal foundation.

 

However, needless to say, nothing in this case law compels recognition of the Knesset’s constituent authority. On the contrary, apart from an obiter dictum of my colleague Justice Barak (Laor, [21]; and cf. HCJ 761/86 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [63] at p. 873 opposite the letter “g”), the Supreme Court did not even hint at constituent authority as the basis for its decisions in any of those cases.

 

As for the decision in the Clal [37] case, our colleague Justice D. Levine did indeed refer to the Knesset as a “constituent authority,” but this statement was made without any explanation, and was not in dispute. The other two justices on the bench expressed no opinion on the two-crown doctrine. This is true a fortiori in regard to the other decisions cited by my colleague President Barak.

 

It is, therefore, difficult to maintain that the Supreme Court recognized the existence of constituent power: The question has remained open, and will continue to remain open even after this decision.

 

We should  bear in mind further that a clear distinction must be drawn between the Knesset’s constituent authority to adopt a constitution for the State, and its authority to entrench laws. They are not one and the same. We, too, believe that the Knesset possesses the power to entrench laws (subject to certain limitations), but concurrently, we think that the Knesset lacks constituent authority. The two issues should not be confused, and a constitution cannot be inferred from entrenchment.

 

58.  Lastly, I do not find that the Basic Laws already enacted by the Knesset provide any support for the doctrines of constituent authority or of unlimited sovereignty. The Basic Laws were, of course, products of the Harrari Resolution, the primary  purpose of which  was to avoid the enactment of a constitution. Moreover, the Knesset members themselves were divided in regard to the effect of the Harrari Resolution. As noted, many of them felt that the decision did not contemplate the enactment of a formal constitution. Thus, I cannot see how this resolution can be regarded as the basis for adopting a rigid constitution. The Harrari Resolution, and all that followed it are nothing more than a “broken reed of a staff” for the establishment of the authority to enact a constitution, and this is certainly the case after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

 

As for the exiguous number of entrenchment provisions in some of the Basic Laws (such as Basic Law: The Knesset), these can hardly serve as the basis for specifically inferring the existence of constituent authority. On the contrary, the fact is that the overwhelming majority of provisions in the Basic Laws were not entrenched at all, and this fact per se invites the conclusion that successive Knessets did not view the Harrari Resolution as the basis for the immediate enactment of a rigid constitution (as distinct from a rigid constitution that may or may not be enacted upon the termination of the Basic Law project). As for the few entrenched provisions that were actually enacted, I have not found that they necessarily originate in the authority to adopt a constitution. Moreover, while this Court actually recognized the Knesset’s authority to entrench s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset (in Bergman [15], Agudat Derech Eretz [19], Rubinstein [20], Laor¸[21]), I have not found that its rulings were premised specifically on the Knesset’s constituent power. The Knesset, and likewise  the Supreme Court, presumably felt that in its current capacity it had the authority to entrench laws, but this view was not premised upon constituent authority.

 

Either way, I have difficulty  understanding an argument  whereby the very existence of Basic Laws or of entrenchment provisions in Basic Laws, is proof per se of the Knesset’s authority to enact Basic Laws (i.e. to enact a constitution that is supposedly the equivalent of Basic Laws), or for the establishment of entrenchment provisions in the Basic Laws. This kind of proof involves a circular argument, because the proof assumes that which it attempts to prove.  In our view, as we will elaborate below, there are firm legal grounds for asserting that the Knesset is permitted to limit its authority within certain boundaries, but this is unrelated to the issue of constituent authority. We will continue to address the Basic Laws below.

 

Additional Questions on the Two-Crown Doctrine (and on the Unlimited Sovereignty Doctrine, as well)

 

59.  The two-crown doctrine inherently raises a number of (additional) questions that defy simple solution. These questions would not have arisen had the Constituent Assembly enacted a constitution for the State of Israel, as envisioned  by the Declaration of Independence of the State. However, in view of the protracted nature of the process, which has continued up until these very days, the questions are pressing and we have found no unequivocal solution.

 

60.  For example, my colleague President Barak asserts that the Knesset is authorized to enact a formal, entrenched constitution, and that until the enactment of an integrated constitution, the Knesset is authorized to enact entrenched constitutional laws (as Basic Laws). Simultaneously, my colleague acknowledges the difficulty pertaining to the Knesset’s authority to enact entrenched laws that are not Basic Laws, as with the Knesset’s authority to enact Basic Laws dealing with subjects that are not “constitutional.” An example of this is the Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984, and its provision that it can be only amended by a majority of the Knesset members.  We discussed this subject elsewhere, and for now we will just address the distinction between a “constitutional subject” and non-constitutional subjects and the theory that the former may be the subject of Basic Laws, whereas regarding the latter, it is claimed, that there is no authority for enactment of Basic Laws.

 

Had the Constituent Assembly endowed Israel with a constitution, our examination of the document itself would enable us to know what the constitution is. In its absence, however, how are we to know which subjects are “appropriate” for inclusion in the constitution and which subjects are inappropriate to a constitution (such that their inclusion in a constitution or basic law would amount to an “abuse” of authority)?  This question’s resolution is of primary importance, because if the Knesset purports to entrench a law that is not a constitutional law, or chooses to append the title “Basic Law” to a law that is not “appropriate “ thereof, then according to the argument above, such an act might exceed the bounds of its authority, and the court would be entitled to declare the invalidity, ab initio, of that act.  On the other hand, is it conceivable that the court itself should define the parameters  of “an appropriate constitution,” and according to those contours rule on the lawfulness of an act of entrenchment?

 

Let us take the example of the Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984. In terms of its substance, it would not generally be included in a constitution.  However, is it for the court to determine what is or is not appropriate for inclusion in the constitutions, and to the extent that the Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984 is inappropriate, is it the court’s role to rule that its entrenchment is unlawful and exceeds the Knesset’s authority for that reason alone?   The prohibition on drinking alcohol (“Prohibition”) was included in an amendment to the United States Constitution. That was what the “framer of the Constitution” desired, and that is what it did. No one would dispute that this is not a law that belongs to the family of constitutional laws. But does this mean that the amenders of the constitution exceeded the bounds of their authority? Can it be said,  at this time and place, that the protection of public assets belongs outside the constitution? In any case, should the court be the body to determine the boundaries of the constitution?  Indeed, it is asserted that for purposes of enacting a constitution, the Knesset’s authority is limited to “constitutional subjects,” and therefore, the court will determine which laws may enter the constitutional garden, which laws will knock but find the gates locked, and which will be expelled should they enter. This assertion itself attests not to the limited authority of the Knesset, but rather to the weakness of the two-crown doctrine.

 

Another example: The two-crown doctrine teaches us that the Knesset possesses two forms of authority, and that the Knesset’s legislative authority may not deviate from the norms established by the Knesset as a constituent authority. A statutory norm and a constitutional norm are located on different levels, and the “inferior” norm cannot exceed the boundaries of the “superior” norm.  The question thus arises: Let us assume that in its constituent capacity the Knesset enacts a Basic Law dealing with a constitutional subject, and then goes a step further and formally entrenches the law.  In other words, it determines that the law cannot be amended  other than by a majority of 61 members of Knesset.  Let us further assume that a later law (also a Basic Law) purports to vary that same entrenched law, but without having been adopted by 61 members of Knesset. Is the later law valid or not? Proponents  of the two-crown doctrine would tell us that the later law is invalid for the simple reason that the later law deviated from the boundaries laid down by the former law (cf. Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1,  The General Doctrine of Interpretation, (Nevo, 1999) 568; idem, vol. 3, at p.282).  We would ask: How can this be? The Knesset established the second law in its capacity as a constituent authority. When acting in that capacity, it is not bound by the Knesset that enacted the first law in its capacity as a constituent authority. The fundamental rule in this context is that  the hand that gives  is the hand  hath taken  away.  The entrenchment of a law is intended, by its very essence, to protect  it against the actions of the Knesset as a legislative authority.  Now that we know that when enacting the second law the Knesset was acting in its constituent capacity, we also know that it acted with the requisite authority. This being the case, aren’t we just playing with words and with abstract legal constructs? (See further on this point, and cf: Nimer, in his aforementioned article; and see Englard, in his aforementioned book (par. 49 above); Likhovski, supra,  3 Is.L.Rev.  at p. 358).

 

Professors Klein and Rubinstein would respond that having enacted the first law, the Constituent Assembly “exhausted” its authority on that subject, and that from that time onwards it, too, became subject to the entrenchment provision (see e.g. Klein, in the aforementioned article, 2 Mishpatim; Rubinstein, in aforementioned book (4th ed.) at p. 450 fn. 13). From where did Professors Klein and Rubinstein take this doctrine (the doctrine of “derivative authority”)? Doesn’t it assume the answer?  This entire doctrine is nothing more than scholarly conjecture.  The question that insistently pounds at our door without let up is whether this is the doctrine by which the Knesset acquired the authority to frame a constitution? My answer is a resounding no.

 

My colleague President Barak also addressed this question, and wrote the following:

 

In exercising its constituent authority the Knesset may limit the future use of its constituent power. This derives from the very essence of the constituent function. This function aims to create a document that entrenches norms that may be altered only in a special way. The constituent function is intended by its very nature to create a formal constitution, the inherent meaning  of which is the establishment of provisions as to the manner by which the constitution may be amended  themselves be amended in accordance with these provisions, failing which the amendment is unconstitutional (the ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendment’). Indeed, the power of the Knesset – when it exercises its constituent authority – to limit itself, and thereby ‘entrench’ its provisions, derives from the authorization to enact a formal constitution itself.

 

All of these are ex cathedra statements presented as incontrovertible axioms.  Furthermore, closer examination demonstrates that all of them are circular arguments that assume that which must be proved, and in their present form they define idem per idem. Indeed, we acknowledge that a constituent authority has the power to limit the legislative authority, but what is the basis for the claim that a constituent authority has the power to limit a constituent authority? This is, and remains a question.

 

In fact, built into the two-crown doctrine  is the requirement that  the Knesset, in its constituent authority, be   able and authorized to limit its constituent authority. This built-in requirement is a result of the  anomaly that gave rise to the two-crown doctrine. The anomaly lies in the fact that the constituent authority has continued to exist for some  50 years, and no one knows the date of its demise. The term  of a normal  constituent authority is fixed. During that period it drafts the constitution, and then  the constitution is presented for ratification in the prescribed manner. This is the case regarding a constitution written as one document, and the same applies to a constitution comprising a collection of written documents. The question of self-limitation either does not arise at all, because of the nature of the constitutional structure created for the drafting of a constitution, or it arises only for the  short, restricted period during which the constituent authority exists and operates (assuming that the constituent assembly and the legislative authority are one and the same).  The anomaly of the two-crown doctrine originates in the reality of there being one king wearing two crowns, but is primarily the result of the unfixed and unlimited reign of that  king.

 

The anomaly did not descend from Heaven. The two-crown doctrine, along with the unlimited sovereignty doctrine, have created and maintained it. Had the original intentions of those who declared the establishment of the State been realized, the problem of self-limitation would never have arisen, at least not for such a protracted period. Initially, the Constituent Assembly existed alone. Its sole purpose was to frame a constitution, and self-limitation was not on the national agenda. This was also the case in regard to the establishment of the First Knesset-Constituent Assembly, the term  of which was, by definition, intended to be fixed and measured. The anomaly emerged together with the unlimited “extension” of the life of the Constituent Assembly. This anomaly inevitably generated the need to establish a rule concerning self-limitation, and hence the doctrine of derivative authority which recognizes the power of the constituent authority to limit its power in the future.  However, as stated, these doctrines are all ex cathedra, to be taken at face value, and instead of seeing the very existence of an anomaly as sufficient reason for rejecting the two-crown doctrine and the unlimited authority doctrine, we see a need to invent another rule, which we deem to be the offspring of the basic norm.

 

62.  In the same context: What prevented the First Knesset from enacting a constitution, the result of which is that until this very day Israel lacks a constitution?  Perusal of the Knesset Proceedings teaches us that the real reason for the failure to adopt the constitution was the refusal of the coalition parties to adopt a constitution, each for its own reasons. This happened with the Constituent Assembly, with the First Knesset and with all the subsequent Knessets.  The obvious question is, therefore, whether the Knesset’s failure to  enact a constitution, or perhaps we should say its stubborn refusal to enact a constitution, is instructive for our purposes?

 

63.  Like my colleagues, I too believe that we deserve a constitution and that a constitution would befit us.  But there are many, eminent people who think otherwise, and in my view their reasons warrant serious consideration, especially since the enactment of a constitution, in certain respects, means taking the path of no return.  Indeed, even those supporting the adoption a constitution should tread carefully lets they fall into traps, be wary of obstacles, lest they be plagued by pitfalls, conspicuous and  concealed.  On the contrary! Let the act be done and let a constitution be adopted. But it should be performed in the way of all the nations. Let a constitution be drafted and submitted for a referendum. Let the constitution be adopted in a process of six readings spread out over the two Knessets. Let any act be done, provided that it involves a substantial deviation from regular legislative proceedings, and provided that the people are involved in the enactment of the constitution. All of these are legitimate acts, and we will acquiesce to them and cherish them.  But with all my might I will oppose our recognition of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution by force of a judicial ruling, via a legal analysis of a document dating back forty seven years, in reliance on disputed conceptions which have no  firm roots in Israeli society.  And where is  the people? Should we not ask its opinion?  On the contrary,  let us call  the people and consult them.  Our matriarch Rebecca was not given to Isaac until she had been asked for her opinion and consent: “We will call the maiden and ask her” (Genesis 24:57) [118].  If this was the case with Rebecca, should we not do the same for the entire nation of Israel?   If the people and its leaders desire a constitution, the means will be found for adopting one. And, if they don’t want one, then the constitution will not be enacted.  But I cannot agree to enacting a constitution without consulting the people.  In fact, what basis is there for asserting that the fundamental conceptions of Israeli society point to recognition of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution?  How do we know that the Israeli consensus is that the Knesset possesses constituent authority?  Has today’s nation conferred upon its Knesset representatives the power to limit the tomorrow’s, even if only on constitutional matters? And if they tell me: Yes indeed, forty-seven years ago, then I too will respond that our concern is with the people of today. Did it grant its delegates in the Knesset today the power to frame a constitution? When did the people give a mandate to its Knesset delegates to enact a rigid constitution for Israel?

 

64.In volume two of his aforementioned book, Professor Akzin treats of the subject of “The Adoption and the Changing of a Constitution” (p. 28 ff.) and the subject of “The Social Significance of Constitutions” (p.50 ff.). Anyone reading these texts will discover that a proper constitution should be enacted by those charged with drafting the constitution, and “whose authority exceeds that of the authorities charged with the establishment of other legal directives” (ibid, at p.28), or “an authority elevated above the realm of governance and law, done with a measure of pomp that emphasizes the unique status of the constitution” (ibid). This was the case of the Constituent Assembly established in 1949. Professor Akzin also taught us another possibility for adopting a constitution, namely with the cooperation of the people, in a referendum or otherwise. In his own words  (at p.34):

…There are many states in which the referendum procedure was maintained or reinstated as a mandatory procedure or as an elective one under certain circumstances pertaining to the establishment of particular norms. More than anything else, the tendency was to require a referendum for purposes of the framing and amending of a constitution. This tendency flows from the conception that the constitution, as a set of norms commanding the highest authority in the state, is more suited than any other set of norms to be established directly by the specific body that a state purporting to be democratic views as its sovereign, i.e. by way of the entire adult population.  When serving as the constituent body, the sovereign people assist in vesting the constitution with the status of a norm that is superior to all other norms, which were only created by the people’s representatives. Similarly, the relatively widespread use of the referendum in adopting a constitution bespeaks the hope that the people’s participation in its enactment will be a clear sign of the fundamental difference between it and all other norms, and will   ensure that the rulers and public office holders will treat it with special respect. From the perspective of the masses, universal participation in the constitutional process will induce a sense of identification with the constitution that they themselves authored, a special affinity to it, and the readiness to enlist in its protection when the need arises.. On the basis of these considerations, a number of constitutions were approved by referendum following their preparation by the appropriate body.

 

And further on (ibid, at p. 35):

 

In the democratic system, even when the constitution is to be presented for ratification by a referendum, the draft constitution is prepared by the constituent assembly. The latter is elected in accordance with the same basic electoral system used in that state for electing representatives to the legislature, or in the case of a far-reaching revolution, in accordance with the method deemed appropriate by those at the helm of the provisional government.

Under these circumstances, the constituent assembly serves both as the institution that prepares the constitution and – presuming that the state is run as a parliamentary system – as a legislative institution that supervises the government.  In the latter case, all the supreme sovereign powers are concentrated in the hands of the constituent assembly, with the exception that it does not see fit to finally adopt the constitution, but leaves that task in the hands of the nation.

 

Indeed, there are other ways of enacting a constitution, such as where the same authority is both the legislative and the constituent authority, but these formats are of an inferior level, and in the words of Professor Akzin (ibid, at p. 37):

 

Experience shows that these alternatives should be viewed with a certain skepticism.

 

And he adds:

 

And it is precisely here that the question arises: Why should one norm established by the legislative body have priority over other norms of precisely the same body? Or, as this problem was formulated at the time: How can the legislature bind itself or the other legislatures following it?  This formulation of the question obviously casts doubt on the very existence of a formal constitution as a distinct normative plane, suggesting that a constitution does not differ substantially from regular legislation.  To the extent that the State of Israel is progressing towards the enactment of a constitution as part of the customary duties of the Knesset – the legislative institution of the State – then it also confronts this problem.

 

This is what we have been saying:  From any perspective – legal, public, moral – in order to adopt a constitution today, forty seven years after the State’s establishment, we require far more than just a legal construction relating to the current Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution.

 

65.  My colleague President Barak gives a somewhat dramatic description of the Knesset debates over the new Basic Laws, and he says (at para. 57 of his opinion) that the Knesset debates were of a unique character:

 

The Knesset debates on the Basic Laws were of a singular nature. The Knesset knew that it was preparing an additional chapter of the State constitution. The Knesset members knew that they were not enacting regular legislation, but constitutional legislation, with far-reaching, long-term consequences as to the law and the character of the State. The debate was ceremonial. When the Basic Laws were enacted all were aware of the importance of the moment.

 

There is no denying that some Knesset members indeed felt a sense of mission. These were primarily the Knesset members who were involved in the drafting of the Basic Laws, and as such they were imbued with a sense of elation.

 

However there were no more than a few ­– a child could count them. Most of the Knesset members felt that they were engaged in their day-to -day routine. For them, the day of adopting the Basic Laws was just another day.  Accordingly, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, a law of immeasurably greater importance than any other law concerning human rights, including Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, was adopted in the Knesset by a majority of 32 against 21 with one abstention.  In other words, only 54 Knesset members bothered to be present in the Knesset during the vote, whereas 66 Knesset members didn’t bother to attend the vote.  I think that it is somewhat exaggerated to claim that the Knesset proceedings “were of a singular nature,” and that “all were aware of the importance of the moment,” and that “the “debate was festive” . I would be surprised if the 66 absent Knesset members shared those feelings.  And, we should remember that 66 Knesset members constitute more than an absolute majority of the Knesset (see further, Karp, in her aforementioned article, at pp. 326-328).

 

Knesset Member Shevach Weiss said the following at the first reading of the draft law of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

…If Knesset member Amnon Rubinstein succeeds, particle by particle, nucleus by nucleus, progressing to atoms, and from the atoms onto a more comprehensive system, and if it doesn’t create chaos and confusion, and there is a semblance of order, by semi-clandestine, semi-legitimate means to smuggle the Constitution into the agenda of the State of Israel, we will praise him for it (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 124, at p. 2596) (emphasis added - M.C).

 

Knesset Member Shevach Weiss felt that we are worthy of a constitution, and that a constitution is appropriate for us, but we can hardly believe that he viewed the Knesset debate as a festive, historical and momentous debate, like the day of giving the Torah.

 

66.  If the two-crown doctrine or the unlimited sovereignty doctrine were a living doctrine, we could expect it to appear before us in all its glory, as if to say, “here I am, for you called me,” and all those who would see it would know and be enthralled. When confronted by a lion, do we need to gather evidence and construct doctrines to prove that it is a lion? If that is the case with a lion, should it not be the case with regard to the very existence of authority to frame a constitution? It should be self-evident. It is an inherent constitutional requirement that the authority acquired by a body to frame a constitution be uncontested, that the authority should present itself before us in all its splendor so that all who see it may know before whom they stand, without the need for explanations, interpretations, and doctrines, why, whence and wherefore the view that the Knesset possessed the authority to frame a constitution provides none of these.

 

Constituent Authority and our Democratic Journey

 

67.It appears that the two-crown doctrine, like the unlimited sovereignty doctrine, establishes a structure in  Israeli constitutional law unknown  in other countries. For almost  fifty years, and for an unknown period into the future, the same body purports to operate both as a regular legislature and as the framer of the constitution, without the need for any proceeding or body external to itself.  And the people was not consulted. Is this how we propose to build a constitution?  Is this how we vest the court with the authority to invalidate the Knesset’s laws? I can hardly imagine that these doctrines will be our crowning glory, that through them the Knesset will acquire the authority to limit its authority, and the court will be authorized to tumble the Knesset’s laws. Indeed, if the Knesset is to possess the authority to enact a constitution, we would expect that such authority be conferred upon it expressly, clearly, and unequivocally. The construction of a constitution today based on the authority acquired by the Constituent Assembly forty-seven years ago, and in the absence of constitutional continuity from beginning to end, is unacceptable, not least when dealing with the very same body – the same Knesset – that is supposed both to enact laws and to enact a constitution.

68.  I believe that I would not be mistaken if I said that those attempting to recognize  the current Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution amendable only by a special majority of over 61 members (and similarly for those who recognize  the Knesset’s authority to limit  future legislation  by the requirement of a special, weighted majority) contemplate legislation that entrenches individual rights and freedoms: freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom from arrest. As we survey all of these, our hearts abound with joy; how good and how pleasant. I rejoice at the promise of fortifying human rights. We will broaden individual liberties and curtail the powers of government. We will benefit the individual and the public and we will all profit. Happy is the man who trusts in the court, and whose hope is the court.  The court may be relied upon to find the “balances” between  individuals, between the private and public, and between the individual and society. Better to trust in the court than to trust in rulers.

 

Even if all of the above is correct, and we agree that they are all correct, we should bear in mind that a constitution is not only concerned with individual rights and human dignity. The constitution is substantially/significantly, perhaps even primarily concerned with the governmental institutions, the branches of government, and the powers and authorities allotted to each of the branches, which may even extend to relations of religion and state, and even to the delineation of state borders. For example, let us assume that a Basic Law established separate elections for the legislature and the executive; that the elections would be conducted in a certain manner; that the allocation of powers among the organs of the executive – the prime minister and the government – would take a particular form; that the state borders would be such and such, and that this Basic Law could only be changed by a majority of eighty Knesset members. With the distribution of power in the State of Israel, it might be impossible to change this law for many years, notwithstanding a desire for change on the part of a majority, perhaps even a substantial majority of the nation and of the Knesset.  Would we accept this?

 

69.  Since our independence we have known no rest, neither as a nation nor as a State. We are frequently confronted by difficult and painful decisions, the effects of which are evident in every day life, and only the future knows what is in store for us. We are constantly beset  by fateful questions concerning the individual and the community, and the nation harbors  a multiplicity of opinions and views.  Let us imagine a certain question that both troubles/ and divides the nation, and further assume that the government or the opposition succeeds in causing the Knesset to adopt a Basic Law concerning that subject, over the strident protests of its opponents, the protests of the Knesset, and protests of the street.  The subject is a constitutional one, and the Knesset further decides that the basic law can only be changed by a majority of eighty Knesset members.  Naturally, the law is passed by a regular majority, as is customary in the Knesset, for example by the majority by which Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was adopted, a majority of 32 against 21 with one abstention, or the majority which adopted Basic Law: The Government (55 votes for, and 22 votes against).

 

And then the day comes – the day after the adoption of the law, perhaps a fortnight later, perhaps months, and maybe even a year or two. And the government or the opposition (as the case may be) desires to change the law, but is unable to do so, having the support of only 70 Knesset members, maybe even 75, or only 61. According to my colleagues, this law would stand because it is a constitutional law, part of the Israeli constitution.

And I say: Absolutely not!  It is inconceivable that the representatives of a majority of the nation should adopt a position, but be prevented from realizing their goal of amending a Basic Law due to our establishment of a legal construction of two crowns or of unlimited sovereignty. Is this a way of preventing the majority of the nation – even a massive majority – from changing the nation’s fate?  I believe that frustrating the majority is a patently anti-democratic procedure. I have stated this on a number of occasions, and will not tire of repeating the point: This is not how one enacts a constitution. If we desire to present the nation with a fait accompli without having asked its opinion this would, indeed, be the way.  But if we aspire to act with the nation’s approval, we should turn to it and consult it, as we did with the real Constituent Assembly of forty-seven years ago. Another kind of act could also be performed – an act which from a constitutional perspective is a radical departure from routine legislation – and we would love it, too. But please, let us not now establish, for the first time, a legal ruling based upon a law from 1951, and with our own hands establish the Knesset as a constituent authority for the enactment of a rigid state constitution.

70.  The matter however is graver still.  In the example cited above, the current Knesset not only purported to limit the discretion of the Knessets – the current one and its successors – but of the nation as well. Accordingly, the current electorate was not asked whether it empowered the Knesset to entrench a Basic Law to the extent of precluding its amendment other than by a majority of eighty.  And now, confronted with a fait accompli, we tell the people: If you wish to change the law – the very same law that you never empowered the Knesset to enact (with respect to the requirement of a special majority) – you must know that you bear the onus of acting. In the coming elections make sure that you direct your vote properly, and after the convening of the Knesset, assemble eighty Knesset members and go to battle. However, good advice to the voter is simplistic because even in the coming elections, the nation’s ability to change the law is limited.

 

Assume that a voter is a staunch opponent of the law, but when weighing all of the considerations he decides to vote for a particular party that actually supports the law.  Considerations of this kind are not unusual, because voters are not likely to vote for a particular party solely because of its intention to change that particular Basic Law. The nation has thus been confronted with a fait accompli, and the onus for changing it is unbearably heavy, with respect to the need to assemble eighty Knesset members sharing the same view, and with respect to the elections to the Knesset. If a system as complex as this is not a blow to democracy, then I don’t know what a blow to democracy is.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

 

71.  Irrespective of the situation in countries that lie across the sea (and even those that are not across the sea), this scenario is a grave one, and I regard it as patently anti-democratic. I will loudly declare: When we go to the ballot box to vote for the Knesset, we request that the elected Knesset be the one to determine the norms by which we live., it  periodically enact the norms that regulate the life of the nation as well as the individual. When we go to the ballot box we do not authorize the Knesset to divest itself of the powers that we gave it, that it divest itself of its legislative powers and bind its hands with respect to future legislation.  Ask the voter and he will tell you – if he has even heard – of the Knesset’s authority to adopt a rigid state constitution, i.e. a constitution which requires more that 61 Knesset members to amend it. Enquire as to whether apart from a few jurists and a few other men of letters – “two or three berries at the top of the highest bough” [Isaiah 17:6 – ed.] – the man on Dizengoff Street was aware that fifty years ago the Knesset acquired the authority to enact a constitution, and that that authority persisted until this very day, and that now the Knesset desires to adopt a constitution.  Did I know this? Did you know this?  Did any of you know this? Is this how the authority to frame a constitution is created, as if ex nihilo?

 

I deem the fundamental democratic principle of majority rule – for our purposes 61 Knesset members – too important to be disregarded as though it were not there.  We may deviate from the principle consciously, intentionally, assuming responsibility, and acting with due deliberation, and by a procedure appropriate for adopting a constitution.  And even if there had been six hundred thousand who requested the constitution, - had we lived in 1948 – can we today realize that intention and desire, when we number five million. “Will the axe boast itself against the one that hews therewith? Will the saw magnify itself against he that moves it” (Isaiah, 10:15 [122]).  The axe will not boast and the saw will not magnify itself. The same applies to the Knesset: Being nothing more than the agent of its voters, it is prohibited from deviating  from the authority conferred upon it by us, the voters, and it has no permission to restrict  its legislative authority without having received a special and explicit license to do so. Such license has never been given.

 

Here we can add what should be self evident, that our concern is only with the issue of the majority required in a democratic system . We are all aware that majority rule as such does not guarantee a functioning democracy. The content and the nature of the regime, genuine elections conducted periodically, separation of powers and protection of individual rights: all of these, and others like them are essential limbs in the body of a proper democratic regime.  All that we are saying here is that the principle of the majority is a condition sine-qua-non for the basic existence of a democratic regime (in the absence of a constitution).

 

72. We speak of “national consensus,” of “basic conceptions” of Israeli society, and of the “social contract.”  In my view, no national Israeli consensus exists for recognition of the Knesset’s authority to limit its discretion in the form of entrenchment requiring over 61 Knesset members. The isolated cases in which this kind of entrenchment was enacted concern undisputed issues that represent the fundamental conceptions of Israeli democracy. No inference can be drawn from them, neither with respect to the Knesset’s authority as a constituent authority, nor with respect to other cases that may be the source of grave, acrimonious dispute.  A fortiori, this applies when dealing with questions that have yet to be examined, either legally or from any other perspective.

And I further ask: How are we to know the current views of Israeli society? Did we conduct a referendum? Did we ask the man on the street? Will we decide that no referendum will be conducted, and that we ourselves will determine that the Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution? Is this possible? Isn’t this a case of a self-fulfilling dream (albeit a worthy one)(worthy) wishes forcing their self-fulfillment?

 

    Now they may say to us, as they indeed have: Why do you require the “nation’s” permission to enact a constitution?  Since when is the “nation” engaged in questions of law and justice, and with the question of whether or not the Knesset acquired constituent authority? The real argument between the sectors of the public is about the content of the constitution, not other specific legal questions. National consensus is only required with respect to the content of the constitution, not the actual authority to enact it. Do not speak of the Knesset’s authority, but rather of the content of the constitution itself. This criticism is unacceptable for a simple reason. If we accept the doctrine of constituent authority or unlimited sovereignty, a minority of the nation would be able to adopt a law with “entrenchment by 80” in the absence of any “national consensus” on the content of that law. In this sense, it makes no difference whether we are treating of constituent authority or of the content of the constitution. They are essentially the same, and Basic Laws adopted by a minority of the nation, as is the case with the overwhelming majority of the Basic Laws, cannot be said to reflect national consensus (certainly not in advance).

  

   73.    It is difficult to escape the impression that the supporters of the two-crown theory and of the unlimited-sovereignty doctrine make the following claim:  The Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution because it is appropriate that it should have such authority (social consensus, etc). In other words, these doctrines are largely sustained by the powerful desire to introduce ideal law into existing law, to inject a doctrine (commendable in its own right) into the veins of the existing system of law. The longing and yearning for a formal, rigid constitution is so deep and powerful that a hypothesis originating in the heart’s desire has magically become existing law. Our desire transforms itself into a reality without strict supervision of the central powers and authorities of the State and the allocation of powers to each particular authority. Needless to say, an aspiration for a constitution, albeit a genuine one, is insufficient to establish the actual authority to adopt a constitution. And where shall we find the social consensus?  I do not know.

   

     I fully concur with what Shapira and Bracha wrote in 1972 in their aforementioned article, at pp. 21-22:

 

Even assuming that those who maintain that the Knesset has constituent authority are correct, it is doubtful whether it is desirable today to base the normative supremacy of a possible constitution on the continuing constituent authority of the Knesset, today, twenty-two years after the elections to the original Constituent Assembly. As mentioned, the social-moral basis for the supremacy of the constitution is grounded in the general public’s sense that the constitution is its own creation, being the direct outgrowth of its will. Is it even feasible today to persuade the public of the reasonableness of giving special normative force to a constitution adopted by the Seventh Knesset – a body elected as a regular legislature – solely because the power of the Constituent Assembly, a body elected a generation earlier, passed to the current Knesset by some formality or another?  We must also remember that there are legal doubts as to whether the current Knesset was vested with constituent authority, something that potentially blurs the distinction between the two capacities of the same Knesset (i.e. between its role as a legislative authority and its standing as a constituent authority). It appears to me that today, the Knesset’s act of accepting a constitution is not sufficient.  an act of adoption of a constitution by the Knesset itself would not be sufficient

 

     These statements were made in 1972. In the twenty-three years that have passed since then, their validity has only increased.

   

    74.   We began with the question: The Constituent Assembly – Was it you or was I dreaming? We respond: Forty seven years ago, it was you, but today you are but a sweet dream.

 

The Knesset’s Authority to Enact Entrenched Laws

 

75.Our view is that the Knesset lacks constituent authority to enact a formal, rigid constitution. Neither the two-crown theory nor the unlimited-sovereignty doctrine is rooted in the law of the land. The Knesset is simply the Knesset, with the authority to enact laws as in the past. And this invites the question: It is an undeniable fact that over the years the Knesset enacted a number of Basic Laws (and non-basic laws) that were “entrenched” or “protected” against a regular majority. The question therefore arises whether in doing so it did not exceed the bounds of its authority (making a clear distinction between the authority to enact a constitution and the entrenchment of laws).

The Knesset lacks “constituent” authority. Does it have the authority to legislate entrenched laws?  A law stating expressly that it can be neither varied nor violated except by a majority of the members of Knesset. Is such entrenchment valid? Is the Knesset really incapable of varying or violating the law unless it enlists a majority of the members of the Knesset in support of the variation or violation? And if the law provides that it can only be changed by a majority of 70 or 80 Knesset members, is such entrenchment valid? We will now proceed to examine this question.

76.For convenience, we begin our discussion with the accepted presumption (accepted, but in my view incorrect, as I will presently explain) that the Israeli Knesset, similar to the British Parliament, is omnipotent and is empowered to pass any legislation, irrespective of its contents (see CA 450/70 Rogozinsky v. State of Israel [1972] [64] at p.136; HCJ 120/73 [41], at p. 759; the Kaniel  case [13],  at p. 798; HCJ 889/86 Cohen v. Minister of Trade and Welfare, at p. 546; the Laor case [21]; Rubinstein, in his book supra  (fourth vol.) at p.135 ff., 461 ff.). This all-inclusive authority is occasionally referred to as Knesset Sovereignty (or Parliamentary Supremacy). In this context, it has been said jokingly, that the parliament in Westminster is authorized to enact any law but to make a woman a man, and a man a woman:

“It is a fundamental principle with English Lawyers, “that Parliament can do everything but make a woman a man and a man a woman” (Dicey, supra at 41).

 

This statement is imprecise. Obviously, if the intention is only that Parliament is incapable of literally turning a man into a woman, and a woman into a man, it is certainly correct. However, such a reading empties the paragraph of meaning, because by the same token, Parliament is unable to move a pencil from one side of the table to the other because the Parliament as such does not occupy itself in any physical action, and is unable to generate any change in the surrounding physical world. Parliament occupies itself solely with norms and normative actions, and its power and authority lie in this field. If, therefore, the intention is that Parliament is “unable” – in the normative sense – to turn a man into a woman and a woman into a man, then it is quite simply incorrect. In the wonderful world of norms that is not perceived by our five senses, but which controls our lives, the Knesset is certainly “able” and authorized to transform a man into a woman and a woman into a man. A separate question is whether or not those to whom the norms are to apply will submit to them. Needless to say, that question is beyond our scope.

 

77.  The Knesset is therefore omnipotent and authorized to enact laws, regardless of their content and their scope. We therefore return to our first question. If indeed the Knesset is “all-authorized” (all-powerful), does that power and authority empower it  to enact entrenched laws, i.e. to limit its legislative power and authority? The question we ask as adults is the question we asked as children. If God is omnipotent, can He create a rock that He is unable to  lift? If he is able to create such a rock, then necessarily he is not omnipotent, because after the creation of such a rock, he will not be able to lift it. And if he is unable to create it, then he cannot, by definition, be said to be omnipotent.  Either way, it turns out that the God we perceived as being omnipotent, is not, actually, omnipotent. Resolution of this paradox requires that we abandon one of the two alternatives: the lifting of the rock or the creation of the rock. Our argument would proceed as follows: Either God has continuing omnipotence (in the language of Hart) except with respect to His own power, which He cannot limit; or that ultimately He is omnipotent and also has the ability to limit His own power (“self embracing omnipotence”), but having curtailed His power, He is no longer omnipotent (See and compare: Hart, “Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition,” supra at p. 147-154; Englard, ibid. at pp. 107-111).

 

78.  Going from the metaphor to its simple meaning: If the Knesset is “all-authorized,” which is our point of departure, is it authorized to limit (or negate) its authority to change the law? If authorized to limit (or negate) its authority, the conclusion must be that having exercised its authority of self-limitation, it is no longer all-authorized. If, on the other hand, it is not authorized to limit (or not to limit) its authority, then it was not all-authorized in the first place. Either way, we began with the assumption of the Knesset’s unlimited authority, but it turns out in the end that its authority is not unlimited.  We therefore face a paradox, and the question is whether it can be resolved.

 

79.  First of all, let us avoid speaking of the omnipotent God (or of any other “omnipotent” entity). God does what He does, and we do what we do. His acts are not ours. His power is not our power; His time is not our time. His affairs are not our affairs. The matter is quite simple. Insofar as God is omnipotent, as per our opening assumption, He is by definition not governed by the rules of logic that apply to us. The concept of “omnipotence” is a metaphysical one, because if God’s “omnipotence” is understood in the literal sense, then He can also exist and not exist; He can exist today, and simultaneously exist yesterday and tomorrow, and also not to exist at those times. He can be white and not white. He can have a body and image and be incorporeal. And in addition to all these, the “omnipotent” can also cause another to be and not to be at the same time.  And if indeed He can do all these, then why should He not be able to limit Himself and not limit Himself? Accordingly, we cannot speak of God as being “omnipotent,” and in the same breath proceed to subject Him to human law, to the laws of nature with which we are familiar, the laws of logic and the laws of democracy. As stated in the hymn Adon Olam (“Eternal Lord”):

 

“He was, He is, and He shall be; Without beginning, without end.” And in “Yigdal” (“Exalt”): “Transcending time and here eternally…A mystery of Oneness, measureless…Before Creation’s dawn He was the same; The first to be, though He never began.”         

“High up in the North in the land called Svithjod, there stands a rock. It is a thousand miles high and a thousand miles wide. Once every thousand years a little bird comes to this rock to sharpen its beak. When the rock has thus been worn away, then a single day of eternity will have gone by” (H.W. van Loon, The Story of Mankind (1921)). Can we presume to apply human laws and logic to that single day of eternity?

 

The heavens belong to the Lord, but the Knesset He has given to mortals

80.  The difficulty remains. Is the Knesset able to restrict (or limit) its future legislative authority? This would mean that in the wake of such a law limiting (or denying) authority, the Knesset would no longer have the unlimited authority that it had prior to its enactment.  To facilitate our discussion we will not apply the rock parable to the Knesset, in other words we will not use the example of a law that proscribes any possibility of its being amended, because that scenario is irrelevant (and in our view such a negation would not be valid). We will restrict our comments to a law that limits the Knesset’s authority in the future, or in Hart’s terminology, a “self-embracing” law, and to the two methods with which we are familiar: procedural entrenchment by force of a special majority (such as restricting the amendment of a Basic Law to the vote of a majority of the Knesset members, as in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, or an even larger majority), and substantive entrenchment, as is imposed by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which obligates the Knesset by force of the content of the legislation, even without formal entrenchment. In our comments below, we will distinguish between these two limitations, discussing each one separately. We will begin with the Knesset’s authority to restrict its legislative activities by the declaration that a particular law can only be varied by force of a special majority (a majority of the Knesset members, or some other kind of special majority).

 

Regarding Formal Entrenchment

 

81. Let us examine the issue from the beginning.   The first and foremost task of the Knesset (as with any other legislature) is the establishment of behavioral norms for people and bodies living and operating in Israeli society (along with its other tasks, such as the overseeing of the Government’s activities). Those who contend that the Knesset is all-powerful refer primarily to its (ostensibly) unlimited power – from a legal perspective – to establish a normative regime in Israel as it deems fit (within “acceptable” boundaries). As stated above, this is the point of departure for our discussion, from which we will proceed.

The Knesset’s “Preparation” for its Activity

 

82.  When establishing norms for Israeli society the Knesset “speaks” through its legislation, and its laws are the binding norms.  But how does the Knesset exercise its authority in “legislating laws”? In its capacity as a collegial body of one-hundred-and-twenty members, how shall it “legislate”? How shall the legislators assemble for a legislative session? On which days and at what time? What proceedings must be conducted for a draft proposal to become a “law”? And once legislated, how is it brought to the public’s attention? A “Knesset” is not merely one-hundred-and-twenty people elected as Knesset members. While the one-hundred-and-twenty elected representatives are, naturally, its principal component, they are surrounded by norms and rules that are designed to organize the Knesset’s work. These rules create and ground its work procedures, from the tabling of draft proposals before the one-hundred-and-twenty members, to bringing the “law” to the knowledge of the general public. From this we learn that before it legislates laws for people and bodies outside the Knesset, the Knesset must first organize its own internal work procedures.

 

The Knesset’s internal organization is a practical imperative and a necessary condition for its activities. “First adorn yourself, and then adorn others” (Bava Metzia 107b [123]). An echo of this rule appears in the provisions of s. 17 of the Interpretation Law, 5741-1981, concerning “Auxiliary powers”: “Any empowerment to do something or to deal with or decide a particular matter implies empowerment to prescribe work procedure and the order of deliberations insofar as these are not prescribed by legislation.”

 

Our comments here apply to any collegial body (and similarly to an individual authority, in a society in which the rule of law prevails, even if only in the formal sense).  For example, this is the law that applies to courts, and is also the reason for the application of lex fori  in regard to court procedure, even where the substantive matters are decided in accordance with rules deriving from foreign legal systems (see, e.g., A.V. Dicey and J.H.C. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (London, 12th Ed., L. Collins, 1993) Ch. 8, p. 169; and see Dr A Levontin, On Marriage and Divorce Conducted Abroad, (Mif’al HaShichpul, 1957) 68-69; and in the words of Professor Avigdor Levontin: “Any organism must be internally organized before it can organize its surroundings,” (“Draft proposal for Conflict of Laws: The Procedural Aspects,” Uri Yadin Volume, at p. 100). Professor Levontin expressed himself in a similar vein regarding the activities of the court (ibid):

 

…without the laws of procedure that apply to it and in it, no court is a court, and it cannot function in that capacity…when a court is requested to handle any matter, the court must be regarded as a living, functioning entity. Every organism must be internally organized before it is able to organize its environment. This is also true of the judicial mechanism.  Without its customary work procedures, the court cannot even be identified.  The rules of panels and appointment inform us as to the identity of the judges in a particular court, and which judges will compose a particular panel.  Other similarly “non-substantive” rules direct us as to where and when the court functions. There are other rules that tell us how to apply to the court, such as that an application to the court must be made in writing, the prescribed number of copies, that it must be filed in a particular office in a particular format, during particular hours, and that a conversation with a judge does not constitute the filing of an action.

 

These methods of acting and of activating, and certainly the panel rules of the court, are thus not something separate from the court “itself”; if they are not followed, no application is made.

 

These comments regarding the court – which for this purpose resembles any other body intended to dictate legal norms for others – also apply to the Knesset and to Knesset legislation, mutatis mutandis. The Knesset’s role is to “organize” Israeli society, and in accordance with the rule “first adorn yourself,” the Knesset must first “organize” itself. Only that kind of organization can change a static body into a dynamic one. A collection of representatives can become a group of people operating in accordance with predetermined rules and programs, and the amorphous collective attains the capability of performing the roles and tasks imposed upon it.  The “organization” of the body – the procedures it will adopt, the paths that it shall tread, and all that surrounds this – are all secondary and ancillary to the body’s principal role, but calling the body by the name “Knesset” necessarily comprises both the house of representatives and its prescribed procedures and organization.  The “legislating Knesset” cannot exist independently of legislative procedures, from beginning to end. Without clear, predetermined procedures, the Knesset cannot discharge its duties.

 

83.  The Knesset’s “organization” for purposes of legislation can be - and is in fact – fixed in different legislative acts. For example, s. 19 of Basic Law: The Knesset provides that “The Knesset shall itself prescribe its procedure” (emphasis added – M.C.) and continues: “insofar as such procedure has not been prescribed by law the Knesset shall prescribe it by the articles.” (This bears an interesting comparison to s. 108 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], by which the Minister of Justice acquired the power “by rules of procedure to regulate the procedure and practice before courts, registrars and execution offices insofar as they have not been prescribed by law…” (emphasis mine – M.C.). Procedures (as in rules of procedure and custom) appear partly in the primary legislation and partly in secondary legislation (in the Knesset Articles or in Civil Procedure Regulation), in accordance with their importance and weight. Hence, procedures of distinct importance will appear in the law, while those of (relatively) inferior status will be included in the articles.

 

The Knesset’s organization for the fulfillment of its tasks does not only include technical “procedures,” such as the procedural regulations by which the courts operate.  There are also arrangements that are at the heart of the substantive law, and which are nonetheless classified as part of the Knesset’s organization for the discharging of its functions. For example, the immunity of Knesset members’ and the immunity of the Knesset buildings, or the example of the publication of laws and the rule that the effective date of a law is the date of publication unless another effective date is determined by the law itself (as per s. 10 (a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance).  And so, festively attired, and light on its feet, the Knesset sets out on its mission of “organizing” its surrounding world, establishing legal norms for people and bodies meant to defer to the Knesset’s word

 

We will further state the obvious. Procedural restrictions within the scope of the Knesset’s “organization” for the discharging of its principal functions cannot be regarded as “self limitation.”  First of all, if the legislature proceeds on its intended path, there is no limitation of legislative authority in any realm in which it chooses to legislate.  Secondly, at any event, the legislature can at all times amend its prescribed procedures, and this releases it from any self-limitation, which was not self-limitation in the first place ( see and compare, Hart, supra at pp. 68-70).

 

Finally, we do not, nor will we claim that we will always be able to easily distinguish between procedure in the sense of “organization” for discharging of duties, and “substance.” The distinction between procedure and substance stands independently, and the problems it poses, as with any type of legal classification, will not be discussed in the present context (and see, for example, Hart ibid. at p. 71-72; R. Eliot, “Rethinking Manner and Form: From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutional Values,” 29 Osgood Hall L.J. (1991) 215; Hogg, supra, Ch.12).

 

84.Incidentally, in English law, and in other national legal systems of states that originated in the British Empire, these legislative procedures are referred to as the “Manner and Form.” The expression originates in a British law known as the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, a law that, as its name indicates, deals with the Empire’s colonies.  According to s. 5 of that law, the legislative authorities of the colonies were granted the authority to enact their own constitutions, but the regulatory authority was subjected to one qualification, namely that the amendment be done:

In such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act of Parliament, letters patent, order in council or colonial law for the time being in force in the said colony.

 

This paragraph in the British law, and the “manner and form” expression in particular, was a primary focus both of the case law of those states, and the writings of scholars, and even Israeli academics have addressed it. Personally, I think it inappropriate for me to resort to expressions rooted in the legislation and law of other states, and certainly not in the mechanical sense. The purpose and the scope of the provision in British law do not necessarily conform to the purpose and scope of the “organization” of our Knesset, and for fear of error, we will do our best to stick to our own nomenclature, without availing ourselves of the expression “manner and form,” which in and of itself may be subject to qualifications that do not concern us. Our concern is with the “organization” of the Knesset, and the need for “organization” which, along with the fundamental tenets of our system, dictates the parameters of our discussion, as we will observe and elaborate below (for example, and merely hinting at the matter, it could be argued that the immunity granted by the Knesset members to themselves exceeds the Knesset’s “organizational” needs and violates fundamental principles of the legal system. Naturally, we will not draw any conclusions at this time).

 

Nonetheless, we can seek assistance from ideas raised by others, and which are germane to our discussion: See and compare, e.g., R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (London, 1961) p.1 ff (“Sovereignty”); Hart, supra, at 67-69, 149-151; A.W. Bradley, “The Sovereignty of Parliament – In Perpetuity?” in The Changing Constitution, ed. J. Jowell and D. Oliver, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 1994) 35 ff. (“Legislative Power” and “Sovereignty”); R. Elliot, supra; Hogg, supra, chap. 12, (“Parliamentary Sovereignty”) at 310 ff., esp. para. 12.3 (b) (“Manner and Form of Future Laws”); Nimmer, supra, 1217.

 

85. Having established its legislative procedures, including those for the publication of laws, the Knesset must proceed along its chosen path, unless it explicitly revokes those procedures and adopts new ones in their stead. It should be stressed that all of this – namely the revocation of old procedures and the adoption of new ones – is performed by the Knesset in accordance with its permanent work procedures, in other words, in accordance with the procedures that it intends to revoke. In other words, the Knesset is “bound” by its previously established legislative procedures. It is able and entitled to change those procedures, provided that such changes are effected in accordance with the predetermined method. None of the above is new. For example, s. 15 of the Interpretation Law provides as follows:

Any authorization to make regulations or to issue an administrative directive also implies authorization to amend, vary, suspend, or revoke them in the manner in which they were made or issued (emphasis added – M.C.)

An additional example of this is the publication of laws. The legal position today is that a law must be published in the Official Gazette, and that if not published it will not come into force (s. 10 of the Law and Administration Ordinance; s. 2(d) of the Transition Law). Let us now assume that the Knesset wishes to enact a law that will take effect even without being published in the Official Gazette. The Knesset cannot enact this kind of law unless it first publishes a law that empowers it to enact laws without publication. If it does not first enact and publish a law (allowing the enactment of laws without publication), the Knesset lacks the power to legislate without publication. A norm adopted by the Knesset by the usual procedures (three readings, etc.) that states that it will come into force even though it has not been published in the Official Gazette will not have legal force, and will not be deemed a law.  The reason is simple: The Knesset (according to the assumption) is all-powerful regarding the contents of any “law” and regarding the procedures for enacting a “law,” but that hypothetical norm is not a law according to the Knesset’s own definition of what constitutes a law. This conclusion is dictated by common sense, good order, and the internal logic of the matter.  While other alternatives are “possible,” the conclusion we presented is practically self-evident (see and compare, Professor Rubinstein, supra (4th ed), p. 472).

Imagine some principality governed by the rule of law (even if only formally). The prince’s bellman, astride his horse, appears in the city square every Monday and Thursday, at five o’clock in the afternoon, unrolls a parchment, and proclaims the new laws to the assembled citizens of the principality.  Should he choose to change the day, time, or place of publication, he must give advance notice to that effect, and will do so at the regular place of publication, on the usual days of publication, and at the predetermined times. If, without prior notice, the bellman appears in the city square on Sunday at eleven o’clock in the morning, his proclamation will not be a proclamation, the square may be vacant, and the law will not be a law. The Knesset’s mode of expression is by the “law,” and a law is only a law if it is published.  A norm purporting to have the validity of law despite its non-publication will not be considered a law according to the Knesset’s own definition of what constitutes a law. Any statement to the contrary would undermine the basic organizational principles of the society, resulting in chaos and confusion, scorn and provocation.

 

Another example: The Knesset Rules of Procedure provide that a law is not valid unless passed by the Knesset in three (or four) readings. A draft bill that passes only two readings remains a draft bill, and does not become a law, even if the draft bill states that it will become law after only two readings. Only an explicit prior amendment (in the Rules of Procedure or in the law, as required) permitting the adoption of a law after only two readings is capable of turning a draft bill into a “law” after only two readings.  The reasons stated regarding publication are similarly applicable here, and do not require repetition.

 

86.  The Knesset and its legislative procedures are comparable to a machine with an internal operating mechanism: A machine that dispenses soft drink bottles will not be able to issue parking tickets unless its internal mechanism is replaced. Needless to say, the transformation must be carried out in a special way in order to make the machine suitable to its new task. The most talented magician cannot open a drawer locked with the key inside, and even the swiftest of men cannot lock a drawer and simultaneously place the key inside it.  A drawer cannot be opened with a key that does not match the lock, but any child can open the same drawer if he has the right key, or if the lock is replaced to match the key. These changes must be performed first, and only afterwards can the drawer be opened.  So it is with drawers and machines, and so it is with the Knesset and legislative procedures (and see, for example, Hogg, ibid., at p.300ff; P.A. Joseph, “Constitutional Entrenchment and the MMP Referendum,” 16 N.Z.U.  L. Rev (1994) at p. 67).

 

Knesset Voting; Special Majority

 

87. Let us now take a closer look at the subject of Knesset voting, which is the core of our concerns. We will begin with the issue of the quorum, and proceed to the subject of voting. Firstly, it bears mention that the issues of quorum and voting both concern the “organizational” procedures that the Knesset establishes in order to enable it to function, and the procedure by which it adorns itself before it adorns others.

 

88. The quorum rule is an optional one. In some cases, a quorum is mandatory in one of a variety of forms, and in other cases, there is no quorum requirement at all. Section 20 of the Interpretation Law (formerly s. 37 of the Interpretation Ordinance (New Version)) states that “an act required to be done by a number of persons shall be valid if performed by the majority of them.” This is the point of departure for assessing the actions of a collegial body (which is not a judicial or quasi-judicial body) (see, e.g., HC 7/55 Yanowitz v. Ohr, [66], at p.1255ff.).

 

Arguably, the Interpretation Law does not apply, by force of its own provisions, to Basic Law: The Knesset. Nonetheless, in the absence of a specific provision otherwise, the Knesset would presumably be subject to the rule laid down in the Interpretation Law, by force of the law’s internal logic and because it reflects the fundamental democratic principle of majority rule.  In any case, we need not resolve this question, inasmuch as s. 24 of Basic Law: The Knesset specifically provides that “The Knesset shall hold debates and pass decisions whatever the number of members present.” The rule stipulating the lack of a quorum requirement is binding as long as it is not changed. Should the Knesset Speaker refuse to submit a certain matter for a vote purely because of a “deficient quorum,” he would exceed his authority, and his decision would be invalid. Were a quorum requirement to be imposed, the Knesset would not be able to enact a “law” unless the quorum conditions were met (provided that the rule had not been changed in a separate, prior proceeding). Accordingly, the draft bill would not become a “law” even if it stipulated that it was not subject to the quorum requirement. That very same “law” would not be deemed a law, inasmuch as it was not passed by the required quorum. Baron Munchausen cannot lift himself up by his bootstraps, or save himself from drowning by pulling his own hair, and the Knesset (according to the hypothetical quorum rule) cannot pass a law without a quorum.

 

89.             Proceeding from the quorum to Knesset voting, the basic rule established in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset provides that:

 

Save as otherwise provided by Law, the Knesset shall pass its decisions by a majority of those participating in the voting –

those abstaining not being reckoned as participating – and the voting procedure shall be prescribed by the articles.

 

These are the voting rules followed in the Knesset by force of Basic Law: The Knesset. Knesset decisions are adopted on the basis of the democratic principle of majority rule, and Knesset members who were absent or abstained from voting are not included in the counting of the votes. Only those present at the vote, who voted for or against the law, will be included in the tally which is governed by the regular rules of majority. These rules have applied in the Knesset from the start. We would only add that this kind of provision stipulating that absentees or abstainers are not counted is common in Israeli legislation, and in other legal systems, as well.

However, nothing compels us to adopt this specific provision. For example, with respect to abstainers, the law could have included abstainers among those participating in the vote, and such a provision would ipso facto have meant counting the abstainers among the opponents of the law. And, needless to say, whichever approach the law adopted would decisively affect the manner of voting, both with respect to abstainers and with respect to absentees. The methods of obtaining a majority depend upon three variables: the requirement for a quorum; the treatment of both absentees and abstainers (in our comments below we address the specific issue of the special majority, which is the focus of our discussion). Thus the exclusion of absentees and abstainers in the tally of votes tends to strengthen the Government (assuming that it is the Government that initiates Knesset decisions). The opposite is also true: The inclusion of absentees and abstainers among those whose votes count, has the effect of strengthening the opposition (insofar as they did not vote “in favor,” they will be counted among the opponents) (see further, “Majority Rule,” in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: 1953), vol. 9 at p. 55; 59 Am.Jur.2d (Rochester and San Francisco) paras. 8, 9; and see CA 219/80 Beit Hilkiya, Workers’ Village for Cooperative Settlement Ltd v. Efrati, at p. 521-522).

 

In the absence of a constitution providing otherwise, the Knesset is free to choose any combination of these variables - quorum, absentees and abstainers - and any combination will be deemed legitimate (from a legal perspective). However, the Knesset’s authority is subject to one significant limit, namely the democratic principle. Regardless of the particular path adopted regarding quorum, absentees and abstainers, the principle of a democratic “majority” must be ensured, admitting of no deviation, right or left. In other words, the “majority” is the axis, the grounding principle around which all other rules and directives orbit. The majority – to paraphrase Hillel – is the “the entire Torah” and all the rest of the rules are “commentary” (we are not now addressing questions of individual rights).

 

90. Knowing that the majority principle forms the central axis – the beginning, the middle and end – facilitates the construction of various models for arriving at a majority decision within the permitted parameters. We can move among a range of models until we encounter the outer borders of democracy, which are inviolable. For example, the rule that abstainers will be considered among the participants in the vote (and therefore included amongst those voting “against”) would, in principle, be burdensome for the government, and require it to muster a larger number of supporters for its proposal. The same method could be applied to absentees. The higher up the ladder we go – in terms of including abstainers and absentees in the vote – the more difficult it becomes for the government, and the easier for the opposition. We climb the rungs of the ladder until we reach the top, where we would say that the Knesset will decide by force of majority, with both abstainers and absentees being counted among the participants in the vote. Such a provision is tantamount to proclaiming that the absentees and the abstainers are considered as having voted against the proposal (by force of not having voted for it). If we remove the veil from this construction, we see a provision stating that a proposal can only be accepted if it receives 61 votes, i.e. an absolute majority of the Knesset members. We further stress that this kind of statutory provision is almost self-evident, being a provision that does not deviate from the boundaries of regular Knesset activities. This would be the position irrespective of whether the 61 votes were implicitly required, as in our example, or explicitly, as contemplated by s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. 

 

In comparison with the majority provision appearing in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset, the requirement of a 61 vote majority for the passage of a decision may be classified as a requirement for a “special,” or “privileged” majority. We certainly have no quarrel with the adjective “special” or “privileged,” and in everyday parlance the term “special” majority appropriately connotes a majority of 61. But at the same time we should know that even when the passage of a law requires a special majority, it is nonetheless a law that the Knesset is authorized and permitted to enact as part of its regular activity. This statutory provision falls within the accepted, legitimate constraints of democracy, and does not cross the boundaries of legitimate, routine Knesset activities. We simply view the Knesset session as a meeting with the participation of all the Knesset members, in which all of the participants vote either for or against. In that situation, a majority of 61 would be required in order to enact a law, and this would also be the rule in the other cases. Needless to say, a stringent statutory provision of this nature could take the form of a general statutory provision in place of the provision in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset, or could be restricted to a particular matter, in accordance with the concluding phrase of s. 25 (“Save as otherwise provided by Law”).

    91.   We could go even further and assert that not only is the majority requirement of 61 neither unusual nor unique – it actually represents the starting point of the entire democratic process.  A requirement of a majority of 61 (i.e., an absolute majority) is not only consistent with the fundamental democratic principle of majority, it constitutes the embodiment of the democratic principle.  In the world of democracy, an absolute majority is neither a “special majority,” nor a “privileged” majority; it is the “authentic” majority, deriving from the essence of the democratic principle of majority. When the Knesset passes a law, it binds the entire nation, and since we do not live in a utopia in which the entire nation assents as one to the adoption of laws, it is appropriate that, at the very least, the majority of the people, i.e. an absolute majority, should assent to them. The people expresses its opinion through its representatives, and we will therefore require that an absolute majority of the people’s representatives agree to imposing obligations on the people. Those in agreement will presumably make the effort to vote in favor, while those who fail to make the effort to vote – by abstaining or by absenting themselves from the vote – may be assumed to oppose the proposal. This accords with the rabbinic dicta: the “majority carries the same weight as the entirety”; “a majority is equivalent to the totality”; “a majority is like the totality.” But this only applies when the majority is taken from the totality, and the principal meaning of a majority from the totality is an absolute majority (and see: Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, supra, at p. 55).

 

   92.    This was the thrust of statements made in the Knesset by Knesset Members Raphael and Rosenberg (in the debate on Basic Law: The Knesset), and I think it appropriate to cite them. Knesset member Raphael made the following statement regarding the majority:

 

…just as I would not want an incidental majority to change our decision, which was a majority decision, I similarly would not want there to be a need for a privileged majority to change a decision. This also would be somewhat arbitrary and would be tantamount to a distortion of the majority position, in view of there being a substantial portion that is pushing for a change.

I do not agree with the proponents of a two-thirds majority or any other kind of privileged majority; my proposal is that it be a majority from the whole, which according to the Rashba [Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Aderet – ed.] and other authorities of Jewish law is the true definition of a majority. This means a majority of all the Knesset members, and accordingly only sixty-one can change it

(Interjection: That is also a privileged majority).

No, it is not a privileged majority. It is a real majority, rather than an accidental majority.

I propose that the Knesset add a stipulation stating that this section can be changed only by a majority of all the Knesset members (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 23 at p. 898)

And Knesset Member Rosenberg stated the following:

Madam Speaker, Knesset Members. I would like to further elaborate on the difference between my proposal, whereby this section can only be changed by a majority of Knesset members, and a proposal stating that the section can be changed only by force of a two-thirds majority. The problem is not that a two-thirds majority requires a larger majority, while a majority of Knesset members requires a smaller majority. It is a matter of principle. The Knesset adopted this law by force of a majority, a majority of the Knesset members, and it is both reasonable and just that what is adopted by force of a majority may only be changed by force of a majority. The Knesset did not adopt this law by a two-thirds majority, and I see no justification for a requirement of a two-thirds majority in order to change it.

I do not accept the approach whereby a constitutional law requires a two-thirds majority. There are states with constitutions containing special clauses prescribing how to amend it, and not necessarily by two thirds, but by all sorts of other means. In England, as in Israel, there is no constitution, but there are still constitutional laws which do not require a privileged majority if there is a desire to change them

I do however concur with what was said here, and this indeed is our approach, that it is forbidden for a matter of principle to be altered by force of an incidental majority. As a result, we are opposed in principle to the notion of a special majority, save with respect to one eventuality, which will be addressed at the end of the law, concerning emergency legislation. Here however, it is clear that we must ensure a Knesset majority, which means a majority of the state. In this context, I adhere to the accepted approach, namely, that in a system of proportional elections, a Knesset majority represents a majority of the people. Accordingly, if sixty-one Knesset members, i.e. a majority in the Knesset that represents the majority of the nation, wish to make a change, they can do so. If less than half of the people, i.e. less than sixty-one Knesset members, then should they wish to make a change, they will be unable to so. Since they do not represent a majority of the nation, they cannot make a change. Accordingly, we recommend the acceptance of our reservations (ibid., at p. 898).

    Knesset Member Amnon Rubinstein made similar comments at the first reading of the draft bill of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty:

…61 Knesset members do not constitute entrenchment, but rather are a tool utilized in many parliaments to prevent votes of chance. However, without s. 10, this law would be meaningless, and as such the section also represents a minimum. As opposed to the draft bill submitted by the Minister of Justice, it does not require a two-thirds majority, but only a majority of 61. This is a minimum requirement beyond which no compromise is possible, because a majority of 61 is intended to prevent any possibility of a legislative hijacking and amendments by a chance majority (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 123, at p. 1236).

  This is what Knesset Member. Rubinstein said in the Knesset session for the first reading of the draft bill of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation:

 

We propose that this law may only be changed by a majority of the Knesset members.  It is not an entrenched majority… There is no entrenchment here….the requirement for an absolute majority, which is not an entrenched majority, tells the Knesset one thing: This law cannot be adopted by a chance majority. You must adopt it by an absolute majority of all the members. I would like to emphasize that under the provisions that apply to many bodies, this is the basic quorum rule. A quorum means an absolute majority. This type of provision does not apply to the Knesset, and rightly so because otherwise it would encounter daily difficulties. But this requirement is absolutely modest, and minimal, not requiring entrenchment but rather an absolute majority (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 124 at p. 2596).

 

And Knesset Member Rubinstein made the following statement in the meeting of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee:

In all of the Parliaments of the world there is a difference between a special majority, which is a majority of two thirds, as proposed by the Minister of Justice, and an absolute majority. This provision is known as a quorum provision, and is not regarded as a special majority provision (meeting on 9.3.92, at p. 53).

This is “real” democracy, in all its glory and grandeur – the democracy of festivals and holydays. It is the starting point: A majority is an absolute majority of the members of the House. But since we all are aware that incidental demands, constraints and matters of convenience lead to the loss of that glory and grandeur, we inevitably find ourselves in the mundane, workaday democracy.

Should an example be necessary, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was adopted by a majority of 32 for and 21 against. Its twin, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the first one) was adopted by a majority of 23 Knesset members, with no opponents or abstainers. This is weekday, routine democracy, and it would surprise me if even the Knesset members themselves regarded the Basic Laws as a “constitutional revolution,” or any other kind of revolution (see and compare Bendor, supra).

 

93. Every day constraints, the convenience of the members of the legislature, and other factors, too, have generated a reality of compromise, of derogation from the absolute majority – the majority that derives from the democratic principle. This was the background of the absentees and abstainers rule in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset. However, our diminution of the “pure” democratic principle should not blind us to the fact that the rule and the principle is that of the absolute majority – the absolute majority that is the beginning of all beginnings. All of this teaches us that the rule of a majority of 61 is the self-evident dictate of the democratic principle of the majority, and as such does not involve the imposition of any element of “self limitation” by the Knesset. When the Knesset prescribes that a particular statute can be repealed, changed or infringed only by a majority of 61 Knesset members, it does not limit its authority, nor does it “curtail” its legislative power. All that it does is give direct expression to the majority rule dictated by the democratic principle. The principle of the majority, quite simply, means 50% + 1 (n/2 +1). In a body comprising 120 members, a “majority” means 61 members (and cf. Hart, supra, p. 68).

 

Requiring a special majority of 61 obviously restricts the Knesset members’ ability to abstain or to mutually set off votes, in that abstention or mutual set off would be regarded as voting against. However, since I do not find that the ability to abstain or set off a vote is a basic right of a public representative, nor is it a right at all even if not a basic right, I do not think that the “rule of 61” violates or infringes any important democratic principle.

 

I would further add, incidentally, that the establishment of a special majority must be specifically anchored in law, primarily because of the statutory provision regarding the formation of a majority in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset. For this reason, I cannot concur with my colleague President Barak, who writes: “It seems to me that the Knesset may – by way of changing the articles – determine that the adoption of a law be by special majority” (Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1, at p. 569).

 

    94.   We have learnt thus far that the requirement of a majority of Knesset members for the annulment, change or infringement of any law may occur at any stage of the Knesset’s routine activities, and bears no legal uniqueness. Indeed, a majority of 61 is “special” when compared to the majority of 23 that voted for the adoption of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the first version), however, this “distinction” does not involve any innovation from the perspective of the law’s constitutional standing. We are unaware of any legal obstacle to the Knesset’s adoption of any law with “entrenchment by 61,” and we see nothing legally unique in that kind of law.

    

     This is the case, for example, in s. 3 of the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law, which provides that “this law may not be amended nor may the appendix be revised except by a majority of the Members of Knesset.” This statutory provision is legitimate in my opinion, and the Knesset was entitled to “limit” its authority by establishing this kind of entrenchment for the law (see and compare, Karp, supra).

 

This view is not unanimous. For example, my colleague President Barak is skeptical regarding the entrenchment of that law. In his view, apparently, entrenchment is valid only when done by means of a Basic Law, whereas the law for Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets is not a Basic Law (see, e.g. Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1, pp. 568-569; vol. 3, pp.274-276). I am highly skeptical regarding my colleague’s view for two doctrinal reasons. Firstly, I do not know what my colleague regards as a “Basic Law” that could justify entrenchment such as in the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law. Had the title of the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law included the two words “Basic Law,” would it have validated the entrenchment? Irrespective of whether the answer is positive or negative, neither of the answers would be satisfactory. (We might argue that the title “Basic Law” is sufficient, but we would then be accused of semantics. On the other hand, we might claim that the title “Basic Law” is insufficient, and that the entrenchment is invalid, having been enacted in excess of authority. But I think that would be going too far in conferring authority upon the court, in the absence of any explicit statutory authorization).

 

Regarding the content of the law, if Prohibition could find its way into a constitution, then it would seem that public investments could also represent a legitimate constitutional interest (and had such a protection been included in the Constitution in the first place, would we disqualify it?). In any case, where does the Court derive the authority to decide what should be included in a constitution, and furthermore, in order to overrule statutory provisions of the Knesset? Moreover, in my view, the Knesset may, in the regular course of its work, entrench a statute by means of an absolute majority of 61 members, and consequently, I am unable to find any fault in the entrenchment of the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law.

95. Incidentally, I will add that for the same reasons I cannot concur with the view of my colleague Justice Zamir that the Bergman ruling represents a “revolution” in Israeli law. Naturally, I agree that the Bergman ruling was a milestone in the Supreme Court’s rulings. This was the first time that the Court struck down Knesset legislation, and in so doing the Court recognized the justiciability of the procedure and the Court’s authority to nullify Knesset legislation. However, in terms of overall constitutional doctrine, I think that the ruling can be understood as being required by the “internal” authority of the Knesset, in other words, it is derived from the Knesset’s authority to limit its authority, and to entrench a law against a majority of less than 61 Knesset members.

96. Is a majority of 61 Knesset members the upper limit to the entrenchment of a law in a democratic proceeding? For example, is the Knesset authorized to determine that a Basic Law can only be repealed, varied or violated by force of a majority of 70 or 80 Knesset members (and if 70 or 80 Knesset members, then why not 90 or 100?)? Is the Knesset authorized to limit its authority by enacting that kind of entrenchment? My colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak maintain that the Knesset is entitled to pass such legislation. In my opinion the Knesset does not have that kind of authority to entrench legislation, and were it to do so it would be exceeding the boundaries of its authority. No lengthy explanation is needed, as this derives from the same reasoning that brought us to the conclusion that the Knesset is entitled to establish a requirement of a majority of Knesset members in order to change a particular law. Establishing a requirement for a majority of Knesset members as a condition for changing a law is permitted as a matter of routine, but it also signifies the upper limit. The democratic process mandates this rule unconditionally, and it is a rule that cannot be violated. A requirement that the Knesset must achieve a majority of 62 to change a law would exceed the boundaries of what is permitted. The Knesset does not have the authority to exceed the limit of 61.

Incidentally, what is the status of a law that the Knesset determines can be changed only by a majority of 80 votes? For example, under the provisions of s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset (a provision that was added in Basic Law: The Government in 1992), the Knesset can extend its incumbency only by force of a law adopted by a majority of eighty Knesset members, and the same applies to ss. 45 and 45A of Basic Law: The Knesset regarding the power of emergency regulations to change or temporarily suspend Basic Law: The Knesset, and regarding a change in the provisions of s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset. Arguably, the “rule of 61” vitiates these entrenchment provisions, because they all require a majority of more than 61. But this is not the case. We have not vitiated these statutory provisions and they should not be regarded as null and void. In my view (prima facie), the law should be regarded as being entrenched under a “61 entrenchment” even if only by force of the rule of ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In other words, we have not annulled those provisions but only diminished their force. I would further say that to date, “80 entrenchment” provisions have been established for matters that are entirely undisputed, and as such it may reasonably be presumed that they will never be subjected to judicial review. We hope that the day never comes. In any case, these provisions do not constitute proof of the Knesset’s constituent authority, if only because one cannot corroborate one’s own testimony.

 

97. In Israel’s current constitutional regime, and in the absence of the living, breathing authority to adopt a “constitution,” a determination that a statute cannot be cancelled, varied or infringed other than by a majority of more than 61 (>61) votes is patently anti-democratic. A functioning governmental organ in a democratic regime – and the Knesset fits that description – cannot have the legal authority to establish such an anti-democratic rule regarding its own activity. For as long as our regime is a democratic one, we are governed by the principle of majority rule (together with civil rights). As such, a requirement for the consent of 62 Knesset members (or more) to change a law essentially means minority rule and abrogation of the majority rule principle. The Knesset does not have that authority, and it is absolutely forbidden for us to recognize it as possessing that kind of authority. If we say that the Knesset is authorized to limit its ability to change a law – regardless of whether it refers to itself as a “constituent assembly” or otherwise; regardless of whether it refers to its authority as constituent authority or otherwise; and regardless of whether the law is titled “Basic Law” or any other name – we thereby acknowledge the Knesset’s authority to enact a law that it will be unable to repeal (as a practical matter). An examination of Israeli parliamentary history shows that very few laws were actually adopted by a majority of 70 or 80 Knesset members. If the Knesset were to entrench laws in that manner, what chance would there be of changing the law? The majority of the nation would stand agape, powerless to change the law. The apologists will explain to the people: you are helpless, and there is nothing you can do.

 

We should further note that according to those who disagree with us, the Knesset is authorized to curtail its legislative authority by determining that a particular law can only be changed by a majority, for example, of 80 Knesset members, even if the law establishing that rule is adopted by a negligible majority of Knesset members – see the examples of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the first one), and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Can this be so? Section 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset – the statutory provision enjoying “80 entrenchment” – was added to Basic Law: The Knesset in Basic Law: The Government of 1992 (the Basic Law intended to replace the current version of Basic Law: The Government). That Basic Law itself was passed in the Knesset by a majority of 55 votes in favor and 32 against (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 125, at p. 3863). This inevitably raises the legal, moral and public question of whether we should recognize the authority of a majority of 55 Knesset members to enact an “80 entrenchment,” especially given our knowledge – in view of the Knesset’s composition since the establishment of the State – that very few laws could be adopted by a majority of 80. We have elaborated on this point, and there is no need to add to it.

 

Indeed, in my view no importance attaches to the number of members that may seek to limit the Knesset’s authority in the future. A regular majority has the authority to entrench a law so that it can be changed only by a majority of 61 Knesset members (“a majority carries the same weight as the entirety”). However, even a hefty majority cannot entrench a law to preclude its amendment other than by a majority of 62 (or more) Knesset members. In the latter case, even if the entire Knesset voted in favor of such a limitation, I would still maintain that the Knesset had exceeded its authority. Indeed, recognizing the Knesset’s authority to revoke its own power to change a law by a democratic majority (= a majority of 61 Knesset members) presents a dire picture.

 

98. The basic principle of majority rule can teach us the following: First, that inherent in the Knesset’s authority to enact laws is the natural power to legislatively establish that a particular law cannot be repealed, varied or violated unless the proposal receives the support of a majority of the Knesset members i.e. 61 Knesset members. There is no need for a source of law external to the Knesset itself in order to endow it with that power. It is inherent in the very nature of the Knesset as a supreme legislative authority, and is derived from Israel’s democratic character. The second conclusion is that the same principle of majority rule – and no other – further dictates that inherent in the Knesset’s legislative authority is the lack of power to establish in legislation that the repeal, the variation, or the violation of the scope of a particular law requires the support of more than 61 Knesset members. A majority of 61 is the upper limit, beyond which the Knesset exceeds its authority.

 

    99. This is but one example of the Knesset’s limited power to legislate in regard to itself, to define its own power and to establish its own authority. There is no shortage of additional examples. Here is one: 

A particular Knesset enacts a Basic Law that stipulates that its term will be extended for an additional four years beyond the four years prescribed in s. 8 of Basic Law: The Knesset (“The term of office of the Knesset shall be four years from the day on which it is elected”). In other words, a particular Knesset was elected for a period of 4 years and it now proposes to serve for eight full years. In my view, such a law would be manifestly illegal, even were it adopted by all one-hundred-and-twenty Knesset members who thus purported to extend their term of office. The people elected the Knesset for only four years. It did not grant the Knesset a power of attorney to extend its own term of office for an additional four years (obviously, we are not dealing with states of emergency and the extension of a term during a state of emergency) (see and compare s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset, which was added in Basic Law: The Government in1992. That provision will enter into force on the day that a Prime Minister elected by virtue of that Basic Law assumes office). In the words of David Ben-Gurion in the Knesset, prior to the elections to the Second Knesset:

 

The Knesset must stipulate the term of the Second Knesset’s office, and if we decide that the term will be for four years, the next Knesset will not be able to serve for more than four years, because the people elected it, from the outset, for four years (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 8, at p. 1581).

 

Another example: A particular Knesset wishes to enact a law that reduces the number of members of the House to ninety members. The law is due to go into effect immediately, and accordingly thirty members are to be removed, pro rata in accordance with their party affiliation. (In other words, there is no “discrimination” among the parties, and the minority does not control the majority. The situation is, therefore, one in which the people elected one hundred and twenty members, whoever they may be, and along comes the Knesset and rejects the mandate it received from the people. Were such a law to be enacted, it would exceed the power of the Knesset, and it would be as worthless as a broken potsherd. It would not be valid from a legal perspective.

 

The examples cited, and others like them, indicate the operation of “hidden” forces, embedded in the very existence of the Knesset, which restrict its purportedly unlimited power to enact legislation. It bears consideration that our concern is the Knesset’s legislating for itself, and not its legislating for others, which is its central role. We are not referring here to restrictions deriving from “natural law” that pertains to the Knesset’s authority to enact legislation for others (such as “every boy that is born to the Hebrews you shall throw into the Nile but you shall let every girl live”(Exodus 1:22 [120])), as this authority is not under discussion.

 

100.              Our views here are not universally accepted. For example, in his aforementioned book, at pp.110-111, Prof. Englard writes as follows:

 

       … “Can the primary legislature limit itself?” In our view the answer is affirmative, and no logical contradiction is involved. Nothing prevents a legal norm from addressing not only a specific kind of conduct of others but also its own validity and the methods for changing it. Just as the legislature can establish the scope of application of a particular norm in terms of time and place, it can likewise provide that a norm can be changed only by force of a particular procedure or by a particular body. Similarly, it can dictate that a particular norm may not be repealed or changed at all, neither by itself, nor by any other body. Such a norm is valid….

 

Professor Englard sees no difference between the Knesset’s authority to establish norms for the world outside the Knesset and its authority to establish norms for itself, and hence his conclusion that the primary legislature – being what it is – is authorized to limit itself. My view is different. In my understanding, the role of the primary legislature is to “organize” its surrounding world. Its authority to “organize” itself is only ancillary and secondary, and as such its goals are limited to those required for “organizing itself.” Even if we were to contend that in its “organization” of the world, the primary legislature could never be limited, this would not be the case regarding its authority to “organize” itself, because it was not created for that purpose. The primary legislature’s authority to organize itself extends exclusively to the specific area that enables it to establish norms for others, and nothing else. Needless to say, all of the above is subject to the provisions of a constitution that spreads its canopy over everything.

 

101.  The basic rule is this: By the very nature of the matter, when it legislates for itself – and in respect of itself – the Knesset does not wield unlimited power and authority. Meta-principles – or, if you prefer, foundational principles – are etched into the Knesset’s very existence. Certain character traits inhere in the genes of the Knesset, being what it is, and the Knesset is unable to free itself from those principles and features. Those characteristics are the Knesset.  One of those principles is the majority principle. This principle teaches us that the Knesset’s authority to limit its power to change laws extends to the requirement of 61 Knesset members, and no more. Hence the majority principle, both upwards and downwards, is a basic foundation in the rule of law and the existence of a democratic regime. Without it the people cast off restraint, and in its absence no kingdom can be established. Each of you to your tents, O Israel! [2 Chronicles 10:16 – ed.]. To uproot majority rule from the body of a regime is to remove the very soul of democracy. The majority principle governs the Knesset in the form of “the high official is watched by a higher” [Ecclesiastes 5:8 – ed.]. The rule of law also governs the legislature. A law enacted by the Knesset becomes part of Israeli law provided that it does not pierce the heart of democracy – the majority principle. All of this, naturally, subject to the provisions of a legally enacted constitution.

 

102.  Incidentally, we spoke of the inherent restriction in the Knesset’s authority that prevents it from enacting a law that cannot be changed other than by a majority of more than 61 Knesset members. We did not address the possibilities of other limitations, such as a law that requires a referendum in order to be changed, or other limitations that derive from the very nature of democracy and the basic values of Israeli society. These “limitations” raise independent problems. In the case of a referendum, for example, the Knesset turns to the people, the source of its own authority. But we will not treat these matters.

 

103.             In conclusion, the Supreme Court has thus far invalidated a number of Knesset statutes that deviated from previously entrenched provisions, but each and every one of those cases concerned a statutory provision that could be changed only by force of a majority (61) of Knesset members, namely a “61 majority.” I fully concur with all of those judgments, because they all conform with the restrictions of a democratic regime. The same applies to the restrictions now established in the new Basic Laws. My quarrel is only with statutory provisions that purport to condition any variation or violation of its provisions on the support of 62 or more Knesset members. Statutory provisions of this nature, regardless of their content, undermine the foundations of Israeli democracy, and cannot be taken at face value.

 

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation

 

104.             So far we have addressed the fundamental principles pertaining to the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution and impose formal limitations upon its legislative activity. We will now take a closer look at the two Basic Laws concerning us here, and attempt to gain a deeper understanding.

 

105.             First, we must distinguish between a “variation” of a Basic Law and a “violation” of a Basic Law, if only because Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation distinguishes between “variation” and “violation” (and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty borrowed therefrom). A variation of a law means a change in the fundamental scope of the law. The law is subjected to “genetic engineering,” and when the law’s genetic code is changed, it is no longer the law that it was. On the other hand, a violation of a law or of a basic right does not fundamentally alter the law or the right. “Violating” the law is like bending a tree and within defined boundaries its power subsequent to the violation is not quite the same as its power prior to the violation. But this is as far as it goes. Nonetheless, it appears that when distinguishing between a variation and a violation, one must consider the degree of the “violation.” As a violation becomes more extensive, it increasingly bears the character of a variation. A variation can masquerade as a violation, hence while referred to as a violation in essence it is a variation. As mentioned, the Basic Laws themselves dictate the distinction between “variation” and “violation,” but the distinction does not appear in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset (from which it follows that the “variation” referred to in that section also includes a violation). In any case, we will take the path already paved by the legislature.

 

106.             Along with the distinction between “variation” and “violation,” we must also distinguish between a statutory provision in which the Knesset purports to restrict its ability to legislate by the formal entrenchment of the law, i.e. by determining that the law can only be varied or violated if certain formal conditions are satisfied (such as a special majority, referendum, etc., and a statutory provision in which the Knesset attempts to restrict its legislative powers by establishing certain substantive criteria, but without formally entrenching those substantive provisions. Formal entrenchment must be treated separately from substantive limitation, and hence we will discuss each of them separately.

 

These two classifications, “variation” and “violation” on the one hand, and “formal entrenchment” and “substantive limitation” on the other hand, generate four different possibilities. We will discuss them in our comments below, distinguishing between the two Basic Laws. We will begin with Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and then proceed to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 

 

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation

 

107.  Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation refers both to procedures for “variation” of the law and procedures for a “violation” thereof. Its provisions include both substantive and formal limitation. We will begin with the issue of variation, after which we will discuss the subject of violation.

 

Variation of a Basic Law: Formal Entrenchment and Substantive Limitation

 

108.  Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation establishes formal entrenchment of its provisions. According to s. 7:

This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset          

 

     The section bears the title “entrenchment,” and prescribes two conditions for the variation of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The first is that a variation can only be made in a Basic Law, and the second is that it must be adopted by a majority of the Knesset members. A statute enacted by the Knesset that does not fulfill either one of the conditions cannot vary the Basic Law. Neither a Basic Law adopted by less than 61 Knesset members, nor a law adopted by 61 members that is not titled “Basic Law” can vary the Basic Law. A separate question is whether the law would be recognized as valid for all other matters that do not vary the Basic Law, but this question does not presently concern us.  

    

     Did the Knesset succeed in limiting its authority to vary Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation? In my view it was successful, and the limitation is valid. Regarding the majority requirement, we have already elaborated, perhaps excessively, on the issue of the majority, and for fear of being tedious, we make no further comment. Regarding the explicit provision that it can only be varied by another Basic Law, this too is a procedural condition, similar to the requirement of a majority. The Knesset’s authority to require a majority of 61 as a condition for varying a law belongs to the appropriate procedures governing the enactment of a law, which do not constitute an illegitimate restriction of the Knesset’s power.  The same rule is true for the explicit requirement that a Basic Law can only be varied by force of a Basic Law. This precondition for the enactment of an amending Basic Law is no different from the requirement of three readings for the adoption of a law. Just as a “law” that only passed two readings is not a law at all, and cannot change an existing law, confer or deny rights, or impose obligations, so too a law purporting to vary a Basic Law, that is not itself a Basic Law (or did not receive a majority of 61 Knesset members). Unless s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is changed, by the method prescribed for changing it, only a norm that satisfies both requirements of s. 7 can vary the Basic Law according to the procedure imposed by the Knesset upon itself. It is understood that a variation of s. 7 of the Basic Law, in the manner prescribed, i.e. by a majority of the Knesset members and in a Basic Law, would hence cause a variation in the method prescribed for changing the basic right of freedom of occupation.

 

109.  Up to this point we have addressed the formal entrenchment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation against variation. How does substantive limitation affect variation? It would appear that s. 5 of the Basic Law establishes a substantive limitation. The provision states “All governmental authorities are bound to respect the freedom of occupation of all nationals and residents.” Given that the Knesset is “one of the governmental authorities,” it follows that the Knesset – like other governmental authorities – must respect freedom of occupation. This obligation constitutes a substantive limitation. However, the provision of s. 5 reflects the binding law for as long as the Basic Law has not been varied (subject to fulfillment of the two requirements for a variation). From this it follows that the statute relates only indirectly to the issue of a variation. The substantive limitation is in fact concealed in the folds of formal entrenchment. The cloak of formal entrenchment conceals substantive limitation, and substantive limitation is in fact derived from the formal entrenchment, in which it hides.

 

Violation of a Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – Formal Entrenchment and Substantive Limitation

 

110.  As far as the violation of the basic right of freedom of occupation, our concern here is with ss. 4 and 8 of the Basic Law, which provide as follows:

           

Violation of freedom of occupation

There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

 

Effect of non­conforming law

A provision of a law that violates freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it has been included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement unless a shorter duration has been stated therein.

 

Section 4 of the Basic Law established various substantive conditions for the possible violation of freedom of occupation (substantive limitation). Section 8 adds to it by establishing procedures for the enactment of a law that violates the freedom of occupation and which does not comply with the provisions of s. 4, and establishes that the duration of such a law may not exceed four years. Two conditions must be fulfilled for the Knesset to acquire the authority to “violate” Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, in the event that it fails to comply with the conditions of section 4. The first is the enactment of a “regular law” by a majority of the Knesset members. The second is that it “expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.” Should one of these conditions not be satisfied, the law cannot violate freedom of occupation. These conditions are prescribed for the enactment of a law that purports to violate the freedom of occupation (a law that does not satisfy the conditions prescribed in s. 4 of the Basic Law), and until such time that the Knesset amends that procedure, this is the only way of enacting a law which is capable of impairing the freedom of occupation (if it does not satisfy the conditions enumerated in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). Regarding the argument that the later law should nonetheless be valid and be capable of violating freedom of occupation, even if it fails to satisfy one of the two conditions (for example, a law enacted by a majority of the Knesset, but which does not explicitly provide that it will be valid despite the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in accordance with the rule of lex posterior derogat legi priori. Our response would be that the later law is not even a “lex” in the first place, because it was not adopted in compliance with the procedures specified in advance by the Knesset for its adoption (like a law “adopted” after only two readings).

 

111.             Concerning the subject of a violation of freedom of occupation, the format of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is the same as the format for the subject of variation. Regarding violation, s. 4 of the Basic Law explicitly establishes a substantive limitation, by prohibiting any violation of freedom of occupation unless particular conditions are satisfied. But here, too, we find that the substantive limitation is in fact concealed within the folds of the formal entrenchment of s. 8 of the Basic Law. A law that violates the freedom of occupation and which satisfies the conditions of s. 4 will be valid, as per s. 4. A law that violates the freedom of occupation and does not satisfy the conditions of s. 4 will only be valid if it satisfies the entrenchment provisions enumerated in s. 8 of the Basic Law. The legislature took pains to establish explicit provisions in the body of the law for different situations.. The issue of entrenchment will, in any case, revolve around the procedural question and the formal entrenchment provision. Any issues of substantive entrenchment that may be raised by Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation will be addressed in our discussion of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

Basic Law: Freedom of OccupationConcerning the Conditions for Entrenchment

 

112.             The issue under discussion concerns the conditions set forth in ss. 7 and 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation regarding a variation or violation of the law. Notably, these conditions are exclusively procedural, and contain no substantive content at all: a special majority, the name of the law (regarding a variation), an explicit “notwithstanding” provision (regarding a violation). We have discussed the issue of majority at length, and need not add. The other two conditions may be viewed as procedural “incantations” for legislation, like the magic words that open a secret cave. The words have no intrinsic substance, but by legislative fiat they pave the way to legislation. Even if the magic formulae have no intrinsic substance, the very need to insert “Basic Law” (at the beginning of the variation) and the “notwithstanding” formula (in the middle of the violating law) is meant to trigger the legislature’s awareness of the importance of its actions, and the responsibility that it assumes when varying or violating the freedom of occupation. Let no Knesset member come along a day or two later, shouting: I didn’t know, I didn’t understand, it never occurred to me to vary or to violate the freedom of occupation. The adoption of a Basic Law (that violates freedom of occupation) is no routine matter, and the specific use of “Basic law” or “notwithstanding” makes it apparent to any one who bothers to look. This kind of law can only be adopted by virtue of the prescribed procedures. In other words, this kind of “law,” which has the power to vary or to violate the freedom of occupation, can only be produced by way of fixed procedures, and the meeting of various, specific conditions.

 

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – Violation of Human Rights and Variation of Human Rights

 

113.  We thus far have addressed Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in accordance with its various formulations. By contrast, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty presents us with a different method of limiting the Knesset in its legislation. Here, the Knesset is substantively limited without the accompanying formal entrenchment. In our comments below, we will address the two subjects of variation and violation of the Basic Law together.

 

114.After establishing its basic principles and purpose, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enumerates various human rights (for some reason, some of the basic rights are not defined as substantive rights). After listing them, s. 8 of the Basic Law imposes the prohibition upon violating the enumerated rights, as follows: 

 

Violation of Rights

8. There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law

 

            Section 11 of the Basic Law adds:

 

Application

11. All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law.

 

We would all agree that the Knesset is one of the “governmental authorities” referred to in s. 11. In fact, it would seem that the section was drafted primarily in honor of the Knesset. Nonetheless, it goes without saying that the other “governmental authorities,” such as the courts, the government, and any other state agency also fall within the ambit of “governmental authorities.” Even in the absence of s. 11, they would be bound to uphold Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, simply by force of being bound by the rule of law, which is an intrinsic part of what we are. The provisions of s. 11 are thus intended to inform us in a formal and binding manner, that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom explicitly applies to the legislative authority, as well, giving expression to the legislature’s subordination to the rule of law. Actually, once s. 8 of the Basic Law provided that basic rights under the law could only be violated by a law that complies with prescribed conditions, the provisions of s. 11 became necessary to supplement the substantive determination of s. 8.

 

115.  The Knesset is thus bound to respect the basic rights enumerated in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty including, and we should add – perhaps primarily – in its legislative activities. Taking this path, we are confronted by the question of the nature and the scope of the Knesset’s act of self-limitation – its undertaking not to violate basic rights except if in compliance with the conditions enumerated in s. 8, referred to as “the limitation clause.” When the limitation clause is fortified by a formal entrenchment provision, as in the case of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, we know the answer. The entrenchment provision is determinative: it paves our way, and we will decide accordingly. However, in the absence of the aegis of entrenchment, as is the case with Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, what is it that protects the “limitation clause” from variation or violation?

 

Let us assume that after the passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Knesset adopted a regular law, by regular majority, that – in practice – violates basic rights specifically established by the Basic Law, but does not satisfy the conditions established by s. 8 for recognition as a “legal” law. For example, it violates a right under the Basic Law to an extent greater than is required. Should we acknowledge the legal validity of such a law? Should we view it as being a “legal” law for all intents and purposes – as a law passed with requisite authority, and that successfully derogates from a basic right? Or perhaps we might say that such a law is not “legal,” and that ab initio it is not binding, insofar as it fails to comply with the Knesset’s provisions in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? In other words, when the Knesset subjects itself to a substantive limitation with respect to future legislation, what significance attaches to the limitation in the absence of a wall of protective entrenchment surrounding it (as is the case with Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation)? How should we construe the provision of the Basic Law, and what is the legal function of the Knesset’s purported self-limitation?

 

 The following four possible solutions present themselves: the provisions of s. 8 are absolute, and no deviation is possible; s. 8 is no more than a guideline for legislation, and hence a deviation from its provisions has no effect on legislation; the provisions of s. 8 can be deviated from in a later law, whether implicitly or explicitly; and, deviation from s. 8 is possible only by way of an explicit law (and perhaps only in the form of a Basic Law). We will now proceed to examine each of these solutions individually, one-by-one, both in terms of the legislative purpose (the level of intention), and in terms of the Knesset’s ability to achieve that purpose (the level of authority) (and see and compare: Karp, supra; Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol. 3 at p.266ff.).

 

116.  One way of interpreting s. 8 is that the legislative pronouncement is resolute and absolute, admitting of no deviation. Having become a law, no governmental authority is permitted to violate any of the human rights stipulated in the Basic Law, unless it satisfies a number of conditions, all of them stipulated in s. 8: It can do so by law, or by force of an express authorization therein; such a law must be consistent with the values of the State of Israel; it must be for an appropriate purpose; its violation of human rights must be to an extent no greater than is necessary. This provision of s. 8 is immutable. Though apparently attempting to create an immovable rock, this interpretation – prima facie – is soundly based, and in substantive terms it is consistent with the nature of a democratic-liberal regime, one that is appropriate for us and that we deserve. For example, every person in Israel has a basic right not to have his life or dignity violated, as per s. 2 of the Basic Law. The law further provides, according to this understanding, that having come into force, the law forbids the violation of a person’s life or dignity unless by force of a law intended for a proper purpose, etc. This prohibition is a rock, and our prohibitions are prohibitions, as written and as intended, as is right and proper.

 

If that is the law in terms of its content and purpose – as per the presumed legislative “intent” – then we look in vain for a source for the Knesset’s authority to limit its future legislative capacity. We have shown that the Knesset cannot shackle itself in its legislative capacity other than by the requirement of a majority of 61 Knesset members, and as we have seen, this particular procedure is in fact required for all legislation (as opposed to a limitation of authority, which in our opinion is forbidden). If the Knesset lacks the authority to limit itself in its legislative activities by positing a requirement for a majority of 62 or more votes, then a fortiori it is incapable of permanently limiting its legislative abilities according to this (possible) interpretation of the law. The nation did not authorize the Knesset to divest itself of its authority and release itself from the yoke of legislating, and this necessarily dictates the rejection of this interpretation of s. 8 of the law. The Knesset cannot create a rock that it cannot lift.

 

117.             A second interpretation, which substantively is the polar opposite of the first, is that the provisions of s. 8 (along with s. 11) of the Basic Law were intended exclusively for purposes of guidance, having no binding authority. Their purpose was to guide the legislature in the act of legislation, meaning that s. 8 is an instructive directive, as opposed to an imperative, mandatory directive (on the distinction between these two kinds of provisions, see CA 87/50 Liebman v. Lipshitz, [68]. According to this interpretation, the provisions of s. 8 are no more than good advice that the legislature has whispered in its own ear. It says: if you choose to take this path – well and good, but if you fail to take it, your acts are valid, and the law that you enact will be a law. This interpretation, while possible, in terms of the legislative intention, is nonetheless unreasonable. There are cases in which the legislative instruction is interpreted as being a guideline, but it is unheard of for the legislature to lay down statutory guidelines for its own legislation. We are unaware of any such proposition, and we do not consider it to be reasonable. That is true in general, and a fortiori it would appear to be the case with respect to the provision in s. 8, which clearly and unequivocally states that there can be no violation of the Basic Law other than by force of law (or by specific authorization therein). The wording of s. 8 is not that of a guideline, but rather that of an obligation, and I see no good reason for not interpreting the law in terms of its plain meaning.

 

118.  Having rejected the two extreme interpretations of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, we are left with the two intermediary interpretations. One interpretation is based upon the concept of implied repeal, while the other is based on that of express repeal. We will now address these two interpretative options, beginning with the subject of implicit repeal.

119.  The basic rule is that a new law overrides the law that preceded it. And you shall take out the old from before the new (Leviticus, 26:10) [1]. Where a later law contradicts or is inconsistent with an earlier law, the later law has the upper hand, and the earlier law is repealed to the extent of the contradiction or inconsistency. (lex posterior derogat priori: (pro tanto)).  The substantive rationale of this rule derives from the fundamental principle that an authorized agency – in our case, the people’s representatives in the House of Representatives – periodically establishes behavioral norms that are appropriate for the general population and the individual. If the legislature established a particular behavioral norm, obviously it intended that norm to be binding, and no other. If today’s norm contradicts yesterday’s norm, then quite obviously, today’s norm should override yesterday’s norm to the extent of the with scope of the new norm. In a democratic regime such as ours, this rule supplements the rule deriving from the very nature of the regime – that the opinion of the majority is decisive.

 

Indeed, when today’s norm explicitly repeals yesterday’s norm, no question arises (provided that the two norms are on the same normative plane, i.e. a law versus a law, a regulation versus a regulation, etc.). The question is what happens when the later norm does not expressly repeal the earlier norm. In this context we have two comments: Firstly, we would do our best to reconcile the two norms, making every effort, even if somewhat contrived, to harmonize them, and enable them to coexist under the same roof. We would push our limits to make peace between the apparent rivals.  We would tell ourselves that had today’s legislature desired to repeal yesterday’s norm, it could have informed us of that intention with a stroke of the pen. Not having done so, it is presumed to have intended that both norms apply concurrently.  If this, prima facie, was its intention, we will do our best to give effect to that intention by way of interpretation, even if in a contrived manner. However, when all possibilities have been exhausted, and even convoluted, tortuous solutions are of no avail, then we may say to ourselves, apparently the legislature overlooked the contradiction between the norms, and because we regard ourselves as bound by its current command, which is today’s norm, we may conclude by implication that its intention was to repeal yesterday’s norm (to the extent of the contradiction). Our comments here were worded in a subjective form, and we can also give them an objective formulation in terms of the relationship between one law and another and the manner in which they are integrated into an overall legislative context. So we have express repeal, implicit repeal and the relationship between them. (see further and compare: Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol. 1 at p. 566ff. and citations there).

 

   120.  We will repeat these comments in another form, and then proceed on our journey. The rule that a later law overrides an earlier law applies, first and foremost, to an explicit provision of repeal included in the later law. The legislature expressed its view and we will abide by it, for it is the legislature that is given the power to legislate. The same logic that applies to a specific repeal provision in the later law, would, prima facie, also apply in the absence of a formal repeal provision. In the later law the legislature established a particular regime, and where that regime is incompatible with the previous regime we can infer the legislature’s implicit intention (the legislative arrangement) for the later regime to replace the former. However, the express repeal of a previous law is binding by force of its content, deriving expressly from the nature of sovereignty; and in a democratic regime it derives expressly from the nature of the democracy. On the other hand, with respect to implied repeal we must rely on the presumed legislative intent (or if you prefer – the intention that we impute to the legislature), because it did not explicitly express that intent. It follows that while our duty to respect the express repeal provision derives (in this country) from the democratic social contract, the interpretation leading to implicit repeal requires an interpretative construction that attempts to reflect the legislative intention (i.e. the purpose of the law). From this we learn that implicit repeal differs from express repeal.  As such, in my view, explicit and implicit repeal must each be treated differently.

 

121.  Therefore, if a law were to establish – for example – that an explicit provision of repeal in a later law (where both laws are on the same normative level), will not be valid and will be incapable of repealing the previous law, that provision of the earlier law would be invalid ab initio, inasmuch as it contradicts the rule concerning the effect of a later law, or if you wish, the very essence of the democratic regime. This is the only possible conclusion. But we cannot say this with the same degree of certainty in regard to an implicit repeal, as for example, where the law states that only an explicit provision in a later law can invalidate (or narrow the scope) of the earlier law. In other words, a provision in a particular law stating that a later law would not be regarded as repealing all or part of that law, unless there was a specific provision to that effect in the later law. It is entirely unclear that such a provision in the earlier law would be void ab initio or would not be of legal effect. On the contrary, inasmuch as when we are concerned with the issue of implicit repeal we rely on the presumed legislative intention (or the intention imputed to the legislature), or if you prefer – the structure of the law and of the legal system in its entirety – the two provisions stand opposite one another, taunting one another. On one side there is a provision that entrenches itself against change, and on the other a regime which purports (implicitly) to repeal by implication. In this case it cannot be said, in general terms, that a later law repeals an earlier law. The reason is that the legislature “was aware” of the earlier law, and when planting the new law in the legislative garden, in which the earlier, entrenched law was already planted, the intention in the later law was, as in the earlier law, that the earlier law should prevail. This is proved by the fact that the legislature did not explicitly revoke the previous regime, despite having established the procedure for repeal of the earlier law. At all events, the legislator’s “intention” for today’s regime to replace yesterday’s arrangement, despite the entrenchment of yesterday’s arrangement, cannot be inferred as self-evident, as with other implicit repeals. The entrenchment provision has the effect of shaking the foundations of the principle of implied repeal. 

It might be compared to a person who promises not to do a particular act. Time passes, and the man forgets his promise, and despite his promise, he goes ahead and does that act. Upon being reminded of his promise, he slaps his forehead and says: Blessed is He who keeps his promise. I made a mistake. I certainly intend to keep the promises I make. Please disregard what I did. I hereby retract that action, and restore the situation to what it was initially. This is the case regarding a person’s personal promise, and the same applies to the legislature – this is the parable and this is its lesson. Hence, the rule regarding implicit repeal, as opposed to the rule of express repeal, may be agreed upon and may be changed. The only question is how we regard the subject of the implied repeal.

 

Incidentally, a hint that implied repeal is not a self-evident principle can be found, also by way of implication, in the explicit statutory provisions of s. 2(a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance (Further Provisions), 5708-1948:

Construction of Laws

2. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared:

    (a) Where any law enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of State is repugnant to any law which was in force in Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948), the earlier law shall be deemed to be repealed or amended even if the new law contains no express repeal or amendment of the earlier law.

 

    This statutory provision is intended to clarify and reinforce the provision of s. 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, regarding the relationship between laws enacted after the establishment of the State and pre-State legislation. (Pre-state legislation “retains its validity to the extent that it does not contradict the provisions of this Ordinance and other laws that may be enacted…”). We can all agree that the provisions of this law establish the obvious. This indeed is the way we see it today, but apparently they thought otherwise at the time. The very fact that our original legislators deemed it proper to enact this kind of legislation, in that formulation, is tantamount to the testimony of 100 witnesses that implied repeal is not the same as express repeal. Now that we know this, we also know that there is no a priori necessity for the rules applying to express repeal to apply to implied repeal.

 

     122.  This brings us to the matter at hand. Let us assume that following the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Knesset adopted a regular law that, by implication, varied or violated a right or rights included in the Basic Law, without meeting the conditions specified in s. 8 of the Basic Law (a law which is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, etc.).  Would the “later-law” rule apply? In other words, would we regard the new law as being valid and the Basic Law as having been repealed to the extent of the contradiction or inconsistency? Or would we say that the Basic law was intended for a special purpose, and a later law would be powerless to implicitly vitiate the Basic Law? Prima facie, the “later-law” rule – which applies to implied repeal – would also apply here. But this is only prima facie, as we shall now explain.

   

     123.  As noted, s. 11 of the Basic Law provides that all governmental authorities, including the Knesset, are bound to respect the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The duty of respecting the law also applies to s. 8 of the Basic Law, the provision that prohibits the violation or variation of any right recognized by the Basic Law, except by way of a law that satisfies certain conditions. Furthermore, the first and foremost addressee of s. 11 is the Knesset itself, as though it stated “the Knesset is bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law.”  Now, if we assume that a later law can impliedly repeal this duty of the Knesset, then what is the particular import of s. 11 of the Basic Law (conjoined with s. 8 of the law)? The other governmental authorities are in any case obligated to respect all of the rights prescribed by the Basic Law by virtue of the principle of the rule of law. If the Knesset can repeal that self-imposed obligation even by implication, then what is the point of the pre-established obligation [of s. 11]? Why did the law specifically obligate the Knesset to respect the provisions of the Basic Law if the Knesset is simultaneously entitled (according to the proposed interpretation) to repeal that obligation even by implication? After all, the Knesset could have taken the same path even if the law hadn’t imposed an explicit obligation upon it?

In other words, an interpretation permitting an implied repeal of the specific obligation that the Knesset imposed on itself, effectively renders the express obligation superfluous. It is as though the legislature spoke in vain. Its words are like the whistling wind. Can we say that s. 11 of the Basic Law is nothing more than good advice? We have already rejected this interpretation, and we now reject it again. The same reasoning also applies to the interpretation of s. 8 of the Basic Law, which similarly imposes a burden on the Knesset. 

 

An attempt to infuse s. 11 (and by the same token, s. 8 of the Basic Law) with wisdom and logic leads inevitably to the conclusion that a law enacted after the Basic Law cannot repeal the provisions of the Basic Law by implication. Evidently, this was the original intention of the arrangement and I find nothing that precludes conferring legal status to that intention, neither in terms of the basic principles of democracy nor from any other perspective. Indeed, the “principle of the later law” regarding an implied repeal cannot be reasonably said to apply to the instant case. While application of the principle may be “possible,” it is neither reasonable nor logical. Where the law explicitly and specifically imposes an extraordinary obligation upon the Knesset, it is neither reasonable nor appropriate, in terms of the rule of law or by any other parameter, to be able to brush it aside incidentally. The principles of statutory interpretation dictate that such an explicit obligation can only be limited or revoked by express repeal.

 

124.This is the possible alternative explanation for the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Knesset, in accordance with its own statement, may violate or vary any of the provisions of a Basic Law only if it does so expressly, and in no other way. The later law can utilize the formula of “notwithstanding” or any other equivalent formula. In other words, the wording must indicate that the Knesset is unequivocally and unreservedly aware that it is about to vary or violate basic rights, even if that (later) law does not satisfy the conditions imposed by the Knesset itself in s. 8. Inasmuch as Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty obligates the Knesset to respect the basic rights enumerated therein in accordance with the scope specified therein, including in accordance with s. 8, we would expect that a later law will specifically state that although the Knesset was originally obligated to respect certain basic rights, in accordance with a particular scope, and although the Knesset is only allowed to violate those rights if certain conditions are satisfied, namely the ones stipulated in s. 8, nevertheless it wishes to violate (or vary) those basic rights, even though the fundamental conditions originally established were not met. Indeed, a government representative should mount the Knesset podium and declare: I was obligated to respect it, but in my opinion it is not appropriate for me to respect it. That is knowledge and awareness, the assumption of responsibility. That is express repeal. I believe, and we all believe, that under such an interpretation of the Basic Law, ill-considered violations of basic rights will decrease, and perhaps will not occur at all.

As noted, s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation explicitly proscribes any violation of the freedom of occupation unless the violation is included in a law that states that it shall be of effect “notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not, concededly, include a parallel provision, but the existence of such a requirement may be inferred from the law itself, even without a specific provision to that effect (see further and compare, Elon, in his aforementioned article, at p. 662; Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol. 1, pp. 562-563).

 

125.  Our opinion is therefore that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty can only be violated or varied by force of an explicit provision to that effect in a later law; an implicit variation or implicit violation in the later law will not suffice. In the event of classic rules of interpretation being inadequate for reconciling a provision in the Basic Law with a later provision i.e. we find that the two provisions are indeed contradictory, and assuming that the later provision does not expressly repeal the provision of the Basic Law, we may conclude that despite it being the earlier provision, the Basic Law’s provision nonetheless shall prevail.

 

We think that this is the necessary interpretation of the law, and that it is self evident from the law itself. Although it is subject to certain objections, in our view it draws support from all directions. We will now discuss certain issues in this context.

 

126. For our purposes an analogy can be drawn from the rule that a later, general law does not derogate from an earlier, specific law: lex posterior generalis non derogat legi priori speciali. We know that a later law overrides an earlier law, but the aforementioned rule teaches us that a later law of broad scope, even if contradicting a law of narrow scope, will not be construed as implicitly repealing the earlier law. In our effort to reconcile the provisions of the two laws and to understand the rationale of the laws and the presumed legislative intent, we would say that in all likelihood the later law did not intend to repeal the earlier (specific) law. Had it intended to do so, we would expect the legislature to do so explicitly. Since the legislature did not do so, we would say that the specific law, which was earlier in time, would remain in force with respect to its (limited) area, whereas the later, broader law would apply to all areas that do not fall within the (limited) scope of the earlier law. We presume that the legislature did not intend to violate the earlier law, for had this been its (presumed) intention it would have expressly repealed it. This is the rule regarding a contradiction between a later, general law and an earlier, specific law (on the rules of interpretation in cases of a contradiction between a later law and a general law, see: Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1, at p. 551ff, and p. 569 ff).

 

We will employ the same criterion in regard to the relationship between an earlier law that substantively entrenches itself against implied repeal and a subsequent law that allegedly repeals the prior law. Let us assume that a certain law includes a provision stating that its provisions remain in force unless a later law expressly repeals them, partially or completely. Along comes a law that, upon examination, contradicts the provisions of the earlier law, but does not expressly repeal them. In such a case, we would say that the legislature (in the later law) did not “intend” to violate the earlier law, because had it intended to so, it would have repealed it expressly. By analogy, the earlier law is like the specific law, and the rule that applies to a specific law would also apply to a law entrenched against implied repeal. In a sense, the entrenched law is more powerful than the specific law, because when we are concerned with a specific law we need only ascertain the intention of the later law in order to reach our conclusion. However, in the case of an earlier law that entrenches itself, we learn the legislative intent both from what is explicitly stated in the earlier law, and from what is implied in the later law. The “legislative intent” extends directly from the earlier law to the later law without encountering anything in the way. We concede that the analogy is not perfect. With respect to the specific law, the later law retains its scope in areas not covered by the earlier law, whereas for our purposes, the later law would be considered a nullity in its entirety. The inescapable conclusion is, therefore, that for our purposes we would seek to limit the scope of the implied repeal, and the analogy is imperfect.

 

127.  In distinguishing between express repeal and implied repeal, we do not reject any fundamental principle of the democratic system or any basic principle of the legal system. Nor do we in any way contradict basic principles of our jurisprudence. For example, if a particular provision of a law explicitly provides that where it contradicts any other provision of the same law, it will supersede that provision, we would, no doubt, honor in full that legislative provision. The same rule would apply to the concurrent adoption and publication of two laws, one of which includes the statutory provision mentioned above. Our case, however, appears to be different in that our assumption was that the Basic Law was adopted first, whereas the later law that purports to repeal parts of the Basic Law by implication was adopted later. However, this is only how it appears.

 

     Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is a, unique law. Whereas the Knesset adopts “regular laws” to “organize” its surroundings, to establish behavioral norms for people and bodies external to the Knesset, in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Knesset purports (inter alia) to “organize” itself. Being what it is, the Basic Law is a law that guides the Knesset and its legislation constantly, every day, and every hour. By its very nature, the Basic Law is implicit in every law, or if you like, it is appended to every law, (or is a preamble to every law). More precisely, we could say that each and every individual law is regarded as being planted in the soil of the Basic Law; its roots reach down to the Basic Law, which is the source of its nourishment and sustenance. By analogy, it resembles human rights, which are regarded as being an integral part of every law.

    

   Basic Laws are comparable to rules of interpretation that accompany each and every law: they are everywhere, all the time.  Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty functions as a “legal escort” that provides the infrastructure and foundation for each and every law. It is as if it is legislated every day anew with each new law, as He “who in his goodness renews the creation every day continually.” A person wakes up every morning (thanking God for returning his soul), and so it is with the Basic Law, which, in effect, is legislated anew each day. This is indicated by the fact that the title of a Basic Law does not include the year of its adoption. All other laws cite the year of their enactment, according to Gregorian and Hebrew calendar. A Basic Law does not cite the year of its adoption. It stands, as it were, above time. It tells us that it is timeless, having neither date nor hour. It is always with us, and its validity is timeless. These being the features of the Basic Law, it is easy to understand how they can be viewed as being enacted anew, in conjunction with the enactment of every specific law, including that rebellious law that purports to repeal it by implication.

    

     An analogy, and perhaps even more than an analogy, may be drawn from the rule whereby changing times may lead to changes in the law’s scope in accordance with current conditions of place and time (this applies a fortiori with respect to “framework concepts”). In the words of President Smoira in HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. President of the State of Israel [69], at p. 811:

 

This is the power of statutory law that speaks normatively rather than casuistically, and by doing so creates vessels that are able to hold content that did not exist when the law was given.

           

Similar comments were made by Justice S.Z. Cheshin in HCJ 180/52 Dor Heirs v. Minister of Finance [70], at p. 911:

 

… This is the power of the law, that it is not designed for its time alone, or for the limited, immediate purpose that concerns the legislature at the time of its enactment.  And as long as the executive branch can achieve its intended purpose within the framework of the existing law – albeit an old law originally intended for other purposes – it cannot be criticized for applying the law to the conditions of a new reality.

 

(See further, Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.2 at pp. 220-221, 267-270; vol. 3 at p. 528-530).

 

This is the basis for the obvious analogy to that special statutory provision that attests to its precedence over all of the other provisions in that law, as well as the analogy to the case of two laws enacted and published on the same day, one of which includes a provision that elevates it above all the other provisions. Just as “there is no earlier or later in the Torah” – as indicated by the essence of the Basic Law – the implied rule of repeal inevitably withers. In the absence of any other indication, and I have not found any, I see no good reason why we should not honor a specific limitation clause which requires express repeal, like the explicit limitation clause in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and the entrenchment provision in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

128.  Having arrived at this point, we should further note that the limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, like the entrenchment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, is derived from procedure. The limitation applies to the procedure, and the law can be varied or violated irrespective of its contents. Our concern here – as in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – is with the rules for “organizing” the Knesset prior to organizing the world outside the Knesset. In order to vary or violate Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, a special procedure must be followed – a “magic formula” like “notwithstanding” must be invoked – that informs us that the Knesset (in the later law) explicitly and deliberately sought to vary or violate the provisions of the Basic Law.

 

    In Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation a rigid formula is established for any violation of the freedom of occupation, like a series of tones that must be uttered for the stone to roll away from the entrance to the secret cave (“which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law”). As opposed to this, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty employs the concept of express repeal without recourse to a specific formula. Nonetheless, the ideational framework is the same and rests upon the same foundations. The analogy from Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation to our subject here carries with it all the same rationales cited to legitimize the Knesset’s actions in limiting itself in legislation. Indeed, just as only three readings can make a “law,” the same will apply to an express repeal.  It is as though the Knesset declares in advance that a particular law – for our purposes, the two Basic Laws, each in its own particular way, can neither be varied nor violated by a later law, unless done so explicitly. Establishing a requirement to state matters explicitly is a procedural requirement, just as is the requirement of three readings. It would seem that this was also the view of Karp in her aforementioned article, at pp 324, 379-80.

 

     129.  An interesting comparison can be made to the rule established by Jewish law for a similar, if not identical subject. The principle in Jewish law is that “the law is in accordance with the views of the later authorities” (hilkhata ke-batrai). Needless to say, this is the rule of lex posterior. Jewish law preferred the words of the later authorities to those of the earlier authorities, even if the stature and authority of the earlier authorities exceeded the stature and authority of the later authorities. The reason for this rule should be self- evident. This is how Jewish law adapted to the changing conditions of life. However, the rule was subject to an exception, which is that: (in the words of M. Elon, Jewish Law, History, Sources, Principles, 3rd ed. (Magnes, 1988), p. 238a:

 

The principle “the law is in accordance with the views of the later authorities” does not apply if the later authority reached his decision per incuriam (inadvertently) i.e. without being aware of the views of his predecessors. For this reason it became authoritatively established that the principle applies only if the later authority refers to and discusses the earlier opinion and shows by proof acceptable to his contemporaries that, although contrary to the position of the earlier authority, his own view is sound.

 

And further on:

 

Thus was established and accepted the fundamental principle of decision-making in Jewish law – “the law is in accordance with the views of the later authorities.” It should not be thought that this principle in any way diminished the respect that later generations accorded to the earlier generations. It was precisely this respect that induced the later authority responsible for declaring the law to consider r his own decision gravely, fearfully and humbly, because he was aware that he was dealing with a question already considered by earlier authorities. Nevertheless, when he finally reached his conclusion, his view, and not the view of the earlier authority, became the law.

   

     Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty resembles the “earlier authorities” (rishonim), while the later law is like the “later authorities” (aharonim). The rulings of the earlier authorities will not recede before those of the later authorities unless the later ones examined the words of the earlier ones, and expressly stated their reasons. The provisions of a Basic Law will not retreat before a later law unless it is clearly and expressly repealed. The same rules apply everywhere.

 

Variation or Violation – Only in a Basic Law?

 

     130.  We have said that a law enacted after Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is powerless to vary or violate rights under the Basic Law unless it specifically states, in one form or another, that its provisions are binding notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law, and that its express intention is to vary or violate those rights. This condition is established explicitly in s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In regard to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, on the other hand, we have deduced the need for such an explicit statement from within the law and its content. If a law subsequent to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty explicitly states that its provisions are intended to vary or violate the provisions of rights established under the Basic Law, must that later law be a Basic Law, or could we say that any law has the power to deviate from the provisions of a Basic Law?

    

     131.  The text of the Basic Law contains no provision regarding the method of its varying or violation – whether by a regular law or a Basic Law. The twin of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, stipulates in s. 7 that any variation thereof must be made by way of a Basic Law.  The question is whether one rule can be inferred from its opposite, i.e. would a regular law suffice in regard to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? Would such a conclusion gain support from the settled rule that any law can infringe another law (even if it is a Basic Law)? (see Kaniel [13], at p. 796; Ressler [14], at p. 560; Negev [12] at p. 642; Prof. Rubinstein, supra, 4th ed., at pp. 456-458; Prof. Englard, supra, at p. 111).

   

     My colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak maintain – each in his own way and for his own reasons – that a Basic Law can neither be varied nor changed other than by way of another Basic Law, or by force of a Basic Law, and that this rule applies to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty despite its silence on this point. On the other hand, it may be argued that there is no inherent necessity for the variation or violation of a Basic Law to be effected specifically by force of a Basic Law – unless the legislature ordered otherwise, as indeed is the case in s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The legislature did not instruct us that any variation or violation of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty must be effected specifically in the form of a Basic Law, and one may therefore assert that we are not bound in that regard. Either way, the most important thing is the Knesset’s awareness of the change or violation that it is about to initiate in the rights established in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and hence the need for an explicit “notwithstanding” statement, in one form or another. Where it is clear that the Knesset was explicitly aware of its act, there is no systemic need that the variation or the violation be made by Basic Law.

 

    Incidentally, the requirement dictated by my colleagues’ decision that any violation of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty be effected exclusively by means of a Basic Law, meaning that a regular law violating the provisions of a Basic Law is invalid even if it states “notwithstanding,” and even if adopted by an extra-special majority, leads to a rather anomalous conclusion: When attempting to formally entrench Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation against violation, the legislature took the trouble of including an explicit provision by which the provisions of the Basic Law could be violated only if certain conditions were fulfilled, as per s. 8 of the Basic Law. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, does not contain this kind of provision.  A person comparing both Basic Laws might thus conclude that the entrenchment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is less than that of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. We are now being told that a Basic Law cannot be violated other than in a Basic Law (and subject to specific provisions in the Basic Law itself). The surprising result therefore is that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is actually more powerful than Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In regard to the latter, which the legislature sought to entrench against violation, the legislature provided that a regular law can also violate it, provided that it satisfies the conditions of s. 8. On the other hand, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, though not meriting any entrenchment to protect it from violation, can nonetheless only be violated by force of a Basic Law. This conclusion is propounded despite the lack of any basis in the language of the law, being exclusively a product of legal interpretation. The doctrine derived from the law thus prevails over explicit statutory provisions – a strange result.

    

     132.  In my view, there is no doctrinal necessity that a variation or violation of a Basic Law be effected specifically by another Basic Law. Quite the opposite: Let us take the case of the Knesset adopting a law in accordance with the rules of procedure, and taking the trouble to specifically indicate that its intention is to vary or to “violate” a provision of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (whether by the “notwithstanding” formula, or any other formula), all in an orderly fashion and according to standard practice. However, the said law is a normal law and not a Basic Law. Knowing that the Knesset is the same Knesset, with the same members, can we say that the law never existed and that the Knesset did not succeed in changing Basic Law: Human Liberty and Liberty? Were this a matter concerning Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation the answer would be clear: Everyone knows and the Knesset was forewarned that the Basic Law could be changed only by another Basic Law adopted by a majority of the members of Knesset (s. 7 of the Basic Law). Having failed to comply with that statutory provision that the later law be dubbed a Basic Law, it is obvious that the change would be of no effect, just as a “law” only adopted in two readings would not be considered a “law.”  

    

     The question however concerns Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which does not specify that its variation or violation requires a Basic Law. Can we, the judiciary, import conditions from afar and plant them in the Basic Law? Indeed, holding that a Basic Law can be varied or violated only by another Basic Law has a persuasive ring. But I nevertheless ask myself whether we can add a requirement to the statute that was not expressly established by the statute itself. 

However, I do not regard this as a cardinal question.

 

The “Constitutional Revolution”

 

133.  In his decision, my colleague President Barak speaks of a “constitutional revolution” that took place in the Knesset in March 1992, when the Knesset granted the State of Israel a “Bill of Constitutional Human Rights,” i.e., human rights in Israel “were transformed into constitu­tional rights.” Israel joined “the community of democratic nations ... that possess a constitutional bill of rights”; “we have become part of the human rights revolution, that characterizes the second half of the twentieth century.” These words, and others, reflect exaltation and elation. However, no two prophets prophesy in the same manner, and personally, I would not describe the Basic Laws of 1992 thus.

 

134.  In regard to the Basic Laws of 1992, I have grave doubts whether the Knesset members themselves were aware of the “revolution” they were instigating. The fact is that Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was passed by a majority of 23 members of Knesset (with no opposition or abstentions), whereas Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was passed by a majority of 32 for, 21 against, and one abstention (see above, par. 65).

 

Furthermore, the term “revolution” connotes a traumatic upheaval in the life of a person, and in the life of a nation, a change from one extreme to another, such as the revolution of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, the French Revolution, and the Bolshevik Revolution.  When one claims that in March 1992 there was a “constitutional revolution” in the realm of human rights, one is in effect saying that in that month a profound, radical change occurred in the field of human rights in Israel, as though human rights first saw the light of day, as though the Knesset had created something ab initio. “The human rights revolution that characterized the second half of the twentieth century” had reached us. And so, happy are we that now have merited constitutional human rights.

 

I take a different view because, as is well known, human rights existed in Israel before 1992, and I addressed this subject elsewhere as follows (CrimApp 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel, at pp. 399-401):

 

The doctrine developed by my colleague the Deputy President centers on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in its function as a Basic Law, the provisions of which are engraved in our statute book. Prior to the advent of Basic Laws according to my colleague, basic rights were nothing other than the product of case law, and now, not only have the basic rights found a home in the body of a statute but the legislature itself went even further, elevating them to the throne of monarchy and they now have the status of super rights… I would like to add what I see as the main point in this context of the existing law, Basic Law and basic rights. Personally, I view the main power and strength of the basic rights as inhering in their essence, in their being “nature’s children” – “natural” rights – self-evident rights that require no explanation or commentary: One saw them, heard about them, read about them, and knew they were with us. Disputes may arise regarding the periphery of these rights, the outer margins that are remote from the center, but there are no disputes among us in regard to their core. In the society in which we live, at this place and time, all those who encounter the rights recognize, understand and agree…

… the basic rights radiate warmth and power and they conceal an inner light. That is why we are willingly captivated by those expressions that attempt to elevate those rights to sublime heights.

   

     When we speak now – and in the future – of Basic Laws and basic rights, it is important that we remember all of these matters.  Humility and modesty are worthy virtues for a person, and a judge is a person. We must guard ourselves against hubris, lest we say to one another that our own power, our own wisdom and our own intelligence achieved this. The history of human rights did not begin with the Basic Laws. Generations of Israeli judges strode hand in hand with these rights, and they have been with us since our independence. They gave rise to the rulings in HCJ 1/49 Bijerno v. Minister of Police [3]; HCJ 144/50 Sheib v. Minister of Defense, 5 IsrSC 399; HCJ 87 79/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4]; HCJ 7/48 Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [42]; HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [7]; EA2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [8], and many other fine rulings that accompany us along our path…and those same rulings were accorded the status of law. That is how they were seen by all, and this is how they were interpreted. Inasmuch as a Basic Law did not create basic rights, I think that it behooves us to conduct ourselves with humility and modesty in our treatment of the previous law, which is fully immersed in those rights.

       …

Indeed, in the future we will mention this Basic Law and rely upon it as a document that embodies basic rights. But we must always bear in mind, firstly, that these rights did not originate in the Basic Law, and that in essence, the Basic Law intended only to give statutory expression to the “natural” rights that already existed. Secondly, that basic rights do not draw their moral and social power from the Basic Law as such, but from within themselves, from their inherent light, intensity, and heat, for they are like the Burning Bush that continues to burn but is not consumed. The bush has been with us from antiquity. Others will say that basic rights are the product of our moral and societal worldviews, and that is the source of their power. Either way, the basic rights already had strength and power before the Basic Law, and even then, there was nothing that “compelled” the courts to rule as they ruled, or that prevented them from ruling otherwise. Essentially, nothing has changed in the wake of the Basic Law.

 

That was my view then, and it is my view this very day, but with greater conviction. 

 

135.  I find the label “revolution” to be problematic. Is it not enough to say that there has been a “change” in the legal system? And I say this because labels – in themselves – may sometimes blind us and make for self-fulfilling aspirations. Moreover, even if we have said that the Basic Laws could generate very important changes in the Israeli legal system – and this has been said – the concept of “constitutional revolution” embraces much more than the concept of change. Not only is it likely to lead to excessive enthusiasm, but by adding force and energy to one side of the equation, it simultaneously derogates from the power and energy of the other side, and vice versa. Is this how a constitution ought to be framed?

 

The law says what it says. I agree, of course, that following the adoption of the Basic Laws, the Court acquired the authority to review Knesset laws and to declare them invalid – completely or partially – in cases where they unlawfully violate fundamental rights or modify fundamental rights specified in the Basic Laws. However to what extent a “revolution” has transpired, only time will tell. The concept of the Industrial Revolution was devised many years after the revolu­tion had taken place, and the Christian calendar did not begin the count on the day that Jesus died but a few hundred years later, counting backwards to the estimated day of his birth (which was erroneously determined).

 

136.  Finally, the path of law is not the path of revolution, but is a “changing story” (as Professor Dworkin has described it). It is a marathon. Life is perpetually changing and with it the law. A law that fails to adapt itself to life is a law in retreat. The relationship between a legal system and life is like an actor on a moving, revolving stage. If the actor does not move he will disappear from the audience’s view, behind the stage. He must move at least as fast as the stage just to remain in the same place, a fortiori if he wishes to move forward. If the revolving stage suddenly speeds up, and the actor fails to increase his own speed, he may well loose his balance. If he moves too fast he is liable to disappear behind the stage. Our wisdom – the wisdom of the law – lies in knowing how to adjust our speed to that of the surrounding world. Indeed, as I said in the Ganimat case [38], at p. 401, “slowly we proceed, heal after toe, toe after heal, treading carefully, in returning and rest” as in the words of the prophet “In returning and rest you shall be saved, in quietness and trust shall be your strength” (Isaiah 30:15).

 

Two Additional Questions that we will briefly discuss

137.   At the beginning of our comments we said that we would only discuss some of the questions that may arise in the matter confronting us. We will now address two additional questions, but only briefly.

 

The Issue of the Authority of the Courts to Invalidate Laws of the Knesset

 

138.   My colleagues have laid a theoretical foundation for the authority of the court to invalidate laws of the Knesset, and I have added to them somewhat. But the question of who possesses this authority still dis­turbs us: will it be all the courts of Israel in all instances, or will this be authority be exclusively for the Supreme Court sitting in the capacity of the High Court of Justice? My colleagues did not raise the question, and we may deduce from their words, if implicitly, that all the courts of Israel – from the smallest to the largest – are competent to invalidate laws of the Knesset, and hence the action of the District Court in the present case. As the question was not raised before us, I will not state my opinion on it. I will merely say that there is a strong basis for the view that the competence to invalidate Knesset laws ought to be re­served solely to the High Court of Justice, and to it alone, excluding all other courts. Indeed, the legal tradition that we follow – the Common Law tradition – recognizes the authority of all courts to declare legislation void ab initio. However, heretofore this rule concerned secondary legislation (purportedly) adopted in accordance with a Knesset law.

 

Having now recognized for the first time – as a matter of law – the competence of the courts to invalidate a law of the Knesset, it would appear that we are also entitled to establish which court will possess the authority of review and invalidation. Indeed, the vessel provided to us by the Common Law tradition – the granting of competence of review to every court, in every instance – is too small to contain the authority to invalidate Knesset laws, as well. In any event, the doctrine that applies to the invalidation of secondary legislation ought not be applied to our case mechanically. It seems to me that significant arguments support singling out this authority for the High Court of Justice alone (while establishing appropriate procedural rules for the transfer of constitutional issues from other courts to the High Court of Justice). In this way even the High Court of Justice will be able to select the questions that it deems suitable for immediate discussion, while deferring other topics for the future. No doubt, many such occasions await us.

 

The Burden of Proof for the Invalidation of a Law

 

139.              Who bears the burden of proving that a particular law is invalid solely because it (allegedly) violates a basic right recognized by a Basic Law? My colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak shared the same view, and our colleague Justice D. Levin concurs. My colleagues distinguish between the following two stages: the first stage concerns the question of whether there was a violation of a basic right as defined in the Basic Law.  For example, whether there was a violation of the right of property as defined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. At this stage of the proceedings, the party alleging the violation bears the burden of proving it. President Barak adds that at this stage of the proceedings there is a presumption of constitutionality, as held in the Bergman case [15] at p. 699.  Once the violation of the basic right has been proven, we proceed to the next stage, which examines whether the law remains valid despite the violation of a basic right, because the violation satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause. The burden at this stage is transferred to the other party, which must now prove the validity of the law. In this respect my colleagues apparently endorse the Canadian approach (see: Hogg, supra, ch. 35, p. 851ff (“Limitation of Rights”) [114]).

 

140.             In our view, the issue of the burden of persuasion does not require a decision, because all are agreed that the Amending Law skips over the hurdles erected by s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. When the time comes, the question of the burden of proof will require our decision, and our decision will be what it will be. My comments here relate exclusively to raising the considerations that should be considered when making that decision.

 

141.             My colleagues’ opinions regarding the burden of persuasion at the first and second stages of proceedings, being the same as the rule in Canadian law, appear to be based on the following two principles. Firstly, an analysis of the formal structure of the law and the particular manner in which the basic rights are defined. On the other hand, there is the permission granted by the legislature, subject to certain conditions, to violate those rights. The second principle is the substance of the basic right, qua basic right, and the nature of the violation of the basic right – in other words, the principle of form and alongside it the principle of substance.

 

We should note that our concern here is exclusively with the burden of persuasion, and not with interpretation of the Basic Law, the scope of the basic rights, nor the interpretation of the limitation clause and the conditions established therein for the validation of a law that violates a basic right. These matters may be self-evident, but we felt it necessary to mention them because all of these topics are discussed in the case law and legal literature as a single issue. Hence to the extent that each one of them is governed by a different set of rules, it seems proper in our view to distinguish between the issues that are mistakenly combined.

 

142.               Regarding the rules prescribed by my colleagues for the burden of persuasion, I must confess, that I gave the matter much thought and that I have reached the conclusion, that at this time these rules are proper both in their own right and in terms of their incorporation in the system of the laws of evidence, including the Basic Laws (see and compare: R. Cross, On Evidence, ed. C. Tapper, 7th ed., (London, Dublin, Edinburgh, 1990) 120 ff. (“Allocation of the Burden”)). However, in my view we should give consideration to the establishment of a caveat regarding the burden of persuasion at the second stage of the proceedings, in the context of the “Presumption of Regularity” and the “Presumption of Constitutionality.”

 

For current purposes, we accept that once the violation of the Basic Law is proved, and upon progressing to the second stage of proceedings, regarding the requirements of the limitation clause, the party claiming the constitutionality of the law bears the burden of proof. In other words, it must prove that the law satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. The caveat that we think should be considered is to rule that, at the second stage of proceedings, in considering the limitation clause, the law should be provided with a presumption of constitutionality. The import of this would be that prima facie, any law enacted by the Knesset is presumed to be constitutional. This presumption would naturally be operative in the framework of determining the burden of adducing proof (burden no.2) as distinct from the burden of persuasion (which falls on the sovereign authority). In this sense, my comments resemble those of my colleague President Shamgar, even if not totally identical (see the comments of my colleague President Shamgar, at par. 85 of his judgment). My colleague President Barak limits the presumption of constitutionality to the first stage only. I have two comments on this: firstly, at the first stage of the proceedings, the presumption of constitutionality is only of secondary importance, because the regular rules of evidence – that the claimant bears the burden of proof – would in any case impose the onus on the party claiming the violation of his right (compare to Hogg, ibid., at p. 857). Secondly, I see no reason for not applying the presumption of constitutionality at the second stage of proceedings. Indeed, in Canadian law the opinion was voiced that the presumption of constitutionality would not apply at the second stage of proceedings in cases pertaining to basic rights (see and compare, for example, ibid, at pp. 859, 860). However, before adopting this opinion, we should examine it on its merits. Perhaps the rule in Israel is different, and the presumption of constitutionality should, prima facie, apply at the second stage of proceedings, and in the words of Justice Landau in the Bergman case [15], at p. 699:

 

In our present consideration of the Financing Law, …we should say by way of introduction …. first of all, Knesset legislation should enjoy the presumption of validity, in the manner it was enacted. The initial tendency of the court should be towards upholding the law and not towards its disqualification, even when it allegedly violates an “entrenched” statutory provision.

      

     Actually, the question of whether this rule has direct, unqualified application in our case is far from simple: the claims go both ways, and we will not elaborate. We will only say that prior to our removal of the presumption of constitutionality from the second stage of proceedings, it is appropriate for us to give the matter deep consideration. I think that this was also the view of our colleague Justice Goldberg.

 

  143.   Furthermore, secondary legislation also benefits from the presumption of validity, and a fortiori, secondary legislation enacted by a Knesset committee or that was confirmed by a Knesset committee (see e.g. HCJ 6290/93 Zilka v. Manager General of Ministry of Health, [71], at pp. 637-639, and references there; HCJ 889/86 [65] at pp. 543-544; HCJ 491/86 Tel-Aviv Jaffa Municipality v. Minister of the Interior, [72] at pp. 495-496; HCJ 73/85 Lidor v. Association for Protection of Houseowners v. Minister of Building and Housing, [73] at p. 607; HCJ 108/70 Manor v. Minister of Finance, [74] at p.445.  

  If this is the case with secondary legislation, it should certainly apply to the Knesset legislation, for in essence, we choose our Knesset representatives so that they can both inform us of and determine the appropriate norms by which we should conduct our lives (vox populi vox dei), and the nation’s representatives are like the nation (see further, A Levontin, “Judaism and Democracy – Personal Observations,” Tel-Aviv Law Studies, 19 (1995) at p. 521). We will not adopt an extreme position that would say that since the voice of the Knesset is tantamount to the voice of the people, therefore the Court has no authority to annul Knesset legislation where it deviates from basic rights. Were we to say so, we would be holding an empty pitcher because we had ourselves poured out its contents. However, in performing the delicate task of balancing, which is our art and craft, I believe it possible to maintain the presumption of constitutionality at the second stage of proceedings as well. And we will act as our wisdom dictates.

  Furthermore, having consideration for the absolute and unqualified wording of the basic rights in the Basic Laws, it is easier for the person claiming a violation of a basic right to skip over the hurdle the obstacle at the first stage of proceedings. This phenomenon will repeat itself with respect to almost every law of the Knesset, because at this place and time almost every law, or at least many laws, likely violates one or another of the basic rights in some way. It thus turns out that in almost every proceeding we will go directly to the second stage, i.e. imposing the burden on those claiming that the law complies with the provisions of the limitation clause. Against this background, it may be appropriate for us to establish that every law should be seen as enjoying a presumption of constitutionality at the second stage too. And if the constitutionality presumption does not apply to the same degree in every case would it be appropriate to apply it selectively to a lesser degree? All of these questions are worthy of examination, and their resolution will come in the due course of time.

Final Word

     The conclusion of the matter is as stated at the outset: I concur with the decisions of my colleagues the Presidents: President Shamgar and President Barak, along with Justices D. Levin, Eliezer Golberg, and Zamir. And I will say the following:

     Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is elevated above other laws, and a law that violates it without having satisfied the prescribed preliminary conditions will be considered not to have been enacted. The Supreme Court has the authority to rule that a particular law contravenes Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and to declare that such a law is null and void for that reason. Finally, the Amending Law entered the field of the limitation clause of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and emerged unscathed.

 

 

 

Justice E. Goldberg:

A Basic Law that anchors human rights is by its nature and substance no ordinary law. A Basic Law that proclaims human rights touches the very soul of the social experience of a democracy. A Basic Law that declares that ‘The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1A of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), brings dignity not only to people, but also to the state. Therefore, ‘the ordinary citizen’ who cherishes human rights naturally perceives such a law as a constitutional law in the most basic sense. From a legal perspective, the two Basic Laws – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation –changed the norm that granted recognition to the human rights that they establish. These rights are no longer ‘natural’ rights; they are no longer the product only of judicial recognition; and the citizen no longer needs to fight in order to obtain legal recognition for any one of these rights. The legal source that now anchors these rights, their status as supra-legislative constitutional rights; their entrenchment (one way or another); and as a result – the power of judicial review that has been granted to the Court in the matter of legislation, and the constitutional remedies that the Court may grant, culminating in the annulment of a law – all of the above undoubtedly provide a basis for declaring that a major change occurred in Israel in March 1992.

 

The question regarding the source of the norm and its status is, in the present case, a theoretical one that does not require determination. I will therefore state only this: I am prepared to proceed on the assumption that none of the views expressed on this point lack solid theoretical, historical and interpretive basis. Yet it is precisely for this reason, precisely because each view represents a ‘legitimate’ legal option, that it is best to prefer the one that enhances the status of human rights, as is required by the values inherent to this subject. Any possible approach that weakens the status of this norm must of necessity lessen the status of the rights themselves, at a time when precisely the opposite tendency should guide us.

 

As a result, it is necessary that the rights that were granted by the Knesset in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty be given the status of constitutional rights – a status that is the ultimate normative status.

 

2. When we speak of the protection afforded to a person’s property by section 3 of the Basic Law, we must first clarify whether the right that we seek to protect is indeed ‘property’ within the meaning of section 3. If so, then the second question arises, viz. whether there was an ‘infringement’ of the property right as defined under section 3. A positive answer to the second question as well, raises the third question, which is whether the infringement fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause in section 8 of the Basic Law (see Prof. Weisman, in his above-mentioned article, HaPraklit 42, at p. 261).

 

3. Regarding the case before us, which is expressed in a law that infringes the contractual rights of creditors, I am also of the opinion that property rights include contractual rights within their scope. This does not indicate a blurring of the accepted distinction between contractual rights (in personam) and property rights (in rem), inasmuch as even obligatory rights are objects of ownership, since they have an economic value:

 

 

The assets that are the subject of proprietary rights may be of different types… thus, for example, one may create a property right… in an asset that is itself a personal right…in personam. We must thus therefore carefully distinguish between the nature of the asset that is the subject of the right (and there is nothing to prevent a personal right constituting the asset regarding which a property right exists…) and the nature of the right in the asset… (Weisman, in his above-mentioned book, at p. 50).

 

In CA 511/88 Mandelbaum v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Rishon LeTzion, et al. [75], at p. 527, President Shamgar states:

 

 

The interest of the protected tenant in the asset is worthy of protection like the interest of the renter or the leaseholder, because in this context it is not the purity of the proprietary nature of the right that is the determining factor, but rather the economic value that is damaged as a result of the plan (in The Planning and Building Law, 1965 – E.G.).

 

And see also Professor Weisman, in his aforementioned article, at p. 267.

 

Moreover, because the civil law recognizes the need to protect a person’s ownership of contractual rights against intentional infringement by a third party, such as in the tortious inducing of breach of contract, there is no reason to diminish the protection given to these assets in the framework of section 3 of the Basic Law (for similar results see: Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel [84], at p. 295; Rio Rico Properties v. Santa Cruz County [100], at p. 174; L. Kreynin, ‘Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can the Constitution Be a Form of Contract Law?’ 90 Colum. L. Rev. (1990)). It is also clear that in the matter before us an infringement of property rights has occurred, and that ‘infringement’ should be interpreted as a detraction form the economic property right that the property owner possessed.

 

4. In addition, I would like to address subjects that touch upon the application of section 8 of the Basic Law. In HCJ 428/86, HCJ 320/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [9], at p. 595, Justice Barak stated that:

 

… Constitutional legislation must be interpreted in light of the structure of the entire system…each constitutional law is nothing but a single brick in the whole building, placed on a given foundation of regime and law. Thus, the task of the judicial interpreter, when construing a constitutional law, is to bring it “into harmony with the foundations of the country’s existing constitutional regime” (M. Landau, ‘Law and Discretion in the Making of Law, 1 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 306).’

 

Thus must we be guided when we interpret s. 8 of the Basic Law, and its three sub-tests. In interpreting this section, the Court must bear in mind the constitutional structure of our system, which is based upon a separation of powers that ensures mutual checks and balances among the branches of government. As President Shamgar wrote in the Ressler case [14], at p. 518:

 

…Only in this manner, that is to say by avoiding overly concentrating power exclusively in the hands of one branch of government, is democracy guaranteed and the freedom of the individual and of the public safeguarded. In other words, the consistent and conceptual spreading of powers among the branches of government, through the imposition of constitutional principles regarding mutual supervision and control, and the establishment for this purpose of connections and bridges among the various branches of government, will create a basis comprising the combined elements that embrace all branches of government. This creates the parallelogram of forces that establishes and stabilizes the balance that is a condition for the existence of freedom and for the proper functioning of all the branches of government.

 

5. The harmony between branches of government therefore requires drawing a ‘red line’ between the exercise of the power of review over an act of legislation granted to the Court, and involvement in the legislative process. The Court must be careful not to blur the boundaries and cross into domains that are not its own. It must bear in mind that it has been entrusted only with the power of judicial review over whether or not the law is constitutional, and in exercising that authority the Court does not replace the legislature. The Court may not substitute its discretion for that of the legislature. The freedom to choose between alternative measures intended to balance the proper purpose and the infringement of a right is granted to the legislature and not to the Court. It is the legislature that is authorized to choose from among the possible means the one that it deems most appropriate for realizing the proper purpose of the law, and there is a presumption that it has indeed considered all of the relevant possibilities.

 

As a result, the constitutional legitimacy of the law under scrutiny is presumed. This approach is accepted, mutatis mutandis, for administrative review, and applies a fortiori to constitutional review. Only a conclusion that the legislature has not met the limitations upon infringement set out in s. 8 of the Basic Law requires that the Court declare a law to be unconstitutional, as if the legislator had acted ultra vires. Any other intervention by the Court would undermine those boundaries required by the separation of powers.

 

6. This is the manner in which we must also relate to the final test in the limitation clause of the Basic Law, viz. that the infringement of the offending law upon human rights be ‘to an extent no greater than is required.’ This test is the ‘degree test.’ The degree of the infringement must be such that it is no greater than required.

 

In order to arrive at the proper degree, there must be a process of winnowing through possible alternatives and of choosing the best. This process, by its nature, reflects the use of discretion in calculating the degree appropriate to realizing the (proper) purpose, while the point of departure is that for every alternative there is a ‘price’ that is expressed one way or another. We would also note that, when s. 8 speaks of ‘an extent no greater than is required,’ there are two meanings to the word ‘required.’ When two values collide, what is ‘required’ is the substantive criterion. When the collision is between two measurable concepts in a concrete system of data, what is ‘required’ is the quantitative criterion. The test referred to is relative and not absolute. The absolute size of the infringement is not what is being examined, but rather its size relative to what is required in order to achieve the proper purpose. While the language of s. 8 of the Basic Law implies that any infringement in excess of that required for the achievement of the proper purpose is forbidden, nevertheless, for reasons which we have examined, it is necessary, in my view, that the Court declare that a law has not met the ‘degree’ test only if it has reached the conclusion that the means chosen in the winnowing infringes to a degree that represents and exceptionally severe deviation from the range of reasonable infringement (in comparison with extreme unreasonableness). Otherwise, the Court will be replacing the legislature’s discretion with its own.

 

The risk is that, in the process of constitutional review, the tasks of the Court and the legislature will be reversed, and the need to fix the borders of intervention, as suggested above, are particularly clear in regard to tax laws and laws that set economic policy (to which the second meaning of ‘required’ that we discussed applies). If a test of legality of degree is carried out in this regard, by means of a careful examination of the possible alternatives, it will be difficult to find economic legislation that will stand up to the test of proportionality. In the words of Justice Blackmun:

 

A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less “drastic” or a little less “restrictive” in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down. (Illinois Elections BD. v. Socialist Workers Party [101], at pp. 188-189)

 

In tax laws and in economic laws there is the additional fact that the Court is not equipped with the tools to delve into the intricacies and the distinctions in the proportionality among the various alternatives (see HCJ 311/60 Y. Miller, Engineer (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport [76], at p. 1996). We must also not forget that an erroneous intervention in laws that deal with the subjects mentioned above may induce shock waves in the national economy. All of these things taken together only strengthen the view that the Court should declare a law unconstitutional for deviation from the test of degree, only if the means that the legislature chose reflects an exceptionally severe deviation from the range of reasonable infringement for the fulfillment of the proper purpose.

 

7. The necessary conclusion from the above is not that we require a different formula for judicial review of tax laws and economic laws, but rather that the ‘threshold’ of possible degree should be higher for them. This is similar to the approach of United States constitutional law that economic legislation is subjected to ‘minimal scrutiny’, and that it is sufficient that there be merely a rational basis for the infringing means employed by the law.

 

A broader framing of the allowable degree of infringement is required by the nature of the subject matter before us, inasmuch as the infringement of property rights of the individual by means of economic legislation in fact comprises three elements: At the first stage, the overall amount of means required for achieving the proper purpose is established. Establishing this overall amount is no more than an expression of priorities among the proper national objectives that the legislature has established. In general, the Court will refrain from intervening in legislation that sets or is based upon such general goals, As it merely expresses a balance between private property and the needs of the general public, and the Court will not intervene unless there is clearly an exceptional departure from the proper degree, such that private property rights will be deprived of appropriate room to exist . The second stage identifies those from whom the necessary means will be recruited in order to achieve the proper purpose. This determination is also subject to the review of the Court (such as in regard to discrimination), subject to the freedom to choose between alternative measures all of which attempt to balance between the proper purpose and the infringement of a right. This balancing, too, as already stated, is the role of the legislature rather than the Court. The third stage constitutes an arithmetical calculation of the degree of infringement.

 

As we see, this is a complex process that is based on both policy and upon the intricacies of complicated actuarial calculations, which are often the subject of disagreement among economists. It is thus understandable that the High Court of Justice tends not to intervene in the determination of economic policy (see, for example, HCJ 49/83 Consolidated Dairies Ltd v. Israel Dairy Board [77], at p. 523). It should be clear that the above is not intended to lead to a conclusion that economic legislation is exempt from judicial review, but rather in order to emphasize that the material under review requires that the Court widen the scope of the possible degrees of infringement so that the Court will not appear to be ruling upon the wisdom of legislative policy.

 

8. This brings us to the question of the burden of proof when a claim is brought that a law infringes one of the rights listed in the Basic Law, and that it does not serve a proper purpose or does not meet the requirement of proportionality. The burden of proof is of importance when the Court is asked to draw factual conclusions. In such a case, it is the burden of proof that determines between two contradictory and equally weighted arguments. When the Court is asked to make a value-based determination (e.g., striking a balance between conflicting values), there is no practical significance to the burden of proof. The Court must apply the tool of logical analysis, with which it is fully equipped. Thus, there is for the most part no significance to the burden of proof in determining whether an infringement of a protected right serves a proper purpose, and the determination is fundamentally one of values. The burden of proof is of significance in determining the proportionality of the infringement, where proportionality itself is not the result of a balancing of values. The material nature of property (i.e. the ability to quantify the value of a property right) is what requires the Court to make recourse to the facts in order to determine whether legislation that infringes a proprietary right meets the criterion of proportionality. If so, the burden of proof will have practical significance in such circumstances, in which the Court must decide between two sets of facts.

 

The task of the burden of proof is to make a determination in conditions of uncertainty when the scales are balanced. Several considerations apply to the division of this burden between the parties to a case. One consideration is that the existence of a fact or of a situation is more reasonable. In such a case, the tendency is to impose upon the person claiming the opposite of such a situation the burden of showing that the situation is different in the case under discussion. An additional consideration springs from the recognition that in conditions of uncertainty the burden of proof will be imposed in a manner that will narrow the risk that the decision will be erroneous. Thus for example, in criminal proceedings, in which a person’s freedom is at stake, the burden is imposed upon the state by means of the presumption of innocence set out in the criminal law. In civil proceedings the burden of proof is placed on the person who is making a claim against another, as he is arguing for a change in the status quo (see D. Bein in this regard, ‘The Burden of Proof and the Evidentiary Requirement in Tax Law’ (1995) III Mishpat uMimshal, at p. 285). In proceedings in which the legality of a law is being examined, the point of departure is that the law is assumed to be constitutional. Thus, any doubt must

 

operate in favor of the law’s legitimacy, and not against its validity. We thus conclude that a party who argues against the validity of a law must bear the burden of proof, even regarding the issue of whether the infringement constitutes an extreme deviation from the realm of a reasonable infringement for the sake of achieving a proper purpose. The evidentiary burden is auxiliary to the burden of proof. The party defending the law need not show that there are other alternatives that more severely infringe the right and that the less-infringing alternative was chosen, but rather the party arguing against the validity of a law must show that there exists a specific, clear alternative that fulfills the proper purpose, while infringing the protected right in a manner that is significantly less than the infringement of the law.

 

9. In the case before us, those assailing the constitutional validity of the law have not presented any alternatives of degree to the one chosen by the legislature for the fulfillment of the proper purpose (and I agree that the purpose is in fact proper).

 

Thus, I too concur with the opinions of my colleagues as to the results of this proceeding.

 

 

 

Justice E. Mazza:

I concur with the opinion of my colleague President Barak. I accept his rationale in general; and I also concur with the summary of his conclusions, which appears in paragraph 108 of his opinion. Given this situation, I will suffice in briefly addressing three of the important issues regarding which some of my esteemed colleagues have presented different positions and approaches. I will begin by emphasizing that the appeals before us do not require a decisive determination of any of these three issues. My brief comments are meant to emphasize my support for one of the possible approaches regarding each issue.

 

The first matter is the question of the source of the Knesset’s power to bind itself – whether by a formal entrenchment provision or by a substantive limitation – which is required in order to establish a constitutional norm that will be protected from the Knesset’s own power. Like my colleague, President Barak, I share the view that this power has been granted to the Knesset on the basis of its constituent authority. That the Knesset possesses constituent as well as legislative authority is strongly anchored in our constitutional history. Moreover, the approach that attributes the Knesset’s constitutional activity to its constituent authority appears substantively preferable to me to other possible approaches. Its main advantage is that it attributes the Knesset’s authority to establish a constitution to a source that is conceptually ‘external’ and distinct from the source of its sovereignty as a legislative authority. In so doing, it establishes a theoretical basis for a normative ladder that enables a practical distinction between the Knesset’s special activity in establishing a constitution and its ongoing activity in the legislative field.

 

The second matter I would like to address is the scope of the definition of ‘property’ and ‘infringement of property.’ I accept the view that, with regard to the effect of s. 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ‘property’ may include obligatory rights. Yet my colleague Justice Zamir rightly points out that ‘The broader the scope of the right to property as a constitutional right, the weaker its protection..’ I believe, as he does, that in order to make a decisive determination regarding the appeals before us, it is enough to assume that the Amending Law does in fact infringe property; and so long as we are not required to do so, we must be careful not to establish fixed conclusions as to the scope of the protected property right. It may be that, in the spirit of the approach of President Shamgar (in para. 69 of his opinion), the practical test for determining whether there is cause for examining the constitutionality of an infringement of property ought to be based not on the internal substance of this right, but rather on the seriousness of the infringement of the right and its identification, by some objective criterion, such as an infringement that substantially affects the position of the right-holder. It would appear that even President Barak, who, in principle, leans toward a broad definition of property and of infringement thereof, would agree that marginal damage to property may not give rise to a cause for constitutional review of the infringement. In any case, he left these questions open for further review, and I am satisfied with that.

 

My third comment relates to the burden of proof in the second stage of the constitutional analysis. There is a consensus that at the first stage of the review, a person claiming infringement of a basic right must assume the burden of proving the infringement. The question is, upon whom does this burden fall in the second stage, in which the question is whether the infringement of the right is constitutional, in the sense that it fulfills the conditions of the limitation clause.

 

 

My esteemed colleagues expressed several views regarding this issue. My colleague President Barak notes the accepted view of comparative constitutional law, according to which the burden of proving the constitutionality of the infringement falls upon the state. The President states that he deems this approach to be appropriate, yet since the issue does not arise in the case before us, he suggests leaving the issue of the burden of proof for further review. My colleague Justice D. Levin decisively expresses his opinion that the law does indeed require that the burden of proof be transferred to the shoulders of the state. The views of my colleagues Justices Bach and Goldberg are diametrically opposed to that. In their opinion, every law enjoys the presumption of its constitutionality, and even when it is proven that a law infringes upon a basic right, the presumption of constitutionality requires that we assume that the infringement satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. Therefore the burden of contradicting that assumption falls upon the claimant. My colleague Justice Cheshin, who admits to having hesitations in this regard, tends to an intermediate position: the burden of proof that a law that infringes a basic right fulfills the conditions of the limitation clause does indeed fall upon the state. However, even a law that has been proven to be an infringing law, enjoys a prima facie assumption that it does not contradict the Basic Law; and one who claims otherwise must bring contradictory proof. This presumption that the state enjoys in meeting its burden of proof, transfers the evidentiary burden onto the claimant. If the claimant does not bring sufficient evidence to contradict this presumption, the state will be found to have borne the burden of proof, whereas, if the claimant manages to adduce contradictory evidence, the state will be required to show the Court that the infringing law does indeed meet the conditions of the limitation clause. Having stated in which direction his opinion leans, and in view of the difficulty of the questions posed in the matter of burden of proof, Justice Cheshin proposes leaving a decisive determination in this matter for the future.

 

I, too, do not have a clear opinion on this difficult matter. My tendency, prima facie, is that there is good reason for splitting the burden between the parties, so that the state will have to convince the Court that the infringement serves a proper purpose and that the means chosen are appropriate for achieving that purpose. The burden of convincing the Court that the government should choose a less harmful, alternative method, should be imposed upon the person alleging the unconstitutionality of the infringement. My colleague President Shamgar explained the appropriateness of his distinction (in para. 85 of his opinion) and, on the face of it, I concur with his approach. Nonetheless, I am not absolutely certain that it is fitting to act in this manner in every instance. It may be that such an approach is appropriate only for infringements of an economic nature, and that a different type of harm to basic rights justifies imposing the burden of proof on the state in regard to all of the conditions of the limitation clause. Subject to these comments, which were meant to indicate a possible direction without setting things in stone, and in the spirit of the proposals of my colleagues President Barak and Justice Cheshin, I would leave for further review the issue of determining the various aspects and levels of the burden of proof.

 

Justice G. Bach:

1. I concur with the view that the appeals in LCA 1908/94 and LCA 3363/94 should be allowed, and that the relevant files should be returned to the court of first instance for continued deliberation. I also concur with the rejection of the appeal in CA 6821/93. I am also of the opinion that there should be no order for costs regarding these appeals.

 

2. It appears that due to the sense of the great importance of this event – from the point of view of the legal, constitutional and judicial history of the State of Israel, when this Court is asked for the first time to rule on the question of the validity of a law enacted by the Knesset, on the grounds that the law infringes upon Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and is thus unconstitutional – some of my colleagues have analyzed in great detail matters regarding which a decision is not necessary for deciding these appeals. Several of my colleagues have noted in their opinions that no binding decision is called for regarding these matters, and thus they are prepared to leave the matters for ‘further review.’ However, since they nonetheless clarified their positions in these matters, other colleagues expressed their opposing views in this regard. This aroused the natural desire of those judges who left the decisions for ‘further review’ to further clarify their principled positions.

 

Truth be told, we are dealing with fascinating topics, that appeal to the heart and the mind at the legal level generally, and at the constitutional level in particular; as well as at the national, public, general and philosophical levels. The temptation to analyze these topics in detail is accordingly great. Nonetheless, I have decided, for myself, to resist the temptation, and to limit my remarks to those topics that appear to me to be necessary for rendering our specific opinion in the matter of these appeals.

 

3. I concur with the commonly held proposition of my esteemed colleagues Presidents Barak and Shamgar, with which most of the other judges on this bench have concurred. According to this proposition, the Knesset is empowered to enact both ordinary legislation and special Basic Laws that constitute the constitution of Israel, and that in the latter type of laws, the Knesset may even limit its own authority and that of future Knessets to amend or infringe these same constitutional Basic Laws. This self-limitation can be procedural, viz. by means of a special majority for the annulment or amendment of these laws, and it can be material, by means of the setting of substantive conditions for amending those Basic Laws.

 

I see no need, for the purpose of these appeals, to take a stand on the inherently interesting and important question of constitutional history of whether, in enacting Basic Laws of a constitutional character, the Knesset wields inherent authority in its capacity as the state’s supreme legislative body, as President Shamgar believes; or whether the Knesset enacts Basic Laws by means of special, separate authority, under the ‘hat’ of constituent authority, as President Barak believes.

 

4. My position regarding this issue would be different, had the claim been raised before us that the aforementioned Basic Laws could only have been enacted by the Knesset in its capacity as a constituent assembly, but that a special procedure for so doing was required, such as a proclamation in the Knesset and of its committees that dealt with these laws, to the effect that the debate and the voting related to the enactment of constitutional laws, and that the Knesset was acting under its constituent authority, and that this fact had to require clear and definitive expression in the wording of the Basic Laws themselves. Such an argument would have implied that without having undertaken such a special procedure, and without a statement in the Basic Laws themselves that they were enacted on the basis of the Knesset’s constituent authority, there is in fact no constitutional effect to the two Basic Laws that we are addressing in these appeals, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

However, since no one supports this extreme line of thinking, and since it is clear from the opinion of my esteemed colleague President Barak that the Knesset’s constituent authority is not contingent upon a procedure different from that used in enacting ordinary laws, and the fact of the constituent assembly’s special ‘hat’ need not be specifically noted in the wording of the aforesaid laws, I do not find any practical difference between the two approaches in the case before us. This situation may change should the Knesset adopt a Basic Law, whether entrenched in a procedural or material-substantive manner, regarding which it be claimed that the Knesset abused its constituent authority, and that the law did not justify the use of the said special authority of Knesset, by virtue of its contents or its national importance.

 

However, this cannot be said, and has not been argued in regard to the two laws before the Court. These two laws address the most basic of human rights. Both the content and the wording of these laws manifestly indicate the legislature’s intent to establish constitutional supra-norms for the protection of human rights. There can be no doubt that the provisions included in these Basic Laws could serve as a central pillar in any constitution worthy of its name in an enlightened democratic regime.

 

5. In his interesting, comprehensive opinion, my esteemed colleague Justice Cheshin raises the question of whether we ought to be convinced that the legislature intended to create part of a constitution when it enacted these Basic Laws. He recalls in this context the theophany at Mount Sinai, in stating, inter alia, as follows:

 

This was the manner in which the Jewish people became obligated by its first constitution... For three days the people waited to receive the constitution … and on the third day the grand and awesome ceremony began… thunder and lightning, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud …

 

The implication is clear: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were not enacted with such festive displays. It is certainly true that these Basic Laws were not enacted with thunder and lightning and the sounding of trumpets. Such phenomena apparently no longer occur in our era. Yet in my opinion the festiveness and the constitutional character of these Basic Laws, and the desire to establish supra-constitutional norms, emerge from the text itself. To illustrate this point it is sufficient to take the main law with which we are dealing, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Sections 1 and 1A of the Basic Law state:

 

1. Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

 

1A. The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’

 

The sections following these establish provisions regarding the protection and preservation of life, physical integrity and the dignity of the person. Section 8, the limitation clause, then states:

 

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required. 

 

Do not these words unequivocally express the legislative intent to establish constitutional norms for the people of Israel, and in a manner that is, in effect, no less than that of thunder, lightening and trumpets?

 

6. This sums up the matter of the Knesset’s intention to establish a constitution. Regarding the question of its authority to establish a constitution, I have already indicated above, that I concur with the positive views of President Shamgar and President Barak in this regard (and I clarified that I understand their position to be a shared one on this point). I reached this conclusion after reviewing the voluminous amount of material that was cited by my colleagues and the learned representatives of the parties, including the constitutional history of the State of Israel from the first day of its establishment, including the ‘Harrari Decision,’ the opinions expressed by members of the Knesset during the debates on the various Basic Laws as recorded in the Knesset Proceedings, and the opinions expressed by learned experts of constitutional law, the content of the Basic Laws that have been legislated by the Knesset prior to 1992, when Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were enacted, and the manner in which these laws were passed, and finally the relevant case law on the subject that has been decided by this Court and the courts of other countries with a constitutional regime.

 

I carefully examined the doubts, reservations and misgivings expressed in this matter by my esteemed colleague Justice Cheshin. In my opinion, one cannot deny the weight of at least some of those points, which also draw support from the opinions of various scholars, as well as several of the Knesset members who took part in the debates upon the said Basic Laws and earlier Basic Laws. Yet, at the end of the day, I concur with the view that the Knesset was endowed with central and supreme legislative authority that includes the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. It seems to me that this view is accepted today, and was accepted in the past by the Israeli public. Were we to ask the supporters of a written constitution and those who oppose it for either practical or ideological reasons, we may reasonably assume that the overwhelming majority of the public would have no doubts as to the Knesset’s authority per se to enact Basic Laws that form a constitution. The public acceptance of the Basic Laws that have been enacted since the establishment of the state proves this.

 

7. I would raise an additional point in this context: Even my colleague Justice Cheshin, does not disagree that the Knesset is empowered to enact a law that comprises a provision that binds future Knessets, in the sense that it requires a majority of Knesset members, that is to say, a minimum majority of 61 Knesset members, in order to revoke or amend the law. My colleague agrees that such a provision does not contradict the fundamental conception of democracy.

 

It appears to me that there is no difference, in principle, between a limiting provision that requires a majority of 61 Knesset members for the law’s amendment or revocation, and a more far-reaching, constitutional limitation provision. A law is passed in the Knesset with a regular majority of those participating in the vote. Absence or abstention is the right of every Knesset member. Therefore, if my colleague is correct in his opinion that the Knesset is not empowered to enact a constitutional law because the next Knesset can revoke any law by ordinary means, then it is difficult to understand why a limiting law that requires a majority vote of 61 Knesset members would constitute an exception to that rule.

 

  It would appear that in order to be consistent my colleague needed to point out the invalidity of any law that prevents the future enactment of a law by ordinary means. Emphasizing that requiring a majority of 61 Knesset members is ‘kosher’ because it accords with our democratic sense may sound good, but I am not convinced that there is a difference of principle regarding the matter before us, between requiring a majority of 61 and requiring a majority of 62 Knesset members, or a greater majority.

 

8.  In his opinion, Justice Cheshin raises concerns, inter alia, regarding the negative phenomena that are liable to result in the future if indeed we recognize the unrestricted authority of the Knesset to limit in a Basic Law the authority of future Knessets to revoke such a law or to amend it. Thus my colleague asks what will happen if a Basic Law enacted in the future would require a vote of 90 or 100 or even more Members of Knesset in order to amend it? Indeed, such a thought raises concerns regarding our future democratic life, but it seems that this concern is more theoretical than practical. Israel is not the only country that has enacted laws of a constitutional nature that include entrenchment and limitation provisions regarding future legislation. Such laws require a majority of members of parliament for the amendment of a constitutional law, or even a majority of two-thirds of parliament or of those participating in the vote. We have never heard of a requirement of a 100% majority, i.e. unanimity, or even of a requirement of 90% or of 80% of the members of parliament.

 

The concern that has been expressed reminds me of the following questions that I have asked myself on more than one occasion: What would happen, if, when the commander of the Independence Day ceremony requests the permission of the Speaker of the Knesset to begin the ceremony, the request would be denied by the Speaker?! What would happen if the President, or the Prime Minister, or the relevant minister would refuse to sign a law enacted by the Knesset? And what if the President refuses to sign the appointment of a judge who has been selected by the Judicial Appointment Committee, when there is no defect in the appointment? The simple answer to questions such as these is that there are certain things that we may assume will simply never happen in a proper democratic regime. And if, heaven forbid, such unreasonable events were to occur, then a democratic regime will find judicial or other governmental solutions. This concern and other problems related to the enactment of future Basic Laws and their amendment, which will be solved in the course of time, cannot outweigh the considerations that lead to the conclusion that the Knesset, as the supreme legislative body, is indeed authorized both to enact ordinary laws and to legislate Basic Laws that provide Israel with a constitution.

 

9. Accordingly, I concur with the opinion of my colleagues, that the above-mentioned Basic Laws do in fact endow the Court with the authority to nullify laws that contradict these Basic Laws and do not meet the legality tests that they establish.

 

10. I agree that the Amending Law that is the subject of these appeals ‘infringes property rights’ within the meaning of s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. I concur with the conclusion and the reasoning of my esteemed colleague President Shamgar on this point, and I see no need to add anything.

 

It remains for us, therefore, to consider the central issue of the appeals before us, and that is whether the Amending Law meets the requirements of the ‘limitation clause.’ In other words, does the Amending Law fall within the scope of s. 8 of the Basic Law, which determines that the new law is not nullified in spite of its infringement of a basic right, because it meets the requirements stipulated in that section?

 

11. Several of my colleagues expressed their opinions upon the issue of which party ought to bear the burden of evidence or proof regarding the question of whether the law at hand meets the limitation requirements in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (and to the same extent, of course, the parallel section to the aforementioned s. 8 in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, viz. s. 4).

 

Some of my colleagues noted that there is no need to decide this question in the appeals before us, and it may thus be left for future consideration. As opposed to my position regarding several other questions that were addressed by my colleagues, I believe that this topic is indeed very relevant to the present matter, and that it is appropriate that we consider it. The moment that we reached a determination that the Amending Law does in fact infringe a property right, that is to say, a fundamental right protected by the Basic Law, we must then answer the question of whether the Amending Law meets all of the criteria in s. 8 of the Basic Law. It is only natural, and necessary, that we ask ourselves which party must convince us regarding these points. What if doubts arise regarding any or all of those? What happens if the scales remain evenly balanced in regard to any or all of those points?

 

Various opinions have been expressed regarding this question. According to one of them, to which my esteemed colleague Justice D. Levin gave most specific and decisive expression, the question of the burden of proof regarding the issues before us must be divided into two: the burden of proof regarding the very existence of an infringement of the basic right in the new law under examination; and, if an infringement of the basic right is indeed proven, then the question arises as to the burden of proof regarding the fulfillment of the requirements in the limitation clause, that is to say s. 8 of the Law, regarding which different rules apply, according to this same opinion.

 

Thus states Justice D. Levin, inter alia:

 

Anyone who claims that a basic right has been infringed and who seeks to undermine the force of a regular law for the sake of such an infringement, must shoulder the burden of persuading the Court that a protected, constitutional basic right has indeed been infringed. The Court then examines this claim in the light of the facts of the case as laid out before it and in accordance with the values that are contained in the protected basic right. If the Court finds that indeed a regular law that has been passed does infringe a safeguarded basic right, the burden of persuading the Court that in this specific case the justifications for such an infringement exist in the limitation clause passes over to the entity protecting the validity of the law – usually a representative of the state.

 

This proposition is accepted by some scholars and judges in Israel and elsewhere, and even the state’s representative did not disagree with it during the proceedings before us.

12. I, however, cannot agree with this view regarding the second part of the proposition, for the following reasons. There are indeed areas of law in which the burden of proving a defense in the face of an accusation or a certain claim falls upon the person who raises the defense. We encounter this phenomenon mainly in criminal law. When it is proven that a defendant, who has been accused of murder or assault, has indeed killed or assaulted another person, and the accused wishes to defend himself on the grounds of self-defense and to therefore claim that he ought not to be convicted, the burden of proof falls upon him to show the existence of a situation of self-defense.

 

The same is true regarding a defense of drunkenness or insanity. In tort law, as well, the burden of proof is sometimes transferred to the shoulders of the respondent. Under certain circumstances, noted in s. 41 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version] and which arouse a prima facie suspicion against the respondent for having been negligent towards the claimant, the conclusion of that same section determines:

 

…and it appears to the court that the happening of the occurrence that caused the damage is more consistent with the conclusion that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care than with the conclusion that he did exercise reasonable care – then the onus shall be upon the defendant to prove that there was no carelessness for which he is liable in connection with the occurrence which led to the damage.

 

In other words, in certain cases, in which the evidence indicates prima facie that a crime or a tort has occurred, and the defendant or the respondent wishes to raise certain defenses based upon facts that are a matter of their special knowledge, the burden of proof will transfer to them regarding these points.

 

Does a similar situation obtain in regard to the topic before us? I think not. In listing the fundamental human rights, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty makes a general, normative declaration. The legislature was well aware of the fact that very many situations would arise in which the law would permit infringements of these ‘rights,’ meaning that undoubtedly laws would be legislated that would meet the requirements of the limitation clause, s. 8 of the Basic Law. When s. 5 of the Basic Law states that ‘There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.’ We can hardly imagine that the legislature was unaware of the probability that laws will be passed that will conflict with this ‘right.’ Is it not clear that every country requires the enactment of criminal laws that permit the arrest and incarceration of suspects and of convicted criminals? Is it not perfectly obvious that laws will be proposed and enacted to permit the extradition of criminals to other countries? We are also all aware that a person’s liberty may be ‘otherwise’ restricted, as for example, by means of conscription into the army. Should we assume that the legislature takes a negative view of all of these possibilities for the restriction of liberty?

 

It also seems to me that various tax laws are also laws that ‘infringe a person’s property,’ and that s. 3 of the Basic Law ostensibly applies to them. There are differences of opinion among experts regarding this point, but I am of the view that in tandem with the prohibition on arrests and detainments, where it is clear that the state must apply the criminal law, the term ‘infringement of property’ must also be interpreted broadly, with an understanding on the part of all those concerned that many laws, in this context as well, will be found wanting in terms of s. 8 of the Basic Law.

 

In other words, a law that prima facie infringes a basic right is not automatically absolutely and thoroughly suspect of being morally or democratically invalid. Each law will be objectively examined in light of the elements prescribed in the limitation clause. In my opinion, this analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no assumption or presumption that every law that infringes human liberty, property, or any other basic right enumerated in the Basic Law is invalid until proven otherwise. On the contrary, in my opinion, the assumption should be that a law was lawfully enacted, unless the Court is convinced that it is void for infringing a basic right and not meeting the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law.

 

There is an assumption and a presumption that every civil servant who performs a task in the framework of his job acts in good faith and in accordance with the law, until the opposite is proven. This well-known rule, omnia praesumuntor rite esse acta, applies to every official act. The same holds for a policeman making an arrest, who is assumed to be acting legally and properly, until proven otherwise. Are we to act in accordance with the opposite assumption, in the case of the legislature, in the case of the members of the Knesset elected by the public? When the people’s elected representatives, following debates in the Knesset committees and plenum, enact a law, is there no assumption that the law was passed for a worthy end and that it conforms to the values of the State of Israel? Is there any justification whatsoever for the opposite assumption? This is precisely the meaning of imposing the burden of proof on the party that claims that the conditions of s. 8 have been fulfilled. If we so determine, it is as if we are saying to the legislators: ‘Since your law contains some infringement of liberty or property, our assumption is that you have acted in a manner that is inappropriate and does not befit the values of the State of Israel; or you have done something that is not intended for a proper purpose, unless you convince us of the opposite.’ 

 

In my view, such a conclusion is unacceptable, and the burden of proof at all stages must be imposed upon the party that argues that the law is void for contradicting a Basic Law. In other words, the person who argues against the validity of a law must convince the Court both as to the law’s infringement of a right protected by the Basic Law, as well as that the law does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause, s. 8 of the Basic Law (see also, in the same vein, para. 8 of the opinion of my esteemed colleague Justice Goldberg).

 

I would also add that we should not forget that the legislature – that is to say the Knesset members, the elected representatives of the people – is not generally represented as a party in this Court. It is said that the state’s representative, the representative of the Attorney General, will in general represent the position of the legislature. Yet this is not necessarily so. There may be situations in which an enacted law does not enjoy the support of the government or the Attorney General. This is another reason for concluding that the Court should not annul a law on the above-mentioned grounds, unless it is convinced by the evidence and the arguments brought before it that the law that infringes a basic right does not in fact meet the criteria of s. 8 of the Basic Law.

 

13. In the above explanation I mentioned the first two requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law, viz. that the law must be ‘befitting [of] the values of the state of Israel’ and that the law must be ‘enacted for a proper purpose.’ But my approach is identical in regard to the third criterion of s. 8, which requires that the infringement of the basic right must be ‘to an extent no greater than is required.’ Here, too, the assumption must, in my opinion, tend to the direction of the legitimacy of the law, unless the opposite is clearly proven. If we impose upon the legislature, or upon whoever is attempting to defend the law, the burden of showing that there exists no alternative to the law as legislated by the Knesset that poses a lesser infringement of the basic right, we are liable to find ourselves in intolerable situations.

 

Let us return once again to the criminal law. There are those who are of the opinion that imprisonment does not deter and is not effective, and that we should employ other sanctions that do not infringe human freedom to the same extent. Others take the view that shorter terms of imprisonment achieve the same punitive result, and may even have better results. Still others believe that for specific offences, such as drug-related crimes or sex crimes, emphasis should be placed on medical treatment rather than on punishment. It is possible that even the judge presiding over the proceedings may hold such views. Additionally, there is extensive professional literature treating of these issues. The same is true regarding fiscal laws or commercial laws, such as the Amending Law that is currently before this Court. There can be no doubt that it is possible to propose alternative laws that, in the eyes of the proposer, appear preferable, more efficient, more just, and less injurious to the property right of the person seeking the annulment of the law.

 

Let us just imagine where we would end up if the Court were required to delve into such arguments, and if the party arguing in favor of the validity of the law would have to prove that there exists no alternative that infringes a given right to a lesser extent.

 

In conclusion, in this matter as well, the burden of proof must rest upon the person arguing that the law should be voided. We should also not accept an overly broad construction of the requirement itself. Only if the evidence and arguments make it clear to the Court that the law infringes the petitioner’s basic right in a manner that is disproportionate to the fulfillment of its desired aim, and that there is a real need for an alternative solution less injurious to the basic right, may the Court decide to void the law for the above-mentioned reason.

 

14. The outcome of all of the above is that only in rare and exceptional cases will the Court find justification for declaring a law void on the grounds that it contradicts the above-mentioned Basic Laws on human rights of 1992.

 

15. If we now apply these rules to the cases before us, the unavoidable conclusion is that there is no justification for voiding the Amending Law that is the subject of these appeals. As my esteemed colleague President Shamgar stated, the purpose of the Amending Law, like that of the Main Law, is an attempt to resolve the crisis in the agricultural sector. This is a proper purpose, and the law conforms to the values of the State of Israel. Moreover, the possible infringement of the property rights of the creditors under the provisions of the Amending Law is not disproportionate to the intended legislative purpose. This is especially so, after taking into consideration the alternatives that were available to those creditors in accordance with the existing laws of execution and bankruptcy.

 

 

I would probably have reached this same conclusion even if I were of the opinion that the burden of proof regarding the conformity of the law to the requirements of the limitation clause was to be borne by the person arguing for the law’s legality. This is so a fortiori given that my view, as explained above, is that the burden of proof rests with the party arguing that the law should be voided.

 

16. I would also like to note that I concur with the concluding remarks in para. 108 of the opinion of my esteemed colleague President Barak, and I refer to paras. 3 and 4 above, in which I clarified the reason for not taking a position regarding the question of whether the Knesset wields its inherent authority or its constituent authority in legislating a constitutional law. My colleague’s statements in those concluding remarks are, in fact, in agreement with my opinion, and they also do not conflict with my position regarding the burden of proof in this matter, which I set out in detail in paras. 11-14 above.

 

17. In light of all the above, I have reached the conclusion set out at the beginning of my opinion.

 

Justice Tz. E. Tal

 

There is a difference of opinion between President Shamgar and President Barak, and between the two of them and Justice Cheshin, regarding fundamental questions of the authority and status of the legislative branch. This difference of opinion is extremely important in terms of constitutional law.

 

Nonetheless, I do not believe that these questions need  be decided in order to resolve the matter before us. I will therefore refrain from entering into the debate between these eminent jurists, and leave these questions to be decided at the appropriate time.

 

In HCJ 878, 726/94, [37], I concurred with the opinion of my colleague Justice D. Levin (although not with his conclusions) in the matter of the superior normative status of the Basic Laws, in the light of which the Knesset’s ordinary legislation should be reviewed, and with that I rest content.

 

My colleagues were divided on the question of who should bear the onus of proving that the infringement of a right protected in a Basic Law did not exceed what was proper. In this matter, I agree with the approach of my colleague Justice Mazza.

 

I concur with the result that the appeal in CA 6821/93 should be denied, and that the appeals in LCA 1908/94 and LCA 3363/94 should be allowed, and that the matters should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

 

Decided as stated in the opinion of President Shamgar.

 

Handed down this day, 16 Heshvan 5755 (November 9, 1995)

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Legislation

 

Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel.............................................................. 6-7, 60-63, 103-106,

                .....................................................................................................................  114, 164 169, 171-2, 174-177,

                .......................................................................... 186, 198,  201-2, 207-209, 211-212, 214,217, 221,229,

                ..................................................................................................... 233-4, 310-317, 319, 328, 330,353, 357

                ................................................................................................................. 361, 364, 367, 371, 397-398, 408

 

Israeli Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ss. 1,1A,2,3,5,8,10,11,12......................................................... 2-4, 7-8,

                ..................................................................................................... 17, 23-25,28, 32;39, 56-7, 59,70, 80, 81,

                ................................................................................................. 82,85,87, -98;102-104;106, 108, 114-117,

                ........................................................................................................... 120-122, 124-128, 134, 135-41, 149,

                ........................................................................................  158;161-163 166-167;203-204, 217, 219-220,

                ................................................................................................. 230-231, 236, 239-241 248-250, 253-258,

                .............................................................................................................. 263, 265, 276, 278, 280, 284-285, ,

                ........................................................................................................ 296, 300, 304-305, 307-308, 323-324,

                ................................... 330, 332, 337, 341-342,417, 420, 429, 440,444-445, 450, 455-456, 460-463,

                ........................................................................................ 465,469, 470-472, 474, 476,478-482 486-487 ,

                ...................................................................................................... 490-492, 500, 502, 504-506, 509, 511, ,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1992); Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994),

                ss. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11........................................................................................... 8-9,39, 48,50-52, 55-57, 59,

                .............................................................................................................. 78-79, ,81-82,84-85 88 -91, 93- 95,

                ....................................................................................................... 97, 101, 103, 106, 108, 116 , 122-125,,

                ...................................................................................... 128, 161, 163, 166, 203 -204,217-219, 221, 230,

                .............................................................. 236, 247,250, 253-258,263,272, 275, 278, 290-291, 307, 315,

                ..................................................................................................... 319-321, 330 – 331, 337, 342, 417-418,

                ............................................................................................................... 429, 444-446, 450, -455-461, 463,

                ......................................................................................................... 472, 476, 478-481,491, 504-506, 509,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................

Basic Law: The Knesset, ss. 4,8, 9A, 9A(A), 19,21 (c),24,25, 34,44, 45, 45A................... 6, 34, 39, 44, 49-50,

                .............................................................................................. 52-4, 63, 66-8, 77, 94, 105, 116, 161, 166-7,

                ............................................................................................. 186-90, 193, 201, 205-6, 211, 218, 224, 236,

                ................................................................................................... 240-1, 243, 304, 366, 374, 397, 421, 427,

                ................................................................................................................ 428-31, 433-5, 437, 439-440, 444

Basic Law: The Judiciary: ss. 10, 17, 22....................................................................... 48,  50, 79, 113, 164,  248

Basic Law: The Government: ss. 42, 50 (c), 50 (d), 56, 56 (d), 59....................................................... 46, 79, 86,

                ................................................................................................................... 107,164,243,420,449,- 450, 452

Basic Law: The Army....................................................................................................................................... 164,243

Basic Law: The President of the State: s. 25............................................................... 79, 107, 164, 89, 242,  376

Basic Law: The State Economy: ss. 3, 7............................................................................................... 79, 164, 376

Basic Law: Israel Lands....................................................................................................... 164, 194, 204, 242, 376

Basic Law: The State Comptroller.............................................................................................................. 164,,204,,

 

 

161

Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No.3)....................................................................................................... 193

Basic Law: Jerusalem, The Capital of Israel........................................................................................................ 164

 

 

Foreign Constitutions Cited:

[Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]..................... 146,,200, 254, 256, 259, 279, 289, 290, 293, 295,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................

[German Basic Law], Sections 1(3), 20(3) and 79(3................................................... 82, 90, ,93,  101, 195, 254

Constitution of Australia............................................................................................................................................ 93

Constitution of Austria, 1920.................................................................................................................................... 90

Constitution of Austria............................................................................................................................................. 262

 

Constitution of Canada....................................................................................... 89, 93, 101, 123, 132,  259, 277,,

                .......................................................................................................................................................... , 286, 289,

Constitution of Cyprus............................................................................................................................................. 262

Constitution of Germany................................................................................................... 82, 90, 93,102, 163, 227,

                ......................................................................... 153-154, 163,195,227,254,262 271,283, 289, 290, 294,

Constitution of India....................................................................................................................................... 102, 262

Constitution of Ireland...................................................................................................................................... 93, 262

Constitution of Italy........................................................................................................................................ 163, 262

Constitution of Japan............................................................................................................................................... 262

Constitution of South Africa........................................................................................................... 95,163, 277, 289

Constitution of Soviet Russia.................................................................................................................................. 192

Constitution of Spain................................................................................................................................................ 239

Constitution of Sweden............................................................................................................................................ 239

Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France....................................................................................................... 102

Constitution of the United States.................................................................................... 93,102,131,141,153,163,,

                ................................................................................................................................................... ,262, 282, 410

Constitution of Turkey............................................................................................................................................. 262

 

International Treaties Cited:

Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (s. 17)......................................................................... 304

European Communities Act, 1972........................................................................................................................... 77

European Convention on Human Rights.......................................................................................... 201, 225, 293,

European Union Convention, Article 177(B)......................................................................................................... 89

 

Israeli Statutes Cited:

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1993......... 2-4, 7, 17, 20-35, 38-39, 85, 89,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................                                   100, 128-9, 135, 136-138,

                ....................................................................................................................... 143, 145-6, 150-2, 157-8, 162

                ................................................................................................................. 168, 276, 296-7, 299, 300-4, 328,

                ............................................................................................................................... 330-2, 335-6, 340-1, 487,

                ............................................................................................................................... 490, 500, 509-10, 514-15

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1992,

ss. 7 (b)(1),11,12,15, 16, 17, 19 (a), 20, 20 (b)(3)(a), 21, 22                                             ..... 2, 17-21, 23, 25-28,

                ......................................................................................................... 30-31, 33-35, 100, 135-137, 143, 146,

                .............................................................................................................................................. 150-52, 160, 308

 

First Schedule, Second Schedule, Third Schedule.................................................................................................. 18

Interpretation Ordinance [New Version] ss. 16 (4), 37................................................................................. 44, 438

Knesset Rules of Procedure.................................................................................................................................. 437-8

Holders of Public Office (Benefits) Law, 1969, s. 1.............................................................................................. 46

Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, ss. 2(b), 7 (a), 9, 9 (b), 10 (a), 11................ 46, 61, 107, 114, 169,

                ............................................................................................................... 175-6, 353, 398, 433, 435, 468-69

Transition Law, 1949, ss. 1, 2 (a), 2 (d)....................................................... 46, 62-5, 68, 82, 170, 178, 181, 206,

                ................................................................................................ 220-1, 239, 304, 346, 350, 384-5, 387, 424

Supervision (Products and Services) (Amendment No.18) Law 1990............................................................... 47

The Knesset (Number of Members in Committees) Law 5754-1994................................................................ 50

Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] 1969, s. 86 (e............................................................................. 50

Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 1984, ss. 64, 108................................................................................. 50, 433

Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law.............................. 54

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 1949, ss. 1, 2(d) 3........................................................ 61-3, 196,

                ................................................................................................................................................. 344-5, 357, 359

Law of Return, 1950.......................................................................................................................... 61, 82, 106, 190

Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951..................................................................................................................... 61,82

Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 1948, ss. 1, 2(d), 3............................ 62, 175, 355, 362, 395, 398

Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 1951, ss. 1, 5, 6, 9, 10.................................................................... 64, 68, 170,

                ................................................................................................................................... 184-6, 196-7, 211, 369

Elections Financing Law, 1973................................................................................................................................. 80

Knesset (Confirmation of Validity of Laws), 1969............................................................................................... 80

Standards Law, 1953.................................................................................................................................................. 86

Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets, 1984, s. 3........................ 206, 409, 447-8

Companies Ordinance {New Version] 1983......................................................................................................... 334

Bankruptcy Ordinance, 1980.................................................................................................................................. 334

Agency Law, 1965, s. 16.......................................................................................................................................... 362

Emergency Regulations (Jurisdiction Constitution) 1948.................................................................................. 395

Interpretation Law, 1981, ss. 15, 17 (a), 20........................................................................................ 431, 435, 438

Planning and Building Law, 1965.......................................................................................................................... 493

Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version], s. 41....................................................................................................... 511

 

 

 

Table of Cases

 

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

 

HCJ 4031/94        ‘Bezedek’ Organization v. Prime Minister of Israel [1994] IsrSC

                                48(5) 1................................................................................................................................. 109,523

HCJ 1225/94        ‘Bezeq’ – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister

                                of Communications [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 661...................................................... 219, 280, 288

HCJ 75/76            ‘Hilron’ Ltd v. Fruit Production and Marketing Board (Fruit

                                Board) [1976] IsrSC 30(3) 645................................................................................ 39, 42, 58-9

HCJ 107/73          ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd

                                [1974] IsrSC 28(1) 640................................................................................ 50, 53, 86, 249, 479

CA 549/75            A v. Attorney-General [1976] IsrSC 30(1) 459.................................................................... 362

HCJ 7/48               Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [1953] IsrSC 2 5.............................................. 176, 483

HCJ 852/86;

HCJApp 483/86;

1/87                        Aloni v Minister of Justice [1987] IsrSC 41(2)

                                1.................................................................................................................................................... 160

LCA 3466/92       Artrekt Bankrupts v. Bankruptcy Trustee [1993] IsrSC 47(2)

                                573............................................................................................................................................... 151

CrimA 74/58        Attorney-General v. Hornstein [1960] IsrSC 14 365; IsrSJ 3 71...................................... 362

FH 13/60               Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 430; IsrSJ 4 112............................ 99, 279

CA 228/63            Azuz v. Ezer [1963] IsrSC 17 2541.................................................................................. 69, 166

HCJ 428/86;

HCJApp 320/86; ........................................... Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6

                                1........................................................................................................................... 41, 160, 280, 493

CA 219/80            Beit Hikiya, Workers’ Village for Cooperative Arrangement Ltd v.

                                Efrati [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 516................................................................................................. 439

HCJ 1/49               Bejerano v. Minister of Police [1948] IsrSC 2 80........................................................ 39, 483

HCJ 3477/95        Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC

                                49(5) 1....................................................................................................................... 288, 292, 339

EA 2/88                 Ben-Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset

                                [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 221............................................................................................................. 311

HCJ 98/69            Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8

                                13.............................................................................................. 54-5, 69, 73, 79-80, 95 126, 164,

                                ..................................................................................................... 210, 215, 246, 263, 277, 336-8,

                                .................................................................................................................. 406, 408, 436, 486, 488

CrimApp

6654/93                 Binkin v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 290................................................................. 219

HCJ 726/94          Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1994] IsrSC 48(5)

                                441......................................................................................................................................................   164, 217, 220, 277, 307, 309,  319, 332, 406, 516

LCA 1759/93       Cohen v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 143................................................. 26, 136

HCJ 889/86          Cohen v. Minister of Trade and Welfare [1987] IsrSC 41(2)

                                540...................................................................................................................................... 426, 489

HCJ 49/83            Consolidated Dairies Ltd v. Israel Dairy Board [1983] IsrSC 37(4)

                                516............................................................................................................................................... 497

HCJ 2481/93        Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324............................................. 280

HCJ 246/81          Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC

                                35(4)1; IsrSJ 8 21............................................................................... 79-80, 215, 264, 406, 408

HCJ 180/52          Dor Heirs v. Minister of Finance [1952] IsrSC 6 908........................................................ 475

HCJ 693/91          Efrat v. Director of Population Register, Ministry of Interior [1993]

                                IsrSC 47(1) 749........................................................................................................ 273-275, 439

CA 239/92            Egged Israel Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [1994]

                                IsrSC 48(2) 66............................................................................................................................ 218

HCJ 6163/92        Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2)

                                229............................................................................................................................................... 273

HCJ 987/94          Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications

                                [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 412............................................................................................ 288,339-340

HCJ 306/81          Flatto-Sharon v. Committee of the Knesset [1981] IsrSC 35(4)

                                118....................................................................................................................... 35, 110, 113, 267

HCJ 3385/93,

4746/92                 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1994] IsrSC

                                48(5)...................................................................................................................................... 93, 218

CrimApp

537/95                   Ganimat v. State of Israel [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 355.......................... 165, 220, 278, 482, 485

CA 723/74            HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [1977] IsrSC

                                31(2) 281; IsrSJ 9 226................................................................................................... 39, 42, 57

HCJ 119/80,

OM 224/80           HaCohen v. Government of Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(4) 281  ................................. 86, 245-46

HCJ 5394/92        Huppert v. Yad VaShem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial

                                Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353.......................................................................................... 220

HCJ 243/62          Israel Broadcasting Studios Ltd v. Gary [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.............................. 166, 310

FH 9/77                 Israel Electric Corporation v. HaAretz Newspaper Ltd [1978] IsrSC

                                32(3) 337; IsrSJ 9 295................................................................................................................. 59

HCJ 65/51            Jabotinsky v. President of Israel [1951] IsrSC 5 801; IsrSJ 1 75..................................... 475

HCJ 73/85            Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141................................................ 267

HCJ 669/85          Kahana v. Knesset Speaker [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 393............................................................. 79

HCJ 148/73          Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 794................... 50, 53, 86, 249, 426, 479

HCJ 73/53            Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1

                                90..................................................................................................... 39, 58,171,221,229,310,483

HCJ 142/89          Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 259.......................................... 77-8,

                                ................................................................. 79,-80,110, 215-7, 220, 222, 233,265,406, 408 426

HCJ 89/83            Levi v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 

                                488.................................................................................................................................................. 45

HCJ 356/83          Lidor, Association for the Protection of Homeowners, Apartments

                                and Private Property in Israel v. Minister of Construction and

                                Housing [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 602............................................................................................ 489

CA 87/50              Liebman v. Lifshitz [1952] IsrSC 6 57................................................................................... 465

HCJ 163/57          Lubin v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [1958] IsrSC 12 1041......................................... 162-3

CA 511/88            Mandelbaum v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Rishon

                                LeTzion [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 522                                                   .......................................... 492

HCJ 108/70          Manor v. Minister of Finance [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 442...................................................... 489

HCJ 256/88          Medianwest Medical Center Herzliya Ltd v. Director of Ministry of

                                Health [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 19.................................................................................................... 47

HCJ 620/85          Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 41(4) 169............................................................... 150

HCJ 761/86          Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 868............................................................... 406

HCJ 287/69          Miron v. Minister of Labour [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 337......................................................... 275

HCJ 337/81          Miterani v. Minister of Transport [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 337.......................................... 39, 97,

                                ........................................................................................................................... 107, 118, 140, 483

EA 1/88                 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Twelfth

                                Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177.............................................................................................. 105

EA 2/84                 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections for Eleventh Knesset; Avneri v.

                                Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985]

                                IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83..................................................................... 39, 274,278, 311, 483

FH 4/69                 Noiman v. Cohen [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 229............................................................................ 138

HCJ 60/77            Ressler v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Knesset

                                [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 556........................................................... 53, 86, 245, 249, 265, 479, 494

CA 450/70            Rogozinsky v. State of Israel [1972] IsrSC 26(1) 129......................................................... 426

HCJ 141/82          Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60

                                ........................................................................................................................ 79-80, 215, 406, 408

CA 673/87            Salah v. Liquidator for Peretz and Issar Construction and Investments

                                Co. Ltd (in Liquidation) [1989] IsrSC 43(3) 57.................................................................... 333

HCJ 131/65          Sevitzky v. Minister of Finance [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 369.................................................... 117

HCJ 153/87          Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221;

                                IsrSJ 8 186.................................................................................................................................. 140

HCJ 1/81               Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 365............................................... 160

HCJ 491/86          Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Minister of Interior [1987] IsrSC 41(1)

                                757............................................................................................................................................... 489

HCJ 120/73          Tobis v. Government of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 757.............................................. 166, 426

HCJ 5510/92        Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 217................................................. 288

HCJ 732/84          Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 141...................................... 274

LCA 7112/93       Tzudler v. Yosef [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 550...................................................................... 130, 281

HCJ 5364/94        Welner v. Chairman of Israeli Labour Party [1995] IsrSC 49(1)

                                758............................................................................................................................................... 268

HCJ 311/60          Y. Miller, Engineer (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport

                                [1961] IsrSC 15 1989............................................................................................................... 496

HCJ 7/55               Yanowitz v. Ohr [1953] IsrSC 9 1252.................................................................................... 438

EA 1/65                 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth

                                Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3) 365.............................................................................................. 233

CrimA

282/61                   Yihye v. Attorney-General [1962] IsrSC 16 633.................................................................. 109

HCJ

6290/93                 Zilka v. General Manager of Ministry of Health [1994] IsrSC 48(4)

                                631............................................................................................................................................... 489

HCJ 10/48            Ziv v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 85;

                                IsrSJ 1 68..................................................................................................................................... 176

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

 

OM (Jerusalem) 1635/92 – unreported................................................................................................................. 151

OM (Tel-Aviv) 1229/93 – unreported.................................................................................................................... 151

OM (Tel-Aviv) 49299/88 – unreported................................................................................................................. 151

OM (Tel-Aviv) 1657/89 – unreported.................................................................................................................... 151

 

 

Australian cases cited:

 

Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214.......................................................................................................... 263

Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29..................................... 279

Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel (1943-44) 68 C.L.R. 261................................................................. 493

 

United States cases cited:

 

Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936......................................................................................... 131

Louisville Bank v. Radford 295 U.S. 555 (1935.................................................................................................. 137

Wright v. Vinton Branch 300 U.S. 440 (1937)..................................................................................................... 137

Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963...................................................................................................... 145, 298

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483 (1955............................................................................................ 148

Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S. 93 (1979...................................................................................................................... 153

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S.  288 (1936)..................................................................... 158

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).................................................... 232

United States v. Baellin 12 S. Ct. 505 (1891)...................................................................................................... 253

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803)........................................................................................... 260-2, 267, 337

 

United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974)......................................................................................................... 267

McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819)........................................................................................................ 278

Kovacs v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949)................................................................................................................... 283

New York Trust Co. v. Fisher 256 U.S. 345 (1921)............................................................................................. 283

Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905)................................................................................................. 144, 298-9

Rio Rico Properties v. Santa Cruz County 834 P. 2D 166 (1992)................................................................... 493

Illinois Elections B.D. v. Socialist Workers Party 440 U.S. 173 (1979)......................................................... 496

 

English cases cited:

 

Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) [1991] ALL ER 70 (C.J.E.C. and H.L. 1)........ 77

MaCarthy Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 180 (C.J.E.C.)................................................................................................ 77

Bribery Comr. v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172 (P.C.)......................................................................................... 263

Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [1969] ALL ER 384 (P.C.)............................................................ 256 

Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319........................................................................................... 279

 

International cases cited:

 

Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [1979] 2 E.H.R.R.......................................................................................... 285

Costa v. Enel (1964) E.C.R. 585............................................................................................................................... 91

.

South African cases cited:

 

Harris v. Minister of Interior (1952) 4 S.A.L.R. 428.......................................................................................... 263

S. v. Mekwanyana (1955) 6 B.C.L.R. 665.................................................................................................... 277, 289

 

Indian cases cited:

 

Kesavande v. State of Kerala [1973] A.I.R. 146................................................................................................. 227

 

Canadian cases cited:

 

R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.................................................................................................... 149, 276, 284, 290

R v. Big M. Drug Mart. Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.................................................................................................. 279

Jones v. The Queen [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284........................................................................................................... 281-2

 

Jewish law sources cited:

 

Leviticus 26:10..................................................................................................................................................... 41,465

Genesis 1, 27; 24, 27........................................................................................................................................ 106, 414

Deuteronomy 15, 1-11; 27, 9.......................................................................................................................... 147, 347

Exodus 1, 22; 19, 10-11, 14-20; 16.................................................................................................. 345-7, 406, 453

Shemot Rabba (on Exodus), 29.............................................................................................................................. 346

Isaiah 10, 15; 30, 15........................................................................................................................... 369, 422-3, 485

Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia (Damages, second part) 107b.................................................................... 431

 

 

 

Volumes of Cases published in English Translation

 

Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel:

 

Volume I (IsrSJ 1)                               1948-1953

Volume II (IsrSJ 2)                              1954-1958

Volume III (IsrSJ 3)                             1958-1960

Volume IV (IsrSJ 4)                             1961-1962

Volume V (IsrSJ 5)                              1963-1965

Volume VI (IsrSJ 6)                             1986

Volume VII (IsrSJ 7)                           1983-1987

Volume VIII (IsrSJ 8)                          1969-1988

Volume IX (IsrSJ 9)                             1977-1990

Volume X (IsrSJ 10)                            1988-1993

 

Israel Law Reports:

 

[1992-4] IsrLR                                                 1992-1994

[1995]     IsrLR                                                1995

[1995-6] IsrLR                                                 1995-1996

[1997]     IsrLR                                                1997

[1998-9] IsrLR                                                 1998-1999

[2002-3] IsrLR                                                 2002-2003

[2004]     IsrLR                                                2004

[2005] (1) IsrLR                                  2005

[2005] (2) IsrLR                                  2005

[2006] (1) IsrLR                                  2006

 

 

 

 

Table of Cases Published in English Translation

(in Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel and Israel Law Reports)

 

HCJ 4804/94                    A v. Attorney-General [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 160; [1997] IsrLR 115

CA 447/58                       A v. B [1959] IsrSC 13 903; IsrSJ 3 350

CA 3798/94                     A v. B [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 133; [1995-6] IsrLR 243

CA 5258/98                     A v. B [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 209; [2004] IsrLR 327

HCJ 199/53                      A.B. v. Minister of Interior [1954] IsrSC 8 243; IsrSJ 2 1

HCJ 113/57                      Abdu v. Mayor of Akko [1958] IsrSC 12 209; IsrSJ 3 1

HCJ 493/81                      Abu Aita v. Officer in Charge of Customs, Gaza Strip Region [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 197; IsrSJ 7 1

HCJ 493/81                      Abu-Dahar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2005] IsrSC 59 (5) 368; [2005] (1) IsrLR 136

HCJ 210/60                      Abudi v. Minister of Religions [1960] IsrSC 14 2020; IsrSJ 3 110

HCJ 3799/02                    Adalah v. IDF Central Commander [2005] (2) 206

HCJ 7052/03                    Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel  v. Ministry of Interior [2006] (1) 443

CrimA 63/58                    Ajami v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 13 421; IsrSJ 3 198

HCJ 7015/02                    Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352; [2002-3] IsrLR 83

HCJ 27/88                        Al Affo v. Commander of IDF Forces in West Bank [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 1; IsrSJ 8 255

HCJ 2722/92                    Alamarin v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [111992] IsrSC 46(3))) 693; [1992-4] IsrLR 1

HCJ 3451/02                    Almadani v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 30; [2002-3] IsrLR 47

CrimA 229/57                  Al-Nakib v. Attorney-General [1958] IsrSC 12 850; IsrSJ 3 183

LCA 444/87                     Alsoucha v. Estate of Dehan [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 397; IsrSJ 9 20

HCJ 125/49                      Amado v. Director of the Immigrants’ Camp, Pardes Hanna [1950] IsrSC 4 5; IsrSJ 1 299

CA 2034/98                     Amin v. Amin [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 69; [1998-9] IsrLR 611

CrimA 158/58                  Amiram v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 13 1965; IsrSJ 3 248

CA 427/58                       Ashuel v. Ashuel [1959] IsrSC 13 953; IsrSJ 3 309; IsrSJ 4 233

CA 308/57                       Assessing Officer, Tel Aviv North v. Menahem [1958] IsrSC 12 881; IsrSJ 3 322

HCJ 358/88                      Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Central District Commander [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 529; IsrSJ 9 1

HCJ 5973/92                    Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 267; IsrSJ 10 168

HCJ 6778/97                    Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Public Security [2004] IsrSC 58(2) 358; [2004] IsrLR 1

HCJ 265/68                      Association of Engineers and Architects in Israel v. Minister of Labour [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 132; IsrSJ 8 1

CA 176/53                       Atia v. Rosenbaum [1954] IsrSC 8 1135; IsrSJ 2 439

CrimA 275/58                  Attorney-General v. Ben-Ami [1959] IsrSC 13 69; IsrSJ 3 190

CA 360/59                       Attorney-General v. Berkovitz [1960] IsrSC 14 206; IsrSJ 3 459

RT 3/58                           Attorney-General v. David [1958] IsrSC 12 1341; IsrSJ 3 304

CrimA 74/58                    Attorney-General v. Hornstein [1960] IsrSC 14 365; IsrSJ 3 71

CA 311/57                       Attorney-General v. M. Diezengoff & Co. [Navigation] Ltd [1959] IsrSC 13 1026; IsrSJ 3 53

FH 13/60                         Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 430; IsrSJ 4 112

CrimA 217/59                  Attorney-General v. Nabulsi [1960] IsrSC 14 1882; IsrSJ 3 256

HCJ 1074/93                    Attorney-General v. National Labour Court [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 485; [1995-6] IsrLR 149

CrimA 156/63                  Attorney-General v. Ostreicher [1963] IsrSC 17 2088; IsrSJ 5 19

FH 5/63                           Attorney-General v. Weigel [1963] IsrSC 17 2358; IsrSJ 5 171

HCJ 68701/93                  Bank Mizrachi v. Migdal Cooperative Village  [1995] IsrLR

HCJ 316/03                      Bakri v. Israel Film Council [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249; [2002-3]IsrLR 487

HCJ 3114/02                    Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11; [2002-3] IsrLR 39

HCJ 4481/91                    Bargil v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 210; [1992-4] IsrLR 158

HCJ 187/54                      Barriya v. Kadi of Acre [1955] IsrSC 187/54; IsrSJ 2 429

HCJ 428/86                      Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6 1

CA 370/63                       Basset v. Hapoel Compulsory Insurance Ltd [1964] IsrSC 18(1) 533; IsrSJ 5 294

HCJ 291/61                      Beit Arizah Rehovot Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 20; IsrSJ 4 96

HCJ 2056/04                    Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC  58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264

CA 161/59                       Belan v. Executors of Will of the late Raymond Litwinsky [1960] IsrSC 14 1905; IsrSJ 3 433

HCJ 129/57                      Ben Kosta v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [1958] IsrSC 12 209; IsrSJ 3 10

CrimA 77/64                    Berenblat v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(2) 70; IsrSJ 5 223

HCJ 98/69                        Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13

HCJ 3/58                          Berman v. Minister of Interior [1958] IsrSC 12 1493; IsrSJ 3 29

CA 84/64                         Beth Hananya Workers’ Cooperative Settlement Ltd v. Friedman [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 20; IsrSJ 5 142

HCJ 1890/03                    Bethlehem Municipality  v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59 (4) 736; [2005] (1) IsrLR 98

HCJ 9135/03                    Bishara  v. Attorney General  [2006] (1) 43

CA 103/63                       Bohakov v. Mayor, Council and Inhabitants of Herzliya [1963] IsrSC 17 158; IsrSJ 5 1

HCJ 3278/02                    Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 385; [2002-3] IsrLR 123

CA 238/53                       Cohen v. Attorney-General [1954] IsrSC 8 4; IsrSJ 2 239

HCJ 29/62                        Cohen v. Minister of Defence [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1023; IsrSJ 4 160

HCJ 336/03                     Commitment to Peace and Social Jusice Society v. Minister of Finance [2005] (2) 335

HCJ 164/97                      Conterm Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 289; [1998-9] IsrLR 1

AAA 9135/03                  Council for Higher Education v. Haaretz Newspaper Publishing [2006] (1) 1

CA 2781/93                     Daaka v. Carmel Hospital [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 526; [1998-9] IsrLR 409

CA 357/56                       Dan Bus Co-op. Soc. Ltd v. Yehiel [1958] IsrSC 12 517; IsrSJ 2 39

CA 545/59                       Dan Co-op Soc. Ltd v. Tel-Aviv District Assessing Officer [1960] IsrSC 14 2088; IsrSJ 3 339

HCJ 2481/93                    Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324

CA 3616/92                     Dekel v. Cheshev [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 337; [1997] IsrLR 533

HCJ 246/81                      Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 1; IsrSJ 8 21

LCA 5103/95                   Deshet v. Eliyahu [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 97; [1998-9] IsrLR 221

HCJ  5026/04                   Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd v. Rosenzweig [2005] (1) IsrLR 340

CrimA 1/52                      Deutsch v. Attorney-General [1954] IsrSC 8 456; IsrSJ 2 92

CrimA 44/52                    Diab v. Attorney-General [1952] IsrSC 6 922; IsrSJ 1 269

CrimA 126/62                  Dissenchick v. Attorney-General [1963] IsrSC 17 164; IsrSJ 5 152

HCJ 6163/92                    Eisenberg v. Minister of Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229; [1992-4] IsrLR 19

HCJ 721/94                      El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd v. Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749; [1992-4] IsrLR 478

HCJ 282/61                      El-Saruji v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1963] IsrSC 17 188; IsrSJ 5 14

CA 86/63                         El-Zafdi v. Benjamin [1963] IsrSC 17 1419; IsrSJ 5 273

CA 140/00                       Estate of Ettinger v. Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter [2004] IsrSC 58(4) 486; [2004] IsrLR 101

CA 3912/90                     Eximin SA v. Itel Style Ferarri Textile and Shoes Ltd [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 64; [1992-4] IsrLR 129

CA 436/60                       Ezri v. Klein [1961] IsrSC 15(2) 1177; IsrSJ 4 301

HCJ 10223/02                  Fisch-Lifschitz v. Attorney-General [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 517; [2002-3] IsrLR 219

CrimA 71/83                    Flatto-Sharon v. State of Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 757; IsrSJ 7 131

CrimA 11196/02              Frudenthal v. State of Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 40; [2002-3] IsrLR 299

HCJ 5261/04                    Fuchs v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 446; [2004] IsrLR 466

HCJ 9098/01                    Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [2005] IsrSC 59(4) 241; [2004] IsrLR 505

HCJ 316/63                      Gazit and Shehem Bldg. Ltd v. Ports Authority [1964] IsrSC 18(1) 174; IsrSJ 5 30

HCJ 279/60                      Gil Halls Ltd v. Yaari [1961] IsrSC 15(1) 673; IsrSJ 4 1

PPA 4463/94                   Golan v. Prisons Service [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 136; [1995-6] IsrLR 489

HCJ 94/62                        Gold v. Minister of Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(3) 1846; IsrSJ 4 175

CA 8/59                           Goldman v. Goldman [1959] IsrSC 13 1085; IsrSJ 3 313; IsrSJ 4 237

HCJ 2838/95                    Greenberg v. Katzrin Local Council [1999] IsrSC 53(1) 1; [1997] IsrLR 373

CA 723/74                       HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 281; IsrSJ 9 226

CA 65/57                         Ha-Etzni v. Ben-Gurion [1957] IsrSC 11 403; IsrSJ 3 365

CA 508/59                       Hapoel HaMizrachi Credit Fund Mutual Society Ltd v. Assessing Officer of Large Enterprises, Tel Aviv [1961] IsrSC 15(3) 2213; IsrSJ 4 254

HCJ 10356/02                  Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 443; [2004] IsrLR 53

LCA 7092/94                   Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 625; [1997] IsrLR 403

CA 50/55                         Hershkovitz v. Greenberger [1955] IsrSC 9 791; IsrSJ 2 411

HCJ 5016/96                    Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149

LCA 4716/04                   hotels.com  v.Zuz Tourism Ltd.  [2005] (2) 48

CA 345/87                       Hughes Aircraft Co. v. State of Israel [1990] IsrSC 345/87; IsrSJ 9 117

CA 776/80                       Israel British Bank [London] Ltd [in liquidation] v. Estate of Williams [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 645; IsrSJ 7 223

FH 9/77                           Israel Electric Corporation v. HaAretz Newspaper Ltd [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 337; IsrSJ 9 295

HCJ 243/62                      Israel Film Studios Ltd v. Geri [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2407; IsrSJ 4 208

HCJ 4885/03                    Israel Poultry Farmers Association v. Government of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 14; [2004] IsrLR 383

HCJ 453/94                      Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 501; [1992-4] IsrLR 425

HCJ 65/51                        Jabotinsky v. President of Israel [1951] IsrSC 5 801; IsrSJ 1 75

CA 3071/91                     Jabrin v. Jabrin [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 361; [1992-4] IsrLR 91

HCJ 101/54                      Jiday v. Chief Execution Officer [1955] IsrSC 9 135; IsrSJ 2 399

HCJ 241/60                      Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies [1961] IsrSC 15(2) 1151;IsrSJ 4 7

CrimA 242/63                  Kariti v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 477; IsrSJ 5 203

HCJ 4542/02                    Kav LaOved Worker’s Hotline v. Government of Israel [2006] (1) 260

HCJ 155/53                      Kiwaan v. Minister of Defence [1954] IsrSC 8 301; IsrSJ 2 320

HCJ 5319/97                    Kogen v. Chief Military Prosecutor [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 67; [1997] IsrLR 499

HCJ 73/53                        Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90

CA 419/59                       Koren and Hammer v. Koren and Koren [1960] IsrSC 14 997; IsrSJ 3 419

CA 817/79                       Kossoy v. Bank Y.L. Feuchtwanger Ltd [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 253; IsrSJ 7 183

HCJ 27/48                        Lahisse v. Minister of Defence [1949] IsrSC 2 153; IsrSJ 1 136

HCJ 5936/97                    Lam v. Director-General of Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 673; [1998-9] IsrLR 537

HCJ 5/48                          Leon v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 58; IsrSJ 1 41

LCA 1684/96                   Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreational Enterprises [1997] IsrSC 51(3) 832; [1997] IsrLR 445

CrimA 6/50                      Levitt v. Angel [1950] IsrSC 4 459; IsrSJ 1 27

HCJ 10/59                        Levy v. District Rabbinical Court, Tel Aviv [1959] IsrSC 13 1182; IsrSJ 3 161

CA 1846/92                     Levy v. Mabat Building Ltd [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 49; [1992- 4] IsrLR 111

HCJ 153/83                      Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 398; IsrSJ 7 109

CA 1212/91                     LIBI The Fund for Strengthening Israel’s Defence v. Binstock [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 705; [1992-4] IsrLR 369

HCJ 5131/03                    Litzman v. Knesset Speaker [2005] IsrSC 59(1) 577; [2004] IsrLR 363

HCJ 221/64                      Local Council of Pardess Hanna v. Minister of Agriculture [1964] IsrSC 18(4) 533; IsrSJ 5 81

CrimA 47/56                    Malka v. Attorney-General [1956] IsrSC 10 1543; IsrSJ 2 213

CrimA 118/53                  Mandelbrot v. Attorney-General [1956] IsrSC 10 281; IsrSJ 2116

CrimFH 532/93                                Manning v. Attorney-General [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 25; [1992- 4] IsrLR 96

HCJ 3239/02                    Marab v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349; [2002-3] IsrLR 173

HCJ 7957/04                    Marabeh v. Prime Minister  [2005] (2) IsrLR 106

CA 634/61                       Mekitan v. Mekitan [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 945; IsrSJ 4 246

CA 9311/99                     Menorah Insurance Co. Ltd v. Jerusalem Candles Ilum (1987) Ltd [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 550; [2002-3] IsrLR 1

HCJ 4541/94                    Miller v. Minister of Defence [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94; [1995-6] IsrLR 178

CrimA 17/59                    Mizrachi v. Attorney-General [1960] IsrSC 14 1882; IsrSJ 3 266

HCJ 1993/03                    Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 817; [2002-3] IsrLR 311

HCJ 3094/93                    Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 404; IsrSJ 10 258

CA 124/87                       Nafsu v. Chief Military Advocate [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 631; IsrSJ 7 263

CA 5587/93                     Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 485 [1995-6] IsrLR 1

CFH 2401/95                   Nahmani v. Nahmani [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 661 [1995-6] IsrLR 320

CA 30/92                         Naiman v. Attorney-General [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 275; [1992-4] IsrLR 84

CrimA                              Najar  v. State of Israel  [2005]  (2) IsrLR 31

HCJ 3511/02                    Negev Coexistence Forum v. Ministry of Infrastructure [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 102; [2002-3] IsrLR 165

EA 2/84                           Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Tenth Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83

HCJ 1/48                          Neiman v. Military Governor of the Occupied Area of Jerusalem [1948] IsrSC 1, 50; IsrSJ 1 125

HCJ 104/87                      Nevo v. National Labour Court [1990] IsrSC 44(4) 749; IsrSJ 10 136

CA 118/51                       New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd v. Youval [Salzman] [1953] IsrSC 7 518; IsrSJ 1 332

HCJ 9232/01                    Noah, the Israeli Federation of Animal Protection Organizations v. Attorney-General [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 212; [2002-3] IsrLR 225

HCJ 205/94                      Nof v. Ministry of Defence [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 449; [1997] IsrLR 1

CA 268/56                       Noy v. Hadera Municipality [1958] IsrSC 12 353; IsrSJ 3 147

CrimFH  2980/04             Oyco v. State of Israel  [2005] (2) 400

CA 36/62                         Ozri v. Galed [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1553; IsrSJ 4 347

HCJ 262/62                      Peretz v. Kfar Shmaryahu Local Council [1962] IsrSC 16(3) 2101; IsrSJ 4 191

HCJ 4764/04                    Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [2004] IsrSC 58(4) 385; [2004] IsrLR 200

HCJ 2936/02                    Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 3; [2002-3] IsrLR 35

HCJ 5100/94                    Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817; [1998-9] IsrLR 567

CrimA 7/53                      Rassi v. Attorney-General [1953] IsrSC 7 790; IsrSJ 1 239

HCJ 7351/03                    Rishon LeZion Municipal Parents Committee v. Minister of Education  [2005] (2) IsrLR 1

FH 16/61                         Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1209; IsrSJ 4 32

HCJ 910/86                      Ressler v. Minister of Defence [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441; IsrSJ 10 1

CA 337/62                       Riezenfeld v. Jacobson [1963] IsrSC 17(2) 1009; IsrSJ 5 96

CA 337/62                       Riezenfeld v. Jacobson [1963] IsrSC 17(2) 1009; IsrSJ 5 96

HCJ   2597/99                  Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. Minister of  Interior [2005] IsrSC 58 (5) 412; [2005] (1) 268

CA 248/53                       Rosenbaum v. Zeger [1955] IsrSC 9 533; IsrSJ 2 10

CA 88/57                         Rosenberg v. Carmarj and Halperin [1958] IsrSC 12 1096; IsrSJ 3 393

CrimA  4596/05               Rosenstein v. State of Israel  [2005] (2)  232

CrimA 35/52                    Rotenstreich v. Attorney-General [1953] IsrSC 7 58; IsrSJ 1 202

CA 127/52                       Roznek v. Dawman [1952] IsrSC 6 722; IsrSJ 1 283

HCJ 141/82                      Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60

HCJ 3267/97                    Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 481; [1998-9] IsrLR 139

CA 108/60                       Sacks v. Mussary [1960] IsrSC 14 2252; IsrSJ 3 140

HCJ 5627/02                    Saif v. Government Press Office [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 70; [2004] IsrLR 191

HCJ 5784/03                    Salama v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 721; [2002-3] IsrSC 289

HCJ 268/52                      Sapoznikov v. Court of Discipline of the Israel Police [1953] IsrSC 7 656; IsrSJ 1 155

HCJ 652/81                      Sarid v. Knesset Speaker [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 197; IsrSJ 8 52

HCJ 680/88                      Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 617; IsrSJ 9 77

HCJ 156/56                      Schor v. Attorney-General [1957] IsrSC 11 285; IsrSJ 3 283

ST 1/50                            Seedis v. Chief Execution Officer [1955] IsrSC 8 1020; IsrSJ 2 382

HCJ 153/87                      Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186

HCJ 1601/90                    Shalit v. Peres [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 353; IsrSJ 10 204

 CA 6024/97                    Shavit v. Rishon LeZion Jewish Burial Society [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 600; [1998-9] IsrLR 259

CA 506/88                       Shefer v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 87; [1992-4] IsrLR 170

HCJ 144/50                      Sheib v Minister of Defence [1951] IsrSC 5 399; IsrSJ 1 1

CA 9796/03                     Shem Tov v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC  59 (6) 397; IsrLR [2005] (1) 156

HCJ 85/47                        Shibli v. Shibli [1950] IsrSC 3 142; IsrSJ 1 252

CA 24/48                         Shimshon Palestine Portland Cement Factory Ltd v. Attorney- General [1950] IsrSC 4 143; IsrSJ 1 290

HCJ 5432/03                    SHIN, Israeli Movement for Equal Representation of Women v. Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 65; [2004] IsrLR 20

HCJ 3315/04                    Shitrit  v. Jerusalem Distsrict Court  [2005] (2) 66

Mot 525/63                      Shmuel v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 452; IsrSJ 5 55

CA 7/64                           Shor v. State of Israel [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 341; IsrSJ 5 313

CA 191/51                       Skornik v. Skornik [1954] IsrSC 8 141; IsrSJ 2 327

CA 191/51                       Skornik v. Skornik [1954] IsrSC 8 141; IsrSJ 2 327

LCA 8925//04                  Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. Estate of Alhamid [2006] (1) IsrLR 201

HCJ 195/64                      Southern Company Ltd v. Chief Rabbinical Council [1964] IsrSC 18(2) 324; IsrSJ 5 43

CA 4628/93                     State of Israel v. Apropim Housing & Promotions (1991) Ltd [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 265; [1995-6] IsrLR 63

CSA 4790/04                   State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim [2005] (1) 376

CA 384/61                       State of Israel v. Fasler [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 102; IsrSJ 4 288

CA 421/61                       State of Israel v. Haas [1961] IsrSC 15(3) 2193; IsrSJ 4 80

HCJ 9264/04                    State of Israel v. Jerusalem Magistrate Court  [2005] (1) 400

CA 543/59                       State of Israel v. Kislug [1960] IsrSC 14 1165; IsrSJ 3 383

CA 338/60                       State of Israel v. Madar [1961[ IsrSC 15(2) 1569; IsrSJ 4 318

CrimFH  1187/03             State of Israel v.Peretz [2005] IsrSC 59 (6) 281; [2005] (1) 200

CA 362/63                       State of Israel v. Schwartz [1963] IsrSC 17 2894; IsrSJ 5 286

LCA 3202/03                   State of Israel v. Yosef [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 541; [2004] IsrLR 83

HCJ 4804/94                    Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 661; [1997] IsrLR 23

CrimA 70/64                    Stroul v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 395; IsrSJ 5 194

CA 360/80                       Struski Ltd v. Whitman Ice Cream [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 340; IsrSJ 7 245

CA 360/80                       Struski Ltd v. Whitman Ice Cream [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 340; IsrSJ 7 245

HCJ 11163/03                  Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [2005] (1) IsrLR  105

HCJ 6055/95                    Tzemah v. Minister of Defence [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241; [1998-9] IsrLR 635

HCJ 806/88                      Universal City Studios v. Film and Theatre Censorship Board [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 22; IsrSJ 10 229

HCJ 100/57                      Weiss v. Inspector-General of Police [1958] IsrSC 12 179; IsrSJ 2 73

CA 141/54                       Wolff-Block v. Jerusalem District Assessing Officer [1956] IsrSC 10 441; IsrSJ 2 309

HCJ 311/60                      Y. Miller Engineering (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport [1961] IsrSC 15(3) 1989; IsrSJ 4 55

CA 10280/01                   Yaros-Hakak v.Attorney General  [2005] IsrSC 59 (5) 64; [2005] (1) IsrLR 1

HCJ 2599/00                    Yated v. Ministry of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 834; [2002-3] IsrLR 57

HCJ 176/54                      Yehoshua v. Appeals Tribunal [1955] IsrSC 9 617; IsrSJ 2 46

HCJ 176/54                      Yehoshua v. Appeals Tribunal [1955] IsrSC 9 617; IsrSJ 2 46

CrimA 5121/98                                Yissacharov  v. Chief Military Prosecutor  [2006] (1) 320

HCJ 10/48                        Zeev v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 85; IsrSJ 1 68

CA 461/62                       Zim Israel Navigation Co. Ltd v. Maziar [1963] IsrSC 17 1319; IsrSJ 5 120

CrimA 6/59                      Zinger v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 13 1457; IsrSJ 3 216

HCJ 7622/02                    Zonstein v. Chief Military Attorney [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 726;[2002-3] IsrLR 147

Hassan v. National Insurance Institute

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 10662/04
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, February 28, 2012
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

This Petition challenges the constitutionality of section 9A(b) of the Income Guarantee Act. The main claim the Petitions raise is that section 9A(b) establishes an absolute presumption whereby those who own or have access to the use of a vehicle shall be seen as having an income at the amount of the benefit, and thus their right to the benefit of income guarantee is revoked. It was argued that this presumption unconstitutionally infringes the right to minimal dignified human existence.

 

The Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice granted the Petitions and declared the unconstitutionality of section 9A(b) of the Income Guarantee Act.

 

President Beinisch:

 

The central purpose of the Income Guarantee Act is to support residents of the country who find themselves in situations where they cannot provide themselves with their basic needs. The point of departure embodied in the Act is that the primary way to accomplish and ensure a dignified human existence is through work. This assumption is reflected in two complementary aspects of the Act. First, income guarantee benefits are granted only to those who cannot support themselves on their own. Second, the purpose of the benefit is to sustain a person in the intermediate time period when they have found themselves without resources, but not to prevent them to once again be integrated into the workforce. The Act aspires to ensure that the benefit is a temporary, rather than permanent, alternative to employment.

 

These principles lead to the two main tests for establishing one’s right to the benefit: the income test and the employment test. The income test sets guidelines to quantify and evaluate the income of the person requesting the benefit. Its purpose is to examine whether this person has satisfactory income in order to meet basic life needs. The employment test conditions receiving benefits upon making every possible effort to find employment that provides an income that is higher than the benefit amount. The person requesting the benefit must lack satisfactory work or be unable to work, and to the extent the person is able to work, they must be willing to accept any work that is suggested by the Employment Services and which fits their health and fitness. In addition to these two substantive tests the Act also sets residency and age requirements.

 

Based on the purposes of the Income Guarantee Act regulations were put in place to define the implications of owning or using a vehicle for purposes of the right to the benefit. From the provisions as a whole it appears that a person seeking the benefit who owns or uses a vehicle and their circumstances are not covered by one of the exception established in the Act, is denied income guarantee benefits. In other words, those who own or use a vehicle are viewed as though they have an income at the amount of the benefit, and thus their right to the benefit is revoked. The issue is whether the above arrangement infringes upon a constitutional right, and if so – whether this infringement meets the requirements of the Limitations Clause. This central issue leads to “derivative” issues. A first of those is the question of what model of judicial review should be applied to examining the constitutionality of a statute that is claimed to have violated a socioeconomic right.

 

The constitutional analysis that has been acceptable in our system since the enactment of the Basic Laws in 1992, is separated into three primary steps. In the first step the question of the infringement is examined, where the Court examines whether the relevant statute infringes upon a right or rights that are enshrined in the Basic Laws. Should the answer be in the affirmative, the constitutional analysis moves onto the next step: examining the constitutionality of the infringement. This analysis is done by applying the requirements set in the Limitations Clause. An infringement that meets the requirements of the Limitations Clause is a permissible infringement. To the extent that it is found that the infringement does not meet the requirements of the Limitations Clause, it is the turn of the third step – the step of determining a remedy. In this step the Court considers the implications of unconstitutionality. This analytical separation has become a foundation of Israeli constitutional law. As opposed to the Respondents’ argument, the mere fact that we are concerned with the right to minimal dignified human existence does not justify a different judicial model of constitutional review.

 

According to the currently common approach, there is no foundation for clearly and strictly distinguishing between socioeconomic rights and political rights on the basis of the positive or negative duties of the state or on the basis of the issue of resource allocation. The seeming differences between the rights are primarily the product of historical evolution rather than of actual differences between the rights themselves. Indeed, “act” and “fail to act”, side by side, are an integral part of protecting all human rights, whatever they nature. But to the extent that there is a certain distinction between civil or political rights to socioeconomic rights, it still does not justify diverging from the acceptable model of review. Favoring the Respondents’ position may result in applying a different constitutional model in for the purposes of two different infringements of the very same right. Such selective application cannot stand on the artificial distinction between the rights. It has no source in the language of the Basic Rights, nor in the constitutional legal tradition of our system.

 

The right to minimal dignified human existence is at the core and the heart of human dignity. A minimal dignified human existence is a condition not only for protecting and preserving human dignity, but also for enjoying other human rights. As opposed to the Respondents’ arguments, the right to minimal dignified human existence ought not be seen as deriving from the right to human dignity, but it must be seen as the right that constitutes the real expression of human dignity. Of the range of meanings that can be attached to the term “human dignity” the most profound is that which goes to the intrinsic dignity of a person, to the minimal necessary conditions for human existence and survival. The income guarantee benefit granted under the Act is but one of the mechanisms that guarantee the protection of one’s right to a dignified existence, but it still holds a central place in protecting this right. It should be clarified that the point of departure is that the State has the duty to establish what are minimal conditions of existence and that the entirety of the welfare arrangements granted in Israel must satisfy the “cart” of conditions necessary for a minimal dignified existence. In this “cart” the income guarantee benefit takes central stage, and thus, revoking it leads inherently to an infringement of the right to a dignified human existence.

 

Section 9A(b) sets a fiction. The fiction is rooted in the presumption, which cannot be rebutted, that the amount of income “produced” by the vehicle is at least equal to the amount of the benefit. Therefore, the ownership or use of the vehicle alone is sufficient to lead to the benefit being revoked. This arrangement infringes upon the right to a dignified human existence because it sets a categorical rule that anyone who owns or uses a vehicle would not be entitled to the income guarantee benefit, and this regardless of the individual issue of whether such a person actually does have an income that could guarantee their right to a minimal dignified human existence. It should be emphasized that the difficulty of the absolute presumption is not a result of the mere need to own or use a vehicle as a component of assessing one’s income, but instead a result of the fact that this component becomes the exclusive element in assessing the income. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the absolute presumption established in section 9A(b) conflicts with the manner in which it is acceptable to examine the right to an income guarantee benefit in Israel – through an individual test whose purpose is to assess the extent of the need for the benefit.

 

Thus section 9A(b) infringes upon the right to a minimal dignified human existence. Does this infringement pass muster under the tests of the Limitations Clause? Indeed it seems that this section meets the requirement for a worthy purpose. Preventing abuse of the state support and welfare system and the attempt to ensure that state support is provided only to those who are most in need of it are worthy social ends. And yet, it must be found that the infringement embodied in section 9A(b) is disproportionate. Indeed, the provisions of section 9A(b) passes the test of the rational connection, although somewhat barely. Still it does not pass the test of the least restrictive alternative. It is possible to point to several reasonable alternatives that could realize the constitutional purpose at the foundation of provision in section 9A(b) while more limitedly, if at all, infringing the constitutional right to minimal dignified existence. For existence, it would have been possible to set a rebuttable presumption.

 

The case at hand is an example of the challenges in applying blanket arrangements where the right to a particular form of state assistance is revoked. Blanket arrangements, by their very nature, do not consider the individual circumstances of each and every person. Though there are situations where individual examination would not realize the purposes of the legislation. In such circumstances there is no escape but to establish a blanket arrangement. However, this is not such a case. The Legislature was aware, in the Income Guarantee Act, of the importance in establishing an individualized consideration mechanism. This path is suitable for the significance of the relevant right, and the centrality of the income guarantee benefit in protecting the right. And indeed, the mechanism to assess income as established in the Act ensures that a rigorous individual examination of each person seeking the benefit would be performed. Since this is the legislative mandate, and an individualized assessment is performed in any event in order to examine the other components of a person’s income, there is no justification for moving to a blanket arrangement as to the ownership or use of a vehicle in particular.

 

All of the above is sufficient for a finding that the infringement of the provision in section 9A(b) upon the right to a minimal dignified existence is not proportional. It should still be clarified in terms of the narrow proportionality test that it is difficult to accept that conserving state resources alone outweighs the harm caused to individuals whose right to a minimal dignified human existence is violated. Although such means make the work of welfare services more efficient – blanket arrangements tend to always be simpler to apply and administer compared to individual examinations – however this goal must not be achieved at any cost. “Efficiency” is not the ultimate goal when we are concerned with violating the most fundamental and significant human rights that the State is entrusted with guaranteeing. This is the case generally, and it is the case specifically when examining the income of a person, which is performed in any event on an individual basis.

 

Finally: section 9A(b) of the Income Guarantee Act must be declared unconstitutional and struck down. The striking down of the section will come into effect in six months.

 

Justice Naor:

 

The difficulty results from the fact that section 9A(b) creates an absolute presumption that completely revokes the benefit from owner or users of a vehicle (aside from the exceptions stipulated in the Act). This absolute presumption may violate the most important of all constitutional rights – the right to a minimal dignified existence. This violation must be resolved. The solutions to be south are those which would assess the real circumstances of those requesting the benefit, without using the fictions embodied by absolute presumption, which do not always reflect the situation as it is.

 

Justice Vogelman:

 

The right to minimal dignified human existence is at the core of the constitutional right to dignity. The arrangement established in section 9A(b) violates this right in a manner that is not proportional. And yet: this is not to say that the State’s position that owning or using a vehicle may be a reliable indication as to one’s financial circumstance should be rejected. Rather – that setting an all encompassing arrangement by creating an absolute presumption that does not empower the authority to investigate the facts as they are and that restricts a person requesting the benefit from proving that the ownership or use of the vehicle are not tantamount to an income at the amount of the benefit in the special circumstances of one’s case, disproportionately violates the right of some of those who receive the benefit to a minimal dignified human existence.

 

Justice Arbel:

 

The methodology of the constitutional analysis applied to socioeconomic rights should be not different than that which is employed to examine other constitutional rights. There is not place to pull back on exercising judicial review on legislation that implicates the right to minimal existence as distinct from other basic rights.

 

The right to a minimal dignified human existence is rooted deep in the heart of the constitutional right to dignity. The arrangement whereby anyone who owns or uses a vehicle shall not be eligible for income guarantee benefits, regardless of whether they in fact have an income that would ensure their minimal dignified existence, is arbitrary. This is a categorical threshold requirement, which results in a disproportional violation of the minimal dignified existed of the person from whom the benefit is denied.

 

Indeed, to the extent that we are concerned with realizing the right in a manner that requires a broad and extensive allocation of resources, the need for restraint on the part of the Court is acknowledged. However in cases where the Court faces a disproportional violation of the socioeconomic rights of a particular group, in a manner that undermines the minimal existence conditions of this group, it must intervene despite the restraint to which it usually holds itself. This is the case here.

 

It must be emphasized that only the regulation of socioeconomic rights in a basic law would lay the proper normative foundation that could afford fundamental constitutional protections to such rights, would make explicit their supremacy and the commitment to respect them, and the sooner; the better.

 

Justice Hayut:

 

The right to a minimal dignified human existence is a social right that is included with the most important rights. As Justice Zmir wrote in HCJ Kuntram, it is imperative that no person is hungry so that they may enjoy, effectively and not only theoretical, their human rights.

 

Justice Rubinstein:

 

Miminal existence is the essence of the Income Guarantee Act. It represents a proper social approach whereby the public provides a safety net for every person in Israel lest they fall into poverty and hunger. This approach is deeply rooted in generations of Jewish tradition, and the State of Israel – as a Jewish and democratic state – would not be able to properly realize its values in the absence of establishing such a safety net.

 

Indeed, section 9A(c) details the exceptions designed to soften the relevant absolute presumption. But still – when viewing the cases in the petitions at hand, where people at the most harsh socioeconomic circumstances and where the use of a vehicle does not at all raise them into a position of a minimal dignified existence – it clearly seem they must be entitled to the safety net and revoking their income guarantee is disproportional to the extent that warrants intervention.

 

And it should be noted, the Court does not by any means come to say that keeping a vehicle shall not be a factor in assessing entitlement. The Court’s position is to ensure a minimal dignified existence through individual assessments, and we are concerned with a situation where there may be an inherent possibility for such assessment.

 

Even when we are concerned with social and economical rights, there is no place to diminish the stage of constitutional examination as to the balances of setting the scope of the right itself. As was the position of President Barak in the past, considering the public interest must be done within the framework of the requirements of the Limitations Clause. In our case, the public interest was found to be lacking.

 

Finally, Jewish law is saturated with duties of charity, and this is also of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, as noted. This gives further force to the reasoning behind this decision.

 

Justice Joubran:

 

The right to a minimal dignified existence is a paramount right and it is the cornerstone to one’s right to dignity, at times even more compared to all other rights. It is known that poverty and distress create a vicious cycle from which it is difficult to come out. This is a reality that elicits a sense of isolation and a distance and suffocates hope for a change. Without minimal conditions one cannot exercise their liberty. Without minimal living conditions they cannot conduct completely autonomous and full life and they cannot become a contributing member of their society and their community. Therefore, this reality, of poverty and distress, is often tied to other gaps that divide society and lead to the development of resentment and hostility between those who have plenty and those who have not the most basic needs.

 

 

The violation of the right to minimal dignified existence in this case, which results from the absolute presumption established by the Act, compels one to choose between holding a vehicle or using it – even if these do not necessarily indicate that one has sources of income which one has not reported – and receiving the benefit. This infringement is particularly severe in cases where the vehicle serves its owner or user for basic daily needs that are not detailed in the Act’s exceptions. There are many regions around the country where it is impossible to access the grocery store, medical services or educational institutions without a car. In this context, it should be noted, that although a vehicle is not necessarily a basic good that is included in the right to a minimal dignified existence, this right should be considered as imposing a duty upon the state to provide some form of transportation to its residents. This duty, which is the positive aspect of the right to freedom of movement, places a particularly heavy burden where the state wishes to revoke the ability to use a vehicle from residents who have no other form of transportation. Revoking the ability to use a vehicle in such areas is an extremely severe violation.

 

The section is unconstitutional because it does not meet the test of the least restrictive means. The burden to show that the legislative purpose is realized to a lesser degree were the alternative mechanism be adopted was not met by the Respondents. Having said this, even were the costs of particular assessments to increase, such increase is not expected to be very significant. This because in any event within the current mechanism the state operates a system of personal investigation in order to ensure the lack of use of a vehicle, whose costs are not insignificant. In any case, the Respondents have not even met their burden to demonstrate that the alternative means would realize the legislative purpose with significantly higher costs. Nor does the section pass the narrow proportionality test. The mechanism of income guarantee is one of the last assistance mechanisms in Israel for any person who cannot support themselves. We should exercise double and triple caution where one is denied this mechanism. The harm caused by a person fraudulently receiving a benefit to which they are not entitled is exceedingly smaller than the harm caused by leaving a person without minimal living conditions. 

Voting Justices: 
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majority opinion
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Full text of the opinion: 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

 

HCJ 10662/04

HCJ 3282/05

HCJ 7804/05

 

Before:

The honorable President D. Beinisch

 

The honorable Justice M. Naor

 

The honorable Justice E. Arbel

 

The honorable Justice E. Rubinstein

 

The honorable Justice S. Joubran

 

The honorable Justice E. Hayut

 

The honorable Justice U. Fogelman

 

 

 

Petitioners in HCJ 10662/04:

1. Salah Hassan

 

2. Sawt el-Amel/The Laborer’s Voice – Defending the Rights of Workers and Unemployed

 

3. Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

 

 

Petitioners in HCJ 3282/05:

1. Meirav Ben-Nun

 

2. Yael Be’er Salaman

 

3. Chen Hazan-Gilboa

 

4. Sigalit Bakar

 

5. Avigayil Avihu

 

6.  Mechuyavut -- Commitment to Peace and Social Justice

 

7. Itach – Women Lawyers for Social Justice

 

 

Petitioners in HCJ 7804/05:

Idit Edan

 

 

v.

 

Respondents in HCJ 10662/04:

1. National Insurance Institute

2. Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor

 

 

Respondents in HCJ 3282/05:

1. National Insurance Institute

2. Minister of Social Affairs

 

 

Respondents in HCJ 7804/05:

1. National Labor Court

2. National Insurance Institute

 

 

 

 

Petitions to grant an order nisi

 

Date of hearing:

11 Heshvan 5772

(November 8, 2011)

 

On behalf of the Petitioners in HCJ 10662/04

Sawsan Zahr, attorney at law

 

 

 

On behalf of the Petitioners in HCJ 3282/05

Keren Shemesh Perlmutter, attorney at law; Netta Ziv, attorney at law

 

 

On behalf of the Petitioners in HCJ 7804/05

Eduardo Wasser, attorney at law

 

 

On behalf of the Respondents in HCJ 10662/04, HCJ 3282/05 and HCJ 7804/05

Chani Ofek, attorney at law; Orna Rosen-Amir, attorney at law; Carmit Naor, attorney at law

 

 

Judgment

 

President D. Beinisch:

 

Preface

1.          The petitions before us deal with the policy of the National Insurance Institute, under which the ownership or use of a vehicle precludes eligibility for an income support benefit. Initially, the petitions were directed against the entire gamut of arrangements that reflected that policy, as they were in effect in 2004, when the first petition was filed (HCJ 10662/04). After an order nisi was granted in the original petitions, the Income Support Law, 5741-1980 (hereinafter: the Income Support Law or the Law) was amended and the policy that was challenged in the petitions was established in section 9A of the Law. Following that development, the Petitioners requested leave to amend their petitions, challenge the constitutionality of section 9A of the Income Support Law. The main claim made in the petitions is that section 9A (b) establishes a conclusive presumption that anyone who owns or uses a vehicle is deemed to have an income the size of the benefit and, therefore, he is not eligible for an income support benefit. This presumption, by virtue of which the benefit is denied, is alleged in the petition to be an unconstitutional violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence.

 

The Petitioners

 

2.          The Petitioner in HCJ 10662/04 is married and the father of five children. The Petitioner has received an income support benefit since October 2001. The Petitioner submitted an application to the National Insurance Institute (hereinafter: the NII) to approve his use of a vehicle for the purpose of transporting his blind daughter without having to forfeit his income support benefit, to which he was entitled at that time. His request was refused because the Petitioner did not prove a medical need of the type that would enable him to possess a vehicle under the Law, while receiving an income support benefit. The petitioner was joined by Sawt el-Amel/The Laborer’s Voice and Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (hereinafter: Adalah), which also represented the Petitioners in this petition.

 

3.          The Petitioners in HCJ 3282/05 are five single-parent women, who, due to the provisions in section 9A of the Income Support Law concerning the ownership or use of a vehicle and, prior to that, the parallel provision in the National Insurance Regulations, were denied the income support benefit. For that reason, Petitioners 1-3 were required to repay the amounts they had received as a benefit from the National Insurance, the claim for the benefit by Petitioner 4 was denied and monies were deducted from the benefit of Petitioner 5. The Petitioners were joined by Mechuyavut -- Commitment to Peace and Social Justice and Itach – Women Lawyers for Social Justice (hereinafter: Itach), which also represented the Petitioners in this petition. The Petitioner in HCJ 7804/05 was also a single-parent at the time the petition was filed, and her income support benefit was canceled when it was learned that she maintains a joint household with her ex-husband and makes frequent use of his vehicle.

4.          Each one of the women Petitioners before us has a harsh and complex life story. All are single-parents who were shouldering the burden of supporting and caring for small children at the time the petition was filed. Some of the Petitioners earned their livelihoods by working in jobs for meager pay and others had no livelihood at all and subsisted from the income support benefit and/or solely from child support payments. In their petition, the Petitioners claimed that the use of a vehicle enabled them to go to work and, for some of them, even lowered the cost of travel compared with public transportation. Petitioner 1, a single-parent of two who has a hearing handicap, required a vehicle for the purpose of caring for her children and for transporting the equipment she requires for her work. She alleges that the cancellation of the income support that she received from the NII led her to give up the vehicle in her possession and to stop working. However, when it came to light afterwards that she uses her parents' vehicle about three times a month, her income support benefit was canceled altogether, which left her and her children to live solely from child support payments and the child allowance totaling NIS 1,841 per month. At the time the petition was filed, Petitioner 2 lived in a remote town without any public transportation, and she required a vehicle to obtain basic services of food, health and education for her son, who suffers from a chronic disease. Over the years she had worked and received income support pursuant to the Income Support Law. When it came to light that she was regularly using a vehicle owned by her mother, her benefit was canceled retroactively and her debt to the NII was set at NIS 114,000. Petitioner 3 also required a vehicle due to lack of frequent public transportation to her place of residence. During the period of time in which she required the income support benefit, the business she owned failed, she divorced her husband and was caring for a-year-old baby. Her benefit was also canceled when it came to light that she was using her ex-husband's vehicle. The decision to cancel her benefit ultimately compelled her to move her place of residence to a central location where she could manage without the use of the vehicle. With regard to Petitioner 4, it was alleged that travel on public transportation required her to change four bus lines on every trip to her workplace and to take her child – who, at the relevant time, was a year old infant – along with her. The Petitioner's claim for the income support benefit was denied because of the vehicle that was placed at her disposal by her family, who financed most of the expenses. Petitioner 5 also required a vehicle to reach her workplace – various prisons in the north of the country, which are not accessible by public transportation. As long as she used her father's vehicle, and due to the father's medical disability, her income support benefit was not canceled. After her father sold his vehicle, and the Petitioner began to use the vehicle of one of her acquaintances, her income support benefit was canceled. Cancellation of the benefit compelled her to quit her job and submit a claim for a full income support benefit. That claim was approved and Petitioner 5 received an income support benefit for a period of time until she no longer needed it.

 

5.          The petitioner in HCJ 7804/05 was divorced and the mother of a little girl at the time the petition was filed. Her income support benefit was canceled after the NII came to the conclusion that she was running a joint household with her ex-husband (which, in itself, does not negate eligibility for an income support benefit, but requires examination of the eligibility of such a nuclear family) and, accordingly, the debt to the NII was said at about NIS 17,000. Afterwards, it transpired that the Petitioner also made frequent use of her ex-husband's vehicle and the Regional Labor Court ruled that even though there was not enough evidence of the existence of a joint household, the Petitioner should be denied the benefit due to the use of a vehicle. The National Labor Court agreed with the conclusions of the Regional Labor Court regarding the use of the vehicle, but added, above and beyond the necessity, that the gamut of evidence indicated the existence of a joint household (NII Appeal 300/03 Idit Idan– National Insurance Institute (unpublished, March 15, 2005)). In the petition, the Petitioner challenged the arrangement established in the law and requested that we vacate the judgment of the National Labor Court.

 

The normative basis

             Before we discuss the main claims raised by the parties in the petitions before us, we will describe the normative basis required for the matter.

 

The purposes of the Income Support Law

6.          The Income Support Law, which establishes the arrangement that is attacked in the petitions, was enacted in 1980. Its intricate provisions create the last safety net available to residents of the state who suffer privation. The main purpose of the law is to support residents of the state who find themselves in a situation in which they cannot obtain their basic needs. As established in the explanations to the Income Support Bill, "The purpose of the proposed law is to ensure every person and family in Israel, who are unable to provide themselves with the income required for subsistence, of the resources to obtain their basic needs" (Bill 1417 of September 30, 1979, 5740, at p. 2 (hereinafter the Income SupportIncome Support Bill); see also Abraham Doron and Johnny Gal “The Income Support System in Israel in a Comparative International Perspective," 58 Social Security 5, 5-6 (2000) (hereinafter: Doron and Gal); for details on all the welfare systems available to the needy population, see Ruth Ben Israel, Social Security, at 898-899 (2006) (hereinafter: Ben Israel)). That support is implemented by means of a differential benefit that is adapted to the age and family status of the applicant. Beginning in 2006, the benefit has been derived from a basic amount that is updated each year in accordance with the rate of the rise in the economy’s Consumer Price Index, which enables it to be updated and adapted according to the economic situation and the cost of living in Israel (see the definition of "the basic amount" in section 1 of the Income Support Law, and the benefit rates established in the second addendum to the Law. In the past, it was updated according to the average salary in the economy – see section 1 of the Law; Ben Israel, at p. 872).

 

7.          The basic presumption inherent in the Law is that the best way to achieve and ensure a minimum dignified subsistence is by working. This presumption reflects two complementary aspects of the Law: first, an assurance income benefit is given only to someone who is not capable of supporting himself on his own. The nature of the benefit, by definition, is residual: it is only given to a resident of the country who does not receive sufficient income from working, a pension or another source of income, and does not have sufficient resources to cover his basic subsistence (Income Support Bill at pp. 2-3). Second, the supplementary aspect of providing alternative income to an individual is to prevent a situation in which that income becomes, in itself, an incentive not to work. The purpose of the benefit is to provide the individual with subsistence during the intermediate period in which he finds himself without resources, but not to prevent him from reentering the job market. To the contrary – the state wants to encourage its residents to work, and not to remain needy and dependent on public support for a lengthy period of time. The Law therefore strives to ensure that the benefit will be a temporary – and not a permanent – alternative to working (cf.: Doron and Gal, at pp. 8, 23-24; Arieh Lieb Miller “Income Support Laws in Israel Compared with the Law in West Germany, Labor Law Yearbook A91, 92-93 (1989); Ben Israel, at pp. 843-845). It should be noted that along with the income support benefit, which is designed to help those who cannot support themselves, the Income Support Law also enables the provision of an income supplement benefit, which is designed to help individuals who have succeeded in finding jobs, but whose pay is low and is not sufficient for basic subsistence.

 

8.          The two main tests that establish a person's eligibility are derived from these principles: the income test and the employment test. The income test, which is the focal point of the petitions before us, delineates rules for quantifying and estimating the income of the benefit applicant. Its purpose is to examine whether the applicant has sufficient income to cover his basic subsistence needs, or he requires the benefit. The rules for examining different incomes, quantifying them and considering them in the decision on granting the benefit are established in Chapter D of the Law and the Income Support Regulations, 5742-1982 (Ben Israel, at pp. 872-874; National Labor Court Hearing 43/04-162 Haviv Dahan– National Insurance Institute, Labor Court Judgments 15 351 (1984)). The employment test makes eligibility for the benefit contingent upon the applicant's making every possible effort to find work that provides income, which exceeds the amount of the benefit (and, in the language of the Law, he has maximized his earning power). Therefore, the applicant must be lacking in sufficient work or be unfit for work (pursuant to a list of exemptions set forth in section 2 (a) of the Law and in the First Addendum): and if he is able to work, he must be willing to accept any work offered to him by the Employment Service that is compatible with the state of his health and physical fitness (Ben Israel, at 880; National Insurance Appeal 232/99, Idit Uri v. National Insurance Institute, Labor Court Judgments 38 157, 163-168 (2002); hearing no. 41/91-3 Ahias Meir – Employment Service, Labor Court Judgments 13 61 1981)). Therefore, the purpose of the employment test is double: it ascertains that the benefit applicant is, indeed, in need of assistance from the state and is not choosing a life of willful unemployment and, concomitantly, it refers the individual to obtaining assistance by finding work, thereby improving his chances of extracting himself from the cycle of poverty and advancing toward self-fulfillment and becoming self-supporting. The employment test therefore gives expression to the second purpose of the law, whereby state support of the individual is intended to be a temporary arrangement, by virtue of, and after which, the individual can recover and stand on his own two feet.

 

9.          In addition to these two substantive tests, the Law also specifies conditions of residency and age. The residency condition focuses on the boundaries of the social safety net for residents of the state who hold residency status for at least two consecutive years. The age condition limits the benefit to residents over 25 years of age, on the assumption that at a younger age, the person can usually support himself or he is still dependent on others – mainly members of his family – and, therefore, he should not be deemed as someone who requires support from the state. Alongside this rule, exceptions were established that also enable the benefit to be granted to someone who is below the threshold age. By their nature, those exceptions were designed to provide a response to situations in which the circumstances of the applicant’s life attest to the fact that he is incapable of supporting himself, notwithstanding his youth.

 

The ramifications of ownership or use of a vehicle for entitlement to the benefit

 

10.        Based on the purposes of the Income Support Law, the provisions of the law that were enacted establish the significance of ownership or use of a vehicle with regard to eligibility for the benefit. The main chapter dealing with the benefit and its rate is Chapter C of the Income Support Law. Section 5 (B) in Chapter C of the Law states:

Rate of

the benefit

The benefit for an eligible person who has an income shall be an amount equal to the difference between the benefit to which he would have been entitled under subsections (A) or (E) if not for the income, and the income.

 

This section reflects that the income test is conducted individually for each benefit applicant, in order to assess his eligibility for the benefit and the rate of the benefit that he will receive, if he is found to be eligible. "Income," for the purpose of calculating eligibility for the benefit and the amount of the benefit, is defined in Chapter D of the Law, in sections 9 – 12 (B). These sections enumerate a long series of data that must be taken into account when determining the income of a benefit applicant. Among these data, for example, the applicant's direct income is examined – including, e.g., other pensions paid to him, maintenance payments or payments made to someone undergoing vocational training, and "indirect" payments, such as income from property. Chapter D also enumerates income that will not be taken into account in the income test, among them, for example, the child allowance and grants to discharged soldiers. 

 

Among the provisions listed in Chapter D of the Law, the relevant provision to the matter at hand is set forth in section 9 (A) (5) as follows:

 

Income

9 (A). In this Law,

“Income” means income from sources set forth in section 2 of the Ordinance [the Income Tax Ordinance – D.B.], even if it was not generated, produced or received in Israel, including…

 

(5) Amounts that shall be deemed income from property that is a vehicle as stated in section 9A

(emphasis added – D.B.).

 

             Section 9(A)(5) therefore shows that in calculating the income of the benefit applicant, income from property that is a vehicle must also be taken into account. It should be emphasized that the Petitioners before us are not attacking the constitutionality of section 9(A)(5), i.e., the actual determination that a vehicle can be taken into consideration in determining a person's income. Their claims focus on the concrete arrangement determined in this matter in section 9A, which specifies the situations in which a vehicle will be deemed property from which monthly income is generated and the significance of this income on the rights to the benefit. The following is stated in section 9A(a) and 9A (b):

Special provisions in the matter of property that is a motor vehicle

9A. (a) In this section, "vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in section 1 of the Transportation Ordinance that is owned by the claimant or used by the claimant or his child who is with him, except for a motorcycle.

 

(b) In the matter of this Law, subject to the provisions of subsection (c), a vehicle is deemed property from which monthly income is generated in an amount that is no less than the amount of the benefit that would have been paid to the claimant if not for the provisions of this subsection.

(emphasis added – D.B.)

 

The insertion of the sections – section 5(b) and sections 9A (a)and 9A (b) – leads to the conclusion that anyone who owns or uses a vehicle is not eligible for an income support benefit, as his “income” from the vehicle is deemed equivalent to the amount of the benefit that would have been paid to him if he did not own or use a vehicle. The meaning, therefore, is that the benefit applicant is deemed to have an income that is above the income threshold that entitles him to the income support benefit and, therefore, as someone who does not need the assistance of the state. It should be noted that at the start of adjudication of the petitions before us, section 9A (b) did not contain the connection of use of a vehicle even though, de facto, the NII interpreted section 9A as also precluding the regular use of a vehicle. The section was amended in 2007, during adjudication of the petitions, and this interpretation was established in the Law, so that now, both ownership and use of a vehicle are deemed a presumption that precludes granting the income support benefit.

 

11.        Section 9A (c) continues and establishes a series of exceptions for which the income support benefit will not be denied to someone who owns or uses a vehicle. This section was also amended during adjudication of the petitions before us, so the range of exceptions set forth therein was expanded. Prior to the amendment, the exceptions focused on cases in which the vehicle is required by the benefit applicant for medical reasons. In 2007, two more exceptions were added to the Law (sections 9A (c) 6 and 9A (c) 7)), which enable payment of the income supplement benefit under certain conditions, even to someone who is working and using a vehicle, or to someone whose earnings ceased a short time before the time for which the benefit is claimed. Section 9A (c), which enumerates the exceptions to the rule of ownership or use of vehicle, states as follows:

9A. (c) A vehicle shall not be deemed property from which income is generated if one of the following conditions is fulfilled –

 

(1) (deleted)

 

(2) The claimant or a member of the claimant's family requires the vehicle for the purpose of medical treatment provided outside their home, pursuant to a prearranged treatment program or at least 6 times a month for a period of time exceeding 90 consecutive days, all pursuant to the rules and conditions established by the minister; in this matter, "family member" means someone whom the claimant drives to medical treatment, as stated in this section, who is the claimant's spouse, son, daughter or parent, provided that the family member as stated does not have an additional vehicle.

 

(3) The claimant, his spouse or child is disabled in his legs and receives payments from the state treasury for maintaining the vehicle and, with regard to someone who does not receive payments as stated – a qualified doctor, as defined pursuant to the provisions of section 208 of the Insurance Law, determined that he requires transportation due to his being disabled as stated, pursuant to the rules, conditions and the period of time determined by the minister.

 

(4) The child of the claimant is paid an allowance pursuant to the provisions of Part 6 of Chapter 9 in the Insurance Law.

 

(5) The vehicle registration was deposited with the authority authorized to issue that same registration, and as long as the registration is deposited, one of the following conditions is fulfilled:

 

    (a) The claimant is not capable of working at any job whatsoever due to illness, provided that the period of time in which the vehicle shall be deemed property from which no income is derived as stated in subsection (b) does not exceed six months from the date on which he submitted a claim for the benefit.

 

    (b) The vehicle is a tractor as stated in the Transportation Regulations, 5721-1961, provided that the tractor is not in use and the claimant has a farm that is not operational.

 

(6) The claimant has a monthly income from the sources set forth in section 2 (1) or (2) of the Ordinance [the Income Tax Ordinance – D.B.], in an amount that exceeds 25% of the average salary, and if he or his spouse have reached retirement age – in an amount that exceeds 17% of the average salary, the claimant does not have an additional vehicle and the vehicle meets one of the following conditions:

 

     (a) The engine volume does not exceed 1300 cc and in the month for which the benefit is paid, seven or more years have passed since its year of production.

 

     (b) The engine volume does not exceed 1600 cc and in the month for which the benefit is paid, twelve or more years have passed since its year of production.

 

(7) The claimant does not have a monthly income from the sources set forth in section 2(1) or (2) of the Ordinance [the Income Tax Ordinance – D.B.], or his income as stated is less than the amounts at the beginning of paragraph (6), provided that all the following conditions are fulfilled:

 

     (a) In the month for which the benefit is paid or the two months preceding it, the claimant was dismissed from his job; in this matter, “dismissed” includes resignation under circumstances that would entitle him to unemployment pay for the first 90 days from the date of termination of the job, pursuant to the provisions of section 166 (b) of the Insurance Law.

 

     (b) In the month for which the benefit is paid, the claimant does not have an additional vehicle, and his vehicle fulfills the provisions of paragraph 6(a) or (b).

 

     (c) In the ten months preceding the month in which the claimant was dismissed, the claimant was paid a benefit under this Law and the claimant fulfilled the conditions set forth in paragraph (6).

 

              Therefore, the meaning that emerges from all the aforementioned sections is that a benefit applicant who owns or uses a vehicle, and whose situation is not included in one of the exceptions, is not entitled to receive an income support benefit.

 

              The constitutionality of that arrangement is the issue to be decided in the petitions before us.

 

The Petitioners' arguments

 

12.         The Petitioners in HCJ 10662/04, the Petitioners in HCJ 3282/05 and the Petitioners in HCJ 7804/05 (hereinafter, for the sake of convenience, we will term all of them together: the Petitioners) submitted their arguments separately, but the petitions were heard together. Even though not all the Petitioners challenged the same aspect of the Law, there is a series of pivotal arguments that is common to all of them and we will focus on those below.

 

13.         The main argument that arose in the pleadings of the Petitioners is that section 9A (b) of the Income Support Law establishes a conclusive presumption that denies the benefit to someone who owns or uses a vehicle. According to the argument, this presumption violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, since it denies a person’s' right to an income support benefit even if, under the circumstances of his life, the user’s ownership of a vehicle does not attest to the fact that he possesses the means for a minimum dignified subsistence. The categorical denial, it was argued, prevents examination of whether the user’s ownership of a vehicle attests to an exceptional standard of living, and it applies whether the use or ownership entail only small expenses, or they are required for a minimum dignified subsistence. The Petitioners point out that such a need may arise due to illness, residence in a remote area with no public transportation connection, or due to a desire to go to work. It was further argued that the violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis increased in cases of denial of the benefit because the income support benefit lies at the core of the protection of human dignity. Therefore, when analyzing the violation of the right, it was argued that the lack of the benefit should not be balanced against other means that the state provides or may provide to its citizens, since other government support is not stable like the income support benefit and, in some cases, is also not established in law. The Petitioners in the three petitions did not argue that the ownership or use of vehicle is a vital component of a minimum dignified subsistence, but they did argue that the use of a vehicle can help them to lead normal lives: to appear at the employment bureaus, to search for new jobs, to access medical treatment, and to maintain social lives. The Petitioners in HCJ 10662/04 (who are represented by Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), added that for the Arab recipients of the benefit, who constitute 26% of all the benefit recipients, the use of public transportation cannot serve as an alternative to the use of a vehicle, since most of the Arab villages have no regular and frequent public transportation at all.

 

14.         Another argument made in the petitions, particularly in HCJ 7804/05, is that the legislature did not address the question of what constitutes "use" of a vehicle, for which the income support benefit will be denied – even though it is now expressly established       in section 9A (a) of the Law. According to the arguments, the tests that were formulated in the rulings of the Labor Court greatly expanded the definition of the use so that, in fact, any use of a vehicle leads to denial of the benefit, even if it is not equivalent to the use made by an owner. It was further argued that the exceptions that were added to the Law in 2007 do not mitigate the violation of the right, for several reasons: first, because they are relevant to only a small number of needy people who earn at least 1,850 shekels a month (an amount equivalent to 25% of the average salary in the economy, as stated in the exceptions) and possess an old vehicle. Second, many benefit applicants utilize a vehicle that belongs to family members or acquaintances, and they cannot affect its value. Third, there are many groups that are not working at all but the use of a vehicle is still vital to running their own lives and fulfilling their parental duties. Finally, many benefit applicants, primarily women, do not hold permanent jobs and, therefore, their income varies from month to month in a manner that does not enable them to regularly rely on the existence of the exception. For all these reasons, the Petitioners argue that the exceptions added to the Law do not resolve the problem arising from the fact that a conclusive presumption has been established in the Law which denies receipt of the benefit.

 

15.         We will note that a dispute arose between the Petitioners and the Respondents on the question of the constitutional review that should be implemented in this case. According to the Respondents – whose position will be described in detail below – the mechanism of judicial review of the violation of social rights and the conditions of eligibility for social rights should be limited, and it should be separated from the judicial review of the constitutionality of civil and political rights. The Petitioners, particularly the petitioners in HCJ 3282/05, opposed the constitutional analysis model proposed by the Respondents. They argue that the proposed model – which endeavors to focus the constitutional examination on the stage of determining whether a right has been violated – does not allow for effective judicial review of laws that violate the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. Moreover, the Petitioners conceded the Respondents' detailed argument, whereby the interest protected by the Law should be defined as the interest of preventing a life of existential deprivation only in regard to those persons who find themselves in that condition because of reasons beyond their control, but they argue that that last  component of duress should not be added to the definition of the right itself. In their opinion, the requirement of duress must be examined as part of the examination of the purpose of the legislation and the proportionality of the violation, while an examination of the circumstances under which a person finds himself in a state of existential deprivation and an examination of the existence of the conditions justifying his extraction from that deprivation, must be made, only after it has been proven that the person is suffering from existential deprivation and that his right not to live in such a manner has been violated. The Petitioners further argued that since the examination of whether the benefit applicant suffers from existential deprivation because of reasons beyond his control is founded on a factual system that is based on various eligibility tests, which include, inter alia, an examination of the family's situation, the requirement to maximize earning power and to conduct a detailed test of income – there is also a practical logic in conducting it at this stage of examining compliance with the tests in the limitations clause, and not at the stage of determining violation of the right. To this the Petitioners added that the position whereby a condition of duress must be read into the definition of the right to a minimum dignified subsistencereflects the outlook whereby people choose a life of poverty and that the individual has a scope of autonomy in choosing his economic status. Such a position, it was argued, ignores the fact that people's economic situation is also derived from the social status into which they were born and to their ethnic, religious and sectoral affiliation. It was argued that emphasizing the individual's scope of choice in circumstances where his ability to choose is limited undermines the state’s obligation to adopt arrangements that narrow the social gaps.

 

16.         With regard to the conditions of the limitations clause, the Petitioners focus their arguments on the conditions of proportionality. With regard to the first subtest, it was argued that there is no rational connection between the use or ownership of a vehicle and the purpose of the law, since no income – even conceptual – could be generated from the use they made of the vehicle. The Petitioners pointed out the fact that from a factual standpoint, the family support that was given to the benefit applicant by placing a vehicle at her disposal several times a week cannot, for the most part, be converted into a monetary payment, and that such assistance is equivalent to the assistance provided by the family in minding and caring for the children – assistance that is given by means of existing personal and family capital. It was further argued that the fact that a conclusive presumption from which there could be no deviations had been established for a basic matter such as a subsistence benefit, is contrary to the natural rules of justice and, hence, is not proportional.

 

17.         The Petitioners further argued that the second subtest, the test of the means with the lesser violation, does not exist in this matter either. The main argument that was made in this matter is that with a conclusive presumption that cannot be refuted and from which there can be no deviations, the legislature should have chosen a means that allows for the assessment of the economic value of the use of a vehicle and deduction of that value from the amount of the monthly benefit. The Petitioner in HCJ 7804/05 emphasized that a person who works and receives a vehicle from his employer is entitled to deduct the value of the benefit generated by the vehicle pursuant to the rate for deducting the benefit in accordance with the income tax regulations, while someone who uses a vehicle that he did not receive from his employer, even if such use is required for his work, is denied that benefit completely. The Petitioners further argued that the law does not comply with the third test of proportionality either. They  argue that the Respondents' insistence on quantifying the family assistance given to the benefit applicants constitutes a negative incentive for family members to help one another, and attests to the state's shirking its responsibilities vis-à-vis the individuals. Additionally, the savings and efficiency attained by the sweeping denial of the benefit do not match the damage caused by denial of the benefit from those who need it for a minimum dignified subsistence.

 

18.         It should be noted that the Petitioners in HCJ 10662/04 chose to focus their petition on the claim of discrimination, whereby Amendment 28 to the Income Support Law, in which two exceptions that are set forth in sections 9A(c)6 and 9A(c)7 of the Law were added, discriminate between recipients of the Income support benefit and the income supplement benefit. This is because these sections enable recipients of the income supplement benefit, under the conditions set forth therein, to possess a vehicle without losing their benefit, and do not allow for a similar arrangement for recipients of the income support benefit. The Petitioners argue that this arrangement discriminates in an arbitrary and comprehensive manner between recipients of the income support benefit and recipients of the income supplement benefit, and violates the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence, and the right to property by recipients of the income support benefit. This discrimination, it was argued, is not for a proper purpose. The Petitioners are not protesting the concrete arrangements set forth in these sections but, rather, are asking to apply it, mutatis mutandis, to the group of income support recipients as well.

 

The Respondents’ arguments

 

19.         The Respondents focused their responses and the affidavit in response on the question of whether section 9A (b) of the Law does, indeed, violate the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. According to the Respondents, section 9A (b) embodies the "pure" socioeconomic policy of the legislature. This policy, it was argued, is not given to judicial review because it establishes a series of social rights that have not reached the status of basic rights. Only a narrow and very limited part of this policy is covered by the constitutional right to dignity in the sense of the right to not live a life of existential deprivation caused by duress and, according to the Respondents, the current case does not fall within the boundaries of the right at all.

 

20.         The Respondents argue that a distinction should be made between the constitutional analysis in a claim of violation of a civil right and the constitutional analysis in a claim of violation of a socioeconomic right, in two main ways. First, the scope of the constitutional right should be limited and the interest protected by law should be narrowly defined as the interest of preventing a life of existential deprivation caused by duress. Second, the Respondents believe that the constitutional examination should be focused on the first stage and the question of whether the protected right has been violated at all should be examined. They argue that the importance of focusing on the stage of the violation is designed to delineate the boundaries of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, and to ascertain that the judicial review is applied only to the core of the right, and not to its marginal parts, to which an economic policy can be applied that is not subject to constitutional judicial review. Accordingly, it was argued, the Court must examine only the existence of the rational connection between the conditions of the eligibility (i.e., the ownership or use of a vehicle) and the interest protected by the Law. This test is a test of relevancy – i.e., it is sufficient that there is some connection of relevancy (absence of arbitrariness) between the protected interest and the means for constitutional review so that the Law will stand the test of constitutionality. According to the Respondents, focusing on the first stage of the constitutional examination (i.e., at the stage of the violation) "does not render the constitutional analysis superfluous but, rather, moves the substantive tests that are implemented in the second stage, to the first stage of determining the existence of the violation" (affidavit in response on behalf of the Respondents, dated November 12, 2009, at p. 8).

 

21. As to the essence of the Petitioners' arguments, the Respondents argue that the rationale underlying denial of the benefit from someone who owns or uses a vehicle is the high cost and the significant expenses entailed in maintaining a vehicle. According to the Respondents, calculations of the monthly cost of maintaining a vehicle, based on the statistical models, indicate that the monthly expense is very close to the amount of the average benefit and, therefore, justifies denying eligibility for the benefit. This rationale encompasses the presumption, pointed out by the Respondents, that it is highly possible that the vehicle’s maintenance expenses are funded from the benefit recipient’s independent income, which he did not report to the National Insurance Institute at the time his eligibility for the benefit was examined. Hence, it was argued, since the income test is the main test for examining eligibility for the benefit, denying the benefit is justified where there is a basis for assuming that the benefit applicant has unreported sources of income. According to the Respondents, this rationale is also valid in cases in which the vehicle is not owned by the benefit applicant and another person pays for the ongoing expenses of maintaining the vehicle. In such a situation, they argue, the benefit applicant should be deemed to have been given the amount of the vehicle's value and the amount of the value of the vehicle's use by the vehicle's owner. The Respondents emphasize that in many cases, the vehicle is made available by family members, who are obligated under Israeli law to care for members of their family. Therefore, it was argued, we should not encourage a reality in which the public treasury finances the existential needs of a person, thereby enabling others to finance needs that are not of an existential nature.

 

22.         From the standpoint of the right to dignity, which is the main right under examination, according to the Respondents, the interpretive model for extending the scope of the right to dignity is the model of existential deprivation caused by duress. According to that model, the constitutional obligation of the state arises only where a danger is created that a person will be forced, because of reasons beyond his control, to live in existential deprivation. When an individual can be required to make a proper change from a normative standpoint, a range of choices opens up before him, which negates the assumption that he is forced to live in a state of existential deprivation. This interpretive model ascribes a limited and narrow meaning to the right to not be forced to live in existential deprivation, which relies, according to the argument, on the fact that that right is derived from the right to human dignity.

 

The questions that must be decided

 

23.         The petitions before us raise the constitutional question of the arrangement established in section 9A(B) of the Law. The main question to be decided by us is whether this arrangement – which means a universal denial of the right to the income support benefit for anyone who owns or uses a vehicle (and whose case does not fall within the realm of one of the exceptions set forth in the Law) – violates a constitutional right. If we find ourselves responding to this question in the affirmative, we must further examine whether that violation fulfills the requirements of the limitations clause and, therefore, constitutes a permitted violation. This pivotal question raises a series of "derivative" questions, which are also required for the decision. These encompass the question of the scope of the violated right, which is the right to a minimum dignified subsistence(or, by its other names: the right to minimal subsistence conditions or the right not to live in existential deprivation), and the question of the connection between it and the right to dignity. In the wake of the position presented by the Respondents, the question also arises as to what judicial review model should be applied in examining the constitutionality of a law that is alleged to violate social rights, and if, as argued by the Respondents, a different constitutional model should be adopted with regard to the violation of social rights. These are the questions that we will deal with first.

 

The stages of judicial review

 

24.        Since the enactment of the new Basic Laws in 1992, the generally accepted constitutional examination in our legal system is divided into three main stages (see, among many others: HCJ 6821/93, United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, IsrSC 49 (4) 221 (1995) (hereinafter: the Mizrahi Bank Case); HCJ 1715/97, Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 51 (4) 367 (1997); HCJ 6055/95, Tzemah v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 53 (5) 241 (1999); HCJ 4769/95, Menahem v. Minister of Transport, IsrSC 57 (1) 235 (2002) (hereinafter: the Menahem Case); HCJ 1661/05, Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset, IsrSC 59 (2) 481 (2005) (hereinafter: the Gaza Coast Case); HCJ 6427/02, Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset, IsrSC 61 (1) 619 (2006) (hereinafter: the Movement for Quality Government Case). In the initial stage, the question of violation is examined, during which the Court examines whether the relevant law violates a right or rights that are established in the Basic Laws. If the answer to this is negative, the constitutional examination comes to an end (see, e.g., the analysis of the question of violation of the right to dignity in HCJ 366/03, Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 60 (3) 464 (2005) (hereinafter: the Commitment Society Case). If the answer is affirmative, meaning that the existence of a violation has been proved, the constitutional analysis proceeds to the second stage: examining the constitutionality of the violation.

 

             A constitutional examination of the violation of the basic right is conducted by applying the requirements established in the limitations clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. A violation that fulfills the requirements of the limitations clause is a permitted violation of basic rights. Such a permitted violation reflects the concept that basic rights are not absolute and, under certain conditions, may be violated (see, e.g., the Mizrahi Bank Case, at 433; Gaza Coast Case, at 545). A constitutional violation of the basic right concludes the stages of constitutional review and the law is declared to be constitutional. If it is found that a law violates a basic right in a way that does not fulfill the requirements of the limitations clause, the third stage commences, which is the stage of determining the remedy. In this stage, the Court determines the result of the unconstitutional law (see, e.g., HCJ 7505/98, Corinaldi v. Israel Bar Association, IsrSC 53 (1) 153, 162-163 (1999); Criminal Appeal 586/94, Azor Sports Center Ltd. v. State of Israel, IsrSC 55 (2) 112, 133-134 (2001)).

 

             As noted by President A. Barak in the Movement for Quality Government Case: “This division into three stages is important. It is of assistance in the legal analysis. It is intended ‘to clarify the analysis and focus the thinking’... It clarifies the basic distinction, which runs like a golden thread throughout human rights law, between the scope of the right and the degree of protection afforded to it and its de facto realization” (id., 670). This division into stages laid the foundations for a uniform judicial review of violation of all of the rights encompassed by the Basic Laws which, as a result, achieved a constitutional, supra-legal status. This division circumscribed the boundaries of constitutional discourse, as part of the limitations imposed by the establishing authority on the legislative authority’s use of its power to violate rights set forth in the Basic Laws. This division also created the analytical basis for a distinction between the conceptual scope of constitutional rights and the scope of the protection given to them by the limitations clause. In fact, given the many years that have elapsed and the large number of judgments dealing with constitutional analysis, it can be stated that this division has become a basic axiom of constitutional law in Israel.

 

25.        Nonetheless, the Respondents have devoted most of their energies to establishing the argument for adopting a different method of constitutional analysis for examining the petitions before us – a method of analysis that is affected by the fact that the right scrutinized by the constitutional examination is the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. Their main argument is that the judicial review of legislation alleged to violate that right should be limited, compared with the judicial review exercised for other rights, so that the examination would focus solely on the first stage – the examination of violation of the right. At the same time, the Respondents argue that considerations taken from the second stage of constitutional review should be “imported” into the first stage of the examination. In other words, the Respondents think it appropriate to make use of some of the tests in the limitations clause, even at the stage of examining the violation of the right.

 

             Several reasons for this argument were cited. First, the Respondents argue that the restricted format in which the right to exist with dignity has been recognized in our legal system – a minimum dignified subsistence – requires the application of stricter criteria than usual in examining the violation of a right, and that the Court should reduce the transition to the second stage of the constitutional examination. Second, the Respondents argue that the methodology used for the constitutional analysis of socioeconomic rights should be different from that used by the Court to examine other basic rights, because legislation that deals with allocating resources for socioeconomic issues does not usually involve constitutional aspects, while, on the other hand, it reflects determinations that concern pure policy. As such, the Court, as a general rule, should reduce the exercise of judicial review in legislation that affects the right to minimal conditions of existence, in contrast to other basic rights. Both of these reasons should be rejected.

 

The distinction between civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights

 

26.        First we will examine the Respondents' argument that a different constitutional model should be applied when we examine a social, or economic right, in contrast to a civil or political right. This argument requires us to address the nature of the rights and the historical background that led to the current development with regard to the status of the social rights.

 

             It is customary to classify the historical development of human rights into two "generations" of rights. The first generation encompasses human rights that are called "civil-political" and the second generation encompasses human rights that are called  "socioeconomic." At the heart of the first generation rights, which developed at the time of popular uprisings for democratization at the end of the 18th century, was the desire to limit the power of government. Accordingly, these rights are characterized by the fact that the obligation of the government facing them is “negative” in nature and proclaims that the government must not impair the life of the individual, interfere in his actions, or restrict his liberty. In the second generation, the social concept developed, whereby rights that impose “positive” obligations on the government to care for the individual, to protect him against violations of his rights by others and to promote his welfare must also be recognized (Yuval Shany, "Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law," Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Israel, 297, 302-304 (edited by Yoram Rabin and Yuval Shany, 2004) (hereinafter the book will be termed: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Israel and the article will be termed: Shany); Guy Mundlak, "Socioeconomic Rights in the New Constitutional Discourse: From Social Right to the Social Dimension of Human Rights" (Yearbook of Labor Law 7, 65, 93 (1999) (hereinafter: Mundlak), Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of Human Rights, 80 AJIL 1 (1986). A kind of "intergenerational struggle" developed between the two generations of rights, over the priority to be given to each one of the generations in national and international law. In international law, this issue found expression in the splitting of the international human rights covenant into two separate covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (hereinafter: the Covenant on Social Rights). The two covenants were ratified by Israel in 1991.

 

27.        Behind the concept that there is competition between social rights and political rights, is the supposition that the two types of rights are inherently different from one another and are exercised at the expense of one another. One of the arguments akin to the arguments made by the Respondents in the petitions before us is that while social rights impose an "affirmative" obligation on the state, the political and civil rights impose a "prohibitive" obligation. The former, so the argument goes, must be limited in their implementation because they require the allocation of state resources, which ultimately come from the pockets and property of the state's citizens. In practice, a natural limitation applies to the exercise of those rights because they are always dependent upon the resources available to the government and their implementation is connected to allocation of the state's resources (see, e.g., HCJ 3071/05 Gila Louzon v. Government of Israel (not yet published, July 28, 2008) (hereinafter: the Louzon Case); and Ruth Gabizon “On Relations Between Civil-Political Rights and Socioeconomic Rights" in: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Israel 23, 42 (hereinafter: Gabizon); Shany at p. 304)).

 

28.        Even though that is the traditional approach, it is not the only approach. Over the years, critical voices have been increasingly heard to the effect that the dichotomous classification of social rights as "positive" and political rights as "negative" is far from reflecting the practice of exercising human rights and that every human right actually has positive and negative aspects alike (C. Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty? 2  Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 211, 215, 221, 228-229 (1985); S. Holmes and C.R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, 35, 39, 44-48 (1999)). Thus, "defending civil-political rights may entail the imposition of positive obligations and public expenses no less than those required to protect socioeconomic rights, and handling socioeconomic interests may only require refraining from interfering." (Gabizon at p. 42-44; see also Aharon Barak, Preface, in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Israel 5, 7). Take, for example, the right to life, which heads the list of civil and political rights in the Covenant on Political Rights. In order to preserve human life, the state is required "to implement actions” at the broadest scope: for that purpose military forces are established to protect the lives of the citizens from outside threats; for that purpose, police forces are established to protect the lives of the citizens from crime and the undermining of the social fabric; for that purpose the state is required to restrain its power and act with caution – and the means of caution cost a great deal of money in themselves. Similarly, the right of a person not to be discriminated against and not to be treated with prejudice also requires the allocation of considerable resources at times. Sometimes the right to equality is only of a negative nature but many times it imposes a positive obligation on the state to rectify discriminatory wrongs in the society and make facilities, services and public functions fully accessible to all members of the population (HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 49 (4) 94 (1995); HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v. Maccabim-Reut Local Council, IsrSC 50 (1) 19 (1996)). This is also the case with regard to other classic civil-political rights, such as the right of expression. For the purpose of exercising the right, the state is required to protect anyone who says things that are not to the public's liking and maybe attacked or threatened because of his words. Therefore, the police are required, as a matter of course, to allocate public resources for the purpose of safeguarding protests and marches and for the purpose of protecting the freedom of expression of public personages and political figures. This is also the case when the state itself has not prohibited expressing opinions, nor has it intervened or interfered with their expression (see in this context: HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Southern District Police Commander, IsrSC 38 (2) 393 (1984); HCJ 2557/05 Majority Camp v. Israel police (not yet published, December 12, 2006)). The most prominent example of the political right that requires the state to allocate resources might be the right to vote and to be elected, in which enormous resources are invested, from the actual holding of elections every few years to the resources required to ensure the accessibility for every person to exercise his right to vote (see, e.g., Gabizon, at p. 42). Therefore, these examples attest to the fact that even when the state itself is willing to fulfill its part and to refrain from action, it may still be obligated to take action to protect the exercise of civil and political rights. With that in mind and according to the accepted outlook today, there is no basis for distinguishing clearly and unequivocally between social rights and political rights based on the positive or negative obligations of the state or based on the question of allocating resources. The ostensible gaps between the rights are mainly the result of historical evolution and not of real differences between the rights themselves. Indeed, "affirmative" and "prohibitive" alongside one another are integral parts of the protection of human rights, whatever their nature may be.

 

29.        Moreover, insofar as there is a certain distinction between civil-political rights and social rights – if only in the scope of the positive obligations that is generally imposed on the state in each one of the groups of rights – the question still remains as to whether that justifies deviating from the constitutional review model that was established among us more than two decades ago? In my opinion, the answer to that is negative. There are several reasons for that conclusion.

 

             First, we must remember that precisely in the context of the right to dignity that lies at the heart of the petitions before us, the constitutional obligation imposed on the legislature is an expressly positive obligation, in accordance with section 4 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which establishes that "All persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity" (for the two aspects of the right to human dignity, see the Commitment Society Case at p. 749 and also below). Against the obligation is the right, and alongside it is the judicial remedy, and those are not subject, in the Basic Law, to a constitutional examination that differs from the one given to the other rights established therein. Therefore, the distinction that the Respondents wish to make has no basis in the internal structure of the Basic Law.

 

             Second, it seems that the Respondents' arguments rely in principle on the claim that exercising the right to a minimum dignified subsistencerequires the allocation of resources that may "overflow" into areas which, in essence, are a policy decision that is not given to judicial review. But this reason also does not justify the application of a different model of judicial review of social rights. It is a well-known rule that the Court will not intervene in questions of pure policy, but it would be proper to examine the constitutionality of various actions, even if they have, or might have, budgetary ramifications. No one disputes the fact that the exercise of many rights entails budgets available to the state and the manner of their allocation. This is certainly the case with regard to the exercise of social rights (See the Louzon Case, paras 10-11 of my judgment). In effect, even the Covenant on Social Rights establishes that the state is not exempt from implementing the measures that are essential for exercising those rights, but it recognizes the fact that the state's ability to promote those rights depends on the resources at its disposal (see section 2 (1) and section 11 of the Covenant on Social Rights). Indeed, the positive protection of human rights – civil, political or social – tends, as a rule, to require ongoing sources of funding which may, by nature, be limited by, and dependent on, the financial situation of the state and the scope of the resources at its disposal (see: Barak Medina, The State's Duties to Provide Basic Needs: From a “Discourse of Rights” to a “Public Finance Theory” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Israel 131; see also section 2 (1) of Covenant on Social Rights). But in a legal system in which the relativism of human rights is preserved, as in our system, the place for arguments about budgetary constraints and conflicting interests is generally in the second stage of the constitutional examination, which examines the purpose of the violation of the right and its proportionality. That stage provides a broad platform for justifying a violation of the right for reasons of lack of budgetary resources, and those considerations should not be transferred to the first stage of examining the essence of violation of the right.

 

             Third, accepting the Respondents' position may lead to the application of a different constitutional model with regard to two violations of exactly the same right. The right to human dignity is a prominent example of that because of the many facets of that right. "The right to human dignity," noted President A. Barak “… constitutes a collection of rights that need to be protected in order that dignity may exist…These rights are likely to be included within the framework of  “civil” (or “political”) rights, and even within the framework of “social” (or “economic”) rights (the Commitment Society Caseat p. 481). Indeed, the right to dignity encompasses a variety of rights. Some of them are derived from it and some of them express the basic meaning of the term "human dignity." In our legal system, the right to equality, under certain conditions, has been declared an integral part of the right to human dignity, as has the right to family life (see: the Movement for Quality Government Case; HCJ 7052/03 Adalah – Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior, IsrSC 61 (2) 202 (2006); hereinafter: the Adalah Case). Alongside those rights, the right to a minimum dignified subsistencehas been recognized. Can some legal basis be found for the argument that a violation of one aspect of human dignity will lead to the application of one model of judicial review, and a violation of another aspect of human dignity will lead to another model of judicial review? Clearly, the answer to that is negative. Such selective application is inconsistent and has no part in the prima facie distinction between the rights, in the language of the basic laws, or in the tradition of constitutional law in our legal system.

 

30.        I also cannot accept the additional argument made by the Respondents that the narrow scope of the right to a minimum dignified subsistencejustifies narrowing the constitutional analysis to the first stage – the stage of the violation. First, the "safety belt" that is required, according to the Respondents, to prevent a situation in which the constitutional protection will be broadened and will be "stretched" to cover rights that are not established in the Basic Laws, exists in the narrow definition of the right. There is no theoretical reason to apply different and stricter rules of analysis to the right, which, in any case, is narrowly defined. Second, this argument – insofar as it is designed to indicate the difficulty of lifting the burden of the violation of a right that is narrowly defined – states the obvious. In any case, when a court exercises judicial review on legislation, at the first stage the burden of proving the fact that the law violates the right rests with the petitioners (see, e.g., the Commitment Society Case, at p. 484, 491-492; the Movement for Quality Government Case, at p. 671-672) and there should be no transition to the second stage of examination if no violation of the right has been found. Moreover, adopting the Respondents' approach means passing the burden of proof to the Petitioners almost completely. If we accept their approach, the Petitioners would have to prove both the violation of the right and the relevancy of the means that were chosen in the legislation. However, the burden of proving the relevancy or, in other words, the rational connection test, is generally that of the Respondents as part of the customary division of the burden in constitutional law. Changing the rules of the constitutional examination in the case before us means releasing the Respondents from the need to prove the constitutionality of the means that were chosen by them.

 

31.        The argument made between the lines by the Respondents, to the effect that the ambiguity of the social rights makes it difficult to pinpoint their violation and, therefore, justifies the application of stricter tests in the first stage of the constitutional review, should also be rejected. Like the arguments pertaining to the distinction between "positive" and "negative" aspects or between "affirmative" and "prohibitive" obligations, the arguments about ambiguity that are ascribed precisely to social rights should also be rejected. Ambiguity is not a problem reserved only for social rights (and it is doubtful whether the argument in itself is accurate: for developments in the concretization of the social rights in international law, see Shany, at p. 321-325). This court has struggled more than once with the issue of the scope and boundaries of political and civil human rights. Does freedom of expression also spread its protection over pornographic expression? Does affirmative action constitute a violation of equality or does it express a relevant distinction? What are the boundaries of the right to privacy in the workplace (see, e.g., HCJ 5432/03 SHIN, Israeli Movement for Equal Representation of Women, and 11 others v. Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting, IsrSC 58 (3) 65, 79, 82 (2004); HCJ 454/94 Israel Women's Lobby v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 58 (5) 501 (1994); Labor Court Appeal 90/08 Inbar – State of Israel – Supervisor of the Employment of Women Law (not yet published, February 8, 2011)). These are but a few examples of the inherent difficulty of examining the scope of rights of all kinds. The theoretical difficulty is basically interpretive. It does not pertain to the distinction between civil rights and social rights but, rather to the distinction between the essence of the right and its marginal aspects. The more the violation pertains to issues at the core of the right, the easier it is to discern the violation and the protection of the right will be expanded, and vice versa when we are dealing with the marginal aspects of the right. Pinpointing the "geometric location" of the violation of the right is in the purview of the court as an interpretive action, whether the matter involves civil rights or social rights.

 

             Indeed, decisions on the scope and boundaries of social human rights are sometimes complex and since they are new rights in our legal system they have not yet been given sufficient legal interpretation in this Court. Even the academic and legal discourse on social rights developed at a slower pace and there are many reasons for that, but this is not the place to discuss them. The ambiguity will, therefore, be removed as the Court addresses the interpretation of the social rights. Indeed, in the words of Prof. Guy Mundlak, “The problem is one of cause and effect. The more social rights are pushed outside the walls of judicial forums due to their inferiority and due to the problem of ambiguity, the more the ambiguity of their meaning will increase. The best way to clarify the ambiguity is by a judicial confrontation with the meaning embedded in those rights. This is not an unknown type of judicial task. It is hard to imagine private law in Israel without ambiguous terms that have been clarified comprehensively in case law, such as reasonableness, good faith and negligence” (Mundlak, at p. 99).

 

             Therefore, the very fact that we are dealing with the right to dignity, which encompasses the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, does not justify applying a different judicial model for constitutional review. We will therefore turn to analysis of the alleged violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, in an orderly manner.

 

Violation of the right

32.        In the first stage of the constitutional examination that is customary in our legal system, as stated, we must examine whether section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law violates the right to dignity and, in its framework, the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. The answer to that question requires us to interpret and determine the scope of the constitutional right to dignity in the context adjudicated by us and the provision that allegedly violates that right. We will begin, therefore, with the interpretation of the right to dignity; we will move on to interpretation of the provisions of section 9A(b); and, finally, we will examine the relationship between the right to dignity and the Income Support Law, and its ramifications for analysis of the violation of the right.

 

On human dignity and the right to a minimum dignified subsistence

33.        The right to human dignity is established in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter: the Basic Law). The Basic Law establishes, as stated, both the prohibition on violating the right to dignity and the obligation to protect it:

Purpose

1.A

The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

Preservation of life, body and dignity

2.

There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.

 

 

Protection of life, body and dignity

4.

All persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity.

 

 

Application

11.

All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law.

 

             A person’s right to dignity under the Law is a right with two facets: a negative facet, which proclaims that violation of the right must be prevented, and a positive facet, which imposes an obligation on the government authorities to protect the right. In the words of President A. Barak, "The two aspects, the negative (passive) aspect and the positive (active) aspect are different parts of the whole, which is the constitutional right to dignity. They both derive from the interpretation of the right to dignity, as enshrined in the Basic Law. Neither aspect takes precedence over the other” (the Commitment Society Case, at p.749).

 

34.        A series of judgments has already established that human dignity, in the constitutional sense, also encompasses and includes the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. This Court held that human dignity includes the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, both in cases that raised the negative aspects of the right and in cases that raised the positive aspects of the right (cf.: HCJ 161/94 Atari v. State of Israel (unpublished, March 1, 1994); Leave for CA 4905/98 Yosef Gamzu v. Na’ama Yishayahu IsrSC 55 (3) 360, 375-376 (2001); Leave for CA 5368/01 Pinchas Yehuda v. Attorney Yosef Teshuva, Receiver, IsrSC 58 (1) 214 (2003); HCJ 4128/02 Adam, Teva Va-Din – Israel Union for Environmental Defense v. Prime Minister of Israel, et al., IsrSC 58 (3) 503, 518 (2004); HCJ 5578/02 Rachel  Manor et al. v. Minister of Finance et al., IsrSC 59 (1) 729, 736 (2004) (hereinafter: the Manor Case) Administrative Petition Appeal 3829/04 Yisrael Twito, Chairman, Mikol Halev Association v. Jerusalem Municipality, IsrSC 59 (4) 769, 779 (2004); HCJ 1384/04 BetZedek Association – American-Israeli Center for Promoting Justice in Israel. Minister of Interior (unpublished, March 14, 2005); HCJ 4634/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. Minister of Internal Security, paragraph 12 of the decision of Justice A. Procaccia (not yet published, February 12, 2007); the Commitment Society Case, at p. 482-484). Indeed, the extension of human dignity to the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis now understood and this position has already been established in our case law (see: A. Barak, Legal Interpretation – Constitutional Interpretation, 423 (1994) (hereinafter: Barak, Constitutional Interpretation): "Human dignity assumes a minimum of human subsistence… This concept is shared by all models with regard to human dignity").

 

35.        The right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis at the heart and core of human dignity. A life of starvation and homelessness and a constant search for help are not a life of dignity. A minimum dignified subsistenceis a condition not only for preserving and protecting human dignity, but also for exercising other human rights. There is nothing poetic about living in poverty and deprivation. Without minimal material conditions, a person cannot create, aspire, make his own choices and exercise his liberties. In the fine words of Justice Y. Zamir, “Human rights must not be just for those who have enough. Every person must have enough, so that he or she can enjoy human rights, in actuality and not just by law." (HCJ 164/97 Conterm Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance, Customs and VAT Division, et al., IsrSC 52 (1) 289, 340 (1998); and see also Gabizon at p. 45: "A person who struggles to attain minimal subsistence conditions does not have the real freedom to strive to achieve any goals").

 

36.        In their arguments, the Respondents claimed that the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis a right derived from the right to human dignity and, as such, it does not enjoy the scope of protection given to the right to human dignity as a right that is expressly enumerated in the Basic Law. I believe that the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceshould not be deemed a right that is derived from the right to human dignity but, rather, should be viewed as a right that constitutes a genuine expression of human dignity. The right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis not, as argued by the Respondents, a right that expands the content and scope of the constitutional right to dignity but, rather, it is rooted very deeply in the core of the constitutional right to dignity (see the analogy used by Judith Karp: "The value ‘human dignity’ can be viewed as being surrounded by circles of content. As though the legislature had cast the ‘human dignity’ stone into the smooth waters of the lake of the Basic Law, and when it touched the water it created ever-widening circles that strike one another on their margins and are filled by one another, and each circle is the result of another, and they flow into one another and move away from their source until they fade away.” Judith Karp, "Questions on Human Dignity According to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,” Mishpatim 25 129, 136 (1995); see also Hillel Sommer, The Non-Enumerated Rights: on the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution, Mishpatim25 257, 329-330 (5757)). Can the right to dignity exist without respecting a person's right to minimal conditions of human subsistence? Doesn’t a person’s right to not live in hunger, without a home and without the ability to cover himself with clothing express his human dignity? Indeed, among the many meanings that can be given to the concept "human dignity," particularly when emphasis is placed on the word "human," the most fundamental of them is the one pertaining to the unique dignity of man, to the most essential conditions of his survival. If we have defined the fundamentals of the right to dignity metaphorically, as reliant on the fact that man was created in God’s image, it appears that that image is harmed, first and foremost, if he is reduced to abject, humiliating poverty.

 

What is the connection between the Income Support Law and the right to a minimum dignified subsistence?

 

37.        What is the connection between the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceand the Income Support Law, whose purposes and structure we discussed above? As I noted above, the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis inherent in the core of human dignity. The obligation of the government authorities is-à-vis the right is twofold, as indicated in sections 2 and 4 of the Basic Law, which state that they must preserve it from violation and ensure that it is protected. This obligation can be fulfilled in many ways. It is implemented by a variety of means, systems and arrangements in Israeli law – all closely connected to the resources available to the state and the manner in which they are allocated. Protection of the right is woven into the welfare legislation like a golden thread, inter alia, by providing state health insurance to every resident, free education, and providing public housing to the needy under certain conditions. The income support benefit provided under the Law is only one of the mechanisms that ensure protection of a person's right to a minimum dignified subsistence, however, it has a pivotal position in protecting the right. As an income-replacing benefit, it is designed to enable those who are eligible to receive it to procure what they need for their basic and minimal subsistence. In the absence of another means, such as purchase coupons or direct supply of vital commodities, it has no substitute. The importance of this is so great that I doubt whether it does not have ramifications for the protection and preservation of other human rights, such as the right to life (see: Yosef Katan, The Problem of Poverty: Causes, Components and Coping Mechanisms, Review of Professional Literature 7, 11-12, 45, 75 (2002); Lia Levin, A "coalition of exclusion": Non take-up of social security benefits among people living in extreme poverty. Access to social justice in Israel,225, 225 [sic] (2009)).

 

38.        In view of the network of welfare mechanisms available in Israel and the relative place of the Income Support Law in those mechanisms, it can be established that the Income Support Law is designed to complete the protection of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence(cf.: the words of President A. Barak in the Commitment Society Case, at p. 483-484). The law is designed to ensure the residents of Israel with the minimum resources they require to satisfy their vital needs when they are unable to do so themselves. The purpose of the law is, therefore, to ensure a minimum dignified subsistence. There is no debate about this purpose among the Respondents and the Petitioners. While the Income Support Law is not the only means utilized by the state for exercising the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, it is one of the main means for protecting it. The importance of the income support benefit in ensuring a minimum dignified subsistenceis the basic reference point for deciding the petition before us.

 

Does section 9A(b) violate the constitutional right to a minimum dignified susbsistence?

 

39.        Section 9A(b) relies on the test established in section 9A(5) of the Law, whereby a vehicle is property that must be calculated in the income test of a person applying for a benefit. This income, by its nature, is not considered income in the regular sense of the word, because it does not refer to income such as income generated from work or from income-yielding property. Income from a vehicle is conceptual income. It is based precisely on the concept of the expense that is required for the purpose of maintaining and using a vehicle and that expense is calculated as though it was part of the income of the benefit applicant – under the presumption that the person must have sufficient income to finance the expense.

 

However, section 9A(b) establishes a fiction. The fiction lies in the incontrovertible presumption that the amount of income "produced" from the vehicle is equal to at least the amount of the benefit. The meaning of this is clear: the very ownership or use of a vehicle is sufficient to lead to denial of the benefit. In such a case, the benefit applicant is held to be someone whose income attests to the fact that he does not require the safety net provided by the state.

 

40.        The question asked in the petitions before us is whether this arrangement violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. The answer to that is affirmative. The arrangement violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistencebecause it establishes a categorical rule whereby anyone who owns or uses a vehicle will not be eligible for the income support benefit, with no connection to the individual question of whether that same person does, indeed, have income in an amount that will ensure his ability to exercise his right to a minimum dignified subsistence. Hence, it is clear that when the income support benefit is denied to someone who needs it for the purpose of minimal subsistence, the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis violated.

 

41.        No one disputes the fact that ownership of a vehicle or use of a vehicle may help in estimating a person's income. The Petitioners did not dispute the assertion in the Law that a vehicle is property from which income is generated, and justifiably so. A vehicle is, indeed, a possible means for estimating income. Accordingly, the ownership or use of the vehicle has a certain economic significance, which can be estimated and quantified for the purpose of including it in the test of a person's income. The problem that lies in the conclusive presumption is not actually the need for ownership or use of a vehicle as a component in estimating a person's income but, rather, in the fact that it becomes the only component in determining the estimated income. The ownership or use of a vehicle – because they are held to be income of at least the same amount as the benefit – obviate the need to examine a person's economic state more thoroughly. The meaning is, therefore, that ownership or use of a vehicle become threshold conditions for eligibility for the benefit. That threshold condition is unequivocal and incontrovertible. It is sufficient to prove ownership of a vehicle or regular use of another person's vehicle in order to deny the benefit.

 

42.        This result violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistencefor all the benefit applicants who, in actuality, do not have sufficient income for minimal subsistence. That is the situation, for example, in cases in which the benefit applicant does not have a vehicle of his own but makes some use of the vehicle of another person – a relative or acquaintance. In such a situation, for the most part, the benefit applicant does not bear the regular payments for maintaining the vehicle (such as payment of the insurance and vehicle registration), nor does he enjoy the potential income that exists by the very ownership of a vehicle. Where a person also uses the vehicle of another person and, at most, pays for token gasoline expenses, what is the justification for ascribing to him the whole gamut of costs borne by the owner of the vehicle? According to the Respondents, even in a case of use of a vehicle, those users should be deemed to have been given the value of the ownership in money. That claim is dubious, in my opinion. After all, it cannot be said that the possibility given to a person of using a vehicle that is owned by another attests necessarily to the fact that the vehicle owner has the ability to assist the benefit recipient in other ways. More than once, a person will enable another person to make use of property (including a vehicle) in their possession because, at that time, he does not need it for his own purposes, even if he is unable to give the other person direct assistance – financial or otherwise. In a situation in which a person makes use of the vehicle of a relative or acquaintance when they do not need it, without the vehicle being placed at his disposal for him to use on a regular basis, we cannot conclude that those who assist him necessarily possess the means to give that person alternative income equivalent in value to the vehicle, with its various expenses. At most, the family assistance can be deemed to be equivalent in value to income in the amount of the value of the actual use made of the vehicle which, in itself, may be significantly less than the value of the minimum income.

 

             As such, it emerges that the provisions of section 9A(b) of the Law may lead to denying the benefits to individuals who need it and do not have alternative source of income, nor the ability to obtain such sources from others. The fact that section 9A(b) of the Law ostensibly enables any use of a vehicle to deny eligibility for the benefit – and the National Labor court judgment interpreted this to mean that using a vehicle only twice a week will also lead to that result – strengthens that apprehension.

 

43.        The situation of the petitioners in HCJ3282/05 demonstrates the problem with the conclusive presumption and the violation that it causes. Most of the Petitioners did not own vehicles but made use of a vehicle that was made available to them by relatives or friends. Petitioner 1, for example, was denied the benefit after it was proven that she used her father's vehicle three times a month, and no more. After cancellation of the benefit, the Petitioner was left to support herself on NIS 1,800 a month from child support and child allowances. The benefit of Petitioner 2 was canceled after it transpired that she made regular use of a vehicle owned by her mother, notwithstanding the fact that she lived in a remote town without any public transportation. No effort was made to quantify the value of her use of the vehicle, in order to examine whether she was, indeed, given assistance in the amount of the benefit. Petitioner 3 was forced to move to another place of residence so that she would not have to make use of a vehicle, and only then was she found eligible for the benefit. All the Petitioners argued that they did not have alternative sources of income and they did not bear the expenses of maintaining the vehicle, except for extremely limited gasoline expenses.

 

             Among them all, it seems that the case of Petitioner 5 demonstrates, more than anything, the main difficulty inherent in the conclusive presumption and the negative results that its implementation may generate. Petitioner 5 worked for her livelihood and was found eligible for the income supplement benefit because her income from work was not sufficient. She used the vehicle to reach her job in various prisons in the North that are not accessible by public transportation. As long as she used her father's vehicle, her benefit was not canceled because of her father's disability. When her father sold his vehicle, one of her acquaintances enabled her to use his vehicle and this led to cancellation of the benefit. As a result, she was forced to resign from her job and submitted an application for a full income support benefit (instead of the income supplement that she had received beforehand). The result of canceling the benefit that was paid to Petitioner 5 was, therefore, not only a blow to her ability to stand on her own two feet, but also a violation of one of the purposes of the Income Support Law ­– encouraging people to go out to work.

 

44.        In the nature of things, we must assume that the aforementioned violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistencedoes not extend to all the benefit applicants. Indeed, there may be benefit applicants who have sufficient income to supply their own basic needs and, therefore, canceling the benefit as a result of the conclusive presumption does not harm their ability to live with dignity. However, it can harm anyone to whom the aforementioned presumption does not apply and the use of a vehicle does not prove that he is not in need of income support. As a result, the conclusive presumption established in section 9A(b) violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistencewith regard to some of the benefit applicants, even if it does not violate the rights of all of them. This is a real and significant violation. Considering the pivotal place of the income support benefit in the network of welfare mechanisms in Israel, denying the benefit means denying the last safety net for those who need it the most.

 

45.        This harsh result is exacerbated by the fact that the conclusive presumption established in section 9A(b) is contrary to the customary manner of examining eligibility for an income support benefit in Israel – by means of an individual examination that is conducted for each and every benefit applicant, the purpose of which is to assess the extent of their need for the benefit. As part of the individual test, the NII examines, inter alia, the age of the benefit applicant, his income, his assets and the various payments made to him by the state. In the individual examination, the family unit to which the benefit applicant belongs is also examined and NII representatives examine the applicant's ability and desire to integrate into the job market. All these are designed to present the NII with a detailed picture that is as accurate as possible regarding the applicant's status, to ensure that the benefit is given to those who really need it. To enable the NII to stay abreast of the situation, section 20 of the Law also instructs the benefit applicants and recipients to notify the NII in writing within three days of any change that occurs in their family status and income, and any other change that might affect their eligibility for the benefit or the rate of the benefit.

 

             However, contrary to the individual examination of a person's income, the presumption set forth in section 9A(b) creates a categorical rule whereby the ownership or use of a vehicle is equivalent to income in the amount of the benefit. Irrespective of a person's actual income, from the moment it is proven that he owns or uses a vehicle, the NII deems him someone who has a sufficiently high income and, therefore, he does not require assistance. In practice, the ownership or use of a vehicle obviate the need for the other income tests established in the Law, and there is no real need for an individual examination of the benefit applicant and for examining his true economic ability, because, in any case, the same fiction that is inherent in section 9A(b) cannot be refuted by it.

 

             It is important to clarify that in our decision, that section 9A(b) of the Law violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, we did not address the definition of what a minimum dignified subsistenceis, what it includes, or what it should include. The starting point for our discussion is that the state has an obligation to determine what the minimum subsistence conditions are, and to establish the welfare system accordingly (see, in this context, the judgment of the German constitutional court BVERFG, A7: 1BVL 1/09, 1BVL 3/09, 1 BVL 4/09 from 09.02.2010. For an abstract of the judgment in English, seehttp://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg10-005en.html). For the purpose of this discussion, we assume that that is, indeed, what was done for the purpose of determining the overall welfare system provided by the state, which also includes the Income Support Law, based on that determination. We therefore assume that the entire gamut of welfare arrangements provided in Israel supplies the "package" required for a minimum dignified subsistence. Within the "package" of welfare services, the income support benefit plays a pivotal role. Without it, and without other sources of income, the needy cannot attend to the most basic conditions of subsistence and, as such, its denial leads immediately to violation of their right to a minimum dignified subsistenceas part of their right to human dignity.

 

47.        It is also important to explain that this conclusion of ours is not meant to determine that a vehicle cannot serve as an estimation of income, and the Petitioners did not dispute the legislature's determination that a vehicle should be deemed property from which income is generated. This conclusion should also not indicate that ownership or use of a vehicle constitutes a condition for a minimum dignified subsistence. However, it should be recognized that a vehicle, under certain circumstances, is not a luxury and can help in the search for work and in getting to the workplace. This is particularly true in places in which public transportation is undeveloped. The violation created by the law does not lie in the concept of the vehicle as property for which the cost of the benefit from the ownership or use can be quantified. The violation occurs as a result of the conclusive presumption set forth in the Law, whereby any case of ownership or use is viewed as though the owner or user of the vehicle has income at a level that removes him from the circle eligibility for the benefit. Such a presumption ignores the individual data of each and every case, and ultimately leads to denial of the benefit without distinction, even from someone who, without having received it, could not have attained a minimum dignified subsistence. The result is, therefore, that section 9A(b) violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence.

 

The argument of duress

 

48.        Before we go on to examine the compliance with section 9A(b), I think it proper to address one of the main points made by the Respondents in the written and oral arguments. When discussing the interpretation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, the Respondents argued extensively that another element should be read into the right, and that is the element of duress. In their opinion, the state's constitutional obligation to provide the safety net in the Income Support Law arises only when there is a danger that the person will be forced, because of reasons beyond his control, to live in existential deprivation. They argue that that situation obtains as long as there is no mode of action that the individual can take, which would prevent his reaching existential deprivation. In contrast, when a life of existential deprivation is the result of choice – a choice which, from a normative standpoint, would be advisable to demand that the individual implement – the state's constitutional obligation does not apply and, in any case, the right to a minimum dignified subsistencehas not been violated.

 

49.                   According to the argument, the need to examine the question of whether the individual was forced to live in existential deprivation or he had the option of making another choice is based on the narrow scope of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, and it rests on three main elements: first, as a policy based on just distribution between the general public and all those receiving support, due to the fact that provision of the benefit entails taking from the public, it is appropriate to reduce the scope of the constitutional obligation. Second, a policy that promotes just distribution internally among those receiving support, requires releasing the state from the need to support those who can take care of themselves. Third, as a matter of policy, the Income Support Law aspires to increase participation in the job market. Hence, the right to benefit from the last safety net will be available only to someone who is forced to live in existential deprivation, i.e., someone who, even with reasonable diligence, cannot integrate into the job market.

 

According to the Respondents, the ownership or use of a vehicle are expressions of the range of choice available to the Petitioners in the petitions before us. According to the argument, each and every one of the petitioners – and anyone else in a similar situation – has the option of choosing between ownership or use of a vehicle (which would lead to denial of the benefit) and forgoing ownership or use of a vehicle (which would result in receiving the benefit). Therefore, anyone who, of his own free will, chose to maintain ownership of a vehicle or to continue to use the vehicle of another, cannot be said to have been forced to live in existential deprivation and, as such, the state is not obligated to provide him with the last safety net. This argument is based on the presumption inherent in the law – which we addressed above – whereby ownership or use of a vehicle has economic value that is estimated to be at least equivalent to the value of the benefit.

 

50.        The argument of duress appears, at first glance, to be captivating, but a closer look shows that there is no connection between the argument and the Petitions before us. Indeed, no one disputes that the state should only be obligated vis-à-vis someone who does not choose on his own to live in existential deprivation. This argument in itself was not at all disputed by the parties to the petitions before us. The Petitioners, like the Respondents, believe that the state is only obligated to distribute its resources to those in a state of existential deprivation by force and not by choice. But they objected to the inclusion of the duress requirement as part of the definition of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence.

 

51.        The requirement of duress is also accepted, in one form or another, in international law and, as argued by the Respondents, also in some of the countries that have established the right to a minimum dignified subsistencein their constitutions.

 

             For example, in interpretive comment 12 to the Covenant on Social Rights, paragraph 15 states that "Whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States shall have the obligation to fulfill (provide) that right directly." (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, Right to adequate food (Art. 11), U.N. Doc. E/C/12/1999/5 (1999), at paragraph 15 (the first emphasis was added, the second emphasis was in the original, D.B.)). Even though the requirement of duress or "for reasons beyond their control" appears to be justified on a theoretical level, on a practical level the distinction between choice and lack of choice is not at all simple. The question of what constitutes circumstances that are the result of free choice and circumstances that are the result of duress and constraint is often complex. Where is the boundary between free choice and social structure? After all, the possibilities of choice are affected, inter alia, by the environment in which the person grew up – his family, economic and social status. This raises the question, which was also recognized by the Respondents, of how to identify the choices that should be decided in the autonomous sphere of the individual. These are complicated questions. They raise problems of various types, and they are not easy to decide. However, they do not arise in the matter before us because in the choice offered to the benefit applicants by the Respondents– vehicle or benefit – they do not attest to the existence or nonexistence of the element of duress. As we explained in detail above, according to the Respondents, and in accordance with the provisions of the Income Support Law, a vehicle serves as an estimation of income of at least the amount of the benefit. This means that the ownership or use of a vehicle proves that the benefit applicant has income in the amount of the benefit. As such, that benefit applicant is not eligible for the benefit because he cannot satisfy the income test set forth in the law, i.e., he is deemed to be someone whose income is higher than the threshold entitling him to the benefit. In that state of affairs, what is the advantage in the requirement of choice, which ostensibly serves to prove the existence or nonexistence of duress? If the conclusive presumption (the problematic nature of which we addressed above) is correct, and a person has income in the amount of the benefit, what is the difference if he chooses a vehicle or he chooses to do without it? Either way, he will not be found eligible for the benefit because of the income test. And if the conclusive presumption is incorrect, i.e., the existence of a vehicle is not sufficient to estimate a person's income and is insufficient to attest to his neediness, then what is its relevance in determining eligibility for the benefit? Why is it used at all in the income test? The purpose is not to prohibit men and women from driving a vehicle. If that is the case, why force a person to make the choice and give up the use of a vehicle if the vehicle does not prove his neediness? Hence, the question of coercion in itself is not up for discussion in the petitions before us.

 

Does the violation of the right meet the conditions of the limitations clause?

 

52.        Once we found that the provisions of section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law violate the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence, we are compelled to examine whether the violation is lawful. That examination is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in the limitations clause in section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which states as follows:

 

Violation of rights       8. There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose and to an extent no greater than is required, or by law as stated, by virtue of express authorization in such a law .

 

             The provisions of the limitations clause express our constitutional concept, whereby human rights are relative and no human right is absolute. Therefore, the legislature may, under certain conditions, violate constitutional rights. These rights are set forth in the limitations clause and express the balance in our constitutional law, between the constitutional rights of the individual and the needs, interests or rights that may justify the violation of those rights.

 

53.        Four cumulative conditions are specified in the limitations clause to examine the constitutionality of a norm that violates a human right, which is protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The first condition is that violation of the constitutional right is implemented under law or by virtue of express authorization in a law. The second condition is that the violating the law befit the values of the State of Israel. In that context, the intention is to the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in accordance with the Purpose clause set forth in section 1A of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (see HCJ 5026/04 Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd. v. Director of Sabbath Work Permits Department, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, IsrSC 60 (1) 38, 53 (2005)). The third condition specified in the limitations clause is that a violation of a constitutional right must be for a proper purpose. The fourth condition is that the violation must be to an extent no greater than required. If one of those four cumulative conditions is not fulfilled, it means that the violation of the protected constitutional right is unlawful and the piece of legislation that establishes the violation of the right is unconstitutional. We will therefore turn to examining whether the violation of the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence, which is caused by the provisions of section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law, meets the conditions of the limitations clause.

 

54.        With regard to the first condition specified in the limitations clause, which requires that the violation of the constitutional right be "by law" – everyone agrees that section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law fulfills that condition. The Petitioners did not elaborate on the question of the existence of the second condition in the limitations clause – which requires that the piece of legislation befit the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and, indeed, it does not raise any problems in the petitions before us.

 

55.        The third condition established in the limitations clause is that the piece of legislation that violates a protected constitutional right must be for a proper purpose. The purpose of the law will be deemed proper if it is designed to promote human rights or realize an important social or public objective (see the Menahem Case at p. 264). In the framework of that test, the nature of the violated right and the extent of the violation, inter alia, must also be taken into consideration, because the more significant the violation of the right, the more important and vital the social objectives must be to justify it (see HCJ 6304/09 Lahav – Bureau of Organizations of Self-Employed and Businesses in Israel v. Attorney General (not yet published, September 2, 2010), paragraph 107 of the judgment).

 

56.        The Respondents' position shows that the purpose of section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law is to ascertain that the state's support is given to those who need it, and to prevent a situation in which a person receives the income support benefit from the state when he actually has other income (including conceptual income). The Respondents wish to deduce the existence of that income from the fact that a person owns a vehicle or uses a vehicle on a regular basis and, therefore, he can ostensibly bear the ongoing costs entailed in the possession and use of the vehicle. The test of ownership and use of a vehicle are therefore designed to serve as an indirect estimate of the "real" income of an individual who claims that he is entitled to the income support benefit. The Respondents further argue that section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law leads to the fact that the support that a needy person receives from others (relatives or friends) will be channeled first and foremost into satisfying his existential needs, since Israeli law "does not encourage a reality in which the public treasury finances the existential needs of a person, thereby enabling others to finance other needs that are not of an existential nature" (affidavit in response at page 15).

 

57.        In my view, section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law fulfills the requirement of the proper purpose. Preventing the abuse of the state support and welfare system and endeavoring to ensure that the state support is given only to those who need it the most are proper social purposes. Indeed, the state's financial resources are not unlimited and it may try to ensure that the financial support that it provides will reach those who need it to the greatest extent. This is particularly true when the state support system is financed from public funds and expresses the mutual involvement among individuals in the society. Mutual involvement has two aspects: alongside the public support of a needy individual is also the legitimate requirement that individuals who have sufficient income for a minimum dignified subsistencedo not abuse the public support system and not become a burden on other individuals in the society. Moreover, as explained above, the calculation of the ownership or use of a vehicle for the purpose of testing a person's income is legitimate and there is nothing wrong, in principle, with weighting those characteristics in the income test established in the Law. The question is whether the assessment of income from ownership or use of a vehicle is implemented in a manner that does not violate, to a greater extent than necessary, the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. We will now address this issue, which is the pivotal question that arises at this stage of the constitutional examination.

 

58.        The fourth condition for examining the constitutionality of the provision of a law that violates a constitutional right, which is protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, is that the right be violated "to an extent no greater than is required." This condition deals with the proportionality of the violation of the constitutional right. The proportionality requirement examines the relationship between the proper purpose of the Law, which has been found to befit the values of the State of Israel, and the means chosen by the legislature for the purpose of implementing that purpose. The proportionality of the violation of the constitutional right is established according to the three subtests that have been recognized in the case law of this Court. Only if the violation of the constitutional right meets the three subtests will the violation of the constitutional right be deemed a proportional violation.

 

             The first subtest in the cause of proportionality is the test of the rational connection. This test examines whether the means chosen by the legislature does, indeed, fulfill or contribute to fulfilling the purpose of the provision of the law whose constitutionality is in question. The second subtest is the test of the means with the lesser violation. This test examines whether the means that violates the constitutional right to the smallest degree was chosen among all the possible means for fulfilling the legislative purpose. The third subtest is the test of proportionality "in the narrow sense." This test examines the existence of a proper ratio between the benefit arising from the piece of legislation that violates the constitutional right, and the damage caused by the violation of that right (see, e.g.: the Movement for Quality Government Case at p. 706-708; the Gaza Coast Case, at p. 550).

 

             It is also important to note that the use of the three subtests described above does not necessarily lead to a situation in which the legislature is entitled to choose only one means (if any) to fulfill the (proper) legislative purpose. Generally, the legislature can choose the most suitable means for fulfilling that purpose from among a variety of proportional means. The range of possible choices available to the legislature in these circumstances is called the "range of proportionality," and the Court will intervene in the legislature's decision "only when the means chosen by him deviates significantly from the boundaries of the legislative maneuvering space available to him, and it is clearly disproportional" (see HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business, Human Rights Division v. Minister of Finance, paragraph 46 of my judgment (to be published, 19.11.2009) hereinafter: the Prisons Privatization Case).

 

59.        Is the legislative means chosen by the legislature in section 9A(b) of the Law – a conclusive presumption whereby the ownership or use of a vehicle is equivalent to income in the amount of the income support benefit – within the range of proportionality?"

 

             First we will analyze the first subtest of the proportionality, which is the rational connection test, in which we must examine whether section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law fulfills the legislative purpose for which it was enacted. It is important to note that this test does not require that the means chosen will fulfill the legislative purpose in full. It is sufficient that there is a "genuine correlation" between the means chosen and the purpose (see: the Movement for Quality Government Case at p. 508; HCJ 1030/99 MK Oron v. Speaker of the Knesset, IsrSC 56 (3) 640, 666 (2002)). Similarly, absolute certainty that the means chosen will fulfill its purpose is not required, but on the other hand, just a slight or theoretical probability cannot suffice either (see: the Adalah Case, at p. 323). The rational connection test is based to a large extent on the factual basis available to the legislature, as well as life experience and plain common sense (see Aharon Barak, Proportionality in Law – Violation of the Constitutional Right and its Limitations, 382 (2010) (hereinafter: Barak – Proportionality)).

 

             As stated, the legislative purpose of section 9A(b) is to ensure that the income support benefit is given to those who really need it and not to those who have sufficient income or the ability to generate such income. Can the conclusive presumption fulfill that purpose? In other words, can the ownership or use of a vehicle serve as a suitable estimate for identifying the individuals who have income (including potential income) aside from the income support benefit and, therefore, their minimum dignified subsistence may be fulfilled even without the benefit? The answer to this question is mainly affirmative however, it is not without some doubts. Indeed, the use of a vehicle is generally accompanied by significant expenses, even when the vehicle in question is old and also when the amount of travel is significantly less than the average in Israel. We can assume that in view of the significant expenses entailed in maintaining a vehicle (including insurance, gasoline and ongoing maintenance), the ownership or use of a vehicle may serve as a certain indication of the fact that the person has additional sources of income aside from the income support benefit or, alternatively, that that person is receiving assistance from others which is also equivalent to income.

 

60.        Therefore, the very ownership or use of a vehicle as an estimate of income and neediness is not arbitrary and unreasonable. The conclusive presumption set forth in section 9A(b) is a test that can fulfill the legislative purpose, if only because there is a "genuine correlation" between it and the purpose, even if there is no “absolute certainty” that the presumption has fulfilled its purpose. However, we cannot ignore the fact that there may be cases in which the ownership of a vehicle, and particularly the use of a vehicle by someone who is not its owner, does not attest to income that is equivalent to the income support benefit, for example, in circumstances in which the cost of maintaining the vehicle is lower than the rate of the income support benefit. The arguments of the respondents themselves indicate that certain circumstances are extremely possible: according to the calculation appearing in the affidavit in response, the average monthly cost of maintaining a used vehicle that travels 10,000 km a year (as at October 1, 2008) is NIS 1,161 for a vehicle with a 1300 mL engine, and NIS 1,324 for a vehicle with a 1600 mL engine. In contrast, the rates of the income support benefit on the same date range between NIS 1,537 for an individual under the age of 55, to NIS 2,574 for a couple under the age of 55 with two children. The last update notice of the Respondents indicates that the benefit rates are even higher now – between NIS 1,632 and NIS 2,044 for an individual, and between NIS 2,447 and NIS 3,549 for a couple with a child (the amounts are similar to those for a single parent with a child). Up-to-date data on the cost of using a vehicle were not provided. Even though we can assume that the cost of maintaining the vehicle has also increased in the time that has passed, the data that were provided shows that there may be a very significant gap between the cost of maintaining the vehicle and the amount of the income support benefit (which ranges between approximately NIS 200 for an individual who possesses a vehicle with 1600 mL engine, to NIS 1,400 for a couple with two children who possess a vehicle with a 1300 mL engine). This does not justify deeming maintenance of a vehicle, in and of itself, as attesting to income equivalent to the benefit. To this we must add the argument that we addressed above, that there may be cases in which the option given to the benefit recipient – to use a vehicle owned by another person – does not mean that the vehicle owner has the ability to assist the benefit recipient in other ways.

 

61.        Nevertheless, when it was found that the use of a vehicle can constitute a certain estimate of income, and because the rational connection test does not require complete fulfillment of the legislative purpose, and it also recognizes the possibility of the existence of some uncertainty with regard to the extent of fulfilling the purpose, I have reached the conclusion that in the circumstances of the matter, the provision in section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law intersects with the rational connection test (see Barak – Proportionality, at pp. 380-382), even if barely so. However, the doubts that arise about the correlation between the means and the purpose will accompany us to the next test of proportionality – the test of the means with the lesser violation of the right.

 

62.        The function of the second subtest of proportionality is to examine whether, among all the possible means for fulfilling the legislative purpose, the means that violates the constitutional right the least was the one that was chosen. The comparison is conducted with regard to other means that might also fulfill the legislative purpose. In this context, it is important to note that:

 

            The second subtest of proportionality does not merely examine whether there is a measure that violates the protected constitutional right to a lesser degree, but it requires us to examine whether that less harmful measure realizes the legislative purpose to the same degree or to a similar degree as the measure chosen by the legislature (see the Prisons Privatization Case, paragraph 46 of my judgment)

 

Moreover, the obligation imposed upon the legislature as part of the second subtest is not to choose a means that is absolutely the least harmful. The legislature must choose – among the reasonable options at his disposal for fulfilling the legislative purpose – the option that violates the constitutional right to the smallest extent. (see the Adalah Case, at pp. 324-325). In the case before us, the provisions of section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law do not satisfy this test for the simple reason that establishing a conclusive presumption whose result is the absolute denial of the income support benefit to someone who needs it for a minimum dignified subsistence, in circumstances in which means can be used that violate the right to a lesser degree (if at all) – is not proportional.

 

63.        As we have seen above there are individuals who fall into the realm of the conclusive presumption established in section 9A(b) even though the (proper) purpose of the section – preventing payment of the benefit to someone who has access to sufficient means to ensure a minimum dignified subsistence– does not apply to them. Those individuals also do not comply with the exceptions established for the presumption set forth in section 9A(b) of the Law. In the absence of suitable exceptions, establishing a conclusive presumption in which the ownership or use of a vehicle is equivalent to income that is at least in the amount of the income support benefit, does take into consideration the individuals who make use of a vehicle that is of less value – sometimes significantly less – than the value of income in the amount of the benefit. This is the case either because their expenses for maintaining the vehicle are less than the benefit to which they would be entitled if not for the vehicle, or because the assistance they are receiving from others by means of use of the vehicle cannot be converted into other assistance that would ensure their minimum dignified subsistence. With regard to those individuals, the question arises as to whether the purpose of the legislation in question could have been fulfilled in other ways, which violate the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistenceto a lesser extent.

 

64.        It appears that the answer to that question is affirmative. There are several reasonable possibilities that could fulfill the legislative purpose underlying the provisions of section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law, with a lesser violation, and even no violation at all, of the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence. For example, a non-conclusive presumption could have been established that would give a benefit applicant, who possesses or uses a vehicle, the opportunity to prove that his ownership or use of vehicle does not attest to the fact that he has other income (or potential income). Alternatively, a mechanism that assesses the value of the use of a vehicle could have been established (when it does not involve a vehicle owned by the benefit recipient) according to the frequency of its use, and reducing the rate of the benefit accordingly and in a graduated manner.

 

             Another possibility available to the legislature (when the matter involves a vehicle owned by the benefit recipient) is to establish a hierarchy that takes the vehicle's value into account, so that the benefit would be denied only to someone whose vehicle exceeds a certain value which, together with the ongoing maintenance expenses, can reflect the financial status of the benefit recipient. This was done, for example, by the legislature in Germany. In the German welfare system, there are a number of social grants. The social grant that is conceptually closest to the income support benefit in Israeli law is given to someone who has the potential to return to the job market, and it is granted after a year in which the recipient is given a benefit that is close to the unemployment benefit provided in our system. That benefit – which is called "lack of employment benefit II" in German law – is established in The Second Book of the Code of Social Law (SGB ii). In accordance with German law, in making the decision on granting this benefit, all the property in the individual’s possession must be estimated. The grant is given to anyone whose property value does not exceed the amount specified in the law, which depends on the age of the benefit applicant (which ranges between €3,100 and €9,900). However, German law establishes that there are types of property that are not deemed part of the total property calculated for the purpose of granting the benefit. Among these assets are a "reasonable vehicle." In 2007, the German Supreme Court, which deals with social welfare matters, ruled in Bundessozialgericht, AZ: B 14/7b AS 66/06, 06.09.2010 that a vehicle whose cost does not exceed €7,500 constitutes a "reasonable vehicle," which is not taken into account in estimating the amount of the grant. When the value of the vehicle is higher than that amount, the difference between the value of the vehicle and the reasonable amount is calculated as part of all the property that is weighted in the grant evaluation. The reason for this arrangement, as indicated in German case law, is the importance ascribed to ownership of a vehicle as a means for promoting the individual's return to work and leaving the cycle of neediness. For that reason, the individual must be given the possibility of possessing a vehicle of reasonable value without losing the grant. It should be noted, however, that the attitude to a vehicle in the provision of other grants under German law changes according to the purpose of the grant (see, e.g., in this context, the judgment of the Saxon Administrative Supreme Court in the case Sächsisches Oberverwaltungsgericht, AZ: 4 D 228/09, 29.06.2010). Another possibility in this matter was raised by the Petitioner in HCJ 7804/05, who proposed offsetting the value of the benefit produced by the vehicle from the income support benefit according to the rate at which the benefit is deducted under the Income Tax Ordinance.

 

             In the nature of things, the aforementioned possibilities are only possible examples. They are not an exhaustive solution. We can even assume that within the legislative maneuvering space available to the legislature, there are other arrangements that could fulfill the legislative purpose, while violating the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistenceto a lesser extent. The main point is that these alternative means would also have fulfilled the proper purpose of preventing payment of a benefit to a person who has other income (including potential income) that ensures his minimum subsistence needs, while violating the protected constitutional right to a lesser extent. In this matter, I would like to emphasize the fact that the state refrains from providing data, statistical or otherwise, to show that other modes of examining, estimating and quantifying are not possible and cannot replace the conclusive presumption. Thus, no information was presented to us about the estimated costs of an arrangement for individual examination or arguments about other arrangements that were examined and ruled out due to one shortcoming or another. All that was argued was that the state is not able to supervise the individual use of vehicles – at the same time that extensive use is now made of private investigators who, in effect, are supervising the scope of vehicle use.

 

65.        In this context, I cannot accept the Respondents' argument that the fact that the basis for usage is not defined in the Law allows for flexibility that blunts the conclusive presumption. To my mind, the absence of the definition in the Law neither adds to nor detracts from this matter. If we say that the Labor Courts are free to interpret the term "use" – and even if we were to interpret the term in the framework of the petitions before us – that would not change the fact that from the moment a person is found to be using a vehicle, he is deemed to have income in the amount of the benefit. The problem, as I noted above, is not in quantifying the income from ownership or use of a vehicle. The problem lies in the fact that the ownership or the use – in accordance with the definition that was accepted by the Labor Courts – employ that same conclusive presumption whereby the eligibility of a benefit applicant is denied because he is deemed to have income equivalent to at least the amount of the benefit. Moreover, we cannot except the Respondents’ argument that section 9A(b) should not be deemed to have established a conclusive presumption because it specifies exceptions. Indeed, we welcome the fact that the legislature saw fit to add additional exceptions to the list of exceptions in the Law during adjudication of the petitions before us, but their applicability remains limited. The exceptions apply only to someone who is compelled to utilize a vehicle because of medical necessity or someone who is in the work force (who was recently dismissed) and is found eligible for payment of income support. As noted by the Petitioners in HCJ 3282/05, even if the exceptions were valid before their petition was filed, except for Petitioner 4, none of them would have been included in them because even the Petitioners who were working at that time did not meet the income threshold required by the exceptions in order to be eligible for exemption from section 9A(b).

 

66.        It seems that the case before us further demonstrates the problem inherent in applying universal arrangements to cases in which eligibility for any state assistance is denied. Universal arrangements, by their very nature, do not take into account the individual status of each and every person. They are based on statistical tests and an assessment that is applied in a uniform manner without distinction. They are inherently problematic because they can ignore the circumstances of concrete cases. The Court has addressed this problem more than once. Thus, in the case that adjudicated a universal arrangement, which denied the candidacy of anyone older than 35 for police service in the Israel Prison Service and in the Customs and VAT Division, the following was ruled:

 

            The employer will find it difficult to satisfy the ‘smallest possible harm test’ if he does not have substantial reasons to show why an individual examination will prevent the attainment of the proper purpose that he wishes to achieve (HCJ 6778/97 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Public Security, IsrSC 58 (2) 358, 367 (2004); and the further HCJ 5627/02 Ahmed Saif v. Government Press Office, IsrSC 58 (5) 70, 77 (2004); HCJ 2355/98 Israel Stamka v. Minister of Interior, IsrSC 53 (2) 728, 779 (1999); IsrSC 3477/95 Israel Ben Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, IsrSC 49 (5) 1, 15 (1996); the Adalah Case, at p. 325-330).

 

Indeed, there are cases in which an individual examination will not attain the legislative purpose. In such situations, there is no choice but to establish a universal arrangement. However, that is not the case in the matter before us. In the Income Support Law, the legislature, was aware of the importance of establishing a clear and individual mechanism. That is appropriate for the importance of the right in question, and the pivotal nature of the income support benefit in protecting the right (cf. in a closely related matter, which dealt with the denial of food stamps to the needy, the importance ascribed by the United States Supreme Court to reducing the scope of the violation and eliminating the universal arrangement: United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973); and see further: Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 504, 515 (1964)). Indeed, the mechanism for examining income, which is established in the Law, ensures that a meticulous individual examination will be conducted for each person who claims an income support benefit. Since that is the case, and an individual examination is conducted in any event to examine the other components of a person's income, I am not convinced that there is any justification for transitioning to a universal arrangement precisely with regard to the ownership or use of a vehicle.

 

67.       The state further argues that the comprehensive nature of the arrangement is justified, since it is difficult to quantify the cost of vehicle usage on an individual basis, because it cannot supervise the vehicle usage habits of each benefit applicant. We cannot make light of that problem. It can justify less harmful violations of the constitutional right, such as establishing a hierarchy for quantifying – even if imprecisely – the value of the vehicle usage, or establishing a non-conclusive presumption that transfers the burden of proof to the benefit applicant, to prove the exact nature of the use he makes of the vehicle. Indeed, a more precise estimation can be made – albeit not absolutely precise – of the value of the vehicle usage, in a way that will make it easier for the state to implement the income test without absolutely denying the individual's right to a minimum dignified subsistence, as is now done through the conclusive presumption established in section 9A(b) of the Law. The Respondents did not provide us with data showing that the problem they indicated cannot be resolved by alternative, less harmful means and, as such, there is no choice but to conclude that the universal arrangement that is expressed in the conclusive presumption is unjustified and the second test of proportionality is not satisfied in the petitions before us.

 

68.       Therefore, the conclusive presumption established in section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law, which leads to full denial of the benefits to anyone who possesses or uses a vehicle beyond the limited and non-exhaustive exceptions delineated in the Law, is an inflexible and unsuitable means that unnecessarily violates the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence. Once we found that the provision in section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law does not satisfy the second subtest of proportionality, it is sufficient to determine that its violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis not proportional and, therefore, does not meet the conditions of the limitations clause of section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

69.       Nevertheless, and above and beyond the requirement, we will also address the third subtest of proportionality, which is the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. This test centers on the question of the ratio between the public benefit produced by the piece of legislation that violates the constitutional right, and the damage caused to the constitutional right by that same piece of legislation (see the Prisons Privatization case, paragraph 50 of my judgment). This is a test of moral balance that places the clashing values against one another and balances them by their weight (see the Adalah Case at p. 331).

 

             In the circumstances of the case before us, the state argues that the public benefits from the savings in state resources by simplifying the work of the welfare institutions and preventing the provision of public monies to those who are not entitled to the benefit and wish to defraud the welfare institutions. Opposite that is the damage caused to all those who are in need of the income support benefit for the purpose of fulfilling their right to a minimum dignified subsistence, but do not receive it because of the conclusive presumption. This is an extremely serious violation of the core of the right of someone who, in any case, is at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and needs the benefit as the last safety net against starvation and poverty. Under those conditions, it is hard to accept that the savings alone – which are partially attainable with less harmful means – exceed the harm caused to individuals whose right to live with minimum human dignity is violated. Indeed, we cannot deny that this means streamlines the work of the welfare services – universal arrangements always tends to be simple to apply and to implement, compared with individual rules of examination. However, the ends do not justify the means. As I have already noted in the past, " ‘efficiency’ (whatever the meaning of this concept is) is not a supreme value, when we are dealing with a violation of the most basic and important human rights that the state is obliged to uphold (see the Prisons Privatization case, paragraph 55 of the judgment). This is true, in general and in particular, when we are dealing with examining a person's income, which is implemented in any case – as noted – on an individual basis.

 

             For all the above reasons, the provision in section 9A(b) that leads to denial of the income support benefit to a person who possesses or uses a vehicle and does not comply with one of the exceptions established in section 9A(b) – is not proportional and, therefore, does not satisfy the test of constitutionality.

 

70.        As we have reached the finish line, and we have established that section 9A(b) cannot stand because of the disproportional violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, there is no more need to discuss the argument of discrimination made by some of the Petitioners. We will also note that we do not accept the argument on the merits because there is a relevant difference between the group of income support recipients and the group of income supplement recipients, which is based on the nature and purposes of the Law.

 

The remedy

 

71.        We have found that the provision in section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law, whereby ownership or use of vehicle must be deemed income that is no less than the amount of the benefit, disproportionately violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. Denying the last safety net required to ensure a minimum dignified subsistenceto those who need it the most, and in a universal and comprehensive manner, contradicts the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This calls for a declaration of the invalidity of section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law.

 

             In the nature of things, in view of the fact that the state will have to formulate an alternative arrangement in place of the arrangement whose repeal we are ordering, section 9A(b) should not be repealed immediately and it is advisable to give the legislature time to formulate a new arrangement. In view of the importance of the right in question and the mortal blow dealt, in the meantime, to someone in need of the income support benefit as the last safety net, who is not receiving it, that timeframe cannot be prolonged. Therefore, I propose to my colleagues that we order that the declaration of repeal go into effect on September 1, 2012, six months from the rendering of our judgment, and that it be effective from that date onwards. It should be noted that the new arrangement, whatever it may be, can be established in principle by authorization in primary legislation, but the individual arrangements can also be established in secondary legislation. In the interim, until a new statutory arrangement goes into effect, the NII would do well to establish interim arrangements that take into account the rulings in this judgment, including applying a narrow interpretation to the term "use" that is set forth in the Law.

 

72.        Before concluding, I would like to note that the Petitions before us were conducted at the level of the principles. We did not address the individual issues of the Petitioners and, in any case, we are not the appropriate judicial forum for such an examination, which requires proceedings from the outset, both before the NII and before the competent courts. However, considering the battle conducted by the Petitioners over many years to change the legal situation, and in view of the result they have achieved, it is fitting to enable the Petitioners, insofar as the issue is still relevant, to resubmit their cases to the NII. This is especially true with regard to the Petitioners whose eligibility was denied retroactively.

 

73.        In conclusion. I propose to my colleagues that we rule that the order nisi become an order absolute in the sense that we will declare the repeal of section 9A(b) of the Income Support law due to its unconstitutionality, which will go into effect within six months of this day, on September 1, 2012.

                                                                        The President

 

Justice M. Naor

 

I agree that an order absolute should be issued in the format proposed by the President. In my view as well, the difficulty lies in the fact that the presumption established in section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law, 5741-1980, is a conclusive presumption that leads to full revocation of the benefit to the owners or users of a vehicle (except for the exceptions listed in the Law). Indeed, the ownership or use of a vehicle can constitute an indication of one's financial situation. So can a high standard of living that is prima facie inconsistent with the declared sources of income (cf. in connection with bankruptcy: CA 404/87Vasing v. Verker, IsrSC 44 (2) 593 (1990)). Indeed, a conclusive presumption facilitates a fast and simple decision on the benefit application by the authority. That is its advantage. However, a conclusive presumption may violate the constitutional right which, in my opinion, is the most important of the constitutional rights – the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. A solution for the violation – even if it is a violation of the constitutional right in only some of the cases – must be found. The solution may lie in reversing the burden. There may be other solutions that are not necessarily based on the ownership or use of a vehicle. The solutions that must be explored are those that would examine the true status of someone who wishes to receive a benefit without using the fictions inherent in conclusive presumptions, which do not always reflect the actual situation.

 

                                                                        Justice

 

Justice U. Fogelman

 

I concur with the comprehensive judgment of my colleague, President D. Beinisch, and the comments of my colleague, Justice M. Naor.

 

             I concur with the ruling of my colleague, the president, and her reasoning, that there is no practical reason to apply a different model of constitutional review to the social human rights that are established in the Basic Laws, as distinguished from other basic rights.

 

             No one disputes the importance of the distinction between the various stages in the constitutional review model. The first stage, on which the state focused its arguments in the context of the Knesset's legislation before us, which is under constitutional review, is the stage that examines the existence of a violation of a constitutional right that is protected in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In the second stage, the protection provided by the Basic Law with regard to that violation is examined by means of the tests in the limitations clause. I accept the state's position that we must avoid over-expanding the sphere of the constitutional right. A sweeping expansion of the boundaries of the constitutional right in the first stage, and "automatic" transition to the limitations clause tests whenever there is a claim that a piece of legislation violates it, may lead, in the final analysis, to erosion of the protection granted by the Basic Laws (cf.: CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village, IsrSC 49 (4) 221, 471 (1995); HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 51 (4) 367, 419 (1997)). However, that is not the case before us.

 

             As noted by my colleague the president, this Court has already ruled that the right to dignity, which is established in sections 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, also extends to the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. I also believe that said right is at the core of the constitutional right to dignity. I also believe that the arrangement established in section 9A(b) of the Income Support Law, 5741-1980 violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, since it also leads to the categorical denial of the income support benefit to someone who does not have sufficient income for minimum subsistence. I also believe that the arrangement established in that section (the conclusive presumption that the ownership or use of a vehicle is equivalent to income in the amount of the benefit) is not proportional, since the purpose of the law can be attained by a means with a lesser violation, such as a presumption that is not conclusive. Please note: this does not rule out the state's position that the ownership of a vehicle and, in the appropriate cases, also the use of a vehicle, may constitute a reliable indication of a person's economic status. However, in establishing a universal arrangement by way of establishing a conclusive presumption that does not enable the authority to thoroughly examine the facts and prevents a benefit applicant from proving that ownership or use of the vehicle is not equivalent to income in the amount of the benefit in the special circumstances of his case, disproportionately violates the right of some of the benefit recipients to a minimum dignified subsistence.

 

For those reasons, I agree that the order nisi should be made absolute, as proposed by my colleague the president.

 

                                                                        Justice 

 

Justice E. Arbel

 

            Human dignity is a complex concept that encompasses many and varied values – some of a physio-existential nature, and some of an emotional-spiritual nature. Violation of human dignity may find expression in emotional humiliation and contempt, and it may find expression in denying physio-existential needs, without which a person cannot subsist with dignity. Take away the roof over a person's head, his food, water and basic medical treatment, and you have taken from him the ability to exist with dignity and to fulfill his existence as a human being (CA 9535/06 Abu Musa'ed v. Water Commissioner(unpublished)).

 

1.         In the petition before us, a question was raised regarding the constitutionality of the arrangement established in section 9A(b) of the Income Support law, 5741-1980, 991 LSI 30 (1980) (hereinafter: the Law or the Income Support Law), which states that anyone who owns or uses a vehicle is deemed to have income in the amount of the income support benefit and, therefore, is not eligible for the benefit. At the core of this issue is the question of whether this section violates the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence.

 

          I concur with the comprehensive judgment of my colleague, the president, on the constitutional aspect therein and her determination that section 9A(b) of the Law disproportionately violates the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistence, for the reasons she cited. If I have seen fit to add my own words, it is only on a number of points.

 

2.       I agree with my colleague, the president, that the methodology of the constitutional review of socioeconomic rights should be no different from that utilized by the Court to examine other basic rights, as well as the fact that there is no reason to narrow the judicial review of legislation that affects the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, as distinguished from other basic rights.

 

3.          The source of the right to a minimum dignified subsistencelies in the nucleus of the basic right to human dignity which was given constitutional recognition in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis found, as stated by the president, in the core and nucleus of human dignity. In my opinion, the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis rooted deeply in the core of the constitutional right to dignity – to human dignity:

 

             Indeed, in Israeli law, it is becoming an entrenched view that that human dignity as a constitutional right also encompasses the right to minimum human subsistence, which includes shelter, basic food and elementary medical treatment, and that the state is obligated to ensure that a person’s standard of living does not drop below the threshold required to live with dignity (AdminA 3829/04 Yisrael Twito, Chairman, Mikol Halev – Kikar Lechem Association for Reducing the Social Gap in Israel v. Jerusalem Municipality, 59(4) IsrSC 769, 779 [2004]).

 

             The Income Support Law is a central means, among other welfare laws, which is designed to ensure a minimum dignified subsistence. The purpose of the Income Support Law is to ensure that every person and family in Israel, who are unable to provide themselves with the income required for subsistence, will receive the resources to supply their vital needs (see the Income Support Bill, 5740-1979, para. 2). The insertion of section 9A(5) and sections 9A(a) and 9A(b) in the Law leads to the fact that anyone who owns or uses a vehicle is not eligible for the income support benefit, because his "income" from the vehicle is deemed to be in the amount of the benefit that would have been paid if he did not own or use a vehicle. The result is that the very ownership or use of a vehicle is sufficient to lead to the denial of the benefit. The assumption is that the income of the applicant is high and attests to the fact that he does not need the safety net provided by the state. I agree with the president that this arrangement arbitrarily violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. The unequivocal rule under which anyone who owns or uses a vehicle is not entitled to an income support benefit, with no connection to the question of whether that person does, indeed, have income that would ensure his right to a minimum dignified subsistence, is arbitrary and is not based on an individual examination suited to the status of the applicant. Like the president, I believe that there may be cases in which the use of a vehicle does not necessarily indicate the fact that that person has independent income, due to which he is not eligible for the last safety net provided by the state, in whole or in part. That is the case when the vehicle serves as a tool for producing a certain income, but does not come under the exceptions in the Law, and when a person makes use of a relative's vehicle and bears only small expenses, when his relatives cannot help him in an alternative manner and in another way. As such, I concur with the conclusion that this is an expansive threshold condition which results in a disproportional violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceof the person who is denied the benefit.

 

4.          My colleague, the president, criticizes the sharp division between civil and political rights and social and economic rights, between a "positive" right and a "negative" right. I agree with her that the division is not dichotomous and, in any case, the two types should be recognized as supra-constitutional rights in a democratic welfare state. Indeed, in contrast to the civil-political rights, the social rights pertain primarily to the conditions of a person's subsistence on the socioeconomic-cultural level. However, there is an inseparable connection between them because without the existence of social rights, a person would find it extremely hard to exercise his civil rights. Without food, water, housing, healthcare and education, it would be difficult for the individual to give content and true meaning to his civil rights. He would have trouble exercising the right to vote, to freedom of expression, to freedom of occupation and the right to property.

 

5.          Indeed, insofar as the matter involves exercising rights in a manner that requires the allocation of substantial resources, the need for restraint has been recognized by the Court. Thus it was ruled that when a case involves matters of budgetary policy connected to the state economy, the Court acts with great restraint in its judicial review for two main reasons: one – judicial interference in economic policy may have real ramifications for the stability of the economy and its proper functioning. Second – the issue of establishing economic policy is the responsibility of the public authorities, whose job it is to formulate it on the basis of their expertise and the relevant data in their possession, and they bear the public responsibility for the results (HCJ 4769/95, Menahem v. Minister of Transport 57(1) IsrSC 235, 263 [2002]; HCJ 4885/03 Israel Poultry Farmers Association v. The Government of Israel 59(29) IsrSC 14, 60 [2004]; HCJ 6407/06 Doron, Tikotzky, Amir, Mizrachi, Attorneys at Law v. Minister of Finance, para. 66 (unpublished, Sept. 23, 2007)).

 

             The restraint that the Court imposes upon itself in these matters stems from the perception that the distribution of the state's resources must be arranged comprehensively by the legislator, who has the required lateral view for handling such issues. A comprehensive arrangement by the legislator is also required in the matter of the social rights that have not yet been established in a Basic Law that enjoys a constitutional status. Recognizing these rights in the form of a Basic Law is particularly important in a democratic state that views itself as a welfare state and endeavors to ensure human subsistence to every person and a minimum dignified subsistencewithin the concept of "human dignity" (Ayala Procaccia, Supreme Court Justice Emeritus, “Social Rights in Law” delivered at the Knesset conference "Basic Law: Social Rights, Social Justice in the Knesset?"  to mark the International Human Rights Day (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=18275).

 

6.          Social rights are recognized sporadically and gradually, either by way of the ordinary legislation of rights, which only deals with certain rights, or by way of case law, which develops slowly and randomly, in dependence on whether a petition is filed and merits recognition of a social right (see, e.g., HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance (unpublished, Dec. 12, 2005); CA 4905/98 Gamzu v. Yeshayahu 55(3) IsrSC 360 [2001]; CA 9535/06 ; HCJ 11044/04 Solomatin v. Minister of Health (unpublished, Jun. 27, 2011); HCJ 1181/03 Bar Ilan  University v. National Labor Court (unpublished, Apr. 28, 2011); HCJ 3071/05 Louzon v. Government of Israel (unpublished, Jul. 28, 2008)). This situation still leaves dark pockets of poverty, hardship, discrimination and a lack of equality in the allocation of state resources.

 

7.          With the aforementioned in mind, the Court cannot refrain from conducting a constitutional review of the violation of these rights, in order to protect those who need it. The Court deems itself obligated to protect the rights of those who come through its gatesCVJH

, when those rights are violated by existing legislation. The Petitioners who assembled in the petitions before us are downtrodden and shoulder the burden of subsistence. They are at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and in need of the benefit as the last safety net against hunger and poverty. Because of some use or other that they make of a vehicle, usually not their own vehicle, the benefit is denied them. The result at which we have arrived in our judgment is, first and foremost, a response to their cry for help and the cries of others like them. We are not ignoring the fact that there are other groups in society in distress, aside from the petitioners before us, who are living below the poverty line at an even lower rung on the ladder. However, the matter of the petitioners is the one that has come before us and we must provide a response to it.

 

             The distress of one group cannot infringe and obscure the needs of another group. The Court can only address the matters that come before it. It does not choose these matters and does not catalog them. For that reason, inter alia, the aforementioned rule was established, regarding the restraint practiced by the Court when it discusses the distribution of resources to the various strata in society. However, in cases in which the Court discovers a disproportional violation of the social rights of a particular group, in a manner that undermines the minimum subsistence conditions of that group, it is obligated to intervene, notwithstanding the restraint to which it usually subjects itself. That is the case before us.

 

             In conclusion, I would emphasize again that it is important to ensure human subsistence to every person. Recognition of social rights in the form of a Basic Law is the only way to lay the proper normative foundation for providing basic constitutional protection for those rights, and for clarifying their supreme status and the obligation to honor them.  That should be done sooner rather than later.

 

 

                                                                        Justice

 

Justice E. Hayut

The right of every person to a minimum dignified subsistenceis, indeed, a social right that is enumerated with the most important constitutional rights. The judgment of my colleague, the President, analyzes with wisdom and sensitivity the issue that has been set before us in these petitions with regard to this right, and I concur with what is stated therein. In paragraph 35 of her judgment, my colleague, the president, quotes from the pertinent and apposite words written in this context by Justice Y. Zamir at HCJ 164/97 Conterm Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance, Customs and VAT Division, et al., IsrSC 52 (1) 289, 340 (1998), when he said “...Every person must have enough, so that he or she can enjoy human rights, in actuality and not just by law."  That message is echoed in a poem by poet Dalia Ravikovitch, "Declaration for the Future," which I have seen fit to present here:

 

Declaration for the future

 

A person, when he's hungry

or insecure,

he will make compromises,

he will do things

he never dreamt of in his life.

 

Suddenly he's got a crooked back,

and what happened to his back

that it got so crooked?

Loss of pride.

And his smile is frozen

and both hands filthy,

or so it seems to him,

from coming in contact with moist objects

whose touch he cannot escape.

 

And he has no choice,

or so it seems to him,

and it's a marvel

how for years he'll forbear,

 

and merely record the annals of his life

within,

year after year.

 

 

             Therefore, the result, according to which an order absolute will be issued in these petitions in the version proposed by my colleague, the President, is accepted by me

 

                                                                        Justice

 

Justice E. Rubinstein

 

A.          I concur with the opinion of my colleague, the president, and the comments of my other colleagues.

 

B.          Minimum subsistence is the core of the Income Support Law, 5741-1980. It represents a worthy social concept whereby the public spreads a safety net at the feet of any person in Israel so that he will not fall into the shame of hunger. The explanation to the law (Bills, 5740, 2), noted by the president, states that the purpose is "to ensure that every person and family in Israel, who are unable to provide themselves with the income required for subsistence, will receive the resources to supply their vital needs.” This concept has been well entrenched in Jewish tradition throughout the generations and the State of Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state, would not be able to adhere properly to its values if it had not designed such a safety net. It integrates into the social security system which is structured in the National Insurance Law (Consolidated Version), 5755-1995, and in other extensive social legislation. It is clearly one of the values of the State of Israel – the "value of the human being," which is mentioned in section 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – and it is found in the sphere of charity, from those same "foundations of liberty, justice and peace in light of the vision of the prophets of Israel," on which the state was founded according to the declaration of independence. Even without my citing references, no one would dispute the fact that someone who does not have enough for minimum subsistence has lost his dignity as a person, and he comes under sections 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In Administrative Petition Appeal 3829/04 Twito v. Jerusalem Municipality, IsrSC 59 (4) 769, 779, Justice Procaccia wrote," Indeed, in Israeli law, the concept is taking root that human dignity as a constitutional right also encompasses the right to minimum human subsistence…and the state is obligated to ensure that a person’s standard of living does not drop below the threshold required to live with dignity.” See the references, id. I concurred with her opinion in that judgment, which was written in 2004, and my opinion has even strengthened since then. This purpose of the legislation justifies exercising fairness, which is doubtlessly a guiding factor for the Knesset and the public authorities.

 

C.          The question at hand focuses on whether the categorical provision – the conclusive presumption – in section 9A(b) of the Income Support law, i.e., "In the matter of this law, subject to the provisions of subsection (c), a vehicle is deemed to be property from which monthly income is generated, the amount of which is no less than the amount of the benefit that would have been paid to the claimant if not for the provisions of this subsection." Subsection (c) enumerates the exceptions that have been inserted over the years in amendments to the Law in 5761 and 5767, which were designed to soften the conclusive presumption, such as in the case of requiring a vehicle for the purpose of medical treatment or in cases of disability or other cases of limited income and a small or old car. I do not minimize those and it is clear that, over the years and after lessons learned, the legislature took steps toward helping those in need of income support in amendments to the legislation. Still, in reviewing the cases in the petitions before us, which were filed by people at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder whose use of a vehicle does not raise them at all to the level of someone who has attained a minimum dignified subsistence if they are denied income support, it is clear that they must be entitled to a safety net, and denying them the income support, even if that is not done willingly, is disproportional in a manner that justifies intervention. I admit that I hesitated initially out of respect for the Knesset and the knowledge that, in its legislation, it has also softened the requirements with regard to vehicles, as stated. However, the constitutional examination with all its stages, as enumerated by the president and, ultimately, "the power of the locked door" facing the Petitioners, against the possibilities for individual examination, where such an examination is already built into the Income Support Law (see Part C), tips the balance in favor of the decision that we have reached. It should be emphasized that we are not trying to say, under any circumstances, that possession of a vehicle will not constitute a criterion for an eligibility test. Our approach lies within the realm of ensuring a minimum dignified subsistence by means of individual examination, and we are dealing with a situation in which, as stated, there is an existing and built in feasibility of individual examination, which is not unattainable.

 

D.          I believe that it is appropriate to write briefly about the vehicle and its place in human existence in Israel in our time. We are living in a dynamic reality, of which the legislature is also aware, in which something that was perceived as a luxury in the past, as the provenance of a select few, has become common to all. This can be said of the electric refrigerator, which has long since been called a "Frigidaire" after a certain model of refrigerators and which 60 years ago began to replace the ice boxes. At that time, it was considered a financial achievement by someone who purchased one. The same is true of the telephone for which my parents, may they rest in peace, waited their turn for about six years before they received one (they did not have any "connections") and, of course, the television which, since it appeared in Israel in 1968, was initially a luxury and a source of pride to anyone who purchased one. Eventually the personal computer, the mobile telephone and the Internet, which were not even imagined by our forebears, but by us as well, and now they are the provenance of the masses. It would be difficult to imagine our lives – and not just the lives of the wealthy, but far wider circles – without them. The vehicles that we are discussing in this matter are very similar.

 

E.          Indeed, in days past, a vehicle was a luxury to most people. In the high school in which I studied in the old north of Tel Aviv around 1960, only the school principal and the parents of one of the students in my class had a car. My parents were from the middle-class and they lacked nothing by the standards of that time, as was the case with most of my classmates, but they did not have a car nor even a driver’s license. The next generation – my generation – was the first generation of drivers and vehicles, and that was also the case in my wife's family and the families of most of my friends. Since then, a great deal of water has passed under the bridge and today it is hard to impart these stories to our generation, which is stuck in traffic jams and exasperatedly seeking parking spots in the cities. I have written these lines in order to emphasize that it is clear to everyone that a vehicle is no longer what it once was, even if it is not an existential matter as a rule.

 

F.          Indeed, these issues have also arisen in Knesset discussions in this very context. Amendments to the Income Support Law in 5761 and 5767 were implemented at the initiative of Members of Knesset (see the Income Support Bill (Amendment 13) (Motor Vehicle), 5758-1998 and the 5758 Bill, 350, and the Income Support Bill (Amendment 29) (Vehicle as Property That Does Not Generate Income), 5767-2006, Knesset Bills 5767, 119). In a meeting of the Labor and Welfare Committee on December 6, 1999, which discussed the 5758 Bill, MK Nissim Zeev said (p. 3) "Just as a Frigidaire was once something special, and a computer, today these things (vehicles – A.R.) are a routine part of life. However, the Ministry of Finance representative responded "I think that saying that a car is no longer a luxury…is view from an ivory tower.” In one of the discussions, the legal advisor to the National Insurance Institute noted (minutes of the meeting of the Labor, Welfare and Health Committee on October 31, 2011), "If we now say that subsistence includes a vehicle, we have to view the ramifications of that statement from the standpoint of the scope of payments. The perception of Israeli society may be that the time has come to view this as part of subsistence." In bringing the 5761 Bill for a second and third reading, the chairman of the Labor, Welfare and Health Committee, MK David Tal (January 1, 2001) noted that "The ownership of a vehicle in the circumstances discussed in the bill no longer constitutes a sign of wealth or luxury. In certain cases, the ownership of a vehicle is even crucial for subsistence, even if it involves a very poor family, for example, and families living on the periphery, for whom a vehicle provides the only possibility of reaching their workplace and keeping their jobs" (Record of the 15th Knesset, session 3, p. 2342). Likewise MK Taleb El-Sana (“Maintaining a vehicle these days is not a reason to deny the right” p. 2343)). On the other hand, Minister of Finance A. Shochat noted that this would contribute to creating circles of people who would not go out to work (2343). We see that the discussion in the committee and the plenum ranges between a more social oriented approach and an economics oriented approach, even though it would be reasonable to assume that everyone wants the circle of employment to expand, and the parliamentary reality which, by its nature, requires compromises, has created balances. As stated, a vehicle in itself is not necessarily and generally an existential matter, of course, and that should be emphasized. But the constitutional question is whether the results of the balances in the law are not disproportional, considering the matter before us, and the Court can only address what it sees – and, for the sake of constitutional proportionality, is there no room to turn the issue of the vehicle and its use into a criterion instead of a padlock? It seems that a vehicle as a criterion and as a basis of examination, instead of the locked door, is a proportional way that does not impair the minimum dignified subsistence in cases like the ones before us.

 

On the examination stage

 

G.          I concur with the president and my colleagues who believe that even when we are dealing with social and economic rights, there is no reason for moving the constitutional stage of examining balances to the stage of delineating the right itself. I concur with the position once voiced by President Barak, that the public interest must be taken into consideration in the framework of the conditions of the limitations clause… and not in the framework of determining the scope of the constitutional right itself" (HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior, unpublished, paragraph 105); A. Barak, Proportionality in Law – Violation of the Constitutional Right and its Limitations (5770) 102, 114). The founders of the Basic Law did not make any distinction between socioeconomic rights and other rights. We should remember that section 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which deals with property rights – a socioeconomic right of the highest order – is at the same level as the other rights in the law which are of a different nature. Indeed, in HCJ 466/07 Galon v. Attorney General (unpublished) I had the opportunity to recall (in paragraph 8), that "Not every right or privilege that provides protection to one extent or another for human dignity in its broadest sense, comes within the realm of the constitutional right." Clearly the Court, which does not have a purse – or a sword – in the words of Alexander Hamilton, one of the fathers of political thought in the United States in its infancy (The Federalist 78), can only practice caution in imposing an actual financial expense upon the Knesset and the government. To that approach of such restraint we must adhere. However, the place of the examination is not at the stage of determining the scope of the right but, rather – as in every constitutional examination – at "the stage of the limitations clause," and, in this case, at the bottom line – proportionality – and that has been found to be defective.

 

On poverty and a minimum dignified subsistence in Jewish law

 

H.          It is impossible in such a matter not to cite the Jewish legal sources and the world of Judaism in this matter. The Bible is strewn with private and public obligations to the poor. This can be found in the Torah and repeatedly in the Prophets, and even more so in the Writings – and not just once or twice, but many times. Those that we will cite here are but a drop in the ocean. "You should not abuse a needy and destitute laborer, whether a fellow countrymen or a stranger in one of the communities of your land. You must pay him his wages on the same day, before the sun sets, for he is needy and urgently depends on it, else he will cry to the Lord against you and you will incur guilt" (Deuteronomy 24:14-15); and of the gifts of the field it is stated, “You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger, I the Lord am your God.” (Leviticus 19:10); the prophet Isaiah said (Isaiah 49:13) “For the Lord has comforted his people and will have mercy upon his afflicted.” The prophet Ezekiel says of the righteous man (Ezekiel 18:7) that "… he has given bread to the hungry and clothed the naked…"; It is written in Psalms "Happy is he who is thoughtful of the wretched, in bad times may the Lord keep him from harm" (Psalms 41:2); “…he hears the cry of the afflicted” (Job 34:28).

 

Below are words that I had occasion to write in Administrative Petition Appeal 3829/04 Twito v. Jerusalem Municipality (pp. 781-782):

 

    The public's obligation to its poor is established in the biblical ethos, which is cognizant of the fact that “… For there will never cease to be needy ones in your land” (Deuteronomy 15:11) i.e., poverty is a phenomenon that frequently accompanies human society. "It is to share your bread with the hungry, and to take the wretched poor into your home, when you see the naked, to clothe him and not to ignore your own kin” (Isaiah 58:7; I would add, as a personal note, that this passage is engraved on the tombstones of my grandmother and my mother, may they rest in peace). Food, shelter, clothing – these are man's obligation to others as kindness and certainly as obligations of the society. “The wretched poor,” says Midrash Raba, “are homeowners who have lost their dignity and their assets” (and there are other interpretations). If we wish, caring for the poorest of the poor will ensure that the human dignity – a basic right in our legal system – of the weakest part of society, is not violated. And the Babylonian Talmud states, “Rabbi Elazar said, ‘The effecter of charity (someone who causes others to give to the poor – A.R.) is greater than the doer, because it is stated, ‘The effect of righteousness is peace’” (Emphasis added – A.R.) (see also Maimonides, Gifts to the Poor, 10:6).

 

    (2) Social justice is an established element of Jewish law. It has been emphasized by the prophets of Israel: "Zion shall be saved in the judgment: her repentant ones, in the retribution" (Isaiah 1:27). Charity is established in the commandments but we should not confuse the concept of charity and kindness, which is a voluntary act, with the public-social obligation. The halachic approach to the public aspect is that "Charity is to be enforced;” in other words, people are required to give for charitable purposes, in amounts commensurate with their means (see the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, Marks 247-248; and Aruch Le-shulchan of Rabbi Yechiel Michal Epstein. Russia, 19th-20th centuries, Yoreh Deah, particularly end of Mark 250).In the modern world, charity has been translated in part into the obligation of taxes which, aside from the expenses for security and other matters, also includes social issues. However, the individual is still obligated to pay a tithe, i.e., to give charity, and, in principle, he is restricted to not expending more than one fifth (two tenths) for that purpose. Law and charity are intertwined: "He has told you, O man, what is good and what the Lord requires of you: only to do justice and love goodness and to walk modestly with your God" (Micah 6:8); and our sages addressed this (Babylonian Talmud. Sukkah, 49b): ‘Rabbi Elazar said, to do justice – this is the law; to love kindness – this is the performance of kind deeds; and to go discreetly – this is taking out the dead and bringing a bride to the nuptial canopy,’ i.e., social obligations.

 

    (3) The author of the Book of Principles (Rabbi Yosef Albo, Spain, 15th century) notes that ‘Doing justice includes all the laws between man and his fellow man, and the love of kindness includes performing all types of kind deeds’ (article 3, chapter 30).  Indeed, the stranger, the orphan and the widow, the weaker parts of society from time immemorial ("Cursed be he who subverts the rights of the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow," Deuteronomy 27:19) are given massive protection in the Torah. And the most worthy charity for the needy is that which enables him to rehabilitate himself economically: "There are eight categories in giving charity as follows: In the highest category is one who strengthens a fellow Jew in need (who is poor – A.R.) by a gift, or loan, or offer of partnership, or employment. This sets him on his feet so that he does not require charitable aid" (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.,249, 6). See also the text of the Hafetz Chaim, Loving Kindness (to which I will return – A.R.

 

    (4) The approach is immersed in mutual responsibility: "Let a man consider that every moment he seeks his livelihood from the Holy One Blessed Be He, and even as he desires that the Holy One Blessed Be He shall hear his cry, so let him hear the cry of the poor. Let him further consider the fortune is a wheel that keeps turning in the universe, and the end of man is that he or his son or his son's son will come to a similar state (of neediness, Heaven forbid – A.R.) – men take pity on those love shown pity for others" (Rabbi Moshe Isserles, in his commentary on [Shulchan Aruch] ibid., 247, 3). See also the series of articles in edition no. 1 of Bema’aglei Tzedek – Paths of Righteousness, Journal of the Torah, Thought and Social Justice (Nisan 5764). It should be noted, however, that the needy person also has obligations (see Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 78b).

 

    (5) The commandment of charity has public aspects, such as providing food for the poor (Baba Batra, 8b). ‘We have never seen or heard of a Jewish community that does not have a charity fund” (Rambam, Gifts to the Poor, 9, 13). See also Rabbi E. Afarsemon, Rabbi D. Wiskott and Rabbi Yechiel Ozeri, "Allocating Resources and Treatment Priorities in Public Medicine," Melilot, Volume I, 5758-1958, 11).

 

    (6) We can obviously see that the public's obligation vis-à-vis the needy among them is rooted in the Jewish legal ethos.

 

See also the words of former Justice M. Cheshin in AFH 11230/04 Twito v. Jerusalem Municipality (unpublished).

 

I.           The Rambam, in Hilchot Yom Tov, 6, 18, reminds everyone enjoying the jubilation of the holiday, “And when he eats and drinks, he must feed the stranger and the orphan and the widow along with the other wretched indigents.” On the classification of the poor and the tests of poverty in Jewish law, see Aviad Hacohen, Gladdening the Poor and Gifts to the Indigent in Parshiot Vemishpatim, Jewish Law in the Portion of the Week, 2011, 272-277; M. Weinfeld, Law and Justice in Israel and Among the Nations (5748). In his comprehensive book, Loving Kindness, the Hafetz Chaim discussed the public's obligation to maintain a charity fund in every city (chapter 16) and, inter alia, (p. 206) “and the collar hangs upon the necks of everyone… for the many who carry out the precept [of giving charity] are nothing like the few who carry out the precept”. At the end of the book, he also addresses the fact that “the requirement to perform acts of charity and righteousness varies according to the recipient and according to the giver” (p. 331).

 

In his preface to the book, the Netziv (Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin of Volozhin) says: “The rule of charity is the existence of the world, and as it is written (Psalms 89:2), ‘Your steadfast love is confirmed forever’, and this is the duty of humankind and this is the form thereof... The people of Sodom were doomed to extinction because they did not support the poor and the needy and they behaved corruptly and inhumanly... Besides being commanded to do charity on the basis of one human being’s duty to another, we are also commanded to do so by the Torah.”

 

J.           And, indeed, as Dr. Michael Wygoda has noted in his comprehensive article, “Between Social Rights and Social Duties in Jewish Law” [Hebrew], in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Israel (Y. Rabin, Y. Shany, eds., 5765-2004) 233, 249-250, the duty of helping the weak “has not merely remained the duty of the individual; rather, it has become one of the principal duties of society and the community; in the words of Moses Maimonides (Gifts to the Poor, 9, 3), ‘We have never seen nor heard of an Israelite community that does not have a charity fund’”; the institution of the charity fund began in the days of the Mishnah; see discussion and references, ibid. see also Y.D. Gilat, “‘Open Your Hand to the Poor and Needy Kinsman’ – The Precept of Charity: Legal Obligation or Generosity” [Hebrew], Parashat Ha-Shavua 179, and in his words there: “... The precept of charity entails two things: the precept of charity by the individual, which is based on the generosity of the giver, and is not to be enforced; and the ‘public’ duty of charity, which is founded on the mutual consent of the city’s residents, and is often also forcibly collected”; see references, ibid.

 

Respect for fellow human beings in Jewish ethical theory

 

K.          Jewish ethical theory emphasizes a point listed in the Mishnah (Aboth 6:6) among the 48 things by virtue of which the Torah is acquired: “bearing the burden with the other” – the duty of lending one’s heart and one’s hand to sufferers, and, in the words of the interpreter, Rabbi Pinchas Kehati, “he sympathizes with his fellow and helps him, whether physically or financially or with good counsel and proper instruction”. This concept was strongly expressed by Rabbi Yerucham Levovitz, the mashgiach (spiritual counselor) at the Mir Yeshiva between the two World Wars, in his articles which appeared in his book, Knowledge, Wisdom and Ethics [Hebrew], Volume I (5727-1967). In his words, “Respect for fellow human beings is the highest point” (2, 33); it is (34) “the middle post which runs from one end to the other, encompasses the entire Torah, all of which is but a matter of respect, respect for the Deity and respect for fellow human beings”; and furthermore (35), “that this matter of respect for fellow human beings, respect for the image of God, this is the form of the entire Torah”. Bearing the burden with the other, in his words (27), is “to feel his fellow’s sorrow in every possible way... because feeling a person’s sorrow, feeling all of his pains... requires a great deal of heartfelt attention and observance, to the point of bending oneself down to feel the burden of the weight”. And in another place (50): “that bearing the burden is the virtue of empathizing with all of the sufferer’s sorrow and agony, being troubled by all of his troubles, and feeling as if those stabbing pains are stabbing into his own flesh”. I shall add that Rabbi J.D. Soloveitchik sees the image of God in respect for fellow human beings (The Lonely Man of Faith, 15).

 

L.          What is before us is a halachic duty, and not only a mere “ethical counsel”; and this applies in cases where binding norms – laws – “are sometimes pushed aside and given the status of an ‘ethical counsel’, which is ostensibly less binding” (see my article, “Halachah and Ethics for Everyone: The Life and Work of the ‘Hafetz Haim’” [Hebrew], Blessing for Abraham (a compendium of articles in honor of Rabbi Prof. A. Steinberg), 5768-2008, 461, 467). This also gives rise to the duty toward the poor, “sufficient for whatever he needs” (Deuteronomy 15:8), which was interpreted in the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Kethuboth 67b) as “You are commanded to maintain him, but you are not commanded to make him rich” – although, in certain cases, the duty extends to providing a certain degree of comfort, as in the case of persons who have lost their assets, as described there; see Maimonides, Gifts to the Poor, 7, 3: “You are commanded to give to the poor man according to what he lacks”; and with regard to eligibility for charity in this regard, see Rabbi N. Bar Ilan, “The Eligibility of the Poor for Charity” [Hebrew], Tehumin II (5741-1981), 453; Rabbi S. Aviner, “Your Luxuries Do Not Come Before Your Fellow’s Life” [Hebrew] , Tehumin LXIX (5769-2009) 54; Rabbi S. Levi, “Giving Charity to a Poor Person Who Is Able to Earn a Living” [Hebrew], ibid., 57.

 

Guaranteed minimum income – charity by the public

 

M.         Guaranteed minimum income is in the nature of charity and righteousness done by the legislators – that is, the public – for the needy. The Torah (Deuteronomy 15:7-8) teaches us: “If, however, there is a needy person among you, one of your kinsmen in any of your dwellings in the land that the Lord your God is giving you, do not harden your heart and shut your hand against your needy kinsman. Rather, you must open your hand and lend him sufficient for whatever he needs.” Maimonides, in his legal treatise Gifts for the Poor (7, 1), says: “It is a positive commandment to give charity to the poor of Israel according to the needs of the poor, as far as the giver can afford”; it should be noted that this precept also applies to resident aliens (Leviticus 25:35), as well as to “your kinsman”.

 

N.          Maimonides further says (ibid., 10, 1): “We are obligated to be more observant of the commandment of charity than of any other positive commandment, for charity is the sign of the righteous of the seed of Abraham, as Scripture states: ‘For I have singled him out, that he may instruct his children [...] by doing what is just and right’ [Genesis 18: 19]. And the throne of Israel cannot be established and the true faith cannot stand, except for charity, as Scripture states: ‘You shall be established through righteousness’ (Isaiah 54:14). And Israel will not be redeemed except for charity, as Scripture states: ‘Zion shall be saved in the judgment; her repentant ones, through charity’ (Isaiah 1:27).” See also Sefer Ha-Hinnuch [the Book of Education, a list of the 613 positive precepts of Judaism], Precept No. 479 (“to give charity according to one’s means”) and Precept No. 66 (“lending to the poor – the root of this precept is that God desired that God’s creatures be accustomed to and trained in the characteristic of kindness and mercy, for it is a praiseworthy characteristic”).

 

On the importance of doing and encouraging work

 

O.          In the present case, at least one of the Petitioners (paragraph 5 of the judgment by Supreme Court President Beinisch) was forced to resign from her work under circumstances which involved “the attribution [of use] of the car”. We have seen, however, that the highest level of charity in Judaism – and, as set forth above, there are eight such categories of charity – is helping a poor person find work; see also Aruch ha-Shulhan, Laws of Charity, 249, 15, by Rabbi Yechiel Michal Epstein (Russia, 19th-20th centuries), who adds: “And in our time, in many cities, there are societies which assign Jewish boys to craftsmen [to learn a trade], and this is a very great thing, as long as they supervise them to ensure that they walk in the paths of God, pray every day, and be faithful to Heaven and to their fellow human beings.”

 

P.          And Rabbi Judah the Hassid (Book of the Hassidim, 5635-1875) said: “There is charity which is not recorded as charity, but is considered by the Creator, Blessed Be He, as excellent charity. For example, a poor man who has an object to sell or book that no one wants to buy, and a person buys it from him, or a poor man who wants to write... There is no greater charity than this, that he should make efforts at writing and you should let him do so...”. The importance of giving one’s fellow human beings not only respect, but work as well, is also indicated by the interpretation given by the Sages and by Rashi [Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki] to Exodus 21:37, “When a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for the ox, and four sheep for the sheep”. Rashi explains: “Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai said: ‘God took pity on human dignity. An ox walks on his own feet, and the thief did not suffer the indignity of carrying him on his shoulders – he pays five; a sheep, which he carried on his shoulders – he pays four, because he suffered indignity.’ Rabbi Meir said: ‘Come and see how great the power of work is: an ox, which he took away from its work – five; a sheep, which he did not take away from its work – four.’” See also N. Rackover, The Greatness of Respect for Fellow Human Beings: Human Dignity as a Supreme Value [Hebrew] (5759-1999), who cites, inter alia, the regulations of “not shaming those who have not” (pp. 145-148); see also E. Frisch, “Rashi’s Interpretation of the Payment of Four and Five – a Diachronic and Synchronic Study (Education to Values through the Teaching of Commentary)” [Hebrew], Peraqim VII (5741-1981), Schein College of Education, Petach Tikva, 155, 159-160, with respect to work and the importance thereof; see also Wygoda, ibid., 261 ff. Accordingly, if anyone finds a possibility for a poor person to earn a bit of a living, even if it involves some slight use of a car, this should not block the poor person’s way to a guaranteed minimum income; it is sufficient for the car to constitute one of the criteria for examination, in line with the outcome of our ruling.

 

Summary

Q.          Jewish law is saturated with the duties of charity, which begin with the individual and continue with the public. This is one of the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, as set forth above, and the ruling in the present case emphasizes this point.

 

Before closing

 

R.          This ruling was handed down on the last day of Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch’s term in office. Throughout the years of her public service – almost 50 years, in the Office of the Attorney General and the Supreme Court – she made many contributions to administrative and constitutional law in Israel. Among other positions, she served as Director of the Department of High Court of Justice Cases and the Attorney General of Israel, as a Justice and as the President of the Supreme Court. These lines express appreciation for her work and the blessing which it conferred upon Israeli law – inter alia, as a trailblazer for women, as the first woman to serve as Attorney General of Israel and as the President of the Supreme Court. Supreme Court Vice President Menachem Elon, when he retired, stated that the Hebrew word for “retirement” (gimla’ot) comes from the same root as the Hebrew word for “redeemer” (hagomel); and, indeed, those who retire in good health and are satisfied with the work they have done may praise the Redeemer of Israel [a reference to the Deity] for having come out in peace. I would like to wish President Beinisch much satisfaction in her future endeavors as well.

 

Justice

 

Justice S. Joubran:

 

1.          After reading the comprehensive opinion of my colleague the president, I saw fit to add my opinion to hers and to state, as she did in her opinion, that section 9A (b) of the Income Support Law, 5741-1980 (hereinafter: the Income Support Law) violates the constitutional right to a minimum dignified subsistenceto an extent that exceeds the required and, therefore, it should be repealed. In view of the importance of the issue at hand, and the legal questions that arise, I will add a few brief comments.

2.          Human rights, civil and social alike, have had a pivotal place in the Israeli legal system since its inception. Human rights, as an integral part of the basic principles of the legal system, were borne in mind by the Court when it interpreted the law, even before the Basic Laws on human rights were enacted. They were also borne in mind by the legislative authority, which gave legal validity to many of those rights, either in its guise as a legislative authority or in its guise as a founding authority. In this context, it should be noted that, as the president stated in her opinion, the distinction between civil rights and socio-economic rights originates in the historical development of the two systems of rights, and is not a substantive distinction (paragraphs 26-29 of her opinion). Clearly, each one of the human rights imposes "affirmative" obligations and "prohibitive" obligations on the state, in accordance with the context and circumstances of the matter. There is, therefore, no difference between the right to freedom of expression, the right to equality and the right to life – and the right to health, the right to education and the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. However, all human rights differ from one another in their extent and the scope of the legal and constitutional protection afforded them.

 

3.          It is well known that human rights, civil and social, are not absolute rights and they must be balanced – among themselves, and with opposing interests and values. The task of balancing the various human rights, and balancing human rights and other social values, is not a simple matter. The legislative authority is frequently faced with this balancing endeavor, and it must do its job while keeping in mind all the constitutional norms pertaining to the matter, as well as the public's interest. The legislative authority has the ability to gather the data and to examine the issue in depth, while considering all the direct and indirect ramifications of its decision, and it is the authority that most closely reflects the will of the people at any given time. In that framework, it is not for the Court to replace the legislative authority. The role of the Court is a narrow one and its only duty is to ensure that the legislative act honors the constitutional principles of the law, which reflects the basic views of the Israeli public. In that context, in our legal system, the limitation clause established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, has been recognized as an auxiliary tool to be borne in mind by the legislative authority when it endeavors to strike a balance between the violation of a protected constitutional right and the public’s interests and needs. It should be noted that, like the president, I believe that there should be no distinction, in the constitutional examination, between the manner of examining the protection of constitutional "civil" rights and the manner of examining the protection of constitutional "social" rights (see paragraph 29 of the president's opinion).

4.          Like civil rights, the social rights have been developed in Israeli law by the legislative authority and the courts. In another matter, in connection with violation of the right to equality, I noted that "The particular law creates a legal framework that reflects the manner in which the legislators decided that it was advisable to contend with a constitutional violation in a given context" (Leave for Civil Appeal 8821/09 Parhansky v. Layla Tov Productions Ltd. (not yet published, November 16, 2011); see also HCJ 721/94 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danielowitz, IsrSC 58 (5) 749, 778-779 (1994)).  That also holds true for social rights. In a long series of legislative acts, from the first days of the state, the Knesset formulated the relationship between the social rights and competing social interests. Thus, the legislature determined the scope of the right to health, inter alia, in the State Health Insurance Law, 5754-1994, the scope of the right to education in legislation such as the Compulsory Education Law, 5719-1949, and so forth. As part of the formulation of the social rights in Israel, a long series of social laws were enacted which establish arrangements that protect the right to a minimum dignified subsistencein accordance with the welfare policy in the State of Israel. These arrangements include disability and old age pensions, financing and operating public welfare services and many others. The Income Support Law was also enacted in the framework of this array of legislation. This law establishes the last social security system designed to assist someone who is unable to secure his own subsistence. In this manner, the Knesset established one of the mechanisms that it deems fitting for exercising the right to a minimum dignified subsistence.

5.          For many years, before the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, this large-scale task of formulating the socioeconomic rights of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel was the responsibility of only the legislative authority and the executive authority. While the actions of the executive authority were subject to judicial review, even before enactment of the Basic Law, the actions of the legislative authority were protected from judicial review, and the main contribution of the judicial authority to formulating the rights established in the Law was made by developing the law and its interpretation. Enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which gave expression to the constitutional concept of the Knesset in its role as a founding authority, granted a constitutional – supra-legislative status to the right to human dignity. The change in the legal status of the right to dignity required the Court to develop the Israeli constitutional law, while meticulously maintaining the duty of mutual respect between the branches of government. The Court was required to infuse content into the constitutional right and also to examine the weighty questions that arise when a piece of legislation is examined through the tests of the limitation clause.

 

6.          In this framework, the right to exist with dignity has been adjudicated before this Court in several cases, and there is seemingly no need to elaborate on its importance. Thus, it was stated that "… the human right to dignity is also the right to conduct one‘s ordinary life as a human being, without being overcome by economic distress and being reduced to an intolerable poverty. This is the outlook according to which the right to live with dignity is the right that a person should be guaranteed a minimum of material means, which will allow him to subsist in the society where he lives." (HCJ 366/03, Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 60 (3) 464,. 482 (2005); and see also HCJ 5578/02 Manor v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 59 (1) 729, 738 (2004)). The right to a minimum dignified subsistenceis what enables a person's material existence. As such, this right is of utmost importance and constitutes the cornerstone of a person's right to dignity and, sometimes, even to all the other rights. We know that poverty and hardship create a vicious cycle from which it is difficult for even the strongest to extricate themselves. This is a reality that creates feelings of alienation and lack of identification and smothers the hope for change. Without minimum living conditions, a person cannot exercise his freedom. Without minimum living conditions, a person cannot live a full and autonomous life and cannot become an active part of his society and his community. The following was written in this context:      Living in extreme poverty is analogous to a prolonged war of existential survival. Human beings who are forced, for various reasons, to live in the shadow of profound economic deprivation are constantly occupied with the attempt to find their next source of nourishment, a roof under which they can live and their ability to contend with extreme weather conditions… Many research papers indicate the fact that life in extreme poverty is closely connected to negative phenomena, both for the people existing in its shadow and for the society as a collective within which heavy economic deprivation exists… Societies in which extreme poverty exists contend with particularly high rates of domestic violence, drug abuse, debt and petty crime (Lia Levin, A "coalition of exclusion": Non take-up of social security benefits among people living in extreme poverty," 225, Access to Social Justice in Israel, Johnny Gal and Mimi Eisenstaedt, Ed., 2009)).

 

            Moreover, this reality of poverty and hardship has been threaded more than once through the other schisms that divide the society and cause the development of hostility and animosity between those who have plenty and those who cannot obtain even the most basic commodities.

 

7.         As part of the legal formulation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, there are two main questions facing the legislators, by which the right is also examined by the Court. First, the question of the scope of the right is examined. In other words, the question of defining the threshold for minimum subsistence – the existence of which the state is obligated to ascertain among all its residents. Second, the question of whether the means that were formulated to ascertain that all residents of the state enjoy that level of subsistence are examined, to see if they are fulfilling their role properly.

 

8.         In the present proceeding, only the second question requires our decision, since the Petitioners made no claim regarding the amount of the income support benefit. The question, therefore, pertains only to the manner of identifying those entitled to the income support benefit. The Respondents’ argument in this context is that maintaining or using a vehicle attests, in an absolute and universal manner, to the fact that the vehicle owner or user is not entitled to the income support benefit. This is because the conclusive presumption established in the Law reflects the assumption that the financial burden of maintaining a vehicle cannot be met by means of the income support benefit alone, and that the vehicle owner has additional income that has not been reported. In the context of vehicle usage, the meaning of the argument is that a benefit applicant did not correctly report his options for financial assistance in his immediate environment. My position, like the position of the president, is that this conclusive presumption violates the right to a minimum dignified subsistenceand is a violation that cannot stand.

 

9.         It should be noted that my opinion, like the opinion of the president, that there is nothing wrong with examining the assets of a benefit applicant for the purpose of evaluating his economic ability and to ascertain the veracity of his claims in everything pertaining to his financial status (paragraph 41 of her opinion). However, it is worth emphasizing in this context that the sole purpose of examining the assets is to check the real income of the benefit applicant. The manner in which a person spends the amount of the benefit lawfully given to him is completely within his discretion. Even though the state provides someone who is unable to provide for himself with a minimum dignified subsistence, it is not entitled to violate his autonomy and his choices by intervening in the way in which the benefit is used. If a person can reduce other expenses and save some of the benefit monies that are lawfully allocated to him in order to keep or use a vehicle, that fact cannot nullify his rights to the benefit as long as such savings do not attest to concealed assets and income.

10.       Violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistencein this case, which stems from the conclusive presumption established in the Law, forces a person to choose between possession or use of a vehicle (even if those do not necessarily attest to the fact that he possesses unreported sources of income) – and receiving the benefit. This violation is particularly grave in cases in which the vehicle serves its owner (or someone who uses it) for basic daily needs, which are not included in the exceptions set forth in the Law. There are many areas of the country in which, without a vehicle, people cannot reach the grocery store, the health clinic or educational institutions. In that context it should be noted that even though a vehicle is not necessarily a basic product that is included in the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, it would be advisable to view this right as obligating the state to provide some means of transportation to its residents. This obligation, which is the positive aspect of the right to freedom of movement, places a particularly heavy burden where the state wishes to deny the use of a vehicle to residents who have no other means of transportation. Hence, denying the possibility of using a vehicle in those areas is an extremely grave violation. It should further be noted in this context that I have not disregarded the Petitioners' argument that the areas in which access to public transportation is particularly scarce are the peripheral areas and, in particular, the regions of Arab villages, and that too could cloud the issue of the constitutionality and proportionality of the section. In any case, once we determined in this proceeding that this section should be repealed due to its violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence, I need not delve deeply into this issue.

 

11.        As my colleague, the president, has elaborated on the details of the violation caused by the section, and as I have also briefly mentioned the extent of this violation, I will only add a few words with regard to the disproportionality of the section. It should be noted that there is no disagreement between the president and me with regard to the proper purpose of the section, which is preventing fraudulent receipt of the benefit, based on the general purpose of the Law, which is providing a benefit that will allow for a minimum dignified subsistenceto someone who cannot obtain it for himself. Similarly, and in my opinion, the Law conforms to the values of the State of Israel and there is a rational connection between the means set forth in the Law and the purpose that it endeavors to promote.

12.        In her opinion, my colleague, the president, states that the section does not pass the second subtest of the requirement for proportionality, which is the test of the less harmful means. In her opinion, an individual examination of the benefit applications can lead to fulfilling the purpose to the same extent with less violation of the right to a minimum dignified subsistence. The question of the manner of examining the second subtest has yet to be fully clarified in the case law of this Court. In general, there are those who assert that the guiding principle in examining this subtest is that the alternative means must fulfill the purpose of the legislation to the same extent (see: Aharon Barak, Proportionality in Law – Violation of the Constitutional Right and its Limitations, 399 (2010); HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior, IsrSC 61 (2) 202, 344 (2006) and at similar costs (see HCJ 466/07 MK Zehava Galon v. Attorney General (unpublished, January 11, 2012) (hereinafter: the Dual Citizenship Law case), in paragraph 38 of the judgment of Justice E. E. Levy)). In my view, in the case at hand, we cannot establish with certainty that an individual examination meets that threshold. Even without the Respondents providing actual data in the matter, it is clear to all that an individual examination would cost more than a general denial of the benefit. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the chance of receiving the benefit fraudulently increases where the presumption is not conclusive.

 

13.        I discussed the difficulty inherent in this concept of the subtest in the Dual Citizenship Law case:

 

             In this matter, the question may arise about the extent to which the alternative means must fulfill the purpose of the law –must the fulfillment be complete and identical or can we suffice with a high extent of fulfillment, albeit not identical (id., paragraph 12).

 

            And regarding the costs, I noted in HCJ 1213/10 Nir v. Speaker of the Knesset (not yet published, February 23, 2012) that:

 

             In my opinion, the concern is that the requirement of identical fulfillment without additional costs is liable to empty this subtest of content and to lead, almost always and inherently, to the conclusion that no means has a more proportional alternative (id., paragraph 48).

 

And that also holds true in the case before us, in which this issue arises. In this matter, I have seen fit to concur with the president's opinion, and to determine that the Law is unconstitutional for the reason that it does not pass the test of the less harmful means.

 

14.       With regard to the extent of fulfillment of the purpose, it seems that the purpose of the section is fulfilled to a lesser extent in the framework of individual examination. However, examination of the alternative means on the backdrop of the Income Support Law as a whole, shows that the alternative means may fulfill the purpose of the Law to an extent that is not less (and perhaps even more) than the manner in which it is fulfilled by means of the present section. As stated, the purpose of the Income Support Law is to allow anyone who is eligible for income support to receive the benefit. The presumption established in this section is an auxiliary mechanism for identifying those entitled to the benefit. Notwithstanding the fact that that mechanism prevents those who are not eligible from receiving the benefit, it also prevents many of those who are eligible from receiving it. As such, the mechanism established in this section impairs fulfillment of the internal purpose of the Law. The question before us, in the context of the second test of proportionality, is whether, on the whole, the purpose of the legislation is fulfilled to the same extent. In other words, we must examine whether the excessive violation in fulfilling the purpose of the particular law (which arises from excessive exclusion), which stems from the presumption, exceeds the violation that would be created by fulfilling the purpose of the same law if individual examination were to be adopted. The burden of proving that the purpose of the law would, indeed, be fulfilled to a lesser extent if the alternative mechanism were to be adopted, was not met by the Respondents in the case before us. Furthermore, even if the costs of the particular examination would make the mechanism for implementing the Law more expensive, that extra expense is not expected to be very significant because, in any case, with the current mechanism, the state operates a system of personal monitoring in order to ascertain the nonuse of a vehicle, which entails expenses that are not negligible. In any event, the Respondents also did not meet the burden of proving that the alternative means would fulfill the purpose with significantly higher costs.

 

15.       Finally, I believe, as does the president, and for the same reasons, that the section does not meet the third subtest, which is the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. As noted above, the income support mechanism is among the last of the assistance mechanisms available in Israel for a person who is not capable of supporting himself. As such, it is advisable to employ extreme caution when a person is denied this last protective mechanism. It is clear that the damage caused by a person who fraudulently obtains a benefit to which he is not entitled is immeasurably smaller than the damage that would be caused by a person being left without the minimum means of subsistence. It should be noted in this context that it is a well-known phenomenon that precisely the neediest are those who have trouble meeting the threshold of proof required for receiving state assistance, and the state is obligated to endeavor, to the best of its ability, to reduce the number of people entitled to the benefit who do not receive it (see, inter alia, Netta Ziv, "Law and poverty – what is on the agenda? Proposal for a legal agenda for those who represent people living in poverty," Alei Mishpat, D 17 (5765); Amir Paz-Fuchs, "Over accessibility and under accessibility to socioeconomic rights, "Din Vedevarim, E 307 (5770)). It should further be noted that even though there is always a fear that people who are not entitled to the benefit will receive it, in the case of the income support benefit, this concern is relatively limited. This benefit, even if it constitutes the breath of life for those who need it, does not allow for a life of wealth and abundance, and I doubt whether many would be willing to live at the minimum subsistence level if they are able to live at a higher standard of living, only for the purpose of exercising their eligibility to the benefit. In any case, even if someone would do such a thing, that is the reason that the authorities are given broad powers to investigate the benefit applicants and, if necessary, to prosecute anyone who defrauds the state authorities.

            

16.        In view of everything stated above, I concur with the opinion of the president.

                                                                        Justice

 

             Decided as stated in the judgment of President D. Beinisch, that the order nisi will become an order absolute in the sense that we declare the repeal of section 9A (b) of the Income Support Law, 5741-1980, due to its unconstitutionality. The repeal will go into effect within six months of this date, on September 1, 2012.

 

In the circumstances of the matter, there is no order for costs.

 

Given this day, 5 Adar 5772 (February 28, 2012).

 

 

The President   Justice      Justice      Justice

 

 

Justice             Justice      Justice

 

 

_________________________

Thiscopy is subject to editorial and textual changes10041690_N04.docAB

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Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Committee

Case/docket number: 
EA 2/84
EA 3/84
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, May 15, 1985
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

The Knesset Elections Law establishes a Central Elections Committee, to which are submitted the various proposed candidates lists that wish to participate in the Knesset elections. The Committee reviews the lists to ascertain that they conform to the requirements of the Law, approves such lists as comply and disqualifies any list that does not comply, supervises the conduct of the election campaign and the elections themselves, rules on various issues that arise during the campaign and during the elections and certifies the results of the voting. The Committee is comprised of representatives of the party lists that are represented in the outgoing Knesset. It is chaired by a Justice of the Supreme Court.

 

The Central Elections Committee for the election of the eleventh Knesset disqualified two party lists. One was the "Kach" list, which it disqualified for the reason that it advocates racist and anti-democratic principles, that it openly supports terrorist acts, that it seeks to foment enmity and hatred between different segments of the population and that its goals and objectives negate the fundamentals of the democratic regime that prevails in the country.

               

The Committee also disqualified the "Progressive List for Peace" from participating in the elections on the ground that it contained within it subversive elements and that certain key members of the list conducted themselves in a manner that identified with enemies of the State.

               

Sitting in a panel of five Justices, the Supreme Court allowed these appeals and reversed the Committee's decisions. The lead opinion was written by the President of the court, Justice Shamgar. He held:

               

1.  There are no provisions in the statute concerning any limitations on the qualifications of a candidates list based on the list's beliefs and goals. Although the Yeredor case (see infra) established that the Committee could disqualify a list that sought to achieve the dissolution of the State, statutes and rulings that limit fundamental rights should be construed narrowly. One should not deduce from that precedent that there is room to expand the grounds for disqualifying a list to include less extreme circumstances.

 

2.  Applying the standards set forth in Yeredor to the "Kach" list, one must ask whether this is a body that seeks to prejudice the very existence of the State, whether the party group was declared - before its disqualification - to be an illegal organization, according to statute, or whether it was proved before the Committee or before a court that its goals include the total negation of the State. The distortions in its opinions, the outrage that they arouse and the desire to disassociate oneself from any approval of these ideas, even indirectly, are not sufficient legal grounds to disqualify the list once it has satisfied the statute's formal requirements.

 

3.  No evidence was presented to the Committee from which it might have concluded that the "Progressive List for Peace" meets the criteria of the Yeredor case. The Committee received a statement from the Defense Minister's spokesman to the effect that the Minister was convinced, on the evidence placed before him, that the list contained subversive elements. Although the information placed before a statutory authority need not meet the standards of evidence that apply in court, it is not sufficient that the Committee rely on information that is entirely in the hands of other parties. In this case, the Committee de facto delegated its authority to the Minister of Defense, and it had no right to do so. The classified nature of the information does not relieve a quasi-judicial body, such as the Committee, from its duty to examine the data itself and make up its own mind.

 

The Deputy president of the court, Justice Ben-Porat, concurred in the decision on the ground that, in her view, the Elections Law does not empower the Committee to consider the question whether a list is worthy of participating in the elections. All the Committee is empowered to do is to examine whether the proposed list meets the formal requirements set forth in the Law. Justice Ben-Porat expressed her agreement with the opinion of the dissenting Justice in the Yeredor case.

               

Justice Elon expressed the opinion that the Elections Law requires the Committee to approve a list once it determines that the list satisfies the requirements set forth in the statute. The Committee does not have any discretion to disqualify a list for other reasons. He supported the decision in the Yeredor case as based on a principle that stands above the ordinary canons of interpretation, namely, that the Law is given to live thereby, not to die thereby. Participation in the elections to the Knesset in order to destroy the State and the Knesset are self-contradictory. Society has a natural right to defend itself. But this is a onetime exception that cannot be applied to other grounds for disqualification of a list. He then surveyed the Jewish sources, in law and thought, that encourage intellectual freedom and the exchange of ideas. He rejected the "racist" ideas of the "Kach" list as contrary to Jewish values and to the Biblical conception that all persons are created in the image of God.

               

Justice Barak was of the opinion that the Committee has discretion to disqualify a list if there is a danger that its approval might undermine the very existence of the State or its democratic character. The proper balance between values that conflict with each other is to be found in the degree of probability that the particular harm sought to be prevented will occur. Nothing in the platform of the "Progressive List for Peace" demonstrates that the list seeks to destroy the State or to injure its democratic character. The "Kach" list's ideas are contrary to the general ideals and to the Jewish values on which the State is founded. But, so long as it has not been proved that there is a reasonable possibility of injury to the State's existence or to its democratic character, the list must be approved.

               

Justice Bejski distinguished between negation of the very existence of the State and injury to its democratic character. The necessity for judicial legislation in the case of the former does not justify extending the Yeredor ruling to the latter situation as well, especially when one considers the basically political nature of the issue. The Committee is a partisan political body. If it were given the power to disqualify a list on the ground that it undermines the democratic character of the regime, without statutory definitions and restraints, some lists might be disqualified for reasons of narrow partisan interests, as they happen to appear at a particular moment to a majority of the Committee. Based on the "reasonable possibility" test advocated by Justice Barak, the "Kach" list endangers the democratic character of the State. The reason it is not to be disqualified is that there is no legal authority to do so.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

            EA 2/84

EA 3/84

 

MOSHE NEIMAN ET AL.

v.

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE

   FOR THE ELEVENTH KNESSET

 

 

           

The Supreme Court Sitting as a Court of Election Appeals

[May 15, 1985]

Before Shamgar P., Ben-Porat D.P., Elon J., Barak J. and Bejski J.

 

 

           

Editor's synopsis -

            The Knesset Elections Law establishes a Central Elections Committee, to which are submitted the various proposed candidates lists that wish to participate in the Knesset elections. The Committee reviews the lists to ascertain that they conform to the requirements of the Law, approves such lists as comply and disqualifies any list that does not comply, supervises the conduct of the election campaign and the elections themselves, rules on various issues that arise during the campaign and during the elections and certifies the results of the voting. The Committee is comprised of representatives of the party lists that are represented in the outgoing Knesset. It is chaired by a Justice of the Supreme Court.

           

            The Central Elections Committee for the election of the eleventh Knesset disqualified two party lists. One was the "Kach" list, which it disqualified for the reason that it advocates racist and anti-democratic principles, that it openly supports terrorist acts, that it seeks to foment enmity and hatred between different segments of the population and that its goals and objectives negate the fundamentals of the democratic regime that prevails in the country.

           

            The Committee also disqualified the "Progressive List for Peace" from participating in the elections on the ground that it contained within it subversive elements and that certain key members of the list conducted themselves in a manner that identified with enemies of the State.

           

            Sitting in a panel of five Justices, the Supreme Court allowed these appeals and reversed the Committee's decisions. The lead opinion was written by the President of the court, Justice Shamgar. He held:

           

1.      There are no provisions in the statute concerning any limitations on the qualifications of a candidates list based on the list's beliefs and goals. Although the Yeredor case (see infra) established that the Committee could disqualify a list that sought to achieve the dissolution of the State, statutes and rulings that limit fundamental rights should be construed narrowly. One should not deduce from that precedent that there is room to expand the grounds for disqualifying a list to include less extreme circumstances.

 

2.      Applying the standards set forth in Yeredor to the "Kach" list, one must ask whether this is a body that seeks to prejudice the very existence of the State, whether the party group was declared - before its disqualification - to be an illegal organization, according to statute, or whether it was proved before the Committee or before a court that its goals include the total negation of the State. The distortions in its opinions, the outrage that they arouse and the desire to disassociate oneself from any approval of these ideas, even indirectly, are not sufficient legal grounds to disqualify the list once it has satisfied the statute's formal requirements.

 

3.      No evidence was presented to the Committee from which it might have concluded that the "Progressive List for Peace" meets the criteria of the Yeredor case. The Committee received a statement from the Defense Minister's spokesman to the effect that the Minister was convinced, on the evidence placed before him, that the list contained subversive elements. Although the information placed before a statutory authority need not meet the standards of evidence that apply in court, it is not sufficient that the Committee rely on information that is entirely in the hands of other parties. In this case, the Committee de facto delegated its authority to the Minister of Defense, and it had no right to do so. The classified nature of the information does not relieve a quasi-judicial body, such as the Committee, from its duty to examine the data itself and make up its own mind.

 

            The Deputy president of the court, Justice Ben-Porat, concurred in the decision on the ground that, in her view, the Elections Law does not empower the Committee to consider the question whether a list is worthy of participating in the elections. All the Committee is empowered to do is to examine whether the proposed list meets the formal requirements set forth in the Law. Justice Ben-Porat expressed her agreement with the opinion of the dissenting Justice in the Yeredor case.

           

            Justice Elon expressed the opinion that the Elections Law requires the Committee to approve a list once it determines that the list satisfies the requirements set forth in the statute. The Committee does not have any discretion to disqualify a list for other reasons. He supported the decision in the Yeredor case as based on a principle that stands above the ordinary canons of interpretation, namely, that the Law is given to live thereby, not to die thereby. Participation in the elections to the Knesset in order to destroy the State and the Knesset are self-contradictory. Society has a natural right to defend itself. But this is a onetime exception that cannot be applied to other grounds for disqualification of a list. He then surveyed the Jewish sources, in law and thought, that encourage intellectual freedom and the exchange of ideas. He rejected the "racist" ideas of the "Kach" list as contrary to Jewish values and to the Biblical conception that all persons are created in the image of God.

           

            Justice Barak was of the opinion that the Committee has discretion to disqualify a list if there is a danger that its approval might undermine the very existence of the State or its democratic character. The proper balance between values that conflict with each other is to be found in the degree of probability that the particular harm sought to be prevented will occur. Nothing in the platform of the "Progressive List for Peace" demonstrates that the list seeks to destroy the State or to injure its democratic character. The "Kach" list's ideas are contrary to the general ideals and to the Jewish values on which the State is founded. But, so long as it has not been proved that there is a reasonable possibility of injury to the State's existence or to its democratic character, the list must be approved.

           

            Justice Bejski distinguished between negation of the very existence of the State and injury to its democratic character. The necessity for judicial legislation in the case of the former does not justify extending the Yeredor ruling to the latter situation as well, especially when one considers the basically political nature of the issue. The Committee is a partisan political body. If it were given the power to disqualify a list on the ground that it undermines the democratic character of the regime, without statutory definitions and restraints, some lists might be disqualified for reasons of narrow partisan interests, as they happen to appear at a particular moment to a majority of the Committee. Based on the "reasonable possibility" test advocated by Justice Barak, the "Kach" list endangers the democratic character of the State. The reason it is not to be disqualified is that there is no legal authority to do so.

 

Note - In the elections to the eleventh Knesset, the "Progressive List for Peace" and the "Kach" list each gained one seat in the Knesset. The eleventh Knesset amended Basic Law: The Knesset, empowering the Elections Committee to disqualify a list if its actions or goals negate the establishment of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, negate the democratic character of the State or incite to racism (section 7A). Based on the third alternative, the Central Elections Committee for the elections to the twelfth Knesset disqualified the "Kach" list from participating in the elections. The Committee rejected a challenge to the "Progressive List for Peace" that was based on the first alternative. The Supreme Court turned down appeals from both decisions (EA 1/88, Neiman et al. v. The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset, P.D. 42(4) 177; E.A. 2/88, Ben Shalom et al. v. Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset, P.D. 43(4) 221).

 

 

Israel cases referred to:

[1] E.A. 1/65, Yeredor v.Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 19P.D.(3)365.

[2] H.C. 253/64, Gharis v. Haifa District Commissioner 18P.D.(4)673.

[3] C.A. 723/74, "Ha-aretz" Newspaper v. Israel Electric Corporation 31P.D.(2)281.

[4] H.C. 75/76, Hilron Ltd. V. Fruit Marketing Council 24P.D.(3)645.

[5] H.C. 337/81, Mitrani v. Minister of Transport 37P.D.(3)337.

[6] H.C. 581/80, Amsalem v. Prison Service Commissioner 35P.D.(2)325.

[7] S.S.A. 1/66, Pascal v. Attorney-General 24P.D.(3)71.

[8] C.A. 292/66, Axelrod v. Yitzhakian and Counter-Appeal 24P.D.(4)387.

[9] H.C. 245/66, Bustenai v. Inspector General of Police 24P.D.(4)441.

[10] H.C. 1/49, Bejerano v. Minister of Police 2P.D.80; 3P.E.54.

[11] H.C. 74/51, Contractors Association v. Minister of Commerce and industry 5P.D. 1544.

[12] H.C. 517/72, Snowcrest (Israel) Ltd. v. Mayor of Bene Berak 27P.D.(1)632.

[13] H.C. 442/71, Lansky v. Minister of the Interior 26P.D.(2)337.

[14] H.C. 56/76, Berman v. Minister of Police 31P.D.(2)687.

[15] H.C. 272/74, Kefar Azar Moshav Ovdim Ltd. v. Minister of Labour 29P.D.(2)667.

[16] H.C. 13/80, "Noon" Preservatives Ltd. v. State of Israel - Ministry of Health 34P.D. (2)693.

[17] H.C. 214/52, Shohat v. Inspector General of Police 7P.D.987; 17P.E.60.

[18] H.C. 288/51, 33/52 Atzlean v. Commander and Governor of Galilee 9P.D.689;19P.E.90.

[19] H.C. 554/81, Baranse v. Commander of Central Command 36P.D.(4)247.

[20] H.C. 297/82, Berger v. Minister of the Interior 37P.D.(3)29.

[21] F.H. 9/77, Israel Electric Corporation v. "Ha'aretz" Newspaper Ltd. 32P.D.(3)337.

[22] H.C. 141/82, Rubinstein v. Chairman of the Knesset 37P.D.(3)141; S.J. vol. VIII, supra p. 60.

[23] H.C. 246, 260/81, Agudat Derekh Eretz v. Broadcast Authority 35P.D.(4)1; S.J. vol. VIII, supra p. 21.

[24] H. C. 292/83, "Neemanei Har Habayit" Society v. Jerusalem Regional Police Commander 38P.D.(2)449.

[25] H.C. 153/83, Levi v. Southern District Police Commander 38P.D.(2)393; S.J.vol.VII,109.

[26] H.C. 73,83/57, "Kol Ha'am" et al. v. Minister of the Interior 7P.D.871; 13P.E.422; S.J.vol.I,90.

[27] H.C. 344/81, Negbi v. Central Elections Committee for the Tenth Knesset 35P.D.(4)837.

[28] C.A.2/77, Azugi v. Azugi 33P.D.(3)1.

[29] H.C. 188/63, Betzul v. Minister of the Interior 19P.D.(1)337. H.C. 188/63, Betzul v. Minister of the Interior 19P.D.(1)337.

[30] C.A. 32/81, Tzonen v. Stahl and Counter Appeal 37P.D.(2)761.

[31] H.C. 152/82, Alon v. Government of Israel 36P.D.(4)449.

[32] H.C. 234/84, "Hadashot" Ltd. v. Minister of Defence 35P.D.(2)477.

[33] F.H. 13/60, Attorney-General v. Matana, 16P.D.(1)430; S.J.vol.IV,122.

[34] Cr.A. 787,881/79, Mizrachi v. State of Israel and Counter-Appeal

35P.D.(4)421.

[35] Cr.A. 696/81, Azulai v. State of Israel 37P.D.(2)565.

[36] H.C. 163/57, Lubin v. TeI-Aviv-Jaffaa Municipality 12P.D.1043; 36P.E.227.

[37] H.C. 10/48, Zive v. Acting Officer in Charge of TeI Aviv Municipal Area 1P.D.85; 1P.E.33.

[38] H.C. 243/82, Zichroni v. Broadcast Authority Management Committee 37P.D.(1)757.

[39] Cr.A. 126/62, Dissenchik v. Attorney-General 17P.D.169; S.J.vol.V,152.

[40] H.C. 148/79, Sa'ar v. Minister of Interior and Police 34(2)P.D. (2)169.

[41] A.D.A. 1/80, Kahana v. Minister of Defence 35P.D.(2)253.

[42] C.A. 165/82, Kibbutz Hatzor v. Rehovot Tax Assessment Officer 39P.D.(2)70.

[43] H.C. 58/68, Shalit v. Minister of the Interior 23P.D.(2)477; S.J.Spec.Vol.(1962-1969)35.

[44] H.C. 29/62, Cohen v. Minister of Defence 16P.D.1023.

[45] H.C. 112/77, Vogel v. Broadcast Authority 31P.D.(3)657.

[46] H.C. 262/62, Peretz v. Kefar Shemaryhau Local Council 16P.D.2101.

[47] H.C. 241/60, Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies 15P.D.(3)1151; S.J. vol. IV, 7.

 

English case referred to:

[48] Rex v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte O'Brien (1923) 2 K.B.361 (C.A.).

 

American cases referred to:

[49] Woodby v. Immigration Service 385 U.S. 276 (1966).

[50] Yick Wo. v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1986).

[51] Williams v. Rhodes 393 U.S. 23 (1968).

[52] Anderson v. Celebrezze 103 S.Ct. 1564 (1983).

[53] Cousins v. Wigoda 419 U.S. 477 (1975).

[54] Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494; 71 S.Ct. 857; 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951).

[55] Communist Party v. Control Board 367 U.S. 1 (1961).

[56] Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

[57] Communications Assn. v. Douds 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

[58] Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357; 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927).

[59] Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

[60] McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

[61] Gompers v. United States 233 U.S. 604 (1914).

[62] Terminiello v. Chicago 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

[63] United States v. Dennis 183 F. 2d 201 (1950).

[64] Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

[65] Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

[66] Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

[67] Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

 

Jewish Law sources referred to:

            These references are not listed here, since they are given their full citation in the body of the case. On the Jewish law sources in general, see note under Abbreviations, supra, p. viii.

           

M. Schecter for the Appellant in E.A. 2/84;

zichrony, Feldman and Barad for the Appellant in E.A. 3/84;

R. Yarak, Director of High Court Matters, State Attorney's Office, for the Respondent.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

            SHAMGAR P.: 1. On June 28, 1984 we decided to allow each of the two appeals, to set aside the decision of the Central Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset of June 17, 1984, with respect to the Kach list, and its decision of June 18, 1984, with respect to the Progressive List for Peace, and to confirm the two mentioned lists for the purpose of section 63 of the Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version), 1969.

 

            At the same time we added:

           

Without derogating from the substantive reasoning called for in these two appeals, we have decided that the court finds it unnecessary at this stage to take a position on the question whether it should adopt the majority or the dissenting opinion in Elections Appeal 1/65 (Yeredor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 19 P.D.(3) 365), since we have reached the conclusion, on the basis of the facts before us, that there was no room to refuse confirmation of the two appellant lists even according to the majority opinion in Elections Appeal 1/65 .

 

We turn now to the substantive reasoning itself.

 

            2. There were two decisions of the Central Elections Committee as to which we convened to hear the appeals of the parties. The first was given, as aforesaid, on June 17, 1984 with reference to the Kach list, and this is the notice that was sent to the list following the decision:

           

I hereby inform you that the Central Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset, at its meeting on June 17, 1984, refused to confirm your list, the Kach list, by majority opinion, on the ground that this list propounds racist and anti-democratic principles that contradict the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, openly supports acts of terror, endeavours to kindle hatred and hostility between different sections of the population in Israel, seeks to violate religious sentiments and values of a sector of the state's citizens, and rejects in its objectives the basic foundations of the democratic regime in Israel.

 

Realisation of this list's principles would constitute a danger to the existence of the democratic regime in Israel and might also cause a breakdown of the public order.

 

            With respect to the Progressive List for Peace, the decision was given on June 18, 1984, and notice was delivered as follows:

           

I hereby inform you that the Central Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset, at its meeting on June 18, 1984, refused to confirm your list, the Progressive List for Peace, by majority opinion, on the ground that this list indeed harbours subversive elements and tendencies, and central persons in the list act in a manner identifying themselves with enemies of the state. The majority opinion rested on close scrutiny of all the verified information put before the Minister of Defence, and on the affidavit of General Avigdor Ben-Gal dated September 24, 1980. Likewise the opinion of the majority was reinforced by the statements made by representatives of the list to the Committee and to the Minister of Defence, as recorded in the minutes of June 8, 1984.

A majority of the Committee members was persuaded that this list advocates principles that endanger the integrity and existence of the State of Israel and the preservation of its unique character as a Jewish state in accordance with the founding principles of the state as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Law of Return.

 

            The notices were addressed to counsel for the respective lists and were signed by the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, Justice Gavriel Bach .

           

            3. The basic statutory definition of the right to submit one's candidacy for election to the Knesset is to be found in section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which provides as follows:

           

Every Israel national who on the day of the submission of a candidates list containing his name is twenty-one years of age or over, shall have the right to be elected to the Knesset unless a court has deprived him of that right by virtue of any Law or he has been sentenced to a penalty of actual imprisonment for a term of five years or more for an offence against the security of the State designated in that behalf by the Knesset Elections Law and five years have not yet passed since the day when he terminated his period of imprisonment.

 

            Section 7 of the same Basic Law lists the state functionaries who are precluded from candidacy for the Knesset because of holding such office.

           

            The procedure for approving lists of candidates is set forth in Chapter F of the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], section 56 of which deals with holders of office who may not be candidates, while section 56a lists the offences which may entail deprival of the right to be elected under section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset. Section 57 prescribes the manner in which candidates lists are to be drawn up, signed and submitted. The other sections of the Chapter deal with representatives of the lists, a security deposit, designations and letters of candidates lists, and rectification of defects in drawing up a candidates list.

                

                 Section 63, titled "Approval of Candidates Lists", reads as follows:

 

A candidates list duly submitted, or rectified in accordance with the previous section, shall be approved by the Central Committee, which shall notify the representative of the list and his deputy of the approval not later than the 20th day before election day.

 

            Section 64 of the Law deals with appeals against a refusal to approve a candidates list, subsection (a) of which provides:

           

            Where the Central Committee refuses to approve a candidates list, either wholly or as to the name of one of the candidates or the designation or letter of the list, it shall, not later than 20 days before election day, notify its refusal to the representative of the list and his deputy, and they may, not later than 18 days before election day, appeal to the Supreme Court against such refusal.

 

            Certain changes concerning these time periods, set forth in sections 62, 63 and 64, applied to the elections to the 11th Knesset, as a result of the Eleventh Knesset Elections (Temporary Provisions) Law, 5744-1984, but these are of no concern here.

           

            So much for the text of the Law. It is clear that the statute says nothing about prohibiting or restricting candidates lists on the basis of the list's principles, its purposes and objectives, or the views of its members. In other words, the text of the pertinent legislation in effect on June 17 or 18, 1984 makes no express provision for the disqualification of a list on any of the grounds included in the notice of exclusion sent by the Central Elections Committee to each of the appellant lists.

           

            4. (a) The authority of the Central Elections Committee to refuse to confirm a list of candidates for the Knesset on grounds of the list's political objectives and character was discussed in this court for the first time in E.A. 1/65 [1] (the Yeredor case). There this court, by a majority opinion, dismissed the appeal of a candidates list (named the Socialists List) which wished to take part in the elections to the Knesset, but had been refused confirmation by the Central Elections Committee. According to the Committee's decision, as cited in the above mentioned appeal, the list was disqualified

           

            for the reason that this candidates list is an illegal association since its promoters negate the integrity and very existence of the State of Israel.

           

            (b) The underlying reasons for the decision of the Central Elections Committee to the Sixth Knesset came largely to the fore in the statement made by the Committee Chairman, Justice Moshe Landau, when summing up his opinion before the Committee members. He mentioned that the list was in fact identical, according to various tests, with the EI-Ard Group, an association that was declared illegal under regulation 84 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, after the Supreme Court had refused to intervene in the District Commissioner's refusal to register it as an amuta* noting that its objectives absolutely and conclusively negated the existence of the State of Israel in general, and its existence within its present borders, in particular (H.C. 213/ 64, Gharis v. Haifa District Commissioner [2]). The society's illegality was not in itself the principal reason for its disqualification by the Elections Committee; rather, the fact was emphasized that the illegality found expression in an endeavour to undermine the existence or integrity of the state. In E.A. 1/65 [1] the Chairman of the Elections Committee was cited as saying, inter alia (at p. 372):

 

            I find a vast difference, as East is separate from West, between a group of people which seeks to undermine the very existence of the state or, in any event, its territorial integrity, and a party that acknowledges the political entity of the state but wishes to alter its internal regime.

           

            He added that Basic Law: The Knesset, does not at all deal with the issue under consideration, but refers only to the personal disqualification of a candidate; however, he thought it permissible to read Basic Law: The Knesset and the Knesset Elections Law, 1959, together with the Cooperative Societies Law, and to read into the Knesset Elections Law an implied condition that an illegal organisation cannot be confirmed as a list. A list that is illegal in the sense that it is opposed to the very existence of the state cannot be confirmed, because the Knesset, which is the sovereign institution in the state and expresses the will of the people, cannot incorporate within it an element that negates the very existence of the state.

           

            (c) This court's decision in Yeredor [1] represented a majority opinion. Cohn J., dissenting, held that there was no statutory provision from which one could deduce the authority of the Central Elections Committee to refuse to confirm a list that has met all the formal conditions specified in chapter F of the Law, whatever the nature of the list's platform or objectives. In his opinion, the legislator's silence and the absence of any statutory provision allowing the disqualification of a candidates list on grounds of its character and platform, deprived the Elections Committee's decision of all legal effect and (it) contravened, in spirit, the principle of the rule of law. Therefore, the decision had to be set aside, and he so ruled.

           

            (d) The President (Agranat) and Sussman J. (representing the majority opinion) took the contrary view that the character of the candidates list was in polar opposition to the very purpose of the elections, because in essence and objective the list negated the existence of the state, and it wished to bring about the annihilation of the State of Israel. Agranat P. said (at pp. 385-386):

           

            Indeed, there can be no doubt - and this is clearly deduced from the statements made in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State - that Israel is not only a sovereign, independent and freedom-seeking state, characterized by a regime of the people's government, but it was also established as "a Jewish State in the Land of Israel", for the act of its establishment was effected first and foremost by virtue of "the natural and historic right of the Jewish people to live like any independent nation in its own sovereign state, and that act was a realization of the aspirations of generations towards the redemption of Israel.

 

At the present stage of the state's existence, I need hardly remark, these words express the nation's vision and credo and we are therefore obliged to bear them in mind "when we come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the State" (H.C.73, 87/53 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of interior 7P.D. 871, 884). The import of that creed is that the matter of the continuity - or if you wish: "the perpetuity of the State of Israel is a fundamental constitutional fact", which no state authority, whether administrative, judicial or quasijudicial, may disclaim when exercising its power.

 

            The statements of the President and of his concurring colleague, Sussman J., recognise that in the normal course of affairs the Central Elections Committee does not have authority to refuse the confirmation of lists that meet the formal statutory requirements. But it happens - as in E.A. 1/65[1] - that extreme and exceptional constitutional factors converge to create a direct confrontation between the very grant of the right to compete in elections and the clear purpose of the elections, or - in more specific and precise terms - there arises a polar conflict between participation in the elections and the intention of the list to destroy the body, in the election of which it wishes to take part. In these circumstances, the committee is authorised to deny the right of participation in the elections, on the merits of the matter.

           

            In the opinion of Agranat P., the basic constitutional premise that the court must take into account in interpreting the laws of the state is that the State of Israel is an existent state, and that its continuity and perpetuity cannot be questioned. This interpretative approach has direct bearing on the problem that arises when one wishes to reconcile a statutory provision that establishes the governmental institution for which the elections are being held, and the negation of its existence advocated by candidates of a list that wishes to take part in the elections. The answer is that this question - whether or not to act for the liquidation of the state and negation of its sovereignty-cannot arise at all on the agenda of the Knesset, for its very presentation contradicts what Agranat P. called the will of the people residing in Zion and its vision and credo. The effect of all this is that a candidates list which denies that doctrine does not have any right, as a list, to take part in the elections for the house of representatives. A group of persons whose unconcealed political objective is not merely "to alter the internal constitutional regime of the state" but "to undermine its very existence", as emphasised by the chairman of the Central Elections Committee, cannot a priori have any right to take part in the process of formulating the will of the people, and cannot, therefore, present its candidacy in the Knesset elections.

 

            Sussman J. elaborated this point (at pp. 389-390):

           

..."An illegal purpose", in the present context does not mean a purpose that aspires to change the internal order of government. This order is not sacred, nor is its alteration a crime that entails punishment. Rather an "illegal purpose" in this context is a purpose that aims to destroy the state, to bring disaster upon the majority of its inhabitants for whom it was established, and to join forces with its enemies... Just as a man does not have to agree to be killed, so too a state does not have to agree to be destroyed and erased from the map. Its judges are not allowed to sit back idly in despair at the absence of a positive legal directive when a litigant asks them for assistance in order to bring an end to the state. Likewise no other state authority should serve as an instrument in the hands of those whose, perhaps sole, purpose is the annihilation of the state.

(Emphasis added - M.S.).

 

            It transpires that even the judges of the majority opinion in the Yeredor case [1] did not consider themselves authorised to fill the gap in the law, in its simple sense, so as to add reservations related to the objectives and character of a candidates list, of the kind that can be found in the elections laws of some countries. All that was decided in Yeredor was that even where the existing law contains no provision allowing disqualification of a list, one must avoid the extreme, substantive and logical contradiction that would allow those who seek an end to the existence of the state and its authorities, to compete in the Knesset elections. One should not deduce from this that the court considered the Elections Committee or itself competent to add to the law and to assume the authority to deny a list its rights, even when no such extreme background conditions operate, and even when such polar conflict between participation in elections and the wish to uproot that elected body's existence, does not arise. Here, the interpretative leap does not entail the lesser power. On the contrary, only an extreme situation permits a kind of judicial legislation that goes beyond the written text so as to fill a gap, because existential necessity, and certainly also constitutional logic, require that it be filled.

 

            The described limitation on the court's possible scope of action, which arises from the existing constitutional situation, therefore found expression also in the conclusion of Sussman J., that there was no identity between the legal situation in a different country - where an express constitutional provision allowing disqualification of a candidates list had been enacted - and our constitutional situation. He said (at p. 390):

           

            ...The German constitutional court, in discussing the question of the legality of a political party, spoke of a "fighting democracy" which does not open its doors to acts of subversion masquerading as legitimate parliamentary activity. As far as I am concerned, as regards Israel, I am satisfied with a "self-defending democracy", and we have the tools to protect the existence of the state even though we do not find them enumerated in the Elections Law.

 

            5. (a) In summary, it appears to have been the opinion of the dissenting judge, Cohn J., that this court does not, today, have any authority to refuse to confirm a candidates list that meets the formal requirements, whereas the judges of the majority opinion held that the court does indeed have such authority, but only with respect to a candidates list that negates the very existence of the state. Because of the importance of this reasoning in application to the instant issue, it should be elaborated further.

           

            (b) The remarks of Cohn J. as to the lack of authority to disqualify a list, regardless of its provocative character and nature, were clear-cut; in his view it was required and necessary that the legislature determine express provisions as to the disqualification of lists and that a particular body - be it the Central Elections Committee, or the Knesset itself, or the court - be vested with the authority to exclude from the Knesset "heretics of the kind who are traitors to the state and aid its enemies". However, the Central Elections Committee and the court may not assume such authority ex nihilo so as to add restrictions and limitations to the election laws. Thus (ibid. p. 379):

           

            In a state governed by the rule of law a person may not be deprived of any right, be he the most dangerous criminal and despicable traitor, except and only in accord with the law. Neither the Central Elections Committee nor this court legislate in this state; the Knesset is the legislative authority, and it empowers designated bodies, if it so wishes, to mete out treatment in accord with a man's conduct and the outcome of his actions. In the absence of such legislative authorization, neither common sense, necessity, love of country nor any other consideration whatever, justify taking the law into one's own hands and depriving another person of his right .

 

          Any measure that is contrary to law or is taken without lawful authority and is calculated to deprive a person of his civil rights, is invalid, in his opinion, and an Israel judge will not uphold it. He added (ibid. p. 382):

         

          There are states in which the security of the state, or the sanctity of the religion, or the achievements of the revolution and the dangers of the counter-revolution, and similar kinds of values, pardon any crime and atone for any action performed without authority and contrary to the law. Some of these states have invented for themselves a natural law which is superior to any legal norm and annuls it when necessary, in the sense that necessity knows no law. These are not the way of the State of Israel; its ways are those of the law, and the law issues from the Knesset or under its express authorization.

(On this aspect, cf. S. Guberman, "Israel's Supra-Constitution", 2 Israel L.R. 445 (1967), at 460.)

 

          Also the majority justices did not believe that the full range of the problem, in all its variations, potentially arising before the Central Elections Committee, could be solved comprehensively without recourse to express legislation. It is absolutely clear from their choice of language that the path they chose was dictated by the extreme nature of the case before them. One cannot deduce from their opinions that they found the constitutional state of affairs satisfactory or that the existing statutory arrangement might be left as it was, and that the solution of these problems - effected in some countries according to constitutional guidelines - be left to the Central Elections Committee, with the changing political coloration of its members, for them to contend with the issue from time to time, to the best of their understanding.

         

          To sharpen the perspective and to indicate additional problems stemming from the fact that the current law deals only with the formal qualifications of the candidates lists, one might mention here, for example, that a right of appeal to the Supreme Court is granted to a disqualified list alone, and if the Elections Committee had chosen to confirm a list of the kind disqualified in E.A. 1/65, there would be no right of appeal available to any other party or body wishing to challenge that decision. The right of appeal under the prevailing law exists only in case of refusal to confirm a list, and not in case of its confirmation.

         

          The approach taken by the majority in E.A. 1/65 [1] pays regard to the essence of fundamental constitutional concepts, but beyond that, and in light of what has already been said, it must be considered in its proper context: a given answer to a constitutional issue might be good and correct for the solution of an extreme, complex problem that arises at a given time, but it should not necessarily be considered a guideline - and certainly not a cure-all - for every additional constitutional complication that public authorities encounter. The conclusion that ought to have been drawn at the time, also from the majority opinion, is that one who seeks to test the qualifications of lists according to their substance and objectives, beyond mere formal criteria, must find for that purpose a legal foundation expressed in a legislative act; the power of the Elections Committee to act without express statutory provision can be exercised only in very exceptional cases, namely: with respect to a list that seeks the annihilation of the state. This should have been clear to anyone interested in the conferment of further powers, such as those found in the constitution of the present German Republic. Yet from 1965 until now there has been no legislative initiative in this respect, neither on the part of the executive branch nor, more important, on the part of the legislature, which normally itself takes the initiative in relation to the enactment of electoral laws (but see the bill for the Knesset Elections (Amendment No. 9) Law, 1968, introduced by Y.H. Klinghoffer, M.K.). Naturally, this is doubly significant in light of the limited scope of E.A. 1/65 [1] (in terms of the circumstances of its application), upon which the Central Elections Committee again sought to rely when making the two decisions which form the subject of the present appeals. Moreover, in addition to the clearly restrictive language of the judgment in E.A. 1/65 [1], there is the restrictive interpretative approach that accompanies any limitation of a fundamental constitutional right.

 

            Our frame of reference, as will be seen below, is that the right to take part in elections and to compete for the voter's ballot is a fundamental civil right, since it emanates from the doctrines of both civil equality and the freedom of expression. A statutory provision or judicial rule which seeks to limit a right is not given a broad sweeping interpretation; on the contrary, their proper interpretation is restrictive and strict (Ha'aretz v. Electricity Corporation [3], at p. 295; Hilron v. Council for Fruit Manufacture and Marketing [4], at p. 653).

           

            As stated in Ha'aretz [3]:

           

            Any statutory limitation on the scope and extent of such right shall be interpreted in a restrictive manner so as to give the said right maximum existence and not to limit it in any degree beyond the clear and express statutory language (H.C. 75/76, Hilron, at p. 653). The freedom of expression and a statutory provision that limits it are not of equal and identical status; to the extent that it is compatible with the written word, the existence of the right should at all times be preferred to a statutory provision designed to limit it. In summary, the standard which accords protection of the freedom of expression primary consideration when that right conflicts with another should find full expression not only when the legislature shapes the provisions of the statute but also in the interpretation of the statute and the application of its directives to circumstances in which its substance and operation are tested in practice .

           

            This is the case when weighing a principle that determines a fundamental right as against a statutory provision that limits it; likewise, a fortiori, when balancing a statutory provision that confers a fundamental right against the intention or wish to restrict it without express statutory authority thereto (cf. H.C. 337/81 [5]).

           

            Hence in accordance with our accepted practice in the interpretation of statutes, there is no room to widen the reach and form an expansive interpretation of the majority opinion in Yeredor [1] and attempt to derive therefrom what is not really there; that is, as if there were room for substantive extension of the inherent disqualificatory power vested in the Central Elections Committee, so that it applies also to cases in which the exceptional circumstances of Yeredor are not present.

           

            It should be clarified that we related to this court's ruling in Yeredor as a primary standard in the present case because the minutes of the deliberations before the Committee reveal that it intended to act within the framework of this court's earlier decision, and thought that it was indeed doing so. Thus, from a strictly formal point of view, we could have disposed of the matter conclusively by merely examining this approach of the Committee. However, in order to complete the picture and encompass the oretical aspects of the matter, it will be dealt with on the merits and independently of our earlier ruling, so as to allay any doubt as to whether there is room for extending the scope of the ruling in Yeredor, that is, whether there is room in the present case to add grounds for disqualification by sole virtue of a new ruling by this court, unsupported by any Knesset enactment. We shall discuss this matter separately, below.

           

            6. By adopting the criteria of the majority opinion in E.A. 1/65[1], we could immediately decide the matter before us. As appears from our decision of June 26, 1984, no facts were brought before the Central Elections Committee from which it could have concluded that either or both of the appellant lists were, as far as known and proven, of a character and identity found by the majority in Yeredor [1] to constitute grounds for disqualifying a list. The reasons for this conclusion differ for each of the lists.

           

            7. In applying the criteria of the majority opinion in E.A. 1/65[1] to the issue of approval of the Kach list, one must pose and be guided by questions corresponding to the rules adopted in that case:

              

(a) Are we dealing with an entity that seeks to undermine the very existence of the state?

(b) Was this entity regarded, prior to the deliberations of the Elections Committee, as a prohibited association or an organisation declared illegal, under one of the enabling enactments in this regard (chapter 8, title 2 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977; regulation 84 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations; section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948)?

(c) Was it proven to the Committee, or to us, that the goals of the list utterly negate the existence of the State of Israel? In the words of Sussman J., an illegal purpose does not mean a purpose that aspires merely to change the order of government. We should add that the distortion in the views expressed by the list and its spokespersons, or the opposition and even disgust which these arouse, and the desire to avoid any indirect affirmation of the list's very existence and the dissemination of its views - all of these are insufficient legal reason, in the present state of the law, for disqualifying the list. We shall later return to this aspect.

 

            In order to give the answer, matters should be assessed as they stand, according to their plain meaning and substance. There is no room for a forced description that would bring the facts artificially within the parameters of the Yeredor ruling. It is not enough to seize upon the expressions used by the court in Yeredor [1] in order to describe correctly the facts pertaining to the nature and activities of the Kach list. The repugnance aroused by the views and opinions expressed by a list does not permit the confusion of dissimilar elements, nor provide an opening for an expansive subjective interpretation that is unsuited to substantive judicial examination in general and constitutional inquiry in particular.

           

            Accordingly one cannot escape the conclusion that the answers to the three questions posed above, are in the negative, and it follows that by the criteria of the Yeredor ruling, there was no occasion to disqualify the Kach list.

           

            8. (a) As regards the Progressive List for Peace, the gist of the argument against it was that its leader should be regarded as a kind of reviver or continuer of the EI-Ard Movement, so that everything said and decided in respect of the Socialists List in Yeredor [1] applies also to it.

           

            (b) The composition of the Socialists List did not, in fact, coincide with the leadership of the EI-Ard movement, but it did reflect that movement, which was declared illegal and whose objects were defined as unlawful by this court, since some of those who headed it were also at the head of EI-Ard. The Socialists List comprised only ten candidates, and among them there were five, that is one half, who had been members of the illegal EI-Ard, which advocated the liquidation of the state. In the present case, on the other hand, we are dealing with a list of 120 candidates, only one of whom - the person at its head - belonged in the past to the EI-Ard movement. The head of the list, Advocate Miyaari, a past member of EI-Ard, contended that he did not regard the list as a continuation of that unlawful movement, and the mixed composition of the list of candidates appears, prima facie, to support this thesis. He further explained in his appearance before the Elections Committee that he no longer represents the views of EI-Ard and dissociates himself from the P.L.O. Covenant.

 

          Clearly, the mere denial of ideological association with a past entity cannot in itself amount to an irrebuttable presumption, juris et de jure that such is the case. Evidence could have been brought before the Committee in refutation of such denial and seeming to point to an opposite conclusion. In this regard two questions arise. First, what is the measure of proof, that is, what must be proven to the Central Elections Committee and upon whom lies the burden of proof? A second and separate question is, what is the decision-making process before the Committee, and to what extent can it avail itself of decisions of other authorities? The first matter concerns substance and quantity; the second concerns the manner of adducing evidence.

         

          How does this apply?

         

          The decision to disqualify a list lies with the Central Elections Committee, hence any ground for disqualification must be proved before it. That is to say, once a list has complied with the formal statutory requirements (a sufficient number of signatures in the required form, their submission to the Committee, etc.), it has fulfilled its obligation, and anyone attributing to the list a shortcoming, in its nature or objectives, bears the burden of proving so and convincing the Committee, which has the authority to decide the matter. It follows that if it was claimed that the Progressive List for Peace is a list seeking the liquidation of the state, like for example the EI-Ard movement, or the Socialists List which followed in its footsteps, and that it is nothing but the same old hostile and subversive movement in new garb, evidence to prove that thesis should have been brought before the Central Elections Committee.

         

          Material required to be brought before a statutory authority does not necessarily have to be submitted in the form of evidence admissible in a court of law and proven in the manner in which evidence is presented in court. An authority exercising discretion vested in it by law is not bound by the laws of evidence applicable in a court of law unless otherwise provided by statute (which is not the case here), and it may base its decisions on information that reaches it even if not given to proof in court proceedings where the law of evidence obtains (H.C. 581/80[6], at 328; S.S.A. 1/66[7], at 78). Thus a tribunal or other authority upon which a power of decision has been conferred by law, may base its decision on uncorroborated evidence when a court would require corroboration, or it may accept evidence not admissible in ordinary judicial proceedings (C.A. 292/66[8], at 391; H.C. 245/66[9], at 446; but cf. H.C. 1/49[10], at 84, where it was explained that mere rumour is not sufficient to found the authority's decision; and see also H.C. 74/51[11], at 1552, and H.C. 517/72[12], at 637). As we have said, the court will tend to set aside a decision grounded only on rumour or unsubstantiated surmise and conjecture, but if factual evidence is brought before the authority, upon which it can base its evaluation and decision - that is, material of such evidentiary value that reasonable people would find it a sufficient foundation for inferring the nature and activities of those concerned (see also H.C. 442/71[13]) - the court will not incline to interfere with the authority's conclusion. As was said in H.C. 442/71[13], not all hearsay testimony can have weight in the view of the authority, for example testimony which is nothing more than vague rumour. But the question of the weight and credibility of the testimony is a matter for the authority to decide, and no rules can be laid down in advance on how it must proceed, except that the testimony - having regard to the subject, the content and the witness - must be such that a reasonable person would regard it as possessing evidentiary value and rely upon it.

 

            A statutory authority is not dependent in its decision on a previous finding by a judicial body (H.C. 56/76[14], at 692), and the power of decision is vested in its hands. Once vested with such decisory authority, it does not discharge its duty if it bases its decision on weak or unconvincing evidence. In this connection I would not construe literally the general dicta sometimes found in the case law that it is enough, as it were, for a statutory authority to have before it some material (H.C. 272/74[15], at 672; H.C. 13/80[16], at 696). According to my understanding, the expression some material does not refer to bits and pieces of material, but to such as a reasonable person might find a basis for forming an opinion, a belief or a suspicion, as the case may be.

           

            H.C. 56/76[14] dealt with the question of denying existing rights, and there it was said that for the purpose of its decision the authority must have before it persuasive and credible evidence that leaves no room for doubt. I accept the implication of this dictum that with regard to the denial of existing rights - a fortiori fundamental rights - equivocal evidence will not suffice. As is the accepted situation in the United States, I think that the evidence required to persuade a statutory authority of a justification for denying a fundamental right must be clear, unequivocal and convincing (see Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) [49], which concerned evidence before the administrative authority prior to issuing a deportation order; see also C.T. McCormick, On Evidence (St. Paul, 3rd ed., by E.W. Cleary and others, 1984) 1023).

           

            The more important the right, the greater the required weight and force of the evidence that is to serve as a basis for a decision in diminution of the right.

           

            Incidentally, I am not dealing here with the interesting question of the demarcation of power between a statutory authority and a court, so far as concerns the upholding of evidence and the line between law and fact (B. Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade, Legal Control of Government (Oxford, 1972) 226, 235; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London, 1984) 311). That is to say, I am not dealing here with the issue of when a court should intervene on a question of fact, since that is not necessary in the present context.

           

            So much as regards the material that may serve as a basis for decision in the circumstances of this case. I now turn to the other question, the manner of reaching a decision.

           

            9. (a) As was stated in H.C. 214/52[17], the evidence should have been brought before the decision-making authority, that is, in the present case, before the Central Elections Committee. However, with respect to the Progressive List for Peace no evidence was actually presented to the Elections Committee upon which it could have concluded that the list suffered a blemish of the kind that founded the majority decision in Yeredor [1].

           

            (b) In the decision of the Elections Committee, the text of which was cited at the commencement of this judgment, it was maintained that this list -

           

...harbours subversive elements and tendencies, and central persons in the list act in a manner identifying themselves with enemies of the state.

 

That is the conclusion. Now as to the factual basis:

 

. .The majority opinion rested on close scrutiny of all the verified information put before the Minister of Defence and on the affidavit of General Avigdor Ben-Gal dated September 24, 1980. Likewise the majority opinion was reinforced by the statements made by representatives of the list to the Committee and to the Minister of Defence...

 

            The information placed before the Minister of Defence was not presented to the Elections Committee and did not come to its knowledge during the course of its deliberations. It received a notice from the spokesperson of the Minister of Defence, that -

           

...After a basic examination of all the verified information placed before him, including the oral declarations and arguments submitted by the list's representatives, the Minister of Defence is convinced that there are indeed subversive elements and tendencies among groups associated with the list and central persons on the list act by way of identification with the enemies of the State.

           

            The nature and details of the verified information before the Minister of Defence remained entirely unknown, not one iota thereof was put before the Committee, and the language of the notice as a whole was vague and ambiguous. Such a notice, which contains no factual details, does not constitute any kind of evidence.

           

            If "elements and tendencies" are present among the groups associated with the list, what is their weight in it? Does this refer to one out of the one hundred and twenty, or to ten of them? What are these "elements", that is, is the reference to groups of people or to programs or views? What is the practical meaning of the term "subversive"? And so on. After all, matters such as these lend themselves to varied evaluations and interpretations, and it is the Committee itself that must draw the conclusion according to its own best discretion. Moreover, as already said, abstract descriptions and generalised conclusions formulated to follow verbatim the observations of this Court in Yeredor [1], are not sufficient if not duly founded on facts brought to the attention of the Committee and considered by it on their merits.

           

            To summarize, since the material remained in the possession of the Minister of Defence or General Ben-Gal, as the case may be, the Committee did not have before it factual details upon which to ground its decision, but rested its decision on a discretion exercised by others on the basis of information brought before those others. We shall deal with this question more extensively later on.

           

            (c) At this point we may pause briefly to consider the manner in which the Committee arrived at its decision, and the limits of judicial review thereof. So far as concerns this court, the accepted view is that in reviewing the action of a statutory authority we examine, in general, whether the modes of deliberation were lawful, and whether the authority had before it material on which it could base its decision (H.C. 288/51, 33/52[18]; H.C. 554/81[19], at 251).

           

            This general observation may be broken down into elements. Lawful deliberation means, generally, that the principles of natural justice have not been violated; that the procedures prescribed by statute and applying to the authority, or set out in the regulations under which it functions, have been observed; that the decision was rendered by the competent person and that it was commensurate with the material jurisdiction of the decision-making authority; that the decision-making authority exercised its power in furtherance of its purpose; that no mistake of law occurred and that the decision was not tainted by fraud or influenced thereby; that the decision was made on the basis of supporting evidence, and, finally, that it was not contrary to law for some other reason. The exercise of a power in furtherance of that power's purpose means, in general, that no extraneous considerations were taken into account; that the authority did not overlook relevant information; that the power was exercised for the purpose for which it was granted; that the discretion was exercised by those empowered thereto, and that there is no room for concluding that the decision is marked by unreasonableness so extreme that no reasonable authority could have made it, or that the exercise of the power was simply arbitrary. This list, long though it may be, clearly does not purport to be exhaustive, and it may well be set out in a different order if compared with the other elements mentioned above.

 

            It was mentioned that the authority must act within the frame of the power vested in it. In the present case the limits of the power of the Committee were not defined by statute but by the precedents of this court, yet as far as the Committee is concerned, this cannot add to its powers. Once its powers have been lawfully defined, it is obliged to exercise them within its prescribed limits, and primarily according to objective standards (R.C. Austin, "Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion - At the Rubicon; Whither Now?" 28 Current Legal Prob (1975) 150, 152), just as it would do had its powers been delimited by statute. In the existing legal situation, the Committee has no power to spread its wings and lay down new limits to its powers, at its discretion and choice, nor may it now exercise its powers according to subjective tests.

           

            The guidelines for judicial review are to a large extent a reflection of the mode of procedure that is binding upon the authority whose functioning is under review. Among other things, the manner of exercising discretion was emphasised, but here the stress must be laid on a single point, that when speaking of a lawful decision based on material upon which a reasonable person might rely in coming to a decision, we mean a decision which results from examination and consideration on the part of the person authorised to decide. In this context it should be emphasised that it is not sufficient to rely exclusively on information that was only in the possession of other persons, or on conclusions reached by others according to information before another who is not the party authorised to decide under the statute.

           

            (d) The authority is the decision-making body, since in it alone did the legislature vest the power to decide the matter. The authority cannot delegate its decisory power to another unless expressly so authorised by the legislature, and in the absence of such authority it is obliged to reach its decision upon an independent examination of the facts. Applying the foregoing to the present case, our conclusion will be that the Elections Committee itself ought to have been satisfied on the facts before it that the candidates list was affected by a disqualifying feature. That, however, did not happen here. The indirect reliance upon information that was presented only before another agency, all or some of the details of which were not at all known to the Committee, signifies that the Elections Committee did not consider the matter and that it was not the Committee that disqualified the list on an independent and considered decision, but that it sought to rely on information unknown to it and available, if at all, only to another agency. Incidentally, the other agency mentioned did not purport to decide the matter, since the Minister of Defence decided nothing, not even a matter within the scope of his authority. In fact, the Committee thereby vested in the Minister of Defence, unbeknown to him and with no foundation in law, the power to disqualify a list of candidates. For it rested content with the fact that the material, the nature and details of which it had no knowledge, had been brought before an executive agency and had convinced the latter to draw the attention of the Committee to the matter in a general way without specifying the grounds for so doing. Such de facto delegation of powers lacks any basis in the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] or any other statute, and goes beyond all accepted constitutional and legal concepts. It entails, on the one hand, making the Minister of Defence the actual decider with respect to disqualification of a list for purposes of the election laws, for which there is no legal foundation, and on the other hand it strips the powers of the Elections Committee of all content.

 

            (e) Needless to add, the Committee could have regarded the submission of the material to the Minister of Defence as the initial ground for its own deliberation and inquiry, but at some stage the material should have come before it, since the Committee cannot discharge its function by having another, of whatever status, decide in its stead and thus in fact assume its power. Nor can the Committee unburden itself of the duty to exercise its discretion in the light of its own consideration of the material. A competent authority need not itself engage in gathering the facts, and it may pass this task on to others acting on its behalf, but at the final stage. before making its decision, the competent authority itself must consider the matter and draw its conclusions on the basis of the collected facts (H.C. 214/52[17], at 990; H.C. 297/82[20]).

           

            When the chairman of the Committee, Justice Bach, opened the deliberations of the Committee, he informed it that the Minister of Defence did not see fit to disclose to the Committee the factual details, but that it had been suggested to him to examine the material. The chairman rightly refused to do so, and explained that examination by him alone would still not resolve the legal problem, since in the absence of a statutory power to appoint someone (an individual or a subcommittee) to examine the material on its behalf, this suggestion would not provide the Committee itself with the information which is required to be before it for the purpose of its decision. I can only express my full agreement with these observations of Justice Bach.

           

            To summarize this point, the classification and secrecy of the evidentiary material do not exempt a quasi-judicial authority (such as the Elections Committee in its capacity in the present matter - E.A. 1/65[1], at 337) from fulfilling its duty to apprise itself of the facts and to decide the matter on its own, on the strength of tested information.

           

            The consideration whether or not to disclose material that is secret for reasons of state security, rests with the person so authorised by law, that is, in the present case, the Minister of Defence. This applies to proceedings before judicial instances (section 44 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 1971), as well as quasi-judicial bodies empowered to take evidence (ibid. section 52) and any other authority. But if the Minister chooses not to disclose the material by reason of its secrecy - and as aforesaid, this power indeed rests with him - there remains before the Committee nothing but general statements in the nature of summary conclusions drawn by someone else, and that is not a sufficient discharge of its duty, as a quasi-judicial body, itself to consider and decide on the matter of disqualifying the list.

           

            The question often arises, whether an authority may be persuaded by and adopt the opinion of an expert, and the answer is affirmative, provided there comes before the authority, for the purpose of its decision, not simply the expert's final conclusion but also substantive material upon which he founded his opinion. The duty of an authority vested with defined powers to arrive at an independent decision on a matter entrusted to it for resolution, does not terminate even when experts have examined the matter. The Committee could have looked into the information gathered by the Defence authorities and availed itself of an accompanying opinion, but it was not free to forgo independent knowledge and inquiry and thereby rid itself of the duty of lawfully deciding.

           

            10. (a) The reference to the affidavit of General Ben-Gal of 1980 also does not alter the situation. In that affidavit General Ben-Gal explained his reasons for issuing administrative orders at the time, after having himself examined the material relating to Advocate Miyaari. But just as the Committee may not forgo a substantive decision based on information examined by itself and rely on information brought to the attention of the Minister of Defence alone, so too it could not rely merely on the fact that four years earlier General Ben-Gal had been convinced that there existed material concerning Advocate Miyaari which was sufficiently persuasive to require the latter's restriction for reasons of security, for one of the purposes enumerated in regulation 108 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

           

            [Ed. - After reviewing the contents of General Ben-Gal's affidavit, Shamgar P. discounted the tendency and sufficiency of this evidence as a ground for disqualification of the List by the Elections Committee, even were it legally permitted to base its decision solely on another's accepted general opinion. The learned President then continued:]

 

            (d) The inquiry made by General Ben-Gal before giving his decision under regulation 110 of the Defence Regulations, well illustrates the proper course to be followed by a decision-making authority. The deponent was aware that he could not rest his decision on the evaluation of the police or the security service. Only after the particulars of the matter were brought before him and he examined them in detail did he decide, in 1980, to exercise his power under regulation 110 and to sign a restriction order.

           

            To sum up, it is the duty of the decision-making authority to examine the facts; others may gather them, classify and organise them - provided that the integrity and accuracy of the picture is not affected - and may even add their advice, recommendations and opinions, but the decision must rest on an independent consideration of the matter and not on that of others.

           

            (e) The affidavit of the person named "David", also presented to the High Court of Justice in 1980, does not add any detail which might have rendered the members the Committee aware of the factual ground and reason for their decision .

           

            (f) The representations made on behalf of the List before the Minister of Defence and the Committee, however much they aroused the objection of the Minister or the members of the Committee, do not in themselves, by their substance and content, display the nature or measure of proof required here. They were no more than expressions of a political view, already voiced inside and outside the Knesset without being regarded as a ground for any legal action, and they did not contain the elements impliedly attributed to them in the decision of the Elections Committee. As already noted, there must be a factual connection between the conclusions and their underlying grounds. What is more, the Committee regarded those representations as supportive of its conclusion, as stated in its decision, but what is the force of such support when essentially there is nothing to support?

           

            11. (a) If the security authorities possessed information, one wonders at its general concealment from the Committee, and why the Committee rested content with the laconic description in the notice of the Defence Minister's spokesperson.

           

            There is no point in laying down guidelines concerning matters that are unknown to this court, but one may assume that the security authorities also considered the possibility of distinguishing between a concise description of a given event, which could be brought to the knowledge of the Committee, and disclosure of personal identifying particulars which might seriously impair security. In any event, apart from the notice of the Minister, nothing but the affidavit of General Ben-Gal was submitted to the Committee, and that dealt with agitation and the organisation of demonstrations and strikes rather than subversive actions to liquidate the state.

 

            (b) It is possible that the inability or unwillingness of the security authorities to present material to the Committee pertaining to the security considerations that motivated their deliberations at the time of submission of the Knesset candidates lists, are a reflection of the fact that the Elections Committee - a broad body composed according to political criteria - is not the appropriate forum for dealing with such classified matters. That in itself cannot be a reason or justification for the Committee to base its decision on information which it has not seen or heard, and which is within the knowledge of only a few members of the executive branch who cannot share it with others. The failure of a statutory body to make its independent decision is, in this case, tantamount to a failure to decide properly, and ipso facto devoids its act of legality and validity.

           

            (c) Some of the Committee members relied for some reason on the fact that this court would examine the classified material that the Committee itself did not examine. As pointed out to them by the chairman, Justice Bach, this assumption had no legal foundation: this court examines the decision of the Committee, and it has no independent power to disqualify lists. It accordingly does not consider anything but the material that was before the Committee.

           

            12. To remove all doubt I will add that the foregoing is not necessarily to be regarded as a definitive conclusion that the apprehensions voiced in connection with the orientation of certain candidates on the List are baseless, and for the present purpose no such conclusion is required. As explained, the Committee's considerations were required to be based on clear, unequivocal and persuasive material - which a reasonable person would regard as indicative of a tendency of the kind defined in the majority opinion in Yeredor [1]. If such material existed, however, it was not brought before the Central Elections Committee. It follows that the Committee could not have applied to the List the legally required yardstick, as enunciated by this court in the past.

           

            This in itself would suffice for the appeal to be allowed, and we have indeed so decided.

           

            13. (a) Thus far we have analysed the factual and legal data on the basis of the statutory law and the rulings of this court in effect at the time of the hearing of these two appeals. However, as already noted, this matter should be examined from a further perspective - that of the separate question whether the rules governing disqualification of a list allow for expansion beyond what was laid down in Yeredor [1], and whether a legal basis could be found for the decisions of the Central Elections Committee - not on its understanding of the substantive prevailing law, but by broadening the judicial rule.

 

            (b) Any redefinition of the limits of the Elections Committee's authority and of the scope of the prohibitions against participation in the elections, has implications for the two lists concerned. That is so even though we have decided the case of the Progressive List for Peace not only upon analysis of the material demonstrating its objectives, tendencies and activities, but also, largely on ground of the process by which the decision was reached. Essentially the substantive problem is whether a list can be disqualified, in the case of Kach, on grounds of its non-adherence to principles of democracy, tolerance and morality accepted by a majority of the public, and on account of its hostility to a defined sector of the general population. In the case of the Progressive List for Peace, the question arises whether a list can be disqualified because of its members' attempt to establish political contacts for the purpose of talks with a hostile organisation or enemy states, while at the same time explicitly disavowing the objective of annihilating the State of Israel, which earlier was the ground for the decision regarding the participation of EI-Ard members in the elections. Also to be considered in this regard, is that the general prosecuting authorities did not regard those known contacts as a criminal offence and instituted no legal proceedings in that connection.

           

            (c) The character of the issue also dictates the method of its examination. The following matters will accordingly be examined: first, the nature of the right under discussion; second, the manner in which its boundaries are defined; third, the principled reasons that induced the court in Yeredor to delineate the boundaries as detailed above; and fourth, the possibility of altering these bounds, as indicated in paragraph (a).

           

            Before undertaking our detailed examination, there is need to further clarify the essential question before us, namely: whether the Central Elections Committee is competent to impose additional restrictions on the right to participate in the Knesset elections, beyond those expressly authorized in Basic Law: The Knesset, or in any other enactment.

           

            14. The yardsticks for testing the answers to the above questions should properly be grounded in constitutional principles. Thus Professor Ronald Dworkin's words are apt, when he writes: "Judicial decisions ..... even in hard cases ..... should be generated by principles not policy" ("Hard Cases", 88 Harv. L. Rev. (1974-75)1057,1060).

 

            As far as I am concerned, judicial decisions in constitutional matters should be rested, even in hard cases, on grounds of principle and not on reasons and motives of policy formed in accord with what appears to meet the needs of the hour and the sentiments of the majority.

           

            The adoption of a general guideline based on principles and not on occasional transient factors, wherever the need for judicial decision arises, as suggested by Professor Dworkin, is a separate matter that does not merit discussion here, and I, for one, do not consider myself bound by it. The reference here is to the standard to be adopted when discussing constitutional questions or legal problems that have constitutional implications. In such circumstances the choice of standard is not to be considered merely as a scholarly imperative or as a just and reasoned advice convincing on its own. Rather the choice dictated by adherence to legal principles inheres in the very nature of the subject. It stems from the need to formulate guiding principles for the functioning of a given political or social body adhering to the fundamental concepts that lend a special status to constitutional civil rights. One must bear in mind, inter alit, that when constitutional matters are under review, their import and implications have to be considered in the long term, and proper weight must be given to their impact on the political and social framework within which they operate. If these are subjugated to the needs of the hour and we adopt a casuistic approach in constitutional matters, particularly concerning the rights and freedom of the individual, we shall miss the mark and deal less than justly with the subject.

           

            15. What is the form and standing of a fundamental civil right in our law? The protection of individual rights derives from fundamental constitutional principles forming a substantive and integral part of the law applying in Israel. The integration of fundamental constitutional rights in our law takes various forms: recognition of the fundamental freedoms does not express itself only in abstract doctrines that guide the actions of governmental bodies, but also entails the formal and concrete conclusion that these freedoms constitute part of the substantive law, in accord with their name and designation. The legal status of a fundamental right within the abstract and theoretical system of rules was referred to in H.C. 337/81[5], at 355-356:

           

            Proper protection of the status of a given liberty is not achieved through mere declaration of its existence, although one should not fail to appreciate the didactic value of a declarative determination; such determination is an essential starting point in the process of moulding the right, in the course of which it gains concrete substance, and is likewise a starting point for introducing the legal principle that it embodies into extra-legal areas, such as the social or moral sphere. It should be added in this context that it is doubtful whether a given fundamental right can be viable without continuous, positive and reciprocal interaction between the legal and the socio-moral areas.

 

To recognise the existence of a fundamental right is to accord it a place as part of our substantive law. In other words, it is not merely a declarative principle representing beliefs and opinions, but is one of the fundamental components of the law in effect in Israel. In this respect it has already been said (in C.A. 723/74, at 294-295) :

 

The absence in the State of Israel of any single legislative enactment enjoying supreme protected status and embodying the constitutional principles, does not mean that we do not have statutory provisions of constitutional substance or that our legal system does not contain constitutional legal principles defining the fundamental human and civil rights. Our conception and view of the law in effect in Israel is that it encompasses fundamental rules as regards the existence and protection of personal liberties, even if the bill of Basic Law: Human and Civil Rights has not yet become law.

 

The bill of the new Basic Law is intended to formulate principles and delineate their scope, and its central function is to root them in a written statute so as to protect them against risks of temporal crises. It is designed to serve as a vehicle for the expression of values which will serve to educate the citizen, and to restrain in advance those who seek to infringe the limits of his rights. Yet already now the fundamental liberties are rooted...in our basic legal perspectives and are a substantive part of the law in effect in Israel.

 

            These legal principles influence the patterns of legal thought and interpretation, which are inspired by their force and direction (F.H. 9/77[21], at 359). Our legal rules relating to fundamental liberties thus serve as a connecting link between these liberties as mere abstract ideas and ordinary legal provisions, which are influenced in their content and language by recognition of the fundamental rights. For, together with the principled legal rules, some of the rights are also integrated in specific statutory provisions, which were influenced and have even been governed by them from the time of their formulation and throughout their existence and actual implementation (see, e.g., section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, and H.C. 141/82[22], at 156).

           

            The delineation of the rights in terms of the wording of the Law is the basic and primary footing upon which their actual protection depends; the very existence of a statute lends tangible expression as well as stability to the political regime and its prevailing fundamental concepts. The stability stems from the existence of a statutory norm embodying the standard against which the legality of the acts of governmental agencies is measured. Therefore, it is of special significance and weight that the constitutional principles defining the fundamental rights be given explicit expression in a legislative act and not merely remain in the realm of the oral or unwritten law. In this way it is ensured that the substance and scope of the rights will be defined in clear language, upon which the individual citizen can rest his demands and claims. Therein, among other things, lies the importance and value of a written constitution, whose absence in our system is conspicuous each time a constitutional issue arises for legal deliberation.

 

            The main expression of the rule of law is that it is not the rule of people - in accord with their unrestrained decisions, considerations and aspirations - but rests on the provisions of stable norms that are applied and binding in equal fashion. The definition of a right and even its inclusion in a statute are not conclusive of its effective protection, for they do not exhaust the existence of the right. The actual realisation of the rights is expressed in honoring them in their actual implementation, in an equal manner and without unjust discrimination. The value and force of a statute that grants rights is that the rights determined therein are more than an abstract idea, proper in spirit and purpose; rather, the written word renders them concrete and positive, to be applied under standards of equality for equals that may not be departed from for invalid reasons (Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 US 356 (1886)). Last to be mentioned, though not in order of importance, is the norm that when rights are violated, every person injured thereby will be shown equal consideration and given equal treatment (Tussman and Ten Broek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws", 37 Calif. L.R. (1948-49) 341).

 

            16. The political rights are among the most important and decisive fundamental freedoms. Thus Professor Bernard Schwartz remarks:

           

            Among the most precious rights of citizenship are those denoted as political. Without such rights, indeed, it may be doubted that an individual can be said truly to attain the dignity of citizenship.

(A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Part III, Rights of the Person, p. 777.)

 

            The main political rights are these four: the right to vote, the right to be elected, the right to assemble for a meeting or demonstration, and the right to address a petition (see also section 48 of the bill of Basic Law: Charter of Fundamental Human Rights).

           

            As regards the right to be elected, the determination in section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset that every Israeli citizen, who is 21 years old or over at the time of submission of a candidates list which includes his name, is entitled to be elected to the Knesset (unless the conditions specified in the concluding part of the section are found to exist) serves to define a right, ideologically based mainly on the principle of political equality, the duty to uphold which derives also from section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset (H.C. 141/82[22], at 156; H.C. 246, 260/81[23], at 19). So far, the right to be elected has found expression in our judicial decisions mainly in the context of equal opportunity, but the directive of the Basic Law reflects a broader and more general import of that right. Incidentally, in providing for the right to be elected in the Basic Law, the Israel legislator gave express and positive recognition to what is only indirectly derived from the U. S. constitutional provisions, without any explicit mention in the text of that Constitution ("Developments in the Law of Elections", 88 Harv. L Rev. (1974\75) 1111, at 1135).

 

            Professor Schwartz says in this connection (op. cit., 778-779):

           

            ...though there are no other express provisions in the matter, it may be stated today that there is a right to hold public office that inheres in the status of citizenship.... One may go further and say that the right of a citizen to hold office is the general rule - with ineligibility the exception. A citizen may not be deprived of this right without proof of some disqualification specifically declared by law. One court has gone so far as to assert that "the lexicon of democracy condemns all attempts to restrict one's right to run for office".

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The legislature may restrict the right to be elected by determining eligibility qualifications, but the accepted practice in countries with similar systems of government to ours, is that there is no lawful restriction in this area except under express statutory directive.

           

            In the U.S. a thesis was developed that even the right to elect becomes incomplete where the freedom to be elected is restricted. In other words, a restriction on the right of a party faction to contend not only limits the activities of the faction but also narrows the right of the individual to cast his vote in the manner he considers most effective. From this follows the view that the right to vote and the right to associate in promoting an elections list are but two sides of the same coin. Thus Justice Black regarded the two rights as -

           

            ...two different though overlapping kinds of rights- the right of the individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.

(Williams v. Rhodes [51], at 30).

 

            In other words, restriction of the right to be elected limits not only the rights of a person running for office, but also the rights of the voters to elect a candidate according to their preference by virtue of their right to enjoy equally with others everything accorded under the Elections Law to persons holding the right to vote. From the voter's point of view a restriction of the right to be elected indirectly narrows also his freedom of expression, since he is deprived thereby of his ability to associate with others in promoting his views and opinions as they would have been presented by his preferred candidate. Hence the court is required to exercise great caution in scrutinising the nature of such restrictions so as to ensure that they are reasonable and non-discriminatory. See Anderson v. Celebrezze [52]; Cousins v. Wigoda [53]; R.D. Rotunda, "Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in the wake of Cousins v. Wigoda", 53 Tex. L.R. (1975) 935; Nowak, Rotunda and Young, Constitutional Law (2nd ed., 1983), 777.

           

            In summary, the right to participate in elections is a fundamental political right that gives expression to the idea of equality, freedom of expression and freedom of association, whence it follows that this right is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society.

           

            Thus far as regards the nature of the right.

           

            17. In Mitrani v. Min. of Transport [5], it was said, with respect to the conditions and limitations that may be imposed on a fundamental freedom, that the standing accorded any one of the fundamental personal rights in a given political or social framework reflects the notions and shapes the character of that framework. The oretical constitutional premise which holds that a fundamental right endures and subsists in its full scope so long as it has not been limited by the law, is more than a mere technical-formal indication of the ways in which the right may be limited. Likewise, that premise serves not only to underpin the principle of legality; rather its primary purpose is to express the superior legal status of a fundamental right, so that any restriction of the right must be founded on express statutory authority. The court there went on to say (ibid., p. 355):

           

            Determination of defined and special procedures for changing a fundamental right is, to a large extent, the principal means of assuring that the matter will be properly examined in substantive terms. The right should not be limited except after careful study and deliberation, since curtailment of the scope of the right might bring in its train a distortion of the character of the social or political regime, to a greater or lesser degree. We have indeed said that the place of a fundamental right within a given legal system mirrors the extent of the substantive rule of law, and any change in the scope of the right necessarily affects also the continued existence of the rule of law. Hence the importance of defined legislative procedures, which offer the sole means of changing the application and scope of a fundamental right.

 

            The exercise and practical implementation of a fundamental right are not absolute. In concrete given circumstances the use of a certain right by one person might conflict with another person's lawful right, as was indicated by my esteemed colleague, Barak J., in a different but related context (Temple Mount Loyalists v. Police Commander of the Jerusalem Region [24], at 455):

           

The freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship, to the extent that it is given concrete expression, is not an absolute freedom (see Cantwell v. State of Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940). My right to pray does not allow me to trespass on my neighbour's property or to subject him to a nuisance. Freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is a relative freedom. It must be balanced against other rights and interests that similarly merit protection, such as private and public property and the freedom of movement. One of the interests to be considered is the public order and security. "The freedom of religion must be qualified: no society can accept the notion that its fundamental concepts as to public order may be frustrated for the sole reason that they are incompatible with the demands of a particular religion" (Rubinstein, op. cit., at 135). The point was elucidated by Justices Black and Douglas in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943), at 643-644:

 

No well-ordered society can leave to the individuals an absolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by the state, as to everything they will or will not do. The First Amendment does not go so far. Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws which are... imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave and pressing imminent dangers.

(See also H.C. 153/83[25]).

 

            If there is a substantial probability that the exercise of a certain right will jeopardise the public order and security in a concrete case, the competent statutory body may limit the practical exercise of the right in those circumstances. But this generates no general right of a statutory body, not so authorised by law, to nullify or qualify the essential right regardless of concrete factual circumstances from which arises such substantial probability of the public security being endangered. This means, for example, that a distinction must be made between a prohibition imposed by a competent agency against holding a demonstration in a certain place at a certain time, and a blanket prior prohibition of the right to demonstrate, in any place at any time, imposed on a defined group of people. Obviously a general prohibition of that nature can be determined only under a legislative provision that authorizes the statutory body to impose it (H. C. 337/81[5]). I need hardly reiterate that the a priori application of general prohibitions against the exercise of the basic freedoms has a direct and negative implication as regards the character and nature of the regime under which they are imposed.

 

            The subject can also be approached from a different angle, namely: the existence of a basic right does not grant immunity from legal proceedings to one who exercises it in contravention of the law. The right to demonstrate carries no permit to breach the public peace or to commit an assault, and a demonstrator who commits an act defined as a criminal offence will be prosecuted, when no general reliance upon the right of demonstration will save him. In other words, the general freedom offers no blanket license to perpetrate criminal acts. The converse is true, too. The right to take legal measures following the commission of a crime and the authority to restrict the exercise of rights in concrete cases, constituting criminal action or giving rise to a substantial probability of danger to the public peace, do not transform the authority in such cases into a general authority to prohibit and restrict in advance the various liberties of citizens, or of classes of citizens, unless the legislature has expressly enacted such authority. The authority to restrict civil rights - including the right to participate as a candidate in the Knesset elections - is not generated ex nihilo, nor is it a natural extension, in character or scope, of the authority to prevent crime and bring criminals to justice. The question of an a priori general withdrawal of a right is on a different level of discussion and of a different legal character. One should distinguish between the formal and the normative elements, and discuss each separately: the legal authority to impose a restriction is one matter; the import of the restriction in terms of its impact on individual liberties, is another matter.

           

            General prohibitions on enjoyment of the freedom of expression or the freedom of demonstration can only derive, in democratic states, from the exercise of an express constitutional power associated with special times of emergency. They are not in the category of a general and obvious inherent power which an authority may exercise without being so empowered by law. As aforesaid, no liberty may be denied in advance except in relation to a substantial and unavoidable probability of the commission of a criminal offence or an impairment of the public security or welfare (see H. C. 153/83[25]), and even then such power must derive from some statutory provision (for instance authorising the prohibition of a demonstration or the refusal of a licence to hold it, as may be provided in the statute concerned). Hence in Yeredor [1] the court, for the purpose of comparison, referred to a number of statutory provisions in English, American and German law which in one way or another imposed limitations on the right to be elected. In England and the United States, however, such general limitations are by and large related only to the candidate's criminal record, along the lines of what is laid down at the end of section 6 of Basic Law : The Knesset (presently we shall refer to special statutory provisions in the United States, as in the Smith Act).

 

            The Constitution of the Federal German Republic, on the other hand, makes express provision for the prohibition of political parties, which also affects the right to campaign for election (see P. Franz, "Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Parties: A German-American Comparison", 5 B. C. Int'l & Comp. L Rev (1982) 51; H.W. Ruhrman, "KPD Verbotsurteil, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift" Dez. (1956) 1817). This provision is embodied in article 21(2) of the Basic Law of May 23, 1949 (Grundgesetz - BG B1 5.1) - the German Constitution. It prescribes that parties oriented by their purposes or the conduct of their supporters towards impairing the fundamental order of a free democracy or the removal or endangerment of the existence of the Republic, are unconstitutional, and entrusts the resolution of the unconstitutionality question to the Constitutional Court, leaving the particulars to be regulated by statute. To complete and supplement this constitutional provision the Law of Parties was enacted on July 24, 1967.

           

            Since the establishment of the Federal Republic the Constitutional Court has outlawed the existence of two parties under the above provision of the German Constitution: the neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei (decision of October 23, 1952, 2 BVerf.GS. 1) and the Communist party (KPD) (decision of August 17, 1956, 5 BVerf. G. 85, rendered by the Constitutional Court after protracted hearings over a period of some four years; see Dr. T. Maunz, Grundgesetz, (Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Muenchen), Vol. II, pars. 4-21).

           

            Incidentally, the thesis that between the two World Wars the German Republic, based on the Weimar Constitution, lacked stability because it did not have the power and authority to ban political parties is unfounded. Under article 48(2) of the Weimar Constitution and the laws for the protection of the Republic (21.7.1922, I Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBI) 585; 2.6.1927, I RGBI 125; 25.3.1930, I RGBI 91), that obtained until the changes introduced by the Nazi regime, in Prussia alone some thirty parties and other political entities were banned between 1922 and 1929 (Maurer, "Das Verbot Politischer Parteien", 96 Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts (1971) 203, 206).

           

            It was not the absence of statutory power that was decisive in this area but a variety of deeper-seated factors, which need not be analysed here but have been mentioned before in another context (F.H. 9/77[21], at 361).

           

            18. (a) Article 21(2) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic confers on the Constitutional Court the power to ban the existence of a political party. Under the pertinent German case law such ban applies not only to the party banned, according to its actual name and identity at the time of the judicial-constitutional decision, but also to bodies and entities seeking to take its place (ersatz Organisationen) (Maunz, op. cit., at 12). A vague and general intention to impair the fundamental order is not sufficient ground to permit the banning of a party. An aggressive, militant and active stance is required, but the orientation of a party may be deduced from its declared purposes or the conduct of its supporters (ibid., at 38).

           

            In a democratic regime the dilemma often arises of an apparent conflict between maintaining freedom of expression and the desire to uphold democratic principles even in the face of those who seek to do away with them yet, to that end and for their own convenience, avail themselves of the very democratic principles against which they conspire. In this connection commentators on the above Constitution pointed out that

           

...it is possible to reconcile the contradictory principles of the amenability of the political regime to historical changes (on the one hand), and preservation of the existing regime (on the other hand) only by way of practical-political reason, with cautious advancement and gradual changes ensuring the continuing existence of the whole.

(3 Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (1976) 32).

 

            With regard to these problematics, the American legal scholar, L.H. Tribe, observed (see "Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech", 10 SW. U. L.Rev. (1978) 237, 239):

           

It should be clear that no satisfactory theory of free speech can presuppose or guarantee the permanent existence of any particular social system. For example, a free speech theory must permit evolution from a society built on the ideals of liberal individualism to a society aspiring to more communitarian visions - just as it must permit evolution from communitarianism to individualism.

 

            (b) The direction indicated by Tribe is clearly formulated, but its application to day-to-day political life is more difficult. That which is permitted ought also to imply that which is forbidden, but drawing the line between the permitted and forbidden is not easy, and not infrequently the fear will arise that something of the freedom of expression or association has been sacrificed to create a wider security margin and to block in advance any trend from which the actual danger that arises may be far from a substantial probability. The German Constitution set down clear bounds, positive and negative, that are not necessarily tied to an ex post facto examination of the purposes and activities of the political party. From the power to ban the existence of a party, where the conditions laid down in Article 21(2) are fulfilled, the Constitutional Court has deduced also what the absence of a banning provision means. In other words, the Constitutional Court concluded from the permissible exercise of article 21(2) that it may not impose prohibitions on a political party. A party whose existence has not been banned under article 21(2) is free to act as a lawful body for all purposes (provided, of course, it is not a camouflaged substitue for a banned body).

 

            As observed by Franz, op cit., at 63:

           

            ... almost as a counterweight to its enormous party-prohibition power, the court has found that this clause provides a "privilege" to a party, under which both the party and its officials, when lawfully acting on behalf of the party, are to be free from government discrimination and governmental intervention as long as the Constitutional Court has not found the party to be unconstitutional. Through this interpretation, Article 21(2) retains a continuing vitality, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court last prohibited a party over twenty years ago.

           

            The court based this "party-privilege" on the theory that a judgment of a party's unconstitutionality is operative not declarative. The court's judgment of a party's unconstitutionality is, in other words, a "performative utterance" that changes something in the world. A party becomes unconstitutional only when the court adjudges it so. The court does not "discover" unconstitutional parties and merely label them as such.

           

            The declaration of a party ban under the above Constitution is constitutive and not declarative. So long as the prohibition has not been pronounced, the activity of the party is deemed lawful, hence it is not possible to employ measures on grounds of past organisation, in the manner of the thesis posited in the American judgment in Dennis v. United States (1951) [54], with which we will deal below. It follows that a party may not be discriminated against or restricted in its activity so long as the Constitutional Court has not decided to exercise its power under Article 21(2). For this reason the German Constitutional Court invalidated the text of election laws that restricted in advance the prospects of parties which, in the view of the majority, constituted "a political danger to democracy" (decision of 9.3.76, 41 BVerf. G. 399) - with reference to a political organisation that had not been banned under Article 21(2).

           

            19. (a) The Constitution of the United States has no provision that permits the banning of political organisations because of their views, but the American legislator has adopted several measures in ordinary legislation to ban the existence of the U.S. Communist Party and to restrict the activities of organisations that are generally subversive. These are the main enactments:

           

            (1) The Smith Act of 1940 (18 U.S.C. (1946 ed), pars. 10, 11 - now 18 U.S.C.A. par. 2385, 54 Stat. 67D 671) defines a new criminal offence, i.e. -

           

            (2)(a) ... (1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

           

            In the fifties and sixties this provision was applied to bring criminal charges against officers and activists of the American Communist Party.

           

            (2) The Communist Control Act of 1954 (Pub. L. No. 83637; 68 Stat. 775 (1954)) rendered the existence of the Communist Party unlawful and prevented its participation in the Federal elections and in various state and local elections.

           

            (3) The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 proceeded from the declared premise that the Communist Party constitutes a clear and present danger to the security of the United States, and imposed a duty of registering bodies and organisations connected in any way with that party or its activities (on the interpretation of the provisions of this Act, see Communist Party v. Control Board (1961) [55]). It appears that this law has not been applied since the beginning of the fifties.

           

            (b) In reliance upon the Smith Act, legal proceedings were initiated in the fifties and early sixties against certain activists of the American Communist Party (Dennis v. United States [54]; Yates v. United States (1957) [56]).

           

            The outcome of these two cases differed as regards the final decision, but in both the court mapped out the guiding principles for construing the provisions dealing with the offence of organising for and advocating any purpose defined in section 2 of the Smith Act. The majority in the Dennis case [54] made it clear that a requirement for conviction, under the Act as phrased, is an unlawful intention to overthrow the government by force or violence. Freedom of expression gives no immunity from legal proceedings to those who support and advocate staging a revolution - in circumstances of a clear and present danger of commission of the forbidden act, that is, the overthrow of the government.

           

            Freedom of expression indeed rests on the assumption that -

           

            ...speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.

(Dennis [54], at 503, per Vinson C.J. , following Communications Assn. v. Douds [57], at 396.)

 

            At times, however, the conclusion is required that the immediate danger outweighs the wish to preserve freedom of expression (ibid, at 509, per Vinson C.J.):

           

            Overthrow of the government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech.

           

            As was held in that case, the government need not sit back and wait for a putsch to take place. If the authorities know that an entity aspiring to revolution is trying to educate its members and organise them in such manner that they will carry out their leaders' decision to commit an illegal act, that will require the authorities to take action as well. The argument that there is no occasion for the governmental authorities to be overconcerned since they in any event command sufficient forces to overcome any uprising, if such occurs, is not weighty enough to call for a protracted inactivity, to wait-and-see.

           

            (c) In the Dennis case [54], on the other hand, warnings were also voiced against excessive use of the "clear and present danger" test. Frankfurter J., who concurred in the majority opinion, referred to the comment of Prof. P.A. Freund (Understanding the Supreme Court, 27) that the test is not to be taken too simplistically, and that a number of factors must always be considered before exercise of the power, including, inter alia: the comparative gravity of the danger in relation to preservation of the values of freedom of expression and political activity; the possibility of employing more moderate means of control, and the need to examine in depth the specific intent accompanying the spoken words. Simplistic reliance on the above mentioned test is no substitute for the weighing of values.

           

            Black J. dissented from the majority opinion and viewed the conviction as a far-reaching violation of the freedom of expression. An assembly for the purpose of disseminating ideas and viewpoints ought not to have led, according to Justice Black's thesis, to conviction for conspiracy to overthrow the government. He added, in a mixed tone of regret and optimism (Dennis [54], at 581):

           

            Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of these Communist Petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society.

           

            In other words, a decision to restrict the exercise of a given liberty should not be governed by momentary pressures or passions, and a more tolerant, long-term evaluation is required.

           

            Douglas J., also in the minority, sought to qualify the restriction on freedom of expression that flowed from the conviction of the accused conspirators in the Dennis case [54]. To give foundation to his point of view he referred, inter alia, to the comments of Brandeis J. in Whitney v. California (1927) [58], noting as follows (Dennis [54], at 585-586):

           

            The restraint to be constitutional must be based on more than fear, on more than passionate opposition against the speech, on more than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is allowed. The classic statement of these conditions was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 376-377:

 

Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it... But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immeidately acted on... In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.

 

...To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

          (d) In the Yates case [56] the meaning of the term "advocacy" was somewhat narrowed, in relation to the expression of opinions about overthrowing the government. The court distinguished between support of abstract ideas and advocacy to carry out illegal acts. As explained there, the Smith Act was not designed to prohibit beliefs and opinions, but only advocacy and incitement to the commission of acts.

         

          20. The above examination of some of the conclusions reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dennis [54] and Yates [56], is for comparative purposes alone, and is not exhaustive of the rules emerging from American case law in this area.

         

          One may learn from the legislative as well as the interpretative approach in the United States, that the starting premise there differs somewhat from the practice under the German Constitution. The latter creates an express and exclusive constitutional basis for the prohibition of a political entity, and once a political body has been declared illegal it follows that no act may be done on its behalf in the area of organisation, dissemination of views, activities and the like. The banned entity is ipso facto precluded from participating in an election campaign. As explained above, the provision in the German Constitution that enables the banning of a political party, reinforces indirectly the conclusion as to the general lawfulness of the political activity undertaken by a body that has not been so banned. For the present purpose one may add that whatever be the views of the party, so long as its existence has not been prohibited by the Constitutional Court under the legal order prevailing there, its participation in elections may not be prevented.

         

          The American approach, as expressed in the Smith Act, puts the emphasis on the character of the actions carried out from time to time. According to the nature of these it is determined whether or not an unlawful act has been committed, and in this respect a preliminary declaration as to the banning of the body is not a condition precedent for the institution of legal proceedings on account of the body's organisational activities.

         

          21. The foregoing demonstrates the nature of our subject as regards its general legal classification. We are concerned here with one of the fundamental political rights. The pertinent provisions of the statutory law embody no authorisation for its restriction on grounds of the purposes and nature of the candidates list. In other words, the court cannot rest its decision upon a statutory provision that delineates in advance the scope of its power and expressly empowers the court to prohibit the participation in elections of a given list or of a type of list. Hence the need of the court to consider (both at the time of giving its judgment in the Yeredor case [1], and now when dealing with the two lists in the present case) to what extent an innate authority is vested in the Central Elections Committee to restrict freedoms and narrow fundamental rights without having been expressly empowered to do so by statute.

 

          What are the powers of the Central Elections Committee and those of this court in the absence of statutory guidance? The principle of legality and the pursuit of the rule of law, which shrinks from restricting liberties without statutory sanction, as well as the special deference we must pay to the various freedoms - all these support the thesis that a fundamental right may not be restricted without statutory authority (H.C. 337/81[5], at 355). The proper and desirable fundamental aim is that rights should be maintained without limitation. Even when rights conflict one with the other, one must consider which of them prevails in the circumstances, or in what circumstances should the one prevail and in what circumstances should the other - and one has recourse to a value test that seeks to maintain the rights as far as possible side by side and not one at the expense of the other. This court cannot and ought not detach itself from the general legal context, and its interpretation is necessarily governed by the constitutional nature of the matter brought before it.

         

          The path taken by the majority in Yeredor [1] represented an optimal exercise of the court's power, and in light of its reasoning we can only conclude that in any less extreme factual situation, the majority of the court in Yeredor [1] also, would have refrained from disqualifying the list.

         

          In other words, the court faced a situation in which it had to fashion criteria ex nihilo for determining when the right to participate in elections was subject to restriction. In any event the court could only act on the premise that the existence of the state, its institutions and the elections thereto was a supreme necessity; and in so doing it had to be guided by the basic perspective that no liberty or right was to be prejudiced except in the most extreme cases. Only the far-reaching significance of the objective to liquidate the state engendered the court's readiness to assume a power amounting to the absolute denial of a right. It thus adopted a twofold test that integrates the supreme, basic constitutional concept of the existence of the state with the practical criterion of "substantial probability". That means that the court rested its decision on the (list's) illicit purpose that goes to the very root of (the state's) existence and on a test constructed in accord with the qualitative weight of the danger, its imminence and its clarity.

         

          What we have said above serves to answer the fourth question we earlier posed, i.e., to what extent, if at all, may the decision of the Supreme Court in Yeredor [1] be supplemented. That is, can the kinds of cases in which a list may be banned from participation in elections be added to by virtue of judicial decision alone, without prior statutory sanction?

 

          The clear answer to this question, which founded our decision of June 28, 1984, is in the negative. Only the polar conflict between the objective of eradicating the state, on the one hand, and the desire to participate in elections to state institutions, on the other, could have called forth a judicial determination resting on an ultimate principle and not requiring concrete legal substantiation founded on express statutory provision. Participation in fashioning the image of the state, through Knesset membership, on the part of those who contest its very existence, is a contradiction in terms, and it was this profound inner contradiction that freed the majority in Yeredor [1] from the limitation imposed by the absence of any written legislative endorsement. However, had it been attempted to add variously to that, and had there developed an expansive case law with new circumstances added and elaborated in which the right to participate in elections might be denied without statutory ground, for reasons unconnected with the above substantive contradiction, the result might have been the clearest injury to the character of the political regime under which we live, and subversive of the fundamental notions by which it is nourished. The addition of further grounds for disqualifying a list would not be of mere quantitative import, but would entail transition to another dimension. Instead of reliance on the fundamental value of the existence of the state, which alone can bridge the legal gap engendered by the lack of statutory guidance, recourse would be had to substantive evaluation or to a value judgment concerning the party list based on its platform. So to do requires express and clear legislation, which demarcates limits and does not leave matters for resolution by way of unqualified discretion. A prominent feature of the democratic regime is not merely that it establishes checks and balances between the different branches of government, but also that it refrains as far as possible from entrusting unlimited discretion to any particular branch. The executive, the legislature and the judiciary must all act within their constitutional confines in such a manner that the fundamental values serve them as their foundations as well as defined tests for exercising discretion.

         

     The danger in choosing an alternative course is not to be discounted. If a committee composed entirely according to political party affiliation considered itself free to decide, by the ordinary majority required, that one list or another is disqualified from participating in the elections, notwithstanding the lack of any enabling statutory authority or normative standards delimiting the committee's discretion and prescribing the circumstances for its exercise of such power - the result might be to reduce substantially the general scope of the political right to participate in elections. In this regard it matters little that initially the committee exercises its power only with respect to entities which are obnoxious to a majority of the public. In the absence of any binding qualifying standard, it would be no surprise if the first selection for disqualification is a list of the kind that a majority of the public finds objectionable. We learn from the experience in other countries that the first examples do indeed relate to the extreme cases, but a less than strict observance of the rule of law and the fundamental freedoms gradually calls forth less extreme examples, as is well known.

 

          Alongside the danger that democracy will be abused by those seeking its eradication or weakening, is the contrary danger that excessive anxiety to preserve democracy will render its principles purely theoretical and alienated from its practical significance, imposing multiple a priori limitations and prohibitions on liberties.

         

          One should bear in mind in this connection that the dilemma of the limitation of liberties, that frequently assails governmental authorities, generally does not arise in relation to the rights of bodies whose existence and ideas are not controversial. It arises most acutely when views are voiced that arouse firm objection on the part of the majority, and even outrage the feelings of listeners. The true test for the existence of a right arises not in times when the current events express composure, tolerance and understanding, but at moments of pain and vexation, when there is little sympathy for the person claiming a certain right or for his views. The individual's right to personal liberty and the preservation of his rights against unlawful imprisonment or bodily torture, does not arise for debate only upon investigation of a respectable citizen's complaint that he was mistakenly taken into custody and mistreated by a police officer. The right is also truly tested when persons suspected of murder or rape are arrested, taken to prison and interrogated there. Protection of the freedom of speech or freedom of demonstration is important not only when words of wisdom are spoken, quietly and reflectively, for the existence of the right is not problematic where there is civilised and calm debate. But it is far more difficult to preserve freedom of expression and similar or associated fundamental rights, where beliefs, opinions and views are aired of a nature found outrageous and reprehensible.

         

          We have seen that it is not sufficient to create a mere formal statutory basis for the authority of the Committee or this court. That is indeed an essential precondition for authority to restrict the right of candidacy in elections, but over and above that need, substantive normative definition of the nature of the discretion and its limits is also required. That is to say, the legislative act must consist of two components: one is satisfied by the formal act of vesting authority; the other - which must be treated with great care - is the definition of circumstances in which the authority may be exercised.

         

          The central problem is the need to determine standards founded on democratic beliefs and viewpoints that must be applied also to persons who do not adhere to democracy and its values - quite the contrary! Professor John Rawls of Harvard named this challenge "The Toleration of the Intolerant" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1971) p. 216).

 

            This matter must be treated with great circumspection. The statutory restriction of the right of party lists to contend in elections when they seek to jeopardise the very existence of the state, creates no special problems. But as one widens the circle encompassing the classes of bodies whose candidacy is sought to be inhibited in advance, one also widens the possible impact of such legislation on the continuing existence and realisation of our fundamental democratic concepts. Thus, as in Britain and in other countries, we have found no room to prohibit the candidacy of lists that would establish a political regime of the kind that exists in some other countries and differs radically from our own. Are there grounds to depart therefrom? Of course, this court will not encroach upon the domain of the legislature, yet it is proper to stress again the caution that is required in this regard, lest any proposed new legislation bring about a change in an unintended direction. In any event, I am not persuaded that there is any reason to discard past truths or to determine new standards that might substantially restrict any of those clear manifestations of the democratic political regime that we have accepted so far.

           

            The fundamental liberties - including freedom of expression, freedom of belief and equality in competing for public office, are all inherent in our governmental system and, therefore, in our legal system too. In every society one finds a variety of differing views and opinions; in a free society the diversity is manifest, in a totalitarian society the diversity is masked and concealed. Exchange of opinions, clarification of views, public debate, the urge to know, learn and convince - all these are essential tools in the service of every opinion, view and belief in a free society. The act of classifying citizens and distinguishing between them, some of whom are granted rights and others not, contradicts the truth that underlies the freedoms and, in its theoretical essence, manifests the same internal contradiction as does a person who decries democracy while utilising the rights it confers. Even with unpopular views and opinions must one contend and seek methods of persuasion. Prohibitions and restrictions are extreme devices of the last resort. The premise is that freedom of speech finds prominent expression when accorded also to those whose opinions appear to be mistaken and even dangerous (per Scrutton J. in the O'Brien case [48], at 382, and see Agranat J. in Kol Ha'am [26], at 878). Adopting a similar approach in Dennis v. U.S. [54], Frankfurter J. quoted these words of Sir. W. Haley, Director-General of the British Broadcasting Authority (at pp. 553-554):

           

...there are powerful forces in the world today misusing the privilege of liberty in order to destroy her. ... [But] no debate is ever permanently won by shutting one's ears or by even the most Draconian policy of silencing opponents. The debate must be won. And it must be won with full information. Where there are lies, they must be shown for what they are. Where there are errors, they must be refuted. It would be a major defeat if the enemies of democracy forced us to abandon our faith in the power of informed discussion and so brought us down to their own level.

           

            No person has a monopoly over truth, opinion and reason, and it has been said that what appears today to be simple and self-evident may seem uncertain tomorrow, or as it was put by Learned Hand: (The Spirit of Liberty, (New York, 2nd ed. 1953), p. 82):

           

            ...(the) certainties of today may become the superstitions of tomorrow. . we have no warrant of assurance save by everlasting readiness to test and test again...

           

            True, liberty does not mean licentiousness, and there are circumstances that necessitate the imposition of restraints, just as it is necessary to take legal measures against the commission of various crimes (Kol Ha'am [26]; Levi v. Southern District Police Commander [25]). However, the restrictions must not only be based on express statutory provision but, more importantly, they must also be imposed only as an extreme measure of last resort in face of a substantial probability of danger. There must always be a rational connection between the degree of danger and the measures taken; and even if the advocacy of a certain view raises just indignation, that is not sufficient to cause the total denial of a basic right. A democracy that acts to restrict freedoms when this is not an existential necessity, as indicated above, loses its spirit and force.

           

            In summary, the practical maintenance of fundamental liberties should not be influenced by transient events or the prevailing sentiments, and where restraints on fundamental rights are necessary, these must not be improvised and moulded according to momentary needs. In a state that regards the rule of law as the principal means for protecting its citizens from diverse internal dangers and believes in the moral power of democracy, a person's liberty may not be restricted except by law and may not be denied him merely on grounds of objection, however forceful, to the content of his statements. Restraints on liberties to prevent dangers that are a substantial probability is sometimes a cruel necessity, but the introduction and implementation of restrictions and prohibitions - except as an extreme measure of last resort in face of a "substantial probability" of danger - could in the long term have the same effect on the fundamental liberties, and cause them the same harm, as is threatened by the advocacy of their restriction on the part of those who object to the very existence of such freedoms.

           

            22. For the above reasons I decided at the time, together with my esteemed colleagues, to set aside the decisions of the Elections Committee.

           

            BEN-PORAT D.P. My esteemed colleague, Shamgar P., has dealt extensively and impressively with all aspects of the problem at the core of the two appeals before us. Accordingly, I shall content myself with a brief exposition of the lines of thought which guided me to concur in the opinion of my colleagues that the appeals should be admitted.

           

            After much thought I have reached the conclusion - which on the face of it might seem somewhat strange - that the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 (hereinafter - "the Elections Law") does not grant the Central Elections Committee (hereinafter - "the Committee") any authority to consider the worthiness of a given list to be a contestant in the elections by virtue of its platform or objectives. Its sole duty is to examine whether the list complies with the technical requirements enumerated in sections 6 and 7 of Basic Law: The Knesset (hereinafter - "the Basic Law") and in various sections of the Elections Law, inter alia: whether the candidate meets the conditions of age, citizenship, etc.; whether the list has the required number of signatures, and so on. Once a list is submitted in compliance with all the conditions, and at the proper time, it has been "lawfully submitted" and must be confirmed; if not - it must be rejected.

           

            I have said that on the surface my conclusion that the legislature entrusted the Committee with a purely technical-ministerial function, might seem somewhat "strange". For, on the one hand it may be urged that it is vital to prevent the infiltration of a dangerous list into the elected body, and it would be better therefore to recognize the power of the Committee to take this weighty consideration into account when asked to grant its approval to a list. On the other hand, however, it emerges from the case law to which I shall presently refer (and which, on the face of it, is unacceptable to me, with all due respect), that there is no judicial forum competent to set aside the Committee's approval of a list. On the contrary, if the Committee has approved a list, no matter how dangerous its purposes, that is the end of the matter and its decision cannot be questioned either by way of appeal or before the High Court of Justice. Recognition of a power in the Committee to grant a list final approval, to the exclusion of all judicial review, is an unacceptable result.

           

            It appears that the Kach List, submitted to the Committee for the elections to the Tenth (i.e. prior) Knesset, was approved by a majority vote, contrary to the view of the Committee chairman (Justice Etzioni) who favoured its disqualification. His opposition was based on certain publications on behalf of Kach, which stated:

           

            ...In order to deter those who are intent on seducing Jewish girls to assimilate we propose mandatory imprisonment for a term of five years without mitigation of sentence or reduction of the term of incarceration for every non-Jew who has sexual relations with a Jewess...

 

To prevent further deterioration we demand that an end be put to all plans of the Ministry of Education to encourage social relations between non-Jews and Jews and also to carry out schooling only in separate schools for Jews and Arabs... This is only by way of initial steps since it is clear that the true solution of the Kach program is to motivate the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael to migrate to their own countries.

 

            As already mentioned, a Committee majority prevailed over the chairman and decided to approve the list. At a further meeting, when those present were informed of the Attorney-General's position that certain publications of this list amounted to a criminal offence, the Committee stood by its decision.

           

            Four Israeli citizens, among them Mr. Moshe Negbi who pleaded on behalf of them all, felt impelled to counter what they considered an impending evil and petitioned the High Court of Justice (in H.C. 344/81[27], hereinafter - the Negbi case) for an order nisi against the Committee (and the Kach list) to show cause why it should not reverse its decision to approve the list, and disqualify it. Mr. Negbi was aware of section 137 of the Elections Law, which provides:

           

Any complaint as to an act or omission under this Law shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Committee, and, save as otherwise provided in this Law, no court shall entertain an application for relief relating to any such act or omission or to any decision or direction of the Central Committee, the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Committee, the chairman of the Committee, a District Committee or a Polling Committee.

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.)

 

            To overcome the difficulty, Mr. Negbi submitted the argument, rightly called "sharp", that section 137 presented no obstacle because the Committee's approval was in no any way based on the Elections Law but on what have been called supra-constitutional principles. In other words, according to the Elections Law the Committee must only consider whether the requisite conditions have been met, materially and technically, in order to deem the list "duly submitted", and no more.

           

            However, according to the rule of the majority opinion in the Yeredor case [1], it is also empowered, so it was argued, to consider supra-constitutional considerations (for instance whether the list is in any way subversive of the existence of the state). Such a consideration, he submitted, goes beyond the strict confines of the Elections Law, hence it is also beyond the ambit of section 137 of the Elections Law and is amenable to judicial review by the High Court of Justice. On the other hand, if a supra-consitutional consideration is a matter within the scope of the Elections Law, then the Committee exceeded its power, which is confined entirely to a technical-ministerial examination, i.e. whether a list has been "duly submitted".

 

          This argument was rejected, the court holding as follows (ibid., at 839-840, per Barak J.):

         

The decision of the Central Elections Committee to approve or refuse to approve a list is taken by the Committee by virtue of the power vested in it under the Elections Law, according to which the candidates lists are submitted to the Elections Committee (section 57(i)), and the Committee either approves or refuses to approve them (sections 63 and 64)... The constitutional-or if you wish the "supra-constitutional" - principles dealt with in Yeredor case, E.A. 1/65, do not sever the act of the Elections Committee from the Elections Law, and the application of these principles by the Committee in actual practice is not excluded from the immunity prescribed in section 137 of the Elections Law. The legal principles laid down in the Yeredor case, E.A. 1/65, comprise a complex of relevant considerations which the Central Elections Committee may or even must take into account when acting under the Elections Law, and in doing so it is immune from judicial review.

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.)

 

          Further on it was stated that even if the Committee erred in exercising its discretion, this does not mean that the decision went beyond the scope of its power under the Elections Law. In the words of Barak J. (ibid. at 840):

         

...Just as a correct decision by the Committee is protected from judicial review, so too is an incorrect decision.

 

          Accordingly, it was on the basis of the immunity covering the decisions and acts of the Committee under section 137 of the Elections Law, that it was decided to dismiss the petition, which meant that the Committee's approval of the Kach list was final and could not be challenged, whether the decision was correct or erroneous. That is to say, even assuming that judicial review were to reveal that the platform or purposes of the Kach list call for its disqualification, it remains legislatively decreed (in light of section 137 of the Elections Law) that the Committee's approval is final and binding.

         

          I must confess that in reading the judgment I formed the impression that it does not distinguish between approval and non-approval by the Committee, as if in both cases its action is covered by the immunity of section 137 (see the passages cited above), but this is not so. To the contrary, the Elections Law does indeed "provide otherwise" (in the sense of section 137), regarding the Committee's refusal to approve a list in section 64(a), which reads:

 

            Where the Central Committee refuses to approve a candidates list, either wholly or as to the name of one of the candidates or the designation or letter of the list, it shall, not later than the 20th day before election day, notify its refusal to the representative of the list and his deputy, and they may, not later than the 18th day before election day, appeal to the Supreme Court against such refusal.

           

            In other words, the symmetry that seemingly emerges from the Negbi case [27], does not exist at all: while the approval of a list is immune from judicial review, the legislature did grant a right of appeal to a list that considers itself prejudiced by the Committee's refusal to approve it. That is to say, the legislature saw no need for judicial review in case of approval of a list, but sought to prevent the injustice that might be caused to a list when the Committee refuses to approve it. If we construe this asymmetry in light of the ruling in Negbi [27], we must inevitably conclude that a decision of the Committee to approve a list is conclusive, regardless of any differences among its members as to the worthiness of the list to campaign in the elections to the Knesset because of its unacceptable platform and that there is no way to challenge such approval, whether by way of appeal or by petition to the High Court of Justice. On the other hand, the Committee's decision to refuse to approve the list is subject to the list's right of appeal to the Supreme Court (section 64(a)).

           

            If this asymmetry relates solely to ministerial examination of the conditions prescribed by the Elections Law (and the Basic Law), it seems reasonable and is even logically compelling. Where a list has been approved, there is no one at all to appeal the decision (unless a minority of the Committee members be permitted to appeal against the majority). It is possible also to understand it is better that a list be allowed (even erroneously) to participate in the elections, than be disqualified without just cause. In this way the principles of democracy are preserved, by the fact that a list barred from contesting benefits from a right of appeal and judicial review of the refusal. On the other hand, were the Committee empowered to take into account superior principles (for example, the fact that the list's platform undermines the existence of the state) and not merely to conduct a ministerial examination, then such asymmetry would be puzzling. The approval of a list subversive of the existence of the state and seeking its annihilation is far more dangerous than a refusal to approve it. It is clear that ensuring the existence of the state takes precedence even over the principles of democracy. Hence, had the legislature intended to embody also such a consideration in the frame of the Elections Law, logic would dictate that it should confer the right of judicial review precisely and primarily when the Committee's decision is to approve a list that endangers state security. If one maintained otherwise, an erroneous decision by the Committee to approve a list that aspires to destroy the state could well be disastrous. Moreover, the natural forum for judicial review of a decision to approve a given list is, to the best of my understanding, the High Court of Justice and not an appellate instance, since there is no one to appeal such approval. Another possible course (for example) is to vest in the Attorney-General a right of appeal against a list's approval. But, as aforesaid, the immunity extended to the approval of a list by the Elections Committee is absolute.

 

          It should be noted that if we are dealing with superior principles, there is no reason to stop at the point where a list is in fact directly subversive, and there is good reason for also barring from the contest a list that aspires to a grave violation of basic democratic principles. Furthermore, without going into detail, it is at times difficult to establish a clear-cut division between crass subversion of the foundations of democracy and an aspiration to destroy the state.

         

          I am aware of the answer given by my esteemed colleague, Barak J., to this asymmetry. His view is that in case of the approval of a list which endangers the existence of the state, the Knesset will be impelled to act. I wonder why the refusal to approve such a list invokes judicial scrutiny, with all the haste necessitated by the impending elections, whereas its approval is a matter for the Knesset and not (for example) the High Court of Justice. In my opinion it is important to prevent such a list from entering the contest, and during the elections period it is difficult to expect the Knesset to find the time to resolve a matter of this kind. Moreover, if the Kach list had attained the "cut-off' percentage in the elections to the previous Knesset, when its participation was approved by the Committee, would the Central Elections Committee have been competent to refuse to approve its participation in the next elections? I wonder. Let us assume that a veteran Knesset faction submits a list to the Committee which is valid in all formal respects, but a majority of the Committee members think that by reason of its past conduct the list is subversive. Would the Committee be competent to refuse approval? The answer, to my mind, is that the Knesset - and it alone - has the power to outlaw an existing party faction. One should bear in mind that it was only by mere chance that the Kach list did not obtain the "cut-off" quota of votes in the previous elections to the Knesset and was not therefore a party-faction in the outgoing Knesset. This line of reasoning also supports my conclusion, that the function of the Committee is merely technical-ministerial. Incidentally, unlike my esteemed colleague, Barak J., I think that the platform of a party-faction would be sufficient ground for the competent body (if such existed) to disqualify it, and it would not be necessary to wait (if the platform is illegitimate) until that faction proves by its conduct that it indeed carries out the platform in practice.

         

            I am conscious of the weighty considerations that moved the majority Justices in Yeredor to hold that the power to disqualify a subversive list was a practical necessity. Those proceedings concerned an appeal against the Committee's refusal to approve the Socialist list, the court holding that a party list whose aim is to destroy the state cannot be allowed to participate in elections to the Israel house of representatives. To so decide as an appellate instance, it was obviously necessary for the court to recognise also (as it did) the Committee's power to disqualify such a list. The reason is simple: the function of an appellate instance, by its very nature, is to determine what decision should have been made by the body against which the appeal was brought. However, assuming that the list (Socialists) had been approved by the Committee (as was the Kach list in the elections to the Tenth Knesset), if only by a single decisive vote, it might be asked whether the immunity extending to such approval would have rendered that list any the less dangerous to the existence of the state? Yet such approval, as already indicated, has absolute immunity from judicial review.

           

            Had it been decided in the Negbi matter [27], that for lack of an appeal (or an appellant) against approval, the doors of the High Court of Justice were open to anyone with locus standi, I might have been inclined to accept the majority judgment in Yeredor [1], if only for the reason that both approval and refusal by the Committee could be judicially reviewed (whether by the High Court of Justice or an appellate instance). I might have been so "inclined" since one of two solutions is possible: "supra - constitutional" considerations are either extraneous to the Elections Law or they fall within its scope. In other words, if the procedure to challenge a Committee refusal (on ground of subversion) is by way of appeal, then the same procedure should also be available to challenge a Committee approval (say at the instance of the Attorney-General, but no such provision is made in the Law). In any event, if the High Court of Justice cannot be approached in case of approval of a list, yet we find ourselves faced as we are here with an appeal against the Committee's refusal, the question of asymmetry in the existing interpretation arises most acutely.

           

            In view of the rule laid down in Negbi [27], and so long as it remains unchanged, I cannot, with all due respect and modesty, see any way to adopt the solution according to which the danger posed by a particular list will be subject to judicial review when the Committee withholds its approval, but will not be reviewable precisely when the Committee approves the list, albeit mistakenly (that is, even when it is in fact dangerous and given to disqualification). I have read with interest the opinions of my esteemed colleagues but have not found in them any reference to the Negbi decision, nor a satisfactory answer to the question how any judicial instance (the High Court of Justice or an appeal court) can remedy the situation if the Elections Committee (whether for political reasons or erroneously) approves a list that aspires to annihilate the state. Such is the consequence of perpetuating the asymmetry. Thus the duty to disqualify the list is held by my esteemed colleague, Elon J., in paragraph 13 of his judgment, to be entrusted to the Central Elections Committee; but if the Committee fails to discharge its duty - how shall we rectify the error? Clearly the statement of my esteemed colleague (ibid.), "in that case we are obliged to disqualify it", is not given to implementation in the existing situation. Likewise, the distinction made by my esteemed colleagues between annihilation of the state and prejudice to democracy is in my humble opinion very questionable. Not only does grave prejudice to democracy pose a danger also to the state's existence, but is itself among the "superior principles" that merit consideration. I nevertheless reiterate, that in case of conflict between principles of democracy and security considerations affecting the very existence of the state, clearly the existence of the state must be given first priority, however important the other principles may be.

 

          In light of the situation I have described I hold to the opinion (as a lesser evil) - also expressed in the dissenting opinion of Cohn J. in Yeredor [1] - that the Elections Law charged the Committee with the sole function of examining compliance with the conditions prescribed by statute. That and no more. The legislature apparently believed - assuming it considered the matter at all - that the supra-constitutional aspects would be dealt with by the Knesset itself, if the need ever arose in the future. The danger that a problematic list would appear and also exceed the "cut-off" quotient of votes, apparently seemed slender or remote. Another possibility, that of petitioning the High Court of Justice in matters vitally affecting the State of Israel, was blocked by the above mentioned ruling in the Negbi case [27].

 

          Support for the attribution of a limited function to the Committee can be found in section 63 of the Elections Law, which provides:

         

          A candidates list duly submitted ... shall be approved by the Central Committee, which shall give notice of ... the approval ...

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.)

 

          Literally at least the text indicates a purely technical examination, as explained succinctly by Cohn J. in Yeredor ([1] at 376 ff.). In this manner the asymmetry loses its significance (as explained above).

         

          This state of affairs, however, is undesirable and in the present reality even intolerable. It is time to enact a law protecting the state against the entry of subversive lists into its legislative body. A state that wishes to survive and remain committed to the principles of democracy, must take care that these are not overwhelmed by destructive elements from within, all in the frame of legitimate campaigning, as it were, for election to the Knesset.

         

          On a previous occasion I agreed that even the majority in Yeredor [1], did not hold the Committee empowered to reject a list that sought to undermine the foundations of democracy, because the question never arose in that case. The fact that the discussion focused solely on the question of state subversion appears from Sussman J.'s description of the political purpose under discussion there (ibid., at 389):

 

          ...a purpose that aspires to annihilate the state, to bring catastrophe upon most of its inhabitants for whose sake it was established, and to form alliance with its enemies.

          As regards the Progressive List for Peace, the esteemed President has already explained in his opinion that privileged material is not "evidence". On the contrary, the meaning of the very privilege is that such evidence may not be proffered, disclosed or relied upon. Thus the preclusion of essential evidence in judicial proceedings because of privilege, will cause the litigant in need of that evidence to fail, for the reason that he is unable to bring evidence that is (so I assume) essential. In other words, privileged material lacks evidentiary force, and it is mistaken to think that the very privilege is in the nature of proof upon which the Committee or this court could rely to conclude that this list aims at annihilation of the state.

         

          Finally, a marginal observation, that I must not be understood to agree with what my esteemed colleague, Shamgar P., said in relation to F.H. 9/77[21] and C.A. 723/74[3]. Vieing with the interest of freedom of expression is the legitimate interest of the individual in his good reputation, and it seems to me that the majority judgment in that precedent expresses the correct balance between the two.

         

          In summary of my opinion that the Central Elections Committee - hence also this court sitting on appeal - is not competent to disqualify a list because it seeks to undermine the existence of the state, I shall restate my main considerations:

         

          A. The Elections Law grants a list a right of appeal to this court against the Committee's refusal to confirm its participation. On the other hand, it absolutely precludes any judicial review (whether by a court of appeal or the High Court of Justice) of a Committee decision approving a list's participation in the elections. In the precedents, too, no ground is found for such review of the Committee's approval (the Negbi case [27]).

         

          B. The above policy reflects the legislature's fear that a list might be wrongly disqualified, and its lack of concern over the possibility of a list's wrong approval. This policy is consonant only with a technical-ministerial function, according to which the Committee must confirm all lists duly submitted in that (formal) sense. An erroneous approval is a "windfall" for the list (because of the lack of review). But the Committee's mistaken refusal to approve the list, provides the list with a right of appeal.

 

            C. The concern that a list might be unlawfully excluded from the contest is consonant with a liberal approach and the desire to ensure wide participation in the electoral contest, as far as possible without hindrance or restriction.

           

            D. Had the legislature assigned to the Committee the function of examining the substance of a list's platform (whether, for instance, it is subversive of the state's existence), it should have designated as a first requirement a judicial or other forum with the power of review, particularly of, the approval of a list by the Committee. If the Committee were to err in such examination, it would be imperative to provide for the possibility of correcting the error, otherwise the security of the state might be endangered and a subversive list allowed to become part of the house of representatives. To leave the solution of the problem, if and when it arises, to the Knesset itself (as Barak J. suggests), is in my view, impractical, since in the midst of elections the Knesset cannot be expected to free itself for this task, and it is important, moreover, to prevent such a list's very entry into the contest.

           

            E. It follows from the above that to invest the Committee with a conclusive power to approve a list, as regards the legitimacy of its platform, is so unwise and unreasonable as to be inconceivable.

           

            F. If the Committee is competent to take into account not only technical but also substantive considerations and on that basis to disqualify a list (for instance) because of its subversive objectives, it is difficult to see how such power may be confined solely to the submission of a new list, as distinct from a list submitted by an outgoing and even longstanding Knesset party or faction. To the best of my understanding this matter is left to the Knesset itself.

           

            I wish to emphasise the immediate and urgent need for appropriate legislation to prevent the infiltration of subversive lists into the house of representatives, perhaps by extending the existing framework so as to embrace, besides direct danger to the existence of the state, also crass violations of basic democratic principles.

           

            ELON J. 1. When I agreed with my esteemed colleagues to allow the two appeals now before us, I did so in reliance upon the majority opinion in the Yeredor case [1]. The rule that emerges from that case is that the Elections Committee is competent to consider the election platform of a party list, and to disqualify that list from participating in elections to the Knesset, only when its platform negates the very existence of the State of Israel, or its integrity. In the present matter, that has not been proved to be the purpose of those promoting the Progressive List for Peace, as was well explained by the learned President. And as regards the Kach list, it falls entirely outside the reach of this ground for disqualification. I might have rested content with that explanation of my opinion - considering the particular circumstances accompanying this judgment, as well as the tradition that brevity is blessed: "And (Boaz) said unto the reapers*, the Lord be with you" (Ruth 2:4). But having regard to the opinions of my esteemed colleagues, I wish to add some further comments. In particular, I do not find their explanations of the Yeredor majority ruling fully exhaustive of its implications and I accordingly see need to elucidate it further. My esteemed colleague, Barak J., expands the Yeredor ruling to cover also a list that negates the democratic nature of the state. He further renders it a precondition to the disqualification of a list, for any reason whatever, that the realisation of that list's ideas is a reasonable possibility. I disagree with him on both scores. I also attach much importance to a Knesset enactment that will delimit the borders of the permitted and the forbidden respecting the matter in issue here - provided that enactment prescribes clear standards. I shall endeavour to explain briefly the reasons for my position in this matter.

 

            2. The majority ruling in the Yeredor matter [1] was a great innovation, and it cannot be explained or even understood in terms of our accepted methods of interpretation. It is well known that the methods of interpretation vary with the interpreter, and this court has said (see C.A. 2/77[28], at 11) -

           

... which is only natural and comprehensible, considering that the rule of the Jewish scholars, "the judge has only what his eyes see", applies primarily to the modes of interpreting the law and the rules for its construction. The view of one judge differs from that of another. All depends on the eyes that penetrate the very heart of the law, its aim and purpose, and not merely the superficial meaning of the text. Some adopt an expansive method of interpretation... others advocate restrictive and strict interpretation... Still others proceed along various middle paths in order to find the proper balance.

 

            From amongst these differing approaches that which commends itself to me holds (ibid., at 12). -

           

...Let not the judge be likened to a mountain palm, and let him not abstain from the task of construction, so long as it is possible, even if strained, to reconcile the matter with the written text, if by doing so a result contrary to the declared purpose of the legislature can be avoided...

 

            It has been said further (H.C. 188/63[29], at 350, per Berinson J.):

           

               We are interpreters and not simply linguists. A good interpreter of the law is one who carries out the legislature's will.

           

            I also accept that the interpretation of a statutory provision must heed the spirit of the law and of the entire legal system. The judge should not rest content with the act of deciding alone, but must adopt a decisory policy. As we said elsewhere (C.A. 32/81[30], at 767):

           

               Such a process of decision-making pursuant to legal policy, which prevails over the legal rule since it itself is part of the law, is a common phenomenon in the decisions of the courts.

           

            But there is a limit to all these methods of interpretation which the judge may not exceed or transgress: the will of the legislature, as it finds expression in its enactments. This prohibition against trespassing upon the domain of the legislature derives from the fundamental principles of the legal system concerning the boundaries of the three branches of government, and the judge may not enter the domain of the law-maker. Just as ascertainment of the legislature's will is one of the fundamental principles of legal policy, so too is it fundamental not to raise ourselves above the legislature but to accept its fiat.

           

            3. The Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version) (hereinafter - the Elections Law) prescribes the fundamental right of every Israeli citizen to be elected to the Knesset, the circumstances in which this right may be denied, and the various requirements concerning the submission of candidates lists and similar provisions (section 56 and chapter six of the Law). The conclusion to be drawn from all these provisions is that the legislature directed and intended that only on the given grounds, and no other, may the Committee refuse to approve an election list. One may not infer in any manner from these grounds - which are technical and formal - the existence of additional grounds, such as flow from examination of the content of a list's platform. There is good reason for the legislature's wish to limit the possibility of disqualifying a list to purely technical-formal grounds. On the one hand it wanted to safeguard the right to be elected, a fundamental right in the democratic regime; on the other, it lacked the confidence to entrust a power of disqualification - on grounds of a party list's substance and content, to a body mainly composed (except for its chairman) of party-political representatives, whose considerations might be ideological-political.

           

            Furthermore, the Elections Law prescribes, mandatorily, that a list meeting the enumerated requirements "shall be approved by the Central Committee" (section 63). In that situation, the court may not assume, nor confer upon the Elections Committee, a discretionary power to disqualify a list for reasons not specified in the Law, when that discretion was withheld by the legislator. We are not concerned here with the application of rules of interpretation, but with acceptance of the rule of law, which is paramount in our legal system.

 

            4. Prima facie this legal situation would lead to the conclusion reached by Cohn J. in the Yeredor case [1], and by my esteemed colleague, Ben Porat D.P., in the present matter, that there exists no competent power to disqualify a list whose platform embodies liquidation of the state and impairment of its territorial integrity. Indeed, had the majority in the Yeredor case reached its conclusion by applying the rules of interpretation as to the balancing of contradictory fundamental interests and the exercise of discretion in that process, I too would have thought that such power does not fall within the scope of the Committee's authority. But that was not the ground for the majority decision, which is clear from its reasoning. Thus Agranat P. said (ibid. p. 387):

           

I agree that ordinarily it is not for the Central Elections Committee, when exercising its power to decide upon approval of one or other list of candidates, to examine the candidates in detail or to question their political views. This rule, however, ceased to apply in the present matter the moment the attention of the Elections Committee had been drawn to the fact that the appellant list was to be identified with a group of people held by the High Court of Justice to be an illegal association, because its purpose was to deny utterly and absolutely the existence of the State of Israel in general, and its existence within its present borders in particular, and that in consequence the same group had been declared an illegal organisation. In view of these facts, the Central Committee was left no discretion or alternative but to decide against approving the appellant list.

(Emphasis added - M.E.)

 

And Sussman J., concurring with the President, added (at p. 389):

 

I also have no doubt that the Elections Law did not empower the Central Elections Committee to approve or refuse to approve a candidates list at its discretion. The opposite of such discretion is implied in section 23 of the said Law; nor is the grant of such discretion consistent with the composition of the Committee, which is a body composed entirely according to political criteria based on the representation in the outgoing Knesset - except for the chairman of the Committee, who is a justice of the Supreme Court. That was not, however, the question before us. The question as defined by the chairman of the Committee at its sitting on September 29, 1965 (p. 27 of the Committee's minutes), was whether the Committee may examine the legitimacy of the list according to a principle that is not written in the statute book.

(Emphasis added - M. E.)

 

            The disqualification of the list in Yeredor was not, therefore, a consequence of the exercise of discretion, or of a balancing of interests, or the rules of interpretation. The Committee "was left no discretion or alternative" but to disqualify the list. For what reason? Sussman J. goes on to say (at p. 390):

           

Just as a person does not have to agree to be killed, so also the state does not have to agree to be annihilated and wiped off the map. Judges may not sit with arms folded in despair at the absence of a positive law to invoke when a party asks them to assist in bringing an end to the state. Likewise no other state authority is required to serve as a tool in the hands of someone who has set the annihilation of the state as a goal, and perhaps has no other goal but that.

 

            It is a contradiction in terms to participate in elections to the legislature in order to abolish the legislature, for the Knesset cannot exist together with those who seek to destroy it. That is an innate contradiction which cannot be reconciled, and the matter is not at all contingent - as my esteemed colleague, Barak J., maintains - upon the existence of a "reasonable possibility" that the members of such list will achieve their evil design. (I shall refer again later to the "reasonable possibility" criterion.) And by virtue of "natural law" and "the right of self-defence of organised society" (per Sussman J., ibid.) there is no alternative but to prevent the list from carrying out its scheme. This lack of choice does not stem from any of the ordinary rules of interpretation, but is founded on a supreme imperative in Judaism: "and man shall live thereby - and not die thereby" (Leviticus 18:5, B.T. Yoma 85b). As for the reservation expressed by my colleague, Barak J., I should make it clear that the legislature may be presumed to expect that the court and every other state authority will have recourse to and apply this supreme imperative, which exists by virtue of natural law. It is hardly necessary to say that this presumption is given to rebuttal where the legislature provides explicitly and unequivocally that the Elections Committee need not or shall not disqualify a list, even when it contests the very existence of the state or its territorial integrity.

           

            5. As I said at the outset, the reasoning behind the Yeredor ruling marks a great innovation in our case law. It does not add a new rule to the ordinary modes of interpretation, but lays down a one-time principle superimposed on the ordinary modes of interpretation. This principle, by its very nature, is confined to the special case of an intent to put an end to the existence of the state or impair the integrity of its borders, and does not apply in any other case, no matter how reprehensible to us the list's political and cultural views. In every other situation the matter invokes the ordinary methods of interpretation, the principle of balancing interests and fundamental rights, the discretion of the body empowered to interpret and consider the matter. And since the legislature never conferred such discretion on any body whatever, the necessary conclusion is that except for the case of a party list whose object is to annihilate the state and impair its integrity - there is no one empowered to prevent any list, whatever its platform, from participating in Knesset elections.

 

            6. As we have seen, this material difference between a list that contests the very existence of the state and one that propounds any other kind of objectionable and questionable ideas, was central to the majority opinion in Yeredor. And just as their observations stress the necessity, as an "imperative of life", to disqualify a list intent on annihilating the state, so too they stress the enjoinder against disqualifying a list for other reasons relating to the content of its platform. Agranat P. dwelt on the point that in a democratic state it is not permissible to preclude the candidacy of any group of people seeking election to the Knesset in order to promote its own ends, except when the purpose is to annihilate the state, in which case it is imperative to disqualify the list (ibid., pp. 387-388). Sussman J. reiterated the point (ibid. p. 389):

           

An "unlawful purpose" in the present context does not mean a purpose that aspires to change the governmental order. That order is not sacrosanct, and its change is not a punishable crime. Rather an "unlawful purpose" is a purpose that aspires to annihilate the state, to bring catastrophe upon most of the inhabitants for whose sake it was established, and to form alliance with its enemies.

(Emphasis added - M.E.)

 

            A clear and exhaustive analysis of this distinction was made by Justice Landau, then serving as chairman of the Knesset Elections Committee, whose views were cited by his colleagues in the Yeredor decision ([1], at 372):

           

...I do not find it at all difficult to draw a line between this list - whose purposes were defined in its rules of association and parts whereof were also mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court - and other political parties who aspire to change the internal constitutional regime of the state... I find a vast difference, as between East and West, between a group of people which seeks to undermine the very existence of the state, or in any event its territorial integrity, and a party that acknowledges the political entity of the state but wishes to alter its internal regime.

 

            The question raised here was what will the morrow bring if we apply the same statutory provision against other parties. I know of no other party in the state against which I could apply the same provision...

 

Hence (ibid., at 374) -

 

...There is no dispute, and the learned chairman explained this to the Committee in unequivocal terms, that a list of candidates who oppose a certain statute and wish to repeal or amend it, or who oppose the composition of the existing government and wish to change it, and the like, is entirely legitimate, and no one would consider disqualifying it.

 

            7. These observations on the rules of democracy made by three past Presidents of the Supreme Court were valid when they were uttered and are even more apposite today. After the Yeredor decision, our legal system underwent a change, and in 1980 the Knesset enacted the Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, which now constitutes one of the basic laws of the State of Israel that form its underpinnings. The fundamental principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, that "the State of Israel ... will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel" which served only as basic guidelines but lacked full legal efficacy, became with the enactment of the Foundations of Law, fundamental legal principles, underlying the entire legal system in the state, namely: "the principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage" (section 1 of the Law). It seems to me that there is no issue more amenable to examination in accordance with these principles of Israel's heritage than the one now before us.

           

            My esteemed colleagues expanded upon the views of legal scholars and philosophers in various legal and political systems on the issue of freedom of expression and opinion, whose views are not always in alignment with and sometimes even contradict each other. Such an examination is most important, since it helps to broaden the horizons and deepen the study of a subject common to all enlightened and progressive legal systems. And in this respect I may comment that in an examination of this kind one must always bear in mind the political background and the legal framework in which the statements are made, since these may vary from those in Israel. Since the different conceptions of scholars the world over have been well elaborated by my esteemed colleagues, I see no need to deal with them again. As I have indicated, we would do well to nourish the answer to our present problem on principles of the Jewish heritage. These we shall now seek to elucidate.

           

            First a preliminary remark. It is common knowledge that abundant differences of opinion and conflicting approaches mark also Jewish thought throughout the ages - even the halakhic system itself, as will be shown later. No party to litigation will find it difficult to glean from its recesses some support for his arguments or views. Such is the case in relation to every matter, including freedom of expression and opinion and other questions which will be dealt with below. It goes without saying that all these views and approaches have contributed together to deepening and enriching Jewish thought at all times. But whoever embarks upon the quest for knowledge must distinguish between statements made for particular times and circumstances and statements made for all times, between a generally accepted view and an exceptional one, and the like distinctions and implications. From this vast and abundant treasure, it is possible to gather much that is significant for the requirements of one's own generation and age, so as to answer contemporary needs and at the same time replenish the treasure of Jewish thought and the heritage of Israel. This reality and the duty to make such distinctions are of the essence of Jewish thought - and of the halakha itself - as is the nature of every conceptual system. The subject is multi-faceted, but this is not the occasion to expand on it (see Rabbi A.I. Kook, Eder HaYekar (Jerusalem, 1967) 13-28; see also M.R. Konvitz, Preface to Judaism and Human Rights (M.R. Konvitz, ed., New York, 1972) 11.)

 

            8. We shall have recourse to the heritage of Israel in relation to two questions: the principle of freedom of opinion and expression, and the legitimacy of the Kach list platform. I shall start with freedom of opinion and expression.

           

            The prophets of Israel and their prophecies have long served as the paradigm of impassioned and uncompromising rebuke of governmental abuse of might and power, and of a corrupt public or individual. They condemn oppression of the poor and exploitation of the widowed, the repression of individual and community rights, and deviation from the spirit and substance of the Torah and halakha. The firm stand and struggle of the prophets of Israel, even when the evoke severe and angry reactions, has been an inexhaustible source of inspiration in the struggle for freedom of expression and for contemporary enlightened democratic regimes. This is common knowledge, not in need of proof, and common currency for every student of political and democratic theory.

           

            I believe there is no more penetrating and encompassing description of the freedom of expression and the importance of every individual opinion - even that of a single individual - than the Talmudic statement regarding the disputes between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai: "both are the words of the living God" (B.T. Eruvin 13b; J.T. Berakhot 1:4; J.T. Yevamot 1:6). For practical purposes, as a binding form of conduct, the halakha is according to Bet Hillel "because they were kindly and modest" (see Rashi to Eruvin 13b), but the views of Bet Shammai remained legitimate and material in the world of the halakha. This approach became characteristic of the halakha.

  

                      The "rebellious elder", even after the Sanhedrin - the highest tribunal of the nation - had ruled contrary to his opinion, could continue to hold to his views and "teach as he had done before", provided he did not actually rule accordingly (Mishna, Sanhedrin 11:2; B.T. Sanhedrin 86b). Moreover, a minority view might in time become generally accepted and acted upon. Rabbi Judah said: "The opinion of a single person is recorded along with that of the many, in case time makes it necessary to rely upon it" (Tosefta (Zuckermandel) "Eduyot 1:4; see also Mishna, Eduyot 1:5). Also:

         

Although the view of a single person is not accepted at first, and many disagree with him, at another time the majority may accept his reasoning and the law be decided accordingly, for the entire Torah was so given to Moses at times to forbid and at times to permit, and when he was asked: "until when shall we deliberate?" he answered: "follow the majority; because both are the living word of God".

(R. Samson of Sens, Talmudic scholar of France and Palestine at the turn of the 13th century, commentary to Mishna, Eduyot 1:5).

 

            And still striking today are the words of Akavia ben Mahalalel, who differed from his fellow scholars:

           

            Akavia ben Mahalalel testified concerning four matters. They said to him: "Akavia, withdraw these four things which you say, and we will make you presiding judge of the court". He said to them: "better I be called a fool all my days than I become even for one hour a wicked man before the Almighty; and let not men say: he withdrew his opinions for the sake of holding office".

(Mishna Eduyot 5:6; and see further M. Elon, Jewish Law, Its History, Sources and Principles (2d ed., Jerusalem, 1978) 870-878).

 

            This plurality of views is no negative phenomenon or defect, but is substantive to the world of the halakha. "There is no instability or shortcoming, such as to say that he causes more than one law to exist, Heaven forbid! On the contrary - such is the way of the Torah, and both are the words of the living God" (R. Hayyim ben Bezalel, introduction to Vikuah Mayim Hayyim (Prague, 16th century); and see in detail Elon, op. cit., at 1145-149). Moreover, plurality of views and approaches has the power to create harmony and unity out of difference. As the last of the codifiers, R. Yehiel Michal Epstein, said at the beginning of this century (Arukh Ha Shulhan, Hoshen Mishpat, Introduction):

           

            All the disputes of the Tannaim and the Amoraim, of the Gaonim and the codifiers, are truly the words of the living God, and all are aspects of the halakha. Indeed that is the glory of our pure and holy Torah, the entire Torah is a song, and the glory of a song is when it is sung in different voices. And this is the essence of its pleasantness.

           

            Indeed this basic conception that "both are the words of the living God" has at all times exerted a decisive influence on the mode and substance of halakhic codification as well as decision. I have dealt elsewhere with the subject and need not enlarge upon it here (Elon, op. cit., at 870, and the references in note 94).

           

            The plurality of views plays a material and fruitful role generally in the life of a just society. The rabbis even composed a special benediction to fit the secret encompassed in this notable phenomenon of a plurality of views in society: "If one sees a large crowd of people, one should say: Blessed is He who is wise in secrets; for neither their faces nor their thoughts are alike" (Tosefta (Zuckermandel), Berakhot 7: 5; and see B. T. Berakhot 58a). This is a blessing for wisdom and creativity: "Just as the nature of creation still renders the countenances of all people different, so also are we to believe that wisdom is still shared by men each differing from the other" (Vikuah Mayyim Hayyim, supra). Such a plurality of views should be respected by our leaders and government, as the following midrashic comments instructively indicate (Numbers Rabbah, Pinhas, 21:2; Tanhuma, Pinhas 10):

           

            Just as the countenances (of people) are not alike, so also their views, and each person has his own opinion ... Thus on the point of death Moses begged of God: "Master of the Universe, the views of every one are well known to you and your children's views are not all alike. When I depart from them, I pray, appoint them a leader who will be tolerant of each person's view".

           

            That is the lesson of leadership and government in the heritage of Israel - tolerance for every individual and every group, according to their opinions and outlooks. And this is the great secret of tolerance and listening to the other, and the great potency of the right of every individual and every group to express their opinions, that they are not only essential to an orderly and enlightened regime but also vital to its creative power. For in the real world "two opposing elements converge and fructify; how much more so in the spiritual world" (Rabbi A.I. Kook, HaNir (Jerusalem, 1909) 47; Eder HaYekar, 13 ff.)

           

            9. When in the plurality of opinions - itself welcome and vital - there is sounded a view that is injurious to society's spiritual and cultural foundation, that society must defend itself and its views. This end must be achieved first and foremost by persuasion and education. Education, as we all know, does not mean merely preaching to others, to those who have strayed from the desired path, but includes self-examination and reflection upon the spiritual and cultural image of that society in which thorns and thistles have sprung up. And when the need arises, a cultured society will employ legislation to punish those who incite and agitate to challenge and threaten it. Those who so deserve, whose transgression has been adequately proved before the judicial authorities, will be punished accordingly. The legislature, needless to say, may employ even the most extreme measure of silencing such views by denying those who express them the right to be elected to its own house; which means also, as indicated by my learned colleague, Shamgar P., denial of the right of those adhering to such views to vote for and elect persons of their choice. This is the legal right of the Knesset, which represents the will of the people, and I shall later make some observations as to the extent to which it is proper, in my view, for the legislature to exercise this right and enact such an extreme and far-reaching measure as withdrawal of the right to elect and be elected.

 

            As I said at the outset, in our democratic regime the denial of such a fundamental right does not lie with the judiciary in the absence of express authorization by the legislature - which represents the will of the people, and whence the judiciary draws its authority and power. If the court were to assume such power without legislative authorization, that itself would constitute an injury to an enlightened democracy, whose very foundation lies in the rule of the law - not of the legislature, the rule of justice - and not of the judge (see H.C. 152/82 [31], at 472-474; HC 234/84 [32], at 484). A further danger is threatened by the court's assumption of such power of disqualification, without express authority and guidance from the legislature, as to the scope and measure of such disqualification. The democratic character of the State of Israel found expression in the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of ensuring complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex, and guaranteeing freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. These principles serve as our guiding light. The Jewish character of the State of Israel found expression in the Declaration of Independence in the very definition of the state as a Jewish State, and not merely as a state of Jews, in the opening of its gates to Jewish immigration for Ingathering of Exiles (as was expressed later in the Law of Return, 5710-1950), and so on. These principles likewise serve to guide us. This constellation of principles forms part of the Jewish state's special make-up. Prominent Zionist thinkers of all trends and streams, Jews of varying world outlook, citizens of the State of Israel of different ethnic and religious belonging, have all reflected upon and continue to debate the practical significance and application of the principles of the Declaration of Independence in the Jewish state. How and by what standard will the court adjudge the content of a party platform that is not reconcilable with each and every one of the complex of principles set out in the Declaration of Independence?

  

                      My esteemed colleague, Barak J., says that disqualification of a list because its platform does not comport with the principles of democracy upon which the State of Israel is founded, may only be effected when there exists a reasonable possibility that the members of that list will indeed achieve their aims; and when the court examines the existence of such reasonable possibility it must "consider the entire social scene in all its various aspects. It should analyse social processes ... not only past events but also the probability of potential future happenings". Does the Court have the tools for this task, which rests entirely on social-sociological considerations and entails no judicial decision at all? According to what guidelines and rules will the court make its decision? Indeed, my esteemed colleague holds this examination to amount to "a prophecy in the guise of a legal decision", in the words of Jackson J. in the Dennis case. I would suggest that as judges we refrain from acting as prophets. The illustrious scholar, Maimonides, appositely remarks:

         

          The Holy One did not permit us to learn from the prophets [how to rule on the law - M. Elon] but from the scholars, the men of reasoning and opinion; and He did not say: "you shall come unto the prophet that shall be in those days" but "you shall come unto the priests and levites and unto the judge (that shall be in those days)".

(Deuteronomy 17:9) (Introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah; and see Elon, op. cit., at 224-225).

 

          If that is so in Jewish Law, which the Jewish scholars recognised as deriving from a supra-human source, all the more so in a legal system that is based entirely on wise men, men of reasoning and opinions, and applied by them. Moreover, as already indicated, the power to disqualify a list for social, ideological and sociological reasons is vested primarily in the Central Elections Committee, which - except for its chairman - is a political body par excellence, whose various members adhere each to his own long held political opinions, and it is much to be apprehended that they will not easily be open to considered and impartial deliberation of so conspicuous a politico-social issue.

         

          10. What I have said suffices to indicate the abundance of problems and difficulties that face us when we begin to consider disqualifying a list because of the content of its platform. From this viewpoint, the case of the Kach list hardly serves to illustrate the reality of these difficulties. For the content of its platform and the aspirations of its initiators and leaders are of such gravity, and so patently mischievous in terms of the cultural and democratic image of the State of Israel, that - had we been vested with the power of disqualification - we could conclude that it should not be allowed to participate with the other lists in campaigning for election to the Knesset. And as far as I am concerned, the most severe and serious aspect of the Kach platform - even more than its distorted outlook as to safeguarding the democratic foundations of the regime in the State of Israel - is that this list and its leaders seek support in the Torah and the halakha. Let us look at this aspect briefly.

 

            A basic element in Judaism is the idea that man was created in the image of God (Genesis 1:27). The Torah so opens, and from this concept the halakha derives certain fundamental principles regarding the value of man - every human being as such - his equality and the love of him:

           

            He [R. Akiva] used to say, beloved is man in that he was created in the image of God, but it is a mark of a greater love that it was made known to him that he had been created in the image of God, as it is said (Genesis 9:6), "For in the image of God made He man".

(Mishna, Avot 3:18).

 

            And it was by reason of this verse that the sons of Noah were prohibited from spilling blood, even before the Torah was given. Very instructive is the difference of opinion between two leading Tannaim as to the crowning value in human relations:

           

            "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself" [Leviticus 19:18], R. Akiva said, this is a major rule of the Torah. Ben Azai said, "This is the book of the generations of Adam" [on the day God created man He did so in the image of God-Genesis 5:1] – this is the greater rule.

(Sifra, Kedoshim, 4:10).

 

            According to R. Akiva the supreme value in human relations is love of one's fellow man; and according to Ben Azai, the supreme and preferred value is the equality of man, since every man was created in the image of God. And these two values - equality and love of one's fellow - came together as one at the hands of the Jewish nation, together forming a cornerstone of Judaism throughout its generations and history. It is also stated in connection with this fundamental issue :

           

Ben Azai said, "This is the book of the generations of Adam"-this is a major rule of the Torah; Rabbi Akiva said, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself"- that is a greater rule; so that people should not say, since I have been demeaned, my fellow man shall also be demeaned...Rabbi Tanhuma said: if you do so, then know whom you are demeaning - "in the image of God He created him".

(Genesis Rabbah, 24:7).

 

            The great rule of loving your neighbor as yourself is not just a matter of the heart, or an abstract love without commitment, but refers to a practical way of life. And Hillel formulated the rule thus: "Do not do to others what is hateful to yourself". The commentators have dwelt on the fact that this negative formulation lent the principle a meaning that makes it compatible with human nature:

           

For a man cannot in his heart love his neighbor as he loves his own self; and in any event R. Akiva has already taught us: your life comes before your neighbor's.

(Nachmanides, Leviticus 19:18).

 

            R. Akiva, for whom the predominant rule was "Love your neighbor as yourself", himself taught that in times of danger - to the individual and to the community - it may be that "your life comes before your neighbor's" (B.T. Bava Metzia 62a).

           

            The Jewish nation is enjoined to fight for its existence and to ward off those who conspire to harm and dispossess it of its sovereignty and its land. But the enemy too retains the value and dignity of a human being. When Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, was victorious over the Ammonites and Moabites, the people stood and sang "Praise the Lord for His mercy endures for ever" (2 Chronicles 20:21-22). On this the scholars commented (T.B. Megilla 10b):

           

R. Johanan said: Why are the words "for He is good" omitted from this thanksgiving [in relation to the corresponding phrase in Psalms 107:1]? Because the Holy One does not rejoice in the downfall of the wicked. And R. Johanan further said: what is the meaning of the verse "and one came not near the other all the night" [Exodus 14:20; the reference is to the Israelites and the Egyptians at the crossing of the Red Sea]? The ministering angels wanted to chant their hymns, but the Holy One said: "the work of my hands is being drowned in the sea and shall you chant hymns?"

 

            My esteemed colleague, Barak J. , referred to the instructive observations of Rabbi A.I. Kook on the love of mankind. Rabbi Kook indeed uttered profound words on this important theme in Judaism. In the chapter from which Barak J. quotes, he went on to say (Middot Hare'ayah, Ahavah 5):

           

            The love of mankind should be alive in the heart and soul, the love of the individual and the love of all peoples, the desire for their uplifting and their spiritual and material welfare... An internal love from the recesses of the heart and soul, to benefit all peoples, improve their possessions and render their lives blissful...

 

            Also illuminating in this context and in Judaism generally, is R. Kook's teaching on the relationship between the "natural, customary morality" of every cultured person and the moral demands of Judaism:

           

The love of mankind needs much fostering, to be expanded as befits it, against the apparent superficiality of its inadequate application in terms of the Torah and customary morality, as if there can be conflict or at least indifference regarding such love, which ought always to fill the chambers of the soul.

(Ibid., Ahavah 10; and cf. Orot HaKodesh, vol. III, p. 318.)

 

            Thus the Torah and customary morality complement and reinforce one another as a dual requirement in nurturing and educating the Jew.

           

It is forbidden that the fear of Heaven suppress the natural morality of mankind, for then the fear of Heaven is no longer pure. A sign of pure fear of Heaven is when natural morality, inherent in the very nature of man, proceeds to rise to even loftier heights than it might otherwise reach. But if fear of Heaven is portrayed in such fashion that life would have a greater tendency to do good and to benefit individuals and society without its influence, and the force of that active agent diminishes under its influence, such fear of Heaven is deficient.

(Orot HaKodesh, vol. III, Preface, paragraph 11, p. 27).

 

And further on (ibid., paragraph 16, p. 32):

 

The visible natural morality must be manifested before the substantive paths of the concealed superior morality can be revealed in the soul. Only in this manner, by establishing first the firm basic foundation, can we erect the upper structure, the summit of which is in heaven. The wider and deeper the roots of the tree spread, the fresher, stronger and more fruitful the branches, and its leaves will not wither.

 

            The demand of morality in Judaism adds to and complements the moral conduct required of civilized and enlightened society, and whoever ignores the latter is deficient in the former.

           

            11. These fundamental perceptions also determined the attitude of Jewish law to a national minority living under Jewish rule. A series of basic Jewish precepts are grounded in the Torah in the historical memory of the nation, in its suffering as a minority under the rule of others: "For you were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Exodus 23:9; Leviticus 19:30; 22:20; 29:9 and so on).

           

 Furthermore, "You shall not abhor an Egyptian, because you were a stranger in his land" (Deut. 23:8). Racism, which has brought so much suffering to mankind, even to this very day, is alien to Judaism, and has been categorically rejected by it. A foreigner who joins the Jewish people becomes one of its members, with all rights and obligations: "You shall have one statute, both for the stranger and for him that is born in the land" (Numbers 9:14); "Neither let the alien that has joined himself to the Lord say - The Lord will surely separate me from His people ... For My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples" (Isaiah 56: 37). This applies not only to the future but even to the past. And thus wrote Maimonides in response to R. Ovadiah Ger Tzedek (a righteous convert) (Responsa (Freiman ed.) 369):

 

            Every one who converts, down to the end of days, and every one who professes the unity of the Holy One blessed be He as written in the Torah, is a disciple of our Patriarch Abraham ... and all are members of his family... No difference at all exists between us and them in any respect. And let not your pedigree be slight in your eyes; if our pedigree relates to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, yours relates to Him who created the world by his word.

           

            The Jewish people does not "gather souls" in order to draw members of other nations into its fold (Genesis 12:5; Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 8:10). This serves to express, among other things, the protection which Judaism gives to minorities to live by their own culture and heritage. The practice, common in ancient - and in less ancient times - of a minority's assimilation and absorbtion into the majority according to the principle of cujus regio cujus religio by virtue of which many minorities were persecuted until they adopted under duress the religion of the ruling majority, was categorically rejected in the world of the halakha. For this reason, when Israel was most powerful the bet din did not accept converts throughout the times of David and Solomon. "In the time of David -in case they came out of fear, and in the time of Solomon-in case they came out of attraction to the greatness and goodness of the kingdom of Israel" (Yad, Hilkhot lssurei Bi'ah 3:15).

           

            The halakha defined a member of a national minority as possessing the status of a "resident alien" (ger toshav) and the only condition that attached to that status was observance of the seven Noachide Laws, i.e., those elementary obligations of law and order which all civilised peoples are commanded to observe, and which the scholars regarded as a kind of universal natural justice (Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah 14:7; B.T. Sanhedrin 56a; Nahmanides, Commentary to Genesis 34:13; and cf. Elon, op. cit., 183 ff.). A national minority is entitled to all the civil and political rights enjoyed by other residents: "...A stranger and a sojourner shall live with you" (Leviticus 25:35); "Resident aliens are treated with courtesy and loving-kindness as an Israelite, since we are commanded to sustain their life ... and since you are commanded to sustain the life of a resident alien, he is healed gratuitously" (Yad Hilkhot Melakhim 10:12; Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:2). And the scholars also said (Deut. 23:17 and Tractate Gerim 3:4):

 

A resident alien shall not be settled in border districts nor in poor habitation but in a good residence in the centre of the Land of Israel where he can pursue his skills, as it is written: he shall dwell with you, in the midst of you, in the place which he shall choose within one of your gates, where it pleases him best, and you shall not oppress him.

 

          The fundamental guiding principles as regards the attitude of the Jewish State to its overall population, are the fundamental principles of the halakha in general, as pointed out by Maimonides (Yad, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:12):

         

For it is stated: The Lord is good to all and His tender mercies extend to all His works, and further: Its [the Torah's] ways are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace.

 

          I have cited just a small portion of the halakhic rules of government affecting minority rights in a Jewish state, and need not elaborate any further here.

         

          I shall end these observations with the inspiring words of Maimonides on the aspiration of the generations for messianic times, which "differ from present times solely in servitude to earthly governmental power" (Hilkhot Melakhim 12:2, relying on Samuel's statements in B.T. Sanhedrin 91b, 99a and elsewhere). He writes:

         

The scholars and the prophets did not yearn for messianic times that they might dominate the world or rule over the gentiles, nor to be exalted by the nations and to eat, drink and rejoice - but to be free for the study of Torah and its wisdom without oppression or disturbance - to gain everlasting life, as we explained in the laws relating to repentance. In those times there shall be neither famine nor war, neither jealousy nor strife - goodness will be abundant and all pleasant things profuse. The whole world will be preoccupied only to know the Lord. Hence Israelites will be wise and will know things that lie obscure and attain understanding of their Creator according to their human capacity, as it is written, "For the earth shall be full of knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea". (Isaiah 11:9) (Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim, 12:45).

 

          Israel's sovereignty and Jewish government - not in order to dominate the world or rule over the gentiles, but so that Israel no longer suffer oppression, and may engage in the study of Torah and its wisdom, and the earth may be filled with knowledge. These significant words of the greatest of Jewish thinkers embody the aim and image of the Jewish State.

 

            12. The content of the Kach platform and the purpose of its promoters and leaders, as reflected in the material presented to us, stand in blatant contrast to the world of Judaism - its ways and perspectives, to the past of the Jewish nation and its future aspirations. They contradict absolutely the fundamental principles of human and national morality, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, and the very foundations of present-day enlightened democracies. They come to transplant in the Jewish State notions and deeds of the most decadent of nations. This phenomenon should cause grave concern among the people who dwell in Zion. This court is charged with the preservation of the law and its interpretation, and the duty of inculcating the values of Judaism and civilization, of the dignity of man and the equality of all who are created in the divine image, rests primarily upon those whom the legislature and the executive branch have chosen for the task. When, however, such a seriously dangerous phenomenon is brought to our attention, we may not refrain from sounding the alarm against the ruinous effects of its possible spread upon the character, image and future of the Jewish State. The remedy lies, in the first place, in a reassessment of the ways of educators and pupils alike, in all walks of our society.

 

            13. It was not, therefore, for lack of sensitivity to the gravity of the Kach list phenomenon that we refrained from endorsing its disqualification, but because the legislature has not empowered us or the Central Elections Committee to disqualify a list from participating in elections to the Knesset on ground of the content of its platform. The only exception is a list that avowedly seeks to abolish the sovereignty of the state or impair the integrity of its borders, in which case we - and any other competent state body - are bound to disqualify it, by virtue of the paramount principle "thou shalt live by them", as we explained at the outset.

 

            The consequence of not disqualifying the Kach list is difficult and saddening, considering the content of its platform, but it is right and proper not only in terms of our respect for the rule of law but also because it precludes the drawing of undesirable conclusions in such an important and complex matter. As I have already indicated, such a fateful and farreaching determination as denial of the right to be elected to the Knesset, on ideological grounds, should properly be made with the approval of a majority of the public, through the legislature, with clear limitations and definitions provided. A general legislative power that sanctions disqualification of a list because its promoters or its platform are opposed to the democratic principles on which the State of Israel rests or which are to be found in the Declaration of Independence, or any other like general and indeterminate formulation, would be so inherently uncertain and vague that this court could not exercise it in actual fact. This certainly applies to a body such as the Central Elections Committee, which is mainly composed (apart from its chairman) of members with defined political views and inclinations. Democratic principles, including those enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, are by their very nature subject to interpretation in different ways, and incorporate different, sometimes contradictory, world views and fundamental perspectives. So it is in the enlightened democracies in general, and so it is in our society in particular, where social, religious, economic and constitutional problems are legitimate subjects of controversy.

 

            Here it is appropriate to return to the Yeredor matter [1], and cite again the comments concerning the vast difference between an entity that undermines the very existence of the state, or in any event its territorial integrity, and a faction that acknowledges the existence of the state but desires to change its internal regime (at p. 372); or opposes a particular statute and seeks its repeal or amendment (at 374); or "aspires to change the governmental order, an order that is not sacrosanct, and its change not a punishable offence" (per Sussman P., at 389). These observations alone are enough to illustrate the objective as well as subjective difficulty of the court in circumscribing the permitted and the forbidden - the court having the function and authority to rule on the interpretation of a statutory enactment, its purpose and application, and not on an issue that turns entirely on world views, the recesses of the heart, and the social image of the regime. In the view of my esteemed colleague, Barak J., the existing situation is preferable to "unbalanced legislation". My view is otherwise, and in paraphrase of my esteemed colleague I would say that detailed legislation is preferable to adjudication that may well be unbalanced. Only the legislature may and can prescribe the criterion, from among the principles of democracy and the Declaration of Independence, which when disregarded justifies the disqualification of a list, and what shall be the degree of the violation and the likelihood of the danger from the violation of such principle that is required for the purpose of disqualification. Such clear determinations are the preserve of the legislature as well as its duty.

           

            That is certainly no easy task, and perhaps its difficulty accounts for the legislature's silence so far. But this task is the legislature's entirely, from which it cannot be absolved. The grave and unwelcome phenomena apparent from the appeal before us, in terms of the image and character of our state, call for the legislature to accomplish this vital task without further delay.

           

            14. In conclusion, for the reasons given above, I concur in the opinion of my esteemed colleagues that the two appeals should be allowed. The appeal of the Progressive List for Peace - because it was not proven that it seeks to liquidate the State of Israel or impair the integrity of its borders, thus leaving no occasion to apply the Yeredor ruling. And in the case of the Kach list - because it falls outside the ambit of the Yeredor ruling, since neither we nor the Central Elections Committee are empowered to disqualify it.

           

            BARAK J. 1. I have read with great interest the comprehensive and important judgment of my colleague, Shamgar P. and I concur, not only in the result reached by him, which we have already announced, but also in the main points of his reasoning. Like him, I am of the opinion that the ratio decidendi of E.A. 1/65[1] (hereinafter "the Yeredor ruling") is confined to a refusal to confirm a list that contests the very existence of the State and wishes to annihilate it. The application of this test was not argued at all with respect to the Kach list, and it was argued but not proven with respect to the Progressive List for Peace. In this matter I believe that the burden of proof lies with the party arguing for the refusal of a list's confirmation, and that it must be discharged by competent "administrative evidence", that is, "such testimony as any reasonable person would consider to be of probative value and upon which he would rely to a greater or lesser degree" (per Agranat P. in H.C. 442/71[13], at 357; H.C. 297/ 82[20], at 37). If I nevertheless choose to add some reflections of my own, it is to elucidate my position on the question whether the Yeredor ruling should be extended and applied also to a case in which the election platform of the list rejects, not the very existence of the state, but its democratic character. Such elucidation would have been relatively simple had I been of the opinion, held by Cohn J. in Yeredor and by Ben-Porat D.P. in the present matter, that the Elections Committee does not have any authority to refuse to confirm a list on grounds of the content of its election platform. That is not my view. I am of the opinion, as was the majority view in the Yeredor case, that the Elections Committee is authorized to refuse confirmation of a list by reason of the content of its platform. Moreover, I am of the opinion that for our present purpose one should not distinguish between a platform that negates the existence of the state and a platform that recognises the existence of the state but disavows its democratic character. At the same time, however, my approach is that the Committee should exercise this authority - with respect to both a platform that rejects the existence of the state and one that rejects its democratic character - only where there is a reasonable possibility that these ideas will be realized. Since such a possibility was by no means established in the present matter, I formed the opinion that there was no ground for refusing to confirm the participation of the Kach list in the elections. My approach thus differs from both the majority and the minority approaches in the Yeredor case. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that it is sufficient for the list to reject the existence of the state in order not to confirm its participation in the elections. Unlike the minority, I do not believe that the Elections Committee has no authority at all to refuse confirmation of a list whose platform rejects the existence of the state. As already indicated, my opinion is that the authority of non-confirmation exists with respect to both a platform that rejects the existence of the state and one that rejects its democratic character; but the exercise of such authority in both cases must be on ground of a reasonable possibility that the "threat"' will be translated into practise. It appears to me that my approach is very similar to that of my colleague, the President, who also stresses a number of times that the authority might inhere in special circumstances where there is a substantial probability that the exercise of a fundamental civil right will cause harm that is sought to be prevented. Yet my colleague is not prepared to follow my approach entirely, so that I find it necessary to set forth my reasoning. I shall begin with an analysis of the ruling in Yeredor [1], with an examination of the law as regards an election list that negates the existence of the state, and thereafter proceed to examine the issue before us of a list that negates the democratic character of the state.

 

            The "Yeredor" Rule: Negating the Existence of the State

           

            2. As we have seen, the question in Yeredor [1] was whether the Elections Committee may competently refuse to confirm a list for participation in the elections if it negates the very existence of the state. On this matter opinions were divided. The dissenting judge, Cohn J., was of the opinion that the Elections Committee is not vested with such authority. It appears that even those who question the correctness of this position do not deny the legitimacy of Cohn J.'s approach. It is well founded on accepted legal arguments in our "interpretative community". It relies, on the one hand, on the legislator's silence and, on the other hand, on a reluctance to read into the law a broad authority which would contradict fundamental principles of our system as regards the citizen's basic right to express himself and to vote. Arguments of this kind are often reflected in this court's rulings, they have significant force and power (see, e.g. , H.C. 337/ 81[5]), and I myself have recourse to them and accept their validity. But the approach of Cohn J. is not the only possible one. That of the majority judges - Agranat P. and Sussman J. - and of Justice Landau when heading the Elections Committee, is likewise well-founded in accepted legal arguments in our "interpretative community". According to this approach, the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 (hereinafter - "the Elections Law") established the Elections Committee and granted it powers to refuse to confirm a list on certain grounds. These grounds can be supplemented, by way of interpretation, which addition is required by the basic principles of our system - principles which serve in the interpretation of statutes. Where the legislature provides that a list "shall be confirmed by the Central Committee" (section 63 of the Elections Law), the court, in applying the interpretative rules of its system, may determine that it is dealing with a directive which confers authority, and despite the mandatory language used, the Elections Committee must necessarily be conceded a discretionary power in order that the fundamental principles of our system be realized. It is true that the linguistic foundation for this interpretative result is weak, but it is decreed by the very fact that we are dealing with the interpretation of a basic constitutional provision. Such basic provisions should be construed according to a "spacious view" - in the words of Frankfurter J. in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [59], quoted by Agranat D.P. in F.H. 13/60[33] at 442 - and on the understanding that we are dealing with a provision that determines a way of life. The interpretation of an ordinary legislative provision is not the same as that of a fundamental constitutional provision. Familiar to us is the statement made by Justice Marshall, upon fashioning the American constitutional perspective, that when interpreting the constitution it should always be borne in mind that it is not an ordinary document - "it is a constitution we are expounding" (M'Culloch v. Maryland [60]). We are concerned with a human endeavour that must adapt itself to a changing reality. We have said that an ordinary statute is not a [linguistic] fortress to be conquered with the help of a dictionary but rather the cloak of a living legislative idea (Cr.A. 787/79[34], at 427); this approach should guide us a fortiori in interpreting provisions of a constitutional character. In the well-known words of Holmes J. (Gompers v. U.S. [61]):

 

            The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions... Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.

           

            We may, therefore, construe the wording of a basic constitutional provision that determines a mandatory duty, in a manner that gives discretion to the authorized person - if such discretion is essential to realising the fundamental principles of the system. The American courts faced a similar problem in interpreting the First Amendment to the Constitution which states in unequivocal language that "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The Supreme Court did not hesitate to hold, in a long line of precedents, that despite the unequivocal language which denies Congress any discretion in the matter, it does have authority to limit freedom of speech and the press in certain cases. (See Lahav and Kretzmer, "The Charter of Civil Rights in Israel: Constitutional Gain or Illusion", 7 Mishpatim 154 (1976).) Indeed, our own Supreme Court has often taken this very approach that narrows or broadens the statutory language so as to realize the fundamental principles of our legal system (Cr. A. 696/81[35] at 574). For a legislative enactment in general, and a fundamental statutory provision in particular, is not a one-time act isolated from the general way of life. The statute gains substance within the framework of a given political and legal system. It constitutes one brick in a whole structure built on the given foundations of that regime and law, which constitute the "primary concepts of that society" (H.C. 163/57[36] at 1051). When a statute provides that a certain person shall decide every dispute, it is clear that he is not obliged to hear a dispute in which he has a personal interest. We interpret the general mandatory language against the background of our constitutional regime and the principles of equality, justice, fairness and morality in our system. Their application narrows the scope of the general language, or expands that of specific language, and this can transform discretionary authority into mandatory authority, and mandatory authority into discretionary authority. "The law of the people", said Agranat P. "must be deduced in the context of its national way of life" (H.C. 73/53[26] at 884). Therefore, every law must be interpreted in the light of the Declaration of Independence, which expresses "the vision and credo of the people" (Smoira P. in H.C. 10/48[37] at 89). Justice H. Cohn himself said in similar vein:

 

When we talk of an enlightened democratic legislature, guided by good practices, lofty principles and concepts of justice, not only are we not allowed to assume that it has abolished them, but its enactments must be faithfully interpreted on the assumption that any law passed by it has been adapted to the framework of the existing "law', in all its multiple and varied components.

(Cohn, "Faithful Interpretation in Three Senses", 7 Mishpatim 5, 6).

 

            According to this approach, the majority position in Yeredor [1] is founded on a firm interpretative base. The existence of the state, its "continuity and perpetuity" - in the words of Agranat P. in Yeredor - is certainly a fundamental principle of our legal system (cf. Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests", 57 Harv.L.Rev. 1). The Elections Law should be interpreted in light of this principle, by virtue of which the authority of the Elections Committee may be expanded so as to allow it not to confirm the participation in elections of a list that rejects the very existence of the state and aspires to its annihilation.

           

            3. It appears, therefore, that both the majority and the minority opinions in Yeredor are possible from an interpretative point of view. Thus we face a real dilemma in which the judge must exercise the "sovereign prerogative of choice" (see Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1952) 239). How is this choice to be made? It seems to me that the key lies in the fundamental principles of the system, which both the majority and the minority relied upon. The majority put its trust in the principle of the state's continuity and perpetuity; the minority in the principle of the citizen's freedom to vote and be elected. It appears to me that the correct course of interpretation must take into account all principles, those relied upon by the proponents of both views. Indeed, I believe that the interpreter-judge should not adopt a particular fundamental principle and neglect another. The judge should have recourse to all the fundamental principles and not choose only those that commend themselves to him as proper.

           

            4. One might ask: how can one take into account all the fundamental principles when some of them lead to a narrow interpretation that denies the Committee's authority (as in the minority opinion) whereas others lead to a broad interpretation that extends authority to the Committee (as in the majority opinion)? What should a judge do when the fundamental principles are contradictory and lead to different constructions in a given situation? This is not a new phenomenon, nor is it peculiar to the case before us. The judge often encounters fundamental values that contradict one another. It is not unusual to find one principle in conflict with another and a thesis opposed by its antithesis. Justice Cardozo commented:

 

Again the task of judging is found to be a choice between antithetical extremes. We seem to see the working of an Hegelian philosophy of history whereby the tendency of every principle is to create its own antithesis or rival.

(Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, (1928) 62).

 

            Indeed, the basic tenets of the system often march in pairs, each having its own direction. (See Dickinson, "The Law Behind the Law", 20 Col.L.Rev. 113,123.) The decisions of the Supreme Court bear testimony to this phenomenon. Thus, for instance, the principle of state security, public order and public security competes with those of freedom of expression (H.C. 73/53[26]), freedom of procession (H.C. 153/83[25]), freedom of religious worship (H.C. 292/83[24]) and freedom of information (H.C. 243/62[38]). The principles of judicial integrity (Cr.A. 696/81[35]) and a person's good reputation (F.H. 9/77[21]) conflict on occasion with the principle of freedom of expression.

           

            5. When the judge encounters fundamental principles of his system that contradict each other - for instance, the preservation of the state and the freedom of expression and the vote - he must take them all into account. The judge must place the principles alongside each other and give each its proper weight and, having done so, he must strike a balance between the various principles. In the words of Justice Frankfurter:

           

The core of the difficulty is that there is hardly a question of any real difficulty before the Court that does not entail more than one so-called principle... Judges cannot leave such contradiction between two conflicting "truths" as "part of the mystery of things". They have to adjudicate. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the task of the Court is to arrive at an accommodation of the contending claims. This is the core of the difficulties and misunderstandings about the judicial process. This, for any conscientious judge, is the agony of his duty.

(F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Man (New York, 1956) 31,43).

 

            The judges of Israel also face this unavoidable task. This is a process in which "we weigh various competing interests in the balance and, after reflection, select those which, in the circumstances, predominate" (Agranat P. in H.C. 73/53[26], at 879), and which constitutes "the interpretative starting point" (Shamgar P. in F.H. 9/77[21], at 361). This was the approach of the Supreme Court in the Kol Ha'am case [26], where the court held that the authority of the Minister of the Interior must be exercised with a proper regard for the objectives of freedom of expression, on the one hand, and public security, on the other. In reaching that conclusion the court did not adopt the one principle and reject the other, but balanced the two. Taking a similar approach in the matter of a Police District Commander's authority as regards the holding of demonstrations, this court noted (H.C. 153/83[25], at 401) that such balancing requires -

 

          ... a judicial determination - in the absence of statutory guidance - as to the relative grading of the different interests, which will ensure resolution of the question whether these interests rank equally in importance or whether one takes preference over the other. Likewise, in the case of interests of equal standing, this balancing process calls for a judicial determination as to which interest shall defer to the other. Thus a judicial pronouncement has to be made with respect to the "limits of sufferance" of the various rights.

         

          It follows that where fundamental values of the system incline in conflicting directions, the court must take them all into account. It must allow the different values to vie with each other, and balance them in accord with their weight and force at the point of friction. Holmes J. said in this respect (op cit., p. 181):

         

          Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.

         

          6. This same approach, requiring the balancing of competing values, should be adopted also where the platform of a list seeking to participate in the elections, negates the very existence of the state. It appears to me that a judge construing the Elections Law may not ignore the fundamental principles referred to by Cohn J. in the Yeredor case. He must take into account the citizen's fundamental right to elect and be elected. My colleague, Shamgar P., noted justly that "the right to participate in elections is a fundamental political right that gives expression to the idea of equality, to the freedom of expression and to the freedom of association" and, hence, "is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society". These principles must be considered in the interpretation of every legislative enactment, including the Elections Law. But, by the same token, it is impossible to ignore the fundamental principles referred to by Justice Landau (in the Elections Committee) and by Agranat P. and Sussman J. in the Yeredor case. It is inconceivable that we should interpret a statute without taking into account the principle that "the State of Israel is an existent state whose continuity and perpetuity is not to be questioned" (Yeredor, at 386). A constitution is not a prescription for suicide, and civil rights are not a stage for national extinction (cf. Jackson J. in Terminiello v. Chicago [62], at 37). The laws of a nation should be interpreted on the assumption that it wishes to continue existing. Civil rights are nourished by the existence of the state and ought not become a tool for its annihilation. Therefore, judicial interpretation has no alternative but to seek a proper balance between the competing values of the continued existence of the state, on the one hand, and freedom of expression and election, on the other. Frankfurter J. commented thus on the matter (Dennis v. U.S. [54], at 524):

 

       The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved.

      

       7. How is the balancing of values, as they compete for primacy in the Yeredor case, to be accomplished? The interest in the state's existence and the interest in the right to vote are not equal. The first clearly precedes the second, since it is a condition for the existence of the second (cf. F.H. 9/77[21]). This court likewise held with respect to conflict between the principle of state security and the public peace, and that of freedom of expression (H.C. 73/53[26]), freedom of demonstration (H.C. 153/83[25]) and freedom of worship (H.C. 292/83[24]). Certainly the same approach should be taken where the very existence of the state is in the balance. It follows that we are concerned with achieving a balance that requires a judicial determination as to the probability that realization of the right to vote will prejudice the interest of the state's continued existence. What, then, is the criterion for weighing the probability of prejudice to the state's existence that would justify a denial of the right to vote? Of course, there is no answer to this question in the Elections Law, and the Supreme Court must provide it. The Supreme Court has faced such questions in related issues. Thus, for example, where the conflicting interests were state security and the freedom of expression, the Supreme Court adopted the test of "probable" danger, while rejecting the known American formula of a "clear and present danger" (H. C. 73/53[26]). The same "probability" test was applied with regard to a conflict between the principle of the public peace and that of the freedom of demonstration, worship and information (H.C. 243/82[38]). However, where the conflict was between the principle of free speech and that of judicial integrity, the court used the standard of a "reasonable possibility" (Cr.A. 696/81[35]), following Cr.A. 126/62[39]. Indeed, when adopting the standard of probability one should not follow a general, universal criterion, since it depends on the force of the different values that come into conflict within a given legal context (H.C. 153/83[25], at 403). The question always is whether the measure of harm, weighed against the possibility that it may not actually occur, justifies violation of a civil right so as to prevent the danger (see Hand J. in U.S. v. Dennis [63]). Professor Schauer remarks in this connection:

      

       Evaluation of the interest in national security requires a determination of the extent of the harm should the argued effect actually occur, the probability of that effect occurring and the immediacy of the effect. The more serious the effect, the less certain and less immediate that effect need be.

            (Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (1982) 199).

           

            According to this approach it is clear that when the interest is that of the state's existence, the damage that may occur is so great that there is no need to require the existence of a clear and present danger or a substantial probability of danger. Furthermore, these formulae are appropriate in cases of concrete, specific and special dangers related to defined events. It is not possible to apply them when dealing with social phenomena that are part of a continuing process. Indeed, the matter calls for wide margins of security, because no unnecessary risks can be taken, and once a list has been confirmed the Elections Committee cannot, at a later stage after the elections, retract its decision. Nonetheless, the principle of freedom of expression and the right to elect and to be elected are precious values, and we should not, therefore, accept a test of probability for which a mere remote danger suffices. It appears to me that the proper balance will be found in a test of "reasonable probability", to which this Court has had recourse in the past (cf. Cr.A. 696/81[35], following Cr.A. 126/62[39]). Certainly, this test "does not constitute a precise formula that can be easily or certainly adapted to every single case" (Agranat P. in Kol-Ha'am [26], at 888). On the contrary - this is a difficult formula that leaves broad margins of uncertainty, but in the absence of a legislative formula it commends itself to me as the most appropriate one.

           

            8. It follows that I find myself taking a position that is not identical with either the majority or the minority opinion in Yeredor. Like the majority view, I too hold that the Elections Committee may refuse to confirm a list for participation in the elections, if its platform negates the existence of the state. However, I do not rest content with the list's "bad tendency" - in the words of Agranat P. in Kol Ha'am [36] - but would require a reasonable possibility that the list's platform will actually be realised. (For a similar approach, see Lahav, "On the Freedom of Expression in the Supreme Court Precedents", 7 "Mishaptim 375 (1976) at 416.) I regret that this requirement was not specified in the Yeredor case. Had the majority adopted that requirement, it might still have reached its same disqualificatory conclusion, since the case involved an organisation which the Minister of Defence had seen fit to declare illegal, which had acted as an arm of terrorist organisations existing in neighbouring Arab states, and which posed a general threat to the state with perhaps a real possibility of endangering its very existence. It is interesting to note the reference made by the minority judge to this aspect (Yeredor [1], at 381):

           

            Moreover, even where the law expressly authorised the denial of a certain civil right - which right was a fundamental civil right, such as freedom of opinion and speech - this court refused to support the exercise of that legal power where the denial was not necessary to prevent a present, clear and substantial danger (H.C. 73/53 - Kol Ha'am). I fail to discern the substantial, clear or immediate danger to the State, its institutions or its rights, in the participation of this candidates list in the Knesset elections. And if one wishes to argue that this danger is concealed from the courts and known only to the security agencies of the Government, I would reply that the material before the Central Elections Committee, which was also submitted to us, does not justify and certainly does not compel a finding that such danger exists. Indeed, the attention of the Committee members was not drawn to any substantial danger supposedly imminent. In the absence of as a sanction for past conduct and opinions; and the Central Elections Committee is certainly not authorised to impose a sanction like that.

           

            Can one assume that if a substantial danger had been proven, Cohn J. too, would have been prepared to take it into account? Should one not hold that the minority judge also would not have accepted the Elections Law as a prescription for national suicide? Still, it should be noted that the above remarks of Cohn J. were obiter dicta, and his main approach was that the Committee had no authority to deny a list's participation on grounds of its platform. I cannot agree with that approach, for if there is proved to be a reasonable possibility that the platform negating the state's existence might be realised, the Elections Committee certainly has the authority, even the duty, to disqualify the list from participating in the elections.

           

            9. Thus far I have not discussed the fact that the authority of disqualification - according to my interpretation, upon a "reasonable possibility" test - is vested in the Elections Committee, which is a body representing mainly political interests. It has occurred to me that this political composition may be indicative of the legislature's disinclination to rest the Committee's vested authority to decide upon a list's participation in the elections, on a party-platform test. Indeed, this is an important argument for, in principle, I believe that a body's authority can be inferred from its structure and composition (cf. J. Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966) 674). Nevertheless, it appears to me that this argument should be treated as part of a structural whole, and not as conclusive in itself. Thus, for example, in municipal elections the like authority is given to an elections officer who is an administrative functionary, and it cannot conceivably be argued that a different law applies there for that reason. Therefore one ought not deduce from the composition of the Elections Committee a decisive conclusion that, in the instant situation, would preclude application of the fundamental principles of our system and their internal balance. My colleague, Miriam Ben Porat D.P., has emphasized the fact that once the Elections Committee decides to confirm a list's participation in the elections, there is no appeal to the Supreme Court (H. C. 344/81[27]). According to her approach, this indicates that the Elections Committee is not authorized to weigh considerations affecting the state's existence, since she holds that it is inconceivable for the legislature to vest such power, without any possibility of an appeal or challenge, in the hands of a political committee. Although I share this approach in principle, I do not believe that it is decisive in the present matter for several reasons. Firstly, the Elections Committee is presumed to weigh material considerations with respect to both confirmation and non confirmation of a list. Secondly, it is necessary in every system to determine who shall have standing to apply to the court for a list's disqualification; in general, this power is given to political functionaries. From this point of view one can regard the Elections Committee as a preliminary obstacle to approaching the court. Finally, in the unusual event that the Elections Committee confirms a list which poses a reasonable possibility and, perhaps, even a certainty of danger to the very existence of the state, the Knesset always retains the power to prevent that disastrous consequence by legislative means.

 

Negation of the Democratic Character of the State

 

            10. So far I have examined the Election Committee's authority to withhold the right of participation in elections from a list that negates the very existence of the state. What is the Committee's authority as regards a list that acknowledges the state's existence but disavows its democratic character? In my opinion, here too we should adopt a like method of analysis. It appears to me that just as the existence of the state is a fundamental tenet in our legal system, so is its existence as a democratic state. The Declaration of Independence - in the light of which our legislation is construed - indicates that Israel rests "upon foundations of liberty, justice and peace as envisioned by the Prophets of Israel" and that it will ensure "complete equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without distinction of creed, race and sex". All this presupposes not only the actual existence of the state but also its democratic essence, for it is impossible to ensure equality, liberty and justice without maintaining a democratic regime under which these principles will be realized. "The system of laws under which the political institutions in Israel have been established and function are witness to the fact that this is indeed a state founded on democracy" (Agranat P. in Kol Ha'am [26], at 884). Indeed, the distinction between questions pertaining to the state's existence and those touching upon its democratic nature, is at times difficult and complex. Can we not say, with a large measure of justice, that sometimes a danger to the existence of our democratic regime endangers also our existence, for our strength is in our regime? Can we not say that our democracy, our equality and our fundamental values are our strongest forces? Is it at all possible to distinguish questions about the state's existence from those about the essence of its democratic regime? Would the State of Israel without the Declaration of Independence be the same State of Israel? Is there any essential difference between denying the state's right of existence and recognising its continued existence under the flag of the Palestine Liberation Organisation?

           

            11. It appears to me, therefore, that just as we must interpret the Elections Law on the basis of a proper balance between the principle of the state's existence and that of the freedom to elect and be elected, so too we must interpret the Elections Law on the basis of a proper balance between the principle of the state's democratic regime and that of the freedom of election. In its interpretation the court may not consider merely the principle of the state's democratic character, thereby ignoring the important fundamental principle of the freedom to elect and be elected. But, likewise, the court may not take into account only the principle of the freedom to elect and be elected, while ignoring the framework of the regime and the law under which that right is exercised, i.e our own democratic regime. As in the Yeredor case [1], so in the matter before us, there is no avoiding a proper balance between the competing values. As with the threat to the very existence of the state, so with the threat to its democratic character, the balance finds expression in the formulation of a proper standard to determine the likelihood of realisation of the danger. As we have seen, that standard is shaped by the extent of the anticipated damage and the chance that it may not come about. It appears to me that in this connection too we should adopt the standard of reasonable possibility, and not probability, because of the supreme importance of the interest in the state's democratic character. Furthermore, as we have seen, the probability test is appropriate in the context of a concrete, defined event, and inappropriate in the context of an overall social framework (see O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice (Princeton, 1961) 140). As with the issue of the state's existence, so here we should maintain broad margins of safety. Still, to meet this standard of reasonable possibility, a "bad tendency" alone will not suffice, and it requires substantial proof of a reasonable possibility that the anticipated danger will actually come about. It follows from what we said above, that the same standard of "reasonable possibility" can be applied to the threat both to the state's existence and to its democratic character. It should not be inferred that these two values are thus seen to be on the same level. The difference between the two will find expression in the different balances that are called for when applying the "reasonable possibility" standard (see C.A. Auerbach, "The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech" 23 U. Chicago L.R. 173 (1956)).

           

            12. The import of the balancing process is no more than to convey that the right to vote, like the rights of expression, procession, information, assembly, and all other "political rights" are not absolute but relative rights (H.C. 148/79[40]). It was so noted by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California ([59], at 373):

           

            Although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.

           

            The same applies to the right to elect and be elected. This right too is one of the citizen's fundamental rights (Reynolds v. Sims [64]), but it is not an absolute right, only a relative one. It can be restricted if there is a reasonable possibility that its exercise will deprive the state of its democratic character. Thus a delicate balance is attained between principles and values that mark democracy. On the one hand, the fundamental right to political expression is not to be denied merely because of the nature of the political view. Quite the contrary, the power of democracy lies in the freedom it allows to express opinions, however offensive to others. On the other hand, democracy is allowed to protect itself, and it need not commit suicide so as to prove its vitality.

           

Reasonable Possibility

 

            13. What is a "reasonable possibility" of injury to the existence of the state or its democratic character? The answer to this question is not at all simple since it requires examination on the particulars required to be taken into account. It appears to me that one should not take into account only the possibility of a change by parliamentary means, through a majority vote in the Knesset. I believe the scope of the examination should be widened to take into account all the social possibilities. The parliamentary test frequently constitutes but a last formal stage in a social system, in which the legitimate activity of a list that rejects the very existence of the state or its democratic character, could injure the social fabric. It appears to me that all these should be taken into account. The danger of a vote in the Knesset is no greater than a danger that the lawful activity of a list which rejects the state, or democracy, might reinforce phenomena that impair the legitimacy of the state, or democracy itself, in the eyes of the public. The reasonable possibility test should encompass the entire social scene, in all its various aspects. It should analyse social processes in the course of which a marginal entity that disavows the state or democracy might gradually accumulate strength until reaching the stage where it constitutes a danger to the existence of the state or its democratic regime. Kirchheimer remarks in this connection (op. cit., 137):

           

            He must consider past experience, future expectations, the ends pursued and the means applied by the revolutionary group, the doctrine it subscribes to, and the relation, if any, between doctrine and action patterns.

           

            The test indeed imposes a difficult task on the Elections Committee and on the Supreme Court. They must examine not only past events, but also the probability of potential future events. This examination amounts to a "prophecy...in the guise of a legal decision" in the words of Jackson J. in the Dennis case ([54] at 570). But this is a task to which a political body is accustomed, and it is not alien even to a legal proceeding which often calls for a decision founded on the examination of social processes.

  

                      14. In determining the reasonableness of the possibility that explicit or implicit ideas of a list will be translated into practice, one must consider the various means that may be adopted so as to mitigate the risk, short of actual denial of the right of election. In fact, the drastic measure of withholding the right to participate in elections should not be taken unless the alternative means are insufficient adequately to reduce the danger to the state or its democratic regime. In this respect two important points should be made. First, one should consider whether methods of persuasion, explanation and education would not act to mitigate the danger. Often the soft face of education towards democracy and its values is preferable to the stiff hand of governmental intervention. These words of Justice Brandeis, quoted by my colleague, Shamgar P., are well-known (Whitney v. California [58], at 377):

         

          If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.

         

          Second, there is room to consider other governmental measures that fall short of actually barring the list from participation in the elections. Thus, for example, activity against the state and its regime might constitute a criminal offence, and those associating together might constitute an illegal association under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. Often the danger to the state and its democratic foundations can be reduced by punitive means - which might also entail the withdrawal of immunity from a Knesset member involved in criminal activity - before using the sharp measure of depriving the list of its right to participate in the elections.

         

          From the general to the particular

15. In the instant matter we have examined the platform of the Progressive List for Peace but have not found in it any indication, explicit or implicit, of a desire to bring about the annihilation of the state or to impair its democratic character. That being the case, the appeal must be admitted without any need to apply the test of a reasonable possibility. Not so with respect to the Kach list. Here the Elections Committee studied the Kach list and its publications, concluding that this material showed the list "propounds racist and anti-democratic principles that contradict the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel". On the basis of this finding the list was denied participation in the elections. In so doing the Committee erred, for the platform alone is not sufficient, and the Elections Committee must consider whether the list poses a reasonable possibility of harm to the democratic character of the state. Words, opinions and views are not sufficient. There must be evidence of the existence of a reasonable possibility of activities that endanger the democratic character of the state. For this purpose one may take into account the past conduct of the faction, its members and its leaders, and the future dangers they hold out. No evidence was brought in this respect, nor was any attempt made to do so. True, there was much evidence before the Committee that the platform of the Kach list impairs the democratic character of the State. There was even evidence that it seriously intends to realise its objectives and does not renounce them. Indeed, the evidence shows that it has engaged in several overt acts to realise its platform. Thus, for example, the head of the list and one of its members were taken into "administrative detention" under the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979, on the basis of information that they were planning attacks against Arabs. That detention was confirmed by the President of the District Court, and an appeal against his decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court which found that the activity of the two constituted a danger to national security (A.D.A. 1/80[41]). So too, a number of the list's activists were convicted in the Magistrate's Court of improper conduct in a public place (Cr. F. 135/82, not published). But all this is not enough. The question is not whether the list is serious in its designs, but whether there is a serious possibility that its purposes will be accomplished. The question does not, therefore, concern the list internally, rather the list in relation to the state. The question is whether the possibility that the platform of the list will be realised, is a reasonable one, or whether such a possibility is most remote. In my opinion there was no evidence before the Committee of any such reasonable possibility. On the contrary: the administrative detention and the criminal trial that were brought to the Committee's attention reinforce the possibility that there are accepted means of defence at democracy's disposal, and there is no need, as yet, to adopt the drastic measure of denying the right to be elected. Indeed, neither the Committee nor this court was confronted with any factual data on which to base a finding that the list creates a possible danger to democracy in Israel. There was no fact from which to conclude that the Israeli democracy had lost, or that there was a reasonable possibility it would lose, its capacity to defend itself against this list - whether by educational or governmental measures. In the main, all that was proven was "bad tendency" - in the words of Agranat P. in the Kol Ha'am case [26] - and attempts to translate it into practice. That alone will not suffice. In these circumstances there was no justification for depriving the list of its right to take part in the elections. Note! I have no doubt that the ideas of Kach are racist and that its principles violate the fundamental doctrines on which the democratic regime of the state is founded. I am also convinced that they contradict the spirit and essence of Judaism, in all its various forms. In the words of Maimonides (Yad, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 12:3):

 

            For this reason, but a single man was created, to teach us that if any man destroys a single life in the world, Scripture imputes to him as though he had destroyed the whole world; and if any man preserves one life, Scripture ascribes it to him as though he had preserved the whole world. Furthermore, all human beings are fashioned after the pattern of the first man, yet no two faces are exactly alike. Therefore, every man may well say, "For my sake the world was created".

                     

The same approach is echoed by Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook:

 

The most supreme value in the love of living creatures should be taken to be the love of man, which extends to all mankind. Despite differences of opinion among religions and faiths, and despite differences of race and geographic location, it is proper to understand the various nations and groups, to attempt to learn their nature and characteristics, in order to base love of humanity on foundations close to reality. For only on a soul rich in the love of living creatures and love of man can the love of the nation rise in its exalted nobility and its practical and spiritual greatness. And narrow mindedness, which sees only ugliness and impurity in all that is beyond the boundary of the particular nation, and beyond the border also of Israel, is one of the more terrible darknesses causing general destruction to all good spiritual edifices that guide by their light every gentle soul.

(See Z. Yaron, Teachings of Rabbi Kook (W.Z.O. Publications, 1973/4), 304.)

 

            If we have decided to sanction the list's participation in the elections, it is not because we accept any particular item in its platform. On the contrary, we have held, and reiterate once more, that its approach contradicts our fundamental conception and the general and Jewish values upon which our national edifice is being constructed. But so long as it has not been proven to the satisfaction of the Elections Committee, and to this court, that the list creates a reasonable possibility of danger to the existence of the state or its democratic character, there is no alternative but to allow it to participate in the elections.

           

From the Particular to the General

 

            16. I have accordingly reached the conclusion that under our existing law, the Elections Committee may refuse to confirm the participation in elections of lists that negate the existence of the state or its democratic character. However, that authority may not be exercised except where the Elections Committee is persuaded by the evidence before it that participation of the list in the elections raises a reasonable possibility of danger to the existence of the state or its democratic character. This approach stems entirely from the creative sources of the judicial process. This process is creative, but constrained within limits. The judge is not as free as the legislature. Therefore, I did not consider myself free to ignore the various principles, values and interests that compete for precedence, and I considered myself obliged to balance them in accord with a standard suited to the nature of the problem. It follows that my examination is interpretative. It seeks to exhaust the statutory language and has recourse to "supra-norms" with respect to the existence of the state, as an interpretative guideline. The same approach was taken by Justice Landau in the Central Elections Committee, in connection with the Yeredor matter. He said:

           

As chairman of the forum of first instance, the Central Elections Committee, I focused my statements on an interpretation of the statute - albeit a broad interpretation, so as to prevent undermining of the constitutional foundations of our regime and of the very existence of the state itself. I believe that this is also the line of reasoning taken by Agranat P. I do not think that the criticism of this approach is justified. We never entertained any doubt as to the sovereignty of the legislature, from whose word the judge may not depart, and which can change any ruling of the court. In lofty matters such as these, it may be presumed that the legislature will address the issue despite its many other occupations. But it is also clear that the court may exercise its discretion in interpreting the legislative word and, with respect to legislation of constitutional significance, that interpretation must derive inspiration from the fundamental notions upon which our constitutional regime is founded.

(M. Landau, "Ruling and Discretion in the Administration of Law", 1 Mishpasim 292 (1969), at 306.)

 

          That is my opinion as well. We are dealing with the interpretation of a legislative text through recourse to the ordinary rules of interpretation. One of those rules is that the statutory language should be interpreted in light of the accepted fundamental values of our legal system (Cr. A. 696/81[35], at 574; C.A. [42]), one of which - among the more important of them, but not the only one - is the principle of maintaining the state's existence. This interpretative approach exhausts the judicial process and lies at its core. It follows from the doctrine of the separation of powers and is consistent with our conception of the democratic state. My colleague, Elon J., is of the opinion that this interpretative approach entails a denial of the Elections Committee's authority. If that is the case, whence the judge's power to contradict the word of the legislature? Let us suppose an express statutory provision that the Elections Committee may refuse (to), or shall not, disqualify a list that negates the very existence of the state. Would Justice Elon still persist in holding that the Elections Committee must prohibit the list's participation in the elections? In my opinion, that result indeed follows from his approach. But how can it be reconciled with the approach of my colleagues - to which I too subscribe - that the judge may not raise himself above the legislature, and that the rule of law, not the rule of the judge, governs our regime? Indeed the "extra-interpretative" approach is not new, and it has been referred to in the past. (See, e.g., Guberman, "Israel's Supra-Constitution", 2 Israel L R 455 (1967).) In this respect I need only adopt again the comment of Landau J. with reference to the Yeredor case, made in his above mentioned article (at p. 306):

         

That decision has evoked criticism. It is said that the court exceeded its authority, thus violating the principle of the rule of law. In my opinion, that is too mechanistic a view of the court's role in interpreting the law. I agree with the statements of Dr. Rubinstein in his article "The Rule of Law: The Formal and the Substantive Perspective":

 

The rule of law is meaningless without basic premises that stand above the positive system of law...The role of the jurist, who has the knowledge and training for this purpose, is to apply the meta-legal principle and to effectuate it through the deductive methods offered him by the juridical technique.

 

That is the role of judicial discretion in the interpretation of the law, so as to bring it into harmony with the foundations of the existing constitutional regime in the state. We know too that the boundaries between the interpretation of statutes and their supplementation where needed, are not defined, and that there are borderline areas. The leading decisions given in this spirit in the first twenty years of the state's existence - and their number is significant - have given our constitutional regime its special character, no less than the legislative enactments of the Knesset. This line of thought is the principal heritage to come down to us from the world of the Common Law, and it links our legal system to that world.

 

            Indeed, my approach in the instant case is based not on "supernorms", raised above the law, but on "supreme principles" that pervade the law and emerge from it. My approach posits no "supra-constitutional" "natural law" that overrides the statutory law. It is a positivist "intraconstitutional" approach, which examines the nature of the law and interprets it according to accepted interpretative criteria. The law, in the words of Sussman P. (H.C. 58/68[43], at 513) is "a creature that thrives in its environment", which environment includes not only the immediate legislative context but also broader circles of accepted principles, fundamental purposes and basic standards that comprise a kind of "normative umbrella" encompassing the entire field of the statutory law (C.A. 165/82[42]). In this manner the judge fulfills his proper role and does not trespass upon the domain of the legislature.

           

            17. I would note, nevertheless, that even were I to resort to such "supra" principles, I would reach the same conclusion. The supra-constitutional rule relied upon by Sussman J. "is actually, so far as concerns the instant matter, no more than the right of self-defence of a society organised within a state" (Yeredor [1], 390.) But when, and in what circumstances, is this rule to be applied? Is a remote fear of a theoretical danger a sufficient ground for applying these principles? The answer appears to be that even with the application of a "supra" principle one must determine a ratio of probability between the danger and its avoidance. Indeed, even the supra-constitutional rule is a legal rule, and as such it too requires interpretation. It appears to me, therefore, that if I were to have recourse to it, I would hold that the supra-constitutional principle may be applied only in the case of a reasonable possibility that the danger will be realised. It follows that I would reach the very same conclusion as I did through interpretation of the Elections Law itself.

 

            18. From the aspect of the general constitutional structure, it is desirable that this question of barring a list from participation in the elections, on grounds relating to the content of its platform, be regulated by legislation and not be left open to judicial interpretation. In this respect I am in agreement with my colleague, Deputy President Miriam Ben-Porat. But the main problem is the substance of that legislation. In my opinion the present situation is preferable to legislation lacking a proper balance, from which might result damage to democracy outweighing any benefit to the democratic process. It cannot be denied that a democracy wishing to withhold the electoral right from lists which reject democracy, is confronted with a philosophico-political difficulty. The difficulty lies in the dilemma - or, if you wish, the paradox: is the barring of antidemocratic lists from participation in the elections compatible with democracy itself, or is the democratic entity not itself taking an anti-democratic measure? This is an old question, and Plato discerned it in asking whether complete freedom does not entail enslavement, and whether the freedom of choice granted by democracy does not lead to tyranny (see, in this respect, Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1, 123, 265). Opinions on this issue are divided among philosophers and political scientists. Some maintain that the essence of democracy lies in full freedom of expression, extended under all circumstances and for all opinions, including those that might undermine the very democracy itself (see A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom; Constitutional Powers of the People (N.Y. 1965)). Others - who constitute a majority - hold that a democracy has the right, under its own internal logic, to exclude election lists that disavow democracy itself from participation in the democratic process (see J.R. Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (1979), 377; Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961), 119). But even those holding the latter view lack agreement as to the desirable solution. Some advocate the solution adopted in Germany, in both the Weimar and the post World War II periods, according to which a party that negated the democratic character of the state could not take part in the democratic process. In Yeredor ([1] at 384), Cohn J. noted that this legislative course might also serve our own legislature as an example. For all its merits, one cannot ignore its many deficiencies, since it denies a fundamental political right solely on grounds of content (of party platform), without any examination of the prospects of its realisation. Ought it not be said that the true test of the ideas of liberty, justice and equality, and the other fundamental principles that form the "credo" of our constitutional regime, is in their inner strength, their inherent truth, and not in their coercive power? Ought it not be maintained that the weakness of racism and incitement lies in their inherent falsehood which is exposed to all precisely in the free exchange of opinions and ideas that is unique to democracy. Justice Holmes explained the notion thus (Abrams v. U.S. [65], at 630):

 

            The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.

 

            Is there no danger that boundaries will be trespassed and that the stamp of racism and incitement will be imprinted on the views of a political opponent merely because they are unpopular? Should we not say that the test of democracy, where there is no reasonable probability of danger that the controversial views will be realized, lies precisely in its toleration of opinions, however odious they may be? Freedom of expression is not the freedom to express an accepted opinion, but rather the freedom to express a deviant opinion. Bach J. elucidated the point in instructing the Elections Committee. He noted that the Elections Committee could extend the Yeredor ruling also to bar the participation of a list whose platform rejects the foundations of democracy, and he also believed that this extended principle should be applied in relation to the Kach list. Nevertheless, he wished it to be taken into consideration that

           

...above all, the right to elect and be elected to the Knesset is among every citizen's central and most hallowed civil rights in a democratic regime - the denial of this right is an exceptional measure which can be justified only in extraordinary cases... This rule is put to the test especially in relation to controversial lists. Ordinary, accepted lists present no challenge to it. But the rule is tested precisely where there is strong objection and aversion to the list on the part of certain or broad sections of the public. Precisely in such case must we generally take care to allow the expression of those opinions and leave the decision as to their weight and justification to the public in a free vote.

 

            As Jackson J. said in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette ([66] at 642):

           

But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

 

            One might argue that these words are fit and proper for the great and powerful America, which can allow itself such a "liberal" approach, whereas we must act very cautiously since our state is small, its regime is young, and it is surrounded by enemies that pose a real threat to it. Indeed, that difference exists, but our own strength is in our moral force and our adherence to the principles of democracy notwithstanding the surrounding danger. In this respect our strength is great, and we can say out loud that even if we do not agree with a certain opinion we would give our lives for the right to make it heard. The legislative question involved is truly weighty and hard. We should hope to find the proper balance, that takes into account the entire picture, in all its complexity.

 

            For these reasons I joined my colleagues in admitting the appeals, setting aside the decision of the Elections Committee, and confirming the participation of the two lists - Kach and the Progressive List for Peace - in the Knesset elections.

           

            BEJSKI J.: 1. Because of the proximity of the elections, we were pressed for time in deciding the two appeals brought before us. Despite the different considerations and reasons of the Elections Committee in refusing to confirm each of the two lists, we found a common denominator that required us to admit both appeals, since that result followed from adoption of the majority opinion in Yeredor [1], and even more so were we to adopt the minority opinion there. My esteemed colleagues have elaborated extensively and incisively upon the important constitutional issue in all its varied complexities, as regards both principles and consequences, and the absence of statutory guidance has brought to the fore differences of approach to the desirable solution of a conflict between basic fundamental rights. If one accepts the minority opinion in Yeredor, as does the esteemed Deputy President, the conclusion is unequivocal as regards each of the two lists concerned. According to this perspective, the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 does not grant the Central Elections Committee authority to deny any list the right to contend in the elections, irrespective of its objectives and declared platform.

           

            If such list meets the formal, technical conditions determined in the Law, and none of its candidates are found to be disqualified under section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset, the position is clear-the list must be confirmed as a lawfully submitted one. And if one adheres to the majority opinion in Yeredor - in its narrow, restrictive sense one might also reach the same result, since the majority opinion is limited in application to a list whose objectives negate the integrity of the State of Israel and its very existence. The reason for the refusal of the Central Elections Committee (hereinafter "the Committee") to confirm the Progressive List for Peace comes very close to attributing such objectives to it, and with regard to this list the decision turns on the evidence, that is, whether the objectives attributed to it were proven sufficiently. In this connection I can already say at this point that I am in agreement with the reasoning in the esteemed President's instructive opinion, and this list's appeal should accordingly be upheld.

 

            The reason for the refusal to confirm the Kach list attributes to it subversion of the foundations of the democratic regime in that it propounds racist principles, supports acts of terrorism, attempts to incite to hatred and hostility among different sectors of the population in Israel, and intends to violate the religious sentiments and values of a section of the state citizens. It is clear that this reason strays from the basis of the majority ruling in Yeredor. Hence, adherence to the majority ruling, as regards the narrow issue of negation of the state's very existence, provides no ground for disqualifying the Kach list, unless the ruling is expanded, by way of judicial legislation, to disqualify also a list which in essential nature propounds anti-democratic principles and seeks to undermine the foundations of the state's democratic regime. Obviously, this reasoning too would require the Committee to examine and be persuaded, in accepted probative manner, that the allegations against that list are substantial. In the case of Kach the Committee reached that conclusion.

           

            2. Counsel for the state indeed invites us to expand the Yeredor ruling, and to hold that the Committee is authorised to disqualify not only a list that negates the very existence of the state but also one that disavows and undermines the principles of democracy as perceived by the free Western world. He contends that Kach is such a list, and therefore it was justly disqualified by the Committee.

           

            It is possible to understand Mr. Yarak's argument that it is not necessary to regard this reasoning as an expansion of the majority opinion in Yeredor, because it was said in that case (following the Kol Ha'am decision [26] at 884) that any element posing a danger to the perpetuity of the State of Israel could not be countenanced; this was a constitutional foundation "which no state authority, whether administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial, may disclaim when exercising its power" (Yeredor [1] at 386). The existence of the state in its present form is tightly linked to the democratic foundations on which it is based and the state cannot be protected without protecting its democratic foundations. In other words, subversion of the principles of democracy is tantamount to subversion of the very existence of the state, for the State of Israel inscribed in the Declaration of Independence, as a constitutional principle, that "it will rest upon foundations of liberty, justice and peace as envisioned by the prophets of Israel. It will maintain complete equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without distinction of creed, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture...".

           

            Mr. Yarak argues further that if the legislator has not seen fit to provide express statutory protection for the values of democracy, that is because these supra-principles have always been acknowledged in the case law as the basis of our regime, as regards both the recognition of rights and the creation of corresponding duties (H.C. 1/49[10] at 83; H.C. 73,87/53[26]; H.C. 148/79[40]), including rights and duties that are not written in the statute book but are recognised in law as stemming from the essential nature of our democratic regime (H.C. 29/62[44], at 1027; H.C. 112/77[45]; H.C. 262/62[46]; H.C. 337/ 81[5]; C.A. 723/74[3], at 295).

 

            3. It is true that to undermine the foundations of democracy is largely the same as undermining the foundations of the state as presently constituted. A democracy may defend itself against such phenomena, and the difficult dilemma which faces most Western democracies relates to the permissible means of defence. That defence is not at all easy since subversive groups often, perhaps mostly, take advantage of the benefits of freedom of speech and assembly under a democratic regime, in order to achieve their goals. Extreme examples of this phenomenon are found in the events overtaking Italy in the 1920's, Germany in the 1930's and Czechoslovakia in the 1940's. The dilemma as to the methods of self-defence - and perhaps also of waging war against groups of a totalitarian nature, is compounded sevenfold because of the fundamental values of democracy which, by its nature, is open to a plurality of opinions and world views. In 1763 Voltaire is reputed to have said that even if he objected to all that his opponent said, he would defend the right to say it with his own life. Open discourse, the right to make unconventional statements, exertion of influence to change ways of thinking on controversial And in the aforementioned Dennis case, Frankfurter J. said ([54] at 551):

           

            This difficult dilemma does not spare us either, and we have to contend with it from time to time. I choose to mention only one decision, the well-known El-Ard case (H.C. 253/64[2], at 679), from which reverberates the warning of Witkon J. concerning events of the kind seen in the recent past, when different totalitarian entities exploited the freedoms of speech, press and association granted them by the state, under the auspices of which to carry out their own destructive policies. It was said there (following H.C. 241/60[47], at 1170):

           

"These freedoms are valuable possessions, the tradition of a democratic regime in a free country, but precisely for that reason they may not be used as a pretext or tool by those who seek to undermine that regime." Likewise in the present matter. And the encouragement given the El-Ard Movement from across the borders alerts us to its potential danger to the State of Israel. It would be blind folly to sanction it.

 

But at the same time the other side of the dilemma was expressed:

 

The freedom of association is of the essence of a democratic regime and a fundamental civil right. Far be it from us to deny that right and disqualify an association for the sole reason that its goal, or one of its goals, is to strive towards changing the existing legal situation in the state. ... However, no free regime will lend support and recognition to a movement that undermines the regime itself.

 

            If we maintain that the right to freedom of association and speech is of the essence of a democratic regime, and that "a regime that does not honor the freedom and right of a minority to express its views cannot claim to be a true democracy" (G. Leibholz, Politics and Law (Leyden, 1965) 44), that does not imply that one may deviate from the fundamental doctrines of that regime in the name of democracy and under its guise. One who claims rights in the name of democracy must himself act in accord with its rules. In the words of Schauer (Free Speech, A Philosophical Enquiry, Cambridge University Press, p. 190):

           

            Superficially, we might say that advocacy of legal change should be permitted, but that advocacy of violent or unlawful means of change should not be protected by the Free Speech Principle. After all, people should not be able to rely on freedom of speech derived, here, primarily from the argument from democracy, for the purpose of going outside the process of democracy. It is not that fairness or consistency requires that those who claim rights under a principle must themselves subscribe to that principle, although such an argument is quite plausible. Rather, speech that produces extra-legal change undermines the process of rational deliberation that is the a priori value of a democratic system.

 

And further on (at 194):

 

That is, if freedom of speech is justified by its relationship to the legal system, and especially if it is justified by its ability to ensure the functioning of a system of laws, then speech directed at weakening or destroying that legal system would appear to have little claim to protection.

 

            Pennock's comment is apposite (Democratic Political Theory, Princeton University Press, p. 377):

           

...It would seem strange to dub as undemocratic a provision designed to prevent democracy from committing suicide.

 

            4. Measures of self-defence against acts subversive of the foundations of democracy are accordingly not considered prohibited, although in theory one can say that self-defence by the extreme method of suppressing or forbidding organisation entails an antidemocratic act. That is a price that must be paid, and it does not appear to be too heavy where a danger to national security or a state of emergency arises, which dangers are regarded as sufficient to deny freedom of speech or organisation. Against this background, the doctrine of a "clear and present danger" was evolved in the U. S. A. , as expressed in Whitney v. People of State of California [58] and modified in Dennis v. U.S.[54] at 507), and especially in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969 [67]), 444). The doctrine's development and the considerations that guided the U.S. courts were discussed extensively in the opinion of the esteemed President, and there is no need for repetition, except to note that when Douglas J. retreated from the "clear and present danger" test in the Brandenburg case, he said (at p. 456):

 

            The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation, is the line between ideas and overt acts.

           

            Any test we adopt, be it the criterion of a clear and present danger, or that of an overt act, or the "reasonable possibility" test now suggested by my esteemed colleague Barak J., immediately poses a twofold dilemma: one relates to the proper time when the defensive reaction may and should come; the other concerns the dimension of the permissible measures, that is, whether radical elimination of the danger, in its infancy, or other lesser means. The tolerance that democracy espouses calls for forbearance also with respect to the timing, until the maturation of the selected test. Still, Leibholz warns (op.cit., at 87):

           

But usually the process of enlightening a misled public opinion in democracy is a very delicate undertaking. The slowness of its tempo may even have disastrous consequences: the warning voices may remain unheard and the reversal of public opinion may come too late.

 

            After comprehensively analysing the lurking dangers, when a democracy fails to act in time and tolerantly seeks to reach compromise and understanding, the author adds (at 160):

           

All these well-timed, tactical, so called understandings only confirm the old experience, that states, like men, are very slow to learn the lesson taught by history, even contemporary history, and to guide their policy and actions accordingly.

 

            It is commonly agreed that governmental intervention against subversive bodies is justified and even necessary. Our historical memory also justifies timely, even prior intervention. That is necessary especially where the group does not stop at mere words but proceeds to act in destructive ways. However, the concrete dilemma concerns the permissible active modes of protection and their limits. Ought the conclusion be to bar the group from participation in public life, to outlaw it, or does it suffice to impose some form of control over the group's activities. The answer involves many factors and considerations - political, educational, economic, military, and the like, and above all the virility of the democracy, the composition of the population and its capacity to withstand external onslaughts. This complex array suggests that the answer lies properly in the political domain. Thus Lippincott opines (Democracy's Dilemma (1965) 199-220) :

 

            It is a task of the highest statesmanship. In order to carry it out, at a minimum cost, democracy will need all the wisdom of which it is capable.

 

            5. I have made these observations to explain why I believe we cannot admit the argument of counsel for the state, i.e. that it is supposedly self-evident that the Yeredor ruling [1] should be extended also to bodies which undermine the foundations of democracy, since that amounts to undermining the very existence of the state; likewise the argument that at in any event, and for the same reason, there is room to expand the Yeredor ruling beyond the narrow confines of the matter decided there. It is clear to me, and so it was unequivocally stated in the majority opinion, that only the vital need and the interest in the state's continued existence moved the court to take the extreme position of withholding the right to be elected, albeit by virtue of inherent authority, based on natural law, from someone whose avowed purpose is the destruction of the state. In the words of Sussman J. (Yeredor [1] at 390):

           

            Just as a man does not have to agree to be killed, so a state too does not have to agree to be destroyed and erased from the map. Its judges are not allowed to sit back idly in despair at the absence of a positive rule of law when a litigant asks them for assistance in order to bring an end to the state.

 

            The majority judges were not prepared to go any further, as was explicitly stated by Agranat J. (ibid. p. 387):

           

As already indicated, I agree that the Central Elections Committee, in exercising its power to decide upon the confirmation of a candidates list, is not ordinarily empowered to inquire into the candidates' worthiness or to reflect upon their political views.

 

            Sussman J. spoke in a similar vein (ibid. p. 389). One might ask: since in the Yeredor case the court, without statutory sanction, assumed the power to deny a fundamental right, why shouldn't we extend that power to another cardinal matter that poses a danger to democracy, and is closely related to that dealt with in Yeredor - where the court saw fit to forestall the danger? The answer is that the two are not alike. Negating the very existence of the state is not the same as subverting the foundations of democracy. If in regard to the former question the court felt itself constrained to go beyond its ordinary bounds and to resort to natural law, that does not mean that the court will extend such judicial legislation beyond the call of necessity. Certainly not where it is concerned with an essentially political matter lying primarily in the domain of the legislature - upon which the court will not encroach except through the modes of interpretation. Even in the Federal Republic of Germany, where section 21(2) of its Basic Law of 1949 expressly authorises the Constitutional Court to decide whether the objectives or tendencies of a party are to impair the democratic foundations of the Republic, that court is enjoined to act with restraint when exercising powers of a political nature. Leibholz says (op.cit., at 299):

 

As custodian of the constitution, the constitutional judge has to watch out that the Supreme Court does not usurp political power and authority. He must respect the well-determined tendencies of the modern state. Out of this, it results that the constitutional judge, in the exercise of his powers, must wisely restrain himself.

 

And in the aforementioned Dennis case, Frankfurter J. said ([54] at 551):

 

To make validity of legislation depend on judicial reading of events still in the womb of time - a forecast, that is, of the outcome of forces at best appreciated only with knowledge of the topmost secrets of nations - is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its equipment.

 

            The authors Nowak, Rotunda and Young comment in similar vein (Constitutional Law (2nd ed.) at 779):

           

Although the Supreme Court has recognized that basic constitutional rights are intertwined in the electoral process, the Court also has noted that elections are largely political creatures and the Courts should refrain from getting too involved in basically political decisions.

(See also G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford, 1971).)

 

            If that is the situation in relation to the review and interpretation of the provisions of a written constitution, a fortiori in our case where there is no enacted provision and we are asked to usurp the legislator's function by way of expansive judicial legislation.

           

            It bears reminder that it is the Committee's function to decide on disqualification and the court has only a power of review. The Committee is a clearly partisan political body, and it is constituted only for the purposes of, and with the powers granted by, the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 - and no more. If without defined and qualified legislative authority this Committee is extended the power to decide which lists undermine the foundations of the democratic regime, lists might be disqualified on grounds of narrow party interests, as deemed fit at the time by a chance or contrived majority in the Committee. Nor should one forget the fervour of elections, with all it entails.

 

            It follows from everything I have said that I adopt the majority opinion in the Yeredor ruling, as it was limited and confined to the disqualification of a list that negates the very existence of the state or aspires to its destruction and the repudiation of its sovereignty.

           

            That is the outer limit. Like my esteemed colleagues, I too am aware of and troubled by those occasional subversive forays, which from time to time might cause serious harm to the values of democracy if there is no planned, timely defence against them. However, I am not prepared to uphold the extreme sanction of disqualifying a list and denying the fundamental right to be elected, without legislative authority.

           

            6. I have read attentively and with pleasure the interesting opinion of my esteemed colleague, Barak J., who, in his own way, finds it possible to expand the Yeredor ruling to apply also to a list whose platform negates the democratic character of the state, provided a reasonable possibility of the realization of its objectives has been shown. My colleague proceeds on the assumption that this authority stems from section 63 of the Knesset Elections Law, and, therefore, the court may apply its system's rules of interpretation to hold that this is an empowering provision; that despite the mandatory language, the Elections Committee must be vested with discretionary authority so as to realize the fundamental principles of the system.

           

            My understanding is that the authority granted under section 63 is not merely limited to a "lawfully submitted" candidates list but, moreover, the power to refuse to confirm a list can only be based on section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset (apart from technical-formal grounds that do not concern us here). That section grants the right to be elected to every national who is twenty-one years of age or over, and provides that a candidate may be disqualified only if a court has deprived him of that right by law or if he has been sentenced to five or more years imprisonment for certain offences against national security, as prescribed in that Law.

           

            We are accordingly dealing with a very circumscribed and narrow authority, deviation from which is not a matter of interpretation or discretion, but one of legislation proper on a subject that has no connection whatever with the matter for which the authority was granted. Moreover, the judicial exception made related only to a danger to the very existence of the state, as was the opinion of Sussman J. in Yeredor, with which I find myself in agreement. It is one matter to refuse to confirm a list that was not lawfully submitted, with which alone section 63 deals, and an entirely different matter to disqualify a list because of its platform or the views of its members, which is nowhere mentioned in the statute. Where the legislature sought to obstruct the path to election of a person sentenced to five or more years of actual imprisonment for an offence against state security, it said as much; in that respect there is room for judicial interpretation, for example as to what constitutes an offence against national security, and so on.

 

            In his instructive article on "Judicial Legislation", (13 Mishpatim (1983), 25 at 39) Justice Barak said:

           

The judiciary is not omnipotent; it is not 'sovereign' in judicial legislation. It is not free to choose the content of a legal norm. Judicial legislation is subject to external limitations that define its formal legitimate sphere ... It is clear that the judge interpreter may not impart to the law a meaning that commends itself to him as interpreter, without it being rooted in minimal connections to the legislative enactment.

 

            And in another article he said ("On the Judge as Interpreter", 12 Mishpatim (1982) 248, at 255):

           

It is possible to give the language of the law a broad or narrow interpretation, an ordinary or exceptional interpretation, but generally one must find an Archimedean foothold for the purpose in the statutory text. There must be, generally, a minimal verbal connection between the language and the purpose. The interpreter may not achieve a purpose that has no hold, however weak, in the statutory language.

 

            I am in full agreement with the above statements, and precisely for that reason I cannot find it possible to extend the Yeredor ruling beyond the issue decided according to the majority opinion, since the statute lacks that "Archimedean-foothold" upon which broad and expansive interpretation can be grounded and constructed. As far as I am concerned, we are not facing here any option of broad or narrow interpretation, but rather the total absence of any statutory provision on the matter concerning us in which we could find some foothold. We cannot forget that we are dealing with such a fundamental matter as the denial of the right to be elected; and if the majority opinion in the Yeredor case followed the unusual course that it did, the matter is explained by the disproportionate weight between the considerations, on the one hand, of negation of the existing integrity of the state and, on the other hand, the right to be elected. From this aspect of both the issue and the conclusion are indeed exceptional, and every other consideration must give way in face of the danger entailed in the negation of the very existence of the state. It is different in the instant case, where the court has little justification for invading so deeply the preserve of the legislature merely on the ground that for nearly two decades that body has kept silent on such an important question of principle as that which arose so acutely in the Yeredor case.

 

            Indeed, my esteemed colleague Barak J. also spoke of the desirability that this issue - the barring of a list from participation in the elections on grounds relating to the content of its platform - be regulated through legislation and not be left open for judicial interpretation. My difficulty is that I cannot find any basis and foothold upon which to construct such judicial interpretation, and for that reason I cannot adopt the solution proposed by my colleague. However, the very appeal to the legislature as regards the need for statutory regulation of the matter, to which I wholeheartedly subscribe, reinforces my view that in its absence we should not trespass upon the domain of the legislature in such a cardinal matter. Like my colleague Barak J., I too am apprehensive of an unbalanced legislative treatment of the subject, but one can assume that the broad considerations and difficult deliberations that accompanied each of us in deciding this case will not escape the attention of the legislature. And once it has spoken, the court will have a basis for interpretation for which there will undoubtedly yet be need.

           

            7. I now come to the other question on which I disagree with my esteemed colleague, Barak J. If I had found it possible to agree with him on the principled question regarding the Committee's authority to disqualify a list on grounds of its platform, objectives and activity - if designed to endanger the foundations of democracy, I would have reached the conclusion that the Kach list had been lawfully disqualified and that we should not intervene.

           

            My colleague says: "Words, opinions and views are not sufficient. There must be evidence that there exists a reasonable possibility of acts that endanger the democratic character of the state." For the sake of argument I am prepared to accompany him this far, though it should not be inferred that I accept the "reasonable possibility" test. However, even according to that test, if one accepts it as correct, I ask myself: what more evidence is required and could be offered in discharge of the burden of proof, than was actually proven with respect to the Kach list?

           

            The Committee had before it scores of publications, booklets, pamphlets, posters, articles, all full of insufferable racist hatred. They speak of deporting the Arab population to other countries, while those remaining in Israel are to become alien residents without national rights. They advocate denying social security benefits to Arabs so as not to subsidize population growth in that sector.

  

          At press conferences views are voiced, mainly by the head of the list, in support of terrorism against Arabs as a religious act in sanctification of God's name. In one public appearance Rabbi Kahana said that if he were appointed Minister of Defence, there would be no mosques and Arabs on the Temple Mount within half a year. In his platform he calls for enacting a law that would impose a sentence of 5 years mandatory imprisonment on a non Jew who engages in intercourse with a Jewish woman. There were also calls against the employment of Arabs, as well as justification for laying explosives on the Temple Mount.

 

          Lest one say that these are only words and opinions which do not amount to a "reasonable possibility" of endangering the democratic character of the state, the Committee had information about members of the list who went to Arab settlements to convince them that they had no place in this country, and that if they did not leave voluntarily with compensation paid, other means would be found. Legal and illegal demonstrations were held to disseminate these views. The Committee had before it court judgments convicting members of the movement in respect of these activities (Cr.F.(Jerusalem)134/82; Cr.F.(Tel Aviv) 167/73). In A.D.A. 1/80[41], this court justified the administrative detention of the head of the list and his comrade, and it was said there:

         

          ...in the instant case the danger to national security, which the orders were intended to prevent, is of such gravity that it is proper to confirm the detention orders despite the violation of the detainees' right to defend themselves.

         

          Lack of space prohibits the specification of all these activities and suffice it to say that they go beyond mere words and opinions, amounting to continuous and consistent action and deeds. And if indeed all these are not sufficient evidence of a danger to the democratic character of the state, then I do not know what more need or could be proven. And in appearing before the Committee, the head of the list gave a lengthy explanatory speech, in which he not only did not deny what was attributed to him and proven against the list, but actually repeated the racist "credo". The speech was long and there is no need to repeat it here, except for one or two extracts by way of illustration: "I now ask all the members of the Committee whether an Arab may live in a Jewish democratic state in peace, in quiet, in democracy, in procreation, to become a majority here and turn this state into one that is not Jewish but Arab?" (p.38). After explaining his conception of an "alien-resident" - that is, "he is not a citizen, does not cast a vote for the Knesset, he has cultural, religious, economic, social rights and no more" - he says: "If he is willing, then by all means, let him dwell here; if not, he shall leave. How? Whoever is prepared to leave quietly, nicely, peacefully, receives money for his property. If not so, the Government will send him out, as did the Poles, the Czechs, the Greeks, the Turks, and all those" (page 39 of the Committee minutes).

 

            These tones reverberate so ominously from the not too distant past, that a democratic state like ours may justifiably defend itself against them despite all the patience and tolerance decreed by democracy for the another person's views. And, as was proven, the Kach list does not even try to disguise its platform, as is sometimes done so as not to arouse fear and suspicion regarding the true goals. Even the affidavit submitted to this court in support of the notice of appeal displays plentiful mention of these views, and without quoting them I shall refer particularly to pages 2-4 of the affidavit. Still I feel obliged to add that even if the platform of the Kach list were untainted with these blemishes, the platform alone does not present the full picture. A platform can be camouflaged. Therefore, the Committee is certainly allowed to base itself on material other than the platform, to the extent that it is indicative of the real objectives of the list and its activity, and so far as reliable. And here, as aforementioned, there was no denial-quite the contrary!

           

            Like the Central Elections Committee, with all the material before it, I am persuaded that there was good reason to regard the Kach list as one that advocates racist and antidemocratic principles, as set forth in the letter of the Committee Chairman, Justice G. Bach, dated June 17th, 1984.

           

            And if in our decision on June 28th, 1984, I concurred in the opinion of my colleagues on the bench that this list should not be disqualified - that was not due to lack of evidence as to its character and purposes constituting a danger to the foundations of democracy, by any standard. As I have explained, it was because I found no lawful authority to do so and did not consider it possible to extend the Yeredor ruling without having been granted such authority by the legislature.

           

            Both appeals allowed.

           

            Judgment given on May 15, 1985.

 


* A lawful non-profit society - Ed.

* A play on the Hebrew word kotzer, which means reaper but also means one who is brief - Ed..

The Movement for Quality in Government v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3094/93
HCJ 4319/93
HCJ 4478/93
AHC 4409/93
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, September 8, 1993
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

These petitions concern the continued tenure in office of the fourth respondent as a Minister in the Government, after he was charged with accepting a bribe, breach of trust on the part of a public servant, obtaining something by deceit under aggravating circumstances, false entry in corporate documents and stealing by a director

               

The petitioner in H.C. 4319, 3094/93, argued that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to the 4th respondent's tenure of office as a Minister. This petitioner's approach is similar to that of the third respondent, as expressed in his application to the second respondent. In the opinion of the second respondent he is not in duty bound by law to use the powers vested in him by section 2lA of the Basic Law: the Government in order to remove the 4th respondent from his office as a Minister. The second respondent drew attention to the letter which the fourth respondent had deposited with him before the fifth respondent had joined the Government, in which he undertook that "if and when an indictment be brought "against him in court, he would suspend himself from the Government of his own accord. The second respondent saw, and sees, this arrangement, as expressed in the said letter, not only as a unilateral undertaking by the 4th respondent, but also as a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the letter are fulfilled.

 

According to the argument, the suspicions raised in the past against the fourth respondent, despite which he was elected to the Knesset, were no less serious than those contained in the indictment. It was argued, therefore, inter alia, that there was no real change of circumstances which justified the exercise of the power under the above section 21A, which is a discretionary power. It was argued further that the arrangment in the Basic Law: The Government with respect to Ministers and Deputy Ministers is a negative one - that is, there is no obligatory provision of law there.

               

The High Court held as follows:

               

A.      (1) In section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government the 3rd respondent was given the power to transfer a Minister from office without being bound by any extraneous obligations while exercising his power in accordance with its legislative purpose.

 

          (2) An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, a State service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law.

 

B.      (1) Section l3A of the Basic Law: the Government was intended, from the point of view of legislative purpose, to prevent agreement and under­takings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

 

          (2) Section 13A(b) is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations and all the more so when the law demands it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance of the power of the authority, within the framework of a political deal.

 

          (3) Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power was under consideration. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot exercise it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

          (4) Where there are considerations which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove someone from office, it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

 

          (5) In the present circumstances the 4th respondent's undertaking, which can be seen to be an agreed bilateral arrangement, drastically defies the prohibitions in section 13A(2) of the Basic Law: The Government and should be deemed to be absolutely invalid.

 

C.      (1) The power conferred by section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution.

 

          (2) Insofar as exercising discretion is concerned there is no difference between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: not only can the unreasonable exercise of a power be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

          (3) Even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weight up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

 

D.      (1) When examining the possibility of exercising a power the statutory authority must take account of all the relevant elements: that is, of all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it, it being obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances.

 

          (2) Where parliamentary-political life is concerned, one cannot rule out taking account of circumstances which arise due to political considerations.

 

          (3) The question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations.

 

E.      (1) Discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our consti­tutional and legal system make failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

 

          (2) The power granted by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in the  web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. The power is vested also in order to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide, and serve as, an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct, land, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in the system of government, on the values upon which the system of government and law is built, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

          (3) This has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. The reference is to the law of the country according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain circumstances, into something extremely unreasonable.

 

 

F.       (1) The fact that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset, and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence, does not make the exercise of the power under section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government when the circumstances demand it, redundant.

 

          (2) Suspending a decision, following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset- if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the Government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to inter­preting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the second respondent under this section.

 

          (3) In the present case the indictment against the fourth respondent includes allegations of corruption of an extremely serious nature. Even though it only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution and even though it is not a judgment, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of signi­ficance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for establishing the nature of the acts attributed in the indictment.

 

G. (Per Justice E. Mazza):

 

          (1) The second respondent sought to take issue with the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office and did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of his reasons.

 

          (2) The approach is contrary to the constitutional principle according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive.

 

          (3) Even after it has been explained to the second respondent that the agreement which he had made with the forth respondent was invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand, while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the third respondent:

 

H.  (Per Justice D. Levin):

 

          (1) A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions had points of view and to the political and social path of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the government set-up.

 

          (2) When the minister fulfills an administrative function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice. Within the framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice. If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. If that be the position in general, how much more so would it be the case when a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law.

 

          (3) If an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy, it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office. It would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he be convinced of his own innocence and clean hands.

 

          (4) If the minister does not do this then the second respondent must weight up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government to remove the minister from office.

 

          (5) When a demand that the exercise his discretion be made he may take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, as it is only natural and understandable that the second respondent will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. But the implications of the indictment cannot be ignored and the minister cannot be left in office as though nothing had occurred for the sake of the Government's survival and because of the desire to further government policy, however important this may be.

 

I. (Per Justice E. Goldberg):

 

          (1) One cannot deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter under consideration. But this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration.

 

          (2) In any clash between the two aspects one cannot say that the public administration norm will not apply at all only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister.

 

            (3) A balance between the two aspects makes it obligatory that the court's power to intervene in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be limited to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

H.C.J 3094/93

H.C.J 4319/93

H.C.J 4478/93

A.H.C. 4409/93

 

1. The Movement for Quality in Government in Israel

 (H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93).

2. Moshe Kirstein

 (H.C. 4478/93)

3.Adv. Zeev Trainin

 (A.H.C. 4409/93)

v.

1. State of Israel

2. Prime Minister

3. Attorney General

4. Rabbi Arye Deri

5. Shas, International Organization of Tora Observant Sepharadic Jews

 

In the Supreme Court Sitting as High Court of Justice

[September 8, 93]

Shamgar P., Barak J., D. Levin, J. Goldeberg J., Mazza J.

           

Editor's Summary*

 

                These petitions concern the continued tenure in office of the fourth respondent as a Minister in the Government, after he was charged with accepting a bribe, breach of trust on the part of a public servant, obtaining something by deceit under aggravating circumstances, false entry in corporate documents and stealing by a director

               

                The petitioner in H.C. 4319, 3094/93, argued that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to the 4th respondent's tenure of office as a Minister. This petitioner's approach is similar to that of the third respondent, as expressed in his application to the second respondent. In the opinion of the second respondent he is not in duty bound by law to use the powers vested in him by section 2lA of the Basic Law: the Government in order to remove the 4th respondent from his office as a Minister. The second respondent drew attention to the letter which the fourth respondent had deposited with him before the fifth respondent had joined the Government, in which he undertook that "if and when an indictment be brought "against him in court, he would suspend himself from the Government of his own accord. The second respondent saw, and sees, this arrangement, as expressed in the said letter, not only as a unilateral undertaking by the 4th respondent, but also as a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the letter are fulfilled.

 

                According to the argument, the suspicions raised in the past against the fourth respondent, despite which he was elected to the Knesset, were no less serious than those contained in the indictment. It was argued, therefore, inter alia, that there was no real change of circumstances which justified the exercise of the power under the above section 21A, which is a discretionary power. It was argued further that the arrangment in the Basic Law: The Government with respect to Ministers and Deputy Ministers is a negative one - that is, there is no obligatory provision of law there.

               

                The High Court held as follows:

               

A.      (l)       In section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government the 3rd respondent was given the power to transfer a Minister from office without being bound by any extraneous obligations while exercising his power in accordance with its legislative purpose.

 

          (2)     An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, a State service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law.

 

B.      (l)       Section l3A of the Basic Law: the Government was intended, from the point of view of legislative purpose, to prevent agreement and under­takings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

 

          (2)     Section 13A(b) is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations and all the more so when the law demands it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance of the power of the authority, within the framework of a political deal.

 

          (3)     Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power was under consideration. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot exercise it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

          (4)     Where there are considerations which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove someone from office, it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

 

          (5)     In the present circumstances the 4th respondent's undertaking, which can be seen to be an agreed bilateral arrangement, drastically defies the prohibitions in section 13A(2) of the Basic Law: The Government and should be deemed to be absolutely invalid.

 

C.      (I)      The power conferred by section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution.

 

          (2)     Insofar as exercising discretion is concerned there is no difference between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: not only can the unreasonable exercise of a power be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

          (3)     Even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weight up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

 

D.      (l)       When examining the possibility of exercising a power the statutory authority must take account of all the relevant elements: that is, of all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it, it being obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances.

 

          (2)     Where parliamentary-political life is concerned, one cannot rule out taking account of circumstances which arise due to political considerations.

 

          (3)     The question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations.

 

E.      (I)      Discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our consti­tutional and legal system make failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

 

          (2)     The power granted by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in the  web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. The power is vested also in order to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide, and serve as, an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct, land, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in the system of government, on the values upon which the system of government and law is built, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

          (3)     This has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. The reference is to the law of the country according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain circumstances, into something extremely unreasonable.

 

 

F.       (l)       The fact that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset, and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence, does not make the exercise of the power under section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government when the circumstances demand it, redundant.

 

          (2)     Suspending a decision, following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset- if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the Government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to inter­preting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the second respondent under this section.

 

          (3)     In the present case the indictment against the fourth respondent includes allegations of corruption of an extremely serious nature. Even though it only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution and even though it is not a judgment, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of signi­ficance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for establishing the nature of the acts attributed in the indictment.

 

G.      (Per Justice E. Mazza):

 

          (l)       The second respondent sought to take issue with the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office and did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of his reasons.

 

          (2)     The approach is contrary to the constitutional principle according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive.

 

          (3)     Even after it has been explained to the second respondent that the agreement which he had made with the forth respondent was invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand, while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the third respondent:

 

H.      (Per Justice D. Levin):

 

          (I)      A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions had points of view and to the political and social path of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the government set-up.

 

          (2)     When the minister fulfills an administrative function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice. Within the framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice. If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. If that be the position in general, how much more so would it be the case when a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law.

 

          (3)     If an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy, it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office. It would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he be convinced of his own innocence and clean hands.

 

          (4)     If the minister does not do this then the second respondent must weight up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government to remove the minister from office.

 

          (5)     When a demand that the exercise his discretion be made he may take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, as it is only natural and understandable that the second respondent will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. But the implications of the indictment cannot be ignored and the minister cannot be left in office as though nothing had occurred for the sake of the Government's survival and because of the desire to further government policy, however important this may be.

 

I.       (Per Justice E. Goldberg):

 

          (1)     One cannot deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter under consideration. But this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration.

 

          (2)     In any clash between the two aspects one cannot say that the public administration norm will not apply at all only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister.

 

          (3)     A balance between the two aspects makes it obligatory that the court's power to intervene in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be limited to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office.

 

Israel Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]   Election Appeals 2,3/84 Neimann v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for the llth Knesset; Avni v. The Same 39 (2) P.D. 225.

[2]        H.C. 1523, 1540/90 Levi v. The Prime Minister 44 (2) P.D. 213.

[3]        H.C. 1635/90 Jarjevsky v. The Prime Minister 45 (1) P.D. 749.

[4]        H.C. 142/70 Shapira v. The Israel Bar, Jerusalem 25 (1) P.D. 325.

[5]        H.C. 4566/90 Dekel v. The Minister of Finance 45 (1) P.D. 28.

[6]        F.H. 16/61 Register of Companies v. Kardosh 16 P.D. 1209.

[7]        H.C. 297/82 Berger v. Minister of the Interior 37 (3) P.D. 29.

[8]        H.C. 156/75 Daka v. Minister of Transport 30(2) P.D. 94.

[9]        H.C. 190/57 Asaig v. Minister of Defence 12 P.D. 52.

[10]      H.C. 2/80 Bat v. Minister of Religious Affairs 34(3) P.D. 144.

[11]      H.C. 596/75 Maccabi Tel-Aviv v. Broadcasting Authority 30 (1) P.D. 772.

 

[12] H.C. 542/76, 103/77 Int. Consortium v. Director General, Ministry of Communications 31 (3) P.D. 477.

[13]      H.C. 653/79 Azriel v. Director of Licensing Department 35 (2) P.D. 85

[14]      H.C. 376/81 Lugassi v. Minister of Communications 36 (2) P.D. 499.

[15]      H.C. 4267, 4287, 4634/93 "Amitay" v. The Prime Minister 47 (5) P.D. 441.

[16] H.C. 6177, 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing 47 (2) P.D. 229.

 

English Cases Cited:

[17]      Rex v. Robert. Ex parte Scurr [1924] 2 K.B. 695 (C.A.)

 

E. Shraga, E. Shapira - for the petitioners in H.C. 3094/93 and H.C. 4319/93;

The Petitoner in H.C. 4478/93 - appeared on his own behalf;

D. Beinish, N. Arad- For the First three respondents in H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93 and H.C. 4478/93.

Z. Agmon, Y. Hirch - for the 4th, 5th respondents in H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93 and H.C. 4478/93;

The Applicant in A.H.C. 4409/93 - appeared on his own behalf.

 

JUDGMENT

The President:

 

The petitions

 

            1. These petitions are aimed against Rabbi Arye Deri's continuing to serve as a member of the Government in his capacity as the Minister of the Interior.

 

            The petition in H.C. 4319/93 evolves directly from the fact that an indictment was filed against Minister Arye Deri; that in H.C. 3094/ 93, which preceded the former petition, deals with the chain of events before the indictment. In the course of proceedings the petition in H.C. 3094/93 was waived, as the petition in H.C. 4319/93 took its place. The petition in H.C. 3094/93 is therefore cancelled.

           

            The petitions in A.H.C. 4409/93 and H.C. 4478/93 are applications to be joined as respondent and petitioner, respectively, in the main petition.

 

            2. (a) The indictment against Minister Arye Deri was submitted to the Knesset on August 2, 1993. It was accompanied by a request that the question of lifting Minister Deri's immunity in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the Immunity, Rights and Duties of Knesset Members Law, 1951, be considered. The Knesset Committee discussed the said request already on 3.8.93 and decided to continue their deliberations on 26.9.93.

           

            (b) The Indictment

           

            The indictment contains the following offences against the law:

           

            (1) Accepting a bribe contrary to section 290 of the Penal Code, 1977 (hereinafter "the Code").

           

            (2) Breach of trust on the part of a public servant, contrary to section 284 of the Code.

           

            (3) Obtaining by deceit under aggravating circumstances, contrary to the last part of section 415 of the Code.

           

            (4) False entry in corporate documents, contrary to section 423 of the Code.

           

            (5) Stealing by a director, contrary to section 392 of the Code.

           

            Each of the above provisions of the Code embrace a substantial number of acts and not only an isolated one.

           

            (c) The facts, whose legal headlines appear above, and which reflect the prima facie evidence in the hands of the prosecution, are described in detail in an indictment which consists of 50 pages. The events dealt with in the indictment concern Minister Deri's exploitation of his office and standing, at first when he served as an assistant to the Minister of the Interior and in charge of his office, in his capacity as the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior, and afterwards as Minister of the Interior. He fraudulently caused money to flow from state funds to various societies in which he was either active himself or was otherwise involved; these societies transferred to him, either directly, or by making payments to others on his behalf, over a long period of time and on many occasions, bribe money, in exchange for his assistance in getting funds for them. The sum total of these bribes was NIS 135,000 (at the time of payment their value was about $ 71,000). In addition there were sums of money, whose value then was about $95,000, which were transferred in other ways, as well as other gratuities.

 

            Another section deals with the use of the respondent's position and connections, as an official of the Interior Ministry, in order to further the granting of a sum of NIS 500,000 to a society in which he was active, by moving the Ministry of Religious Affairs through false representations. This money was used in a deceitful manner and not for the declared purpose, with the aid of fraudulent records and various misrepresentations.

           

            A third section deals with conspiring to move government bodies to grant land to persons, who had bought plots in Nebi Samuel from one of the above societies, when it transpired that the society in question could not fulfil its obligations towards them. The respondent acted in a manner involving an absolute clash of interests, concealed facts and made false representations in order to receive privileges and money - for his societies - and through them for himself.

           

            Within the framework of his activities for the purpose of forwarding the affairs of the societies which paid him bribe money in exchange for his services, the respondent initiated a grant of NIS 200,000 from the Jerusalem Municipality to one of these societies. For this purpose an extraordinary sum was budgeted, contrary to Interior Ministry practices.

           

            An additional matter concerns the appointment of Moshe Weinberg, his accomplice in most of the above offences, to the post of chairman of the appointed Local Council of Lehavim, in order to enable him to draw a salary and have an official car. This Weinberg had previously been a real estate and haulage agent and for some time had been the respondent's driver. Weinberg was heavily debt-ridden and his appointment to public office was intended to rescue him from his troubles.

 

3. The Parties' Arguments

 

            From the parties 'written and oral arguments before us it would appear that the petitioners maintain that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to Minister Arye Deri's tenure of office. This approach is consistent with that of the Attorney General who told the Prime Minister, both in writing and verbally, that once the above indictment had been submitted to the Knesset, on August 2, 1993, it was only proper that Minister Deri's tenure of office be terminated. Mr. Harish, the Attorney General, said the following in a letter dated August 6, 1993:

           

"From now and until the end of his trial it would be contrary to the basic principles of law and government, and also unethical, for Mr. Deri to continue to serve as a Minister in the Government."

 

            In written arguments the Attorney General added further details and summed up his stand as follows:

           

            "(a) The letter containing the undertaking which Minister Deri deposited with the Prime Minister (a document to which we shall refer later - M.S.) made his tenure of office as a Minister in the Government and a member thereof basically conditional; and, therefore, nothing is being taken away from him today, only the question of granting a conditional right to his very tenure as Minister of the Interior in the Government, being at issue.

           

            (b) From the moment that Minister Deri signed his letter the circumstances changed, mainly because the suspicions and evidence that had not been thoroughly examined before then became embodied, in a clear and concrete indictment, into offences involving ignominy for the person accused of them.

           

            (c) As long as there is a weighty suspicion that Minister Deri committed these offences, his trustworthiness as a person in charge of public money on behalf of the government is questionable; and in this I find even the fear of a conflict of interests insofar as his function as Minister of the Interior is concerned, mainly with respect to the manner in which he exercises his discretion in matters connected to subjects bound up with the suspicions against him.

           

            (d) Insofar as the allegations in the indictment and the offences of which he is suspected are concerned, the indictment which is before the Knesset today must be seen as having progressed beyond the corridors of the court, and Minister Deri must therefore immediately honour his undertaking to suspend himself from the Government. In this matter the process of lifting his immunity will not serve as a stumbling-block in the way of the duty to terminate his tenure of office as a Minister in the Government."

           

            4. Minister Arye Deri informed the court , through the learned counsel for the International Organization of Torah Observant Sepharadic Jews (Shas) (the 5th respondent), that he saw no room for appearing and putting his case before us personally as expression would be given to his stand in the arguments brought on behalf of the 5th respondent, whom he represents in the Government. He added that he would of course honour any decision of the court.

           

            5. The stand of the Prime Minister, as conveyed to us by the Attorney General and which can also be gathered from the written material submitted by the Attorney General, is that he is not obliged by force of law to exercise the power vested in him by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government to remove Minister Deri from office .

           

            In this context the Prime Minister referred, in his letter of August 22, 1993, to the Attorney General, to the course of events in the matter before us which accompanied the formation of the Government in July, 1992: about a year ago, in a letter dated July 2, 1992, the Attorney General brought the Prime Minister's attention to the fact that an investigation was being conducted by the police against Minister Deri. In his letter the Attorney General spoke of "heavy suspicion of criminal acts which have not yet been thoroughly examined and clarified" and mentioned the use to which Minister Deri had put his right to remain silent. On July 6, 1992, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Attorney General, and on the strength of what was agreed there, with the consensus of the Attorney General, Minister Deri deposited a letter with the Prime Minister in the following language:

 

"If Shas joins the Government which you will head, and if Shas decides that I should be a member of the Government, and in the light of the Attorney General's letter to me concerning my affairs, and on the strength of your request to me, I hereby inform you that if and when an indictment is brought against me in court I will suspend myself from the Government of my own accord."

 

            The Prime Minister saw, and sees, in the arrangement to which expression is given in the above letter, not only a unilateral undertaking by Minister Deri but a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 2IA of the Basic Law: The Government, unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the above letter ("...when and if an indictment is brought...in court") are fulfilled.

           

            In July, 1992, a Government was formed which included Minister Deri. His letter was brought at the time to the notice of the Knesset, as required by section 13B of the Basic Law: The Government, and exposed openly to the public.

           

            In the Prime Minister's letter of August 22, 1993, to the Attorney General, which is in the nature of a reply to the detailed and reasoned opinion of the Attorney General, of August 6, 1993, a substantive part of which was quoted above, he notes that he does not accept the Attorney General's approach, in accordance with which, since July, 1992, there had occurred a change of circumstances expressed centrally in the submission of the indictment to the Knesset, for the following reasons: in the meantime Minister Deri had abandoned his right of silence and answered his interrogators' questions; the suspicions of July, 1992, were no less serious than those embodied now in the indictment, and perhaps even the opposite was the case; the fear of a conflict of interests raised by the Attorney General in his above letter was exposed and known at the time the Government was formed.

           

            It was argued further that cognisance should be taken of the fact that in the matter of removal from office the legislature had laid down express provisions for electees and for functionaries other than ministers or deputy ministers, as can be seen in the State Service (Discipline) Law, 1963, in section 42B of the Basic Law: the Knesset, in section 20 of the Local Authorities (Election and Tenure of Head and Deputy Heads) Law, 1975, etc. On the other hand, the Basic Law: The Government makes no provision for the suspension of ministers and deputy ministers or their removal from office because of suspicions, investigations or criminal charges. Which means that when the legislature saw fit to enact obligatory provisions for the removal from office on account of criminal acts, it did so by law. The arrangement in the Basic Law: The Government, in respect of ministers and deputy ministers, is a negative one, which means that there is no similar obligatory provision of law there.

           

            As stated in the Prime Minister's letter of 22.8.93:

           

"In this serious matter there exists, according to the law, a fundamental and substantive difference between electees and functionaries. And it was not only incidentally that the legislature enacted different provisions for these two categories. The electee serves by virtue of the confidence of the public which elected him in a democratic process, and which has the power to remove him from office in the same manner if he is found to be tainted. There must, therefore, be very serious reasons for removing an electee from office or suspending him, such as a criminal conviction of an ignominious nature, a prison sentence, etc. - which does not apply to ordinary functionaries."

 

            The Prime Minister also referred to the precedent which was created, in his opinion, in the case of Aharon Abuhazeira, who continued to serve in the Government while two criminal actions were being conducted against him, and the then Attorney General, Professor I. Zamir, took no action whatsoever.

 

            As noted, it is argued that there is no legal norm for the matter before us, and that the opinion of the Attorney General is based on public norms pertaining to the confidence of the public in the system of government. But according to the Prime Minister this should be countered by a norm of no less public importance - that is, confidence in the Prime Minister, who formed a Government on the strength of an undertaking which received the approval of the Attorney General, and who is now asked to breach his undertaking on a public and personal plane without any real change in the circumstances. The Prime Minister sums this up in the following manner:

 

"The matter before us is unique and special, as it has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of interpreting a law but concerns a confrontation between two public norms. And this is particularly so after I made an undertaking in this matter, and even acted upon it, on the strength of your opinion given me only about a year ago, and for dishonouring which undertaking I can find no possibility, reason or justification."

 

            6. The 5th respondent, in a written declaration and in the arguments before us by its learned counsel, Advocate Zvi Agmon, also supported the idea that there is no binding law concerning the removal of a minister from office because he has been indicted. Insofar as a member of the Knesset who is also a member of the Government is concerned, he was of the opinion that what was operative here was the Knesset's confidence in the Government. Section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government was enacted only in 1991 and until then the Prime Minister had no power to dismiss a minister, the termination of whose tenure of office could be effected only by his resignation or by the resignation of the whole Government. This section, he argued further, was intended mainly for the purpose of preventing "irregularities" in the Government's actions. At any rate its application in any particular instance came entirely within the discretion of the Prime Minister.

           

            Advocate Agmon, whose arguments paralleled to a great extent the stand of the Prime Minister, as apparent from his letters and from the speeches of the State Attorney who appeared on his behalf before us, referred also, for the purpose of comparison, to express laws concerning removal from office of other functionaries and sought thereby to bolster his conclusion that the absence of legislation concerning ministers is not coincidental. He found this interpretational conclusion to be logical for the following reason: according to the constitutional construction of the regime in Israel, the Government rules by virtue of the confidence of the Knesset, and is collectively responsible to the Knesset. The Knesset is the elected representative of the people as a whole and it can decide when a minister's tenure of office should be terminated, and when not, by using its sovereign power to express a lack of confidence in the Government and, indirectly, in a minister serving in the Government.

 

            In the course of proceedings before us the learned counsel for the 5th respondent agreed that the above section 21A could possibly be applied in the case before us, but added that just as its application should be reasonable so could a decision concerning its non-application be reasonable.

           

            7. Advocate Zeev Trainin, the petitioner in A.H.C. 4409/93, argued before us that the court should take into account the party-political repercussions of any decision concerning Minister Deri's removal from office. Mr. Moshe Kirstein, the petitioner in H.C. 4478/93, who asked to be joined as an additional petitioner, and in whose case no order nisi was given, argued that this court must not intervene in the dismissal of a minister as long as there is no express provision of law on the subject.

           

            8. The Legal Subjects On Which The Proceedings Were Based

           

            We shall now proceed to analyse the arguments before us. Two central legal problems were raised before us. The first is the legal validity of the undertaking which the Prime Minister claimed he had imposed upon himself when Minister Arye Deri signed the letter of July 6, 1992, (the contents of which were given in full above) before him.

 

            The second question bears on the nature of the Prime Minister's powers under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government, which deals with removal of a minister from office.

           

            We shall commence with the question of the undertaking of July 6, 1992.

           

            9. Undertaking not to Remove a Minister from Office

           

            According to the simple wording of the letter of July 6, 1992, it contains a declaration by Minister Arye Deri, dressed as an undertaking on his part, that in the given circumstances, as set out there, he would suspend himself of his own accord from the Government. This declaration was bound up with negotiations for forming a Government , and came following upon a letter from the Attorney General in which he sought to inform the Prime Minister of the existence of an investigation against Minister Deri and of the general substance of the investigation. The Attorney General's letter did not only convey information, but it also contained expressions of doubt concerning the advisability of including in the Government someone concerning whom, at the time, investigations, as described in the said letter, were being conducted. In this context the letter said that it was advisable that the Prime Minister take account of the facts described when weighing up - if at all - the question of the candidacy of Minister Deri for office in the Government which he (the first respondent) was about to form.

           

            After the first respondent had given due consideration to the contents of the Attorney General's letter and had decided to include Minister Deri in the Government, on the basis of the written undertaking of July 6, 1992, and following upon it, it is reasonable to conclude that what was contained in the above undertaking was acceptable to both parties: that is, that the yardstick provided for in the undertaking would guide both Minister Deri and the Prime Minister. In other words, just as the one undertook to leave the Government in given circumstances, as described in the under­taking, so did the other, who had decided to include Minister Deri in the Government, take it upon himself to honour the condition concerning the timing of the resignation from office contained in the undertaking. From a legal point of view the conclusion is, therefore, that the Prime Minister agreed not to remove Minister Deri from office as long as the conditions laid down in the above undertaking of Minister Deri had not been met.

           

            10. An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, state service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government, and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law. Fettering the power clashes with the legislative purpose of vesting the power, in accordance with which the Prime Minister may remove (a person) from office when the circumstances brought to his attention justify or demand this, and there is no reservation or condition attached to this save for the substantive necessity to exercise this power for its legislative purpose.

           

            11. (a) The relevant provision of enacted law is contained in section 13A(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, which states that:

           

            "Where, by law, power is given to remove a person from office in the Knesset, in the Government, in state service, in an association established by law, in a government company or in any other public body - no agreement and no undertaking concerning the non-removal of that person from office may be made."

           

            The "power to remove a person from office" is, in the case under consideration, the power of the Prime Minister by virtue of section 21A of the Basic Law. The prohibition against giving an undertaking in connection therewith, as contained in section 13A, is unequivocal.

           

            In other words, while section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government vests the Prime Minister with the power to remove a minister from office, without being tied to any extraneous undertaking and while exercising his power within the confines of the aim of the law (see E.A. 2,3/84 [1], at p. 252, opposite A) an undertaking not to exercise this power to remove from office, unless the conditions contained in the above letter have been met, is equivalent to an undertaking on the part of the Prime Minister to limit in advance his statutory power, whatever the factual circumstances which might occur.

           

            The said section 13A was added to the Basic Law: The Government on the strength of the Basic Law: The Knesset (12th amendment) which came into force on 22.2.91; that is, only one-and-a-half years before the above undertaking, signed by Minister Deri, was given. The amendment to the law came at the initiative of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset and it is patently clear from its content, including what is contained in sections 13A (a) and (c), that this addendum to the law is a sequel to what was held by this court in H.C. 1523, 1540/90 [2], and an echo of the problems raised in the proceedings in H.C. 1635/90 [3].

           

            (b) From the point of view of legislative purpose, section 13A , with all three of its sub-sections, is intended to prevent agreements and undertakings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

           

            (c) Subsection 13A(a) deals with an agreement containing an undertaking concerning the office of a minister or deputy minister, and is intended to prevent the acquisition of support from a member of the Knesset who belongs to another party, in exchange for a promise to appoint a minister or deputy minister.

           

            (d) Subsection 13A(b), with which we are concerned here, is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power, in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations, and all the more so when the law requires it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance, in the framework of a political deal, of the power of the authority.

           

            The legal power to appoint and the legal power to remove from office were granted by law to any particular functionary in order to enable him to carry out the administrative duties within his charge, in accordance with the law which granted him the power and subject to the conditions, if any, attached to it by the legislature. Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power is weighed up. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot use it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

            What is said above flows from the standing and duties of a public functionary, either elected or appointed, and is encompassed in them. The powers of a functionary in public service are intended to be used for the general good. Every electee and every holder of office is a servant of the general public (H.C. 4566/ 90,[5]). As we have explained on more than one occasion , this means that the power to appoint or to remove from office should be exercised fairly, without extraneous considerations and for the good of the public.

           

            In every instance when the exercise of such power is required it is only right that the said exercise be reviewed in the light of the circumstances and of all the factors, and while striking a proper and reasonable balance between the various considerations. But, according to the provisions of section 13A(b), the holder of the power is forbidden, inter alia, to fetter his considerations in advance in order to give preference thereby to the political-party consideration whatever the weight of the other factors may be. That is to say, where considerations arise which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove (a person) from office (a subject to which we will return and discuss later) it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

           

            (e) The last subsection of section 13A - subsection(c) - deals directly with the circumstances which were examined and disqualified by this court in H.C. 1523, 1540/90, [2], above, (financial guarantees) and there is no need to discuss it in detail here.

           

            (f) To sum up, section 13A as a whole comes to prohibit limitation of freedom of action on the part of an authority. It demarcates the boundaries of what is permissible and what is forbidden in the matters described here, in order to cultivate public integrity and to limit the things which can be used, lawfully, as rewards in political deals. Section I3A seeks to ensure that a statutory power conferred on a functionary for the purpose of carrying out his duties will be used by him for the general good. Furthermore, section 13A clothes in legal-statutory dress desirable and obligatory public norms and the prohibitions laid down by law which complement them.

 

            As mentioned above, it was already held by this court, before the enactment of section 13A, that the acts described in it are contrary to the general principles of law.

           

            12. In the light of the thesis propounded by the first and fifth respondents, in accordance with which it is not a unilateral obligation on the part of Minister Deri which we are dealing with, but a bilateral agreement - which is a reasonable conclusion, per se, in the light of all the circumstances - the bilateral obligation which emerges from Minister Deri's letter of July 6, 1992, quoted above, should be seen as an obligation which drastically defies the prohibition in the above section 13A(b). It must, therefore, be deemed to be absolutely invalid: it does not contain any valid limitation of the Prime Minister's power to exercise the right vested in him by section 21A of the Basic Law.

           

            13. It must be understood that the question of whether the parties to the agreement had been aware of the existence of section 13A(b), or not, is irrelevant insofar as the validity of the obligation is concerned. The question of this validity depends entirely on the clear wording of section 13A(b) and nothing further need be added.

           

            In the course of proceedings we were asked to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the provisions of the above section 13A(b), and following upon this the State Attorney informed us that the Prime Minister had in fact not been aware at the time of the existence of the above provision in the Basic Law: The Government, but that this did not affect his stand on the substance of the matter. In his opinion he was not in duty bound to exercise the power vested in him by sections 20 and 21A(a) of the Basic Law, for the reasons already quoted above , without there being any connection with the legality of the above undertaking.

           

            We must, therefore, proceed to examine the second question, which is that of a Prime Minister's exercise of his power to remove a Minister from office, within the meaning of section 21A(a) of the Basic Law.

           

            14. The Power to Remove a Minister from Office

           

            (a) Section 21A(a) provides that:

           

            "The Prime Minister may, after informing the Government of his intention to do so, remove a Minister from office; the Minister's tenure of office is terminated 48 hours after the notice of removal from office has been handed to him , save if the Prime Minister changes his mind before then."

           

            The power conferred by section 21A(a) is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary and change from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution. (F.H. 16/61 [6], at p. 1215).

           

            But, even when the power is a discretionary one it still has a normative framework. The usual rules regarding reasonability, fairness, good faith, integrity, absence of arbitrariness and discrimination, etc., apply to every exercise of administrative discretion (see my esteemed colleague, Justice Barak, in H.C. 297/82 [7], at p. 34).

           

            (b) Furthermore, as already noted in the past, there is no difference for purposes of the matter before us - that is for purposes of the exercise of discretion - between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: where the preliminary conditions required for exercising the power exist it is incumbent upon the statutory authority to act. It follows that even when the authority refrains from exercising its discretionary power its decision to do so is subject to the usual criteria applicable to statutory powers, that is, it can be reviewed to discover whether it was based on reasonable considerations or whether the combination of circumstances did not in fact demand the exercise of the power.

The decision can also be reviewed to see whether it was not unreasonable or was not based on arbitrariness or discrimination, which could disqualify the acts or omissions of the authority. That is to say, not only the unreasonable exercise of a power can be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

            (c) In this context I said, in the above H.C. 297/82 [7], that laying down initial arrangements in a law which vest a particular functionary with the ability to exercise a power in certain defined circumstances, does not only mean giving power and authority, but also means ascribing fundamental meanings to the power which include a duty with respect to the manner in which it is used.

           

            So that attached to the grant of power there is, inter alia, the duty to weigh up whether it is necessary to exercise it and the proper measures to be taken in this context. Secondly, it is understandable and well-known that from the grant of power to a particular functionary there evolves the duty to deal with petitions and requests aimed at moving the holder of the power to exercise it in one way or another. Finally, insofar as examining and dealing with requests in the context of exercising a power is concerned, the nature and content of the manner in which this is done must be consistent with the basic standards laid down in judgments of this court, and any departure therefrom could have repercussions on the validity of any decision. In other words, even when the "may" is not necessarily "must", that is, even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weigh up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

           

            (d) I will add that the holder of a power has the discretion to decide on a matter despite the existence of a decision in principle on the subject-matter of the power. For this latter decision may require re-evaluation in general or with respect to the concrete case. H.W.R. Wade, in discussing this subject, had the following to say, under the heading "Over Rigid Policies" (Administrative Law, p. 330):

 

"An authority can fail to give its mind to a case, and thus fail to exercise its discretion lawfully, by blindly following a policy laid down in advance".

           

            That does not mean that a fundamental decision, which provides for a desirable policy or method of operation, should not be adopted, but that decision must also be the fruit of an orderly process, and even then every concrete case deserves substantive consideration in order to examine whether to apply to it, either positively or negatively, the guiding rule according to which the authority acts.

           

            Till now we have discussed what was said in H.C. 297/82 [7] in connection with the duty to weigh up , in every ordinary case, all the data and circumstances, before deciding whether to exercise a power or refrain from doing so.

           

            15. When there is a possibility of exercising a power, the statutory authority must give its mind to all the relevant elements, that is to all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it. But it is obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances. However, in order to remove all doubt I will add that where parliamentary-political life is concerned one cannot deny taking account considerations which arise due to political considerations. But, as my esteemed colleague, Justice Goldberg, pointed out in H.C. 1635/90 [3], quoted above, (at p. 866) it should be remembered that we are not dealing, in the context of the case before us, with the binding validity of a political agreement, but with the question of whether an act carried out, or due to be carried out, following upon an agreement, is unlawful or invalid according to the norms of administrative law recognised by us: that is, whether the content of the act is consistent with the basic principles of an enlightened State.

           

            Therefore, the question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations. When certain considerations are given preference over others to an unreasonable extent, a decision would be invalid. In other words, as long as every element is given due and reasonable weight, in the circumstances of the case, there can be no complaints. But, when one consideration is preferred over another, despite the fact that the weight, substance or content of the rejected consideration clearly and obviously indicated that it should have been the preferred one, or that the scales were weighted in its favour, then the decision would be stamped with unreasonableness.

 

            I said, in H.C. 156/75 [8], at p. 105, that there could be circumstances in which the statutory authority did not give weight to any extraneous consideration and only took relevant considera­tions into account, but nevertheless gave the latter so little weight as to make the final conclusion invalid.

           

            That is the rule with respect to "good faith" on the part of a statutory authority. Unreasonableness can be discovered even when there was good faith at the basis of a decision. As Judge Scrutton remarked: "Some of the most honest people are the most unreasonable" (R. v. Roberts, Ex Parte Scurr (l924) [17], at p. 719).

           

            16. In the framework of the arguments before us some of the respondents referred repeatedly to other laws dealing with functionaries other than ministers and deputy ministers, containing detailed provisions concerning their removal from office. They sought to learn from the positive arrangements in other laws that there is a negative arrangement in the case of ministers and deputy ministers: that is, that for them there is no provision of law laying down in advance the circumstances in which the power to remove them must be exercised. There is no legal basis for this argument. There are laws which detail the circumstances in which removal from office is allowed or required. But there is nothing in that to indicate a negative arrangement for removal from office of a minister or deputy minister. The matter of removal from office of a minister is anchored today in the above section 21A of the Basic Law and the absence of any detailed circumstances in which this is permitted or required only goes to show that the law, for this purpose, is the general law concerning statutory powers. The main rules for exercising such powers have already been explained above, and will still be enlarged upon. Furthermore, the absence of detailed provisions permits of the removal from office in a wider diversity of cases than those detailed in the laws dealing with other electees or appointed functionaries. At a later stage we shall deal with those circumstances in which there is a legal duty to exercise the power of removal.

 

            17. Against the background of a general description of the relevant provisions of the law we shall now deal directly with the case before us. There are occasions when discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise. (H.C. 190/57 [9]; H.C. 2/80 [10], at p. 146, and see also Professor B. Bracha, "Administrative Law" (Schocken Publications, 1986), 149). That is, there are circumstances in which the conclusion may be drawn - with respect also to a discretionary power - that refraining from exercising a power is so unreasonable as to descend to the roots of the matter (H.C.596/75 [11]; H.C. 542/76, 103/77 [12], at p. 483). In order to adapt this to the case before us: an authority is in duty bound to exercise a power when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our constitutional and legal system make the failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

           

            Unreasonableness which goes to the root of the matter invalidates a decision of an administrative authority (see H.C. 297/82 [7] above; H.C. 653/79 [13]; H.C. 376/81, [14]).

           

            It is true that the power under section 21A above can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in with the web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. Those are, of course, only examples of what is commonly known as "irregularities". But this does not amount to a comprehensive description of the borderlines of the power under section 21A, the general nature of which points to its breadth and depth. This also does not constitute a description of the complete legislative purpose of the provision in this section of the law. The said provision of law is intended also to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide and serve as an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct and, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in our system of government, on the values upon which our system of government and law is built and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

            In order to remove all doubt I will add that what is said here has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. We are talking here about the law which exists here and according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain given circumstances, to something extremely unreasonable. This is a conclusion based on law and not one which is anchored only on abstract values without any legal basis, as could have been imagined from some of the arguments propounded before us.

           

            It was argued at length before us that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence in the Government. I am prepared to accept this. I am also prepared to accept the distinction between a public servant and a public electee (see H.C. 4287/93 [15], in the case of Deputy Minister Pinchasi). But the confidence of the Knesset does not make the exercise of the power under section 21A, when the circumstances demand it, redundant. Furthermore, the constitutional reciprocal bond between the Government and the Knesset, and from there to the public, is a two-way one. The Government must also serve as a drafter of norms of governmental behaviour and must act in a manner which creates confidence. Suspending a decision following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset - if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to interpreting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor key provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the Prime Minister under section 21A and constitutes unreasonable refrainment from exercising a power granted by the legislator.

 

            18. At this stage a short pause in the presentation of the legal background is called for, in order to return to the facts of the case. We described above the main points of the indictment presented to the Knesset. The indictment includes extremely serious allegations concerning corruption. The indictment is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution. But, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned, even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of significance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for judging the acts attributed to an individual, as clothed in the official dress of an accusation ready for presentation to the judicial instances.

           

            In the case under consideration the lifting of immunity is also required as it affects a member of the Knesset. But the proceedings for lifting immunity do not change the content and significance of the indictment and what is alleged in it. If a minister who is charged with receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels in bribes and of abuse, in other ways, of government office, continues to serve in the Government this would reflect in a far-reaching manner on the image of government in Israel, and on its good faith and integrity. This has a direct effect on the question of reasonability according to the provisions of law (for changes flowing from the differentiation between a public servant and a minister - see also H.C. 6177, 6163/92 [6]).

           

            19. It was pointed out in the arguments before us that there is a precedent for the continued service of a minister in the Government despite the fact that indictments containing serious charges against him were brought.

           

            In my opinion no precedent was established. There was in the past an invalid omission which does not consecrate the system. A past invalid act or omission only demonstrates to what extent each individual act of political convenience becomes harmful, from the aspect of obligatory standards of conduct, as people will seek to learn from it, to imitate it and to regard it, for some reason or other, as a precedent.

           

            In our constitutional history there are more esteemable instances of reactions following upon criminal allegations which it would be preferable to copy.

           

            20. I can now sum up my opinion in the case before us:

            (a) The power under section 21A is a discretionary power.

           

            (b) A government promise not to remove a functionary from office has no validity.

           

            (c) The authority must weigh up whether to exercise its power, when this is demanded or is obligatory, in an orderly and systematic manner, and must use it for the purpose for which it is granted while refraining from applying extraneous considerations.

           

            (d) Parliamentary-political considerations can be legitimate in certain circumstances, but they must be examined with an eye to finding a fine balance with other considerations. When the fact that there is prima facie evidence that a criminal offence has been committed by a member of the Government is one of the other considerations, then the seriousness of the (alleged) offence is a relevant factor. The more serious the offence the less weighty would the other considerations be. I will add that in the context of the matter before us I saw no cause for dealing with the more general subjects discussed in the judgment of my esteemed colleague, Justice D. Levin.

           

            (e) Whoever exercises discretion must keep in mind all the relevant and influential components and factors and must find a reasonable balance amongst them. Giving undue weight to one component or another, can invalidate a decision.

           

            (f) There are circumstances which make the exercise of a discretionary power obligatory. Failure to exercise the power in such circumstances can be found to be so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

           

            (g) An invalid act in the past demands prevention of perpetuation, and not imitation. A blunder in the past does not give a license for the future.

           

            (h) The offences attributed to Minister Deri are outstandingly serious and failure to exercise the power to remove him from office is unreasonable to an extreme extent. Reliance in this case on an undertaking which is inconsistent with the provisions of section 13 A of the Basic Law, has no place.

           

            The damage to confidence in the government as a result of the failure to remove from office a person accused of the crime of corruption is far more serious than the damage to confidence as a result of failure to honour an undertaking which is prohibited by law. As already explained, we are not dealing here with the question of confidence as a moral norm, but with the provisions of law which deal with the reasonableness of failure to exercise a power.

           

            21. I am of the opinion, therefore, that we should declare that the Prime Minister is required by law to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government to terminate the tenure of office of Minister Deri. In this sense the order nisi should be made absolute.

           

Justice A. Barak: I concur.

Justice A. Mazza:

 

            I concur with the judgment of my esteemed colleague, the President.

           

            The stand adopted by the Prime Minister in the matter before us was based, for the main part, on the existence of a political agreement with Minister Deri, made at the advice of the Attorney General, on the eve of the formation of the Government. And having failed to be convinced of the justice of the Attorney General's argument that there had been a substantive change in the circumstances since the agreement was reached, the Prime Minister decided that he had to choose between two norms of at least equal weight: one, on the basis of which the Attorney General had argued that as long as Minister Deri was not cleared of the suspicions levelled against him with the tabling of the indictment against him in the Knesset he could not continue in office in the Government; and the other, which is connected with the fear of a blow to his trustworthiness, as Prime Minister, in the eyes of the public, of he did not honour his part of the agreement with the Minister. There was, therefore, a basis for assuming that unless the Prime Minister was mistaken in thinking that his obligation to Minister Deri was a valid one and that his credibility in the eyes of the public depended upon his honouring it, he would have refrained from taking the stand which led to the petititoners' application to this court for a remedy on behalf of the public. But this was not the case.

 

 

            From the Prime Minister's letter of 22. 8. 93 to the Attorney General, a copy of which was submitted to us during the course of proceedings, it appears that even after his attention was called to the provisions of section 13A(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, his stand remained substantively the same, on the basis of other reasons enumerated in the letter, in which he takes issue with the Attorney General's approach (as detailed in the letter of 6.8.93 to the Prime Minister). In his letter the Prime Minister indicated that there was, in his opinion, a difference between elected functionaries and appointed public servants and he referred also to the case of Minister Abu-Hazeira, as though this were a precedent. But the main reason given by the Prime Minister for not acting on the opinion of the Attorney General was his reliance on his obligation towards Minister Deri, upon the honouring of which his credibility in the eyes of the public ostensibly depended.

           

            The distinction between the principal and the secondary in the Prime Minister's reasons can be seen from a reading of his letter. But there is also a fundamental difference in the content of the reasons: a fear of harm to his credibility in the eyes of the public is a reason with public significance. In presenting this reason the Prime Minister relied on the assumption (albeit a mistaken one) that there existed a political agreement by which he was bound. This reason, even though not legally admissible, is at least understandable. This is not the case insofar as the Prime Minister's other reasons are concerned. The Prime Minister did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of these reasons, but sought to take issue with the opinion of the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office.

 

            This approach is contrary to the constitutional principle, long since accepted in our system of law, according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive (see paragraph 42 of the judgment of my esteemed colleague, Justice Barak, in the Pinhasi case, H.C. 4287/93 [15]). And the Prime Minister, with all due respect, could not be heard at all on the grounds of these reasons. I was, therefore, sorry to learn that even after it had been explained to the Prime Minister that the agreement which he had made with Minister Deri had been invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the Attorney General.

 

            As to the question of what is the legal norm applicable to the case before us, the decision lies clearly with the Attorney General. There is, therefore, no cause for enlarging on it. Only recently did Justice Barak explain what the proper legal norm is, in H.C. 6163/92 [16] and again in the Pinhasi case [15]. And also from the reasons contained in the judgment of my esteemed colleague, the President, the conclusion must be drawn that the law applicable to the continued tenure in office of Minister Deri is no different, if not even more apt.

 

Justice D. Levin:

 

            I agree with the conclusions of the President and I am party to the main points in his legal analysis and to the approach taken towards the central matters at the focus of the proceedings before us, on the basis of which the required result is obvious and obligatory in the circumstances of the case.

           

            However, I would like to add some comments on the subjects which were under discussion and which, in my opinion, call for further enlargement and emphasis.

           

            (a) I agree that a member of the Knesset earns his status by virtue of the confidence placed in him by the voting public, which saw in him someone who faithfully represents its sentiments and viewpoints - either politically or because of his attitude to social and economic matters and his approach to matters of faith and culture. Once he has been elected by this particular public, then it is only natural that he should regard himself as being in duty bound to remain faithful to his electors. If, heaven forbid, he should disappoint them, if the confidence which they placed in him should be shattered, for any reason, then when the time comes he would have to face, politically, the judgment of the electors.

 

            (b) The situation is different when an elected member of the Knesset takes upon himself, on behalf of the faction to which he belongs and which he represents, an official duty within the framework of the executive, as a member of the Government and a minister in charge of a government office, or as a deputy minister.

           

            He then owes a duty of loyalty and a greater degree of responsibility to his electors, to the Knesset which gave him its confidence and to an even greater extent to the general public which he is called upon to serve faithfully.

           

            For, whoever is given executive power by force of law will be found to influence by his acts, or, heaven forbid, by his omissions, for good or for bad, the rights of the general body of citizens and residents of the country. He is their trustee and he must behave towards all of them with fidelity, honesty and fairness and without discrimination. That is the challenge and he will be judged in accordance with how he meets it.

           

            (c) A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions and points of view, and to the political and social paths of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the governmental set-up. But, in my opinion, when fulfilling his administrative function, as a minister or even as a deputy minister, as one in charge of a government office and directing its operation, then his political function must give precedence to his administrative function, which has its own rules of conduct.

           

            When fulfilling this function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice, when moved to do so. Within tile framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents, and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice.

 

            If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. He would have to face the said review and, if the circumstances warrant it, be indicted and stand trial.

           

            If that is the position in general, how much more so is it the case when, heaven forbid, a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law. The nature of the offence and of the circumstances in which it was committed could make the possibility of his continuing in office questionable.

           

            I do not suggest that we lay down any hard and fast rules on this subject and decide in a sweeping manner when and how conclusions should be drawn. For, first and foremost, it is the political system which must react, within the framework of the proper political-democratic process. But there may be exceptional situations, such as the one before us, when our intervention is required in order to lay down specific, obligatory norms of behaviour.

           

            (d) It seems to me, for example, that if, heaven forbid, an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy - such as, for example, if a minister is charged with accepting bribes, with fraud, with cheating state authorities, with lying or making false entries in documents - then it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office.

           

            I would think, if this should unfortunately occur, that it would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he is convinced of his own innocence and clean hands. He should allow the process of establishing the truth to be exhausted and await comprehensive clarification of the matter.

 

            (e) If he does not do this then the Prime Minister must weigh up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power, under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government, to remove a minister from office. As this power is a discretionary one, the Prime Minister may exercise it but is not, on the face of it, in duty bound to do so.

           

            When a demand that he exercise his discretion be brought, he can take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, since, as already noted, a minister has a twofold function, both political and administrative. It is only natural and understandable, in my opinion, that the Prime Minister will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. For the sake of ensuring so important and vital a need he can, on an appropriate occasion, forgive "irregularities" in the conduct or pronouncements of a minister, and even opposition to binding decisions of the Government, as all this would come within the confines of the minister's political function, which would be examined and criticised on the credibility plane before the Knesset and the voters.

           

            This is not the case, in my opinion, when the question is one of a minister who sinned against integrity, and who committed offences involving ignominy, such as the examples given above, especially when the offences attributed to him were allegedly committed in the process of fulfilling his office. In such cases the credibility of the Government and its ministers in the eyes of the public must take precedence over any other consideration.

           

            I dismiss out of hand the argument that for the sake of the survival of the Government and the coalition at its base, and because of the desire to further government policy, however important it may be, the implications of the presentation of the above indictment can be ignored, everyday proceedings can be continued, and the minister can be left in office as though nothing occurred.

           

            (f) I think that in our case, too, the Prime Minister actually realised that if Minister Deri should be indicted on the charges being investigated when he was appointed, he would have to suspend himself, and that if he did not do so, he, the Prime Minister, would have to exercise his authority to suspend him.

 

            I would like to assume that the Prime Minister saw this as an inevitable consequence, not only because he faced coalition pressure, but also because, as someone responsible for the existence of an enlightened regime, he thought, to the best of his conscience, that that was what he had to do.

           

            I do not think that there is any difference, or that there should be any difference, from the normative aspect, between an indictment which has already been brought before a court and one which, at some stage, has only been presented to the Knesset Committee for purposes of lifting immunity.

           

            (g) In the course of proceedings before us we heard from counsel for the fifth respondent (Shas), albeit in muted terms, that Minister Arye Deri had earned the confidence of his electors despite the lengthy police investigation conducted against him, and despite the suspicions which hovered above him. It can be assumed that this occurred because they honestly believed that the candidate whom they favoured was innocent, clean and pure of the suspicions against him.

           

            One cannot know if they would have behaved similarly if, heaven forbid, the charge against him had been proved in a court of law or even if the indictment against him, containing allegations of serious offences, was pending in court.

           

            But I do not see any importance in this and there is nothing in it to indicate anything, as this is not the main issue, the main issue being the need for our democratic and enlightened "camp" to remain pure and that persons tainted with corruption and crimes of the nature indicated above do not harm government morality.

           

            It should be emphasised, in order to avoid any mis­understanding, that what I have said on this last subject is purely theoretical. There is nothing in what I have said which can, heaven forbid, establish facts and hand down judgment in the case of Minister Arye Deri, which must still be decided within the framework authorised to do so and be thoroughly cleared up, so that the factual truth may come to light.

 

            As already stated, I concur with the conclusion suggested by the President in his judgment.

           

Justice E. Goldberg:

 

            In contradistinction to public servants, to whom the State Service (Appointments) Law, 1959, applies, a minister and a deputy minister are not appointed to office only because of their skills, qualities and personal standards. Party and coalition interests are at the centre of their appointments, and the texture of public life is not affected by the appointment of a minister or deputy minister who is not exactly blessed with characteristics of the highest quality. The question is whether the confidence of the public in the government is harmed when a minister or deputy minister, against whom an indictment containing an offence involving ignominy has been framed, remains in office.

           

            The answer to this question is not simple or unambiguous. For if we should say that in every such case the confidence of the public in government institutions would inevitably be harmed, we should also have to say that such harm would be caused when a member of the Knesset is found guilty of an offence involving ignominy and is sentenced to imprisonment. For such member of the Knesset would not only participate in legislation, and serve in a quasi-judicial capacity when considering the lifting of another Knesset member's immunity, but it is possible that he would also be a member of one of the Knesset committees, be it the Finance Committee, which deals with the public's money, or the Knesset Control Committee, whose task it is to fix norms of proper management, or any other committee, which deals with public matters of first importance. And, nevertheless, the legislature was not afraid that the public's confidence in the Knesset would be harmed because of this, and provided, in section 6 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, that every citizen is entitled to be elected to the Knesset save "if a court denies him this right by law, or if he is given a prison sentence of five years or more for an offence against the security of the State, as laid down in the Elections to the Knesset Law, and five years have not elapsed since the day he completed this sentence."

 

            Is it not a fact that when a person elected by the public is the issue then the democratic principle takes precedence over any other public interest, even though a Knesset member also fulfills a public service and the Knesset is one of the authorities of the State.

           

            As a minister and deputy minister fulfil political functions, as already stated, could it not be said, in a case where an indictment containing an offence involving ignominy is brought against one of them, that it is the "price of democracy" and that criticism of his appointment belongs to the Knesset, which can pass a vote of no-confidence in the Government for making an appointment which in its, the Knesset's, opinion is not proper.

           

            Furthermore, would not our (the High Court's) intervention in such a matter be interference in "the composition" of the Government and upset the balance between the authorities? One cannot, therefore, deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter before us. But, on the other hand, this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration. I am of the opinion that in any clash between the two aspects we cannot say that the public administration norm, which we have already held is applicable to a public servant (see H.C. 6163/92 [16]), will not apply at all, only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister. Such a consequence would not only constitute a 'double standard", but would also mean the application of double and conflicting legal norms - one for the ordinary public servant and another for the politician who holds office - which is a violation of the principle of equality before the law.

           

            The clash between the two aspects does not mean that the one must supersede the other. All that is required is that a balance should be found between them. This balance makes it obligatory that the court's intervention in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be in small measure, and that it be restricted to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office. In other words, our intervention would occur, save in such cases, only when the administrative authority, which has been given the discretionary power, departs, in the circumstances of the case, radically from reasonability by leaving the minister, or deputy minister, in office.

 

            I am of the opinion that the seriousness of the circumstances, in the case before us, as is evident from the indictment, tips the scales and makes the removal from office of the minister obligatory. I therefore concur with the judgment of the President, on all counts.

           

            Decided as held in the President's judgment.

           

Judgment handed down on 8.9.93.

 


*               Edited by Prof. A. Enker

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